Russia’s January 2026 use of a hypersonic Oreshnik missile was not primarily about destroying a target. It was a strategic message delivered through speed and proximity rather than words. Western reporting confirms the strike occurred near Ukraine’s western border during a broader missile and drone attack and was widely interpreted as a deliberate signal toward NATO rather than a battlefield necessity.

This is how the conversation begins. Russia speaks first, not with a declaration, but with a capability demonstration. Hypersonic systems like Oreshnik reportedly exceed Mach 10, compressing detection and decision timelines and complicating interception by existing missile defense architectures. The message is implicit. If this can reach here, it can reach farther. Geography does the rest of the work.

From a battlefield perspective, the strike changed little. Ukraine has endured far heavier damage from conventional missile campaigns. Infrastructure effects were limited relative to scale. That is precisely why the strike matters. Hypersonic weapons derive much of their value not from explosive yield but from psychological and strategic effects that shape decision-making under uncertainty.

Hypersonic systems sit in an uneasy space between conventional and nuclear deterrence. Their speed and maneuverability reduce warning time, while their dual-use potential introduces ambiguity about intent and escalation thresholds. This ambiguity is destabilizing by design. It forces worst-case assumptions and heightens coercive leverage without crossing overt nuclear red lines.

The timing of the strike matters. It occurred amid active European debates about long-term security guarantees for Ukraine. Russia has consistently opposed deeper Western involvement, and analysts note that demonstrations of advanced strike capabilities often coincide with diplomatic inflection points to influence allied decision-making. Poland was not targeted, yet proximity alone conveyed risk. That was sufficient.

This brings the conversation directly to deterrence and national strategy. The most recent United States National Defense Strategy identifies Russia as an acute threat and emphasizes integrated deterrence across domains, allies, and instruments of national power. The document explicitly recognizes the challenge posed by advanced missile threats and highlights the need for resilient command and control, integrated air and missile defense, and close coordination with allies.

However, the Oreshnik strike exposes a gap between strategic acknowledgment and operational specificity. The National Defense Strategy speaks clearly about the importance of integrated deterrence, yet it remains largely high-level in addressing how compressed decision timelines created by hypersonic weapons affect escalation management in Europe. While the strategy calls for investments in missile defense and sensing, it does not fully grapple with the psychological and political effects of hypersonic ambiguity on alliance cohesion crises.

Deterrence by denial becomes harder to sustain when allies know that some threats may penetrate defenses regardless of investment. Hypersonic systems challenge assumptions that reassurance can rest on interception alone. NATO and U.S. strategies increasingly emphasize deterrence by punishment and resilience, yet the National Defense Strategy stops short of articulating how allies should respond politically and militarily when warning time collapses, and attribution is immediate, but intent remains unclear.

This does not mean the strategy is wrong. It means it is incomplete. Integrated deterrence remains the correct framework, but hypersonic weapons demand greater emphasis on crisis decision-making, distributed command structures, and alliance-level exercises that assume ambiguity rather than clarity. Analysts have long warned that hypersonic systems stress deterrence not by making war more likely, but by increasing the risk of miscalculation during moments of political tension.

Russia’s hypersonic signal near NATO’s border, therefore, becomes a practical test of whether strategic documents translate into a credible posture. The National Defense Strategy acknowledges the problem. The question is whether implementation moves fast enough to match the physics involved. Deterrence must function even when seconds replace minutes, and ambiguity replaces certainty.

The Oreshnik launch did not redraw Europe’s security map overnight. It changed the tone of the room. It reminded policymakers that deterrence is not static, and that technology can erode comfortable assumptions faster than doctrine adapts. Hypersonic weapons are not the end of deterrence. They are a stress test of whether national strategies and alliances can remain credible when clarity disappears.

When the screens go dark in that briefing room, the real discussion begins. Not about panic or retaliation, but about adaptation. Deterrence endures not because threats are fast, but because responses remain coherent under pressure. Russia spoke in velocity. The enduring question is whether strategy, alliance resolve, and execution can keep pace.

