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		<title>Turkey’s ICBM: Ambition for Autonomy</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/turkeys-icbm-ambition-for-autonomy/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Curtis McGiffin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 12:13:22 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Yildirimhan]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32714</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: May 26, 2026 At the recent SAHA Expo 2026, Turkey unveiled a mock-up of the Yildirimhan (Thunderbolt) and released details about the long-range, four-engined, liquid-fueled ballistic missile. The designation “Yildirimhan” refers to Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I, known as “the Thunderbolt,” circa 1400 AD. He was known for acting faster than his enemies, striking before [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/turkeys-icbm-ambition-for-autonomy/">Turkey’s ICBM: Ambition for Autonomy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: May 26, 2026</em></p>
<p>At the recent SAHA Expo 2026, Turkey <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/05/08/turkey-touts-propellant-breakthrough-for-yildirimhan-long-range-ballistic-missile/">unveiled</a> a mock-up of the Yildirimhan (Thunderbolt) and <a href="https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2026/tuerkiye-unveils-yildirimhan-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-challenging-china-df-26-range">released</a> details about the long-range, four-engined, liquid-fueled ballistic missile. The designation “Yildirimhan” refers to Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I, known as “the Thunderbolt,” circa 1400 AD. He was <a href="https://www.turkiyetoday.com/culture/yildirim-bayezid-sultan-who-struck-like-lightning-3214325?s=3">known for</a> acting faster than his enemies, striking before alliances formed, and crushing resistance with swift effectiveness. The naming approach sends a geopolitical message as loud as the missile itself.</p>
<p>Turkey’s pursuit of an advanced long-range missile capability reflects a broader shift in its strategic ambitions, regional influence, and state security priorities. Once seen as sufficient to defend NATO’s southeastern flank but not fit for EU membership, Turkey has increasingly sought to redefine itself as an independent geopolitical power. No longer willing to be merely a buffer state for Western interests, Ankara is actively transforming into an independent, assertive geopolitical power capable of shaping the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even Europe itself.</p>
<p>A key part of this transformation has been Turkey’s increasing focus on defense self-sufficiency, domestic military technology, and <a href="https://www.anixneuseis.gr/turkeys-defence-industrial-ambition-from-dependence-to-strategic-autonomy/">strategic autonomy</a>. Within this context, Turkey’s declared <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2026/05/turkey-rolls-out-intercontinental-missile-with-purported-6000km-range/">goal to develop long-range ballistic</a> capabilities, including at Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) levels, demands America’s full attention.</p>
<p>We may be witnessing the ultimate manifestation of a state seeking to decouple its sovereign interests in security and power projection from historical external arms dependence and traditional “alliance reliance” Western security guarantees.</p>
<p>Turkey’s missile ambitions are likely part of a broader effort to reduce its dependence on foreign defense suppliers that either <a href="https://nordicmonitor.com/2023/07/turkeys-defense-industry-suffers-from-undeclared-embargoes/">restrict access to advanced weapons</a> capabilities or sell suboptimal weapons systems that are difficult to integrate, costly to maintain, or are just ineffective. Turkish leaders have frequently expressed frustration with <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R44000/R44000.97.pdf">arms embargoes, sanctions</a>, and <a href="https://nordicmonitor.com/2023/07/turkeys-defense-industry-suffers-from-undeclared-embargoes/">restrictions</a> imposed by allies during political disputes. These tensions have accelerated Turkey&#8217;s investment in domestic aerospace, drone, missile, and satellite-launch industries, framing these programs as symbols of national sovereignty, technological progress, and strategic independence.</p>
<p>Concurrently, Turkey’s increasingly unstable security situation has incentivized its need for long-range deterrent capabilities. Ankara is not only positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, but it is also close to several regional flashpoints involving Ukraine, Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and ongoing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey desires increased geopolitical influence and greater operational freedom. Developing long-range missile systems, therefore, has both military and political importance, boosting deterrence and signaling Turkey’s rise as a regional power capable of independent strategic action. In short, Turkey intends to shape these challenges moving forward, and more autonomy is the price of leadership.</p>
