China’s dominance of the rare-earth mineral supply chain gives Beijing a powerful tool of economic coercion against rival states. Vital rare-earth minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, and graphite are crucial inputs for products used in daily life and in national defense. These include electric vehicles, solar panels, military aircraft, and semiconductors. Ensuring control over the supply chains of these critical minerals is becoming a key aspect of geopolitical rivalry. 

Much of this competition is focused on Africa, which holds about 30 percent of the world’s mineral reserves. China has already secured dominant positions in essential parts of these supply chains, recognizing the strategic importance of controlling access to these critical resources. 

China produces nearly 70 percent of the world’s rare earth minerals, and has reinforced this position through deliberate efforts to control every stage of the critical mineral supply chain. This process begins long before extraction, with Chinese banks and engineering firms securing involvement. Beijing then extends that control to the project’s end, pairing ownership of mines with ownership of the railways, roads, and ports through which these materials move. The result is a supply system in which China extracts, refines, and exports minerals from Africa which ensures that, in many cases, raw materials move on Chinese terms. 

China’s dominance in the rare earth mineral trade stems from its strategic approach to mineral supply chains, not just profit. This allows Beijing to maintain long-term control of mines during economic downturns. This is a luxury that profit-driven Western competitors do not have. Chinese firms enter the market fully prepared and offers financing, workforce, equipment, and logistics that often gain significant control over project execution from the start. This strategy has helped Beijing achieve “processing dominance,” meaning control over the refining system to the point that winning a mining contract in Africa does not ensure independence from Chinese supply chains. Although China produces only about 10 percent of the world’s lithium, cobalt, and copper, it controls roughly 40-90 percent of the refining capacity for these materials. Therefore, a Western company extracting ore in sub-Saharan Africa has not truly succeeded if the ore must be processed through a Chinese refinery. For the United States, this distinction has far-reaching consequences beyond market competition. 

The U.S. is highly exposed to supply chain disruption risks because critical minerals have uses that extend far beyond consumer products. They are key components of systems essential to national defense, including F-35 fighter jets, Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines, Tomahawk missiles, radar systems, Predator unmanned aerial vehicles, and more. The U.S. maintains only one domestic rare earth mine, possesses minimal refining infrastructure, and relies on China for 70% of rare earth imports. Expanding domestic mining and refining capacity requires significant capital investment and highly specialized expertise, limiting the speed at which domestic production can realistically offset exposure risks. The result is a situation in which the U.S. defense industrial base is significantly dependent on a strategic adversary for materials it cannot easily replace, and which are essential to the production and sustainment of advanced military capabilities. 

The risks of relying on a strategic adversary like China for materials vital to American national security are clearly shown by the China–Japan Rare Earths dispute of 2010. In September 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided with two Japanese Coast Guard ships in the East China Sea, leading to the arrest and detention of the boat’s captain. In reaction, the Chinese government stopped exporting critical minerals to Japan. Tokyo, which depended on Beijing for nearly 90 percent of its rare earth mineral imports, saw prices for these goods rise nearly 10-fold in the year after the incident. Although the United States and Japan are in different positions within global supply chains, Japan’s experience demonstrates the broader strategic dangers that arise when a country becomes heavily dependent on a geopolitical rival for key resources. 

The coercive value of rare earth dominance lies not only in China’s ability to deny access but also in the threat of disruption. Even the possibility of export restrictions can drive price volatility, delay industrial production, complicate defense procurement, and undermine long-term investment planning. Japan’s response to the 2010 dispute reveals that dependency on rare earth elements is not unavoidable. Japan’s proactive approach included investing in recycling technologies, developing alternative materials, diversifying supply chains through overseas mining projects in Australia and other countries, and building stockpiles to secure reserves. As a result, Tokyo reduced its reliance on Chinese rare earths by about 30 percent, demonstrating that policy actions can yield tangible results. More broadly, Japan’s experience underscores a key truth of modern strategic competition: dependence on an adversary for vital materials can create vulnerabilities that go beyond economics. Washington and its partners should take notice. 

Holden Johansen is an independent researcher focused on geopolitical security risks. He holds a B.A. in Political Science from Miami University and completed coursework in European Politics and Security at the Danish Institute for Study Abroad in Copenhagen. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

China’s Critical Mineral Strategy and the Structure of Strategic Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

Far from being a mere slip of the tongue, the episode revealed the extent to which BRICS have established themselves as increasingly influential players in international politics and economics. The fear aroused by those words was no accident; it reflected the growing perception that this bloc represents a direct challenge to the established international order.

The informal BRICS alliance was formed in 2009, when several emerging economies decided to coordinate their efforts to strengthen their financial, economic, and political cooperation. Brazil, Russia, India, and China formed the group, which was joined by South Africa in 2010. Since then, the bloc has steadily increased its influence, becoming a central player in the international system. It currently represents about 50% of the world’s population and approximately 40% of global GDP in terms of purchasing power parity.