Brandon Toliver is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

The Conversation Europe Never Wanted: Hypersonic Tensions and U.S. Defense Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

This issue is not new. In his 1957 book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Henry Kissinger made a controversial, yet analytically compelling, argument for the possible utility of tactical nuclear weapons in limited wars. He warned that massive retaliation was neither credible nor effective for deterring limited aggression and that a rigid dichotomy between conventional and strategic nuclear responses risked inviting coercion at the lower rungs of the escalation ladder. For Kissinger, introducing the possibility of limited nuclear use was not a call to war, but a recognition of strategic reality; the ability to escalate with restraint could deter adversaries from escalating first.

Fast forward to the 2030 scenarios modeled in Guardian Tiger I and II, and Kissinger’s insights remain disturbingly relevant. In the exercise, North Korea carried out a low-yield nuclear strike targeting South Korean naval vessels. American decision-makers, faced with the risk of horizontal escalation with China and the lack of consensus among allies, struggled to identify a proportional yet credible response. The idea of a retaliatory tactical nuclear strike was floated, but the simulated American leadership hesitated, reflecting both doctrinal ambiguity and an operational gap in American nuclear capabilities.

The risks of such hesitation are manifold. First, American restraint may be misinterpreted as indecision or weakness, particularly by allies like South Korea and Japan, who are directly exposed to North Korean and Chinese threats. Second, it creates an opening for adversaries to believe they can escalate to the nuclear level without inviting proportional retaliation. Third, it undermines the entire architecture of extended deterrence that underpins regional security.

Critics will rightly point out the perils of normalizing nuclear use. Introducing tactical nuclear weapons into a conflict zone invites moral hazards, increases the risk of miscalculation, and breaks long-standing nuclear taboos. It also challenges existing declaratory policies, such as the 2022 P5 Joint Statement affirming that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

But these arguments, while valid in principle, must be weighed against the operational reality that a low-yield nuclear strike by an adversary may not be deterred by threats of massive retaliation. As the Atlantic Council report noted, North Korea’s nuclear doctrine increasingly incorporates elements of pre-delegated authority, tactical nuclear use, and efforts toward a more survivable second-strike posture. If the United States signals that it will not respond proportionally to a limited nuclear attack, North Korea may calculate that it can use nuclear weapons to coerce the South or constrain American action without triggering regime-ending consequences.

Moreover, the credibility problem is not confined to North Korea. China, observing Washington’s reluctance to respond in kind, may also be emboldened to engage in horizontal escalation, confident that the United States’s nuclear threshold is politically—and perhaps operationally—immobile. This perception could unravel the strategic coherence of integrated deterrence.

To address these challenges, US Forces Korea (USFK) and Indo-Pacific Command should adopt a more robust approach across multiple dimensions. First, the United States should consider forward-deploying platforms capable of delivering low-yield nuclear weapons. This could include the reintroduction of dual-capable aircraft or sea-based assets positioned in or near the Korean Peninsula. Such deployments must be both survivable and possess the ability to clearly signal an adversary of will, while being fully integrated into bilateral operational planning with the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Second, escalation options must be clarified through updates to American declaratory policy. This does not mean issuing public ultimatums or fixed thresholds but rather ensuring that adversaries understand the United States is willing to conduct proportional nuclear responses if deterrence fails. Strategic ambiguity must not become strategic paralysis.

Third, while the US and South Korea launched the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) in 2023 to enhance extended deterrence coordination, further institutionalization is needed. A structure modeled more closely on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Nuclear Planning Group would help deepen transparency, signal unity of purpose, and reduce the risk of fragmented responses during crises.

Fourth, both US and ROK forces must be equipped and trained to operate in the aftermath of a limited nuclear strike. This includes rehearsals and exercises focused on base survivability, radiological detection and decontamination, logistics continuity, and the resilience of command-and-control (C2) systems.

