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		<title>A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-blueprint-for-deterring-war-over-taiwan/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alan Dowd]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Mar 2026 12:09:45 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32469</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: March 23, 2026 Two parties have watched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) from a distance. China has been taking notes. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has tracked munitions consumption rates of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Both the PRC and INDOPACOM know that what is happening above, in, and around Tehran will impact Beijing’s plans [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-blueprint-for-deterring-war-over-taiwan/">A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: March 23, 2026</em></p>
<p>Two parties have watched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) from a distance. China has been taking notes. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has tracked munitions consumption rates of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Both the PRC and INDOPACOM know that what is happening above, in, and around Tehran will impact Beijing’s plans to take Taiwan. And they know Washington plans to prevent that.</p>
<p><strong>Opposing Forces</strong></p>
<p>The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) strongman Xi Jinping <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-46733174?utm_source=RC+Defense+Morning+Recon&amp;utm_campaign=74efb51fbd-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_01_02_10_54&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_694f73a8dc-74efb51fbd-81835633">declared</a> Taiwan “must and will be” absorbed. He has even set a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/cia-chief-says-chinas-xi-little-sobered-by-ukraine-war-2023-02-02/">deadline</a> of 2027 for his military to be ready to seize Taiwan. The Pentagon <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF">reports</a> that Beijing “continues to refine multiple military options” to take Taiwan “by brute force.” Xi is assembling the <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF">capabilities</a> to execute those options. This includes 420,000 troops, 750 fighter-jets, 300 bombers, 158 warships (including 50 landing ships) and hundreds of missile systems, all in the Taiwan Strait region.</p>
<p>In response, Taiwan has increased defense spending from 2% of GDP in 2019 to 3.3% of GDP in 2026, with plans to invest 5% of GDP on defense by 2030. Taiwan is using those resources to produce <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/inside-taiwans-massive-domestic-missile-arsenal">homegrown</a> antiship, air-defense, land-attack and air-to-air <a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2024/01/16/taiwan-missile-bases-china/">missiles</a>; expand production of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/08/18/1186919198/taiwan-military-weapons-manufacturing-industry">attack-drones</a>; and build a fleet of <a href="https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2025/taiwans-domestically-built-submarine-enters-sea-trials-to-strengthen-defense-against-chinese-invasion-threat">submarines</a>. Taiwan recently <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/taiwan-is-getting-its-u-s-weaponrybut-years-behind-schedule-11c151b1?mod=asia_news_article_pos1">received</a> ATACMS missiles and HIMARS systems. Taipei is still awaiting delivery of dozens of F-16V fighters and TOW antitank systems, which is part of a $21 billion <a href="https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-arms-backlog-february-2025-update-early-trump-admin-arms-sales-and-rumors-of-a-big-request-from-taiwan/">backlog</a> of U.S. arms. Taipei also <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/11/11/2003826737">wants</a> F-35s and additional Patriot systems. In short, Taiwan is racing to construct “a porcupine defense”—one that would make an invasion so painful as to dissuade Xi from even attempting it.</p>
<p><strong>The United States Response</strong></p>
<p>While Xi has been clear about his plans for Taiwan, Washington has been vague. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, neither side of the Taiwan Strait knows exactly what Washington would do in the event of war.</p>
<p>The INDOPACOM commander, Adm. Samuel Paparo, is doing his part to send a clear message. If Beijing attacks Taiwan, he <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/06/10/taiwan-china-hellscape-military-plan/">plans</a> to “turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape.” The drones and missilery of “hellscape” would come from multiple directions. Further supporting this clear message is that in 2024, the U.S. Army <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/u-s-plans-to-deploy-more-missile-systems-in-the-philippines-challenging-china-d0f42427?mod=world_feat2_asia_pos1">moved</a> Typhon missile systems to the Philippines, and in 2025 the Pentagon created Task Force-Philippines and deployed a Marine unit armed with anti-ship systems to the Philippines. Lastly, in 2026, the Pentagon unveiled <a href="https://news.usni.org/2026/02/02/u-s-army-quietly-stands-up-rotational-force-in-the-philippines">Army Rotational Force-Philippines</a>, which will deploy <a href="https://news.usni.org/2026/02/20/u-s-philippines-commit-to-increased-missile-drone-deployments-in-first-island-chain">missile and drone assets</a>.</p>
