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		<title>Rising Security Threats in West Africa and Regional Responses</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/rising-security-threats-in-west-africa-and-regional-responses/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Huseini Kamara]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Apr 2026 12:12:34 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Here is a comma-separated list of keywords from the paper:West Africa]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Sahel]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32593</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: April 20, 2026 West Africa has experienced an increasing number of national security challenges over the past two decades. Violent extremism, political instability, transnational organized crime, and maritime insecurity have created complex threats that undermine governance, economic development, and regional stability. According to the United Nations Africa Renewal, instability in the Sahel has become [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/rising-security-threats-in-west-africa-and-regional-responses/">Rising Security Threats in West Africa and Regional Responses</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: April 20, 2026</em></p>
<p>West Africa has experienced an increasing number of national security challenges over the past two decades. Violent extremism, political instability, transnational organized crime, and maritime insecurity have created complex threats that undermine governance, economic development, and regional stability. According to the <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2023/security-crisis-sahel">United Nations Africa Renewal</a>, instability in the Sahel has become one of the most pressing security concerns on the African continent, with escalating violence and growing humanitarian consequences. Countries such as Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have faced persistent security crises that require coordinated responses at both national and regional levels; issues that the world should be paying attention to.</p>
<p>One of the most serious security challenges in the region is the rise of violent extremist organizations operating in the Sahel. Groups affiliated with global jihadist movements have expanded their activities across national borders, transforming local conflicts into regional security threats. The Boko Haram insurgency in northeastern Nigeria is a prominent example. Since its emergence in the early 2000s, Boko Haram has conducted numerous attacks targeting civilians, government institutions, and security forces. The conflict has resulted in thousands of deaths and the displacement of millions of people. The insurgency has <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-boko-haram">destabilized</a> large parts of the Lake Chad Basin and continues to pose a significant threat to regional stability.</p>
<p>The spread of extremist violence is not limited to Nigeria. Countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso have experienced rapid increases in militant attacks over the past decade. Armed groups have exploited weak state presence in rural areas, limited economic opportunities, and political grievances among marginalized communities. In many cases, extremist organizations present themselves as alternative authorities capable of providing protection and financial support to local populations. Militant organizations in the Sahel increasingly <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel">operate</a> across national borders, making regional coordination essential for effective counterterrorism responses.</p>
<p>Political instability has further complicated the security environment in West Africa. In recent years, several countries in the region have experienced military coups, including Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger. These political disruptions often occur in contexts where governments struggle to address security threats and economic challenges. Military interventions in politics can weaken democratic institutions and create governance gaps that extremist groups may exploit. Governance failures and security crises have <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-coups-are-returning-to-africa/">contributed</a> significantly to the resurgence of military coups in parts of Africa.</p>
<p>Another important dimension of insecurity in West Africa involves organized transnational crime. Criminal networks operating across the region engage in activities such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, and arms smuggling. West Africa has become a major transit hub for cocaine shipments traveling from Latin America to European markets. Weak border controls and limited law enforcement capacity make it difficult for governments to combat these illicit networks effectively. Organized criminal networks in the region <a href="https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/west-africa.html">frequently</a> intersect with extremist groups, enabling the trafficking of weapons and illicit commodities across borders.</p>
<p>Maritime insecurity also represents a growing challenge for coastal states in West Africa. The Gulf of Guinea has become one of the most dangerous maritime regions in the world due to piracy and armed robbery at sea. Criminal groups often target oil tankers and commercial vessels, stealing valuable cargo, and disrupting international shipping routes. These activities have significant economic consequences for regional trade and energy production. The <a href="https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/Gulf-of-Guinea.aspx">International Maritime Organization</a> has identified the Gulf of Guinea as a major global hotspot for maritime piracy and maritime crime.</p>
<p>Several structural factors contribute to the persistence of security threats in West Africa. Elevated levels of poverty and youth unemployment create conditions that extremist groups and criminal networks can exploit for recruitment. Many young people lack access to education and stable employment opportunities, making them vulnerable to financial incentives offered by militant organizations. The United Nations Development Program <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/">highlights</a> how socio-economic marginalization and limited state services contribute to instability in fragile regions.</p>
<p>Climate change has also intensified competition over natural resources in the Sahel region. Desertification and declining rainfall have reduced agricultural productivity, leading to conflicts between farming and pastoralist communities. These local disputes can escalate into broader security challenges when armed groups become involved. The World Bank has <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange">emphasized</a> that environmental pressures and climate variability are increasingly linked to conflict dynamics in the Sahel.</p>
<p>Addressing national security threats in West Africa requires a comprehensive strategy that combines military responses with governance reforms and socio-economic development. Governments must strengthen democratic institutions and improve transparency to build public trust and reduce political instability. Effective governance is essential for preventing the conditions that allow extremist groups to expand their influence.</p>
<p>Regional cooperation is also critical for managing transnational threats. Organizations such as the <a href="https://www.ecowas.int">Economic Community of West African States</a> play a key role in coordinating peacekeeping missions and promoting political stability. Joint military operations and intelligence-sharing initiatives can improve the ability of governments to respond to cross-border insurgencies.</p>
<p>Economic development programs should be prioritized in regions most affected by insecurity. Investments in education, infrastructure, and job creation can help address the underlying socio-economic drivers of violence. Providing young people with economic opportunities reduces the likelihood that they will join extremist groups or criminal networks.</p>
<p>West Africa’s security challenges are complex and interconnected. However, through stronger governance, regional cooperation, and sustainable economic development, governments and regional organizations can significantly improve the prospects for long-term peace and stability in the region.</p>