Fifth, strategic communication must be strengthened. Clear and consistent messaging to both adversaries and allies is critical. Deterrence depends not only on military capabilities, but also on the perceived credibility of those capabilities and the intentions behind them.

Ultimately, the goal of these measures is not to normalize the use of nuclear weapons, but to reinforce the threshold against their use by making deterrence more credible and responsive.

If that threshold is ever crossed and the United States fails to respond proportionately, the credibility of its extended deterrence architecture could unravel. The Guardian Tiger exercises highlight this grim possibility and should serve as a clarion call to action for policy and defense leaders alike.

As Kissinger warned in 1957, the danger of total war arises not so much from a deliberate decision to embark on it as from a series of actions which, though rational in themselves, cumulatively lead to disaster. The United States must ensure that its rational desire to avoid nuclear escalation does not lead to an irrational loss of deterrence. Tactical nuclear flexibility, responsibly exercised and credibly signaled, may be the painful but necessary insurance policy to uphold peace in East Asia.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, President of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

The Case for US Low-Yield Nuclear Options in Korea was originally published on Global Security Review.

The primary objective of Biden’s integrated deterrence strategy was to harmonize and unify the efforts of various government agencies and allied nations to deter aggression from China and other hostile actors. To achieve this objective, the strategy aimed to maximise the utilisation of all available tools of American power, encompassing diplomacy, intelligence, economic assistance, and force posture decisions. Integration with allies and partners was an integral component of Biden’s deterrence strategy and would be achieved by enhancing the interoperability of allied military forces and coordinating the diplomatic and economic initiatives of friendly nations.

While the goals of integrated deterrence appear sensible, many expressed concerns about the concept. Some claimed the term was not new or unique. It simply described the implementation of any effective, tailored deterrence strategy that leverage various organisations to prevent hostile actions.

American deterrence was executed in an integrated fashion throughout the Cold War by necessity, thanks to the size and significance of the Soviet threat. Concerns were also expressed that proponents of integrated deterrence overstated the ability of sanctions, diplomacy, and other non-military tools to prevent conflict. History shows that the threat of major military action has a unique strength in deterring an enemy, especially when that threat comes from a nation with a nuclear arsenal.

Regardless of one’s stance on integrated deterrence and its implementation, a coordinated US strategy that leverages the strengths of its allies should be preferred to the alternative currently being pursued in Washington. A lack of integration in deterrence matters is evident both within the US government and in its interactions with partners and allies.

Within the United States government, there are several reported disconnects between President Trump and senior members of his administration. For example, Secretary of State Marco Rubio was first informed of Trump’s proposal to take Gaza by military force and evict Palestinians while watching a press conference held by Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Furthermore, it was recently reported that Rubio is “privately frustrated that Trump has effectively sidelined him.” More recently, Signal messages disclosed highlight significant differences between Vice President Vance and President Trump on the timing and signaling associated with strikes on Houthi targets.

This lack of vertical integration diminishes the authority that the secretary holds in meetings with both allies and adversaries. Additionally, it eliminates the potential for any exchange of ideas that could transpire within the Department of State to develop more effective policy options to present to the president.

Horizontal integration of deterrence across various departments was also weakened, partially by budgetary cuts and eliminations of entire organizations. Foreign assistance and development resources were pivotal components of the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy. However, extensive cuts made to the United States Agency for International Development and other government agencies by the Department of Government Efficiency did not fully consider or comprehend the regional implications or potential negative impacts on deterrence.

To date, much of Trump’s foreign policy is focused on addressing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. A strategy for dealing with China, beyond the use of tariffs and other economic measures, is yet to be revealed. There are lessons to be learned from what has transpired with allies facing a menacing Russian threat in Europe.

President Trump consistently urges the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) member-states to significantly enhance their defence expenditures, even suggesting that 5 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) may be an appropriate threshold. For those nations that fail to meet NATO’s spending guidelines, Trump stated that US military support under Article 5 may not be available. While NATO nations were increasing defense spending prior to Trump taking office (a 20 percent increase in 2024), Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) recently announced plans to further bolster defense budgets.

