Introduction

Russia’s recent deployment of a conventionally armed, diesel-powered submarine to Indonesia should not be dismissed as routine naval activity. It is a calculated strategic signal. One that highlights a growing challenge for Australia and calls into question the resilience of U.S. extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. While such deployments fall below the nuclear threshold, they reveal an emerging approach to strategic competition. The use of advanced conventional capabilities can undermine the systems that enable nuclear deterrence.

At the center of this challenge is the vulnerability of U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture. Facilities in Australia, including Pine Gap and Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt, are integral to this architecture. They support early warning, signals intelligence, and communications with nuclear forces. As such, they are not only strategic assets but also potential targets. Modern diesel-electric submarines—quiet, survivable, and increasingly capable—can operate in Australia’s northern approaches and threaten these critical nodes with precision strike options or intelligence-gathering missions that enable future disruption.

The Gray Zone Effect

This development reflects a broader shift in adversary strategy. Rather than relying on overt nuclear coercion, states such as Russia are exploring how to achieve strategic effects through conventional means. By targeting NC3 infrastructure using submarines, cyber operations, or long-range precision strike, adversaries can degrade the credibility of nuclear deterrence without crossing the nuclear threshold. This approach exploits the grey zone between peace and war, complicates escalation dynamics, and introduces ambiguity into alliance responses. It is not escalation dominance in the traditional sense, but escalation manipulation, and shaping the environment so that nuclear deterrence becomes less certain, less credible, and therefore less effective.

Recent Chinese naval activity reinforces this concern. The PLA Navy’s circumnavigation of Australia should not be viewed as routine presence or symbolic signaling alone. Rather, it demonstrates an emerging capacity to operate persistently along Australia’s littoral approaches and key maritime choke points—areas proximate to critical infrastructure that underpins U.S. and allied NC3. Such operations enable the mapping of undersea terrain, surveillance of communication pathways, and potential identification of vulnerabilities in systems such as subsea cables and relay nodes. In a crisis, these capabilities could be leveraged to conduct limited, deniable disruption of NC3 functions that degrade communication, delay decision-making, and complicate alliance coordination without crossing the threshold of armed attacks. In this sense, China’s activity mirrors and reinforces the broader trend: the use of conventional means to hold at risk the foundations of nuclear deterrence.

For Australia, the implications are significant. The traditional model of U.S. extended deterrence, anchored in the threat of nuclear retaliation, assumes that nuclear forces remain survivable, communicable, and politically usable. However, if NC3 systems are degraded or disrupted, that assumption weakens. Deterrence begins to erode not because nuclear weapons are absent, but because their employment becomes uncertain or delayed. In such a scenario, adversaries may calculate that they can act with greater freedom at the conventional level, confident that escalation can be managed or avoided. 

Policy Recommendations

This evolving threat environment demands a recalibration of Australia’s defense and deterrence posture. Nuclear deterrence remains essential, but it is no longer sufficient on its own. It must be reinforced by a comprehensive strategy that integrates conventional resilience, grey-zone competition, and a more explicit recognition of the role nuclear forces play in underpinning deterrence across all domains.

First, Australia should prioritize the hardening and resilience of NC3-related infrastructure on its territory. This includes enhancing physical protection, investing in redundancy and dispersal, and strengthening cyber defenses. Facilities such as Pine Gap and Harold E. Holt must be able to operate under contested conditions, ensuring continuity of communication and decision-making even in the face of sustained disruption. This may also require the development of alternative communication pathways, including space-based and mobile systems. Resilience is not merely a defensive measure; it is a core component of deterrence, signaling to adversaries that attempts at degradation will not succeed.

Second, Australia must significantly expand its undersea surveillance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. The ability to detect, track, and, if necessary, neutralize hostile submarines in Australia’s maritime approaches is critical to protecting strategic infrastructure. Investments should focus on integrated undersea sensor networks, maritime patrol aircraft, autonomous systems, and closer operational integration with allies. A persistent and credible ASW posture will complicate adversary planning, increase operational risk, and reduce the feasibility of covert operations targeting NC3 nodes.

Third, Canberra should deepen strategic dialogue with Washington on the role of Australia within U.S. nuclear deterrence architecture. This dialogue must move beyond general assurances and address specific contingencies, including how attacks on NC3 infrastructure in Australia would be interpreted. Greater clarity around escalation thresholds, attribution challenges, and response options will reduce the risk of miscalculation and strengthen the credibility of extended deterrence. This should include regularized nuclear consultation mechanisms and scenario-based planning.

Fourth, Australia should take the lead in advocating for the development of an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance. Such a framework that brings together the United States, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and Australia, would formalize shared deterrence responsibilities and strengthen collective resolve. While politically sensitive, this arrangement could include elements of nuclear consultation, planning, and burden-sharing, similar in principle to NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements. By distributing deterrence functions and signaling unity, such an alliance would complicate adversary calculations and reinforce the credibility of nuclear deterrence across the region.

Fifth, Australia must engage India more directly on the implications of Russian strategic behavior. As a key regional power with longstanding ties to Moscow, India occupies a unique diplomatic position. Canberra should clearly communicate its concerns regarding Russian military activities in the Indo-Pacific, including the risks posed to critical infrastructure and regional stability. In parallel, India should be encouraged to consider the broader consequences of a hypothetical Russian attack on Australia, not only for bilateral relations, but for its strategic partnerships with both the United States and Australia. This dialogue would not seek to force alignment, but to underscore the interconnected nature of regional security and the potential costs of strategic ambiguity.

Sixth, Australia should explore options to visibly anchor U.S. nuclear deterrence in the region. This necessitates a proactive approach to alliance integration. Mechanisms such as enhanced consultation, increased transparency around nuclear policy, and potential participation in nuclear planning arrangements could reinforce deterrence by demonstrating resolve and cohesion. Initiatives under AUKUS provide a foundation for this deeper integration and should be expanded to include broader deterrence considerations.

Seventh, Australian defense policy must explicitly recognize the interdependence of conventional and nuclear deterrence. Investments in long-range strike, cyber capabilities, and undersea warfare are essential, but they must be understood as part of a broader deterrence framework. These capabilities contribute to resilience and denial, but they are ultimately underpinned by the threat of escalation. Ensuring that this relationship is clearly articulated in strategy and doctrine will strengthen deterrence coherence and improve signaling to adversaries.

Finally, Australia must broaden its strategic focus to account for multiple nuclear-capable adversaries operating in the Indo-Pacific. While China remains the primary focus of defense planning, Russia’s increased presence in Southeast Asia underscores the need for a comprehensive approach. Strategic competition is no longer confined to a single actor or domain. It is multi-faceted, simultaneous, and increasingly coordinated. Australia’s deterrence posture must reflect this complexity.

Conclusion

The central lesson is clear. Deterrence in the 21st century cannot be treated as a layered system in which nuclear weapons sit passively at the top. Instead, nuclear deterrence must actively underpin and reinforce every level of conflict, including the conventional and grey-zone domains. Adversaries are increasingly seeking to exploit gaps between these layers, using conventional means to achieve strategic effects without triggering nuclear retaliation.

To respond to this challenge, Australia must take seriously the credibility of the nuclear deterrent on which it relies. This means investing in the resilience of critical systems, strengthening conventional capabilities, and engaging more deeply with allies and partners on the role of nuclear alliances and forces in regional security.

In an era defined by ambiguity and threshold management, the effectiveness of deterrence will depend on integration, clarity, and resolve. By advancing new nuclear alliance structures, deepening strategic dialogue, which includes India, and reinforcing both conventional and nuclear pillars of deterrence, Australia can ensure that sophisticated conventional threats do not undermine the stability of the broader strategic order.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Silent Signals: Russian and Chinese Conventional Threats to NC3 and U.S. Extended Deterrence in Australia was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the summer and fall of 2025, Washington’s decision-makers faced an urgent question: which partners could act immediately and deliver tangible results? This focus on short-term capability, rather than potential or size, has brought Pakistan back into the spotlight of U.S. foreign policy. Its importance today is tied not to historical ties, but to what it is prepared to deliver. Recent high-level meetings and agreements provide evidence of this shift, signaling a new calculus in Washington’s regional approach.

The Main Reason Behind Trump’s Foreign Policy Shift

The main reason for the U.S. foreign policy pivot toward Pakistan is neither ideology nor historic friendship, but Pakistan’s current capacity to deliver on Washington’s key objectives—security, resources, and political flexibility. This “capacity to deliver” consists of three dimensions on which Washington is counting today.

The first is the operational-security dimension, involving intelligence and operational cooperation that yields measurable results, such as counterterrorism cooperation and mediation in Afghanistan. The second is strategic and economic resources, referring to access to energy, minerals, or contracts supporting U.S. industrial and defense initiatives, including mineral promises and economic or crypto agreements. The third is diplomatic and tactical flexibility, characterized by Pakistan’s readiness to make quick deals, assume regional roles, and engage in de-escalation aligned with Washington’s interests—something India is less willing to do.

In short, Washington seeks a “measurable partner,” not merely an “ideal strategic ally,” and Pakistan is offering that measurable partnership.

Why Didn’t India Become Dependable?

To understand why the U.S. is stepping back from India, it is essential to distinguish between two types of capability: long-term capacity—such as market size, population, and economic strength—and immediate ability to cooperate, meaning willingness to align with U.S. interests. While India’s long-term potential is undeniable, several factors have eroded Washington’s trust in its short-term reliability.

New Delhi’s independent economic and energy behavior, including continued purchases of discounted Russian oil and increasingly protectionist trade policies, has been interpreted in Washington as undermining U.S. economic interests, prompting tariff responses and weakening strategic trust. In addition, tactical asynchrony on regional and international issues has made India reluctant to reach quick agreements with Washington or bear domestic political costs of alignment.

As a result, India’s behavior has become, in Washington’s view, “predictably resistant.” When a partner’s cooperation becomes constrained, the U.S. tends to look elsewhere—even if the alternative is smaller or less prominent globally.

How Did Pakistan Build a “Deliverable” Status?

Pakistan actively crafted a “delivery package” combining tangible security cooperation, fresh economic offers, and regional coordination—the formula Washington sought.

On the security front, reports point to growing counterterrorism cooperation and structured dialogue between the U.S. and Pakistan, signaling that Islamabad can play an immediate operational and intelligence role. Economically, Pakistan has presented proposals tied to vital minerals, energy projects, and partnerships involving firms linked to Washington’s business circles. These offers, coupled with access to strategic resources and investment contracts, have added significant political value.

Regionally, Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and participation in recent arrangements—such as the defense pact with Saudi Arabia—have further positioned Islamabad as a pragmatic actor in Washington’s calculus.

The Role of Leadership Style in Washington: Trump’s Transnationalism

The trajectory of U.S. foreign policy is closely tied to leadership style. The Trump administration embodies a distinctly transactional approach—offering rewards for cooperation and swift punishment for actions undermining American interests.

This style has reshaped Washington’s behavior in three ways. First, speed has become paramount: quick deals and visible short-term results matter more than long-term strategies. Second, deliverability is the new standard: Washington prioritizes what a partner can provide immediately rather than who might remain loyal in the future. Third, domestic politics and business networks, including figures linked to Trump’s inner circle, have made decision-making more interest-driven and risk-prone. Reports of business ties close to the White House have reinforced this perception.

The Costs and Risks of This Shift

Washington’s tilt toward Pakistan may follow the logic of “deliverability,” but it carries risks that should not be overlooked. Partnering with a nuclear-armed state facing internal instability exacerbates security vulnerabilities, especially amid discussions of Saudi-Pakistan defense arrangements. India is unlikely to remain neutral; it could lean further toward China or reinforce strategic autonomy, both weakening U.S. influence in Asia. Moreover, privileging Islamabad risks alienating regional and Middle Eastern allies, opening the door to new bloc formations complicating U.S. strategy.

These risks are structural. For Pakistan, the gamble is also dangerous: entanglement in U.S.-China rivalry may deepen domestic fragility rather than strengthen its position.

The Messages of the Shift for Key Players

Washington’s pivot sends clear signals to New Delhi and Islamabad. For India, the first is the need to make foreign policy more operational—demonstrating tangible results in areas Washington prioritizes, from technology supply chains to selective security cooperation. The second is using multilateral channels to reduce risks while carefully addressing costs of diverging from Washington.

For Pakistan, two messages stand out: if it seeks to move from being merely “deliverable” to becoming a “responsible partner,” transparency on nuclear issues and guarantees of internal political stability are essential. Pakistan must also channel its leverage into structural investments—through institutional building and resource legislation—to reduce dependence on transactional deals.

Conclusion: A Warning and an Opportunity

Washington’s pivot to Pakistan reflects a key principle in contemporary geopolitics: in fluid, high-pressure environments, actors able to deliver short-term results gain advantage—but this edge is not lasting without transparency, accountability, and risk management. For observers, the story is clear: today, the U.S. seeks tangible results; Pakistan provides them; if India cannot—or chooses not to—adapt to “practical deliverability,” it must be prepared to bear strategic costs. Washington’s choice signals that in the current era, those who can act immediately hold significance.

If India fails to show greater flexibility in trade, energy, and geopolitical alignment, years of diplomatic investment in its relationship with the U.S. could be seriously undermined.

Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher specializing in international security, regionalism, and foreign policy. As a freelance writer, he contributes to national and international publications, including Modern Diplomacy, Global Security Review, RealClearDefense, and Afghan outlets such as Hasht-e-Subh and Madanyat Media, and has published articles in academic journals of Afghan universities, providing analysis on Afghanistan, South Asia, and broader global affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Why Washington Has Turned to Pakistan—and What It Means for India was originally published on Global Security Review.

Far from being a mere slip of the tongue, the episode revealed the extent to which BRICS have established themselves as increasingly influential players in international politics and economics. The fear aroused by those words was no accident; it reflected the growing perception that this bloc represents a direct challenge to the established international order.

The informal BRICS alliance was formed in 2009, when several emerging economies decided to coordinate their efforts to strengthen their financial, economic, and political cooperation. Brazil, Russia, India, and China formed the group, which was joined by South Africa in 2010. Since then, the bloc has steadily increased its influence, becoming a central player in the international system. It currently represents about 50% of the world’s population and approximately 40% of global GDP in terms of purchasing power parity.

Today, BRICS is once again at the center of global debate. For those who failed to understand the significance of Trump’s words, or the reasons for the nervousness they provoked, it is essential to pause and analyze exactly what this organization is and why its rise is generating growing concerns about the international balance of power. The question, in this context, is inevitable: why is this institution attracting so much attention today?

After the end of World War II, the United States and the major Western democracies promoted a framework of rules, institutions, and relationships that is now known as the “liberal international order.” This system was based on liberal principles—both political and economic—and cooperation among states through multilateral organizations designed to ensure stability, growth, and collective security.

However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bipolar system, the international scene underwent a profound transformation. Washington emerged as the sole global superpower, a situation that led Francis Fukuyama to formulate his thesis of the “end of history.”

Over the last few decades, Uncle Sam has maintained its hegemony through the liberal international order, relying on political and military alliances, shared norms, and universalist values, with institutions such as NATO and the IMF serving as fundamental pillars. This framework has guaranteed the hegemony of the dollar and its so-called “exorbitant privilege,” which has allowed the United States to borrow on more favorable terms than any other country, finance its deficits without immediate risk, and consolidate its debt as the safest asset in the global financial system.

To fully understand this analysis, it is essential to add another key element of the Western system’s success: the SWIFT network. This global payment infrastructure connects most of the world’s banks and acts as an intermediary in international transfers, the vast majority of which are conducted in dollars. In this way, the dollar has become the dominant currency worldwide. However, despite its power and influence, the liberal international order is beginning to show increasingly evident cracks.

Over time, a series of events have contributed to weakening this system. The financial crises of recent decades have undermined confidence in Western elites’ ability to manage the global economic order, while the U.S. strategy of shaping the world according to its own interests has fostered a coalition of states that reject its hegemony. Similarly, specific episodes such as Brexit in 2016, President Obama’s blockade of the WTO Appellate Body—considered the guardian of free trade—and Donald Trump’s return to the White House have intensified doubts about the soundness and legitimacy of this system.

Added to this context is the use of the dollar as a tool of political pressure, particularly visible in the sanctions imposed on Russia, a move that has reinforced the perception that the U.S. currency also functions as a geopolitical instrument.

This set of factors has led many powers to seek alternatives that reduce their dependence on the system dominated by the U.S. In this scenario of a weakening liberal international order, recent moves by BRICS are perceived as a direct threat to Washington, once again placing the bloc at the center of global debate.

As already noted, the BRICS is an informal intergovernmental organization whose main objective is to increase its global influence and offer alternatives to Western-dominated institutions. Since its creation, the bloc has progressively expanded its reach and sought to reduce its dependence on the U.S.-led international financial system.

A key step in this strategy was the 2014 creation of the New Development Bank, aimed at financing development projects in emerging economies, as well as the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, a $100 billion fund designed to protect member countries from financial crises. These initiatives are perceived as direct challenges to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, essential pillars of the liberal international order.

Added to this institutional progress is the growing economic weight of the bloc. BRICS countries have established themselves as one of the main drivers of global growth, accounting for a significant share of industrial production and strategic resources.

It is in this context that BRICS found an historic opportunity to challenge the rules of the international economic game. In addition to developing their own institutions, in 2018 BRICS introduced a new international payment mechanism called “NIPS,” later known as BRICS Pay. Although the project progressed slowly for several years, it regained prominence in October 2024 during the 16th BRICS Summit, held that same year. On this occasion, the member countries formally presented and endorsed what was now called BRICS Pay.

BRICS Pay aims to facilitate international transactions in local currencies and reduce the centrality of the dollar. The system would rely on DCMS, a decentralized messaging network developed in Russia and distributed among member countries, allowing each state to control its own financial infrastructure and trade without using the dollar, thereby weakening its dominance. At the same time, the absence of a hegemonic actor within the system aims to foster more balanced cooperation and potentially reduce geopolitical tensions.

This project represents a direct challenge to both the United States and the SWIFT system and, by extension, to the liberal international order. If BRICS countries succeed in consolidating the success of BRICS Pay in the future, we could be witnessing a notable change in the world order as we know it today.

However, significant obstacles remain between ambition and reality. Although an initial prototype of BRICS Pay has been presented in Moscow, and it has been suggested that it could be operational by 2026, the path to a fully functional system is complex. The experience of the European Union shows that financial integration requires time, coordination, and a high degree of economic convergence.

Furthermore, BRICS countries have profound differences in their levels of development, monetary policies, and strategic priorities, which makes it difficult to build a stable and cohesive framework. Similarly, despite their growing economic weight, their global political influence remains limited and, for the time being, it is insufficient to displace Western primacy.

Even so, the bloc’s rapid rise in a brief time has altered the international balance and raised fundamental questions about the future of the global system. The central question is whether BRICS countries will succeed in consolidating themselves as a real alternative to the liberal order led by the United States or whether their challenge will remain, at least for now, a symptom of an increasingly fragmented and multipolar world.

Ana Lorenzo López is a geopolitical analyst currently collaborating with The Political Room, where she writes in-depth political and strategic analysis on international affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

BRICS: The Emerging Bloc That Threatens the Liberal International Order was originally published on Global Security Review.

In South Asia, India’s expanding space program—featuring anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) to spy and surveillance satellites—is not motivated by technological ambitions but is instead a function of its deep strategic culture. Indian scholar Rajesh Basrur’s concept of deep Indian strategic culture is an apt lens to study India’s space politics. India’s space odyssey reflects its quest for autonomy and prestige, the two essential components of its deep strategic culture.

Basrur identifies two levels of strategic culture: ‘mutable strategic culture’ that can shift over time and ‘deep strategic culture’ that is a set of core strategic preferences derived from historical experiences. According to Basrur’s statement in his book chapter on Indian Strategic Culture, defining a deep strategic culture is “tricky, perhaps tautological since it is a recognition that is post facto (a long-term attribute is deep until it is not!).”  Still, he defines deep strategic culture as “patterns that are sustained unchanged over a long period of time (in the present context, since independence), irrespective of changing circumstance.” He further underscores the two most enduring pillars of Indian strategic culture as a persistent preference for strategic autonomy and a long-standing quest for status on the global stage.

India’s space politics is thus a reflection of its deep-rooted desire to achieve strategic autonomy. India has heavily invested in dual-use technologies, such as navigation satellites (NavlC) and communication satellites (GSAT). India leverages these dual-use technologies as a strategic enabler that allows real-time monitoring and surveillance of the South Asian region and beyond. Moreover, the indigenous development of launch vehicles like the PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle) and GSLV (Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle) is adaptable for military purposes.

The Mission Shakti ASAT Test is evidence of using an indigenous launch vehicle for the delivery of kinetic anti-satellite weapons. It underscores the operational autonomy in space without reliance on external partners or even against them. The pattern of international space cooperation of India is also driven by its deep strategic culture. India engages with both the US and Russia as per its strategic needs. This multi-alignment strategy aims to get access to modern technology, expertise, and partnerships without committing to any one side.

Another deeply interwoven element of Indian strategic culture in its space politics is the pursuit of status. India leverages space as a key domain to achieve recognition as a technologically advanced and influential major power. India demonstrates its status through high-profile space missions, such as Chandrayaan, Mangalyaan, and the upcoming Gaganyaan mission. These missions garner international attention and enhance India’s prestige, signaling to the international community that the country has ambitious space aims.

Furthermore, to enhance prestige and status, India participates in international space forums of exploration and governance like the Artemis Accords, the TRUST initiative, and the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET). India harnesses these platforms to advance its national interests by gaining greater visibility, access to dual-use technologies, and opportunities for space exploration. India also leverages these forums for high-accuracy real-time data that allows it to do regional surveillance and monitoring.

Indian space politics is not only about capability but also about demonstrating it in ways that enhance its international standing. All this is not occurring in isolation but in a region with a fragile balance of power maintained by nuclear deterrence. This translation of Indian strategic culture into astropolitics has regional and global implications. At the regional level, India’s increasingly offensive space uses, such as surveillance, missile guidance, and precision strikes, are creating a security dilemma for its neighbors. This disrupts the regional balance of power and will motivate Pakistan to enter an arms race or to equip itself with non-military means to compete with India.

At the international level, India is actively involved in cooperation with both the U.S. and Russia; however, India’s multi-alignment strategy is not working as per its expectations. There are structural constraints at the heart of the implementation of Indian astropolitics. India is dependent upon the U.S. for advanced space technologies, intelligence, and commercial space opportunities. It erodes the very basic tenet of Indian astropolitics, strategic autonomy. Moreover, India and Russia have a joint historical space and defense ecosystem, which has become politically sensitive amidst international sanctions on Russia. The dual-track or multi-alignment strategy of India increases strategic ambiguity.

In a nutshell, strategic autonomy sounds sophisticated, but it is practically unlikely since alliances and power blocs are the pivot of international relations. The contemporary strategic rift between the United States and India is evidence of the backfiring of multi-alignment as the U.S. criticizes India on its strategy and close ties with Russia. If this strategic split expands, it reduces India’s technological options, putting serious constraints on its space program that is dependent upon both the U.S. and Russia. India’s strategic ambiguity exposes it to structural pressures and regional security dilemmas by reinforcing perceptions of India as a destabilizing actor in an already fragile strategic environment.

Areesha Manzoor is a Research Assistant at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad, researching space politics. Her authorship includes articles and research papers on space politics. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

India’s Deep Strategic Culture Beyond the Skies was originally published on Global Security Review.

AI has improved intelligence operations in developing nations, but it has also created a new intelligence gap due to disjointed technological implementation, political exploitation of surveillance, reliance on foreign suppliers, and insufficient integration between HUMINT and AI-driven systems. Pakistan and India have large human resources and developing technological ecosystems, but institutional fragmentation and political agendas prevent the development of integrated, modern intelligence frameworks.

The problems that South Asian intelligence services are having are part of a larger global transformation. AI is now a segment of intelligence operation in the US, China, Israel, and some European countries. This includes automated translation, pattern-of-life analysis, algorithmic triage of intercepted data, commercial satellite imagery analytics, and cyber-enabled anomaly detection. China’s surveillance state uses AI-powered facial recognition, behavior prediction, and nationwide data fusion to show what a fully integrated intelligence model looks like. The U.S. is pushing for automated signals intelligence (SIGINT) processing and predictive analysis in all its intelligence agencies in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). As shown in studies of its military AI systems, Israel uses AI in real-time targeting and ISR fusion.

Developing countries are just as vulnerable to cyber-attacks, terrorism, and false information, but they do not have the institutional frameworks that let AI grow. This global gap is what makes the changes in intelligence in Pakistan and India so important for strategy. Pakistan and India have both spent resources on AI-enabled surveillance systems like ID databases, CCTV networks, predictive policing tools, interception systems, and cyber technologies that come from other countries. The NADRA database and Safe City projects in Pakistan give a lot of biometric and real-time data. India has made the Central Monitoring System (CMS) and the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) to connect databases between state agencies. The ministry, military, police, and intelligence systems are separate. Legacy bureaucracies promote compartmentalization over integration. AI needs centralized databases, clean data, agency cooperation, and agreed analysis criteria. These requirements are missing; hence, AI systems exhibit limited and inconsistent intelligence. Agencies are collecting more data than ever but lack the framework to analyze it.

Pakistan and India still value HUMINT for intelligence. It is crucial for counterterrorism, political spying, and regional operations. HUMINT alone can’t compete with hybrid enemies who use AI-driven processing. Strategically, China’s integrated military and civilian AI ecosystem is advantageous. Developing states are stuck between two sources of intelligence: First is a legacy HUMINT system with deep networks and second is an AI ecosystem that is fragmented and not fully developed, so it cannot support strategic analysis. In cross-border threat assessments, cyber invasions, and emerging non-traditional security issues like information warfare, this mismatch causes delays, blind spots, and analytical distortions.

In both Pakistan and India, AI-enabled surveillance has been used more for political purposes than for improving strategic intelligence. Amnesty International reported that India’s use of Pegasus spyware targeted journalists, activists, and political opponents. Pakistan has been criticized for using automated social media monitoring and political profiling, which often focuses on threats from within the country rather than threats from other countries. When surveillance tools are used to control political competition within a party, two things happen. First, institutional resources prioritize domestic control over strategic analysis. Second, technology investments strengthen policing instead of updating intelligence. This challenges national security by making it harder for the intelligence system to predict cyberattacks, regional crises, and threats from outside the country.

South Asia has a lot of foreign AI and cyber infrastructure. Pakistan employs Chinese surveillance equipment (Hikvision, Huawei), while India uses Israeli, US, and European and American forensics platforms. This increases structural risks, including data exfiltration and espionage due to entrenched vulnerabilities, strategic reliance on foreign updates, and weakened sovereignty over vital intelligence activities.

Two traditional rivals, nuclear-weapon states, are weakened by this reliance. AI-powered surveillance systems increase digital access points for assault. Big national data repositories attract attackers. Pakistan has had multiple government system hacks, and India has had large breaches that compromised critical infrastructure and government information.  Failures in the past were largely caused by human error, but in the AI era, bias in algorithms, data manipulation, hostile and automated cyberattacks, and misclassification can lead to erroneous operational decisions. These dangers make the strategy unstable.