<p><em>Huseini Kamara is a researcher with academic interests in national security, terrorism studies, and regional security dynamics in West Africa. His previous publication examined the role of artificial intelligence in ECG interpretation. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own<strong>.</strong></em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Rising-Security-Threats-in-West-Africa-and-Regional-Responses.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="212" height="59" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 212px) 100vw, 212px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/rising-security-threats-in-west-africa-and-regional-responses/">Rising Security Threats in West Africa and Regional Responses</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Russian View of Deep Battle: Implications for the War in Ukraine</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-russian-view-of-deep-battle-implications-for-the-war-in-ukraine/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-russian-view-of-deep-battle-implications-for-the-war-in-ukraine/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stephen Cimbala]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 12 Jan 2026 13:09:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bonus Reads]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence & Foreign Policy]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[air superiority]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[command nodes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[contested airspace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deep Battle]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drones]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[energy infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[exploitation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[incremental deepening]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[logistics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[long-range strikes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[maneuver warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[massed firepower]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear signaling]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[operational depth]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[operational tempo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Precision Fires]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[reserves]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russian operational art]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Soviet doctrine]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Ukrainian defenses]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Triandafillov]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[war of attrition]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32116</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s conduct of military operations in Ukraine cannot be understood without revisiting one of the most influential concepts in Soviet and Russian operational art: Deep Battle. Developed in the 1920s and 1930s by theorists such as Vladimir Triandafillov, Deep Battle emphasized striking not only the enemy’s frontline forces but also the entire depth of their [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-russian-view-of-deep-battle-implications-for-the-war-in-ukraine/">The Russian View of Deep Battle: Implications for the War in Ukraine</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s conduct of military operations in Ukraine cannot be understood without revisiting one of the most influential concepts in <a href="https://balagan.info/deep-battle-soviet-doctrine-for-operational-level-warfare">Soviet and Russian operational art</a>: <strong>Deep Battle</strong>. Developed in the 1920s and 1930s by theorists such as Vladimir Triandafillov, Deep Battle emphasized striking not only the enemy’s frontline forces but also the <a href="https://api.pageplace.de/preview/DT0400.9781040309209_A49868906/preview-9781040309209_A49868906.pdf">entire depth of their defensive system</a>—logistics, command nodes, reserves, and infrastructure—simultaneously. The goal was to collapse the enemy’s ability to respond, restoring maneuver to the battlefield after the static carnage of World War I.</p>
<p>Nearly a century later, Russian planners still view Deep Battle as a foundational concept. Yet the war in Ukraine has exposed the performance gap between theory and practice.</p>
<p><strong>Deep Battle in Russian Military Thought</strong></p>
<p>Deep Battle was designed as a holistic operational approach: massed firepower, rapid penetration, and exploitation by mobile formations. It required tight coordination, robust logistics, and the ability to sustain momentum across multiple echelons. Soviet forces demonstrated aspects of this during World War II, and the concept remained embedded in Russian doctrine long after.</p>
<p>Modern Russian operations—at least on paper—still aspire to this model. Analysts note that Russian commanders have attempted to regain maneuver by applying Deep Battle principles, seeking rapid breakthroughs and deep strikes to disorganize Ukrainian defenses. However, the conditions required for successful Deep Battle are far more demanding than the theory suggests.</p>
<p><strong>Why Deep Battle Has Struggled in Ukraine</strong></p>
<p>Several factors have undermined Russia’s ability to execute Deep Battle effectively. Logistical fragility has plagued Russian operations, as sustaining supply to fast-moving units proved difficult; forces entering Ukraine in 2022 quickly outran their logistics, leading to stalled advances and exposed columns. <a href="https://understandingwar.org/analysis/russia-ukraine/">Scholars argue</a> that this logistical weakness fundamentally compromised Russia’s ability to maintain operational tempo. Additionally, Ukrainian resilience and adaptability have presented unexpected challenges. Ukrainian forces have been far more agile and technologically integrated than Russian planners anticipated, employing precision fires, dispersed command structures, and Western intelligence support to blunt Russian attempts at operational shock and interrupting supply lines and replacement equipment. Their use of drone and counter-drone technology exemplifies adaptive learning that has already been noted and copied by other state militaries.</p>
<p>Russia’s attempts at Deep Battle are further hindered by insufficient force quality and added maneuver complexity, as the doctrine relies on well-trained, coordinated echelons. Russia’s reliance on mobilized troops, fragmented command structures, and heavy attrition has made synchronized deep operations difficult to sustain. The loss of air superiority has limited Russia’s ability to shape the battlefield making the battlefield more complex. As intended by doctrine, Soviet Deep Battle assumes overwhelming air support to suppress enemy depth, but contested airspace in Ukraine has prevented this crucial element.</p>
<p><strong>Where Russia Has Adapted</strong></p>
<p>Despite these challenges, Russia has applied Deep Battle concepts in modified ways. In adapting the principles of Deep Battle to modern conflict, Russia has focused on targeting Ukrainian infrastructure with long-range strikes. This campaign has prioritized attacks on energy systems and logistics nodes, aiming to disrupt Ukrainian depth and sustain pressure even without accompanying maneuver. By striking critical assets far from the front lines, Russia attempts to weaken Ukraine’s ability to resist and maintain its war effort.</p>
<p>Rather than achieving rapid breakthroughs as originally envisioned by Deep Battle doctrine, Russia has shifted to a strategy of incremental, attritional “deepening.” This approach relies on massed artillery and slow, grinding advances to steadily erode Ukrainian defenses. The result is a war of attrition where progress is measured in small territorial gains instead of dramatic operational shifts, demonstrating an adaptation of Deep Battle’s objectives without its characteristic momentum.</p>
<p>In addition to these methods, Russian military planners and observers continue to pursue efforts to reconstitute maneuver forces. Despite ongoing challenges, such as limited operational success, attempts are being made to rebuild the capacity for operational-level breakthroughs. These efforts underscore a persistent desire within Russian strategy to reclaim the maneuver warfare and deep operational reach that are central to Deep Battle theory, even as practical limitations remain.</p>
<p><strong>The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Deep Battle</strong></p>
<p>Vladimir Putin has repeatedly issued veiled or explicit warnings regarding the potential for Russian nuclear first use concerning the possibility of Russian nuclear first use in response to perceived unacceptable threats. This stance is further reflected in Russian military exercises, which have frequently included <a href="https://www.aei.org/research-products/book/riding-the-tiger/">simulated launches with tactical nuclear weapons systems</a>. However, it is important to note that some <a href="https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot%20Spots/Documents/Russia/2017-07-The-Russian-Way-of-War-Grau-Bartles.pdf?ref=hermes-kalamos">Soviet assessments during the Cold War</a> adopted a realistically pessimistic outlook on the conduct of military operations in a nuclear environment, recognizing the immense challenges such conditions would impose.</p>
<p>Taken together, these perspectives highlight the duality in Russian strategic thinking: while nuclear signaling and preparation remain integral to Russia&#8217;s military posture, there is also an awareness—rooted in historical experience—of the profound difficulties associated with waging war in a nuclear-affected battlespace.</p>
<p><strong>Implications for the Future of the War</strong></p>
<p>Understanding Russia’s attachment to Deep Battle helps explain both its ambitions and its limitations. Russia will continue seeking opportunities for operational breakthroughs, even if conditions rarely allow them. The concept remains deeply embedded in Russian military culture. At the same time, Ukraine’s strategy of disrupting Russian logistics and command nodes directly targets the prerequisites of Deep Battle, making it harder for Russia to generate momentum. If Russia can rebuild its logistics, improve training, and integrate drones and electronic warfare more effectively, it may regain the ability to conduct deeper operations—but this remains uncertain. The war is likely to remain attritional because neither side currently possesses the combination of mass, mobility, and air dominance required for true Deep Battle.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>Deep Battle remains a conceptual framework and historical marker for understanding Russian military behavior. But the war in Ukraine has shown that doctrine alone cannot compensate for structural weaknesses, resilient opposition, and the realities of modern precision warfare. Russia’s struggle to translate Deep Battle theory into battlefield success underscores the widening gap between its strategic aspirations and its operational capabilities.</p>
