In an age of persistent great power competition, the fight for influence is the decisive precursor to any potential conflict. Adversaries like Iran, who cannot compete symmetrically with the U.S., have poured resources into the information domain, recognizing it as the critical battlespace. As detailed in “In an Asymmetrical War, Iran Seeks an Edge With Its Information War,” Iran is waging a sophisticated offensive to win the war of perception first, shaping the cognitive battlefield to paralyze U.S. decision-making. This poses a direct challenge to the U.S. Department of War’s core focus on “maximum lethality,” as outlined in the 2026 National Defense Strategy. That goal, however, is unachievable if the information battlespace is lost. Cognitive dominance in the operational information environment is not a distraction from lethality; it is the fundamental prerequisite for it. To win, the joint forces must complement their pursuit of kinetic overmatch with a mastery of the cognitive domain. 

Iran’s gray zone strategy, a mix of proxy warfare and calibrated escalation detailed in analyses by CSIS and Michael Eisenstadt, is designed to create dilemmas and exploit the seams in Western military thought. The U.S. response was to elevate “Information” to a joint function, a critical doctrinal step. But as then-Brigadier General Grynkewich noted when introducing the concept, doctrine-on-a-shelf changes nothing without a corresponding shift in the force’s “cultural mindsets.” The real work is building cognitive architecture to apply it. 

This is where a “Global Mindset,” defined by scholars in “A Whole New Global Mindset for Leadership” as “the capability to influence others unlike yourself,” becomes a warfighting imperative. This mindset is not an abstract virtue, but a tangible capability built on three pillars: (1) Intellectual Capital: The cognitive horsepower to understand the complex web of political, cultural, and social factors in a contested environment. (2) Psychological Capital: The resilience and fortitude to operate effectively in ambiguous, long-term struggles, countering an adversary’s “long game.” (3) Social Capital: The behavioral skill to build trust and show intercultural empathy, allowing for the creation of authentic partnerships and resonant counter-narratives. 

Yet, how do you build this mindset at scale? The answer lies in a structured, teachable framework. The Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model, a methodology developed at The Air University and Defense Information School. It was designed specifically to make the abstract actionable. It provides a repeatable process for planners to solve “wicked problems” in the information domain. Its five core elements are: 

(1) Complex Adaptive Systems Thinking: This foundational mindset shifts planners from linear predictable models to seeing the information environment as a dynamic ecosystem. It allows them to anticipate ripple effects and identify high-leverage nodes in an adversary’s network. 

(2) PESTLE and Ecosystem Analysis: Using a structured analysis of the Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal, and Environmental domains, this step builds the deep situational awareness required to uncover the root grievances an adversary like Iran exploits. 

(3) Cynefin Sensemaking Framework: This framework helps leaders correctly categorize the environment. The gray zone is a “Complex” domain, where the only effective approach is to “Probe-Sense-Respond,” in essence to conduct small-scale, reversible actions, see how the system reacts, and adapt accordingly. This neutralizes an adversary’s probing tactics and reduces the risk of miscalculation. 

(4) Wicked Solutions for Complex Problems: This approach is the engine for building social capital. It forces planners to see the problem from the diverse perspectives of all stakeholders, enabling the creation of sustainable, locally resonant strategies that can “flip the script” on an adversary’s propaganda. 

(5) Strategic Foresight: This element breaks Iran’s “long game” advantage by shifting the U.S. focus from short-term reactions to long-term competition, allowing planners to anticipate future conflict domains and build strategic patience. 

Defeating our adversaries in the gray zone is a cognitive, not purely a kinetic, challenge. To achieve the Department of War’s goal of decisive lethality, we must first win the war of ideas. The time has come for U.S. military leaders to stop treating information as a supporting effort and recognize it as the central battlefield in modern competition. This requires a deliberate, sustained investment in the intellectual and cultural readiness of our warfighters. We must integrate cognitive frameworks like the Olympus Mons model into professional military education and operational planning. This is not just about improving human decision-making today; it is about future-proofing our force. The structured, logic-based nature of this model is the most compatible framework for integration with the Information Advantage large language models that will define the next generation of warfare, allowing our warfighters to serve as the critical ‘human-in-the-loop’ for AI-enabled operations in the information environment. 