<p>Currently the Pentagon is <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/inside-us-plans-to-reopen-wwii-air-bases-for-war-with-china-11286002">revitalizing</a> airfields in the Philippines, <a href="https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2023/12/22/asia/us-air-force-pacific-tinian-island-airfield-intl-hnk-ml">Tinian</a> and <a href="https://www.15wing.af.mil/Units/11th-AF-Det-1-Wake-Island/">Wake Island</a>; basing top-of-the-line fighters on <a href="https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2024-07-03/f-15ex-kadena-okinawa-japan-f-35-misawa-iwakuni-14380105.html">Okinawa</a>; and rotating B-52s through Australia. Army units on <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2024/06/25/us-armys-new-precision-missile-hit-moving-target-in-pacific-exercise/">Palau</a> have tested land-based missiles against seagoing targets. And F-35s are now carrying <a href="https://www.twz.com/air/f-35-shown-carrying-stealthy-long-range-anti-ship-missiles-for-first-time">long-range antiship missiles</a> tailormade for targeting a PRC invasion fleet.</p>
<p>Near the end of his tenure, however, commanding U.S. Army-Pacific, Gen. Robert Brown <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-little-bit-of-fear-is-a-strong-deterrent/">reported</a> that his PRC counterparts “don’t fear us anymore.” This is regrettable, but understandable. America’s Navy deploys fewer than 300 ships which, like America’s commitments, are spread around the world. Those commitments expend finite assets: OEF has exposed the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-races-to-accomplish-iran-mission-before-munitions-run-out-c014acbc?mod=middle-east_more_article_pos9">limitations</a> of U.S. weapons stockpiles and production capacity, and it has forced the Pentagon to <a href="https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/03/03/OTCQNNDNORCHHG6Q5RB6YZ4NLA/">shuffle</a> assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.</p>
<p><strong>Allied Response</strong></p>
<p>America’s not-so-secret weapon is its interconnected system of alliances. America’s alliances serve as force-multipliers, layers of strategic depth, and outer rings of America’s own security, which enable power projection through prepositioning, basing, overflight, and resupply. Even though U.S. allies are critical, China has no real allies.</p>
<p>Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi <a href="https://www.gmfus.org/news/japans-takaichi-stands-firm-taiwan">describes</a> an attack on Taiwan as a “threat to Japan’s survival,” indicating Japan would <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/japan-us-alliance-would-crumble-if-tokyo-ignored-taiwan-crisis-pm-takaichi-says-2026-01-27/">assist</a> the U.S. in defending the island. In hopes of preventing such a scenario, Japan has bolstered defenses across its southwestern <a href="https://news.usni.org/2024/04/01/japan-stands-up-amphibious-rapid-deployment-brigade-electronic-warfare-unit-for-defense-of-southwest-islands">territories</a>, placing F-35Bs on Kyushu, anti-ship systems, air-defenses, and electronic-warfare units on islands south of Kyushu; and air-defense and missile-defense units on <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/Japan-boosts-defenses-on-remote-islands-near-Taiwan-amid-China-fears">Yonaguni Island</a> (70 miles east of Taiwan). In addition, Japan is fielding 22 attack submarines, acquiring 500 TLAMs, <a href="https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2026/02/japans-emerging-counterstrike-missile-posture/">producing</a> missiles domestically, and upconverting ships into aircraft carriers armed with F-35Bs.</p>
<p>Australia is partnering with the U.S. and Britain to deploy a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, and Australia has opened its territory to U.S. Marines, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australia-pledges-27-billion-progress-nuclear-submarine-shipyard-build-2026-02-15/">submarines</a> and B-52s.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/22/business/defense-industry-rare-earth-restrictions-china.html">Briain and France</a> have stepped up in production of a key element needed for TLAM production due to China shutting off the supply. Norway is supplying the U.S. with antiship <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2024/11/14/kongsberg-wins-biggest-ever-missile-contract-from-us-navy-marines/">missiles</a> and <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/air-force-buys-first-lot-norwegian-joint-strike-missiles/">joint strike missiles</a>. A U.S.-Israeli partnership is manufacturing <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2025/10/israels-uvision-looks-to-cement-us-army-ties-after-nearly-1b-loitering-munition-win/">loitering munitions</a>, which are likely part of Paparo’s “hellscape.” Japan, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, and Germany have conducted freedom-of-navigation operations through the Taiwan Strait further supported by Britain, Italy, and France <a href="https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/uk-france-and-italy-align-carriers-for-indo-pacific-mission/">coordinating deployments</a> of their aircraft carriers in the Pacific.</p>
<p><strong>Enhancing A Deterrent Posture</strong></p>
<p>China’s commitments and assets, conversely, are focused on its neighborhood. If Xi moves against Taiwan, his arsenal will be better positioned than the U.S. and is more sophisticated than Iran’s.</p>
<p>Deterring Xi from making that move will require more capability and more defense spending.</p>
<p>Sen. Roger Wicker has unveiled a <a href="https://www.wicker.senate.gov/2024/5/senator-wicker-unveils-major-defense-investment-plan">plan</a> to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Similarly, the Commission on National Defense Strategy <a href="https://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/NDS-commission.html">recommends</a> lifting defense spending to levels “commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.”</p>