Increasing intelligence gaps between Pakistan and India jeopardize national and regional security. More likely to misjudge opponents: In fast-moving crises, agencies may miss signals, misjudge threats, or misread trends without AI–HUMINT fusion. Cross-border escalation risks rise; poor intelligence integration in nuclearized environments may aggravate misperceptions during crises like the 2019 Pulwama–Balakot incident or the May 2025 standoff. Cyber attacks expose national secrets. Easy-to-get digital network intelligence can have fatal repercussions. China-asymmetric strategic competition: China is decades ahead in intelligence upgrading, and Pakistan and India may fall further. Domestic AI reduces institutional capacity: political survival trumps strategic intelligence.

In summary, countries that do not update their intelligence risk being caught off guard, making mistakes, and becoming more vulnerable. The myths of shadows, secrecy, and huge people networks that fueled emerging country intelligence organizations are gone. AI has highlighted bureaucratic opacity’s long-hidden structural flaws: dysfunctional systems, politicized surveillance, reliance on foreign technology, and a lack of HUMINT-AI integration. Thus, Pakistan and India’s new intelligence divide is not about data or resources. It is about institutions’ failure to transition from analogue intelligence to AI-connected ecosystems. State and non-state adversaries that accelerate this transformation will benefit.

In nuclearized, crisis-prone South Asia, small misunderstandings could lead to massive wars. Pakistan and India need more than AI tools to stay competitive strategically. They need data architectures that work together, technical specialists, protocols to prevent politicians from abusing their authority, and strategic AI–HUMINT fusion.

Dr. Tahir Mahmood Azad is currently a research scholar at the Department of Politics & International Relations, the University of Reading, UK.  Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Intelligence Illusion: How AI is Exposing Strategic Vulnerabilities in the Developing World was originally published on Global Security Review.

In May 2025, Pakistan shot down seven Indian warplanes, a claim backed by later credible reports. U.S. sources confirmed Chinese-built J-10C fighters shot down Indian Rafales, and Pakistan’s Air Chief Zaheer Ahmed Babar Sidhu publicly tallied the Indian fighters destroyed in combat. Multiple reports also identified wreckage of an Indian Rafale and Mirage-2000 at Pakistani strike sites, reinforcing Pakistan’s account. India provided no evidence to dispute these claims.

India’s response to those losses has been to extensively enlarge its LR-ASM arsenal. In the May war, the Indian Air Force (IAF) used its BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, French SCALP/Storm Shadow, and Rampage missiles to strike targets from its own territory. Now India openly seeks even longer reach. Reports say India is in talks to procure the Air-LORA long-range missiles from Israel and is also field-testing an 800 kilometer (km) range BrahMos. Almost two years ago, India contractually signed its largest-ever BrahMos procurement (220 missiles, approximately $2 billion) and approved 110 more air-launched BrahMos.

Longer-range missiles enable Indian jets strike “from safe distances,” beyond Pakistan’s air defence zones, including advanced Pakistani air-to-air weapons like PL-15. Each new LR-ASM thus allows India to hit targets deep from its own soil. After the May war, India is changing its tactics: attack Pakistan without risking aircraft losses. Thus, in the next conflict, Pakistan will also retaliate equally, and this might take the crisis up the rungs of the escalation ladder. Every extra kilometer of range brings Pakistan’s “red lines” closer. For Islamabad, even a strike from hundreds of kilometers away could look indistinguishable from a major attack. Analysts note that with 800 km range missiles, all Pakistani cities, from Islamabad to Karachi, lie within reach of Indian jets flying entirely from Indian territory. Some analysts warn there is now almost no conventional buffer: any use of these missiles could be conflated with a strategic attack.

Pakistan’s doctrine of “full-spectrum deterrence” is designed to deter threats “at all rungs” of that ladder. In practice, using LR-ASM will make any deep Indian conventional counterforce strike against Pakistan more feasible, and this will be treated in Pakistan as an existential threat. These novel weapons will also cause an illusion of security in India since they will feel that they can launch attacks with no major reprisal by the Pakistani side, or if there is any, then it will be countered. Due to this expansion, India has made limited strikes a more attractive coercive instrument and bargaining an increasingly risky game of brinkmanship. LR-ASM enables an attacker to impose rapid, precision costs on an adversary (targeting runways, command-nodes, air-defences, logistics) without risking pilots, so political leaders can credibly threaten or carry out deep strikes short of general war. This kind of weapon also compresses the decision-making time windows through which India can compel Pakistan’s actions and shift the onus of responsibility of escalation onto Pakistan.

The consequences for deterrence are also stark: a limited conflict in future may have a much higher probability of escalation. Modernization and high-alert postures already leave “little margin for error” in South Asia. When India can hit sensitive targets from 800 km away, and Pakistan retaliate back via its quid-pro-quo-plus (QPQP) strategy, multiple rungs can be skipped, potentially leading to a full-scale war. In such a scenario, Pakistan’s Army Rocket Force Command and the Pakistan Air Force’s long-range unmanned systems would form part of Islamabad’s broader retaliatory and signalling toolkit. Indian strategists may view a layered mix of BrahMos, Rampage, and Air-LORA as a route to “escalation dominance” by pressuring Pakistan while minimising their own vulnerabilities. Yet the May 2025 losses only deepen this appetite for so-called risk-reducing stand-off capabilities, even though classic Kahn and Schelling deterrence theories warn that such confidence in controllable escalation is often an illusion.

LR-ASM expansion after the May 2025 war will generate an illusion of dominating the escalation ladder in the Indian psyche. This increases the possibility of a conventional strike, which would compel both states to skip multiple rungs of the escalation ladder and risk a more dangerous crisis. The May 2025 war demonstrated exactly how LR-ASM capabilities increased the dangers of escalation. In the absence of force posture transparency, plausible restraint signalling, and a solid mechanism of crisis handling, the deterrence equilibrium will be more fragile in the region with major consequences of potential nuclear involvement.

Abdul Wassay is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies, Lahore. He can be reached at info@casslhr.com. The views expressed are those of the author.

India’s Push for Long Range Air-to-Surface Missiles was originally published on Global Security Review.

While many analysts argue that this deal covers Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, the reality is that this agreement augments the already existing strategic partnership rather than providing Saudi Arabia with a nuclear umbrella. Neither Pakistan’s nuclear policy nor its doctrine entails providing extended nuclear deterrence to any other state while Islamabad’s deterrence posture remains India-specific and does not extend to providing a nuclear umbrella to any state.

Islamabad and Riyadh have been tied in a mutual defense pact for decades. Pakistani forces, which account for 1,500–2,000 troops, provide operational and technical help to Saudi forces. In regional conflicts, Pakistan safeguards Saudi frontiers under the defense protocol of 1967. Over time, Pakistan trained approximately 8,000–10,000 Saudi military personnel.

The recent strategic mutual defense agreement further strengthens the historical alliance between Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), rather than creating a new pact. Even previous defense agreements do not guarantee a “nuclear umbrella.” In a similar vein, the recent mutual defense pact between Pakistan and the KSA serves the purpose of signaling solidarity and strategic cooperation, rather than providing an unconditional military guarantee for Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan does not seek to assume the role of a regional security guarantor. Rather, it contributes to collective security in line with international law and its national interests. However, Islamabad can be an essential actor in collective security arrangements in the Middle East in accordance with the norms of international law.

As the Israeli air raid on Doha sent shockwaves across the globe, Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, realized that the United States is unlikely to go to the defense of its Gulf partners in times of crisis, despite deep ties with the Kingdom.

The reliability of the US as a security guarantor to its Arab partners in the Gulf region diminished after the United States tolerated the Israeli bombing of Hamas leadership in Doha, Qatar, September 9, 2025. Al-Udeid Air Base, in Qatar, is the largest US military base in the Middle East with 10,000 active troops.

Israel’s attack against Hamas leadership in Doha also infuriated Gulf countries. However, the lack of action by the US against its ally for the airstrike in Doha has damaged the image of the US as a reliable security partner. Therefore, Arab states are exploring new partners for their security against Israeli aggression.

Pakistan, with its battle-tested military and cordial relations with Gulf monarchies, appears to be a natural partner for the KSA. Its decades-old alliance with the KSA is rooted in deep strategic interests, shared faith, and economic interdependence. The presence of 2.7 million Pakistanis in the KSA also matters as they contribute over $6 billion in annual remittances. Pakistan’s reliance on Saudi oil imports is also important. These factors deepen mutual trust and economic interdependence.

Together, they reinforce the strategic logic behind the Pakistan–Saudi Mutual Defense Pact. Additionally, Pakistan’s participation in Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 projects highlights opportunities for long-term economic integration and strategic cooperation.

The cardinal aspect of this new mutual defense pact lies in formalizing a deep alliance which has historical roots. With this agreement, both Islamabad and Riyadh vow joint deterrence against any aggression, institutionalizing their long-standing security cooperation. Both Pakistan and KSA view this pact as an outcome of a decades-old partnership, not a sudden alliance aimed at any adversary, as Pakistani officials reiterated in their statements. Similar to the previous defense agreements between Islamabad and Riyadh, this agreement does not offer any nuclear guarantee to the KSA.

Therefore, the idea of a nuclear umbrella remains speculative and the actual text of this mutual pact, along with Pakistan’s stated nuclear doctrine, does not support it. Operational readiness and interoperability of both states’ armed forces will be significantly improved. The pact will foster defense industry collaboration on emerging technologies such as cybersecurity, drone technology, and space-based defense systems between both states. It will enable the co-production of conventional military equipment as well, paving the way for a promising future of strategic cooperation between Islamabad and Riyadh.

It may also be pointed out that Pakistan has not offered a covert “nuclear button” to Riyadh and defense cooperation with Riyadh does not imply an automatic war pledge. While addressing the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, also praised this defense deal between the two brotherly Muslim states, marking the pact as the beginning of a comprehensive regional security system.

A Pak–Saudi mutual defense pact enhances Pakistan’s strategic depth by reinforcing its defense cooperation with the Muslim world’s most influential state, thereby expanding Islamabad’s diplomatic leverage beyond South Asia. The pact bolsters Pakistan’s deterrence posture vis-à-vis India, as Riyadh’s political and strategic backing adds weight to Pakistan’s regional standing.

Economically, it promises deeper defense collaboration, potential joint production, and technology transfer. In December, the KSA loaned Pakistan $3 billion, shoring up its foreign exchange reserves, while politically reflecting its growing confidence in Pakistan’s professional military capability and responsible nuclear stewardship. In essence, the agreement strengthens Pakistan’s strategic autonomy, broadens its alliances, and projects it as a pivotal player in the evolving security architecture of the Muslim world.

Nawal Nawaz is a Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS).

Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi Defense Agreement was originally published on Global Security Review.

India’s strategy of escalation dominance, aimed at acquiring the ability to control the pace, intensity, and outcome of a conflict at each successive rung of the escalation ladder, as well as termination on its own terms, is underway. There are indications of development of such a strategy. Conventional superiority, strategic signaling, ready-to-use nuclear forces, and crisis management are all examples. Its strategy of escalation dominance, coupled with damage limitation, is supported by multilayered missile and air defense systems and canisterization of its nuclear-capable missile for a ready-to-use force, as well as cyber and space capabilities.

These capabilities are considered key to a state’s escalation dominance strategy. However, India’s escalation dominance in South Asia is not only accelerating the intensity of the security dilemma by increasing its own security but also deepening the threat perception of the adversary—weakening the strategic stability of South Asia.

In 2004, India revealed its Cold Start doctrine, a limited warfighting offensive plan to achieve conventional objectives within a limited time frame. Later, two more doctrines, known as the Joint Doctrine for Indian Armed Forces and the Land Warfare Doctrine, were issued in 2017 and 2018.

Recently, the Indian government announced a joint exercise by the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, named Cold Start, in the first week of October 2025. The exercise aimed to test drones and counter-drone systems that officials labelled as the biggest such drill to be conducted since the May India-Pakistan conflict.

On September 25, 2025, the Indian Ministry of Defense announced that India had conducted a successful flight test of a rail-based Agni-Prime intermediate-range ballistic missile (MRBM). This is the first railway-based ballistic missile, which the minister called “under a full operational scenario.” A rail-based launcher is considered a significant development since the missile can move freely across the national rail network. This  increases the flexibility of the system in terms of its operational capability and survivability, as well as its ability to be deployed quickly.

The development is part of India’s ongoing military modernization program by fielding more types of weapon systems. A rail-based launcher, compared to fixed silos and road mobile launchers, has the advantage of quick deployment, maneuverability, and greater chances of survivability. With the test, India has joined a select group of nations with this capability.

India’s counterforce capability, followed by emerging trends in its nuclear posturing and technological developments, play into Pakistan’s fears. Indian ambitions for conventional counterforce capabilities only increases Pakistan’s fears. Reportedly, India is also pursuing a missile capable of carrying a bunker-buster. Its potential to cause massive destruction could cross Pakistan’s threshold for nuclear use, thereby leading to a serious crisis.

These ambitions require expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal in terms of more missiles, more warheads, and more fissile material to fulfill the requirements of its emerging nuclear posture, which is detrimental to regional peace and stability. India’s pursuit of an escalation dominance strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan could be perilous and lead to retaliation and war, as true escalation dominance is rarely attainable in any confrontation.

It is not something that is a feasible policy objective. Ending conflict on favorable terms remains a perilous policy objective. This is the capability of a state to dictate the endgame of a conflict, ensuring that peace is maintained on its own terms, not the opponent’s.

Nevertheless, India’s policy of escalation dominance in South Asia is escalatory, while remaining elusive. The recent four-day conflict is the latest example of India’s objectives to end the conflict on advantageous terms militarily, economically, and diplomatically. For instance, after its strike inside Pakistan, the Indian government immediately started to claim the success of Operation Sindoor, praising its military capabilities and technological strides.

On the diplomatic level, India anticipated the international community`s response to the attacks and support for the Indian stance to strengthen its regional and international standings. However, the failure of the Indian strategy was exposed at the military level when India faced tough retaliation from Pakistan, resulting in the reported loss of its six jets, besides damage to its key military installations, including its costly defense systems. At the diplomatic and economic levels, Trump’s repeated claims of credit for ending the conflict question its long-held stance of strategic autonomy and rejecting third parties’ role in resolving the Kashmir dispute. After the ceasefire, Trump claimed that to end the conflict between India and Pakistan, his threat of extremely high tariffs was instrumental in reaching a ceasefire agreement.

India has been unable to achieve the desired outcomes from the conflicts it has initiated many times over the past two decades. Latest statements from the Indian military leadership also show that India is unsatisfied with the outcomes of its strategy. It is more useful to treat escalation dominance as a philosophical aspiration than as a feasible policy objective, especially against a country that has a qualitative edge over the initiator of the crisis. Therefore, advanced technologies could be decisive in any future conflicts, but it could be that reciprocal development can offer a counter-capability in the same-domain deterrence and thus may challenge escalation dominance. Pakistan’s policy of full-spectrum deterrence is instrumental in countering Indian ambitions at every level of the escalation ladder. India’s pursuit of escalation dominance complicates the regional security dynamics, which already lack institutionalized Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), a nuclear risk-reduction mechanism, and an arms control framework aligned with the emerging technologies.

Sher Ali Kakar is an Associate Director of Research with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Atta Ullah is a Research Fellow with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Views express in this article are the Author’s own.

India’s Strategy of Escalation Dominance was originally published on Global Security Review.

That gap undermines American extended deterrence because Washington cannot reassure allies or deter aggressors without accounting for South Asia’s threat calculus. AI arms developments in this region stem from colonial legacies and mistrust of great power intentions, creating a volatile strategic environment.

India’s Governance Innovation in Defense AI

India’s governance model integrates civilian oversight with defense research and ensures ethical deployment of AI. The Responsible AI Certification Pilot evaluated algorithms for explainability before clearance. Its National Strategy for AI mandates ethical review boards for dual-use systems. Developers must document bias-mitigation measures and escalation pathways. Embedding accountability at design phase stabilizes deterrence signals by reducing inadvertent algorithmic behaviors.

The Evaluating Trustworthy AI (ETAI) Framework advances defense AI governance. It enforces five principles: reliability, security, transparency, fairness, privacy, and sets rigorous criteria for system assessment. Chief of Defense, Staff General Anil Chauhan, stressed resilience against adversarial attacks, highlighting the challenge of balancing effectiveness and safety. By mandating continuous validation against evolving threat scenarios, ETAI prevents mission creep and maintains operational integrity under stress.

India’s dual use by design philosophy embeds safeguards within prototypes from inception. This contrasts with reactive models that regulate AI after deployment. Civilian launch-authorization channels separate political intent from technical execution, ensuring decisions remain under human control and reinforcing credibility in crisis moments. Regular red-team exercises involving independent experts further validate system robustness and reduce risks of false positives in autonomous targeting.

Strengthening Extended Deterrence through Cooperation

US-India collaboration on AI verification can reinforce extended deterrence by aligning technical standards and testing protocols. The iCET fact sheet outlines secure information sharing and joint safety trials. Launched in January 2023, iCET has already enabled co-production of jet engines and transfer of advanced drone technologies. Building on this foundation, specialized working groups could develop common benchmarks for adversarial-resistance testing and automated anomaly detection.

A Center for Strategic and International Studies report recommends a trilateral verification cell blending American evaluation tools with India’s ethical reviews. Joint trials of autonomous air-defense algorithms would demonstrate interoperability and resolve. A shared “AI Red Flag” system would alert capitals to anomalous behaviors and reduce strategic surprise. Embedding cryptographically secure logging of decision path data ensures an immutable audit trail for post-event analysis and confidence building.

The INDUS-X initiative, launched during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2023 US visit, integrates responsible AI principles into defense innovation. By aligning standards, both countries ensure AI systems enhance strategic stability rather than undermine it. Expanding INDUS-X to include scenario-based wargaming with allied partners can stress-test ethical frameworks and calibrate thresholds for human intervention under duress. This model can extend under the Quad framework, pressuring authoritarian regimes to adopt transparency measures.

Institutionalizing Global AI Arms Control

A formal arms control dialogue should adopt India’s baseline standards for ethical AI governance. The UNIDIR report calls for universal bias audits and incident-reporting obligations to prevent unintended escalation. Carnegie scholars propose a tiered certification process under a new protocol for autonomous systems within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, requiring peer review of algorithms before deployment. Embedding such certification in national export-control regimes would create global incentives for adherence.

The UN General Assembly has established an Independent AI Scientific Panel and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance to issue annual assessments on risks and norms. This mechanism can evaluate military AI applications and recommend confidence-building measures. Procedural transparency would coexist with confidentiality requirements, balancing security with mutual reassurance. Regular joint workshops on risk-assessment methodologies can diffuse best practices and diffuse mistrust among major powers.

Regional Applications and Future Prospects

India’s responsible AI framework must inspire regional adoption and confidence-building measures. Pakistan and China should engage transparency initiatives to prevent dangerous asymmetries in AI capabilities. Proposed measures include joint research on AI safety, shared performance databases, and collaborative development of detection algorithms.

Successful tests of India’s hypersonic ET-LDHCM system, capable of Mach 8 and a 1,500-kilometer range, underscore the urgency of governance frameworks before fully autonomous weapons deploy. The Quad’s model of Indo-Pacific cooperation provides a template for multilateral norms on responsible AI in defense. Extending these norms to confidence-building measures such as pre-deployment notifications and automated backchannels can reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation.

Looking ahead to the United Nations General Assembly meeting on AI governance in September 2024, American policymakers can leverage India’s experience. Joint verification exercises and an ethical audit regime will establish global norms for military AI. Integrating lessons from ETAI and iCET into the assembly’s resolutions can produce enforceable standards that bind both democratic and authoritarian states. This approach will reaffirm American extended deterrence and help prevent destabilizing AI-driven arms races worldwide.

By demonstrating that ethical AI development strengthens rather than weakens deterrence credibility, India’s model provides both technical solutions and normative frameworks for managing the military applications of artificial intelligence. Sustained international cooperation on these principles is pivotal for securing strategic stability in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.

Vaibhav Chhimpa is a researcher who previously worked with the Department of Science & Technology (DST), India. Views expressed are the Author’s own.

The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

Secretary Meink’s wake-up call deserves restating,

One area of particular focus for the US Space Force is “space control,” the ability to ensure that US satellites can operate without interference while denying adversaries the same freedom. Unfortunately, 10 to 15 years ago, some of our adversaries started to weaponize space, and weaponized space aggressively. We stood on the sideline, probably too long. We didn’t want to go down that path, but now we are pushing hard. We didn’t start the race to weaponize space, but we have to make sure we can continue to operate in that domain. Going forward, we can’t lose that high ground.

This long overdue improvement in strategic communication marks a turning point toward rebuilding a credible American space deterrent. China seized the high ground through a rapid build-up of space deterrence and warfighting forces, while Australia, Japan, and South Korea observed warily this tipping of the strategic balance. The US and Europe pretended it was not a problem at all.

This was part of a broader trend for the West to bury its head in the sand for most of the past 35 years, from nuclear deterrence to space warfare. As adversaries weaponized space, the US Space Force (USSF) acknowledges at long last it must focus on fielding credible and effective deterrence and warfighting forces in space.

The USSF published an International Partnership Strategy, where “strength through partnerships” aligns allies with US space efforts. There are challenges, however, for an effective USSF international strategy. These include divisive geopolitics in space and foundational issues surrounding space defense strategy beyond support services. In addition to geopolitical and strategic quandaries, organizational politics stand in the way of a sound strategy. If the US has more robust space capabilities, partnering with the US is more attractive for allies. The ability to go it alone with the prospect of winning is what gains allies.

It turns out allies make similar moves. The US and UK Space Commands conducted their first-ever coordinated satellite maneuver in early September 2025. Among Quad members, Japan’s new space domain defense guidelines spearhead rapid battlespace awareness and real-time detection and tracking of threats. This further reinforces the importance of disrupting adversary command, control, communications, computers, and information (C4I) and other expanding threats. India will develop “bodyguard satellites” after an orbital near-miss. France’s National Strategic Review 2025 makes space central to sovereignty and defense, to acquire rapidly deployable ground and space capabilities to deny, disable, or disrupt adversaries. Last, but certainly not least, Germany is ramping up its military space posture.

When Boris Pistorius, Federal Minister of Defense of Germany, announced a $41 billion investment to counter the “fundamental threat” posed by Russia and China, he mentioned their targeting and tracking of Western satellites. While flying over Germany on reconnaissance missions, two Russian Luch-Olymp spy satellites tracked two Intelsat satellites used by the German Bundeswehr.

Pistorius suggested the Bundeswehr could centralize Germany’s military space functions to quickly respond in conflict. That requires investment in hardened systems less prone to Russian and Chinese jamming, spoofing, and manipulation. Installing “guardian satellites” to provide defensive and offensive capabilities to boost deterrence is required.

Insufficient yet required functionalities need fixing. This includes resilience of satellite constellations and ground stations, secured launch functions, improved space domain awareness capabilities, and space surveillance satellites.

This does not happen in a capability vacuum and leaves some questions unanswered on how to square that with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Despite Ariane 6 and rocket ventures, Europe does not have the required launching capability and still depends on SpaceX. IRIS², the European security-oriented constellation, will not be operational until the 2030s. Until then, dependency on Starlink remains.

Industry partners, such as Eutelsat, SES Satellites, Airbus Defense and Space, Thales, and OHB SE, will get the contracts for the German and European military space systems, but are they financially fit-for-purpose and able to deliver quickly? It depends. Airbus and Thales have heavy defense order backlogs. Eutelsat must recover from its acquisition of OneWeb, and SES just acquired Intelsat.

The question of military space capacity building for non-US NATO allies further resonates outside NATO. Japan does everything to strengthen its military space industrial base, while India puts in a serious effort from space situational awareness to launchers to warfighting satellites. Allies will get there eventually, but it may not be fast enough vis-à-vis Russia and China.

One thing is clear, the center of gravity in deterrence is shifting to space-enabled, long-range, rapidly replaceable kill webs. With NATO officially calling space a warfighting domain, it is no longer a support area. Non-US NATO leaders need to build military space capacity. They should not wait another decade to adopt an Allied Space Operations Doctrine 1.0.

Indo-Pacific allies should endeavor for a similar effort, all while leveraging NATO’s military space experience. That might include some degree of coordination between NATO and Indo-Pacific allies, especially for areas of concern to all, such as the Arctic. Without delegated authorities, codified protect-and-defend protocols, attribution thresholds, tactically responsive launch (less than 96 hours), and common allied space rules of engagement, the good guys’ response times will miss the fight as adversaries dominate orbit.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

A Realist Shift in Western Military Space Posture was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this complex environment, world leaders are facing sanctions, isolation, and strategic setbacks that send a clear message—the long peace may soon end. Whether China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, will play a positive or divisive role in the future is uncertain.

It is certain that China seeks to move from the role of “model student” to that of leader, all despite depending heavily on Western markets and technology. The United States and the European Union remain China’s largest trading partners and any disruption in these relationships could push its economy toward stagnation. How China’s ambitious transition addresses major paradoxes and limitations in three key areas deserves further discussion.

The Alliance Paradox 

At first glance, dissatisfied countries may appear a united front against the West, with China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and, to some extent, India in alignment. A closer look shows deep-rooted tensions. Russia inherited the legacy of empire and finds it difficult to accept a subordinate role to China. While Moscow relies on Beijing’s support in Ukraine, China’s growing economic and security influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus is seen as a direct threat.

India, another key player, sits with China in forums like BRICS, but remains a strategic rival. Border disputes in the Himalayas, competition for influence in the Indian Ocean, and strong ties with the United States and the West prevent any real constructive partnership between the two Asian powers.

Iran and North Korea also face serious internal and international constraints. Iran struggles with deep domestic cleavages, while North Korea remains unpredictable, at times even complicating China’s strategic plans. On a broader level, there is no shared set of values among these countries; their primary connection is opposition to the West.

As Henry Kissinger noted, such alliances often reflect disorder rather than creating a new order. This coalition is more capable of disrupting the existing system than building a replacement. None of its members, individually or collectively, possesses the institutions or tools required to reshape global order.

Xi Jinping’s presence alongside this coalition primarily serves as a symbolic display, signaling dissatisfaction, demonstrating power, and marking the end of a unipolar world. But this performance does not equate to practical ability to establish a new order. While China wields significant economic power, it lacks the instruments to replace the West in security and international politics; it has no NATO-like network, no universally trusted currency, and no capacity to reshape international legal institutions to its advantage.

The Contradiction between Experience and Ambition 

One of China’s main challenges is its lack of practical experience in major global tests. Since World War I, China has not been involved in any large-scale wars and has not faced a real-world military crisis. This gap highlights China’s inexperience in handling major international conflicts. Even considering Russia, with its weakened military and struggling economy, and Iran, facing deep domestic and regional crises, the pillars of this alliance do not appear particularly strong.

Ambition without experience, combined with an alliance lacking shared values, risks creating instability rather than a new order. This coalition sends an important message to the West, especially the United States: global dissatisfaction with American hegemony is real and even temporary alliances can exert significant pressure on energy markets, financial systems, and peace negotiations. China and its partners, despite their fundamental weaknesses, can disrupt Western calculations across many regions—a capability that should not be underestimated.

At the same time, China’s lack of hands-on experience in managing major military and economic crises leaves its foreign policy vulnerable to miscalculation. Ambition without real-world testing can thus be both an opportunity and a threat to regional and global stability. Moreover, global leadership is not possible by economic or military power alone; it also requires a compelling culture and a large consumer base capable of attracting goods, technology, and lifestyles from other countries. The United States built its hegemony precisely on these foundations. China possesses none of these.