The character of conflict is evolving, but the core of American strength, the ingenuity and adaptability of its warfighters, remains unchanged. The next generation of warfare will not be won by military might and technology alone, but by those who can master the cognitive battlefield of the Operational Information Environment which includes the complex human terrain where influence is wielded and will is broken. Frameworks like the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model do not replace the warrior’s ethos; they sharpen it, forging leaders who can out-think, out-maneuver, and out-compete our adversaries in the war of ideas. Seizing this cognitive high ground is the ultimate expression of ‘peace through strength.’ The tools to build this future are within our grasp; what is required now is the vision and the will to forge the victory of tomorrow. 

Oshawn Jefferson is a national security professional and strategic communication expert with over two decades of experience in the U.S. military and academic sectors. He is the creator of the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model and a leading voice on developing cognitive readiness and a global mindset within the Joint Force. The views of the author are his own. 

Applying the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model to Defeat Iran in the Gray Zone was originally published on Global Security Review.

Strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific is increasingly taking place in the “gray zone”—the space between routine state competition and open warfare. Rather than relying solely on conventional military confrontation, states are employing hybrid tactics such as economic coercion, cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, and limited military provocations to gradually shift the strategic balance in their favour.

China, North Korea, and Russia are among the most active practitioners of gray zone strategy. Their activities are deliberately calibrated to remain below the threshold that would trigger a large-scale military response, allowing a to challenge the rules-based order while avoiding outright conflict.

For policymakers and military planners, this presents a difficult dilemma. Traditional deterrence models were designed to prevent major wars, not persistent low-level coercion. As gray-zone competition intensifies across the Indo-Pacific, regional states must consider how to deter and respond to these activities without inadvertently escalating the situation.

Understanding the actors involved, and the tactics they employ, is therefore essential. The following sections outline how China, North Korea, and Russia conduct gray zone campaigns across the Indo-Pacific and how these activities collectively challenge regional stability.

China: Gradual Strategic Expansion

China arguably conducts the most sophisticated and comprehensive gray zone campaign in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing’s approach combines military presence, maritime coercion, economic pressure, and legal strategies to expand its influence while avoiding direct confrontation.

In the maritime domain, China frequently uses coast guard vessels and maritime militia to harass foreign ships in disputed waters, particularly in the South China Sea. These forces operate in ways that blur the line between civilian and military activity, allowing Beijing to apply pressure while maintaining plausible deniability.

China also conducts frequent aircraft incursions and large-scale military exercises near Taiwan, while maintaining persistent patrols around the Senkaku Islands. These operations serve multiple purposes: demonstrating military capability, testing regional responses, and normalizing Chinese presence in contested areas. Moreover, Beijing employs cyber espionage, economic coercion, and diplomatic strategies sometimes described as “lawfare,” often passing domestic laws that extend jurisdiction into contested spaces to codify expansive claims, selectively invoking international law, and using legal ambiguity to its advantage. These efforts allow China to reinforce its territorial claims and political narratives while staying below the threshold of open conflict. Over time, such actions gradually reshape the strategic environment in China’s favour.

North Korea: Coercion Through Provocation

North Korea relies heavily on gray zone tactics to pressure its opponents while avoiding the disastrous consequences of full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula.

Cyber operations are one of Pyongyang’s most important tools. Groups such as the Lazarus Group have conducted large-scale hacking campaigns targeting financial institutions, governments, and cryptocurrency exchanges. These cyber activities not only generate revenue for the regime but also demonstrate North Korea’s growing technological capabilities.

In addition to cyber operations, North Korea regularly conducts missile launches, artillery exchanges near disputed maritime boundaries, and military demonstrations aimed at raising tensions in the region. These examples are limited military provocations designed to signal resolve without triggering open conflict.

North Korea also operates extensive sanctions-evasion networks. Through covert maritime trade, smuggling operations, and cyber-enabled financial crime, the regime generates revenue while circumventing international restrictions. These activities allow Pyongyang to sustain its economy and military programs despite heavy sanctions pressure.