<p>Turkey’s long-range missile development, fueled by its <a href="https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/news/news-from-turkey/pages/president-erdogan-unveils-turkiye-2030-industry-technology-strategy.aspx">National Technology Initiative</a>, is part of a larger investment in <a href="https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/we-want-to-maximize-our-technological-independence">civilian space and satellite launch</a> initiatives, which were officially presented as peaceful technological advancements designed to strengthen communications, scientific research, and national prestige. Turkey’s commitment to this effort is now on display in <a href="https://www.turkiyetoday.com/nation/turkiye-begins-construction-of-space-launch-facility-in-somalia-3211221">Somalia</a>, of all places, where it is constructing a spaceport to support future launch operations. The technologies required for satellite launch vehicles closely overlap with those needed for ballistic missile systems, including multi-stage rocket propulsion, precision guidance, and reentry vehicle engineering. As a result, advances in Turkey’s space program will expedite its long-range ballistic missile development.</p>
<p>Although Turkey does not possess nuclear weapons and is a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, occasional statements by <a href="https://nordicmonitor.com/2025/07/turkeys-fm-criticizes-nuclear-weapons-treaty-as-unjust-questions-turkish-endorsement/">Turkish officials criticizing</a> the global nuclear order have fueled international speculation that Turkey might seek its own nuclear arsenal in the future. Any ICBM <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2026/05/turkey-rolls-out-intercontinental-missile-with-purported-6000km-range/">capable of carrying</a> a 6,000-pound weapons payload over approximately 6,000 kilometers would have limited strategic value as a conventional weapon, but with a nuclear warhead, it would dramatically alter the strategic calculations across the region and beyond.</p>
<p>The possibility of a reduced American nuclear commitment to NATO Europe could increase Turkey’s importance in the same way. If European governments keep pushing Washington out of NATO, the result will be that Europe must pay for and <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-05/features/europe-moving-independent-nuclear-deterrent">develop its own nuclear capabilities</a>—another form of deterrence. France has introduced its <a href="https://warontherocks.com/disperse-to-survive-the-logic-of-french-forward-deterrence/">new doctrine of “forward deterrence,”</a> which <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/what-macrons-changes-to-french-nuclear-policy-mean-for-european-security/">advocates</a> for an expanded nuclear arsenal and a broader nuclear deterrence umbrella over all of Europe, but only under French operational control. Both <a href="https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/nuclear-bombs-poland-germany-weapons-3pwvwdwhz?msockid=3393505b86306ec71fdc452087506f0e">Poland and Germany</a> have conveyed interest in alternative nuclear arsenals to bolster European deterrence. In this context, Turkey could see its long-range missile capabilities as an opportunity to fill the deterrence gap identified by other NATO leaders and as a pathway toward future nuclear delivery capability if political circumstances change.</p>
<p>At the same time, Turkey’s pursuit of advanced missile systems could generate tensions within NATO if those capabilities are not carefully integrated into the alliance’s broader strategic framework. Some European allies may view Turkish missile development—and any potential future nuclear ambitions—as destabilizing, given Ankara’s sometimes contentious relationships with other NATO members. Such developments would inevitably raise questions regarding missile security, command-and-control arrangements, escalation risks, and about whether Turkey’s long-term strategic objectives remain fully aligned with broader alliance priorities.</p>
<p>Whether Turkey ultimately seeks to develop an arsenal of nuclear-armed ICBMs remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that Turkey’s long-range missile ambitions are real and appear to support both a broader long-term strategy of autonomous power projection and a more immediate effort to expand capabilities that could contribute to NATO’s evolving long-range strike and nuclear deterrence requirements.</p>
<p>Turkey’s growing missile capabilities reflect a clear strategic goal: to make itself an independent, technologically advanced, and influential military power in an increasingly unstable region; thereby, demonstrating that Turkey is not only a force to be reckoned with but also a partner to be allied with. Its growing missile ambitions reflect a strategic objective of establishing Turkey as an independent, technologically advanced, and regionally influential military power capable of operating with greater strategic autonomy in an increasingly unstable security environment. Turkey should not be viewed merely as a state to be reckoned with, but as an indispensable ally and arms supplier.</p>