While additional insights into Trump’s approach to allies in the Indo-Pacific are anticipated in the coming weeks and months, Australia should draw upon several valuable early lessons. The first pertains to the long-standing Canberra tradition of analyzing and dissecting the statements and writings of senior officials within an American administration to comprehend policy. Maintaining cordial relations with officials at all levels of the US government remains prudent, but it is uncertain whether statements from senior administration officials can be relied upon to fully reflect Trump’s perspectives.

Furthermore, the current level of Australian defense spending, which accounts for 2 percent of GDP, will not meet Trump’s expectations for allies. A pre-emptive move to increase defense spending to 2.5 percent of GDP by 2027, similar to what was announced in February by the UK, would demonstrate Australia’s national commitment to addressing its deteriorating strategic circumstances and to contributing more towards its share of the alliance. If President Trump has made one thing clear to allies, it is that if they do not value their own defense neither will he.

Carl Rhodes is founder of Robust Policy and a senior fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Carl hosts the Deterrence Down Under podcast and previously spent 25 years with RAND Corporation. Carl has a PhD in chemical engineering from Caltech.

Trump’s Disintegrated Deterrence and Lessons for Australia was originally published on Global Security Review.

Though integrated deterrence outlines a comprehensive strategy, the complexities of integrating diverse tools and actors across multiple domains can be incredibly challenging. Coordinating actions between military, diplomatic, economic, and informational agencies require seamless communication, shared goals, and a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities. Even then, it still may not work. It is arguable that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was the first example of integrated deterrence’s failure.

Prioritizing non-military tools within an integrated deterrence strategy can mitigate the risk of escalation and unintended conflict while providing proportionate responses to aggression, potentially avoiding the need for military force. Despite the application of various non-military measures, Russia was not dissuaded from its invasion, demonstrating the limitations of this approach in altering aggressive behavior when considering the impacts on Russia’s political influence, economic stability, and military capabilities. Economic sanctions against Russia over the past two years are proving an abject failure, as are diplomatic efforts to isolate Russia.

The effectiveness of an integrated deterrence strategy hinges on the same factor as previous and long-standing deterrence strategies—the ability to credibly threaten and, if necessary, impose meaningful costs on adversaries. This is difficult to achieve, especially when dealing with adversaries who are willing to tolerate economic pain, information warfare, or other non-kinetic actions.

At its core, integrated deterrence is designed to be flexible and adaptable, allowing the US to tailor its response to specific threats and adversaries. Theoretically, this can make it more effective than traditional deterrence, but there is little evidence to support the theory. In fact, integrated deterrence has been successful at extending the conflict between Ukraine and Russia and has utterly failed to restore deterrence with Russia. Russia’s nuclear threats have proven more successful in deterring American and European intervention on behalf of Ukraine.

The complexity of integrated deterrence leaves it prone to miscalculation and misinterpretation, as adversaries may perceive certain actions as escalatory or provocative. This can lead to unintended consequences and increase the risk of conflict, rather than supporting deterrence. Implementing integrated deterrence requires significant resources and investment across multiple domains. This can strain budgets and create competition for resources between different agencies and priorities.

Alliances, a crucial aspect of integrated deterrence, are important, but relying too heavily on them for deterrence can create vulnerabilities if allies are unwilling or unable to meaningfully contribute capability. This undermines the credibility of the overall deterrent effort. The shift to integrated deterrence as a preferred strategy for discouraging aggression against the interests and allies of the United States has seemingly positioned Russia and China in an advantageous position to seize a small window of opportunity to reshape the global power dynamic, while potentially creating the opportunity for states such as North Korea and Iran to extend their regional objectives beyond words.