Taken together, North Korea’s gray zone strategy enables the regime to coerce its adversaries, generate financial resources, and maintain strategic relevance without crossing the threshold of major war.

Russia: Information Warfare and Strategic Signalling

Although Russia’s primary strategic focus lies in Europe, Moscow also conducts gray zone activities in the Indo-Pacific that challenge regional stability and Western influence.

Cyber operations remain a central element of Russia’s approach. Moscow-linked actors have been associated with intrusions targeting government systems and critical infrastructure in countries such as Japan and Australia. These operations are often accompanied by online disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining public trust and influencing domestic political debates.

Russia also engages in strategic military signalling across the region. Long-range bomber patrols and naval deployments near areas such as the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea demonstrate Russia’s military reach and reinforce its presence in the Indo-Pacific. In some cases, these activities occur alongside Chinese forces, highlighting increasing coordination between Moscow and Beijing. Such cooperation amplifies the strategic message that Russia and China are capable of jointly contesting Western and allied presence in the region.

Russia also maintains sanctions-evasion networks that facilitate illicit maritime trade, including ship-to-ship transfers involving North Korea. These networks allow Moscow to sustain economic ties while bypassing international restrictions.

The Strategic Challenge of Gray Zone Competition

Gray-zone campaigns pose a growing strategic challenge for Indo-Pacific states. Because these activities remain below the threshold of armed conflict, they are difficult to deter using traditional military tools. Yet over time, they can gradually erode regional stability and shift the balance of power. This raises an important question for policymakers: how should states respond to persistent gray zone coercion without escalating into major conflict?

One approach is to use limited, proportionate conventional responses to push back against gray-zone activities. However, such responses must be carefully calibrated to prevent unintended escalation. This is where broader strategic deterrence may play an important role.

A stronger Indo-Pacific security framework—potentially including deeper military integration among regional allies and partners—could provide the stability needed to manage escalation risks. In particular, a future Indo-Pacific nuclear security architecture could serve as a strategic backstop. As much as nuclear deterrence underpins NATO’s conventional defence posture in Europe, a similar framework in the Indo-Pacific could help ensure that responses to gray zone provocations remain limited rather than spiralling into major war.

Preparing for Persistent Competition

Gray zone competition is likely to remain a defining feature of Indo-Pacific security in the coming decades. China, North Korea, and Russia are already using these tactics to challenge the existing strategic order while avoiding direct confrontation.

For regional states, the challenge is not simply responding to individual incidents. It is developing a deterrence framework capable of managing persistent, low-level coercion across multiple domains. Without such a framework, gray zone activities will continue to stress the limits of allied resolve and gradually reshape the strategic landscape. Strengthening regional cooperation, improving resilience against hybrid tactics, and reinforcing strategic deterrence will therefore be essential steps in preserving stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 2: Gray zone campaigns and activities conducted by China, North Korea, and Russia in the Indo-Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

Whether the MSS is indicative of an unfolding RMA remains a subject of debate. At a minimum, it represents a significant leap in how modern militaries sense, decide, and act in combat. From a scholarly perspective, RMAs are not defined by single technological breakthroughs but by clusters of innovations that fundamentally transform the conduct of warfare.

They typically involve shifts in doctrine, tactics, organization, culture, and technology. Unlike broader military revolutions, which reshape societies and political systems, RMAs are confined to the military sphere—and they often unfold quietly, only recognized in hindsight.

Several RMAs were identified in the past, providing a framework to anticipate future ones. In The Dynamics of Military Revolutions: 1300–2050, MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray outline five significant military revolutions in the West since 1618. Each one, they argue, set off a chain of revolutionary changes in military affairs.

These include the emergence of the modern state with its standing armies, the political and social upheavals brought on by the French Revolution, the industrialization of warfare in the 19th century, the era of total war in the 20th century, and the transformative impact of nuclear weapons. If a new RMA is underway, we may not fully recognize it until it has already matured.