<p>Colonel Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of <em>MCG Horizons LLC</em>, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has three decades of experience in uniform and DoD civil service and is the co-host of the weekly <em>The NIDS View</em> podcast. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and <em>MCG Horizons LLC</em>, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other affiliated organization.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Turkeys-ICBM-Ambition-for-Autonomy.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="209" height="58" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 209px) 100vw, 209px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/turkeys-icbm-ambition-for-autonomy/">Turkey’s ICBM: Ambition for Autonomy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>What Does Xi Jinping’s Engagement in Conflicts Reveal to the World?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/what-does-xi-jinpings-engagement-in-conflicts-reveal-to-the-world/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dawood Tanin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2025 12:09:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31666</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The world today is more unsettled and volatile than ever. The war in Ukraine has become Europe’s largest conflict since World War II. Tensions between Israel and Iran cast a heavy shadow over the Middle East. Taiwan issues spark new threats almost daily. The gap between Europe and the United States is becoming increasingly evident. [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/what-does-xi-jinpings-engagement-in-conflicts-reveal-to-the-world/">What Does Xi Jinping’s Engagement in Conflicts Reveal to the World?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The world today is more unsettled and volatile than ever. The war in Ukraine has become Europe’s largest conflict since World War II. Tensions between Israel and Iran cast a heavy shadow over the Middle East. Taiwan issues spark new threats almost daily. The gap between Europe and the United States is becoming increasingly evident. Trade wars between East and West are turning into a fierce and decisive struggle.</p>
<p>In this complex environment, world leaders are facing sanctions, isolation, and strategic setbacks that send a clear message—the long peace may soon end. Whether China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, will play a positive or divisive role in the future is uncertain.</p>
<p>It is certain that China seeks to move from the role of “model student” to that of leader, all despite depending heavily on Western markets and technology. The United States and the European Union remain China’s largest trading partners and any disruption in these relationships could push its economy toward stagnation. How China’s ambitious transition addresses major paradoxes and limitations in three key areas deserves further discussion.</p>
<p><strong>The Alliance Paradox</strong><strong> </strong></p>
<p>At first glance, dissatisfied countries may appear a united front against the West, with China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and, to some extent, India in alignment. A closer look shows deep-rooted tensions. Russia inherited the legacy of empire and finds it difficult to accept a subordinate role to China. While Moscow relies on Beijing’s support in Ukraine, China’s growing economic and security influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus is seen as a direct threat.</p>
<p>India, another key player, sits with China in forums like BRICS, but remains a strategic rival. Border disputes in the Himalayas, competition for influence in the Indian Ocean, and strong ties with the United States and the West prevent any real constructive partnership between the two Asian powers.</p>
<p>Iran and North Korea also face serious internal and international constraints. Iran struggles with deep domestic cleavages, while North Korea remains unpredictable, at times even complicating China’s strategic plans. On a broader level, there is no shared set of values among these countries; their primary connection is opposition to the West.</p>
<p>As Henry Kissinger noted, such alliances often reflect disorder rather than creating a new order. This coalition is more capable of disrupting the existing system than building a replacement. None of its members, individually or collectively, possesses the institutions or tools required to reshape global order.</p>
<p>Xi Jinping’s presence alongside this coalition primarily serves as a symbolic display, signaling dissatisfaction, demonstrating power, and marking the end of a unipolar world. But this performance does not equate to practical ability to establish a new order. While China wields significant economic power, it lacks the instruments to replace the West in security and international politics; it has no NATO-like network, no universally trusted currency, and no capacity to reshape international legal institutions to its advantage.</p>
<p><strong>The Contradiction between Experience and Ambition</strong><strong> </strong></p>
<p>One of China’s main challenges is its lack of practical experience in major global tests. Since World War I, China has not been involved in any large-scale wars and has not faced a real-world military crisis. This gap highlights China’s inexperience in handling major international conflicts. Even considering Russia, with its weakened military and struggling economy, and Iran, facing deep domestic and regional crises, the pillars of this alliance do not appear particularly strong.</p>