<p>Although the president recently <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/07/trump-calls-record-defense-budget-00715298">called</a> for more military spending, the administration’s FY2026 defense budget was just 3.2% of GDP. The Cold War average was more than twice that.</p>
<p><strong>The Way Forward</strong></p>
<p>It is time to maintain a policy of “strategic ambiguity” to one of strategic clarity because of the great danger it presents. The secret alliances that led to World War I remind us that there is a greater risk in leaving defense guarantees opaque. The open defense treaties that followed World War II, and prevented World War III remind us that the prudent course is clarity of commitment.</p>
<p>There is a blueprint for deterring war over Taiwan: Washington needs to be clear about the nature of its commitment to Taiwan. Washington needs to view alliances not as liabilities to cut, but as resources to nurture. “We cannot afford,” as Churchill once counseled, “to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.”</p>
<p><em>Alan Dowd is a regular contributor to Global Security Review and a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, where he leads the </em><a href="https://sagamoreinstitute.org/policy-2-2/defense/cap/"><em>Center for America’s Purpose</em></a><em>. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/A-Blueprint-for-Deterring-War-Over-Taiwan.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="184" height="51" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 184px) 100vw, 184px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-blueprint-for-deterring-war-over-taiwan/">A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Indo-Pacific Command: US Must Improve Nuclear Deterrence</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/indo-pacific-command-us-must-improve-nuclear-deterrence/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christophe Bosquillon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Apr 2024 12:18:01 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27590</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On March 20, 2024, the House Armed Services Committee hosted a hearing on military posture and challenges in the Indo-Pacific. Assistant Secretary of Defense, Ely Ratner, testified that “China continues to present the most comprehensive and serious challenge to the United States’ national security.” He added, “That’s because China remains the only country with the [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/indo-pacific-command-us-must-improve-nuclear-deterrence/">Indo-Pacific Command: US Must Improve Nuclear Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On March 20, 2024, the House Armed Services Committee hosted a hearing on military posture and challenges in the Indo-Pacific. Assistant Secretary of Defense, Ely Ratner, <a href="https://www.theepochtimes.com/us/ccp-investing-in-weapons-to-exploit-us-vulnerabilities-us-admiral-5612206">testified</a> that “China continues to present the most comprehensive and serious challenge to the United States’ national security.” He added, “That’s because China remains the only country with the will and, increasingly, the capability to dominate the Indo-Pacific region and displace the United States.”</p>
<p>Admiral John C. Aquilino, commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, testified, “The Chinese will continue to develop weapons that they believe have advantage and deliver vulnerabilities to the United States.” What is interesting here is how, in less than a year, Admiral Aquilino’s discourse evolved from a conciliatory stance vis-à-vis China, to downright alarmist, albeit realistic, warnings.</p>
<p>As the commander of Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Aquilino leads the nation’s oldest and largest combatant command, responsible for US military activities in the Indo-Pacific region. The command includes over 380,000 soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, guardians, coast guardsmen, and Department of Defense civil servants. When, back in May 2023, Admiral Aquilino delivered a <a href="https://www.ncuscr.org/event/indopacom-aquilino/">keynote address</a> to the National Committee on US-China Relations, his exchanges with the audience focused on Sino-American military policy in the context of the overall bilateral relationship. They followed the diplomatically conciliatory script “that conflict is not inevitable and that both countries seek peace and prosperity.”</p>
<p>Emphasizing peaceful relations and cooperation between the US and China, the admiral highlighted the importance of dialogue and adherence to international rules. He expressed concerns over China’s actions that undermine the rules-based international order, particularly regarding the law of the sea and attempts to replace it with self-defined rules.</p>
<p>While advocating for military exercises, Aquilino insisted on the need for collaboration and communication to manage competition responsibly and prevent potential conflicts. The discussion, which also covered surveillance flights and cooperation in humanitarian efforts and climate change, was replete with calls for transparency and adherence to international norms. The discussion on surveillance and military dialogue further underscored the importance of risk mitigation and crisis management to avoid escalations in regional tensions.</p>
<p>Fast forward to the March 2024 House Armed Services Committee hearing and Aquilino struck a much different tone. China, Aquilino suggested, is investing in military technologies to exploit American vulnerabilities and assert dominance. This is taking place while China focuses on assimilating Taiwan (peacefully, if possible, through force, if necessary). China is also actively attempting to displace the US as the world’s leading superpower.</p>