The concept of RMA has drawn justified criticism for being abstract, amorphous, and debated to the point of analytical paralysis. After the Gulf War, the DoD’s fixation on identifying the “next RMA” often overshadowed the operational impact of emerging capabilities. Scholars frequently focus on definitional purity rather than assessing real battlefield transformation.

Whether the MSS fits a textbook definition, adopted by the DoW or derived from historical theory, is less important than its functional impact. If an RMA is indeed emerging or approaching, there should be tangible real-world consequences. Otherwise, theory becomes disconnected from practice. In this light, the MSS may serve as a bridge between the long-unfolding information RMA and a new, AI-driven transformation.

The MSS could be indicative of another significant shift in command and control (C2). While the US Army’s command post computing environment (CPCE) already integrates legacy systems into a modular, cloud-capable architecture for multi-domain operations, the MSS pushes these capabilities toward revolutionary real-time situational awareness.

While initially developed to automate drone feed analysis, the MSS has evolved into an AI-powered battlefield intelligence engine. It fuses intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data, enables real-time targeting, and supports distributed decision-making. As with the telegraph in the 19th century, the MSS may redefine the military’s relationship with information and time.

Historically, C2 was slow and fragmented. Commanders relied on flags, runners, and direct observation, limited by geography and transmission delay. The Industrial Revolution began to change this. Introduced in 1793, Claude Chappe invented the optical telegraph which allowed faster coordination across long distances. It was Samuel Morse’s electrical telegraph, patented in 1837, that truly revolutionized communication.

AI is reshaping combat just as electricity once did. Electricity transformed communication by creating the foundation for critical innovation, like the internet. The harnessing of electricity for industrial use itself was not an RMA, but it was the essential prerequisite for one. Without it, the revolution in communication that began with the telegraph would not have been possible. AI may not constitute a full RMA on its own, but it is the enabling foundation for one.

During the Crimean War and the American Civil War, the telegraph enabled real-time command for the first time. In the US, President Lincoln relied on the War Department telegraph office to direct Union forces and enforce strategic decisions. Strategic-level C2 became possible, and expectations for real-time situational awareness took hold. The rise of the steam-powered printing press and the expansion of railways accelerated this transformation, making war reporting nearly instantaneous—a precursor to modern information warfare.

Similarly, Project Maven, initiated in 2017, began as a machine learning initiative to automate drone video analysis. Since then, the MSS has grown to integrate cloud computing, ISR fusion, and targeting. The MSS delivers intelligence to the tactical edge at machine speed on enterprise cloud infrastructure. It processes unfathomable amounts of data in milliseconds— augmenting analysts and automating portions of the workflow.

Just like the electric telegraph centralized control and supported linear commander decisions, the MSS introduces machine learning, machine inference, and adaptive analytics to take command and control. The MSS provides a picture of the theater that is not merely quantitative, but qualitative.

A true RMA requires more than new technology. It demands operational adaptation, organizational restructuring, and doctrinal evolution. The MSS checks many of these boxes. Technologically, the MSS merges AI, edge computing, and cloud infrastructure in a holistic fashion. Operationally, it uses human-machine teaming to accelerate kill chains. Organizationally, it catalyzed the creation of institutions such as the Joint AI Center (JAIC) and the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office. Doctrinally, it promotes shifts toward algorithmic and mosaic warfare, which are adaptive, data-driven models of conflict.

The MSS could signal a broader shift in military operations, much like the telegraph reshaped communication in the 19th century. By combining intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) with artificial intelligence at operational speed, the MSS is changing how armed forces interpret the battlespace, make decisions, and coordinate action—all while improving the shared situational picture. Yet without a corresponding cultural shift, even the best tools can fail to yield a true RMA. Whether the Department of War can fully adapt its doctrine and institutions to leverage the MSS remains to be seen.

Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Fecteau is an information operations officer working with artificial intelligence. The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of War, or the US Government. 

Signals of a New Revolution: Maven Smart System and the AI-RMA Horizon was originally published on Global Security Review.

The EAR Report is a must read for National security professionals to stay informed about rapidly evolving global threats and the strategic implications for U.S. defense policy.