<p><em>NOTE: The author provides a grateful acknowledgment that is made to David Glantz and the late Dr. Jacob Kipp for the author’s appreciation of this topic. None bear any responsibility for arguments herein.</em></p>
<p><em>Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy.  He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025).</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/The-Russian-View-of-Deep-Battle-Implications-for-the-War-in-Ukraine.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="277" height="77" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 277px) 100vw, 277px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-russian-view-of-deep-battle-implications-for-the-war-in-ukraine/">The Russian View of Deep Battle: Implications for the War in Ukraine</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Cybersecurity Framework for Maritime Port Management</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/cybersecurity-framework-for-maritime-port-management/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Maryyum Masood&nbsp;&&nbsp;Rizwana Abbasi]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 08 Apr 2025 12:37:28 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Cyberattacks]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30472</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Maritime ports act as mediums for international trade and transportation. They facilitate the legitime flow of trade and the transfer of goods between ships and shore. Ports have the requisite infrastructure to run routine operations, such as handling the docking of ships and cranes and management of storage facilities and warehouses. Ports not only link [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/cybersecurity-framework-for-maritime-port-management/">Cybersecurity Framework for Maritime Port Management</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Maritime ports act as mediums for international trade and transportation. They facilitate the legitime flow of trade and the transfer of goods between ships and shore. Ports have the requisite infrastructure to run routine operations, such as handling the docking of ships and cranes and management of storage facilities and warehouses. Ports not only link the sea lines of communication (SLOC) but also connect to land transportation, such as highways, railroads, and airports, enabling the smooth movement of goods to and from the ports.</p>
<p>Maritime ports authorize customs clearance and are involved in regulatory checks, ensuring compliance with national and international law. Ports perform most of these functions digitally. Maritime ports are now under serious threat of malicious cyberattacks that can disrupt and compromise port operations worldwide.</p>
<p>Industry is deeply interconnected, and a cyberattack on one major port can send shockwaves through global trade networks. Consider a scenario where a major port, responsible for handling millions of cargo containers, suddenly halts operations due to a cyberattack. Cranes freeze, logistics systems collapse, and cargo ships are left stranded at sea. This is not a hypothetical scenario; it is a real and escalating threat to global trade.</p>
<p>The maritime industry, long seen as the backbone of international commerce, now faces an urgent cybersecurity crisis. Ports are no longer just about cranes and cargo; they have evolved into digital ecosystems reliant on interconnected networks, automation, and artificial intelligence. As ports become smarter, they are also becoming more vulnerable. Cybercriminals are increasingly exploiting these vulnerabilities, causing financial losses, operational disruptions, and even national security risks.</p>
<p>Maritime cyberattacks are no longer rare occurrences, they are becoming alarmingly frequent. In 2023, a ransomware attack crippled more than 1,000 vessels by targeting a software provider used across the shipping industry. The attack forced the shipping industry to shut down its ShipManager system, affecting global supply chains. A year earlier, the Port of Lisbon suffered a cyberattack that took its website offline for days, with the ransomware group LockBit claiming responsibility and alleging that it had stolen financial reports, contracts, and ship logs.</p>
<p>In Germany, a 2022 cyberattack on two oil companies disrupted fuel shipments, forcing Shell to reroute supplies and exposing the vulnerabilities of critical maritime infrastructure. The 2017 NotPetya ransomware attack, which paralyzed Maersk and caused an estimated $300 million in damage, remains one of the most devastating cyberattacks in shipping history.</p>
<p>Ports are among the most attractive targets for cybercriminals. The motives behind these attacks vary as some hackers seek financial gain, while others aim to steal sensitive trade-related data, and some may even use cyberattacks as part of hybrid warfare.</p>
<p>The economic consequences are staggering, from ransom payments and insurance hikes to delays that can ripple across global supply chains. Beyond financial losses, cyber threats to ports pose serious security risks. For example, a well-coordinated cyberattack on a major port could disrupt military logistics, cripple trade networks, or even manipulate cargo data to facilitate smuggling and illicit trade.</p>
<p>Hackers carry the potential for unauthorized intrusion into ports’ digital networks and interrupt ports’ routine operation through malicious software attacks. The workforce involved in port management may be trapped into revealing sensitive data by clicking on malicious links. The hackers can also disrupt digital networks that regulate critical port infrastructure, such as cranes, pumps, and valves. Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems can come under cyber threats disrupting routine functions. N<em>onstandard computing hardware</em> like sensors, actuators, or appliances that transmit data from the network wirelessly are vulnerable to data theft.</p>
<p>Hackers can steal data such as cargo manifests, crew information, and financial records. They can also manipulate data, such as altering cargo manifests, or manipulate navigation systems. Hackers can also steal intellectual property, such as trade secrets or proprietary software.</p>
<p>Another pressing issue is supply-chain security. Ports rely on a complex web of third-party vendors for logistics, software, and cargo management. If one vendor is compromised, the entire port system could be at risk.</p>
<p>Hackers can also use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance means or to attack port infrastructure, such as damaging equipment or disrupting power supplies. Ports may be exposed to cyberattacks through third-party suppliers, such as logistics providers or maintenance contractors. Ports may be exposed to cyberattacks through cargo and containers, which may contain malicious devices or software.</p>
<p>Cybersecurity in the maritime sector is often treated as an afterthought. Many ports still operate with outdated software and weak security protocols, making them easy targets. Given the critical role of ports in the global economy, the widening cybersecurity gap is a growing challenge. Strengthening port security necessitates urgent regulatory mechanisms, some of which are proposed below.</p>
<p><strong>Regulatory Mechanisms</strong></p>
<p>To mitigate the growing cyber threat, ports should adopt internationally recognized cybersecurity frameworks. First, ports should adhere to the rules and protocols of the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Maritime Cyber Risk Management Guidelines, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework, and ISO 27001 standards. Implementing these frameworks will help establish clear security protocols and ensure that ports are prepared to defend against cyberattacks.</p>
<p>Second, network security should be reinforced by segmenting information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems, preventing malware from spreading across critical infrastructure. Regular penetration testing and vulnerability assessments can further identify weak points before attackers do.</p>
<p>Third, investing in cybersecurity training for port workers is equally crucial. Many cyberattacks exploit human error—phishing e-mails, weak passwords, and social engineering attacks remain among the most common entry points for hackers. A well-trained workforce can serve as the first line of defense against these threats.</p>
<p>Fourth, leveraging artificial intelligence and machine learning for threat detection can enhance ports’ ability to identify cyber risks before they escalate into full-scale attacks. Artificial intelligence (AI)–led systems can monitor network activity in real time, flagging suspicious behavior and predicting potential breaches before they happen. In this regard, the strict security assessments of third-party vendors and blockchain-based cargo tracking can enhance transparency and reduce the risk of supply-chain cyberattacks.</p>
<p>Fifth, beyond prevention, ports should also be prepared to respond effectively to cyber incidents. For this, establishing cyber incident response teams (CIRT) can ensure that ports have trained professionals ready to mitigate and recover from cyberattacks swiftly.</p>