<p>China keeps increasing its defense budget despite a relative economic decline, further investing in nuclear and hypersonic weapons. There are concerns about China and Russia cooperating. This adds pressure on the US and its allies on several fronts. Aquilino warned Congress about potential challenges to American deterrence efforts against the combined Chinese and Russian nuclear arsenals.</p>
<p>Having assessed the intensifying competition between the US and China in military capabilities and strategic influence, Admiral Aquilino focused on the enhancement of US conventional and nuclear defense capabilities to counter hypersonic weapons and the rapidly growing Chinese nuclear arsenal. If diplomatic efforts are to succeed, strengthening alliances and partnerships mitigating the influence of the China-Russia cooperation, increased attention must be paid to Taiwan’s security and to strategies to deter Chinese coercion without escalating into conflict.</p>
<p>While the continuous monitoring and adaptation of defense policies to address evolving threats from China and its partners is warranted, Admiral Aquilino concluded that “we need to negate those vulnerabilities, and we need to take advantage of our capabilities that outmatch theirs.” Indeed, China aims at more than 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and has already increased its arsenal from at least 300 to 500 weapons.</p>
<p>There is nothing particularly disruptive in what Admiral Aquilino advocates. He echos what a congressional commission <a href="https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/a/am/americas-strategic-posture/strategic-posture-commission-report.ashx">concluded</a> in 2023: that the US should work to expand and enhance its nuclear arsenal to compete with the combined threat posed by China and Russia. The Biden administration and its successor need to respond positively to multiple recommendations to modernize and expand the American nuclear arsenal. While this in itself is not sufficient, it is absolutely necessary, lest the nation allow American deterrence in the Indo-Pacific to falter, and, ultimately, American global leadership to unravel. The clock is ticking.</p>
<p><em>Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Indo-Pacific-Command-US-must-improve-nuclear-deterrence.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-26665 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="Get this publication" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/indo-pacific-command-us-must-improve-nuclear-deterrence/">Indo-Pacific Command: US Must Improve Nuclear Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>America’s Strategic Posture Report: Get Behind It</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/americas-strategic-posture-report-get-behind-it/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jonathan Trexel]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Dec 2023 12:15:59 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>In October of this year, the final report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States was released. It is a wake-up call and a national call to action. The report is urgent, reasonable, and sound, assessing emerging threats in the international security environment, the United States’ posture against those threats, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/americas-strategic-posture-report-get-behind-it/">America’s Strategic Posture Report: Get Behind It</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In October of this year, the <a href="https://www.ida.org/research-and-publications/publications/all/a/am/americas-strategic-posture">final report</a> of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States was released. It is a wake-up call and a national call to action.</p>
<p>The report is urgent, reasonable, and sound, assessing emerging threats in the international security environment, the United States’ posture against those threats, and offering sound recommendations to address urgent deficiencies. The report consolidates the strategic threats facing the US and defines the context of the nation’s new strategic posture. These threats are addressed by others, but the report captures them collectively, presenting a menacing glimpse into the future. It is vital that the country gets behind these recommendations without delay.</p>
<p><strong>Sound Recommendations</strong></p>
<p>The nation’s current strategic posture is predicated on a benign threat environment, favorable political relationships, arms control, and a post–Cold War system of international cooperation. The report draws attention to vast and worsening threats, with implications for US and global security.</p>
<p>Today, the risk to strategic stability is simultaneous regional conflicts escalating to threaten the homeland, allies, and partners. The US must adapt the Defense Planning Guidance to address this new environment. This logic undergirds the rationale for sweeping changes to the nation’s strategic posture, to include enhancing our conventional, nuclear, and strategic defense forces to meet this new era’s deterrence, assurance, warfighting, and war termination requirements.</p>
<p>In isolation, the strategic threats are deeply troubling; combined they are alarming. For example, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine includes repeated coercive nuclear threats. Russia may feel confident making such threats and unilaterally suspending adherence to the New START, given its 10-to-1 advantage in “non-strategic nuclear forces” and its modernized strategic nuclear forces. China undertook a rapid and comprehensive nuclear breakout, described as “<a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/aug/12/china-engaged-breathtaking-nuclear-breakout-us-str/">breathtaking</a>” by the former commander of USSTRATCOM. This breakout is propelling China to peer status with the US and Russia and posturing it to pursue a coercive strategy. Meanwhile, North Korea continues its nuclear expansion, threatening the US homeland with ballistic missiles. Iran persists in fomenting regional instability as it stubbornly progresses toward <a href="https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/08/10/preventing_a_nuclear-armed_iran_shifting_to_deterrence_is_long_overdue_972009.html">becoming a nuclear weapons state</a>.</p>