This report addresses critical developments in nuclear deterrence, missile defense, and geopolitical trends, and equips professionals with actionable insights to navigate the complexities of modern security challenges effectively.

Commentary and Quotes of the Week

• Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin: Reaffirmed the U.S.-ROK alliance and the strengthening of extended deterrence through the Nuclear Consultative Group.
  Peter Huessy: Detailed the financial and strategic implications of eliminating the ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, emphasizing the costs of alternative measures for maintaining current deterrence levels.
  Jon Finer, Deputy National Security Adviser: Highlighted Pakistan’s emerging threat with the development of long-range ballistic missile capabilities.
  Bill Gertz: Revealed China’s rapid nuclear buildup and the expansion of its missile capabilities.
  Russian Leaders: Asserted advancements in missile systems and dismissed arms control as a relic of the past.
  Rep. Chuck Fleischmann: Stressed the urgency of modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent, citing contributions from Tennessee’s Oak Ridge Lab.

Strategic Developments of the Week

• China’s Military Build-Up: The Pentagon report highlighted Beijing’s dramatic advancements in hypersonic missile technology, nuclear warheads, and ‘intelligentized warfare.’
  Russia’s Strategic Actions: Russia’s legislative shift regarding the Taliban and progress in missile systems underlined its geopolitical maneuvers.
  U.S. Missile Defense Challenges: Reports emphasized the lag in U.S. hypersonic missile capabilities compared to China, pressing the need for enhanced missile defense systems.
  Space and Drone Developments: New legislation and technological advances highlight the increasing role of space and drones in modern warfare.

Important Reports of the Week

1. “President Trump Must Put the Nuclear Enterprise on a Wartime Footing” by Robert Peters:
   • Advocates for accelerating nuclear arsenal modernization to restore deterrence credibility.
     Calls for a stronger commitment to stockpile stewardship and missile defense.
2. “Importance of Building Homeland Missile Defense” by Robert Joseph:
   • Reiterates the vision of a comprehensive missile defense system to counter emerging threats.
     Proposes leveraging space-based systems for more robust and efficient protection.
3. “What Happens if the United States Eliminates the ICBM Leg of the Triad?”:
   • Examines the repercussions of removing the ICBM leg, including massive financial costs for alternative deterrence methods and strategic vulnerabilities.

Download the Full Report

ICBM EAR Report for December 20th was originally published on Global Security Review.

Consider the following scenario: a nuclear-armed state faces a significant threat to its security but refrains from resorting to nuclear weapons use out of concern for reputational damage and the global perception that the country is no longer a responsible nuclear stakeholder. While this decision may seem prudent from a moral and ethical standpoint, it inadvertently undermines the credibility of the state’s nuclear force. Its adversaries may perceive this reluctance to employ nuclear weapons as a sign of weakness, emboldening them to act with impunity—disregarding the state’s nuclear deterrent.

The Crucial Role of Narrative Control

The crux of the matter lies in narrative control. In a world where perception is often more potent than reality, the ability to shape public opinion and control the narrative surrounding nuclear capabilities is of paramount importance. Leaders must project strength, resolve, and a willingness to employ nuclear weapons. This is necessary for instilling fear and uncertainty in the minds of adversaries.

Achieving narrative control is no easy feat. In the age of social media and instantaneous communication, information warfare is the new battleground for shaping public opinion. States contend with an onslaught of propaganda, misinformation, and alternative narratives, making it increasingly challenging to maintain a coherent and convincing message. 

Israel’s Narrative Struggles 

The case of Israel’s war with Hamas serves as a poignant example of the perils posed by losing the narrative war. Israel is being painted as the oppressor by large swaths of the international community, even though Hamas initiated the war with their October 7, 2023, attack. Despite possessing a formidable nuclear arsenal and clear escalation dominance in the region, Israel was utterly incapable of deterring conflict with Hamas. In fact, Hamas never believed Israel will use [its?] nuclear arsenal in a Gaza conflict. The Israelis have also failed to deter further escalation of aggression from Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies.