Message to the World and the West

Xi Jinping’s alignment with countries opposing the existing global order sends a dual message to the world. First, it signals widespread dissatisfaction with the current system. This shows the world, particularly the West, that the liberal international order is no longer uncontested and that the hegemony of the United States faces a challenge. Second, it exposes the weaknesses and contradictions within the anti-Western coalition. The alliance lacks the intellectual, institutional, and operational foundations needed to create a new order. Internal divisions and the absence of security and political tools indicate that China and its partners, at least in the short term, cannot replace the existing global order.

Nevertheless, China’s stance against the liberal international order marks a new phase in global politics—one that may not produce a new order but could intensify instability and geopolitical complexity. Henry Kissinger even considered such disorder a threat greater than war. This situation shows that China is simultaneously trying to display power, secure advantages, and strengthen its global position, yet it still faces significant constraints and challenges on the path to genuine global leadership.

Conclusion

China’s transition from the “model student” to “global leader” faces three key obstacles. First is the alliance paradox in which coalitions of dissatisfied countries reflect disorder more than they create new order. Second is the gap between experience and ambition in which ambition without major practical tests leaves China vulnerable and its foreign policy prone to miscalculations. Third is the alliance/coalition’s message to the world, where China loudly signals its dissatisfaction with the current order but has no attractive alternative to offer. In other words, China seeks a larger share of the global order, yet it lacks the capacity to host it.

Today, the world is entering a new phase—one that may not produce a new order but will likely heighten instability and geopolitical complexity. In this environment, conflict remains the most probable scenario.

 Dawood Tanin is a researcher, freelance writer, and professor of political science at a private university in Afghanistan. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

What Does Xi Jinping’s Engagement in Conflicts Reveal to the World? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since the beginning of the nuclear age, the international community consistently made efforts toward disarmament. However, the world saw both vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. Nuclear-armed states are modernizing their nuclear forces.

Although there are notable breakthroughs in efforts to reach agreements on arms control and disarmament, the world remains far from achieving disarmament goals and is still on a long quest to eliminate nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons hold a key place in security policy.

The latest report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) says nearly all nuclear-armed states, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, are modernizing and upgrading their nuclear capabilities. Consequently, a perilous new nuclear arms race is emerging, and reliance on nuclear weapons is increasing. This inevitably raises the question, is nuclear disarmament still logical and relevant?

Signed in July 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is considered the first major step aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation and ensuring disarmament, including the recognized nuclear powers under the treaty. Article VI of the NPT emphasizes the pursuit of negotiations in good faith to bring an end to the nuclear arms race, achieve nuclear disarmament, and promote general disarmament by nuclear-armed states. Article VI serves as the foundation for global efforts such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

However, nuclear weapon states under the NPT are not adequately fulfilling their obligations and commitments under Article VI and instead continue to modernize their nuclear capabilities. They even provide support to their allies on nuclear matters in clear violation of the treaty. The Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) deal and the Nuclear Supplier Group’s waiver to India are cases in point. It is important to note that nuclear weapon states are primarily responsible for progressing disarmament. Under the NPT, the division between nuclear weapons states and non–nuclear weapon states is not supposed to be permanent as all NPT parties will move to non–nuclear weapon states.

The current geopolitical landscape regarding nuclear proliferation, nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, and disarmament indicates a deadlock in the pursuit of a global zero (GZ). Two key terms, conceptualized in this article, may help explain the shortcomings in nuclear disarmament efforts under the grand bargain. The first is the security betrayal trap (SBT), which refers to a situation where security guarantees are betrayed, leaving a country exposed and vulnerable. The second is disarmament deception syndrome (DDS), a pattern of negative consequences resulting from false promises made during the disarmament process.

This situation is exacerbated by the fear of cheating among the nuclear-armed countries, “If we disarm, others might not.” Hence any proactive action would leave some at some disadvantage vis-à-vis adversaries.

The latest SIPRI report suggests that countries are modernizing their nuclear arsenals with a greater reliance on nuclear weapons, which undermines the efforts of arms control and disarmament. The abandonment of bilateral arms control treaties between the United States and Russia, alongside the failure to develop multilateral treaties on the subject, led to a lack of faith in arms control and disarmament.

In South Asia, India’s prestige-driven global ambitions and expansion of its nuclear arsenal beyond a credible minimum deterrent is complicating security dynamics in the region and beyond. This is further worsened by a purported strategic chain with cascading-downward influence on arms control, nuclear risk reduction, crisis management, confidence-building, and strategic stability in South Asia—induced by extra-regional powers. While offering no cascading upward stimuli for bringing regional stability, there are biases and discriminatory norms governing nonproliferation regimes and arms control and disarmament negotiations at the conference on disarmament (CD).

This suggests not only why nuclear disarmament is not happening, but it also explains skepticism over the future of disarmament. For instance, Ukraine presents a novel case of SBT and questions the negative and positive security assurances/guarantees in conventional as well as nuclear terms. The Ukraine paradox cautions other countries, in a DDS, that their survival rests with nuclear weapons of their own. Even confidence in the nuclear umbrella and assurance by treaty allies is eroding. NPT-member states are yearning for nuclear weapons and pose the greatest danger of proliferation.

Ukraine regrets abandoning its inherited nukes in the wake of its ongoing war with Russia. The withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT and the lesson it learned are that nukes are key to national survival. Similarly, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capability is considered inevitable for the country’s national security. In this geopolitical context, it is hard to make countries believe in any negative as well as positive security in return for disarmament and de-nuclearization.

Disarmament is also unlikely in today’s world due to the changing technological landscape. Countries with advanced technologies and space-based capabilities can still threaten the survival of their enemies.

Emerging technologies are leading to increased conventional imbalances between rivals, which heightens reliance on nuclear weapons for crucial security interests and could, therefore, serve as the ultimate deterrent. Moving toward disarmament requires five actions. First, there is a need for legally binding agreements to address the threats posed by emerging technologies. Second, nuclear powers should not support their allies’ nuclear pursuits. Third, effective multilateral arms control agreements are required. Fourth, it is important to address biases within global frameworks. Finally, confidence-building measures (CBMs) between rivals are needed to resolve long-standing disputes, help prevent arms races, reduce nuclear risks, and build hope for disarmament in the future.

Sher Ali Kakar is an Associate Director of Research with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Atta Ullah is a Research Fellow with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.

Illogic of Nuclear Disarmament in the Contemporary Era was originally published on Global Security Review.

Great care was taken to secure the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons following the collapse of the state for this very purpose. The Obama administration later held four nuclear security summits to inspire international cooperation for increasing physical security at nuclear facilities. Today, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization leads the effort to convert the fuel in various international civilian reactors from weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) to less risky low enriched uranium (LEU).

Despite these successes, it remains difficult to definitively discern whether specific action prevented and deterred nuclear terrorism or if other factors are at play for why such an event never materialized. It is a fact that no terrorist group has yet successfully pursued a strategy to develop a nuclear device. Yet, it may very well be the case that no group has ever legitimately tried. Terrorism as a strategy of targeted political violence may be largely incompatible with the consequences of acquiring and detonating an improvised nuclear device.

In 2004, US President George W. Bush received unanimous support from the UN for a resolution calling on countries to enact stronger controls to block terrorists from acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Since then, American policy turned away from the global war on terror and back to the strategic competition found in the Cold War. The fourth International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) held in May 2024 was the first of its kind to conclude without a ministerial declaration. Yet, the risk of nuclear terrorism has arguably not grown despite a shift in national security priorities.

In a 2019 piece written for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, authors Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey argue that there are four main options for a terrorist group that acquires a nuclear weapon: blackmail, opacity, latency, and dormancy. These options fall on a spectrum from overt threats of nuclear use to keeping the existence of a nuclear device a secret until its detonation. In all of these strategies, however, deterring a nuclear attack is possible as the outcome for use is the same: guaranteed massive retaliation from state governments.

As outlined by Keith Payne in a National Institute of Public Policy report, some scholars incorrectly assume that terrorist groups are undeterrable because they are irrational and possess no territory to hold at risk for assured retaliation. Terrorism is a fundamentally local endeavor and maintaining the support from the surrounding populations is key to preserving the cause. A deterrence by punishment scenario therefore also involves inciting local communities to turn on the terrorists they harbor.

Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” The key word is “premeditated” and supports the argument that groups employing terrorism are indeed rational actors, with their decisions about organizational structure, monitoring of funds, and selection of recruits providing evidence to support this statement. As with any rational actor, deterrence is possible.

A deterrence-by-denial strategy, although more difficult, is also legitimate. Ensuring states make it as difficult as possible for groups to acquire material aims to deter groups from even trying. Convincing states to do this may then require assured retaliation from other states. Perhaps there is a reason why former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s fears of North Korea selling plutonium to the highest bidder never materialized. For a regime already well-familiar with the international community’s condemnation of its nuclear program, giving others another reason to take out its nuclear facilities by selling material to a group would be strategically unwise.

However, for a nuclear peer of the United States, such as Russia, holding it responsible for lax security is more difficult. In 2011, a Moldovan lawyer was caught attempting to sell HEU on the black market. Forensic analysis confirmed the material very likely originated from Russia. This is not the first time weapon-usable nuclear material has gone missing from Russia. Still, Russia, like any other state, is motivated to prevent nuclear terrorism within its borders; the likeliest place for such an attack to happen is near the facility where material goes missing.

In physicist Michael Levi’s opinion, deterrence credibility is better served with certain attribution following an attack. Going further than assessing a relationship between a state program and a terrorist group, nuclear forensics attempts to identify exactly which country interdicted material originated. At best, a state would be forced to admit poor security practices that led to the theft of material. If used in a terror device, this excuse may not hold up to international scrutiny with any community affected still demanding its pound of flesh.

Neither a strategy of deterrence by punishment or by denial requires the level of explicit policy that was seen in the early 2000s. While not unhelpful, it is rather the continued existence of nuclear-armed states with massive conventional superiority over terror groups that may be the most successful tool in combating the risk of nuclear terrorism. Deterrence against nuclear terrorism, for now, is holding.

Alexis Schlotterback is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Deterring Nuclear Terrorism in the Era of Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

One thing is clear: Pakistan’s nuclear capability is solely focused on India. Claims to the contrary misrepresent Pakistan’s doctrinal posture while creating unfounded geostrategic fears.

Unlike North Korea or Russia, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is India-focused and regionally confined. Even when it became a nuclear power, it was not the first country to introduce nuclear weapons in South Asia. Pakistan’s missile inventory includes the Shaheen, Ghauri, Ababeel, and other series of missiles. They are all short- or medium-range missile systems to counter Indian nuclear capabilities. Even Pakistan’s multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)–capable medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), the Ababeel, has a range of 2,200 km and is a response to India’s ballistic missile defense system.

Moreover, Pakistan’s Shaheen III land-based MRBM has a range of 2,750 to cover Indian far-off strategic bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These missile ranges are not even close to the ICBM threshold of at least 5,500 km.

Unlike nuclear weapon states that have ICBMs, Pakistan does not possess the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, terrestrial or space-based, needed to accurately launch nuclear weapons half-way across the planet. India, not Pakistan, is working on not just ICBMs, but also the global ISR infrastructure to effectively employ such weapons. India has not only tested the Agni-V, which has a range of 8,000+ km but is also developing the Agni-VI with a 12,000 km range. The K-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), with intercontinental strike capability, is also in development.

It is alarming to note that the deployment of K-5 SLBMs on expansive ocean patrols can enable India to target Europe, Russia, Israel, and American Pacific territories. Such Indian military and nuclear buildup are not consistent with India’s policy of credible minimum deterrence (CMD).

Currently, India is accelerating the deployment of 52 military satellites for ISR. These satellites will support ICBM employment and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons capabilities.

Indian naval nuclear projection also indicates that it will develop military bases abroad in accord with its ambitions to be a blue-water navy. India is developing overseas military facilities across the Indian Ocean region, including in the Seychelles, Tajikistan, Oman, the Maldives, and Mauritius. India also has signed logistic support agreements (LSAs) with states for mutual logistic support at ports and bases. These agreements also include ISR agreements with Australia, France, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the United Kingdom, the US, and Vietnam.

Pakistan’s strategic culture and historic interests reflect a deep concern with losing a conflict against India. This is because Pakistan does not have the geography that allows for a defense in depth against an attacking Indian Army. Thus, both conventional and nuclear forces are designed to deter and defeat that specific threat.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is defined by the logic of CMD. Its full-spectrum deterrence (FSD) posture also falls under CMD at all levels of threat, including tactical, operational, and strategic. The development of an ICBM is inconsistent with every aspect of Pakistani military thinking and action.

Pakistan already fields the capabilities needed to strike any target in India. Pakistan has no ambitions regarding global power projection. From a Pakistani perspective, building nuclear weapons for the sake of coercing or striking the United States only makes the relationship with the United States worse and invites American intervention in Pakistan.

When Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi, Indian Americans, published an article in Foreign Affairs in which they suggested Pakistan is building an ICBM whose target is the United States, they engaged in blatant information warfare. Their assertion is unfounded.

India’s shift from deterrence-by-denial to a more aggressive nuclear posture, including deterrence by compellence and punishment, certainly has Pakistan concerned. This change is tolerated by the United States because India is seen as a counterweight to China in Asia.

It is important for Americans to learn a critical lesson from the 2020 China-India crisis; India is unlikely to fight with the US against China if a war comes. China is the second-largest trade partner of India after the US with total trade reaching $127.7 billion in 2024–2025. There is ample reason for India to do what it has always done, play both sides.

Admittedly, Pakistan has a problem with terrorism and a difficult time effectively controlling terrorists operating from the Afghan border region, which grew worse when Pakistan partnered with the US to fight the War on Terror. Pakistan is now the second most negatively affected country when it comes to terrorism.

Over recent years, Islamabad alone lost 80,000 civilian and security personnel to the menace of terrorism. India has also been involved in terror activities in Pakistan, irrefutable evidence of Indian involvement was provided to UN Secretary-General.

Keep in mind, the vast majority of Pakistanis want to live in a country that looks like the United States, not one that looks like Afghanistan or China—when it comes to democracy, economic prosperity, freedom, and stability. Pakistanis want increased economic trade and development with the United States, not nuclear war.

As India expands its capabilities, Pakistan is likely to follow India’s lead. This is, however, done for the purpose of ensuring India cannot launch a disarming strike against Pakistan. Platforms like SSBNs may be necessary as Pakistan is compelled to diversify, not globalize, its range of nuclear weapons.

If the US is sincere in its desire to create stability in South Asia, encouraging India to cease building nuclear weapons that are a direct threat to Pakistan would be helpful. The US can also invest in arms control dialogue and crisis communication in South Asia. President Trump played a key role in ending the most recent conflict. He also ended the Twelve Day War between Iran and Israel. Given his concern for preventing war, President Trump can play a critical role in South Asia.

Pakistan has partnered with the United States since its independence from India. It was a partner during the Cold War when India was not and worked closely with the United States for two decades during the conflict in Afghanistan. Admittedly, Pakistan faces some internal challenges, but educated Pakistanis want nothing more than a good relationship with the United States.

Anum A. Khan is an Associate Director at the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad, a Youth Leader Fund (YLF) Mentor with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), and Project Associate of The Third Nuclear Age Project.

Pakistan Is Not Building an ICBM to Attack America was originally published on Global Security Review.

Turkey provides advanced military equipment to Pakistan and financial support when necessary. The success of Turkey’s Bayraktar drones in Ukraine are but one example of Turkey’s push to build a technologically sophisticated military force.

Greece, however, is focused on domestic programs and is developing a military capable of effectively deterring Turkey, should the desire to seize further Greek territory arise. Greeks are complacent and too willing to view membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a guarantee against Turkish aggression.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a diplomatic visit to Cyprus on June 15, 2025. This was a fortuitous visit because India has long dealt with the kind of challenges Turkey poses to Greece. The country has also undertaken an effort to modernize its forces, which offers lessons for Greece.

The United States, China, Russia, Germany, and India accounted for 60 percent of the world’s total military spending, with their total expenditure amounting to $1.6 trillion. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) most recent data highlights that India is consistently investing more in defense, as security issues increasingly dominate national priorities.

India is among the top five military spenders in the world, according to new SIPRI data. India’s defense spending increased by 1.6 percent in 2024, reaching $86.1 billion, making it the fifth largest military power in the world.

India’s first domestically produced hydrogen-powered drones are ready for use. Sharad Shah, Managing Director of Paras Defense Space Technologies, says his company is able to support India’s immediate security needs following the recent attacks. And just as India was preparing to launch deadly strikes on terrorist camps in Pakistan, Paras announced a strategic joint venture with Haven Drowns in Israel, a US-based global company recognized for its autonomous, hydrogen-powered, and mission-specific drones.

The joint venture with Haven Drones will create a new capability in India for the design, manufacture, and supply of next generation drone systems tailored to India’s defense and internal security. These drones serve long-term plans to address global crises.

Paras is a defense engineering company specializing in advanced cutting-edge optical systems, optoelectronic systems, and defense solutions—not originally a drone manufacturer. The drones that emerged from this Indian-Israeli collaboration were tested on the highly volatile border of Israel. What makes them a game changer for India is their resilience and autonomy. These are hydrogen-powered unmanned aircraft that can stay in the air five times longer than current systems and are virtually silent, making them ideal for round-the-clock surveillance. One model can hover 500 meters above the ground, maintaining continuous surveillance of vast areas.

The recent escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan in the Pahalgam region of Kashmir underlines a harsh reality; persistent surveillance and rapid response are no longer optional—they are urgent. Paras is focused on providing real-time intelligence and countermeasures through surveillance technologies that can be deployed without delay and is working with India’s Ministry of Defense to ensure border security.

Both India and Greece must give maximum effort to protect their borders with state-of-the-art drones that can both prevent entry of illegal aliens and detect enemy movements. Greece can benefit greatly from drones in the Evros, which borders Turkey by land and sea. India has similar challenges in the Kashmir region, which borders Pakistan, and in Arunachal Pradesh, which China illegally claims by calling it South Tibet. These common challenges make India a natural partner.

India’s defense sector has experienced strong growth in recent years, driven by the government’s strong emphasis on innovation and increased defense spending. Rising border tensions and global geopolitical challenges spurred both domestic and international orders of Indian defense hardware, demonstrating increased confidence in the capabilities of Indian defense manufacturers.

The domestic defense industry grew to Rs 1.27 lakh crore (over $18 billion) in 2024, registering a remarkable growth of 174 percent since 2015. This impressive growth is supported by government efforts along with foreign military sales that include more than 17,000 items, which encourages domestic production for the international market.

It is time for Greece to start developing its own heavy industry sector and to stop relying on tourism as its source of revenue. In the 1980s, Greece even stopped making automobiles and started depending on loans from European organizations. Given Greece’s central location as the buffer between Europe and the Middle East, it is time to start investing in its own domestic arms manufacturing industry which is exactly what the “Made in India” movement is all about.

Of course, Greece does not have a domestic arms industry, but it understands the complexity of the simultaneous crises that impact the country. It is because of worsening conditions that the Greek Air Force is strengthening air defenses on Crete.

There is, however, positive news. Minister for National Defense Nikos Dendias proposed the creation of a defense dome, Achilles’ Shield, for the country. This effort is already underway as part of the Agenda 2030 effort. This follows the approval of the New Force Structure and the 12-year Armament Program by parliament and the Kysea. These efforts are a good start.

If Greece follows India’s example and invests in an indigenous arms industry that serves both Greece’s needs and an international market, the endeavor can prove successful. Restoring domestic industrial production is also an important undertaking for a country that has largely seen its domestic manufacturing industry perish. Greece has too long rested on its laurels while Turkey modernized its military and grew its domestic defense industry. Taking the positive elements of India’s efforts and avoiding their mistakes can serve as a path forward for Greece.

Dimitra Staikou is a Greek lawyer who works as a journalist writing about human rights violations in South Asia. She works for Greece’s biggest newspaper, Skai.gr, and Huffpost.Gr, as well as international distinguished news sites such as Modern Diplomacy and Global Research. 

The Future of War Is Coming from India to Greece was originally published on Global Security Review.

Despite India’s conventional superiority, the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) shot down five Indian fighter jets, including its three French Rafales, one Russian MiG-29 and one Su-30, and a Heron surveillance drone. The interception and neutralization of the drone, and the shooting down of the fighters about 17 miles from the line of control (LOC), highlighted the Pakistani Air Force’s (PAF) expeditious response to Indian missile strikes.

The Rafale, a 4.5-generation multirole fighter jet, which is capable of performing interdiction and aerial reconnaissance, is one of the reasons for India’s muscle flexing in the region. Although the Rafale is not a stealth aircraft, it does have a smaller radar cross section. The Rafale was also touted as a game-changer for the Indian Air Force (IAF), boosting the country’s technological edge over its regional adversaries especially Pakistan.

However, the successful shoot down revealed New Delhi’s low operational efficacy and false perception of Indian air superiority. The MiG-29, a twin-engine fighter jet designed for air combat, was also believed to be shot down. With features like advanced avionics and radar systems, the loss of such aircraft was unexpected.

Likewise, the downing of India’s primary frontline fighter, the Russian SU-30, which is known for its maneuverability, indicates weaknesses in Indian operational tactics and a clear vulnerability to Pakistani air defense forces. Contrary to common belief, the PAF historically outperforms the IAF aerial engagements. The excellence of PAF was first made evident when it defeated the IAF on the ground and in the air during the first full-scale war with India (1965). In 2019, the IAF conducted airstrikes in Balakot in response to the Pulwama incident, accusing Pakistan of involvement in the terrorist attack. The following day, the PAF retaliated with an airstrike in the Rajouri sector of Jammu, downing an Indian MIG-21 and capturing Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman in the process.

In the latest example of conflict between the two countries, Pakistan responded with its best fighters, the Chinese-made J-10C, which is a multirole fighter and was unproven in combat until these events. With the shoot down of Rafale fighter jets, shares of Dassault Aviation declined by 6 percent. The PAF response to Indian airstrikes displays its enhanced air combat capabilities.

According to the Indian Ministry of Defense, Operation Sindoor was India’s effort to punish the perpetrators of the Pahalgam attack. However, Pakistan, which has denied any involvement in Pahalgam, deemed these strikes “unprovoked.” Beginning on May 6, 2025, Indian officials undertook drills and exercises in preparation for their attack. This “show of strength” was designed to send a clear message to the international community that India can employ conventional force under a nuclear shadow. However, the reluctance of the international community to get involved in the dispute served as a concern for the Trump administration, which ultimately aided in ending military clashes.

On May 9, 2025, India fired air-to-surface missiles at three air bases in Rawalpindi, Chakwal, and Shorkot, as well as Rahim Yar Khan airport, normalizing escalation between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. Pakistan deemed these missile strikes an “act of war,”  authorizing the military to take corresponding military action against India.

In response, Pakistan launched Operation Bunyanum Marsoos after four days of Indian strikes. These strikes targeted wide swaths of Indian territory, including military bases in Udhampur, Pathankot, Drangyari, Nagrota, Adampur, and Buj Air Base. As the escalation veered from the disputed state of Kashmir towards the brink of nuclear escalation, the United States, shifting from its previous stance of non-interference, brokered a ceasefire between Pakistan and India.

Vice President JD Vance initially remarked on May 8, 2025, that the latest escalation between Pakistan and India is not the United States’ business. The situation changed after Indian missile strikes hit Pakistan’s Nur Khan Airbase in Rawalpindi, fearing potential nuclear escalation. Nur Khan serves as a key transport and refueling hub for the PAF, lying just kilometers from the strategic plans division, which oversees Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

Before the situation expanded into widespread conflict, the United States announced an immediate ceasefire between the two states, offering assistance for resolving the Kashmir issue. The efforts of President Trump, an advocate of peace, led to the 2025 ceasefire and are a notable diplomatic achievement for the US. However, the success of this ceasefire rests upon a fragile equilibrium. In absence of institutions and channels of communication for resolution of key disputes between Pakistan and India, peace and stability of South Asia will remain uncertain. Without addressing structural issues like the dispute over Kashmir, the region will remain locked in cyclical deterrence failures, with the future of peace less likely than escalation.

Nawal Nawaz is a Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

Pakistan’s Response to Operation Sindoor was originally published on Global Security Review.

The international system is now firmly bipolar, with China’s global power rapidly increasing at a time when Russia regularly threatens to use nuclear weapons against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), influencing the administration of President Donald Trump. The combined Chinese and Russian threats are leading President Trump to warn of a possible World War III.

American power is increasingly contested, bringing new operational challenges to extended deterrence. A fundamental question is now in play—should the US abandon the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) it created in 1960s and instead push its allies to field nuclear weapons?

Allies are already reconsidering their nuclear stance. In the Asia-Pacific, American ally Australia provides useful historical insights.

From the late 1940s to the early 1970s, Australia sought to acquire nuclear weapons in response to an unstable international order where it felt threatened by China. In 1967, Secretary of US Defense Robert McNamara said it would be “entirely natural” and “an obvious thing to happen” for Australia to acquire nuclear weapons in response to China developing them. He also expressed interest in establishing a collective nuclear organization for the Far East, “starting with Australia and the Philippines.”

Indeed, Secretary of State Dean Rusk earlier suggested a “US-supplied Far Eastern nuclear stockpile” open to Japan and India. In 1958, others proposed the US could base intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in Australia, in the event the US decided to keep tight control of nuclear weapons in its own hands and actively worked to push its allies to agree to the NPT treaty.

There were similar debates around friendly nuclear proliferation in Europe around the same time. Aiming to regain leadership in Europe, the US proposed a multilateral nuclear force within NATO. While there were doubts over its military utility, the diplomatic discussions that started around sharing nuclear hardware and control did allow time to develop a European non-proliferation solution. In 1966, the NATO nuclear planning group was established, allowing some European allies to be involved in how and under which circumstances American weapons might be used.

The structural changes in the international system that prompted these earlier ideas are happening again. It is time to start thinking seriously about the next steps to take. The nuclear history noted suggests three broad approaches.

First, allies might build their own nuclear forces. The logic is that in a high-intensity conflict between the US and a nuclear power, the adversary may target American allies with nuclear weapons. Such an escalation demonstrates an adversary’s willingness to coerce allies into ceasing support for the United States.

This is the worst-case scenario that extended deterrence was created to prevent. If allies seriously doubt American credibility, fielding independent nuclear forces is a solution.  Indeed, economically challenged Pakistan and North Korea took this path already. For America’s allies, acquiring nuclear forces may be a lower cost option than growing their conventional forces.

Second, allies might work together to devise a modern multilateral nuclear force as considered in 1960s Europe. In the Pacific, Australia considered working with Britain on nuclear weapons in the late 1940s and 1950s; some still favor this effort. In that regard, Japan and Australia have recently acquired Tomahawk cruise missiles, which the US armed with nuclear warheads to deter Russia in the 1980s. Such weapons might be a starting point for an allied nuclear force in the eastern Pacific. As noted, the US considered deploying ICBMs in the Australian outback.

Third, another option, arguably better for American global leadership, is to address the allies’ deepening concerns over extended deterrence. This would involve the current administration actively reassuring allies that it still places importance on existing security treaties, increasing nuclear sharing and including more nations in nuclear planning, especially in the Pacific. Such steps would be at marginal cost to the US.