<p>Sixth, regular cyber drills and crisis simulations should be conducted to test response plans. This ensures that when an attack occurs, the damage is minimized, and recovery is swift.</p>
<p>Seventh, international collaboration to deal with these threats is essential. Governments, port authorities, and private stakeholders should work together to share intelligence, standardize security protocols, and invest in collective defense mechanisms.</p>
<p>Public-private partnerships can play a key role in funding advanced cybersecurity infrastructure, while international regulatory bodies like the IMO must enforce stricter cybersecurity mandates across the industry. Finally, as ports transition into smart ports, powered by the internet of things (IoT), AI, and automation, cybersecurity should be at the forefront of maritime security strategies. Emerging technologies like quantum computing and zero trust architecture will play a crucial role in strengthening digital defenses, but ports should remain vigilant. The very technologies designed to enhance security could also introduce new vulnerabilities if not properly managed.</p>
<p>Cybersecurity is no longer just a technical issue; it is a fundamental pillar of modern port management. If cybersecurity continues to be treated as an afterthought, the next major cyberattack could bring global trade to a standstill. Ports are the lifelines of the world economy, and securing them is not just about protecting data, it is about safeguarding the stability of international commerce and national security.</p>
<p><em>Maryyum Masood is working as a Research Officer &amp; Associate Editor at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad. She is an MPhil scholar in the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU) Islamabad.</em></p>
<p><em>Rizwana Abbasi is an Associate Professor of Security Studies at the National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, a non-resident Fellow of the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad, and a Visiting Fellow at the Central European University of Austria.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Cybersecurity-Framework-for-Maritime-Port-Management.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="317" height="88" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 317px) 100vw, 317px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/cybersecurity-framework-for-maritime-port-management/">Cybersecurity Framework for Maritime Port Management</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Achieving Peace Through Strength: A Sustainment Imperative</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/achieving-peace-through-strength-a-sustainment-imperative/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/achieving-peace-through-strength-a-sustainment-imperative/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brandon Toliver]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 31 Mar 2025 12:13:21 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[acquisition reform ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[advanced manufacturing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Air Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[aircraft]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense industrial base]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[depot maintenance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[funding]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[sustainment]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[warrior ethos]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[workforce retention]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30390</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s directive to achieve “peace through strength” inherently relies on a restored warrior ethos, a rebuilt military, and reestablished deterrence. However, sustainment challenges within the Air Force—including personnel shortfalls and aging infrastructure—threaten the execution of this mission. Addressing these challenges is vital for maintaining operational readiness and strategic deterrence against pacing [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/achieving-peace-through-strength-a-sustainment-imperative/">Achieving Peace Through Strength: A Sustainment Imperative</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s directive to achieve “<a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4040940/secretary-hegseths-message-to-the-force/">peace through strength</a>” inherently relies on a restored warrior ethos, a rebuilt military, and reestablished deterrence. However, sustainment challenges within the Air Force—including personnel shortfalls and aging infrastructure—threaten the execution of this mission. Addressing these challenges is vital for maintaining operational readiness and strategic deterrence against pacing threats, particularly posed by nations like China and Russia.</p>
<p>Informed by the works of Lieutenant General Tom D. Miller, particularly “<a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjb-tm8gO6LAxWZE1kFHf72ALEQFnoECBQQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fdml.armywarcollege.edu%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2023%2F01%2FMiller-Defense-Sustainment-Industrial-Base-2010.pdf&amp;usg=AOvVaw3ZXraxctSKJCCoB3YUd09V&amp;opi=89978449">The Defense Sustainment Industrial Base</a>” and “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/capability-capacity-and-risk-in-the-sustainment-of-air-force-weapon-systems/">Capability, Capacity, and Risk in Sustainment of Air Force Weapon Systems</a>,” it is clear that the challenges and strategies surrounding maintenance of Air Force weapon systems are multifaceted. The first article highlights the foundational elements necessary for a robust defense sustainment industrial base, emphasizing the need for a resilient infrastructure. The second publication further develops this analysis, delving into the evolving landscape of capability, capacity, and risk management in the context of sustaining advanced weapon systems. Collectively, these works offer critical insights and recommendations on optimizing the sustainment process, ensuring readiness and effectiveness in a changing security landscape.</p>
<p>This passage highlights a significant juxtaposition of key themes present in the Secretary of Defense’s goals and Gen. Miller’s examination of Air Force sustainment challenges. To navigate these challenges effectively, specific focus must be placed on three pivotal areas: restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding the military, and reestablishing deterrence.</p>
<p>In the effort to restore the warrior ethos, the military needs skilled personnel, modern facilities, and a sustainable defense industrial base. Workforce retention and a shortage of technical expertise undeniably impact operational readiness. According to the Secretary of Defense’s mandate, there is a pressing need to “revive the warrior ethos and restore trust in our military.”</p>
<p>Miller’s analysis reveals that the sustainment workforce is facing severe challenges such as an aging workforce, a lack of recruitment, and significant technical expertise gaps. <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjLxI_1gO6LAxUTElkFHeEwDmYQFnoECCUQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.afsc.af.mil%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw0NR4JOXP31-7yi8FPQ96DQ&amp;opi=89978449">The Air Force Sustainment Center (AFSC)</a> is currently experiencing a 30 percent shortage in experienced depot maintenance personnel. This shortfall adversely affects the maintenance and throughput of mission-critical aircraft. A 2022 report by the <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105571">Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported</a> that workforce shortages at Air Logistics Complexes (ALCs) contribute to an average delay of 20 percent in aircraft depot maintenance cycles, diminishing operational readiness.</p>
<p>Transitioning from a counterterrorism focus to one that emphasizes great power competition necessitates a sustainment workforce capable of advanced manufacturing and software maintenance, but current training pipelines struggle to produce such expertise. The implications are stark; a degraded sustainment workforce directly undermines operational readiness, particularly in maintaining high-end platforms like the F-35, which are essential for effective deterrence.</p>
<p>In relation to rebuilding the military, the defense industrial base faces significant hurdles due to aging infrastructure, inefficient procurement processes, and inconsistent funding. Secretary Hegseth emphasizes the importance of this rebuilding process, stating the need to match threats with capabilities. Gen. Miller’s assessments indicate that the Air Force’s sustainment infrastructure is outdated and that funding for depot modernization is inconsistent. The average age of Air Force maintenance depots exceeds 60 years, with several facilities dating back to World War II. Supply-chain vulnerabilities also arise. Significant dependence on a sole supplier for 67 percent of critical spare parts for legacy aircraft creates potential crises during conflicts. Moreover, extended procurement cycles often delay readiness enhancements, averaging 8 to 10 years from requirement to fielding for sustainment modernization projects.</p>