Admittedly, nuclear weapons were never intended to deter all forms of aggression. It is possible that past Israeli strikes on Iraqi and Syrian nuclear facilities are serving as a deterrent to Iran going nuclear because they fear an actual Israeli nuclear strike. This is speculation but serves to highlight the challenge of deterrence.

Israel has struggled to gain international acceptance and legitimacy for its action in Gaza with the United Nations condemning Israel, calling for a cease-fire, and even lending legitimacy to claims of genocide. This is a claim that prominent political scientists John Mearsheimer and Norman Finkelstein supported in the past weeks. The prominent commentator and former judge, Andrew Napolitano, also asserts that Israel has lost the public relations war.

Ultimately, the psychological impact of narrative victory empowers non-nuclear entities to resist traditional deterrence strategies. Adversaries, fueled by a sense of righteousness and global support, become more resilient to the deterrent effect of escalation dominance and nuclear superiority.

This resilience poses a significant challenge to the US and Israel, who find themselves contending with adversaries undeterred by their joint military superiority in the region. Even irrational decisions, in a quantitative sense, do not strike fear in adversaries that believe they dominate public support and will obtain divine vindication and retribution in their cause.

Reclaiming the Narrative Initiative

As a result, Israel finds itself caught in a precarious position, where its nuclear deterrent is weakened by perceptions of ambiguity, mistrust, and self-deterrence. Its adversaries are emboldened by this perceived weakness coupled with global support for their struggles. They may be more inclined to continue challenging Israel’s security interests, knowing that the costs of nuclear escalation are mitigated by doubts surrounding Israel’s willingness to employ nuclear weapons in conflict. This is a challenge with maintaining a nuclear posture of opacity.

To regain the narrative initiative, Israel must invest in strategic narrative crafting. Emphasizing shared values with allies, just causes, and a commitment to peace can reshape perceptions and counteract the narrative of oppression. Israel wants to be seen as a liberator and defender, not as the oppressor or the extension of an American empire. Israel has much work to do to change their current international reputation and reclaim the moral high ground. Strengthening international alliances and engaging in diplomatic efforts in the Middle East are essential and a good place to start. This is not to say Israel is not engaging in such efforts. They certainly are, but to little effect.

By influencing global narratives, Israel can garner support for their actions and create a more balanced perception of the current conflict. Launching targeted public diplomacy campaigns can bridge the gap between military actions and public understanding. Providing transparent and compelling narratives about strategic objectives can counter misinformation and build domestic and international support. Additionally, recognizing the power of cultural and ideological narratives is crucial. Israel should continue to tap into historical narratives that showcase their commitment to democracy, freedom, and human rights, countering portrayals that paint them as aggressors and oppressors.

Conclusion

The nexus of self-deterrence, narrative control, and nuclear deterrence is of utmost importance in the contemporary strategic environment. As states grapple with the complexities of nuclear strategy, the ability to shape public perception and maintain credibility is essential for maintaining peace and stability. Failure to do so risks undermining the very foundations of global security, with potentially catastrophic consequences for all nations involved. Only by mastering the art of narrative control can states hope to navigate the treacherous waters of nuclear politics and ensure the continued survival of the international order.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Self-Deterrence, Narrative Control, and Nuclear Deterrence: The Case of Israel was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the teams take the field, their profiles are worth noting. After all, they each bring a different style of play to the field of competition.

The United States

The United States is a titan of technological innovation and military prowess. With a defense apparatus that leverages cutting-edge technology, including cyber capabilities, stealth technology, and unmanned systems, the Americans exemplify agility both in thought and action.

Its strength lies not just in its superior hardware but in its ability to integrate information warfare, space dominance, and artificial intelligence to outpace and outthink its adversaries. These strengths are also seen as weaknesses by the opponent, which they plan to exploit.

The Challengers

On the other side, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea form an axis of strategic adversaries. Each brings unique strengths to the table. What holds this team together is shared desire to defeat the United States.

China, with its rapid military modernization and significant advancements in areas like hypersonic weapons and space technology, poses a multidimensional threat. With the second largest economy in the world and a population only rivaled by India, is should come as no surprise that China finds itself in the Super Bowl of Deterrence.