The most important might be nuclear sharing as this appears a tangible example of commitment. Of course, nuclear sharing is actually a misnomer since the US shares in the employment of certain nuclear weapons. It retains full control of the weapons prior to an authorization to strike a target.

The US could increase nuclear sharing with Pacific allies, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, and broaden out to other NATO nations like Poland and the Scandinavian nations, which appear to be Russia’s next target after Ukraine. These nations could then reciprocate in hosting US nuclear weapons as Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands do now.

This discussion hinges on American ambitions for global leadership. As the Trump administration pushes allies to bare a greater share of their own security while attempting to close a $2 trillion annual deficit, the US must necessarily cut costs everywhere. Thus, American allies must take a realistic look at what President Trump is seeking to accomplish with the federal budget and understand that they must step into the breach while the US sets its house in order.

Sometimes, a great power must admit that it may be in its interests to change direction and push its allies down a new, different path. In that case, the Trump administration might declare the NPT finished and instead encourage its allies to go nuclear.

Dr. Christine Leah is a Fellow at the US National Institute for Deterrence Studies and has worked on nuclear issues at Yale, MIT, and RAND and in London, Singapore, and Canberra. She is the author of The Consequences of American Nuclear Disarmament and Australia and the Bomb. Dr. Peter Layton is Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. He is author of Grand Strategy and coauthor of Warfare in the Robotic Age.

Time to Proliferate Nuclear Weapons (or Not?) was originally published on Global Security Review.

This digital divide is not just about access to technology but also about the ability to harness AI’s potential for economic, social, and global political empowerment. The implications of the AI divide are leading to a tech race that impact geopolitical power dynamics, exacerbating competition major powers like the US, China, France, and India. Depending on how the race ends, it could swing the balance of power in a negative direction.

AI Paris Summit

The recent AI Action Summit held in Paris emerged as a pivotal event that highlights both the opportunities and challenges associated with this evolving AI tech race. This summit serves as a beacon of innovation, encouraging France and India to collaborate more closely, while also exposing the complex interplay of international reactions, particularly from major powers like the United States, United Kingdom (UK), and China.

The summit focused on expanding AI’s boundaries while respecting environmental and ethical obligations. France’s President Emmanuel Macron reaffirmed his nation’s commitment to AI innovation, while maintaining high regulatory standards that draw parallels to Notre Dame Cathedral’s restoration. Such a strategy will likely accelerate AI ventures and foster innovation.

However, the regulation proposed was also a noose around the neck of the summit’s emphasis—deregulation. It is worth considering whether drastic deregulation will lead to genuine advances or the weakening of certain crucial safety nets as the world grapples with how to handle ever expanding data and the fragmentation that result from the intersection of geopolitical interests and the private ownership of data and capability. The US and China approach the issue differently than Europe, whose adoption of the AI Act (2023) will see the first comprehensive AI regulation in the world.

Many wondered how agentic AI will impact the balance of power. Whether AI will have a net positive or negative effect is uncertain. The rate at which agentic AI is developed and adopted in the three main economic blocs of China, Europe, and the United States will determine much.

India-France AI Alliance

India and France are forming a partnership to leverage AI’s full potential globally, sharing knowledge, resources, and best practices to create a robust framework for AI initiatives and global dialogue. During the summit, leaders from both countries addressed how their alliance could facilitate joint ventures, research collaborations, and talent exchange programs. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Macron foresaw great potential for future cooperation in 2019 when they endorsed the Indo-French Roadmap on Cybersecurity and Digital Technology. India and France, founding members of the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, aim to develop a safe, open, secure, and ethical AI for human development and global commons.

Global Reactions

As the world watches the developments in Paris, reactions from other global powers, notably China and the United States, added another layer of complexity to the conversation around AI regulation and collaboration. In recent years, both states have invested heavily in AI research and development, seeing it as critical to their national security and economic competitiveness.

China’s approach to AI governance contrasts significantly with that of France and India. While the Chinese government prioritizes rapid innovation with minimal regulatory oversight, this led to concerns about privacy, surveillance, and ethical implications. The US, on the other hand, grapples with debates around data privacy, corporate responsibility, and the potential for AI misuse. As a result, the responses from these two states illustrate differing philosophies about how best to harness AI’s potential while safeguarding public interests.

The US and UK declined to sign a declaration on “inclusive and sustainable” artificial intelligence at the Paris summit, in a blow to hopes for a concerted approach to developing and regulating the technology. The document was backed by 60 other signatories on February 11, 2025, including France, China, India, Japan, Australia, and Canada.

The reactions from the relevant stakeholders highlight the urgent need for international cooperation and dialogue. As AI transcends borders, creating harmonized standards and frameworks could mitigate risks associated with its deployment.

Opportunities and Challenges Ahead

The summit concluded by emphasizing the need for proactive state engagement in AI regulation, prioritizing innovation while protecting individual rights and societal values. This, participants believed, would allow the world to fully capitalize on AI’s benefits.

As the world grapples with the realities of increasingly AI-driven technology, the voices of diverse stakeholders, including technologists, ethicists, policymakers, and civil society must be heard in shaping the future of AI. Under the flag of the AI Paris Summit, the India-France AI alliance is entering into a new and more unpredictable phase. By defying red tape and cultivating a spirit of cooperation, states are setting the pace for unlocking unprecedented opportunities while highlighting the inherent challenges of this transformative technology.

Huma Rehman is a project consultant, consultant, and defense and foreign affairs analyst. She can be reached at X @HumaRehman1.

AI Paris Summit and Emerging Paradox of AI Haves and Have-Nots was originally published on Global Security Review.

India and the Philippines are set to sign a $200 million missile deal in 2025, that will include Akash missiles, which is a short-range surface-to-air ballistic missile and has a range of 25 kilometers (km). This is the second defense venture between Manila and New Delhi, the first being the acquisition of missile systems in 2022 worth $375 million from India. This new development shows India’s rise in the international defense market.

To enhance its defense capabilities, India robustly tests missile systems. In March 2024, India successfully tested the nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Agni-5 missile, which has a range of 5,000 km. This missile is capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) and has elevated India’s status as it enters the group of states that can fire multiple warheads from a single ICBM. In November 2024, India tested a long-range hypersonic missile successfully that can mark targets 1,500 km away. This missile is indigenously developed and puts India in the league of just a few countries that have developed this advanced technology.

In its Defence Day parade in January 2025, India publicized the mass production of quasi-ballistic Pralay missiles, which have a range of 150 to 500 km, can carry a payload of 500 to 1,000 kilograms (kg), and can maneuver while keeping a low trajectory. This is a short-range surface-to-surface tactical missile and is expected to be deployed near the Chinese and Pakistani borders. Moreover, there are media reports that Armenia is interested in buying these missiles from India.

According to media reports, India issued a notice to airmen (NATOM) in early 2025 for potential missile tests in the Bay of Bengal. It is anticipated that this NATOM was  conducting tests of the Agni-5MII. If tested successfully the Agni-5MII will modernize the Indian military, advance the Indian missile program, give India an edge over regional competitors, and will enhance India’s status in shaping the global security dynamics.

Along with the modernization of its missile program, the MTCR’s membership grants India greater boosted defense ties with various states, as previously mentioned. The MTCR focuses on missiles alone, but Indian defense exports are beyond just missiles. They include a broader range of equipment and services. Indian defense exports are estimated to increase to over $4 billion by 2025.

Moreover, India is actively pursuing partnerships with France, Israel, Russia, and the US. All of these partnerships focus on joint development and production of defense equipment, joint productions, transfer of technology, and military exercises.

Growing Indian missile capabilities pose a challenge to regional competition, putting Pakistan in a position where it needs to maintain the balance of power in the region via upgrading its defense capabilities. Indo-Philippine defense ties can be translated as a shift in the alliance in the Pak-Philippines equation. This was a traditionally warm relationship. It can force Pakistan to look out for developing closer ties with other states to counter this emerging alliance.

The technological advancement India achieved via the Akash missile can push Pakistan to invest in developing the same capabilities to counter any future Indian threat. The selling of Akash missile technology to the Philippines can be viewed in the light of India’s attempt to expand its strategic footprint at the regional and global level.

Pakistan then needs to reassess its own strategic alliances and defense posture. Growing Indian missile and defense ambitions will have repercussions on peace and stability both at the regional and global level. India’s growing missile ranges, in the case of ICBMs, will be perceived by China as an emerging threat, which can escalate tensions between these two states. The mutual perception of threat by China and Pakistan has the possibility of driving these two nations closer together. This is certainly not something the United States desires.

Dr. Anum Riaz is the Associate Director of Research for the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

India’s Missile Program: A Threat to Regional and Global Peace and Stability was originally published on Global Security Review.

The latest round of sanctions showed the Biden administration’s disregard for Pakistan’s long history of cooperation with Washington. Islamabad always sought to engage diplomatically with the White House in a constructive manner—aspiring to nurture its relationship with the United States. However, the sanctions imposed on Pakistan’s missile program by the US, grounded in doubts and assumptions, do not bode well for the overall stability of the relationship.

When Pakistan became an ally of the United States in the 1950s and supported American strategy in the region, especially during the Cold War and the War on Terror, Pakistan took significant risk both domestically and with often unfriendly neighbors. Pakistan valued the relationship and made significant strides in fostering a partnership. However, it still struggles to preserve peace and stability in the region after a hasty American withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The recent spate of American allegations against Pakistan not only increase mistrust between the two states but also undermine the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Current sanctions tend to create an imbalance in the strategic calculus of South Asia, shifting the balance of power towards Pakistan’s adversary, India. New Delhi’s military and nuclear modernization is already destabilizing South Asia.

            Washington’s favoring of New Delhi furthers the augment that there is an increasing gap between India and Pakistan, which could reignite an arms race. Historically, the US played a constructive third-party role in easing tensions between Pakistan and India. However, growing mistrust between Pakistan and the US could limit its leverage to act as neutral mediator in any future crisis. Such a trust deficit between the US and Pakistan could undermine regional stability in South Asia.

With New Delhi’s evolving missile capabilities, Pakistan considers its strategic capabilities crucial for deterrence. This ensures that the country does not face an existential threat from across its border. Islamabad maintains that its missile and nuclear program are intended to counterbalance India’s growing conventional and nuclear superiority.

According to the former US Principal Deputy National Security Advisor, Jon Finer, Pakistan has pursued “increasingly sophisticated missile technology, from long-range ballistic missile systems that would enable the testing of significantly larger rocket motors.” If that continues, Finer said, “Pakistan will have the capability to strike targets well beyond South Asia, including in the United States.” He further said that the advancement in Pakistan’s ballistic missile systems could pose a direct threat to global security, enabling Pakistan to target countries far beyond its immediate neighborhood.

In response Pakistan’s Foreign Office (MOFA) commented on Finer’s statement and said that the perception of an alleged threat was “unfortunate.” These sanctions which are imposed under Executive Order 13382, are based on mere doubts and suspicions devoid of any substantial evidence. In its statement, the MOFA said that “Pakistan has also made it abundantly clear that our strategic program and allied capabilities are solely meant to deter and thwart a clear and visible existential threat from our neighborhood and should not be perceived as a threat to any other country.” With such clarity in Pakistan’s strategic approach, the American sanctions on Pakistan’s ballistic missile program are nothing more than misplaced concerns.

The US is turning a blind eye towards Indian nuclear expansion and is strengthening its strategic partnership so that it can serve as a counterweight to China. Because of this strategic cooperation, the US aids India with the transfer of high-end defense technologies. Agreements such as the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) and the Communications Capability and Security Agreement (COMCASA) are critical to Indian development. Under the framework of the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) and the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (CET), India also benefits.

In 2008, the United States pampered India with a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) restrictions, exempting it from obligations that apply to nuclear export controls for states outside the scope of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).This mutual defense cooperation between the US and India augments Indian military capabilities, accentuating military asymmetries in South Asia.

While maintaining silence on India’s intercontinental ballistic missile program, with a manifest range of above 5,000 kilometers, American officials raised misleading concerns regarding Pakistan’s capabilities. In reality, the longest-range ballistic missile of Pakistan, the Shaheen III, demonstrated a range of 2,750 kilometers, explicitly designed to deter only India. The country’s ballistic missile program has no intention of endangering the sovereignty of any other state, including allies of its long-standing partner, the United States.

To overcome this trust deficit, Pakistan and the US must take the initiative and forge a comprehensive security dialogue that aligns their strategic interests. This security dialogue would provide an avenue to discuss common security objectives, including regional stability, counterterrorism efforts, and transnational threats. Furthermore, mutual collaboration in intelligence-sharing will augment the effectiveness of both nations’ security apparatus. Constructive communication between Pakistan and the US is crucial to building a more stable and cooperative future, which would not only strengthen their bilateral ties but also contribute to peace and security in South Asia and beyond.

While the Biden administration expressed concerns about Pakistan’s missile capabilities, Islamabad maintained, then and now, that these measures are purely defensive in nature. They are designed to safeguard national security amidst evolving regional tensions. It would be fruitful for both nations for President Donald Trump to correct the mistake of the Biden administration, acknowledging Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns and engaging with a willing ally. Collaboration rather than coercion is necessary for Pakistan and the US to address shared challenges.

Nawal Nawaz is a research assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

American Sanctions and Pakistan’s Strategic Realities was originally published on Global Security Review.

President Trump’s foreign policy will primarily focus outside South Asia and engage countries with a lens toward their relationship with China. Drawing on his known foreign policy orientation, Trump 2.0 is poised to keep India on a high strategic pedestal in the broader framework of Indo-Pacific strategy.

Pakistan is unlikely to play a major foreign policy role for the Trump administration. Thus, it is pertinent for the Pakistani diplomatic community to find areas of convergence with the Trump administration. Policy options must be exercised in a way to constructively approach strategic divergencies between the two states.

America’s engagement with the Global South is likely going to decline as an “America First” approach calls for reducing international engagement towards all but a handful of countries. Critics may characterize President Trump’s foreign policy approach as short term and transactional, but this sells the president short. A policy of “minilateralism” is not shortsighted but may allow him to focus on more pressing domestic issues in the United States. This redirection of focus is, however, bad news for global agendas like climate change and multilateral cooperation.

There is a broader consensus in the Trump team, based on a strategic imperative to counter China in the Asia-Pacific, that leaves less room for lower priorities. Thus, the trade and tariff wars between China and the US may have second-order effects for countries like Pakistan.

President Trump’s advisers are likely to approach China as an adversary and will view Pakistan with some caution, perceiving it as an ally of Beijing. The Trump administration may seek to intensify the competition with China and up the ante for countries who are onboard with Chinese infrastructure and development projects, such as Pakistan, which could be a potential victim of a new Great Game.

An era of conditional trade agreements between Pakistan and the United States appears imminent and is characterized by a departure from preferential trade practices. Instead, the US is likely to prioritize market-driven agreements, emphasizing economic pragmatism over diplomatic goodwill. To enhance bilateral trade relations, Pakistan could strategically leverage its geopolitical significance and pursue a proactive approach to addressing American concerns, without compromising its national strategic interests.

This would necessitate credible efforts to combat terrorism and contribute to stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. Such measures could foster greater mutual confidence and pave the way for more constructive economic engagement between the two nations.

American attempts to make India its strategic surrogate in the Asia-Pacific will embolden Indian hegemonic ambitions. Intense security collaboration between the US and India at bilateral and multilateral defense groups like the Quad could disrupt the regional strategic stability calculus in South Asia.

Pakistan’s economic woes may not allow it to sustain the brunt of a growing Indian strategic modernization in the long run. This will impact strategic stability in the region.
Retrospective analysis of the first Trump administration suggests that American cooperation with Pakistan, in the realms of climate change and clean energy, will be relegated as more pressing geostrategic issues take precedence. Moreover, the dwindling economy of Pakistan may find the Trump administration far less sympathetic as far as economic aid and loan packages are concerned. The first Trump administration was less sensitive to Pakistan’s core interest, like Kashmir, and more demanding of Pakistan in its Afghanistan conundrum.
The US State Department under Trump will likely pursue a limited set of priorities, especially in the security and counterterrorism realms. US-Pakistan relations are traditionally marked by events in Afghanistan. This was true from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the war on terror. With the reduction of American engagement in Afghanistan, Pakistan finds itself entangled in an increasingly intricate security matrix amid deteriorating relations with the Taliban and increasing terrorism in Pakistan.

Shifting the onus onto Pakistan for an American policy debacle was a convenient strategy of the Biden administration. Pakistan may find the new administration more aggressive in its demands for stabilizing Afghanistan. The “do more” mantra will not go over well with Pakistan anymore and will require a more practical approach on the part of the US.
On the flip side, President Trump’s personality-centered diplomatic overtures, rather than institutionalized mechanisms, are not good for Pakistan. President Trump engaged with Imran Khan constructively, but he is no longer in office. Criticism could come from Trump’s team regarding the crackdown on Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) movement. State Department and Pentagon engagement with Pakistan’s diplomatic corps and security establishment will depend on the whims of Trump rather than an ongoing policy framework. The absence of mutual interests between the US and Pakistan remains a hurdle.

These are interesting times for the diplomats of Pakistan. On the one hand, they will try to resist President Trump’s pressure-based strategy toward Pakistan. On the other hand, they will try to convince State Department officials to pursue more practical approaches to the US-Pakistan relationship. How hard this proves is yet to be determined.
Either way, Pakistan will face a more conditional and transactional relationship with the US. It will hinge on security concerns rather than economic issues. Being close to China diplomatically and strategically opens a unique window of opportunity for Pakistan. It can play the role of a bridge between China and the US, as it has done historically, should the Trump administration seek it out.

Muhammad Haseeb Riaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The Future of US-Pakistan Relations was originally published on Global Security Review.

Based on the latest EAR Report, these are the critical points on global security, upcoming events, and the ongoing discourse on nuclear deterrence, modernization, and geopolitical strategy for 2025.

Quotes of the Week

• Xi Jinping (China): “No one can stop the historical trend” of China’s “reunification” with Taiwan.”
• U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg (South Korea): Reaffirmed the U.S.-South Korean alliance amidst geopolitical tensions.
• DPRK Kim Jong Un: Committed to implementing the “toughest” anti-American policy while criticizing the U.S.-South Korea-Japan security partnership.
• Antony Blinken (U.S. Secretary of State): Highlighted Russia’s intentions to share advanced space technology with North Korea.
• NATO Official: Warned of unconventional Russian attacks causing substantial casualties.

Upcoming 2025 Seminar Events

1. January 10, 2025, 10:00 AM: Robert Soofer & Mark Massa on “The Case for Homeland Missile Defense.”
2. January 31, 2025, 10:00 AM: Shoshana Bryen & Ilan Berman on “Middle East Update and the Iranian Nuclear Threat.”
3. February 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Stephen Blank & Mark Schneider on “Russian Intentions with Its Growing Nuclear Forces.”
4. February 28, 2025, 10:00 AM: Hon. Madelyn Creedon & Hon. Frank Miller on “Assessment and Update of the Posture Commission.”
5. March 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Gordon Chang & Rick Fisher on “The Chinese Nuclear Threat & Implications for US Security.”

Nuclear Derangement Syndrome

• Criticism of nuclear deterrence is gaining momentum, focusing on framing nuclear weapons as both unnecessary and dangerous.
• The Union of Concerned Scientists highlights essays opposing nuclear modernization, which are countered with arguments emphasizing deterrence as essential for stability.
• The critique overlooks the strategic necessity of nuclear weapons in preventing large-scale conflicts and ensuring global security.

The Biden-Trump Arms Race

• Criticism: The Biden and Trump administrations’ claims of an arms race are exaggerated. They focus on necessary modernization within New START limits.
• Reality: Modernization efforts (Columbia submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, B21 bombers) align with treaty commitments, aiming for readiness by 2042.
• Key Concern: Rising nuclear capabilities of Russia and China surpass New START limits, demanding U.S. responses to maintain strategic balance.
• Counterarguments: Opponents argue modernization fuels an arms race, while proponents emphasize deterrence and technological edge against adversaries.

Download the full report.

ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

These states are modernizing their naval deterrence capabilities, thus weaponizing the waters of the IOR. The growing competition between US-led alliances, China and India, as well as India and Pakistan intensified, particularly with US support for India to counter China’s influence in the IOR.

Pakistan views these developments as a security threat, as they challenge its maritime mobility and increase the risk of entanglement between Indian and Pakistani forces at sea. The escalating tensions between India and Pakistan underscore the need for maritime confidence-building measures (CBM) and risk-reduction strategies to avoid conflict. What are the evolving dynamics between India and Pakistan in the IOR and how can maritime CBMs be realized and institutionalized to prevent prospects for any dangers?

Maritime Entanglement in the IOR

Maritime entanglement refers to the complex and potentially dangerous situations where naval forces from different states, often adversaries, come into proximity or engage in activities that can lead to unintended confrontations, miscalculations, or escalations. The IOR is a center point for states’ contestation where forces of India and Pakistan can interface anytime.

India is modernizing its naval capabilities to assert its regional dominance through advanced technologies such as Arihant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, aircraft carriers, uncrewed systems, and sensors, thereby expanding its naval presence.

India has also approved the purchase of MQ-9B high-altitude, long-endurance drones, which will enhance the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities of its armed forces in the IOR.

India is also inclined to procure high endurance unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) to further enhance its ISR, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and mine-counter measures (MCM). India is using China’s looming threat as leverage to procure 26 Rafale-M fighters to serve as the new carrier, Vikrant’s, air wing, and three additional Kalvari-class submarines.

Pakistan, in turn, is also improving its deterrence survivability. Pakistan’s capability is mainly based on conventional platforms with heavy reliance on cruise missiles. Its sea-based force consists of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles, deployed on Agosta-class submarines or on-surface ships.

India’s acquisition of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) adds new complexities to Indian Ocean security. These stealthy, autonomous systems enhance India’s naval capabilities in surveillance and anti-submarine warfare and increase the risk of unintended encounters with other countries’ forces, especially Pakistan, as the autonomous nature of AUVs makes them less predictable and harder to monitor.

Furthermore, a cyberattack on surveillance or intelligence systems can create monitoring “blind spots,” leading to potential misinterpretations of naval activities. If one country’s radar is disabled, it might incorrectly assess the other’s movements, prompting a more aggressive stance. This risk escalates if command and control communications are also affected, as either side could misinterpret a blackout as a threat, potentially deploying additional naval assets and leading to unintended confrontations.

The presence of a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine near another state’s naval assets might be perceived as a prelude to an act of aggression, especially during times of heightened tensions. A stark example of this occurred during the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis between India and Pakistan. In the milieu of the Pulwama crisis, the Indian Navy declared that its carrier battle group, including the Indian nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, the INS Arihant, was on a deterrence patrol, which was “swiftly shifted from exercise to operational disposition” amid the crisis.

After the crisis, Pakistan reportedly detected an Indian submarine, suspected of being armed with nuclear weapons, within its maritime zone. The lack of transparency surrounding nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine movements makes it difficult for states to distinguish between routine operations and potential threats, increasing the risk of miscalculation.

This is particularly noteworthy in the IOR where numerous states assert their interests in strategically significant areas as well as crucial chokepoints for trade routes, namely the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. Thus, misinterpretation of naval maneuvers, especially involving nuclear-armed submarines, heightens the risk of maritime entanglement between India and Pakistan, which will create challenges for all the players involved and disrupt the SLOCs and transportation. These developments demand the opening of effective CBMs between India and Pakistan to prevent any risks in the maritime domain. 

Proposed Confidence-Building Measures

In the context of India and Pakistan, several CBMs are applicable. First, establishing a mutual notification and data-sharing mechanism on cybersecurity threats between India and Pakistan is essential, given the growing reliance on digital systems for naval and maritime operations. This mechanism would help reduce misunderstandings and prevent the misattribution of cyber incidents to state actors.

Second, an agreement on prior notifications of naval activities such as naval exercises or critical movements of submarines is needed. This will enhance transparency and trust by ensuring that routine movements, such as those involving nuclear submarines, are not misinterpreted as hostile actions.

Third, an agreement on managing incidents at sea can also be formalized by setting up clear protocols for their behavior during unintended or unexpected encounters at sea. This would help both countries to turn dangerous eventualities into normal situations. The two states can create standardized rules of engagement for naval forces operating nearby and develop crisis-management protocols to handle maritime incidents.

Fourth, another risk-reduction initiative could be a submarine rescue agreement, enabling cooperation in case of climate-prone or any natural crisis-led accidents involving rescuing crew and sunk submarines, and sheltering the survivors on board.

Fifth, the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) deployment notification and safety protocol CBM proposes that India notify Pakistan, via a neutral third party or direct hotline, about routine SSBN deployments near Pakistan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Arabian Sea. It includes communication protocols to prevent accidental encounters from escalating, with India providing limited, non-sensitive information on SSBN timing and location near shared maritime boundaries.

Sixth, an agreement on the non-deployment of AUVs between India and Pakistan is essential to mitigate risks associated with autonomous systems in sensitive maritime areas. Establishing no-deployment zones, particularly near nuclear sites, disputed areas, and key naval bases, would reduce the chances of misinterpretation and accidental confrontations, offering a safety buffer in shared waters.

Seventh, India and Pakistan could establish a code of conduct (CoC) for the Arabian Sea to manage maritime interactions, reduce confrontation risks, and promote peaceful sea use amid regional tensions. Modeled after the South China Sea CoC. This CBM would provide a framework of rules for behavior in contested areas, particularly near disputed zones like Sir Creek and along shared maritime boundaries.

Eighth, direct bilateral maritime cooperation and conflict resolution between India and Pakistan would ideally be the most effective approach. Given the current state of relations between the two countries, this option remains politically challenging.

Therefore, a more feasible path to promote bilateral trust would come through multilateral forums. For example, the Indian Ocean Rim Association can be a valuable avenue to which both nations are already members. This forum provides a platform for indirect cooperation on shared maritime issues such as security, trade, and disaster-related risk management.

Expanding their collaboration within this multilateral forum, particularly on non-sensitive issues like anti-piracy efforts and environmental protection, could help build trust between them. As multilateral engagement deepens, it could serve as a steppingstone toward more focused and issue-specific dialogues between India and Pakistan at a bilateral level.

Implementation of the above agreements would provide a structured approach to promote a more secure and stable maritime environment in the IOR preventing miscommunication or misunderstandings and ensuring safety during maritime operations, contributing to greater stability in the IOR.

Rizwana Abbasi is an associate professor of security studies at the National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, a non-resident fellow of the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad, and a visiting fellow at the Central European University of Austria. 

Maryyum Masood is a Research Officer and Associate Editor at CISS and an M. Phil Scholar in the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Islamabad.

Proposing Maritime Confidence-Building Measures between India and Pakistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Both sides subsequently took steps to militarize the border and there was talk in New Delhi of following a more aggressive policy towards the Chinese. It was quite a surprise, therefore, that before the 2024 BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit at Kazan, India announced that it reached an agreement with the Chinese on how to patrol the border without clashes. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping also had a bilateral meeting in Kazan. Several factors led to this turn of events.