Alternative strategies to integrated deterrence could focus on revitalizing traditional military capabilities while fostering deeper diplomatic ties with allies. Bolstering conventional forces and modernizing nuclear arsenals can serve as a powerful deterrent by signaling a nation’s willingness and ability to defend its interests. Simultaneously, strengthening alliances and partnerships through information sharing, joint military exercises, and technology cooperation can create a united front against potential adversaries.

This multifaceted approach, combining hard power with robust alliances, may prove more effective in deterring aggression than relying solely on economic or informational tools. Moreover, a renewed focus on arms control agreements could reduce the risk of miscalculation and escalation, contributing to a more stable security environment. Ultimately, a balanced strategy that leverages military might, diplomatic cooperation, and arms control measures could offer a more comprehensive and robust approach to deterring aggression in the 21st century.

Time will tell if the choice to apply a strategy of integrated deterrence convincingly reinforces the all too important “will” necessary for any effective deterrence strategy or it results in the United States grossly miscalculating its ability to deter with non-military and non-nuclear means. If the Biden administration is wrong, American interests around the world will suffer greatly.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS). With over 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. The views expressed in this article are his own. 

American Legitimacy and Integrated Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet empire, subsequent defense cuts and the failure to sustain and enhance the American nuclear deterrent left the United States facing the prospect of two nuclear-armed peers in Russia and China, with combined nuclear arsenals approaching some 10,000 nuclear weapons—well beyond the size and capability of the American arsenal.

Behind this reversal in nuclear arms reductions lies a set of assumptions reflected in recent American nuclear posture reviews and nuclear policy that assumed nuclear reductions and restraint would be permanent and positive. For example, the recent Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States’ straightforward America’s Strategic Posture highlights differences in “understandings of the threats” with the Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).

The 2022 NPR assumed greater cooperation between Russia, China, and the United States in addressing nuclear matters, especially preventing terror organizations and sponsoring states from acquiring nuclear weapons. Moscow, however, regularly violates arms treaties. China has never signed a bilateral nuclear arms agreement with the US.

With analysts projecting Russia and China will field approximately 10,000 theater and strategic nuclear weapons by 2035–2045, a significant reversal of events is taking place that is unavoidable. A chronological look at arms treaties from 1967–2010 reveals whether American assumptions about arms control stood the test of time, particularly with respect to the lasting import of such deals and effects on American security requirements. In that context, examining the implications of American arms control agreements is instructive.

First, the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives assumed that American restraint in nuclear forces and deployments would lead to the restrain of other nuclear powers. This assumption was incorrect.

Second, the critics of START I and II and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) assumed that the Reagan nuclear build-up would trigger a similar Soviet effort and limit any deal on nuclear weapons reductions. While Gorbachev initially increased SS-20 missile deployments, increased troops in Afghanistan, walked out of the arms talks over opposition to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and increased assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua, Reagan eventually prevailed. Peace through strength worked, contrary to the opinion of disarmament advocates.

Third, opponents of proliferation see the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a guarantor of sharply limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, when in fact NPT members China and Russia hid their rogue behavior and facilitated the spread of nuclear programs to Pakistan and North Korea and thus consequently to Iran, Libya, Syria, and possibly Iraq.

Fourth, arms control advocates blame the United States for North Korean, Syrian, and Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons. This blame is neither supported by facts nor a firm understanding of the security dynamics at play for each of these countries.

Fifth, because nuclear modernization often requires concomitant nuclear arms control efforts (New START ratification for nuclear modernization) to maintain support from Congress and the White House, an adversary can refuse to enter arms control agreements as a means of compromising American nuclear modernization. Constant efforts to stall modernization would leave the United States in an increasingly weak position.

Sixth, the START II process underscored Soviet efforts to kill any American ballistic missile defenses. Such efforts were supported by the arms control community. Russian President Vladimir Putin also continues to push for termination of missile defenses, which are now a central component of integrated deterrence.

Seventh, while New START achieved modest reductions from the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), the pursuit of still lower numbers as part of seeking abolition or “global zero” is likely to reach a point where strategic stability fails. A world without nuclear weapons is a world once again safe for great-power conventional wars.