<p>The commission correctly warns that the US must presume that the Russia-China strategic partnership could include cooperation in waging war against the US and its allies in ways that maximize their advantages. This means, the US must deter both, and be prepared to combat both simultaneously, with the potential for simultaneous nuclear escalation.</p>
<p><strong>The Report is Reasonable</strong></p>
<p>When considering US strategic posture force requirements, the commission cites the traditional role of nuclear weapons, including deterrence, assurance, achieving objectives if deterrence fails, and hedging the force. The report also ascribes common, basic tenets of American nuclear strategy to include assured second strike, flexible response, tailored deterrence, extended deterrence and allied assurance, the policy of calculated ambiguity, and hedging for future uncertainty.</p>
<p>When these roles and tenets are overlaid with simultaneous two-war planning, a wide-ranging set of recommendations necessarily results. These include tailored responses to threats, such as defense against decapitation strikes; the need to address the imbalance in strategic nuclear forces between the US and its adversaries; regional risks associated with theater nuclear force disparities; and comprehensive infrastructure reform of the nuclear weapons complex and defense industrial base.</p>
<p>For American strategic nuclear forces, this could include replacing delivery platforms, modernizing warheads and command and control, recapitalizing the entire nuclear enterprise infrastructure, preparing to upload some or all of our hedge warheads, deploying the new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (with some road-mobile), building more B-21 bombers and supporting tankers (with some bombers on alert), and building more ballistic missile submarines, Trident missiles, and ship-building facilities.</p>
<p>To address widening disparities in theater nuclear forces, modernized nuclear forces need to be developed and deployed to provide forward-basing, survivability, yield variation, penetrability, and promptness in both INDOPACOM and EUCOM. Certainly, this alludes to the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile and similar platforms. But the report does not stop there.</p>
<p>The United States’ nuclear weapons complex is vast but outdated, limited in responsiveness, and ill-equipped to meet existing and emerging threats. Therefore, the complex needs modernization and expansion to meet requirements, as well as to hedge against technical failures, delays, delivery system losses, or a further worsening of the threat environment. This includes recapitalization of nuclear weapon pit production and nuclear enterprise technical expertise.</p>
<p>Other significant recommendations include fielding missile defense systems designed to deter and defeat limited attacks by Russia, China, and North Korea. This is a significant expansion of the scope and mission of missile defenses. The report also recommends developing offensive and defensive space assets, fielding increased numbers of long-range (hypersonic) conventional strike weapons; improving our strategic supply chain; improving private-sector contracting processes; pursuing a global ban on fractional orbital bombardment systems; and establishing <a href="https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/06/08/the_primacy_of_nuclear_deterrence_939473.html">nuclear deterrence</a> as the top priority in the Departments of Defense and Energy.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>Getting Behind It</strong></p>
<p>The US believed conventional dominance would deter conflict. Theater nuclear forces were removed from the Pacific and modernization of strategic nuclear forces was consistently delayed. Americans forgot that to first deter war and then wage war, if necessary, “quantity is a quality all its own.” The nation allowed the industrial base to both atrophy and be outsourced.</p>
<p>In a world marked by diverse threats and the prospect of simultaneous armed conflict against multiple nuclear adversaries, there are no reasonable alternatives to the report’s recommendations. Arms control is not the answer to risk-tolerant adversaries and others seeking an organic deterrent capability. Allies and partners could and should share the burden of deterrence in the long run but that will take unavailable time.</p>
<p>The costs and risks of simultaneous armed conflict with nuclear-armed peers is unquestionably higher than the costs associated with a strong strategic posture aimed at preventing conflict and associated escalation of nuclear risks. <a href="https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/Strategic-Posture-Committee-Report-Final.pdf"><em>America’s Strategic Posture</em></a> is a sound, reasonable, and urgent document and stands alone as the most credible solution to the nation’s current challenges. It is time to once again “awaken a sleeping giant” and set America on the right path.</p>
<p><em>Dr. Jonathan Trexel is a graduate faculty member with Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Americas-Strategic-Posture-Report-Get-Behind-It.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-26183 size-full" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/get-the-full-article.jpg" alt="" width="150" height="43" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/americas-strategic-posture-report-get-behind-it/">America’s Strategic Posture Report: Get Behind It</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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