Today, BRICS is once again at the center of global debate. For those who failed to understand the significance of Trump’s words, or the reasons for the nervousness they provoked, it is essential to pause and analyze exactly what this organization is and why its rise is generating growing concerns about the international balance of power. The question, in this context, is inevitable: why is this institution attracting so much attention today?

After the end of World War II, the United States and the major Western democracies promoted a framework of rules, institutions, and relationships that is now known as the “liberal international order.” This system was based on liberal principles—both political and economic—and cooperation among states through multilateral organizations designed to ensure stability, growth, and collective security.

However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bipolar system, the international scene underwent a profound transformation. Washington emerged as the sole global superpower, a situation that led Francis Fukuyama to formulate his thesis of the “end of history.”

Over the last few decades, Uncle Sam has maintained its hegemony through the liberal international order, relying on political and military alliances, shared norms, and universalist values, with institutions such as NATO and the IMF serving as fundamental pillars. This framework has guaranteed the hegemony of the dollar and its so-called “exorbitant privilege,” which has allowed the United States to borrow on more favorable terms than any other country, finance its deficits without immediate risk, and consolidate its debt as the safest asset in the global financial system.

To fully understand this analysis, it is essential to add another key element of the Western system’s success: the SWIFT network. This global payment infrastructure connects most of the world’s banks and acts as an intermediary in international transfers, the vast majority of which are conducted in dollars. In this way, the dollar has become the dominant currency worldwide. However, despite its power and influence, the liberal international order is beginning to show increasingly evident cracks.

Over time, a series of events have contributed to weakening this system. The financial crises of recent decades have undermined confidence in Western elites’ ability to manage the global economic order, while the U.S. strategy of shaping the world according to its own interests has fostered a coalition of states that reject its hegemony. Similarly, specific episodes such as Brexit in 2016, President Obama’s blockade of the WTO Appellate Body—considered the guardian of free trade—and Donald Trump’s return to the White House have intensified doubts about the soundness and legitimacy of this system.

Added to this context is the use of the dollar as a tool of political pressure, particularly visible in the sanctions imposed on Russia, a move that has reinforced the perception that the U.S. currency also functions as a geopolitical instrument.

This set of factors has led many powers to seek alternatives that reduce their dependence on the system dominated by the U.S. In this scenario of a weakening liberal international order, recent moves by BRICS are perceived as a direct threat to Washington, once again placing the bloc at the center of global debate.

As already noted, the BRICS is an informal intergovernmental organization whose main objective is to increase its global influence and offer alternatives to Western-dominated institutions. Since its creation, the bloc has progressively expanded its reach and sought to reduce its dependence on the U.S.-led international financial system.

A key step in this strategy was the 2014 creation of the New Development Bank, aimed at financing development projects in emerging economies, as well as the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, a $100 billion fund designed to protect member countries from financial crises. These initiatives are perceived as direct challenges to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, essential pillars of the liberal international order.

Added to this institutional progress is the growing economic weight of the bloc. BRICS countries have established themselves as one of the main drivers of global growth, accounting for a significant share of industrial production and strategic resources.

It is in this context that BRICS found an historic opportunity to challenge the rules of the international economic game. In addition to developing their own institutions, in 2018 BRICS introduced a new international payment mechanism called “NIPS,” later known as BRICS Pay. Although the project progressed slowly for several years, it regained prominence in October 2024 during the 16th BRICS Summit, held that same year. On this occasion, the member countries formally presented and endorsed what was now called BRICS Pay.

BRICS Pay aims to facilitate international transactions in local currencies and reduce the centrality of the dollar. The system would rely on DCMS, a decentralized messaging network developed in Russia and distributed among member countries, allowing each state to control its own financial infrastructure and trade without using the dollar, thereby weakening its dominance. At the same time, the absence of a hegemonic actor within the system aims to foster more balanced cooperation and potentially reduce geopolitical tensions.

This project represents a direct challenge to both the United States and the SWIFT system and, by extension, to the liberal international order. If BRICS countries succeed in consolidating the success of BRICS Pay in the future, we could be witnessing a notable change in the world order as we know it today.

However, significant obstacles remain between ambition and reality. Although an initial prototype of BRICS Pay has been presented in Moscow, and it has been suggested that it could be operational by 2026, the path to a fully functional system is complex. The experience of the European Union shows that financial integration requires time, coordination, and a high degree of economic convergence.

Furthermore, BRICS countries have profound differences in their levels of development, monetary policies, and strategic priorities, which makes it difficult to build a stable and cohesive framework. Similarly, despite their growing economic weight, their global political influence remains limited and, for the time being, it is insufficient to displace Western primacy.

Even so, the bloc’s rapid rise in a brief time has altered the international balance and raised fundamental questions about the future of the global system. The central question is whether BRICS countries will succeed in consolidating themselves as a real alternative to the liberal order led by the United States or whether their challenge will remain, at least for now, a symptom of an increasingly fragmented and multipolar world.

Ana Lorenzo López is a geopolitical analyst currently collaborating with The Political Room, where she writes in-depth political and strategic analysis on international affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

BRICS: The Emerging Bloc That Threatens the Liberal International Order was originally published on Global Security Review.