Russia, seasoned in electronic warfare, unconventional strategies, and disinformation brings a wealth of experience in disrupting adversary operations. Although Russia’s performance shows a weakened player, the United States can never forget Russia’s trump card, which it has yet to play.

Iran, with its asymmetric warfare tactics, proxies, and extensive international network, excels in creating unpredictable challenges. In short, Iran is an agent of chaos on the field.

North Korea, as the smallest player on the field, adds a wildcard element with its nuclear capabilities and cyber warfare tactics. America’s advantage against North Korea is that the North Korean objective is a simple one: preserve the regime.

The Game Plan

The Super Bowl of Deterrence is not won by brute force alone but by the ability to disrupt the adversary’s decision cycle and achieve strategic overmatch. In many respects it is like a game of chess, where the objective is to force the other player into a position where the only option is defeat.

The US strategy hinges on its agility and technological edge, aiming to outmaneuver its opponents by disrupting their communications, blinding their sensors, and sowing confusion within their ranks. This game is about anticipation, where the US seeks to predict and counter its adversaries’ moves before they can execute, effectively scoring preemptive strikes in this lethal contest of wits and will.

The autocrats have a simple game plan: prevent the United States from moving forces into the region by making them blind, deaf, and dumb through cyberattacks on command-and-control systems and the American military’s logistics network. Attacks on American space assets is also a key element of the autocrat strategy.

Role of Allies and Partnerships

In this complex game, American allies and global partners play a crucial role, akin to the role played by special teams. The US leverages its network of alliances and partnerships to extend its reach, gather intelligence, and coordinate actions that pressure and isolate the opposing side. These relationships enhance the United States’ strategic positioning, providing logistical support and enabling joint operations that amplify its power-projection capabilities.

The autocrats do not have a similar set of alliances and partnerships. With their team built on a mutual desire to defeat the United States, the same level of trust and cooperation the United States has with its allies does not exist. Thus, team cohesion is tenuous.

Conditions for Victory

Victory in the Super Bowl of Deterrence is measured not in points on a scoreboard but in the ability to maintain global stability and prevent conflict. The ultimate goal for the United States is to deter aggression and ensure that its adversaries think twice before acting. This requires a delicate balance of showing strength without escalating tensions unnecessarily. This includes employing a mix of diplomacy, economic power, and military forces to maintain the status quo and protect national interests.

For the autocrats, victory is the toppling of the American-led international order. The asymmetry of interest in the contest means that the two teams will play a very different game for very different purposes. The dynamics of this contest are inherently unpredictable. Just as in football, where a single play can change the outcome of the game, the Super Bowl of Deterrence is fraught with uncertainties. Technological advancements, shifts in global politics, and unexpected moves by any player can alter the strategic landscape, requiring constant vigilance and adaptation by all involved.

Conclusion

The Super Bowl of Deterrence stands as a testament to the importance of strategy, technological supremacy, and the human element in the quest for global security. In this game, the stakes are immeasurably high, and the consequences of failure are real. Through agility, innovation, and strategic partnerships, the United States is positioned well and viewed by its opponent as a formidable contender that is ready to defend its title and ensure peace in an ever-changing world.

This epic contest is a vivid reminder that in the arena of global security, the game is always on, and victory favors the prepared, agile, and resilient. Like football, good intentions mean nothing. Preparation and capability mean everything.

Greg Sharpe is the Director of Communications and Marketing at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies

The Super Bowl of Deterrence: The Ultimate Showdown in Strategic Overmatch was originally published on Global Security Review.

The concept of information operations (IO) has entered into our everyday lexicon without a precise definition.

Any stated definition of information operations is relative to the context. IO remains a complex subject, and the field is evolving. This article hopes to provide greater insight and clarity into the definition of IO, and also identify existing and potential shortfalls.

Regardless of context, information operations maintain some nearly-universally-agreed-upon characteristics. An information operation is a campaign that is dedicated to obtaining a decisive advantage in the information environment. Some conflate IO with mere cyber or influence operations, but these are one of many capabilities that IO practitioners—both civilian and military—use to gain an edge in the information environment.