Eighth, the 1999 Russian Duma’s rejection of the START II arms control treaty and the ban on multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) is consistent with the findings of the Strategic Posture Commission, which clearly laid out Russia’s willingness to use nuclear coercion. For the arms control community, this potential use of nuclear weapons by Russia was dismissed—again proving how wrong disarmament advocates were.

For American deterrence to reflect the lessons above, it is also necessary for the United States to jettison bad thinking that still undermines deterrence effectiveness. Many arms control advocates believe conventional arms are sufficient to retaliate against an enemy’s nuclear strike, which would allow the United States to adopt a minimum deterrent of just a few hundred nuclear weapons.

A corollary to this thinking is the view that nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence, rather than warfighting. This view undermines the credibility of deterrence by undermining American seriousness in the eyes of an adversary. Absent a willingness to fight, deterrence is not credible.

Similarly detrimental to credibility is the idea that on-alert nuclear forces are destabilizing. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is the fact that nuclear forces are on-alert that makes them a less attractive target—improving deterrence credibility.

As the Strategic Posture Commission explained, China and Russia see nuclear weapons not just as a deterrent to prevent aggression, but as weapons for theater blackmail and coercion to allow aggression to succeed and keep the United States from supporting Ukraine and Taiwan.

Americans must understand that arms control efforts between the United States and adversaries is no solution for strategic stability. Arms control just for its own sake is foolish. Its utility is only in advancing American interests.

Given the current breathtaking modernization and expansion of Russia and China’s nuclear arsenals, in conjunction with their near-alliance, Americans must carefully weigh whether any arms control proposal advances American interests.

Deterrence at the strategic level remains robust since no power has the ability to launch a disarming strike. Theater-level deterrence is much weaker, with the United States at a distinct disadvantage.

For the foreseeable future, arms control has no realistic prospects. It is even difficult to argue that nonproliferation efforts are worthwhile since the United States may need the assistance of a nuclear-armed South Korea and Japan to stabilize tension in East Asia and prevent North Korean or Chinese aggression.

Instead, the United States should press forward with modernization of the strategic nuclear triad, while also looking at ways to expand theater nuclear capabilities. Rightsizing the arsenal and developing effective ballistic missile defenses are a must. Rejecting wrong-headed ideas that impede these initiatives is also necessary.

Finally, Congress must pass a defense budget on time. Over the past four decades, defense appropriations passed on time only four times. Bipartisan budget reform measures sought by the House Budget Committee will hopefully address the issue and none too soon. There is too much riding on it.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, CEO of Geostrategic Analysis, and host of a forty-plus year series of seminars and symposiums on nuclear matters.

Joe Buff is a risk-mitigation actuary and former submarine technothriller author now researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. Views expressed by the authors in this article are their own. 

The Problem with Arms Control Assumptions was originally published on Global Security Review.

Rather than an aggressive push in space strategy, policy, and guidance for the DoD’s emergent roles and missions in such things as cislunar operations, in-space manufacturing, low earth orbit operations (LEO), space weather, science, technology, engineering, and math skills, planetary defense, and support for deep space exploration and development; the only substantive document produced by the office was an updated directive for the Department of Defense on space policy. While this usefully collects and repeats a number of high-level policies, it falls short as it fails to codify the most important policies and taskings material for strategic, great power competition, which were released by the two previous administrations.

Reading the updated directive gives the impression that the DoD is not subject to any of the space-specific national strategies and appears to indicate that the National Strategy for Space, as developed in 2018, is defunct. The DoD’s space policy completely ignores the nation’s legal and policy direction to economically develop space and continue to lead the free world in this vital domain.

Worse, the absence of forward-leaning enabling policy leads to hesitation on the part of key players in government and industry that increase uncertainty and reduce synergies within the interagency, and their allies and partners.