The Indians knew for some time that to dislodge the Chinese from the positions they occupied in the Himalayas would lead to an expensive war where India would likely not succeed in achieving its objectives. The alternative was to negotiate a settlement on resuming patrolling along the border and move towards improving the relationship in other areas, as the Chinese had suggested, notably by increasing trade and foreign direct investment in India.

The first sign that a policy shift was taking place came when the Ministry of Finance’s publication, “The Economic Survey of India,” called for seeking Chinese foreign direct investment to boost the economy. Such a statement could only come with the approval of the prime minister’s office signaling a change in thinking in New Delhi. While India’s bureaucratic and military establishments wanted a hard line towards China and to move closer to the United States, India’s three major business houses—Ambani, Adani, and Tata—all wanted closer economic ties with the Chinese, as did others in the business community. China provides the necessary equipment for Indian industry as well as the much-needed middle managers for India’s bourgeoning high-tech industries.

Further, while the United States was engaged in discussions with India it could not provide anything concrete and meaningful to New Delhi. Foreign direct investment from the United States was not forthcoming in significant amounts. Militarily, Washington was not providing the high-tech weaponry that India badly needed—at least not without terms and conditions that India found onerous. On the other hand, India lacked the financial resources to pay for the more advanced technology it wanted.

In terms of the Quadrilateral Alliance (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), the Indians were always the outliers since their military technology could not operate seamlessly with the American, Australia, and Japanese systems. Moreover, the Indians were cautious about the extent to which they wanted to aggravate the Chinese, worrying about Beijing’s potential to complicate the security environment in South Asia.

The budding bilateral alliance between Beijing and Moscow also worried New Delhi. Beijing and Moscow are moving towards a much closer political and economic relationship that is partly aimed at transforming the dollar-dominated international financial system.

Militarily, the emergence of closer military ties between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK) is worrying not only to the West but also to India since Russia is a major supplier of weaponry to India and New Delhi does not want to see this supply chain disrupted because Moscow decides to favor Beijing and reduces supplies to India.

Moreover, within BRICS there is a move towards accepting the Beijing-Moscow position on an alternative world order—the Law Based International Order—that while India accepts it, it is also concerned that it would be dominated by Beijing (and India would be shut out of framing the new narrative). All these reasons required mending fences with the Chinese.

Outcomes

             At the very least, this move is welcome because it is going to lead to a lowering of tensions along the border, which helps the internal position of the incumbent prime minister. Narendra Modi was weakened in the May-June 2024 general elections where his party went from having an absolute majority to being forced into a coalition with untrustworthy partners.

In such a situation, a bad military outcome along the border would severely weaken Modi’s internal standing and lead to calls for him to be replaced. Stabilizing the border, therefore, removes an irritant in domestic politics.

India needs foreign direct investment and despite all the talk from Tokyo and Western capitals, China is the most likely source of such financial resources. Chinese companies, despite the downturn in India-China relations, now control over 70 percent of the country’s cellphone market with companies like OnePlus, Redmi, Oppo, and Vivo outselling Apple, Samsung, and Sony.

Huawei and Hisense are making inroads in India’s white goods market while Chinese electric scooters (or ones powered by Chinese batteries) are becoming the ride of choice for young Indians. Paytm, the mobile payment service, has a Chinese majority share in its ownership and it is one of the leading players in the Indian market.

All of this has happened while relations between the two countries were sour. There is, therefore, considerable room for growth if the political climate between the two countries improves significantly. There is talk, in fact, that China may do a substantial foreign direct investment in India because, unlike Pakistan and Sri Lanka, there is less worry about nonperforming loans in India.

Some worry that the Indian rapprochement with China could have an adverse impact on US policy toward the Indo-Pacific and will give greater momentum to a BRICS-inspired move to de-dollarize the global economy. The Indians have a residual distrust of China and, therefore, are not going to bail out of Western-directed initiatives in the Indo-Pacific just because New Delhi is now the recipient of Chinese largesse.

Instead, India will encourage the development of Western-crafted institutions in the Indo-Pacific and participate in them particularly if they lead to economic growth. As far as de-dollarization is concerned, the Indians want to go to payments in one’s own currencies within BRICS but are not talking of displacing the dollar. In part, this is because the alternative could be the yuan or a Chinese-dominated BRICS currency.

The rapprochement between the two countries is good because it deescalates tensions and makes room for investment that India badly needs to reinvigorate its economy. At the same time, it does not shift India into the Chinese camp since New Delhi is a long way from trusting Beijing and entering into an anti-Western partnership with it. For the West, the best move is to wait and see, while remaining on good terms with India.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Advisor to the Forum of Federations Ottawa. The views in this article are his own.

Why India Made Up with China at the BRICS Summit was originally published on Global Security Review.

Missile flight time between both India and Pakistan is a few minutes. Hence, commanders do not have time for verification and decide to launch a retaliatory strike on warning.

In Pakistan, a high-ranking Pakistani military officer contacts Pakistan’s prime minister to tell him India has initiated a nuclear strike, and an immediate response is required. The prime minister immediately orders a counterstrike. Pakistan proceeds to counterstrike protocols.

Missiles begin crossing borders between India and Pakistan as the world hurtles towards a nuclear catastrophe in South Asia. The world’s worst fears are realized. It is only later realized that the high-ranking Indian military officer’s message to an Indian commander was made by a nuclear command-and-control system embedded with generative artificial intelligence (AI).

The Role of Generative AI in Modern Warfare

The use of generative AI, which is best exemplified by ChatGPT, by an adversary, or third party, can impact deterrence stability between India and Pakistan. In a worst-case scenario, it could trigger a nuclear war, like the scene mentioned above. Should generative AI be embedded in nuclear command-and-control systems, it is theoretically possible that hyper-personalized messages, like the one described above, could be generated in a system that was not originally designed to allow such an outcome. The potential for a tailored message, for specific individuals, is possible.

Traditionally, content and information generation were based on human creativity. However, at present, generative artificial intelligence is being considered as a tool for digital transformation. Generative AI is a deep learning model which has the capability to generate synthetic media including text, video, and audio—dependent on training.

Perception Building and the Escalation of Crises

Generative AI can also play a distinctly different role in leading to nuclear crisis. In a deterrence framework, the development of a narrative and perception are crucial. Similarly, communication of deterrence threats is also achieved through perception-building of an adversary—concerning a state’s capabilities and credibility. In the specific case of India and Pakistan, India is creating misperceptions regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program. Recently, Pakistani Ambassador Munir Akram, at the United Nations Security Council’s high-level debate, stated that India is actively pursuing a state-led disinformation campaign to malign Pakistan.

He was referring to recent EU Disinfolab’s reports on how India is using fake nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, media outlets, and international organizations to malign Pakistan. Similarly, it is possible that India may use Generative AI to manipulate public opinion, thereby, creating misperceptions among Pakistan’s public. This could make the citizenry, as well as the government of both India and Pakistan, susceptible to separate facts from fiction—especially in a crisis situation. Hence, AI-driven narratives could push both countries to a crisis leading to warfighting.

Misinformation and Crisis Management Challenges in South Asia

Misinformation through generative AI can make crisis management and escalation dominance between India and Pakistan much more difficult. According to Heather Williams and Alexi Drew, Herman Kahn’s escalation ladder has transformed into a web across domains with multiple actors and alliances, especially in the age of social media. In South Asia, due to mated warheads and cannasterization of missiles by India, coupled with geographical contiguity with Pakistan, nuclear use may become ultimate escalation within minutes—without a ladder or a web. Social media could be a threat multiplier and can become lethal with the use of generative AI. Although, tweets are unlikely to independently start a crisis, tweets from government officials of India and Pakistan could be fabricated through utilizing hacking and generative AI to escalate an ongoing crisis.

Risks of Generative AI in Command-and-Control Systems

While Indian nuclear weapons may have an effective command and control where nuclear weapons have nuclear safety and security mechanisms, there was a “Brahmos missile crisis” in 2022. Inadvertent or accidental, the launch of a missile could trigger a reactionary strike by Pakistan as the missile is dual-capable. Furthermore, this fog of war could undermine strategic stability. As a Group Captain was blamed for the launch, many commanders like him, who may be capable of launching nuclear missiles, even on Indian nuclear submarines, could be manipulated via high-level orders created through generative AI.

False Flag Operations and Strategic Escalation

India has also opted for adventurism against Pakistan through its false flag operations and surgical strikes. Pakistan has adopted a conventional strategy of quid-pro-quo plus as a conventional response to such Indian limited strike. However, malicious false flag operations through disinformation and fake news by India to garner public support for electoral gains and domestic politics can result in crisis escalation in such a competitive strategic environment. It is due to mistrust within the adversarial relationship of India and Pakistan.

The Need for Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) in AI

There is a dire need for risk reduction and confidence-building measures (CBM) between India and Pakistan in the domain of AI. However, the appetite for CBMs and dialogue on the Indian side is non-existent. India and Pakistan could establish bilateral AI incident reporting and mitigation centers to counter the use of AI as a tool for inducing false alarms and other escalatory actions. Furthermore, there is a need for India and Pakistan to further opt for unilateral AI security and regulation measures, especially for inter-organizational and inter-state strategic communications. If leading states like the United States, China, and Russia opt for an AI arms control agreement, less powerful states, including India and Pakistan, may be persuaded to follow suit. This will help establish a universal AI arms control regime regarding the use of AI for military purposes.

Generative AI and Deterrence Stability: A Scenario for De-escalation

It is the night of May 28, 2028, at India’s military command center. A high-ranking Indian military officer sends a message to a subordinate commander; Pakistan has initiated a preemptive strike. Prepare for a retaliatory strike. This is not a drill.

Flight time between India and Pakistan is a few minutes. Hence, commanders do not have time for verification and need to decide quickly whether to launch a retaliatory strike. He calls the command center to verify the message received.

India’s prime minister is contacted immediately concerning the message received by one of his commanders. He picks up the hotline to Pakistan’s prime minister and asks, “Have you launched nuclear weapons?”

Pakistan’s prime minister responds, “Not at all. This is fake!”

India’s prime minister informs the military command center. The crisis is averted, and nuclear weapons are not used.

Confidence-building measures, which were present in the second scenario, have the opportunity to change the outcome of a conflict. Given the potential for artificial intelligence to be used in nefarious ways, it is time to take action to avert such a crisis.

Ms. Anum A. Khan is an Associate Director at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad. She is also currently a Research Fellow at Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization and a Project Associate of The Third Nuclear Age Project led by Prof. Andrew Futter.

Generative Artificial Intelligence and Deterrence Stability between India and Pakistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today, China enjoys a positional advantage within the First Island Chain, which allows the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to enjoy interior lines of communication and supply to move forces more efficiently along an inner arc, compared to American-led coalition forces that will operate on an outer arc. This strategic advantage facilitates faster mobilization and concentration of military power by the PLA, enhancing its ability to project force within the region.

To counter China’s geographic advantage, Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. argues in Archipelagic Defense 2.0 that the United States and its coalition partners should prioritize establishing robust fixed defenses at critical points along the First Island Chain (an arc of islands stretching from Japan to the Philippines). These fixed defenses can stock deep magazines, harden positions, and complicate PLA scouting efforts. By situating ground forces on key islands these defenses can slow down if not prevent China’s aggressive mobility and provocation capabilities.

The islands of the First Island Chain, along with the flanking states (South Korea in the north and Vietnam in the south), form natural chokepoints that can impede China’s access to open seas. Coalition forces can play a crucial role in enhancing defense by focusing on these chokepoints. Deploying undersea sensor networks, submarines, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), antiship missiles, and mines can effectively limit PLA naval and air operations.

Ground forces can significantly contribute to the defense of maritime chokepoints as well. By establishing strongholds at key locations, they can free up more mobile forces for counter-concentration efforts. This static defense strategy, coupled with mobile strike capabilities, creates a layered defense system that complicates the PLA’s operational planning and execution.

On March 8, 2024, the Philippines Secretary of National Defense Gilberto C. Teodoro Jr. emphasized the importance of the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC). The CADC leverages the positional advantage of the Philippine section of the First Island Chain. This arc forms a natural barrier against Chinese maritime expansion, and its strategic significance lies in its potential to restrict the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) movements.

The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the United States could do more to enhance archipelagic defense. The Balikatan Exercise in April 2024 exemplifies the ongoing military cooperation aimed at strengthening defense capabilities in the region.

However, recent developments, such as the planned construction of a new port in the Batanes Islands, without US help, highlight the Philippines’ efforts to bolster its infrastructure and defense independently. This move, while avoiding direct US involvement, ensures that the Philippines remains vigilant and prepared to counter potential threats from Chinese expansion. The strategic importance of the Batanes Islands is that it is located less than 200 kilometers from Taiwan and separated by the Bashi Channel. These islands, along with Itbayat and Basco in the Luzon Strait, form critical chokepoints in the western Pacific and the South China Sea. In the event of Chinese aggression towards Taiwan or the Philippines, controlling these islands becomes paramount.

For its part, China has built bases on three atolls (Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Mischief Reef) and Taiping Island (Itu Aba Island) and is continually harming Filipino sailors and ships within the sovereign territory of the Philippines. Further, Chinese military activities near Japan are increasing such as when the PLAN sent survey ships, like the Chen Jingrun, into Japan’s uncontested waters between the Iriomote and Yonaguni Islands.

The addition of the tenth dash to the nine-dash line is China’s claim to Senkaku, which necessitates a comprehensive archipelagic defense strategy. The Philippines and Japan, in collaboration with the US and its allies, must enhance fixed defenses, leverage positional advantages, and fortify critical chokepoints within the First Island Chain. By doing so, they can effectively counterbalance China’s assertive maritime claims and increasing hostility.

The CADC, supported by initiatives like the EDCA represents the beginning of a much-needed effort towards safeguarding the Philippines’ national sovereignty and maintaining the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. As geopolitical dynamics continue to work against Taiwan’s de facto independence, the US must work closely with Japan and the Philippines to harden the Yonaguni Islands that stretch from the south of Japan to the north of Taiwan and the Batanes Islands that reach from the north of the Philippines to the south of Taiwan.

These Philippine and Japanese territories off Taiwan’s coast are particularly valuable entry points because of the Ryukyu Trench and the Philippine Sea Plate which provide easy access to the Pacific Ocean. If Taiwan falls to China, the US and its Pacific allies should already be in a position to plan for the next phase of China’s aggression as it will not stop with Taiwan.

If the US, together with the Philippines and Japan, fail to fortify these strategic island networks, American Pacific power will be pushed back to Hawaii. Allies will also face an authoritarian and mercantilist regional order that they do not wish to see return. China can be contained, but the time to act is now.

Alexis Littlefield, PhD, is Chief of Staff at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a Fellow of the Institute. He lived in Taiwan and China for two decades. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Increasing the Archipelagic Defense from the Philippines to Japan was originally published on Global Security Review.

As in other countries, the exit polls were wrong, and the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies won 291 seats—enough to form a government but a far cry from the 400 seats that the party bragged it would win. The general consensus was that with a sweeping majority, the Modi government would take drastic steps to reshape Indian society along ideological lines. Instead, the electorate voted for a more pluralistic parliament. Why did this happen, and what are the implications for Indian democracy?

Read the full article here.

Narendra Modi’s Disappointing But Not Disastrous Election was originally published on Global Security Review.

Clearing the harbor of the collapsed bridge and debris requires the removal of containers from the Dali so that it can be towed away, as well as the removal of wreckage, section by section. Meanwhile there are 11 large ships stuck in the port until the main channel opens. With the primary channel only 50 feet deep, the wreckage blocks all large vessels from entering the Port of Baltimore. On April 28 the first container ship since the wreck passed through a temporary channel.

A deeper channel was opened May 10, and the permanent channel is expected to reopen by June. The Navy is relying on contractors to bring cranes in to remove the salvage.

Since the incident, many naval and shipping experts have chimed in on social media about the state of our Navy and Army Corps of Engineers. There is a concern about the military’s lack of capacity to conduct salvage operations without contractors.

As good ports are determined by geography, there are only so many options for the US Navy. Naval bases are in enclosed bays, such as Puget Sound, San Diego, and San Francisco. Nearly all of them are located behind a bridge that crosses the mouth of their respective bays.

There are five major naval bases behind narrow passageways, and three that are easily obstructed by an unassuming containership. One can find all of these using google maps in minutes. It does not take long to find where the home ports are for American warships or what their deployment cycles look like. The US even has fleet trackers that are posted on social media. Using this information alone, one can estimate how many ships are in port at any given time, and their state of readiness. There is no need for satellite surveillance.

According to the International Chamber of Shipping, there are 1.8 million seafarers worldwide. Most come from China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Russia. Two of those nations are adversaries. The largest ocean carrier, Mediterranean Shipping Company, has more than 700 ships and a long history with Balkan drug cartels. The largest cocaine seizure in US history took place on one of their vessels, as did many other massive drug busts.

This begs the question: is it really impossible for a small number of Chinese-flagged container ships to obstruct the entrance to critical ports, trapping most of the US Navy in port and isolating approximately one-fourth of the Navy from reinforcement and resupply? Such an event would be the modern analogy to the Battle of Gravelines or Red Cliffs, with the Pacific becoming a vacuum for an up-and-coming naval power—China.

America’s allies throughout the Pacific would suffer. It is impossible to maintain logistical supply lines in the Pacific without the Navy. A modern container ship can carry up to 400,000 tons of cargo. The Air Force’s 52 C5 Galaxy cargo aircraft and 275 C17s carry a combined cargo of 25,975 tons. It is far more efficient and practical to resupply by sea.

The US Navy may have the best radar, the best anti-ship missiles, and the best crews, but the fleet only has so much food, fuel, and firepower. Unfortunately, US Navy logistics capabilities were completely gutted, including prepositioned stocks. On top of that, as seen with the USS Boxer’s recent breakdown, the Navy has limited dry-dock capabilities for repairs.

In light of the Dali disaster and the US Navy’s present capabilities, it is time to reassess the security of American ports from asymmetric or even conventional attack. They are simply more susceptible to attack than at any time.

After the War of 1812, the Fortification Board was created to plan for coastal defenses. From then until World War II the Army Corps of Engineers occupied their time with coastal defense. This is no longer their focus—or any other federal agency’s focus. This leaves the nation vulnerable to an unexpected attack.

The United States’ position in the world is a result of American economic strength, a strong military, and a commitment to the freedom of navigation. Adversaries do not share these values and seek to change the status quo. Times have changed, and so have the means and methods of adversaries to harm the United States.

First, it was foreign port security after the USS Cole bombing. Then it was airline security after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Now, the nation must adapt its capabilities and defenses to secure ports and entryways—before an attack has a catastrophic effect. This will require investment in time and treasure, as well as a shift in strategic thinking. The payoff is preventing a larger Pearl Harbor. The time to act is now when costs are at their lowest.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Fixing the Nation’s Harbor Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

Despite pressure from the Biden administration, the Indian government stuck to its position and, instead, bought Russian oil at discount prices only to refine it and sell it to Europe. The Indians also continued to buy arms from Russia and have sought to rebuild the defense arsenal and civilian scientific sector with Russian technology. Why have the Indians stuck to the Russians despite a warming relationship with the United States? What are the implications of India’s continued relationship with Russia?

The Military Linkage

First and foremost, India sees Russia as the source of weaponry, military technology, and the provider of systems that the West is unwilling to sell. Thus, the Indians leased nuclear submarines from the Russians which proved invaluable in training personnel for India’s own domestically manufactured nuclear boats. Negotiations continue for the lease of another Akula/Nerpa nuclear submarine from Russia although the international sanctions imposed on Moscow following the invasion of Ukraine have made payments difficult.

Similarly, the Su-30 MKI now forms the backbone of the Indian Air Force (IAF) fleet (with over 270 aircraft). The Indian government has proposed the purchase of 12 more Sukhois to help replenish India’s declining strength in air combat squadrons. The government officially authorizes 42 squadrons, but the IAF is down to roughly 31 squadrons against a continued two-front threat from Pakistan and China.

Even at the most basic level, after years of trying to indigenize the development and production of an assault rifle, the Indians set up a factory to build the Kalashnikov variant, the AK-203. For a country that has both internal and external security concerns, having a capable assault rifle for both its military and security forces remains a priority.

The more important factor is not just the ability to replenish the military supplies of the country but rather the fact that the Russians are providing the technologies India seeks to become a technologically advanced nation in the production of weaponry.

The India-Russia collaboration has led the country to jointly develop the Brahmos supersonic missile. The next generation of the weapon is supposed to have a hypersonic capability. That would put India in the same league as the United States, Russia, and China in terms of its missile capabilities.

Equally important is the fact that the Indians secured an export order from the Philippines for the Brahmos. Discussions are ongoing to sell the missile to Indonesia. This fulfills a long-term Indian ambition to become an arms exporting nation. While India seeks to sell its indigenously developed Tejas fighter to countries as varied as Argentina, Egypt, Nigeria, and the Philippines, it has not met with success. It will also be interesting to see if the United States permits a plane with an American engine to be sold to countries that are potential customers for American aircraft.

Similarly, India’s space program, which has impressive accomplishments like missions to Mars and the Moon, was built on Russian heavy launch engines. Now, the Indians are negotiating for the next generation of cryo-engine from Russia to further their ambitions in space.

On the other hand, there are problems in the mechanics of the relationship that lead, on the Indian side, to a degree of frustration. Spare parts remain a problem, although India has started to use its domestic industry to reverse engineer Russian systems. There are also delays in getting completed systems from the Russians as witnessed by the lengthy delays in acquiring the Gorshkov aircraft carrier because the shipyard could not carry out the retrofit in a timely manner.

The other problem is that post-Ukraine sanctions make it difficult to purchase weaponry from Russia. This is not a problem for heavily sanctioned countries like North Korea and Iran, but India sees itself as a part of the international community and a supporter of a rules-based international order. Consequently, New Delhi walks a fine line between purchasing weapons systems while not disregarding international concerns. This complicates the purchase of the S-400 anti-missile system from Moscow as India has troubles working out how to make the payment through internationally acceptable rules.

Although the Russians are careful about how India uses the nuclear technology it provides (asking for full-scope safeguards), it does not sanction the Indian use of Russian conventional systems and allows New Delhi to use Russian systems to carry strategic weaponry. Thus, the Su-30 can be used to carry nuclear weapons.

In contrast, all weapon sales from the United States lack guarantees that, in the event of a conflict Washington opposes, weapons are sanction- and embargo-free. This is one of the reasons India preferred the Rafale over the F-16—since the former could be used as a nuclear delivery system. For a country that is far from self-sufficient in weapons production, this is a major factor in deciding arms purchases.

Diplomatically, the Indians are getting closer to the United States. However, New Delhi does not want to antagonize Russia or China, especially because the American relationship, as discussed, comes with its own set of constraints and limitations. Thus, while the Indians see China as an existential threat, they are careful not to cross the point of no return with Beijing by pressing for a full-blown conflict. Similarly, when it comes to the supply of raw materials, Russia remains an important partner.

Even though India’s largest trading partners are China and the United States, the economic link with Russia remains vital to Indian developmental interests. American sanctions on Tehran forced India to wean itself off Iranian oil. The Russian supply of oil has been beneficial to India. Not only did it reduce import costs, but it allowed India to refine the crude and sell it on the international market—particularly to Europe.

In the short to medium term, the oil supply chain from Russia cannot be disrupted since India has few alternatives. This is of importance because Middle East oil becoming more expensive due to production cutbacks.

Lastly, a negative factor shapes the desire to keep open ties with Russia. New Delhi worries that if Moscow and Beijing get too close, it narrows India’s maneuvering space in the international system.

In a post-Ukraine war world, Moscow will likely give up its aspiration of being considered a western power and, instead, is highlighting its identity as a Eurasian nation with close ties to China. A Russia that sides with China against India would be New Delhi’s worst nightmare. This problem is compounded if Washington takes an even-handed approach to an India-China confrontation as Trump did, when, in 2020, he offered to mediate after Indian and Chinese forces engaged in fisticuffs along the border. Thus, India will continue the relationship with Russia until guaranteed military and economic alternatives are provided to India by the West.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Advisor on Peace and Conflict Resolution to the Forum of Federations, Ottawa. The views in this article are his own. He can be reached at agupta1856@gmail.com.

Start the debate! Let us know your thoughts in the comments section.

It Is Difficult to Break the Russia-India Link was originally published on Global Security Review.

There are two ways to achieve the regime’s objectives. First, Iran can cross the nuclear threshold and turn the tables on the United States, Israel, and the Sunni Arab states. Second, Iran can continue engaging in conflict and terrorism via proxies.

This approach took shape with the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, which drove the US out of Lebanon. The United States and Israel’s current conflict with Iranian proxies is at best a strategic distraction that cost the lives of American troops and drains Israel of resources. Houthis militias not only disrupt 15–25 percent of global shipping, but they are also a vector for testing increasingly lethal weapons and tactics.

When recently fighting Islamist militias in Idlib, Syria, Iranian forces demonstrated the brand new Kheibar Shekan ballistic missile with a range of 1,450 kilometers (900 miles). This puts Israel within range, making the Iranian threat to “raze Tel Aviv and Haifa to the ground” even more explicit.

While the West is distracted by the persistence of proxy attacks, Iran’s laser-sharp focus on nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities continues to deliver results. As of early 2024, Iran is capable of Uranium enrichment above the 80 percent threshold, while it keeps growing its stockpile of Uranium enriched to 60 percent. Iran might not have yet mastered Uranium-metal machining and the implosion trigger, but it eventually will, albeit with a little bit of help from the enemies of the United States. It is not a question of if but when will Iran field a nuclear weapon.

Iran has long developed the largest and most diverse arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. It took nearly three decades for Europe to acknowledge that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities were a growing threat. Western inability to deploy coercive nonproliferation tools that effectively compel Iran to cease and desist with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs demonstrates that efforts to deter Iran are an epic failure. It is in that context that Iran’s space launch vehicle programs provide a pathway toward longer-range ballistic missile systems, something not fundamentally different from North Korea’s approach.

The current American bombing campaign in retaliation for the attack on American troops in Jordan, while targeting proxies, does not change Iran’s tactical or strategic objectives. It is not a stretch to anticipate that Iran may consider a theater nuclear paradigm. For this to be adopted, Russian tutelage of Iran as to the utility of its nuclear doctrine is needed.

There remain several issues to consider. These include warhead miniaturization, mating with a Shahab 3 missile, and missile guidance, which require assistance from Russia, China, or North Korea. North Korea spent the past decade working on these very issues and is likely to share its knowledge for a price.

China relies heavily on Iran and Iran-controlled Iraq for its oil imports. Iran’s export of crude oil recently reached a 5-year high with China as the top buyer. Sanctions simply do not work. In addition to the expanded Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) and the Global South’s emerging alternative payment systems, which bypasses dollar-based control infrastructures, illegal weapons/technology proliferation continues unabated. While it is concerning that components used in Iranian missiles are reported to have made their way from the United States to Iran via China, the obvious question is what export-control designated items should never have made it out of the United States in the first place.

By staging a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia and accelerating the expansion of the BRICS to countries that are primarily oil and gas suppliers, China is further consolidating its energy security and its appeal as an alternative to the Western-led world order. Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of His Royal Highness Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, maintains bridges with Iran while performing diplomatic damage control such as in Lebanon. This does not mean that Saudi Arabia will ultimately turn its back on the West. But by keeping its options open, Saudi Arabia’s smart diplomacy does not lose sight of its own strategic goals—leveraging any weight China already carries around the Middle East and globally.