<p>Ambition without experience, combined with an alliance lacking shared values, risks creating instability rather than a new order. This coalition sends an important message to the West, especially the United States: global dissatisfaction with American hegemony is real and even temporary alliances can exert significant pressure on energy markets, financial systems, and peace negotiations. China and its partners, despite their fundamental weaknesses, can disrupt Western calculations across many regions—a capability that should not be underestimated.</p>
<p>At the same time, China’s lack of hands-on experience in managing major military and economic crises leaves its foreign policy vulnerable to miscalculation. Ambition without real-world testing can thus be both an opportunity and a threat to regional and global stability. Moreover, global leadership is not possible by economic or military power alone; it also requires a compelling culture and a large consumer base capable of attracting goods, technology, and lifestyles from other countries. The United States built its hegemony precisely on these foundations. China possesses none of these.</p>
<p><strong>Message to the World and the West</strong></p>
<p>Xi Jinping’s alignment with countries opposing the existing global order sends a dual message to the world. First, it signals widespread dissatisfaction with the current system. This shows the world, particularly the West, that the liberal international order is no longer uncontested and that the hegemony of the United States faces a challenge. Second, it exposes the weaknesses and contradictions within the anti-Western coalition. The alliance lacks the intellectual, institutional, and operational foundations needed to create a new order. Internal divisions and the absence of security and political tools indicate that China and its partners, at least in the short term, cannot replace the existing global order.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, China’s stance against the liberal international order marks a new phase in global politics—one that may not produce a new order but could intensify instability and geopolitical complexity. Henry Kissinger even considered such disorder a threat greater than war. This situation shows that China is simultaneously trying to display power, secure advantages, and strengthen its global position, yet it still faces significant constraints and challenges on the path to genuine global leadership.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>China’s transition from the “model student” to “global leader” faces three key obstacles. First is the alliance paradox in which coalitions of dissatisfied countries reflect disorder more than they create new order. Second is the gap between experience and ambition in which ambition without major practical tests leaves China vulnerable and its foreign policy prone to miscalculations. Third is the alliance/coalition’s message to the world, where China loudly signals its dissatisfaction with the current order but has no attractive alternative to offer. In other words, China seeks a larger share of the global order, yet it lacks the capacity to host it.</p>
<p>Today, the world is entering a new phase—one that may not produce a new order but will likely heighten instability and geopolitical complexity. In this environment, conflict remains the most probable scenario.</p>
<p><em> Dawood Tanin is a researcher, freelance writer, and professor of political science at a private university in Afghanistan. Views expressed in this article are the author&#8217;s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Chinas-Transition-from-Model-Student-to-Global-Leader.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="209" height="58" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 209px) 100vw, 209px" /></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/what-does-xi-jinpings-engagement-in-conflicts-reveal-to-the-world/">What Does Xi Jinping’s Engagement in Conflicts Reveal to the World?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Forecasting Syria’s Military and Political Future</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/forecasting-syrias-military-and-political-future/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed ELDoh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 10 Mar 2025 12:07:23 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Mediterranean]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[militias]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[power vacuum]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30236</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The fall of the Assad regime has marked a watershed moment in the Syrian armed conflict, fundamentally ushering in a new phase of military and political uncertainty. This development intensified regional and international competition for influence in Syria, with profound implications for the country’s stability and the broader Middle East. Critical factors are already shaping [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/forecasting-syrias-military-and-political-future/">Forecasting Syria’s Military and Political Future</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The fall of the Assad regime has marked a watershed moment in the Syrian armed conflict, fundamentally ushering in a new phase of military and political uncertainty. This development intensified regional and international competition for influence in Syria, with profound implications for the country’s stability and the broader Middle East. Critical factors are already shaping Syria’s future in the post-Assad era.</p>