<p>Thus, without rapid modernization of sustainment infrastructure and necessary acquisition reform, the Air Force will struggle to maintain aging fleets while simultaneously integrating essential next-generation capabilities for initiatives like joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) and agile combat employment (ACE).</p>
<p>Reestablishing deterrence requires a comprehensive assessment of readiness to ensure that sustainment capacity effectively aligns with the threats posed by nations such as China and Russia. As stated in the SECDEF mandates, deterrence must be reestablished through defense of the homeland and collaboration with allies. However, Miller’s 2022 assessment points out a disconnect between current sustainment funding models and the operational requirements of deterrence in contested environments. For instance, from 2012 to 2022, the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwj27azYge6LAxVNEVkFHbfnNVUQFnoECBQQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.airandspaceforces.com%2Fair-force-mission-capable-rates-fiscal-2024%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2KqGvEhWtyOQhQbIcC9ztO&amp;opi=89978449">readiness rates</a> for the USAF fighter fleet plummeted from 75 to 57 percent, with sustainment backlogs contributing significantly to non-mission-capable status. Only 40 percent of American sustainment infrastructure is currently forward-positioned in the Indo-Pacific, which is crucial for countering aggressive actions from adversaries.</p>
<p>To counter these challenges and bolster national defense strategy, courses of action should be implemented. First, revitalizing the sustainment workforce through expanded training and technological improvements is essential. According to projected outcomes, this could reduce depot maintenance delays by 15 to 20 percent within five years while raising mission-capable rates for advanced platforms.</p>
<p>Second, prioritizing infrastructure and acquisition reform will require streamlining procurement processes and integrating industry best practices. This reform could lead to a reduction in aircraft downtime and enhance rapid repair capabilities essential for operating within geographic regions such as the Indo-Pacific. Finally, adopting a risk-based resource-allocation strategy aligned with high-threat mission areas can significantly strengthen deterrence, ultimately raising mission-capable rates of critical platforms.</p>
<p>By aligning sustainment actions with the objectives of the <em>National Defense Strategy</em>, the Air Force can demonstrate improved deterrence capabilities, build enduring advantages, and modernize its force. An immediate investment in revitalizing the sustainment workforce, modernizing depot infrastructure, and aligning resources with operational needs is imperative. A reformative approach to sustainment is not merely an operational necessity; it constitutes a vital aspect of maintaining peace through strength. Without these necessary adjustments, the Air Force risks facing severe mission degradation in high-threat scenarios, ultimately jeopardizing national defense.</p>
<p><em>Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Achieving-Peace-Through-Strength.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="295" height="82" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 295px) 100vw, 295px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/achieving-peace-through-strength-a-sustainment-imperative/">Achieving Peace Through Strength: A Sustainment Imperative</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Bolstering Extended Deterrence</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/bolstering-extended-deterrence/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/bolstering-extended-deterrence/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[William Atkins]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Dec 2024 12:45:22 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[alliances]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American commitment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Australia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense cooperation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[heavy bomber task force exercises]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo-Pacific]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[interoperability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Japan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[joint coalition exercises]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[multilateral treaty organization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear umbrella]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear-capable F-35s]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[partnerships]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[People's Republic of China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[power projection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regional defense cooperation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[William Atkins ​]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29487</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As the nuclear deterrence landscape continues to change, the United States must reinvigorate its alliances and partnerships to project power effectively and effectively hold adversaries at risk. The 2022 National Defense Strategy outwardly identified the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a pacing threat. Russia’s almost three-year war on Ukraine has also made the North [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/bolstering-extended-deterrence/">Bolstering Extended Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As the nuclear deterrence landscape continues to change, the United States must reinvigorate its alliances and partnerships to project power effectively and effectively hold adversaries at risk. The 2022 <em>National Defense Strategy</em> outwardly identified the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a pacing threat. Russia’s almost three-year war on Ukraine has also made the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) long-standing success in fostering multilateral coordination with European allies even more important and a valuable model that could be leveraged in other regions.</p>
<p>Such an alliance is needed most in the Indo-Pacific region where China is attempting, with some success, to challenge the American-led rules-based international order. Growing American alliances and partnerships beyond current bilateral relationships is the solution.</p>
<p>A more tailored and comprehensive approach involving Australia, Japan, and South Korea should serve as the beginning of an alliance that could expand and counter Chinese efforts in more than just the military realm. Such an alliance could bolster American nuclear deterrence and assurance in the region and directly support regional stability. A need for increased security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is a clear and obtainable objective.</p>
<p><strong>Formalizing a Multilateral Treaty Organization</strong></p>
<p>Creating a regional multilateral treaty-bound organization with Australia, Japan, and South Korea will institutionalize defense cooperation and bolster collective security. This organization could formally facilitate regular interoperability consultations, increase joint coalition exercises, and more effectively coordinate responses to regional threats. By formalizing these relationships, the US and its allies can ensure a cohesive and effective deterrence strategy with more eloquence throughout the Indo-Pacific.</p>
<p>Establishing a new treaty organization will be challenging, but the cost-benefit will be worthwhile in the long term. This formality directly supports the diplomatic leg of the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) model.</p>
<p><strong>Equipping Allies with Nuclear-Capable F-35s</strong></p>
<p>Expanding the sale of nuclear-capable F-35As to Australia, Japan, and South Korea represents a significant advancement in regional coverage of the US nuclear umbrella. These next-generation fighters provide a capable and credible nuclear capability to prepare allies for future conflict, allows increased power projection against potential adversaries, and bolsters the operational compatibility between American forces and allies.</p>
<p>By integrating these aircraft into their respective air forces, allies can contribute to a more dynamic and responsive deterrence posture if a need arises as the geopolitical environment changes. And, if the alliance expands as expected, F-35s can compensate for their range limitations by “island hopping” their way to the fight or allies can build their own aerial refueling capability.</p>
<p>The presence of highly mobile nuclear-capable platforms increases regional solidarity in a strategically tailored way that messages adversaries that aggression will not be tolerated. Given growing Chinese aggression, this is an important task.</p>
<p><strong>Developing Supporting Infrastructure</strong></p>
<p>To maximize the efficacy of these new capabilities, it is crucial to establish a robust infrastructure that supports the deployment and maintenance of nuclear-capable assets for</p>
<p>forward-based power projection. This includes upgrading the host nations’ airfields, maintenance facilities, and command-and-control systems.</p>
<p>Such infrastructure will allow seamless integration of allied forces into joint operations and ensure sustained operational readiness. The host nations will need to take charge of the economic development required to maintain the increase in capability and its continued sustainment in the long term—relieving some of the costs that would otherwise be borne by the American taxpayer.</p>