In January 2024, a Qaem 100 rocket from the Aerospace Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, for the first time, launched a Soraya satellite to an altitude of 750 kilometers. Not long after this first success, a Simorgh (Phoenix) rocket launched 3 small satellites into orbit.  Iran’s missile program, under the guise of a space program, demonstrated significant breakthroughs just as Iran is on the brink of reaching its technical goals for its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. As the West contemplates failed deterrence policies, the United States and other western nations must contemplate how much longer they can continue to fail without having to pay a price for their eroding regional and global leadership.

Iranian effort to reassert itself to regional hegemony after a long period of mediocrity will not go unchallenged by the Saudis (Sunni Arab) or Turks (Sunni Turkish). American preeminence in the region kept old animosity at bay but may not for much longer. We will all be worse off for it.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Iran’s Quest for Middle East Hegemony was originally published on Global Security Review.

On paper, India looks like a good candidate. It is a nuclear weapons power. It has a large army that in recent years confronted China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) along the disputed border between the two countries. It shares democratic values with the United States as well as the objective of a free and open Indo-Pacific. There are several problems, however, on both sides that will prevent this partnership from achieving its objectives.

Militarily, the United States, Japan, and Australia have the same technology and weaponry making interoperability easy between the three countries. India, on the other hand, presents an obstacle since its weaponry is largely of Russian origin and its technology is a generation behind that of the other three Quad members. This means that the Quad is actually a 3+1, because in a real conflict it would be difficult for the four countries to successfully coordinate their efforts.

Politically, while the US, Japan, and Australia share values and are strong alliance partners, India has significantly divergent views from Washington on Russia and the Ukraine invasion, its position on nonproliferation issues, and because of its unwillingness to be in an open alliance against China.

Technologically, while India wants the latest technologies for its armed services, and would like to build these weapons systems domestically, it does not have the financial resources to pay for these systems or, arguably, the ability to absorb the latest technologies. The Indian government prioritizes butter over guns and has kept defense expenditure below 2 percent of gross domestic product to pay for social welfare programs. (And unlike the United States, the Indian defense budget includes the pensions paid to retired servicemen.)

These financial constraints led to India cutting its order for the Rafale fighter from 126 to 36 aircraft and to the government delaying acquisitions like a new conventional submarine, a new aircraft carrier, and additional fighter jets. Fully modernizing the Indian armed forces requires selling weapons at subsidized rates to the Indians—something the United States will not, and cannot, do, since this would up-end the United States’ arms-transfer policies that have been in place for decades.

Additionally, the Indian government has a policy of techno-nationalism which requires that new weapons systems be built in India. The problem with this approach is that such production is marked by delays and quality-control issues. The Indian Air Force’s long and troubled procurement history of the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft is testimony to these failures.  Not only is production marred by delays, but the procurement of weapons from foreign companies moves at a glacial pace and can take decades. It took twenty years for India to buy the Hawk Trainer and fifteen to purchase the Rafale. More recently, the Indian Navy has put out a tender for a new conventional submarine but the takers are few since the Navy’s requirements

are considered impractical by major suppliers and some have dropped out of the competition for supplying the new submarine.

The other problem for India, of course, is the cost of weapons systems and here the United States can be of little help to New Delhi because the latter would need high-quality arms at subsidized rates—something that the US has not done in significant numbers since the Cold War. Further, some of India’s most pressing needs—like a conventional submarine—cannot be met by the US which decades ago gave up producing those subs.

Despite these problems, if given proper assistance, Indian capabilities can be improved to the extent where the country’s armed forces can pose a greater challenge to China and in doing so complicate the threat calculus of the People’s Liberation Army in the Indo-Pacific. As of now the Chinese have two divisions in Xin Jiang which are heavy units with armor and over 10,000 soldiers in each of them. In Tibet, the Chinese have four brigades with 4,000 soldiers each and 10–12 regiments with 2,000 soldiers in each unit.

The units in Tibet face the India border, and as of now, there is no major Chinese build-up of forces in the region. Instead the Chinese are modernizing their air defenses and infrastructure to allow for the rapid movement of troops and materiel into the area. Facing an Indian Army that has better weaponry, and more effective intelligence assets, would force the PLA to divert more resources, especially manpower, to the border and tie down those forces.

Better weaponry does not necessarily mean better aircraft and submarines, it requires building up the fundamentals of the armed forces which is cheaper to do and leads to combat effectiveness. Thus, the Indian Army still does not have a decent assault rifle since the factory that is supposed to produce Russian AK-203s is still not fully functional and the Army was forced to import 73,000 Sig Sauer rifles from the United States. The Indian Army also operates largely without night-vision equipment and is only now beginning to acquire drones at the tactical level for its units. Given that it has engaged in skirmishes with the PLA, the Indians need to be in a better position to handle such localized conflicts.

The other area where the United States and India can cooperate is in developing a set of affordable drones for surveillance and carrying out tactical strike operations. The Indian Army is buying off-the-shelf First Person View (FPV) drones in sufficient numbers and, eventually, the three services will acquire 31 Reaper drones, although these are both expensive and, given the vast ocean, mountain, and desert territories of India, too few to make a substantial difference to Indian combat capabilities. What the country needs is an affordable Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drone to back up the FPV drones and provide a redundancy in drone capabilities. There are several medium-sized American companies that can collaborate with the Indians to build such drones thereby fulfilling the Indian desire to manufacture in India but also allowing for the procurement of affordable systems for the military.

The other key area where the US can help the Indians is by providing intelligence on Chinese positioning and basing along the border. This was done in 2022 because of an intelligence-sharing agreement that gave the Indians the location of Chinese forces, which allowed the Indians to successfully engage and deter the Chinese. Such agreements should expand to significantly enhance Indian capabilities along the border since New Delhi lacks the space-based assets to comprehensively monitor its border.

While the India-US military relationship may not prove as successful as those with NATO or Israel, it can develop to give the Indians a better ability to defend their interests along the disputed India-China border. That is good for America’s interest in containing China in the Indo-Pacific.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Advisor on Peace and Conflict Resolution to the Forum of Federations, Ottawa, Canada. The views in this article are personal. He can be contacted at agupta1856@gmail.com.

The views expressed by the authors are their own.

The Flawed US-India Military Relationship was originally published on Global Security Review.

Armenia’s biggest vulnerability is that it relies on Russia for defense, which has been a noncommittal security guarantor since at least 2016’s Four Day War. After Armenia was attacked by Azerbaijan on sovereign territory, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan pleaded for help from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian dominated defense treaty alliance. In response the CSTO led sent a civilian delegate on “fact finding mission” damaged areas.

Following the week of attacks U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visited Yerevan and stated  Azerbaijan attack as “illegal and deadly”. This diplomatic serendipity to Armenia was a tremendous step for Washington’s advancing relations with Yerevan. However, the Speaker of the House is only one significant leader in the U.S. Government. Nations and non-state actors do not begin formal bilateral cooperation with the U.S. overnight. Cooperation requires many actors in diplomacy, private sector, military, law enforcement, lawmakers, and intelligence, to name some, who share common interest.

The U.S. probably has interests to work with Armenia due to shared democratic values, a bustling tech sector which cooperates with American companies, and diaspora members who carry a significant voice in domestic politics. Armenia very likely has interests to work with the U.S. for the sake of maintaining its sovereignty.  Yet one major point of concern for cooperation with Washington is that only Armenia recognizes the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) based on the Soviet Oblast’s referendum in the 1990s. The rest of the world, including Russia and the U.S., recognize Stalin’s redrawn borders placing the Armenian dominate population firmly within Baku’s authority.

The following are opportunities for Yerevan to press for its highest defense needs while soliciting the White House, Pentagon, and Congress for security assistance. Engaging these American actors probably will take more time, which is a luxury Yerevan does not have. Warm weather in the Caucasus is here again and Azerbaijan may attack again.

Need for Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS)

The most significant threat Armenia faces from Azerbaijan are Turkish-made TB-2 drones (UAVs). According to some war fighting experts, the TB-2 and other drones give Azerbaijan a tremendous attack advantage, providing air-to-ground missile fire, while simultaneously giving real time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to troops. The Turkish-made drone was so successful after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War against Armenian procured Russian defense systems that Ukraine decided to use the same weapons system in its war against Russia. Azerbaijan’s seemingly uncontested attack capability from the air can strike infantry vehicles, tanks, and deny logistics to the front lines.  Judging from sources online, Armenian Armed Forces and Nagorno-Karabakh Self Defense Forces do not seem to have a viable alternative to counter this great threat from the air.

Yerevan needs to understand that only IADS are the most capable counter to Azerbaijan’s threat from the air. To oversimplify, there are several air defense systems which can deny a threat including, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), surface to air missiles (SAMs), air artillery guns (AAGs), and air-to-air denial from jets.

One option for Yerevan’s new IADS is the Mistral, a French MANPADS which can counter Azeri threats from the air. It operates in many countries outside France, such as Cyprus, Georgia, Serbia, and others. Although the Mistral has yet to be proven in combat against Turkish drones, it could provide a barrier in the air against Azerbaijan’s greatest weapons. France is the highest favored country by Armenians, according to a U.S. think tank poll, and President Macron’s pro-Armenian rhetoric could lead to an air defense deal. As the TB-2 and other Turkish UAVs are some of the most popular in the world today, a counter weapons system would arguably find great demand.

Every Armenian engineer and defense manufacturer should focus on IADS procurement, and domestic research and development right now, from tracking incoming threats to eliminating them.

Soviet Era Doctrine & Personnel Reform 

It logically follows that Russian warfighting doctrine heavily influences Armenian warfighting doctrine. Both borrow from the Soviet Union. In 2011, then-Commanding General of the U.S. Army Europe Mark Hertling and an unnamed Russian General held a conversation on training personnel. General Hertling told his counterpart that without an effective non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps, Russian troops will never be trained effectively. Sure enough, lack of Russian NCOs have been one of the biggest operational issues during their Ukraine campaign. Russian NCOs “Are not in charge of tactics,” Russian military expert Michael Kofman opined to American defense news outlet Defense One “That’s why the Russian military is officer top-heavy. The officer corps handles all those issues that NCOs might.”

Armenia’s conscript-dependent military may desire to emulate the principles of a “professional military” (or “all-volunteer military” – these terms are used interchangeably). Yet, a significant overhaul in doctrine with war potentially imminent likely requires much more dedication in time, resources, and training to overcome critical personnel vulnerabilities. Yerevan can instead task its Ministry of Defense to train a robust NCO corps borrowing from Western doctrine such as the U.S. Call them, for example “Vartan’s Volunteers”, and establish prestige with joining a volunteer all-year NCO corps.

U.S. Medal of Honor Recipient and Afghanistan War Veteran Clint Romesha offered thoughts on what makes efficient NCOs to Task and Purpose, an American military news outlet,

While officers are the ones who put the plan together, it’s those enlisted leaders, the NCOs, who implement it. Even before those orders come down from the officers, the NCOs are moving proactively and preparing the troops, and they are usually the ones fighting with their junior soldiers on the front lines, leading them in combat.

This is not to suggest that Armenian NCOs, officers, or others are not competent. Rather, as some Armenian analysts call for Armenia to become a “Garrison State”, a strong, modern, defense doctrine needs to have “suits” (political and private sector), “stars” (generals and commissioned officers), and “stripes” (NCOs and conscripted) all understand their responsibilities and carry it out effectively. Immediate reform with NCO corps could be a short-term improvement to better improve command and control from the bottom-up, while doctrine is reformed top-down.

For recruitment and conscription guidance, Yerevan can look to nations which have successful programs. Singapore’srelations with Washington are strong and likewise with Yerevan. Singapore’s military has extensively trained with the U.S. and could probably provide insight on personnel, training, and logistics from a civilian to solider mentality. Furthermore, Armenia can utilize contractors from eclectic backgrounds, such as diaspora Armenians from U.S., France, Russia, Lebanon, Greece, or elsewhere. The Armenian government could expand its robust diaspora work-live programs for contractors to train conscripted soldiers, thereby increasing the rate of trained civilians. Moreover, a diaspora group of military experts could perhaps work with the Ministry of Defense as an affiliate council to study and suggest micro and macro-Armenian military inquiries.

Above all, Yerevan must think beyond “pro-Moscow” or “anti-Moscow”. The best militaries in the world borrow strategies, doctrine, operational planning, and more from others to enhance assets to their greatest potential. They do not prepare to fight the last war.

Training 

India’s major arms deal to Armenia may be the first step in a blossoming Armenian relationship. Azerbaijan is strongly allied with Pakistan. India and Pakistan historically share animosity.  Moreover, India views Armenia as a vital link to for its trade route from Iran through the Black Sea region. Indian Mountain Brigades are some of the best mountain troops in the world. It can be argued that Indian President Modhi could find training Armenia for combat in high terrain to test his best operational and tactical methods for the ongoing challenges with China in their own disputed territory.

French President Macron and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan have spoken over the phone many times since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. French Sniper Schools are some of the most well-respected institutions in the world. French sniper training to Armenian long-range fighters could prove to be vital for another defensive conflict judging from the rugged terrain and long lines of sight within Armenian territory.

South Korea is a nation which always must consider border security. Perhaps Armenia could learn from South Korean defense against neighboring North Korea, utilizing training programs, expertise on surveillance and counter surveillance, mining, reconnaissance, and communications to headquarters from the forward line of troops.

Equipment & Arms Procurement 

Yerevan needs to look beyond Russian suppliers for equipment and arms procurement. Diplomatic loyalty to allies and financial cost can often be problematic factors for nations who desire to bulwark defense capabilities. If Armenia’s ultimate goal is to earn Washington’s trust and purchase arms from the American private sector, Yerevan should engage US friendly countries to procure “surplus” while diaspora and Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs press American private companies and Congress to procure from the “source”.

Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan declined in relations during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War when Saudi Arabia called for peace instead affirming the Azeri position on territorial claims. Saudi Arabia might be under the impression that a crippled Armenia would mean Turkish dominance over the Caucasus region, and therefore may be inclined to send equipment and defensive weapons to Armenia. Yerevan can argue to Riyadh, perhaps making a case that a Turkish dominated Caucasus region would mean that Sunni Muslim nations in the central Asian steppe would be more inclined to follow Turkey rather than Saudi Arabia.

Greece shares over 2,000 years of mostly positive relations with Armenia. Today, Athens confronts hostile rhetoric from Turkey’s President Erdogan. In 2020, Greece accused Turkish troops of making an incursion within Greek territory. In 2022, Athens sent millions of dollars in defense equipment to Ukraine, according to a speech given by Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis to the U.S. Congress. A revamped Greek military considering perceived Turkish aggression and NATO duties to Ukraine could also aid Armenia.

Brazil just concluded the closest election in its history. Armenia can play to the new President Lula da Silva under the guise as the first Christian nation who desires to prevent another genocide on the grounds of protecting democracy and human rights. Lula may want a quick foreign policy victory as an ecumenical issue while Brazil remains divided domestically. The small but impactful Brazilian-Armenian diaspora can be utilized to this degree.

Egypt’s Coptic Orthodox Christian minority (which shares ties to Armenian Apostolic Christians) recently suffered a tragic deadly loss of 41 believers in a fire. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi may be seeking an opportunity of good will to his non-Muslim supporters, assisting Armenia could be one. Furthermore, Egyptian-Turkish relations have gone through a rough patch since 2013. Yerevan could leverage Egypt if El-Sisi desires to press Turkey in the tense Eastern Mediterranean.

The above are just a few examples. Yerevan should indiscriminately look to the broader US community of allies. Yet most important, the Armenian Diaspora should focus all efforts on one primary goal: earning the trust of the US military defense industry and carry out private sector deals to Yerevan.

The Armenian Diaspora’s extensive networks were instrumental in pushing the recognition of Armenian Genocide by the Executive Branch, Legislative Branch, and state governments. Yet for all the Diaspora’s merits to raise awareness in history, new history can arguably be made if Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh are ethnically cleansed from their homes. Armenian Diaspora can use their tremendously organized body to engage U.S. blue-chip defense contractors. Diaspora education can encourage the American private sector to push Congress for Yerevan to eventually procure American equipment. Once permission is granted, private sector defense contractors can immediately begin selling systems to the now-democratic former Soviet republic for self-defense purposes.

If Armenia Wants Western Defense Support, Doctrine and Partner Engagement Reform Must Happen Now was originally published on Global Security Review.

Efforts by the United States Intelligence Community (IC) to apply Cold War strategies to new age threats and non-state actors have largely failed, leading to adaptations and evolutions within the IC to understand and address new threats in new ways. The Soviet Union and the Islamic State terror organization pose very different problems for intelligence professionals to solve. As the world moves further into the information age, the IC as a whole is evolving to meet new threats with analytical, technical, and ideological developments designed to foster the flow of information, rather than compartmentalize it into Cold War-era boxes and stovepipes.

This article outlines the differences between nation-states and non-state actors, including their structures, threats posed by them, and IC adaptations necessary for global social progress. The first step in this process is to define and differentiate nation-states and non-state actors, followed by an outline of IC approaches to each type of threat, intelligence paradigm developments, and potential enhancements to future U.S. intelligence operations.

Nation-States vs. Non-State Actors

Nation-states need structure to function in the world, while non-state actors do not. Foreign intelligence organizations of nation-states are designed to function as parts of their nation’s governmental structure in some form or way, which makes identifying them and addressing potential threats from them a verifiable process. Nation-states are also generally held accountable for the actions taken by government associated organizations and departments, which in part dictates the field of activity that any given nation-state can and will be willing to conduct at any time. International repercussions from the global community—including sanctions and/or military retaliation—are a strong deterrent for most national governments that prevents them from taking certain courses of action and from many forms of conduct.

The Russian Federation, for instance, took control of Crimea in a deception-based maneuver that resulted in virtually no combat, intentionally avoiding any conventional military retaliation from the West.¹ Chinese military expansion into the South China Sea, while creating tension in the region, does not involve war or international conflict either.² Still, when faced with being charged with cyber-attacks on the United States, the Chinese Government remains unwilling to admit that it was even conducting cyber operations,³ for fear of international repercussions—including the potential for conventional war. These examples show that while nations are willing to act, they are generally unwilling to engage in major conflict or start a war. Non-state actors do not have this problem. Instead, many thrive on the prospects of international conflict and warfare.

Non-state actors are generally defined by their lack of structure, asymmetric tactics, and unique operational procedures. Any entity not acting on behalf of or directed by a nation-state is a non-state actor, including drug cartels, terrorist organizations, hackers, sex trafficking organizations, international corporations, vigilantes, bounty hunters, and even basic criminals and individual citizens of the world. They can, therefore, only be defined in the category of not being a nation-state or directed by a nation-state, and not defined in respect to what they actually are.⁴ Some non-state actors have an organizational structure, such as corporations, and can be addressed like that of a nation-state, or targeted similarly for espionage or protection purposes. However, most non-state actors that pose threats to nation-states do not have a structure that is easily identifiable, definable, or targetable.

Operational procedures and tactics of non-state actor threats also tend to be less symmetrical than nation-states, and almost every non-state actor is unique in its specific operational procedures and techniques. Each threat must be evaluated and addressed individually for threat mitigation and/or intelligence operations because of this uniqueness. Conducting counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State, for example, cannot be based on counterterrorism operations against Hezbollah, simply due to the differences in each organization’s unique strategies, culture, location, and patterns, despite both of them being terrorist organizations. Non-state actors require a higher degree of analysis to understand each threat completely before actions are taken, unlike nation-states where threats posed are understood, partly based on comparable historical analyses, international law, the economic prosperity of the nation, and regional stability.

Nation-States and Non-State Actors: Similarities and Differences

Nation-states and non-state actors are similar in the respect that they are mainly people led by other people, so understanding the behavioral psychology of people is a useful approach to understanding either type of threat. Both require resources, including people, to present a threat. Terrorist organizations like the Islamic State rely primarily on weapons and recruiting to grow in numbers and capabilities—the larger they are, and the more weapons they have, the more significant of a threat they can potentially pose. Nation-states like Russia and China rely heavily on other resources, such as energy, food, water, and other types of wealth-creating capital. Organizational utilization of those resources also differs, as a nation-state’s resources are used mostly for ensuring economic stability for its citizens and creating capital wealth to raise international prestige and rapport. At the same time, terrorist organizations have somewhat different concerns.

Terrorist organizations’ primary concern for resource utilization is being able to kill as many people as possible with as much media attention as possible, to boost recruiting efforts, and spread their ideology across the world for purposes of regional or global domination.⁵ Public support matters to both nation-states and non-state actors as well, since increasing one’s reputation, both locally and around the world, can increase the range of actions that are acceptable to conduct. Russia’s invasion of Crimea was not retaliated against, mainly because of the way the issue was presented to the public,⁶ just as media manipulation by the Islamic State was primarily responsible for its swift expansion and success in recruiting.⁷ Both of these entities swayed public support in their favor to help achieve their goals.

Despite several similarities between nation-states and non-state actors, there are many factors that simply only apply to one or the other. International law does not regulate or affect non-state actors or their actions since they inherently cannot be a party to any international agreement or treaty for any reason. Nation-states, on the other hand, face severe repercussions by openly violating any international laws or signed treaties, or if they are caught violating either of these clandestinely. Nation-states also have massive infrastructures for large scale weaponry and economic operations as well. In contrast, hostile non-state actors do not have access to the required materials and/or facilities needed to establish such features. There are no terrorist organizations with a space program, for example.

This means that any satellite operations conducted by terrorists, be it for cell phone communications or cyber operations, must go through a nation-state’s infrastructure. Nation-states like Iran who are state sponsors of terrorism and also have a space program, therefore, create a very unique problem.⁸ Non-state actors cannot by definition have a ballistic missile program either, since this also requires an infrastructure that only a Nation-State can achieve, but they can still acquire and use such weapons through allies, theft, or the black market. If the Pakistani Taliban or the Haqqani Network, for instance, were to seize Pakistan’s missile facilities, they would immediately become the world’s first terrorist organization with nuclear Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles,⁹ which makes potential instability within the Pakistani Government of paramount international concern.¹⁰

Technological innovations generally also require a Nation-State’s infrastructure with research facilities, scientific education programs, and a lot of money, limiting this combat multiplying factor to nation-states as well. Just as with missiles, however, non-state actors may still acquire technological innovations, including medical devices, weapons, computer hardware/software, communications equipment, or espionage devices by other means. In free societies like the United States, this problem is multiplied by readily available technological innovations to the public. It has resulted in the evolution of technologically based non-state actors like the hacktivist collective, Anonymous, presenting new and unique threats to nation-states and the world.¹¹

Free societies have also provided other non-state actors, like terrorist organizations, with technological infrastructures that can be used for cyber operations and tactical social media coordination for paramilitary operations, including terrorist attacks, such as happened in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Paris, France. The fact remains that non-state actors, while very different in nature from nation-states, have overlapping features, and unique features, and each threat must be approached by intelligence professionals uniquely and individually to achieve success. Intelligence methods and operational tactics must evolve continuously in the face of perpetual technological and ideological evolutions around the world to maintain global stability and human freedom, and the American intelligence infrastructure represents the best hope for achieving this goal in today’s world.

Intelligence Community Adaptations: Killing the Cold War Mindset

Intelligence operations and focuses throughout the Cold War were primarily concerned with threats posed by nation-states, and in particular, the Soviet Union and its Communist allies. The intelligence infrastructure of the United States that was created and grown during this era of Nation-State threat priorities stimulated the creation of extensive analytical techniques and operations explicitly designed to counter threats from foreign nations and their organizations. While terrorism and other non-state actors existed, they were not prevalent and did not receive enough attention to warrant extensive development of Non-State Actor threat mitigation techniques until relatively recently.

Intelligence representatives developing the intelligence infrastructure that exists today can target specific organizations within specific Governments for intelligence and counterintelligence operations. The ability to understand a structured organization made this possible and facilitated expansive espionage operations, including penetration operations and counterintelligence missions, to deceive the enemy and/or deny them information. The ability to identify the enemy and define it is the primary reason this type of analysis and intelligence operation targeting nation-states is so successful. The Soviet Union was an obvious target. Its intelligence, political, economic, and military organs also were definable, and therefore targetable. Even the tactics and procedures used by the Soviet Union could be documented over time, providing a standard analytical framework to base decisions on, with known variables regarding how specific parts of the Soviet Union’s organizations function and operate. Traditional threats posed by nation-states and individuals, before the onset of the information age, pale in comparison to the threats that exist today, threats that cannot be defined, controlled, and some that simply cannot be defeated, only mitigated.

Moving from the Cold War era into the information age has changed everything and created a large number of asymmetrical threats, not just from asymmetrical non-state actors, but from nation-states as well, transforming the entire global threat landscape forever. Intelligence professionals in today’s world must deal with issues and threats that have never existed, and therefore without historical data to reference when attempting to analyze them. Technological proliferation is the primary cause of this new threat landscape, technology in nearly every area of human life that is causing third world threats to be armed with first world weapons and technologies to aid their cause.

Transnational terrorist networks conducting cyberspace operations and coordinated paramilitary attacks on civilian populations have created global fear in addition to the physical threats that exist in the world, multiplying the overall effect of any attack they conduct. Many nation-states have also adopted non-traditional techniques and weapons, creating entirely new potential combat zones in space and cyberspace. The United States IC in today’s world must address a more significant number of potential and real threats, simultaneously, than have ever existed at one time in human history, and the freedom of the entire human race is at risk.

Intelligence professionals in the information age are no longer only trying to discover the number of tanks or missiles that an adversarial foreign nation has operational at a given time. They are instead assessing a multitude of threats without historical precedence that change the entire analysis and many which act as force multipliers, including but not limited to:

• The number of supercomputers any potential adversary has access to
• The speed of an adversary’s most advanced processor
• Whether or not terrorist organizations have access to weapons of mass destruction, how they might use them, and where they could turn to get them
• Regional and global economic stability
• Human rights violations by nation-states and non-state actors
• Weaponized space assets, potential and known, and their impact(s)
• Prospects for human expansion into space, including colonization, celestial militarization, and planetary resource exploitation
• Robotics technology proliferation
• Military and intelligence-related nano-science applications
• Global and regional drug and sex trafficking operations
• Human impacts on the Earth’s natural cycles
• The radicalization of violent homicidal terrorists who gain a foothold in failed states and spread their ideology throughout cyberspace

These are just some of the things that occupy the focus of the IC today, and each one has its own unique properties and operational requirements. Individual entities and organizations within each classification also contain their own unique features and operational tactics. The evolution apparent in the IC is as complex and expansive as the evolution from a paper letter to a personal computer hard drive with a terabyte of data storage. Growth does not make something inherently more effective; however, so another focus—on intelligence procedures themselves—is also necessary for the IC to appropriately adapt to current and future threats in the world.

Intelligence Evolution in the Information Age

Many of the challenges of today have not been addressed before in history and must be analyzed and understood before they can be addressed. Some threats are similar to threats of the past, however, and understanding history can help analysts learn to analyze more effectively, through the study of human nature, warfare, and intelligence operations throughout history. Communism is an ideology, and the Kharijite ideology that spurs the majority of radical Islamic terrorists into action is also an ideology. While there are few similarities between the ideologies themselves, the practice of combating an ideology on a global scale is not new to the United States or the IC. The Soviet Union eventually collapsed from economic and social disparity. The Communist ideology lost popularity, however, due to disillusionment within its believers, not the Soviet Union’s collapse.