<p>The collapse of the regime created a tremendous power vacuum, with various actors vying for control over Syria’s fragmented political and military landscape along with the main aim of shaping the country’s trajectory. Iran remains deeply entrenched in Syria through its network of allied militias and its strategic interests in the region. Tehran’s ability to sustain its presence and influence will depend on its capacity to mobilize resources and navigate mounting international and regional opposition.</p>
<p>In a post-Assad context, Iran may seek to carve out autonomous zones of influence, particularly in areas of strategic importance such as southern Syria and the corridor connecting Damascus to Lebanon. However, with the Assad regime no longer in power, the United States and Israel are likely to intensify their efforts to prevent Iran from filling the power vacuum. This could include targeted military actions, support for opposition groups, and diplomatic pressure on Iran and its allies. These countermeasures will play a very important role in shaping the balance of power in Syria and limiting Tehran’s ability to consolidate its position.</p>
<p>In the same vein, ISIS is likely to re-emerge again in the Syrian scene, which has already prompted US Central Command forces to <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3989696/us-central-command-conducts-dozens-of-airstrikes-to-eliminate-isis-camps-in-cen/">conduct</a> a series of airstrikes to eliminate ISIS camps in central Syria. The existing fragmentation among opposition forces over the past years is likely to continue and despite the fall of Assad’s regime, the absence of a centralized authority has exacerbated divisions among Syria’s opposition groups, including factions with divergent political and ideological agendas.</p>
<p>External support for these groups will be a decisive factor in determining whether they can coalesce into a viable political and military force or remain fragmented, thereby prolonging instability. In this respect, the role of international and regional powers in supporting different opposition groups in Syria will be detrimental about how the tense situation in Syria unfolds.</p>
<p>Regional actors including Turkey, Israel, Iran, and Gulf Arab states are poised to play a more prominent role in Syria’s post-Assad future. Turkey has already expanded its influence in northern Syria, while Gulf states may seek to assert their presence by supporting moderate factions. However, Turkish involvement is more complicated, given that Turkey aims to take control of influencing Syria. The ongoing armed conflict between Turkish forces and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/08/world/middleeast/syria-turkey-kurds.html">Kurdish</a> controlled Syrian cities in the North is likely to intensify.</p>
<p>In this regard, it is worth noting that Kurdish forces in Syria were originally <a href="https://apnews.com/article/syria-war-assad-kurds-rebels-turkey-us-2b4af609c4dcf853ac6d7a22d3dccf5d">supported</a> by the US and considered one of the main local allies in the fight against ISIS. The interplay among these powers will significantly influence Syria’s trajectory and the broader regional order.</p>
<p>Russia’s evolving strategy for Syria is still worthy of consideration. Russia’s role in Syria has become more precarious following the fall of the Assad regime. Moscow already faces many challenges of recalibrating its strategy to safeguard its regional interests, which include maintaining access to its naval bases in the Mediterranean, countering Western influence, and preserving its role as an influential actor in the Middle East. The Kremlin’s ability to adapt to the new reality will determine its long-term relevance in Syria. Despite speculations that Russia is likely to negotiate maintaining naval bases with the controlling opposition force led by Al-Jolani, it can be also assumed that Turkey will be the main negotiator with Russia with regard to allowing Russian forces access to Syrian soil.</p>
<p>Overall, the fall of the Assad regime represents a major setback for Russia, which had invested heavily in propping up the Syrian government as a cornerstone of its Middle East strategy over the past decade. Accordingly, Moscow now faces a host of strategic challenges.</p>
<p>With the Assad regime gone, Russia has lost a key partner that provided it with a foothold in the Middle East. This development undermines Moscow’s ability to project power in the region and challenges its status as a dominant player in the Syrian conflict. Russia must now contend with the risk of its influence being marginalized by other actors, including Turkey, and the US.</p>
<p>Russia’s airbase in Hmeimim and its naval facility in Tartus are critical to its military strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, the fall of the Assad regime has exposed these facilities to heightened security risks, including potential attacks by opposition forces or Islamist groups. Protecting these assets will require significant resources and a re-evaluation of Russia’s military posture in Syria, which can be challenging for Russia given its existing war with Ukraine.</p>