<p><strong>Increasing SSBN Port Calls and Coalition Heavy Bomber Task Force Exercises</strong></p>
<p>Boosting the frequency of American ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) port calls and conducting more coalition heavy bomber task force exercises will further strengthen the deterrence posture within the region. American SSBN presence provides a method to showcase a strategic, survivable deterrent, while heavy bombers enable power projection. Conducting joint operations further solidifies a multinational force’s allied resolve and compatibility.</p>
<p>Additionally, the United States could showcase the ability to provide a safe haven for the required heavy bomber task forces if the need arises. These activities would demonstrate an increase in enhancing regional security ties and reassuring allies of the continuation of American commitment. The United States could also sell the B1 and B2 bombers it plans to retire to its allies.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>Strengthening American nuclear deterrence in the Indo-Pacific requires a multifaceted approach that continues to foster positive alliances and partnerships that advance capabilities. Honoring these commitments showcases allied resolve to hold adversaries at risk with well-calculated multilateral decision-making processes and regional cooperation. By equipping Australia, Japan, and South Korea with nuclear-capable F-35As, establishing the necessary infrastructure, formalizing multilateral agreements, and increasing strategic exercises with ballistic missile submarines and heavy bombers, the US and its allies can enhance deterrence.</p>
<p>These measures will solidify regional defense cooperation, amplify the efficacy of the nuclear umbrella, and ensure a regional multilateral response to potential nuclear threats, thereby reinforcing the American commitment to maintaining stability and countering China’s growing influence across the region.</p>
<p><em>William Atkins spent a career in the nuclear enterprise. The views expressed are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Bolstering-Extended-Deterrence.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/bolstering-extended-deterrence/">Bolstering Extended Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Ukraine’s Incursion into Russia: What’s Next for the Peace Process?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/ukraines-incursion-into-russia-whats-next-for-the-peace-process/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/ukraines-incursion-into-russia-whats-next-for-the-peace-process/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Seher Intikhab]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Nov 2024 12:49:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29339</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In August 2024, Ukraine launched a significant incursion into Russia’s Kursk Oblast, advancing up to 30 kilometers and gaining control of 1,200 square kilometers and 93 villages. Analysts suggest the offensive aims to pull Russian forces away from the eastern front lines and secure leverage for potential peace talks. However, Russia continues to make gains [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/ukraines-incursion-into-russia-whats-next-for-the-peace-process/">Ukraine’s Incursion into Russia: What’s Next for the Peace Process?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In August 2024, Ukraine launched a significant incursion into <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682">Russia’s Kursk Oblast</a>, advancing up to 30 kilometers and gaining control of 1,200 square kilometers and 93 villages. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/ukraine-russia-kursk-incursion-war.html">Analysts suggest</a> the offensive aims to pull Russian forces away from the eastern front lines and secure leverage for potential peace talks. However, Russia continues to make gains in eastern Ukraine, capturing the town of Niu-York near Donetsk and pushing Ukrainian troops to evacuate Pokrovsk. As both sides dig in, the conflict shows no signs of abating, resulting in a severe humanitarian crisis.</p>
<p>As the international community struggles to manage the escalating crisis, the prospect of a peace process remains distant. Russia maintains that peace is only achievable when its objectives are met. These <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67711802">objectives</a>, central to Moscow’s stance from the beginning of the war, include the demilitarization and neutralization of Ukraine, as well as changes that align with Russia’s security interests. These include control over Crimea and influence in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/un-ukraine-zelenskyy-russia-peace-territorial-blinken-db3954c29fa826601f42101e05fd6db0">dismissed peace talks</a> with Russia, insisting that any resolution must involve the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.</p>
<p>He emphasized that Russia, as the sole aggressor, must be compelled to comply with international law and respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Despite ongoing military engagements and international diplomatic efforts, both sides remain entrenched in their positions, with Russia demanding territorial concessions and Ukraine insisting on sovereignty and territorial integrity.</p>
<p>A potential resolution could involve establishing a neutral zone in contested areas, facilitating a phased withdrawal of both Russian and Ukrainian forces. Ukraine’s commitment to its territorial integrity should be upheld, while Russia could receive assurances regarding its security concerns, particularly concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) commitment to Ukraine’s future membership. Such a balanced approach could open avenues for dialogue, encourage a more stable regional environment, and ultimately benefit both nations while contributing to broader international stability.</p>
<p><strong>Russia’s Domestic Situation</strong></p>
<p>Russian President <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/06/14/europe/putin-conditions-peace-talks-ukraine-intl/index.html">Vladimir Putin</a> outlined Russia’s conditions for ending the war in Ukraine, which focus on Ukraine’s full withdrawal from the entire territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia—regions Moscow claims as Russian land. He also demands that Ukraine abandon its bid to join NATO—addressing Russian concerns about NATO’s eastward expansion. Furthermore, Putin called for Ukraine’s demilitarization and insisted on the lifting of Western sanctions that, while not crippling, impact Russia’s economy.</p>
<p>Domestically, Putin frames the war as essential to Russia’s security and national identity, maintaining significant support despite economic hardships caused by sanctions. The extended nature of the war, however, is seeing inflation, falling living standards, and localized protests over conscription. Despite these pressures, Putin shows little interest in peace, viewing the war as vital to Russia’s strategic objectives. Without significant internal shifts or international pressure, it is unlikely that Russia will pursue peace soon. Putin’s current stance suggests that the conflict will persist, with little sign of de-escalation unless broader geopolitical changes occur.</p>
<p><strong>Ukraine’s Domestic Conditions</strong></p>
<p>In Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky maintains strong public support despite the immense challenges the country faces. The Ukrainian population remains united in their resistance against Russian aggression, bolstered by a deep sense of national pride and resilience. However, the ongoing conflict has taken a severe toll on the country’s infrastructure, economy, and civilian population.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s desire for peace is clear, but not at the cost of sovereignty or territorial concessions. Zelensky’s government has repeatedly stated that any peace deal must include the withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.</p>
<p><a href="https://apnews.com/article/un-ukraine-zelenskyy-russia-peace-territorial-blinken-db3954c29fa826601f42101e05fd6db0">President Zelensky</a> dismissed the idea of peace talks with Russia, urging for decisive global action to compel Moscow into peace. Speaking at a United Nations Security Council meeting, he emphasized that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion violated numerous international laws and will not cease through negotiations. Zelensky’s government consistently maintains that any peace deal must include the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea. He argued that as the sole aggressor, Russia must be forced into peace, underscoring the need to uphold the UN Charter’s principle of respecting every nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.</p>
<p><strong>The Collapse of Peace Proposals for the Russia-Ukraine Conflict</strong></p>
<p>Multiple international peace efforts failed to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict. <a href="https://time.com/6258052/china-russia-ukraine-cease-fire/">China’s 12-point peace proposal</a> for the Russia-Ukraine conflict advocated for an immediate cease-fire and respect for national sovereignty. It called for the lifting of non-UN sanctioned sanctions, protection of civilians, and the promotion of dialogue while emphasizing humanitarian issues and global energy security. The plan also included a cease-fire that would freeze Russian troops in place on Ukrainian territory and urged cooperation among nations to achieve lasting peace.</p>