Even Communist China does not follow the original Marxist philosophies of early communism. It has adapted to a Capitalistic type of communism in the face of widespread disillusionment with the Communist ideology. The Kharijite ideology can be fought the same way – through intentional and extensive operations aimed at disillusioning the believers and potential believers of radical Islamism. Cyberspace and economically challenged regions in the world are the primary recruiting grounds for radical terrorist organizations, which means the IC can target these same areas to eliminate the potential for recruitment, with aggressive, offensive counterintelligence operations in cyberspace in addition to economic interventions to educate and elevate the populations of regions with economic and social disparity. Ironically, eliminating social and economic inequality in critical areas of the world could collapse radical Islamic terrorist ideologies in much the same way that increasing economic and social disparity collapsed the Soviet Union and led to the disillusionment of Communism.

Lack of education and the censorship of information are significant factors that contribute to social disparities in the world, and therefore need to be countered with information proliferation and education. Part of this requires technological proliferation to increase the ease of access for societies to information through the internet, and potentially even Government sponsorship of satellite communications and internet capabilities for nation-states that lack the potential for such a technological infrastructure by themselves. Because this increases the risk of these technological assets being used by non-state actors for other purposes, increased intelligence operations, specifically in cyberspace, must accompany these information expansions.

In addition to these longer-term strategic economic and social methods to tear down the radical Kharijite ideology that fuels the majority of global Islamic terror, enhanced paramilitary operations and covert actions are needed to simultaneously combat physical terrorist elements already established around the world. With combined international cybersecurity efforts to ensure cyberspace as a place for global information proliferation and education, along with robust offensive counterintelligence, covert action, and paramilitary efforts to combat global terrorism and other physical Non-State Actor threats, world peace has its first opportunity in recorded history to be achievable and maintained. The challenge now is for Governments and people to realize this, and act accordingly to secure the future for humanity and the world.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any U.S. government agency, including but not limited to the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Marine Corps. Assumptions made within the analysis are not reflective of the position of any U.S. government entity.

¹ Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “Crimea and Russia’s Strategic Overhaul,” Parameters 44, no. 3 (2014): 81-90.

² Miroslaw Przygoda, “China – Russia, a Strategic Political and Economic Axis of the Contemporary World,” Varazdin Development and Entrepreneurship Agency (VADEA) (2015).

³ Cuihong Cai and Diego Dati, “Words Mightier than Hacks: Narratives of Cyberwar in the United States and China,” Asian Perspective 39, no. 3 (2015): 541-553.

⁴ David Moore, Sensemaking: A Structure for an Intelligence Revolution, (Washington D.C.: NDIC Press, 2011).

⁵ Andrew Terrill, “Understanding the Strengths and Vulnerabilities of ISIS.” Parameters 44, no. 3 (2014): 13-23.

⁶ Thomas Grant, “International Dispute Settlement in Response to an Unlawful Seizure of Territory: Three Mechanisms,” Chicago Journal of International Law 16, no. 1 (2015): 1-42.

⁷ Rohan Gunaratna, “A New Threat Landscape in 2015,” UNISCI Discussion Papers 37 (2015): 9-13.

⁸ Dan Dickerson, “Iran Would Strike First,” Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International 16, no. 3 (2010): 30-36.

⁹ Paul Kerr and Mary Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” Current Politics and Economics of the Middle East3, no. 2 (2012): 313-351.

¹⁰ Kerr and Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons.”

¹¹ Brian Kelly, “Investing in a Centralized Cybersecurity Infrastructure: Why “Hacktivism” Can and Should Influence Cybersecurity Reform,” Boston University Law Review 92, no. 5 (2012): 1663-1711.

From Missiles to Microchips was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States provides substantial diplomatic and economic support to Pakistan. Unfortunately, this policy inadvertently enables Pakistan’s economic, political, and military support for the Taliban and other Islamic militant groups. The U.S. should move from its dubious relationship with Pakistan to a more compatible alliance: India should become America’s premier South Asian ally.

Pakistan is an unreliable and untrustworthy ally. From the Taliban’s inception in the 1990s, The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency has supported them with money, training, and supplying weapons. It continues to be a significant source of financial and logistical support. In addition, the Taliban own real estate in Pakistan and receive large donations from private Pakistani citizens. The Taliban also teach their brand of Islam in numerous madrassas (Islamic Schools) all over Pakistan, a valuable tool to influence and recruit new members.

Since 2009, the U.S. government has committed over $5 billion in civilian assistance to Pakistan and over $1 billion in emergency humanitarian response. U.S. assistance includes projects supporting economic growth and bilateral trade; refugees and refugee-housing communities; law enforcement; civil society; and countering infectious diseases. In addition, the U.S. is Pakistan’s largest export destination country and has been one of Pakistan’s top investors. Examples of U.S. investments include consumer goods, energy, chemicals, agriculture, transportation, and communications. Yet, despite all the resources the U.S. has invested in helping Pakistan, Pakistan still harbors and supports the Taliban.

The U.S. should shift attention and priority to India as the premier South Asian U.S. ally. This new policy would keep economic and diplomatic ties with Pakistan but lessen them over time as the U.S. builds closer ties to India. It makes more sense for the U.S. to focus on India as the essential South Asian relationship. Both countries share a commitment to freedom, democratic principles, equal treatment of all citizens, human rights, and the rule of law.

India also shares a commitment to counterterrorism. India actively opposes the Taliban. Unlike Pakistan, India is willing to cooperate with the U.S. in counterterrorism operations against the Taliban and other militant Islamic groups.

Lastly, adopting this new policy instead of a more aggressive approach towards Pakistan would prevent a more powerful Taliban. Economic sanctions on Pakistani military and government officials with ties to the Taliban would likely be counterproductive and cause a backlash. Pakistan might even increase monetary and arms support for the Taliban. However, a growing and ever-closer U.S. relationship with India would send Pakistani officials a powerful message.

Critics argue that the U.S. neglect of Pakistan in favor of India will increase tensions in South Asia. However, tensions are already growing because of a Taliban-leaning Pakistani government. India’s relations with Pakistan are always tense. The difference is that a more robust U.S.- India relationship can bring more regional stability than keeping things status quo or pushing towards a more aggressive policy towards Pakistan. India is a more reliable partner.

Current U.S. -Pakistan policy has enabled Pakistan to support and assist the Taliban and other radical Islamic groups for the past two decades. Pakistani intelligence officials deliberately lie to CIA officials regarding Taliban whereabouts, yet still claim they are committed to fighting the War on Terror alongside the U.S. Continuing down this path with Pakistan is a dead end. It is time to chart a new course with India. A U.S. alliance with India would protect U.S. strategic interests and contribute to regional stability and peace.

India Should Become The United States Premier South Asian ally was originally published on Global Security Review.

The issue came to the forefront of debate when the RAND Corporation’s peace plan began circulating in Kabul as early as January 2019. Entitled “Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Conflict in Afghanistan,” the draft document proposed a joint interim government with the Taliban as the first essential step towards a political settlement in Afghanistan.

Adding to the controversy and fueling speculations was a statement by the Pakistani Prime Minister suggesting new governing arrangements in Afghanistan to facilitate and speed up the ongoing Afghan peace talks.

The idea of an interim administration also has supporters among Afghan politicians and power brokers who most probably see it as their ticket for returning to the center of Afghan power politics.

However, lost in the noise are the consequences of going down the road of a joint interim administration with the hardliner Taliban who isn’t compromising on their regressive demands at all, and the likelihood of its success, especially when the international community is wrapping up its Afghanistan adventure and are preparing to leave the country altogether?

Jeopardizing the Peace Process and Achievements

Proponents of the idea of an interim government forget, and the new Biden administration must know, that any discussion of an interim administration with the highly infamous Taliban—more than 80 percent of Afghans have no sympathy for the group—further boosts the insurgents’ morale and feeds into their narrative.

In other words, talks of an interim government with the Taliban inadvertently acknowledges the insurgent groups false rhetoric and blatant propaganda that paints the U.S.-led international community’s retaliatory intervention (in response to 9/11 attacks) as an invasion, degrades the UN-sanctioned multinational security forces presence in Afghanistan to occupation, and justifies their own bloody campaign as freedom fighting and just war for some delusional salvation of Afghanistan.

An interim administration would also tip the balance of power further in favor of the Taliban, especially after their diplomatic victory of discussing troop pullout with the Trump administration, and provide them with an opportunity to take on the scattered Afghan parties and groups and squeeze them to the extent of reversing the gains and rewriting everything.

Existing democratic institutions, freedom of speech and free press, women’s rights and advancements, and above all, the Afghan Constitution that guarantees all of the above would be in great jeopardy.

Although some claim that the Taliban have changed and are now open to discussing previously taboo and highly sensitive issues, including women’s rights and freedom of expression and press, ground realities indicate otherwise.

The recent rise in violence across the country coupled with targeted killings of any and every Afghan who might speak against or could potentially challenge the Taliban’s narrative and worldview cast severe doubt on the insurgents’ intentions. The Taliban’s vague verbal commitments wrapped up with Islamic suffixes about women, the press, and the inclusive government just adds to the suspicion.

Furthermore, the interim government’s volatile environment coupled with the Taliban leadership’s highly negative view of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) could cause panic among the ANDSF rank and file. Fear of the unknown future plus inclination to survive could easily force the ANDSF to vie for political and even ethnic support, causing the ANDSF disintegration.

And this is not an exaggeration; Afghanistan’s defense and security establishment has previously experienced overnight breakdown and integration into ethnolinguistic factions after the dramatic fall of the Soviet-backed Dr. Najibullahs government in the early 1990s.

Funding And Oversight Challenges

It is important to note that this is not the year 2001. Thus, the international community is not as enthusiastic about prolonged engagement with and rebuilding Afghanistan as they were back then in the first Bonn Conference held nearly two decades ago.

A lot has changed over the last twenty years, and Afghanistan is no longer a top priority for the international community. The world is facing new challenges, especially the COVID-19 pandemic, and its grave impact on the world economy cannot be overlooked.

In such circumstances, it would be difficult for the donor countries, already on the verge of leaving Afghanistan, to embark on a new state-building mission in the war-torn country. Even if some of these donor countries would like to contribute generously, they will have a tough time selling the idea of engaging with and sponsoring a Taliban-dominated government to their respective citizens, many of whom have lost their sons and daughters in the fight against insurgents over the last two decades.

The United States’ principal partners in Afghanistan, European Union, and India are highly skeptical about an interim administration with the Taliban. India has clearly stated that it doesn’t like the idea.

And this isn’t the only issue. The U.S.-led international community has also drastically reduced its military presence in Afghanistan. As part of the Trump administration’s peace deal with the Taliban, the international coalition has already reduced itself to just a few thousand troops scheduled to leave the country in the next few months, pending the new Biden administration’s review.

Even if the remaining foreign troops stay in Afghanistan, their tiny footprint is not enough to ensure the country’s political stability. In the absence of a sizable security assistance force coupled with no disarmament program for the insurgents, the probability of interim government success between two opposing poles, the democratic Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban, is zero.

Rather than acting as a catalyst for lasting peace, an interim administration at present would further exacerbate the already uncertain environment in favor of the militant Taliban, fuels infighting among democratic forces currently serving and supporting the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and result in chaos for the country, which could be costly to the international community down the road.

Therefore, to minimize the probability of an apocalyptic scenario in Afghanistan, the U.S.-led international community must look up and push for other options such as convincing the Taliban (with the help of their main patron, Pakistan) to share power with the current Afghan government or participate in UN-supervised early presidential as well as parliamentary elections in the country.

A militant group changed for the good and willing to share power and respect the will of the people as has been claimed about the Taliban, and a critical external player, Pakistan, satisfied with the Taliban’s return to power should have no problem with alternative governing and power-sharing arrangements.

An Interim Government Could Cause Chaos in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

In January of this year, General Secretary Xi Jinping of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) visited Myanmar, where he laid the foundations of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. Xi signed dozens of bilateral agreements while lauding the Burmese leadership for its efforts to combat terrorism while bypassing entirely the internationally condemned treatment of Myanmar’s Rohingya ethnic minority.

Beijing has been steadily encircling India since 2013 when General Secretary Xi announced the start of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its constituent projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the CMEC (China-Malaysia Economic Corridor), or the China-Sri Lanka Economic Corridor, to name a few.

India Encircled by a String of Pearls

Thus far, India has followed a sheepish approach to Beijing’s voracious appetite for geopolitical influence, as exhibited by its much-publicized “String of Pearls” strategy to exercise geo-economic and military domination across the globe by making massive infrastructure and trade investments.

Strategic Chinese acquisitions in its “String of Pearls” include the purchase of a port in the West African state of Djibouti, the Hambantota Port of Sri Lanka, the Gwadar port in Pakistan, and more recently, a deep-sea port at Kyaukpyu, Myanmar. Bejing is already on track to exert the regional dominance reminiscent of Chinese hegemony in the 5^th century AD.

India is involved a geopolitical quagmire with China, an adversarial power, yet an important strategic partner. While China is India’s second-largest bilateral trade partner, it is also rapidly consolidating its influence throughout South Asia. India, therefore, is at risk of encirclement, restricting its ability to exert its still-considerable influence in the world, particularly in Africa, and, to an extent, in South Asia.

How Should India Respond?

India has consistently rejected the idea of participating in the Belt and Road Initiative, citing concerns over sovereignty. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through Baluchistan in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, has been a point of contention for New Delhi, albeit one that has been mildly expressed. Despite economic and strategic conditions that are seemingly in Beijing’s favor, there are several steps that New Delhi can take to counter China’s expanding influence in India’s backyard.

First, it’s clear that India cannot match China in terms of economic strength, at least not in bilateral terms. However, India can use its regional influence to strengthen multilateral geo-economic organizations of which it is a member, such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) by embarking on multilateral economic projects in the iron and steel, oil and petroleum, and textile sectors, as well as leveraging its considerable expertise in the information technology sector.

Second, New Delhi must double-down on a carrot-and-stick approach to managing geo-economic competition with China. India has massive market potential, with a population of over 1.3 billion people. The country is one of the world’s largest markets for electronics, IT, logistics, and, more recently, defense. At the same time, India must intensify scrutiny of Chinese goods by strengthening the Harmonized System Nomenclature (HSN) and by cracking down on imported products of substandard quality—a critical step to take considering that 45% of India’s imported goods are of Chinese origin.

Third, India must take further steps to bolster its exports to countries increasingly wary of China’s growing influence, particularly as global scrutiny of the sustainability of China’s Belt and Road Initiative gains traction. At the same time, New Delhi should facilitate Transfer of Technology (ToT) agreements with other countries in sectors where India is traditionally strong, such as logistics, defense, agriculture, and dairy. India must increase its use of its soft power by undertaking proactive cultural, economic, and political diplomacy in key BRI participant-countries, including Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Brunei, while simultaneously bolstering defense ties through bilateral and multilateral military exercises and training programs.

Finally, India must strengthen its economic relations with ASEAN member-states, particularly with the Vietnam-South Korea-Japan trilateral grouping. More robust economic ties between the ASEAN group and India will be an essential component in countering China’s hegemonic trade practices. Thus, India’s withdrawal from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was an unfortunate setback in the efforts to build a healthier and more equitable multilateral economic partnership.

New Delhi must move rapidly to boost India-ASEAN trade and investment levels. The slower India is in responding to China’s aggressive economic moves; the more India will end up losing in the era of great power competition.

A study conducted by the Research Bureau of the PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry has predicted that Indian trade with ASEAN economies will double by 2025, from the current level of $142 billion (2018) to $300 billion. Measures the Indian government can take include enhancing incentives for Indian exporters, implementing policies to significantly boost the international presence of India’s service sector, undertaking a continuous review of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement, simplifying customs procedures, bolstering private sector engagement, and improving access to financial and banking services.

Is India at Risk of Losing the Game of Great Power Competition? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Yet, even a cursory glance at the project’s participants unveils the complex, if not confounding, geopolitical, and security ramifications that await the pipeline. Negotiations over the Afghan portion have been particularly contentious, with the Taliban taking a capricious approach toward the initiative, vowing once to defend, and once to destroy, the integral project.

Transnational efforts, led by the Asian Development Bank, the project’s promoter and adviser, renewed the dormant dream, pushing forth a narrative that ancillary benefits await each of the stakeholders involved.

For Turkmenistan, TAPI offers an opportunity to diversify the country’s export markets for its’ natural gas. Although global demand for natural gas persists, particularly in neighboring South Asia, the number of customers able to tap into the abundant supply in landlocked Turkmenistan has been limited due to a shortage of supply routes.

Sales to Russia, once the biggest customer of Turkmen gas, have waned due to pricing disputes, making China the current top importer. Nevertheless, as lucrative as the Chinese markets are, fear of overdependence on a handful of powerful hegemons has compelled Ashgabat to make pipeline projects like TAPI a foreign policy priority.

However, perhaps no country stands to gain, or lose, more from TAPI than Afghanistan. As a necessary transit point, initiatives like TAPI demonstrate Afghanistan’s potential to boost badly needed government revenues as a regional energy transit hub. With nearly $400 million (USD) in transit fees at stake, Afghanistan simultaneously serves as the project’s greatest benefactor and its’s biggest bottleneck as fears mount regarding the Afghan government’s ability to protect the pipeline.

For both India and Pakistan, participation in TAPI is driven by a need to satiate local demand for natural gas. Both countries are expected to purchase over 40% of the gas pumped through TAPI. Such access would likely alleviate acute supply shortages in Pakistan. Shortages have spurred a major energy crisis in the volatile southern provinces of Balochistan and Sindh, where chronic power outages have decimated local industry and hindered the growth outlook for both provinces.

In response to security risks, observers have suggested that Pakistan’s dire energy crisis would dissuade temptation to “weaponize” the pipeline in the event of armed conflict with India, as well as ensure that the Taliban, which Pakistan retains a considerable amount of influence over, not interfere in the operation of the pipeline.

Yet, it is this very concern that has informed India’s stance on the viability of the project, which has been idyllically dubbed the ‘peace pipeline.’ Estimates suggest that India could satisfy up to one-third of its gas needs via TAPI, but such exposure would likely foster dependence on dangerous overland routes in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Hence, ambivalence on the part of the Modi government has generated speculation that India prefers Turkmen gas to be routed via Iran. Although this route would likely incur a higher cost than present estimate for the TAPI pipeline of $10 billion, India’s justification of any premium would be reflected in the reliability of such a pipeline.

Thus, New Delhi’s lack of confidence in Islamabad to securitize TAPI remains an impediment, if not a deal-breaker. Threats emanating from within Pakistan and from the Taliban have coerced India to seek insurance by forging regional projects with neighboring Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, and Bangladesh for its’ energy needs.

Furthermore, current events in the region have complicated the pipeline’s progression. Tensions in the region have seldom been higher with India’s repeal of Kashmir’s autonomous status, followed by the abrupt cancellation of U.S.-Taliban peace talks. Both events could forestall any concrete steps toward operationalizing the TAPI pipeline.

Construction, which first commenced on the Turkmenistan portion in 2015, has been relatively opaque, with little information regarding progress on the Afghan or Pakistani sections of the pipeline. Several delays have imperiled earlier estimates that suggested the pipeline could be operational by 2020.

With an estimated 12,000 jobs and lucrative transit fees for Afghanistan, and energy access on the line for India and Pakistan, TAPI, in theory, could have satiated each stakeholder’s needs. Such conditions suggest that before its’ lofty ambitions can be realized, TAPI will have to contend with the inconvenient whims of mistrust and suspicion in the neighborhood of South Asia.

TAPI Pipeline Puts South Asia’s Prosperity in Peril was originally published on Global Security Review.

There is a strong likelihood, however, that it will guarantee the opposite—an enduring condition of violence and unrest that can spill over into South Asia and beyond.

The Indian Government has repealed Article 370—the article in the Indian Constitution that guaranteed Jammu & Kashmir’s status as an autonomous territory, rather than a union state of India—greatly angering Kashmiris, who have been protesting since the announcement on August 5th, stunning observers worldwide. The move also violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 38.

Kashmiris knew something was wrong as the announcement was foreshadowed by widespread Indian state activity in Indian-administered Kashmir. Curfews along with a media and communications blackout were imposed, former Kashmiri Chief Ministers Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti were put under house arrest, and additional troops were deployed, bringing the total up to 46,000. 

The Indian Government gave no warning ahead of the lockdown, announcing the article’s repeal the next day.  Mass protests have rocked the streets of Kashmir since the announcement, the region’s biggest demonstrations thus far. In the town of Soura alone, at least 10,000 demonstrators protested the repeal of Article 370. Despite the relaxing of travel restrictions, protests are still ongoing at the time of writing.

Indian security forces resorted to using pellet guns to disperse protesters. The use of pellets has been the subject of a great deal of international scrutiny and condemnation, as it violates international law and has left thousands of Kashmiris permanently blinded. Between July 10th and 12th of 2016, SMHS Hospital in Srinagar received 570 patients for eye treatments and surgeries after they had been fired upon with birdshot pellets. Pellet blindings, along with other human rights violations by Indian security forces,  lead some Kashmiris to join and participate in a homegrown insurgency.

There is a case to be made that repealing Article 370 was a response to American offers to mediate the Kashmir Issue. India has long tried to keep the issue bilateral, rather than internationalize it. When Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan visited the U.S. at the end of July, President Donald Trump said in an Oval Office press conference that India had asked him to mediate the Kashmir Issue—something Indian authorities robustly denied, in keeping with their line of keeping the issue bilateral and off the international agenda. All of this has been on the tail of worsening Indian-U.S. relations, following a dispute regarding increased Indian tariffs on American goods, and India’s exclusion from the Afghan Peace Process in favor of Pakistan.  

What does repealing Article 370 mean?

Article 370 guaranteed that the territories of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh would be governed autonomously rather than from New Delhi. A sub-article, Article 35A, ensured that non-Kashmiri Indians would not be able to buy land or vote within Indian Kashmir, meaning that Kashmiris would remain in control of their territory as well as their governance.

Repealing Article 370 means that sub-Article 35A will be reversed as well, meaning Hindus and other non-Kashmiris can purchase property, settle, and participate in politics within Kashmir. Native Kashmiri Muslims are fearful this may be the first step in a campaign of ethnic cleansing by majoritarian Hindus. Indeed, such concerns were voiced by former Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti in response to the decision, saying that the reason behind repealing Article 370 was to change the demographics of Indian-controlled Kashmir and render India’s only Muslim-majority state ethnically homogenous.

By purchasing land in Kashmir and settling, they would eventually be able to force the native Muslim population out or replace it by marrying Kashmiri women. Such fears are reinforced by the vitriolic nationalist rhetoric espoused by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Government in Delhi, as well as by a swath of the Indian media. As a result of New Delhi’s decision to repeal Article 370, Kashmir faces a higher risk of sub-state violence and the potential for a mass-emigration of Kashmiris.

Increased Militancy and Violence

The Kashmiri population will lash out more violently against the Indian state than before, having already been on the receiving end of state violence and repressive policies. The potential for violence is likely the underpinning factor in the logic behind the pre-announcement media blackout and troop deployments. 

Repealing Article 370 could end up inciting increased violence in Kashmir due to the end of the autonomy that has been highly-valued by Kashmiris for the past seven decades. A violent response to the repeal could beget even more violence and heavy-handed action from Indian authorities, threatening regional peace. Pulwama was the deadliest attack against Indian forces in Kashmir, and the response threatened global security and turned more Kashmiris against the Indian state.

Established movements like Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) could re-emerge, alongside a range of newer actors fighting the Indian state. In either case, a violent uprising would lead to an enduring and far more ferocious condition of insurgent violence, with more frequent and intense attacks adding to the nearly 50,000 casualties resulting from the 30-year-long dispute. The prolonged enactment of humiliating and repressive policies by the Indian government against Kashmiris has, for decades, arguably fostered a condition of hatred and a loss of allegiance to India, leaving an endless pool of potential recruits for an insurgent movement. Repealing Article 370 could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back. 

While the Indian government’s decision has profound ramifications for Kashmiris, who will be targeted by security forces in retaliation, a renewed Kashmiri insurgency would impact regional security as well, depending on how New Delhi responds.

In the aftermath of the February 2019 Pulwama bomb attack, India immediately blamed Pakistan for the attack (with minimal evidence), before launching airstrikes against Pakistani territory (this author previously published a two-part article covering the Pulwama Incident for Global Security Review). While neither side escalated to full-scale war, there was a genuine potential for nuclear conflict.

Simply blaming Pakistan is not an effective strategy for India, nor is baiting Pakistan into military adventurism. Given the sensitive nature of the Article 370 issue, a heavy-handed response to militancy in Kashmir would detrimentally impact regional security.

A mass-movement of Kashmiri refugees

As mentioned earlier, the settlement of non-Kashmiris will have a profound impact on the area’s demographic make-up. Rampant Islamophobia emanating from New Delhi raises fears that native Kashmiris will be forced out of their territory, either into India or over the Line of Control (LoC) into Pakistan. 

Kashmiris are already one of the most marginalized communities in India, being the targets of pogroms and Islamophobic violence by Hindu extremists and repressive policies enforced by security forces in Kashmir itself. Following the Pulwama attack, Kashmiri students across India were targeted in acts of violence and harassed at school. Increasingly alienated by India, Kashmiris who can leave, will. 

Kashmiris have previously crossed the LoC into Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Since the 1990s, 38,000 refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir fled the fighting and escaped across the LoC, with some leaving their families on the other side. Like many in Indian-administered Kashmir, the refugees were subject to repressive policies enforced by Indian security forces.

Due to their shared religion and history of mass migration, Kashmiri refugees will head for Pakistan, despite its economy being unable to cope with an influx of refugees. A Kashmiri exodus would be the last nail in the coffin, compounding other problems like overpopulation and mismanaged funds. Additionally, should Pakistan be blacklisted at the Financial Action Task Force meeting in October, it will be precluded from receiving the loans it so desperately needs to keep itself going. 

Pakistan is still reeling from the influx of refugees from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S.-led invasion, along with internecine civil unrest in cities like Karachi during the 1990s. According to UNHCR, there are 1.4 million registered Afghans living in Pakistan. The mass movement of refugees has had a detrimental impact on Pakistan’s resources, and security through Afghan involvement in crime and terrorism. 

India’s BJP government will achieve the opposite of what was intended if it believed that Indian security would be enhanced by bringing Kashmir into the Indian Union. To Kashmiris, it seems that the government has written them off entirely, which more radical elements see as a green light to conduct acts of violence against India. 

Pakistan has successfully been able to lobby the UN Security Council to discuss the current Kashmir Crisis in a meeting on the 16th of August. Whatever the outcome, Kashmiris have the most to lose as a result of the BJP’s political adventurism.

Ending Kashmir’s autonomy will mean wide-ranging implications for India was originally published on Global Security Review.

Ever since the commencement of peace talks between the United States and the Taliban, India has struggled to play an influential role in Afghanistan. Despite being one of Afghanistan’s most valuable strategic partners, India remains a mute spectator of the U.S.-Taliban peace talks as well as intra-Afghan negotiations. As India finds itself increasingly ignored in Afghan affairs, the time has come for Delhi to make its presence felt in the landlocked country and ensure that it’s not excluded from negotiations going forward.