<p>The collapse of the Assad regime diminished Russia’s ability to dictate the terms of international engagement in Syria. Without a stable Syrian government to anchor its strategy, Moscow will struggle to assert its influence in negotiations over Syria’s future. This loss of leverage could weaken Russia’s position not only in Syria but also in broader Middle Eastern geopolitics.</p>
<p><strong>Scenarios for Syria’s Post-Assad Future</strong></p>
<p>The fall of the Assad regime presents a range of possible outcomes, each with distinct implications for regional and international actors. These scenarios may include the following.</p>
<p><strong>Continued Fragmentation</strong></p>
<p>The most likely short-term scenario is the persistence of fragmentation, with various factions and militias controlling different parts of the country. This will lead to prolonged instability and create opportunities for external actors to widen their influence.</p>
<p>For Russia, this scenario presents both challenges and opportunities, as it seeks to secure its interests while navigating a highly complex landscape. The same applies to Turkey. Turkey is, however, well-positioned to expand its influence, particularly in northern Syria, where it already established a significant military presence. This scenario could lead to increased friction with Russia, as Ankara’s ambitions conflict with Moscow’s strategic objectives in Syria. Furthermore, armed conflict between Turkey and Kurdish controlled areas, which are supported by the US, are likely to escalate.</p>
<p>Accordingly, the situation in Syria represents a new challenge to the Trump administration regarding its Middle East engagement policy. On one hand, President Donald Trump has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-17/trump-sees-turkey-as-key-player-shaping-syria-s-future-after-assad-s-fall">indicated</a> that Turkey holds the key to Syria’s future. On the other hand, the US already <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-fears-military-buildup-by-turkey-signals-preparations-for-incursion-into-syria-1c2e88e9">fears</a> that the ongoing military build-up by Turkey, along the Syrian border, signals that Turkey is preparing for a large-scale invasion to areas held by the American-backed Syrian Kurds.</p>
<p><strong>Iranian Consolidation</strong></p>
<p>Despite the recent Israeli strikes on Iran and its proxies in the region, including Lebanon and Syria, Iran may still seek to fill the power vacuum by strengthening its alliances with local militias, establishing a dominant presence in key areas. Such a scenario would be of a key concern for other regional and international powers and lead to increased military confrontations.</p>
<p>For decades, Syria was under the influence of Iran. Syrian ground routes were among the main routes of supply of armaments by Iran to Hezbollah. Regardless of Iran’s current weak state, Iran is unlikely to give up on its influence in Syria. However, it is very likely that Iran-back militias will continue to take a central role in countering any stabilization endeavours in Syria.</p>
<p><strong>Emergence of a New Central Authority VS Escalation of Proxy Conflicts</strong></p>
<p>While very unlikely in the short term, the emergence of a new central authority that can unify the country would fundamentally reshape Syria’s future. Such an outcome will depend on significant international support and political compromise.</p>
<p>On the other hand, and more likely, the power vacuum in Syria will increase the likelihood of Syria becoming a battleground for proxy conflicts among regional and international powers. Regardless of the opposition forces’ success in overthrowing the Assad regime, still many member of these opposition forces emerged from extremist groups, which prompted Israel to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/12/10/world/syria-news-assad-rebels">strike</a> most of Syria’s military assets following the country’s take over by Al-Jolani.</p>
<p>The rise of ISIS bases in Syria also presents an imminent threat to the region, prompting US CENTCOM to <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4005902/centcom-strikes-isis-new-carrier-group-enters-region/">conduct</a> precision airstrikes targeting ISIS camps and operatives in the region. Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Major General Pat Ryder stated that the US military presence and primary focus remains on &#8220;supporting the defeat of ISIS mission more proactively in terms of disrupting and degrading any potential external operations.&#8221;</p>
<p>The post-Assad era in Syria is defined by uncertainty, with a host of internal and external factors shaping the country’s trajectory. For Russia and Iran, the fall of the Assad regime represents a major strategic challenge, forcing it to rethink its approach and adapt to a rapidly changing landscape in Syria and the Middle East.</p>
<p>As regional and global actors vie for influence in Syria, the country’s fate will remain a key barometer of broader geopolitical trends. The decisions made by international actors in the coming months and years will not only shape Syria’s future but also redefine the balance of power in the region.</p>
<p><em>Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/forecasting-syrias-military-and-political-future/">Forecasting Syria’s Military and Political Future</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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