This messaging effort has multiple components to ensure the desired effects are delivered in the most advantageous way possible—sometimes using influence and other times the intention is solely to send a direct, clear, and concise message. Take, for example, a scenario involving displaced persons. The influencing elements are sending out pamphlets intended to induce the displaced persons to return home, but civil liaison elements are building permanent structures that will incentivize displaced individuals to remain. It is the IO practitioner’s job to de-conflict this disjointed message. An IO practitioner should be working in tandem with other capabilities to shape the information environment.

The Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election was a strategic use of IO.

The Russian government sought to both influence the U.S. presidential election, and undermine the Democratic systems. State-sponsored Russian actors hacked into Democratic National Committee servers and gained access to a key Democratic advisor’s emails. These hackers than used third-party intermediaries to release derogatory or potentially damaging information through WikiLeaks. Furthermore, Russian actors focused on psychological operations disseminated propaganda and disinformation via social media. An IO practitioner would, typically, be the one that coordinated this effort.

However, the definition of IO can change based on the context in which the term is used. According to a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report from 2018, a government entity, IO is sometimes conflated with Information Warfare (IW). The report says that “Information warfare takes place at the strategic level, while information operations (IO) involve using various information-related capabilities to implement the strategy.” However, unlike IO, IW is not defined in any contemporary U.S. military doctrine, nor does the U.S. military doctrine specify IW “takes place at the strategic level.” Surprisingly, no recent U.S. Government publication specifies there is a distinction between IO and IW; the U.S. Government should clarify the difference—if one exists.

The U.S. military has its own distinct view of information operations.

The 2016 U.S. military doctrine defines IO as “The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.” Per this doctrine, IO is focused on coordination and synchronization “during military operations.” IO is absent real deliverables, it relies on other capabilities to deliver effects. As previously stated, influence and cyber operations are just two of many information-related capabilities.

The more antiquated IO doctrine distinguished between information warfare and information operations. In a military publication from 1999, IO is defined as “…actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems.” The publication addresses IW as “Information warfare (IW) is IO conducted during time of crisis or conflict (including war) to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries.” While these definitions appear to be out-of-date, they provide substantially greater clarity and understandability than contemporary military doctrine (IW was removed from military doctrine in 2006).

In the private sector, the definition differs from the military with actual deliverables. Facebook Security defines “as actions were taken by organized actors (governments or non-state actors) to distort domestic or foreign political sentiment, most frequently to achieve a strategic and/or geopolitical outcome.” Facebook’s definition appears to conflate IO with mere influencing instead of producing a specific desired effect.

The nonprofit global policy think tank Rand Corporation defines IO as the following: “Information operations and warfare, also known as influence operations, includes the collection of tactical information about an adversary as well as the dissemination of propaganda in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent.” This definition poses a number of challenges because—again—much like the private-sector Facebook definition, it is focused on “influence operations,” which are, in actuality, only part of a true IO campaign that is synchronizing and coordinating a range of influence, cyber, and psychological elements. RAND’s definition also conflates IW with IO. For its part, the CRS report attempts to distinguish IW from IO, something U.S. military doctrine fails to do.

The absence of a clear definition could lead to a strategic disaster.

Making things even more complicated is the fact that these nuanced definitions also face international interpretation, and the United States’ foreign competitors may define or conceptualize information operations differently. This means matching their capabilities that much more difficult, making any discussion over a strategic competitor’s (e.g. Russia) IO capabilities an apples-to-oranges comparison.

It is now more important than ever to develop a clear and concise understanding of information operations as a concept. Unfortunately, this paper may fall short because of the complexity and evolving nature of IO. In the short-term, the U.S. Government could re-adopt the out-of-date, yet more concise definitions for IO and IW.

Updating these definitions would ensure that IO is properly understood, conceptually and practically speaking. Until then, with each new IO definition, there will be a nuanced complexity that only serves to confuse rather than clarify the ever-changing nature of information operations.

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Understanding Information Operations & Information Warfare was originally published on Global Security Review.