<p>However, it was dismissed by the West for favoring Russia and not addressing Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty. The <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/us-russia-talks-ukraine-/31645760.html">Geneva talks</a> regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict sought to establish a framework for dialogue aimed at addressing security concerns and finding pathways to a peaceful resolution. Key topics included NATO expansion, security guarantees for Ukraine, and managing the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. These discussions, however, have faced obstacles due to differing views among the parties involved, leading to limited progress and a continuing stalemate in negotiations.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgr542l753po">Hungary’s attempts</a> to mediate in the Russia-Ukraine conflict faced significant challenges, culminating in the European Union’s (EU) decision to strip Budapest of its right to host foreign and defense ministers’ meetings due to Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s meeting with Vladimir Putin. EU leaders viewed it as undermining a united European response to the war. As a result, Hungary’s role as a mediator has been called into question, with criticism from various EU member states highlighting the lack of consensus around its diplomatic initiatives.</p>
<p><strong>Is Peace Possible?</strong></p>
<p>The prospect for peace in the Ukraine-Russia conflict remains vague at best. A potential resolution could involve creating a neutral zone, phased troop withdrawal, and maintaining Ukraine’s territorial integrity while addressing Russia’s NATO-related concerns. However, entrenched geopolitical dynamics may prolong the conflict for years, worsening devastation, and complicating diplomatic efforts.</p>
<p><em>Seher Intikhab is a university student majoring in international relations. Views expressed are the author&#8217;s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Ukraines-Incursion-into-Russia.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/ukraines-incursion-into-russia-whats-next-for-the-peace-process/">Ukraine’s Incursion into Russia: What’s Next for the Peace Process?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Reviving Cold War Air Bases: A Strategic Move for Modern Deterrence?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/reviving-cold-war-air-bases-a-strategic-move-for-modern-deterrence/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/reviving-cold-war-air-bases-a-strategic-move-for-modern-deterrence/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Thibert]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jul 2024 12:11:46 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=28496</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The West is behind in rebuilding the infrastructure needed to meet the emerging threats posed by China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. The re-emergence of great-power competition requires an intense effort to rebuild atrophied capabilities. The Strategic Posture Review made the case for urgent investment in modernized strategic forces including a less vulnerable road-mobile Sentinel [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/reviving-cold-war-air-bases-a-strategic-move-for-modern-deterrence/">Reviving Cold War Air Bases: A Strategic Move for Modern Deterrence?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The West is behind in rebuilding the infrastructure needed to meet the emerging threats posed by China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. The re-emergence of great-power competition requires an intense effort to rebuild atrophied capabilities. The <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF12621.pdf"><em>Strategic Posture Review</em></a> made the case for urgent investment in modernized strategic forces including a less vulnerable road-mobile <a href="https://www.afnwc.af.mil/Weapon-Systems/Sentinel-ICBM-LGM-35A/">Sentinel</a> intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and expressed concern that the nuclear bomber force is currently located at only three bases with ICBMs and ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) each at two additional bases.</p>
<p>As the <a href="https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/2682973/b-21-raider/">B-21</a> bomber enters the Air Force inventory the number of nuclear-capable bomber bases sees very little change. With the nation preparing for the geopolitical era ahead, it is time to discuss the re-commissioning of Cold War<strong>–</strong>era United States Air Force (USAF) bases, whose geographic positions can once again play an important role in deterring the axis of autocracy that is forming in opposition to American and Western leadership.</p>
<p>The changing strategic landscape and <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R43838.pdf">re-emergence of great-power competition</a> should prompt discussion of renewing a committed focus towards strategic deterrence and the nuclear capabilities needed to deter China, North Korea, and Russia. Many Cold War<strong>–</strong>era bases were strategically located to project power and respond to threats. Re-commissioning these bases could provide needed dispersal for a bomber force that is located at only three bases. While upgrades and modernization are necessary, existing infrastructure at bases that remain in use by National Guard units, for example, or other organizations could significantly reduce the cost and time required to build a more resilient bomber leg of the nuclear triad. Tankers and other supporting components to the bomber mission would also benefit.</p>
<p>Utilizing existing bases could minimize environmental impacts, construction costs, and impact on local communities. While the Base Realignment and Closure effort that followed the Cold War’s end allowed the United States to reduce defense spending through dramatic cuts to infrastructure, the three-decade hiatus from great-power competition is over and the consolidation impacted deployability and introduced strategic force vulnerabilities. Today’s accelerating threat requires the urgent re-establishment of a ready network of dispersal and forward bases.</p>
<p>In tandem with re-commissioning Cold War<strong>–</strong>era Air Force bases, the strategic value of the US <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-government-use-strategic-petroleum-reserve">Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)</a> must also be considered. As a critical asset in ensuring energy security, the SPR provides a buffer against potential disruptions in oil supply that could arise from geopolitical tensions or conflicts. Ensuring that military operations are not hampered by fuel shortages is paramount, especially when considering the logistical demands of dispersed air bases. By maintaining and potentially expanding the SPR, the US can safeguard its military readiness and resilience, ensuring that energy constraints do not undermine strategic deterrence and defense capabilities.</p>
<p>The expansion of the American strategic nuclear arsenal—including <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/01/03/us-navy-avoided-a-2022-trough-in-submarine-fleet-size-but-industry-challenges-threaten-future-growth/">increasing</a> the number of SSBNs, making Sentinel road-mobile, and acquiring more than the planned <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/air-force-b-21-stealth-bomber/">100 B-21 stealth bombers</a>, which are all required in the current strategic environment—underscores the need for re-commissioned bases. Not only are these bases useful for dispersal of bombers, but they have the potential to offer areas from which road-mobile ICBMs can disperse.</p>
<p>Admittedly, significant investment is required to modernize shuddered bases, including upgrades to runways, hangars, communication systems, and security. Environmental assessments and remediation efforts may also be necessary to address potential contamination from previous operations, adding to the cost and timeline. Re-commissioning could also disrupt local communities and raise concerns about noise pollution, safety, and environmental impacts, necessitating careful planning and community engagement. However, many towns devastated by the closure of bases would gladly welcome their return.</p>
<p>Significant resources are required to refurbish or rebuild facilities, integrate new aircraft and technology with existing infrastructure, coordinate with local authorities, and establish new supply chains and support networks. Legacy infrastructure at Air National Guard bases, for example, can reduce the cost and time required to build a more resilient force structure while reducing costs. ICBMs, tankers, and other support elements would also benefit.</p>
<p>During the Cold War, the U.S. military employed a dispersal strategy to mitigate the risk of concentrated attacks on its airbases, scattering aircraft across multiple locations to enhance survivability and ensure retaliatory capabilities. This approach was vital in countering the Soviet threat—reducing the vulnerability of strategic assets. In today’s context of renewed great-power competition, with rising threats from China, North Korea, and Russia, adjusting the current strategy is essential.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the decision to expand the basing footprint should be built on a comprehensive analysis of costs and benefits and a thorough understanding of strategic implications. By carefully weighing these factors, policymakers can make informed decisions that enhance national security while minimizing negative impacts on communities and the environment.</p>