Some apologists for the lack of thought leadership from ASD Space Policy argue that the office is held hostage by an administration whose National Space Council is overly focused on a norms-based approach and is overly passive about developing the key material capabilities needed to address America’s ever-diminishing advantage in strategic competition in the space domain. While the Biden administration kept the Artemis program, and released a cislunar science and technology strategy, they were overly tolerant of NASA’s delays, budget overruns, and failure to meet the intent of SPD-1—to facilitate a permanent and industrial base on the moon. While the administration kept the Space Force, it allowed both ASD Space Policy and the Space Force to operate for nearly four years without a future operating concept or strategy for strategic competition in the space domain.

To address this flagging advantage in space, and the lackluster focus of ASD Space Policy and the administration, Congress must play a stronger role to ensure that the strategy, guidance and resources are committed to ensure American leadership in space through the following actions:

First, Congress needs to ensure the ASD Space Policy is not distracted from their intended duties. When Congress elevated the position, in concert with the establishment of the Space Force, Congress envisioned a dedicated shop which would enable concentrated and singularly space focused, civilian oversight and rapid yes/no decisions in support of the Space Force and overarching national security space requirements. This would enable more agile evolution and employment of the force—in some ways analogous to ASD for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD-SOLIC).

Rather, the administration convoluted the new office with other strategic capabilities for integrated deterrence, including cyber, missile defense, nuclear weapons, and countering weapons of mass destruction. This should be reversed and should provide the dedicated strategy/policy focus space requires for the US to compete and win against adversaries in space.

Second, task ASD Space Policy, in partnership with OSD Net Assessment to provide Congress with a bigger-picture net assessment and strategy for great-power competition in space. In the 2021 NDAA Section 1614, Congress asked the National Space Council to do a comprehensive net assessment and to produce a comprehensive strategy to compete with China. The National Space Council proved uninterested in the task.

Congress should re-assign this primarily security-focused study to ASD Space Policy as lead. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), who historically pushed for the creation of both the ASD Space Policy and the Space Force, should ensure that their fiscal needs reach Congress in a timely manner, and not compromise the long-term effectiveness of ASD Space Policy by exacerbating perceptions of the office’s tardiness and non-responsiveness.

Third, Congress should direct ASD Space Policy to update the Defense Space strategy. It was argued at the time of release that the 2020 Defense Space Strategy was already out of date. Since 2020 a diversity of higher-level policies has established major components of a broader national grand strategy in space. New joint doctrine better articulates the DoD’s role in strategic competition; the Defense Space Strategy has not aged well. Congress should therefore ask for a new Defense Space Strategy that acknowledges the nation’s grand strategy in the domain. In particular, the nation’s civil and commercial ambitions in cislunar space must be included, with provisions for enabling policy to US Space Command (USSPACECOM) and the Space Force—to support and protect those equities.

Fourth, accompanying this broad defense space strategy should be a specific DoD cislunar strategy. Just as the DoD has an Arctic strategy, which articulates the manifold ways in which the department supports primarily civil and commercial actors in the Arctic, A whole-of-nation strategy is needed for space. ASD Space Policy should be directed to author a DoD cislunar strategy which articulates how DoD postures, invests, and operates to support broader national goals.

Finally, Congress should also ask ASD Space Policy to update the DoD directive on space policy and the DoD directive on functions of the Department of Defense, with the specified tasks in Title 10, the Unified Command Plan, National Space Policy, national cislunar strategy, In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing National Strategy, LEO strategy, and planetary defense strategy. These White House documents detail US Space Command, US Air Force, and US Space Force responsibilities to protect and defend commerce, develop technologies of strategic interest, and develop capabilities for homeland defense against asteroids and comets. Just as NASA provides implementing guidance for the national planetary defense strategy, ASD Space Policy should provide implementing guidance for each of those mentioned above.

In short, Congress must ensure that ASD Space Policy is not a stumbling block to America’s grand strategic ambitions in space. Toward that end, Congress should give that office some much needed homework.

Peter Garretson is Senior Fellow in Defense Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Congress Must Demand Stronger Leadership from OSD Space Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.