<p><em>Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the</em> <a href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/"><em>National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</em></a> <em>with nearly 30 years of comprehensive expertise. His background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. Views express are his own. </em><em> </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Reviving-Cold-War-Air-Bases_-A-Strategic-Move-for-Modern-Deterrence.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28497 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Download3-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Download3-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Download3.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/reviving-cold-war-air-bases-a-strategic-move-for-modern-deterrence/">Reviving Cold War Air Bases: A Strategic Move for Modern Deterrence?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Ukraine’s Long-Term Catastrophes: Demographic  Decline and Economic Devastation</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/ukraines-long-term-catastrophes-demographic-decline-and-economic-devastation/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amit Gupta]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 May 2024 11:51:31 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[demographic decline]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27772</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As the war in Ukraine grinds on with mounting casualties on both sides, Americans are debating whether to continue funding Kyiv’s war effort. Ukraine, however, faces two far greater long-term challenges to its existence as a nation-state. These are serious demographic declines—that will leave it with a shrinking and aging population—and the huge cost of [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/ukraines-long-term-catastrophes-demographic-decline-and-economic-devastation/">Ukraine’s Long-Term Catastrophes: Demographic  Decline and Economic Devastation</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As the war in Ukraine grinds on with mounting casualties on both sides, Americans are debating whether to continue funding Kyiv’s war effort. Ukraine, however, faces two far greater long-term challenges to its existence as a nation-state. These are serious demographic declines—that will leave it with a shrinking and aging population—and the huge cost of economic reconstruction.</p>
<p>In both cases, the situation is dire for Ukraine and one that will require considerable external assistance. Such assistance is crucial to maintain the credibility of the West, yet the fear is that once the war ends, so, too, will Western interest—leaving Ukraine with an aging population and a destroyed economy that may not recover for decades. If that happens, the demographic decline of the state will only accelerate as it will provide few opportunities for its younger population who will leave. The West needs, therefore, to come up with a long-term plan to reverse both these interrelated trends.</p>
<p><strong>Demographic Decline</strong></p>
<p>Ukraine’s population is declining and has for some time. The country went from a population of 51.7 million, at the time of independence in 1991, to 43.5 million in 2020. A weak economy with few jobs led to an exodus of young people to other parts of the world, particularly Western Europe. Declining birth rates also contributed to a shrinking of the population with it reaching a <a href="https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/idb/#/dashboard?COUNTRY_YEAR=2024&amp;COUNTRY_YR_ANIM=2024&amp;CCODE_SINGLE=UA&amp;CCODE=UA">fertility rate</a> of 1.23 children per couple by 2019. Ukraine is one of the European countries that was already in serious demographic decline and the war has only exacerbated this trend. By 2023 the population shrank to 34.8 million.</p>
<p>The war led to 4–6 million citizens living in an area occupied by Russia, another 4 million are refugees in the European Union (EU), and another 1 million are spread over the rest of the world. Worse, about 20 percent of Ukraine’s children are now refugees in the EU and there is a big question mark over how many of these children and their parents will return to the war-torn and impoverished nation. Thus, a Ukrainian population that was meant to reach 35 million by 2050 is now expected to further shrink by that year to 30.9 million. As the Census Bureau’s data shows the bulk of this population will be in the age group 55–75, hardly a cohort that can drive economic activity in the country, foster innovation, or attract outside investment.</p>
<p><strong>The Cost of Economic Reconstruction</strong></p>
<p>The economic damage to Ukraine, especially the destruction of its infrastructure, continues to grow, leading the World Bank, in 2023, to estimate that the country would require $411 billion for rebuilding from the war’s devastation. This estimate now tops $486 billion, although the final figure is unclear—given recent <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/russian-forces-launch-aerial-attack-across-ukraine/">attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure</a>. By the time the war is over the cost of reconstruction is likely to exceed $500 billion, a staggering amount for any group of countries to provide in assistance. To put this in perspective, the EU is committing $54 billion over a four-year period to Ukraine—a sum of $13.5 billion a year. Funding at that level is too little to significantly change the fortunes of Ukraine, especially since after the war is over the EU and US may have other priorities. This means upping aid to the level where it has a meaningful effect on Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts and that leads to the other problem.</p>
<p>The EU and US would have to sink roughly $20 billion a year for 25 years into the country. Asking for such a long-term commitment is difficult. Western nations would likely balk at the sums involved and the length of the financial commitment to Kyiv. Further, western public opinion, while overwhelmingly supportive of Ukraine, is likely to lose interest in the minutiae of post-war reconstruction. Supplying arms, after all, is far more compelling and appealing than seeking to rebuild power grids and schools.</p>
<p>One solution is to take the $300 billion of confiscated Russian assets and either transfer them to Ukraine or loan them to Kyiv. The problem with this approach is that it reduces confidence in western financial institutions as secure and safe repositories of foreign assets.  Taking such an action might see foreign investors pull their holdings in the West. Funding Ukrainian reconstruction may, therefore, be costly for the West. But both for demographic reasons and for showing the strength of Western commitment, it is necessary to consider a sizeable and long-term economic package for Ukraine.</p>
<p>Demographically, a Ukraine that shows the prospect of being rapidly rebuilt is far more likely to attract back the millions of refugees who have crossed into other countries. It will also stem the outflow of future populations from the country as jobs and opportunities become freely available. Beginning with the Ukrainian arms industry, particularly its missile and aircraft industries, may be a good starting place. At one point, Ukraine-based Antonov was one of two producers of heavy-lift aircraft for the Soviet Union. Antonov manufactured the world’s largest transport aircraft—the An-225 Mriya. The sole operational Mriya was destroyed in the early days of the attack on Kyiv, <a href="https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2016-09-06/antonov-sells-dormant-225-heavylifter-program-china">but the manufacturing rights and technical data were sold to China in 2016</a>. Rebuilding what Ukraine has a proven talent and capacity for would be the first right step in the path to reconstruction.</p>
<p>A long-term commitment would also show the rest of the world that the West is willing to bear the burden of a decades-long aid process. In doing so, it would signal that the Western alliance does not cut and run when its short-term objectives are achieved. After Afghanistan, for example, trust in the West as a reliable long-term ally reached a low given the manner of the pull-out from Kabul. A sustained commitment to Kyiv would show that the sacrifices made by the Ukrainian people were not in vain.</p>
<p>While the war may continue for a while, it is necessary to develop a solid long-term plan for the economic reconstruction of Ukraine and to line up donors who will fund it over a long period of time. Otherwise, Ukraine’s demographic disaster will only escalate, and the West will be seen as an alliance that does not honor its commitments.</p>
<p><em>Amit Gupta is a Senior Fellow of the National Institute of Deterrence Studies. The views in this article are his and do not necessarily reflect those of the NIDS. He can be contacted at agupta1856@gmail.com.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Ukraines-Long-Term-Catastrophes.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-26665 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="Get this publication" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/ukraines-long-term-catastrophes-demographic-decline-and-economic-devastation/">Ukraine’s Long-Term Catastrophes: Demographic  Decline and Economic Devastation</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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