India in Afghanistan: a Proactive Economic Partner

India has played a critical role in supplying economic aid to Afghanistan since the U.S. invasion and overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. Since 2002, India has provided humanitarian aid and invested in major infrastructure projects as well as smaller developmental initiatives which have provided Afghanistan with a much-needed lifeline amidst ongoing war, sectarian divisions, and terrorism.

Major projects that have benefited from Indian investment include the construction of the Parliament Building in the country’s capital, Kabul, where India committed $178 million (USD), spending approximately $28 million thus far, the $150 million Zaranj Delaram highway project connecting western Afghanistan with the strategic Chabahar port in Iran, and the $42 million Salma Dam Project on the Hari Rud river in the province of Herat province—which includes the construction of a power transmission line connecting the city of Pul-e-Khumri with Kabul. India has also signed a trilateral preferential trade agreement with Afghanistan and Iran.

Inspired by India’s history of successful community engagement programs in Sri Lanka and Nepal, hundreds of social development programs were launched in Afghanistan in conjunction with 250,000 tons of wheat to be provided to primary schools as food assistance. Furthermore, India provides technical advisers to Afghan public institutions, offers training for Afghan civil servants and policemen, and contributes funds to an Afghan Red Crescent Society program which provides free medicine and healthcare consultations in its medical missions in five Afghan cities.

India’s Role in the Afghan Taliban Peace Talks

Historically, India has been staunchly anti-Taliban. When the Afghanistan government led by President Mohammed Najibullah collapsed in 1992 and Najibullah’s subsequent assassination in 1996, Delhi grew increasingly alarmed by the Taliban’s rise to power. On the other hand, the Taliban has historically maintained a neutral position when it comes to India, even expressing a willingness to engage with India—provided that India abstained from interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.

Today, India has adopted a somewhat softer stance towards the Taliban. Delhi understands the potential consequences of a resurgent Taliban, but it must face the geopolitical reality that the Taliban controls over half of the territory of Afghanistan. According to a report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), 229 districts were controlled by or under the influence of the Afghan government as of January 31, 2018—approximately 56.3 percent of Afghanistan’s districts. On the other hand, 59 districts—approximately 14.5 percent—were controlled by the Taliban.

India is concerned that a return to power by the Taliban will undermine the fragile government of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani—which is struggling to provide basic necessities and security to the Afghan people as it continues to battle the Taliban for its very existence. In a sign of its changing position towards the Taliban, the Modi government dispatched two former highly-decorated diplomats in November 2018 on a “non-official visit” to Russia to participate in negotiations with the Taliban that were being held there.

Former diplomat and secretary to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs Vivek Katju—  known for his hardline stance against the Taliban—has adopted somewhat different take on the Taliban issue. Writing in an editorial for The Indian Express, Katju argued that it is in India’s strategic interests to engage with the Taliban to not only maintain its influence in Afghanistan but to better understand the power dynamics of the broader South Asian region.

India must increase and sustain engagement in Afghanistan, particularly after not being invited to participate in quadrilateral talks between the United States, Russia, Pakistan, and China after talks between U.S. Special Envoy for Peace in Afghanistan Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban representative Maulana Abdul Ghani Baradar. China subsequently issued a statement saying that India was not intentionally excluded from the quadrilateral talks and that India would be included in future regional discussions involving the Taliban and other stakeholders in Afghanistan.

While India has put forth clearly defined red-lines concerning its dealings with the Taliban, its willingness to engage in discussions with the battle-hardened militants is evidence that Delhi has adopted a more pragmatic stance.

India’s Expectations for the Taliban

India’s first expectation is that “all initiatives and processes must include all sections of the Afghan society, including the legitimately elected government.” Historically, the Afghan government has often been sidelined by international interlocutors in their engagements with the Taliban. Furthermore, this expectation indicates a degree of acceptability in Delhi over negotiating with the Taliban, as the group represents a “section of the Afghan society.”

Delhi’s second expectation is that “any process should respect the constitutional legacy and political mandate,” meaning that democratic processes and human rights—including women’s rights—should be respected.

Thirdly, India expects that any process “should not lead to any ungoverned spaces where terrorists and their proxies can relocate.” This expectation is crucial for India, as it highlights the threat posed by terrorist groups such as the Haqqani network, Al Qaeda, and Islamic State. Furthermore, this expectation implies that Pakistan-based terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and Jaish-e-Mohammed cannot be permitted to expand their operations into Afghanistan.

India cannot afford to remain on the sidelines of the peace process in Afghanistan. The country is an important partner and is of great strategic value for India—especially with India’s control over the Iranian port of Chabahar, which has been granted a sanctions waiver by the U.S. government. India must up the ante in Afghanistan by initiating track II diplomacy, engaging with tribal elders, and convincing the Taliban to adopt and maintain a favorable stance towards India while preventing Afghanistan from becoming a haven for foreign terrorist groups. Furthermore, should the Taliban return to power with backing from Pakistan, India will be in a challenging position concerning the maintenance of a favorable balance of power in South Asia.

Is India’s Influence in Afghanistan Declining? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Proxy wars and great power politics have returned to Afghanistan. Afghanistan is once again at the center stage of regional and global rivalries over influence for a variety of geostrategic interests and the quest for resources. This time unlike the past, there are many players including nearly all of Afghanistan’s neighbors, the most prominent being Pakistan, Iran, China, and India.

Afghanistan, as observed by Lord George N. Curzon, was an empty space on the map which was neither Persian nor Russian nor British. It was purely a geographical space which emerged and was used as a buffer zone during an era of great power politics between the former British Empire and Russian Tsar. Some scholars and historians describe Afghanistan as an accidental nation.

The nomadic, semi-nomadic, and settled ethnic groups living in this rugged but vitally strategic land were used as tools to extend the influence and interests of one Empire against the other. The monarchies and militia groups trained and funded by these two empires emerged as a result of these great rivalries used to take turns in preparing the ground for government collapse and capturing Kabul centric power through assassinating monarchs, waging coups, and rebellions to further the interests of their imperial paymasters.

In recent times, the Afghan government and its allies are complaining about enemy sanctuaries and safe-havens across the border in Pakistan and Iran for the growing insurgency in the country, but this phenomenon is nothing new. Afghan monarchies and the Afghan communist regime were toppled by rebel leaders, dethroned Kings, and disgruntled tribal and religious leaders who enjoyed financial and military support in the courts of British Raj, the Persian Empire, and the Russian Tsar. In recent times, the Pakistani military and intelligence services have provided safe havens and training grounds for militant groups like the Taliban.

This time around the stakes are higher, and the game is much more complicated. Various countries are furthering their interests within the country through their proxy—oftentimes with ethnic, racial, and sectarian ties to their sponsors.

Understanding the depth of this problem, the incumbent President of Afghanistan, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, has been consistently warned Afghanistan’s neighbors in various forums including the recent SAARC leaders summit in Nepal, Heart of Asia conference in Beijing, and other multilateral and bilateral meetings that he will not tolerate proxy wars in his country and will not allow Afghan territory to be used against its neighbors from any party involved in the country. However, the reality of the situation is different, as the Afghan state’s influence is limited beyond major urban centers. This makes it difficult to ensure and deliver on Dr. Ghani’s promises.

Today, Pakistan claims that India is using Afghan territory to support Baloch separatists and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) whereas India has been over the years warning and complaining to the international community over Pakistan’s duplicity and complicity in various terrorist attacks within and outside India. The recent bombings of Indian Embassy and consulate in Afghanistan are in no doubt the handiwork of the various extremist groups supported and trained by the powerful Pakistani military intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Furthermore, Iran and Saudi Arabia are vying for influence to promote or protect the Shiite and Sunni domination within the power structure in Afghanistan. Russia and China, respectively, are concerned about Chechens and Uyghurs in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. An unstable Afghanistan that is infested with proxy groups presents a great threat to Central Asian states, the security of the Russian Federation, as well as China’s commercial and economic interests in Central Asia.

It seems that history is repeating itself once again in Afghanistan. With the development of technology and advancements in land, sea, and, air transport it seemed that countries such as Afghanistan which were pivotal geo-strategic land bridges lost some of their strategic importance. Conversely, however, these new developments have not done much to diminish the geopolitical importance of the Afghanistan. Geography is still a significant factor in deciding the political and economic fate of a state.

The Rise and Fall of Regimes in Afghanistan: Proxy Wars and Regime Collapse in Afghanistan

By several estimates, the average lifespan of republican regimes in Afghanistan is 3.5 years with significant statistical outliers in Afghan monarchies. These are normally regimes which normally lasted over a decade. The reasons for such rapid regimes changes, coup d’états and state collapse in Afghanistan are many chief among them exclusive politics and rebellions supported by outside actors. 

One of the effective instruments for toppling various Afghan regimes has been proxy warfare exploiting ethnic and/or religious sensitivities. Historically and with few exceptions, nearly every rebellion in Afghanistan was organized, trained and funded by outside actors and regional players. The British Raj gave refuge and sanctuary to various toppled Afghan kings and statesmen and eventually paved the way for their return whereas the same tactic was used by the Russian Tsar.

The Russian Tsar hosted Afghan emirs like Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, Amir Shir Ali Khan, along with several other Afghan monarchs in the former “Bukhara” and later on assisted them in their return to power. The last Afghan King, Mohammad Zahir Shah, by several accounts is born in British India and completed his education in France and occupied the throne after his father who also came to power with considerable British support and was later assassinated in a school shooting also enjoyed significant regional support by remaining neutral in regional rivalries.

Furthermore, the Afghan communists, Mujahiddins, and more recently, the Afghan Taliban, were all groups which were actively supported, trained and assisted in their rise to power by regional powers. Therefore, external powers always play a pivotal role in the rise and fall of various regimes in Afghanistan.

Old Game, New Players: Proxy Wars and Ethnic Conflict in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has been at the epicenter of the “Great Game” and later on the cold war rivalry between the former Soviet Union and the United States in the lead. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan was abandoned to Pakistan and the proxies of other countries—chief among them Iran, India, Russia, and Central Asian states—each of whom supported a particular ethnic faction. It led to a bloody civil war which lasted for almost a decade resulting in the hundreds of thousands of death of civilians.

Today, this old game is returning with new players. These new proxy wars are more localized with regional players (i.e., Pakistan and India playing the lead role, followed by Iran and Saudi Arabia to safeguard their interests). This time, the stakes are higher—as are the costs of inaction for Afghanistan.

Absence of Indigenous Economy: Financial and Economic Dependence

The absence of an indigenous economy and source of financial revenue has made the political sovereignty and military independence of Afghanistan vulnerable to various regional players. For years, Afghan political elites and parties have been dependent on regional funding and support to pursue its political goals inside Afghanistan. The Afghan communist party factions—PDA Khalq (People) and Parcham (Flag)— were heavily reliant on Moscow while various Mujahiddin factions benefitted from Pakistani, Iranian, Saudi Arabian, and Western support. The current Afghan government is heavily dependent upon Western military and financial support.

During his tenure as former President Hamid Karzai acknowledged that his office is receiving millions of dollars from western and regional intelligence agencies for various payments. This implies that, just like the British Raj and Russian Tsar buying loyalty in the Afghan royal court, the same financial manipulation in exchange for loyalty is happening in the corridors of Afghan presidential palace today.

This dependence has made Afghanistan and its multiethnic mosaic social structure vulnerable to political manipulation and the biggest threat to its national security and long term stability. Almost all of the ethnic and religious groups in Afghanistan are in various ways politically and economically supported by regional countries.

For Afghanistan to preserve its political sovereignty in the true sense of the word, it has to find a sustainable source of financial revenue and a comparative advantage. Political sovereignty without financial independence have no meaning. So long as Afghanistan remains a financially dependent state, it will remain unstable and vulnerable to regional proxy wars.

The Vicious Cycle of Traps: The Crisis of Governance and Statesmanship

Afghanistan since its establishments as an independent state has been consistently tangled in four traps of poverty, poor governance, geographical limitation and internal conflicts. Each of these traps have been reinforcing each other.

Throughout history, Afghan statesmen have either completely monopolized power or wealth or been struggling for the control of the country through quelling internal rebellions under various banners and causes. This has given the little time to think strategically about their country and its vision and future.

The first Afghan statesmen who rose to fame due to his 5 year plans and presenting the first vision of governance, economic development in addition to addressing internal conflicts and the geographic limitations of the country was Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan, who fell out with his communist allies and was brutally murdered inside the presidential palace in Kabul. Most other governments have either been too preoccupied with preserving their power or fighting for control of the rest of the country.

In essence, the country has been in some sort of war since its establishment as an independent state. It has suffered from a crisis of governance and leadership and the traps have only been pushing Afghanistan deeper and deeper into a state of crisis.

From Vicious Cycle to Virtuous Cycle: Hard Decisions to Make for Afghanistan

In order to reverse this historical trend and address the four traps of poverty, bad governance, geographical limitation, and internal conflicts, Afghan statesmen and policymakers will have to make some very hard choices and bring Afghanistan out of this vicious cycle and put into a virtuous cycle of stability and peace. Some of these hard decision require statesmanship, courage combined with a vision and farsight for the country.

To address these four traps, Afghan statesmen and policy makers will have to take the following three vital steps:

1. Forge a national agenda and broad based consensus across all political parties and ethnic groups on key national interests, priorities and threats of the country. Afghanistan should start a national movement of internal rejuvenation and national awakening. Afghanistan will only prosper at a time when its leadership and commoners understand that the only way to stability is through the hardwork and unity of Afghans and its neighbors. Nobody else can hand in peace and stability to Afghanistan but the Afghans themselves with their neighbors.
2. Afghanistan will have to reach a fundamental agreement with its neighbors, particularly Pakistan and Iran. In return for safeguarding their legitimate interests in Afghanistan, they will stop engaging in interference and proxy warfare in the country. This can be done through a long process of honest and direct diplomatic and bilateral negotiations.
3. Finally, without a sustainable indigenous economy and financial self-reliance, Afghanistan cannot become a truly sovereign state. Financial dependence and economic vulnerabilities will continue to make Afghanistan and various Afghan ethnic groups prone to political manipulation and military sabotage by regional players and criminal networks.

A Framework for Managing Regional and Global Interests

When it comes to the management of regional interests in Afghanistan, there are three schools of thought which, in some cases, pursue complementary as well as contradictory views.

The proponents of the first view opine that Afghanistan like many other countries with a vital geostrategic location, should take advantage of these rivalries to build itself. This means that through wise leadership and smart diplomacy just like Pakistan, Afghanistan can exploit the geopolitical vulnerabilities of its allies and neighbors and in return get the required economic and military assistance to build its economy and military capabilities. This is very hard under the current circumstances

The proponents of the second view are supporting that Afghanistan should remain a neutral state and give vital guarantees to its neighbors and other major powers that its soil will not be used against one or several of its neighbors. This policy has been pursued time and again by Afghan statesmen and policy makers, but it has not paid much dividend except it kept the country weakened and divided.

Lastly, proponents of the third view advocate that Afghanistan should ally itself with one of the major global powers (the United States, China, or Russia). Therefore, by obtaining the required security and economic guarantees, Afghanistan can serve as the frontline state in ensuring its interests through the pursuit of the interests of the allied power.

All of the above options require a broadly-based, strong government in Kabul with a long-term view of its interests. Afghanistan will sooner or later have to make some tough decisions when it comes to its survival and long term interests or get dumped as it often does into the dark pages of history.

Throughout history, Afghan political leaders and monarchs have fallen prey to great power politics and regional proxy wars due to their failure to manage the geopolitical and strategic interests of various regional and global powers in its soil. But this time the stakes are higher and involves the survival of the Afghan state. A combination of smart leadership, active diplomacy and strong governance will enable Afghanistan to swim the tides.

A Game as Old as Empire: The Return of Proxy Wars in Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Essentially, the Afghan national security apparatus requires a significant reorganization. Afghanistan’s existing military and security architecture must be reconfigured and restructured to accommodate former Taliban fighters and commanders, given the drastic changes that will come to the country’s threat environment once the Taliban give up the fight and agree to a peace deal. This could be either vertical or horizontal integration of individuals, groups, or units of Taliban commanders and fighters within Afghanistan’s existing military, civilian, and political institutions.

Many senior and mid-level Taliban commanders would want to join leadership roles in the Afghan army and police whereas their foot soldiers would like to join the Afghan security forces en masse. This will require a detailed roadmap outlining the ways and means of military integration. More importantly, such an integration roadmap should serve as a guarantor and accelerator for the long-term sustainability and resilience of any peace deal.

The Afghan Taliban is estimated to have between 60,000 and 100,000 fighters under the leadership of mutually exclusive operational commanders, along with mutually dependent political factions within the group, and a highly centralized chain of command but decentralized control and decision-making systems, which gives considerable levy and authority to local commanders to decide routine day-to-day operations in consultation with Taliban shadow administration officials (i.e. governors). This number fluctuates, peaking during the summer months, with seasonal fighters and volunteers coming from Pakistani madrasas to fight in Afghanistan. Numbers are at their lowest during the winter months, due to harsh weather conditions and logistical hurdles.

The Afghan government estimates that one-third of these fighters are foreign terrorist fighters who fight under the Taliban umbrella—these are global, regional and Pakistani terror outfits such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, ETIM, IMU and LeT among others. These fighters are vital for Taliban finances, logistics and provide sophisticated explosive making expertise. Therefore, any peace deal at the outset should require the Taliban to break ties with these terror outfits and foreign terrorist fighters. A challenging task which Taliban are yet to show the resolve and determination to undertake.

The integration of over 100,000 fighters and commanders into military and civilian life is going to be a daunting and fragile task, which would require delicate management and sharp political negotiation skills with both Afghan ownership alongside third-party foreign oversight—preferably from the United Nations.

Afghanistan is no stranger to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants into military and civilian life. Back in 2004, the Afghan New Beginning Program (ANBP) administered through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) assisted in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of thousands of former mujahidin and combatants but with mixed results. It was followed by the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Group (DIAG) program which again had mixed results given lack of Afghan ownership and a strong presence of warlords within the Afghan security and military institutions.

Any military integration of the Afghan Taliban within the ranks of the Afghan military and security institutions would have to be defined within the limits of the type and structure of the new state and subsequently what kind of a security structure and organization would be agreed upon by all sides of the conflict. Furthermore, international experience especially in Africa and South Asia shows that after a peace deal certain countries have opted to downsize the number of their security forces given the new threat environment and have opened up space through reservation and quota within the shrinked security structure for the combatants and their commanders to become apart of the new security and military apparatus.

Military integration of the Taliban fighters and commanders within any new or existing military and security architecture would require a multi-year phased linear approach under the ownership and management of Afghans with the technical assistance of a third party ie the United Nations (UN) with political plus financial support of the United States and its NATO allies as they draw down their troops and redirect a fraction of that cost towards financing the budget required to reintegrate Taliban combatants and commanders in the Afghan military and civilian life.

The Approach

International experience shows that there are mainly three approaches to military integration. Albeit, Afghan history can also guide us in this regard and has its own versions of military integration after the fall of the communist regime in the 1990s and later in early 2000 during the fall of the Taliban regime – both of which were more institutional cleansing than military integration. 

The three military integration models are: 

1. A consent-based approach, where a comprehensive negotiated settlement of the conflict is reached between the warring parties and the government forces absorb the combatants within its ranks and/or the two forces from the different warring parties merge and constitute a brand new single national security force. 
2. A complete demobilization model, where the government downsizes its forces but does not integrate combatants into the national security forces.
3. A coercive model of peace building, where forced disarmament and demobilization of the armed rebels takes places with external assistance (i.e., UN mandated forces).

In all these models—the most feasible one for the Afghan case is the consent based model whereas the ANDSF is resized based on the new threat environment and security landscape and the Taliban commanders and fighters are accommodation across all the level of ANDSF through a quota and reservation system.

The Prospects

In the event of a comprehensive deal with the Afghan Taliban – military integration will inevitably be part and parcel of any peace deal. The foundational questions which needs to be tackled at the outset of any peace deal will be: what will be the size and shape of the new security and military architecture of Afghanistan in view of the new security environment and based on what model (i.e. NATO or non-NATO military model) as well as the future relationship of the Taliban with the United States and its allies. These foundational questions will determine the size, scope and sustainability of the future Afghan military and security forces of which the newly demobilized Taliban fighters and commanders will be an integral part of it. 

Subsequently, the Taliban can be integrated at three levels, with senior commanders at the top, mid-level commanders in the middle, with foot soldiers making up the base. Integration can be done individually, in groups, or unit integration at the field level. Senior and mid-level Taliban commanders would expect positions of influence within or outside of the Afghan military and security services. This can be approached through a bottom–up field level integration at the division or corp level or be undertaken through individual negotiations with Taliban military leaders through a screening and filtering mechanism.

Much will also depend on the size of the new Afghan military and their operational priorities in view of the rise of Daesh and emergence of Taliban splinter groups and criminal outfits post Taliban peace deal who would split from the Taliban chain of command and carry on the fight in pursuit of their own political and business agendas.

Under such such circumstances—in the interim—the Afghan government and its allies will have to integrate Taliban rank and file within the existing ANDSF size and structure and then through a roadmap transform and downsize ANDSF into a more affordable and sustainable force. This interim integration could be done through center and field level integration (i.e., integrating Taliban units to various geographical army corps across the country and integrate senior Taliban commanders in Kabul HQ).

In the long run – the Afghan government together with its allies, will also have to decide how many professional armed forces and how many auxiliary local forces they need for securing the country. This could provide an opportunity for Afghans and their NATO allies where the existing army could be kept as a professional force, albeit significantly downsized, whereas the Taliban forces with some exception could be added as auxiliary local forces given their vast presence in the country side to complement the security work of the newly reorganized Afghan army.

Furthermore, the Taliban commanders and fighters will need to go through sensitization programs as well as short and long-term training courses plus attend joint exercises with the Afghan forces to promote unity in the force. This will help cohesiveness and efficiency within the command and control structure of the newly reorganized and reconfigured Afghan military.

The Challenges

Naturally, with the military integration of the Afghan Taliban within the security infrastructure of Afghanistan comes many sets of political, military, institutional, cultural, financial and budgetary challenges. In fragile countries such as Afghanistan, the biggest of them all will be the political challenge – wherein both sides of the conflict remain committed and resilient regardless of the change in personalities and leaders to the agreed terms of the peace deal and do not use military force as a means of political leverage on each other.

Most of the peace deals and military integration plans fail because one side renege on their commitments and start using military force as a political leverage. Second, comes the institutional absorption capacity to accept change and not to resist the integration of the Taliban commanders and fighters within their ranks.

This is followed by the management and financial requirements which is the least of our worries since a third party (i.e. the UN with the help of the international community) will assist in providing the technical expertise and raise funds to finance the budgetary requirements of the peace deal and military integration plan.

In the case of Afghanistan, the two top challenges will be political resilience and institutional capacity to transform and accommodate the newly integrated Taliban commanders and fighters. The rest can be managed.

The Mechanism

Based on international best practices, there are normally two internationally recognized mechanisms through which Taliban fighters and commanders can be integrated within the rank and file of Afghan forces: (a) a temporary parallel co-existence mechanism until full integration happens which is normally referred to as interim security arrangement; and (b) immediate reintegration whereas forces are immediately disarmed and demobilized by individuals, groups and units sometimes keeping the entire command and control structure intact.

Both mechanisms have their pros and cons, under the interim security arrangement both forces co-exist within their geographies under their control but in a cooperative manner (i.e. ceasing hostilities providing security and law enforcement services to their respective areas eventually merged into one force). This mechanism is a recent phenomenon due to size and institutional absorption capacity issues. Many military integration and DDR processes have failed because it has stalled due to institutional capacity issues and political infightings. Therefore, an interim period is envisioned whereas the forces are integrated in instalments over a period of time while both forces co-exist with each other in a cooperative manner conducting joint patrols, joint trainings and exercises. This will assist in better integration and merger of the two forces.

The immediate mobilization mechanism is doable only when the size of the opposing warring parties are small and the institutional absorption capacity in the military apparatus of the country is high with a firm political will and adequate financial resources at hand. This is normally the classic method of military integration whereas the armed rebels are disarmed and demobilized immediately and reintegrated within the government security forces through an elaborate screening, training and professionalization process.

The Way Forward

For any peace deal to succeed in a complex case environment such as Afghanistan, it is imperative that it has to have a robust military integration roadmap for integrating Taliban fighters and commanders within the existing or a new Afghan military and security apparatus. This means Afghans together with their international partners will need to reassess their force size, posture, composition and operational readiness in view of the new challenges that would emerge in the event of a post peace deal with the Taliban.

The Taliban leadership will also have to evaluate and make certain key decisions such as what kind of an army and police they envision for Afghanistan? How do they intend to break their ties and fight foreign terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, LeT, and others, as well as to define their long-term relations with the United States and its allies?

Finally, the United States and its allies must define what, when, how, and under what circumstances they will continue assisting post-peace deal Afghan security forces reconstituted and reorganized with Taliban commanders within its ranks?

All of the above decisions will have a significant bearing over the success and failure of any potential military integration plan for the Taliban commanders and fighters within the ranks of the Afghan security forces.

Frenemies: Prospects and Challenges for the Military Integration of the Taliban into the Afghan Security Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

Of the victims, thirty-five were citizens of foreign states. According to Sri Lankan authorities, multiple terrorists attacked large hotels and Christian churches with explosives. Sri Lankan security services have arrested several dozen people.

Political violence has affected Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) since the country re-established itself as a republic in 1971.  Sri Lanka was engaged in a decades-long civil war until 2009, the end-product of the country’s colonial and post-colonial oppressive social and economic policies. These policies constrained the rights of the Tamil population, a Hindu minority group. The Tamil people felt that they were politically unrepresented and were increasingly marginalized in Sri Lankan society.

In 1972, when Ceylon changed its name to Sri Lanka, established the state as a republic, and announced that the official religion would be Buddhism, the Tamil began peacefully protesting against the government’s policies. As time went on, however, Tamil armed resistance groups began to emerge. These groups employed terrorist tactics during what would become a bloody civil war, characterized by large-scale human rights violations and the deaths of over 100,000 people.

Today, the situation in Sri Lanka is different.

Throughout Southeast Asia, acts of violence are primarily carried out by jihadist groups and Islamic separatist movements. Christians are increasingly targeted by both long-standing terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, and groups founded more recently, such as ISIS (Daesh).  Al-Qaeda and ISIS are engaged in a competition for influence and leadership within the broader region, one that is illustrative of the evolving nature of jihadist insurgencies in the region. 

Although ISIS no longer controls territory in Syria and Iraq, the group’s increasingly asymmetric nature and the propaganda disseminated by the group are now affecting Southeast Asian states like Indonesia and the  Philippines, which governments are having difficulty countering. Furthermore, there is increasing concern over the threat posed by foreign fighters returning to their country of origin, as it could have a profound impact on local conflicts. In Sri Lanka, for instance, ISIS didn’t radicalize many people. However, the group’s propaganda intersects with that of other jihadist militant groups, increasing the overall terrorist threat in Sri Lanka, as tensions and rivalries among various jihadist factions make the security landscape inherently more complex.

ISIS claimed responsibility for the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings in Sri Lanka, as evidence emerged of the perpetrators’ sophisticated management and organizational capabilities, along with their use of known jihadi tactics. The government accused the National Thowheeth Jama’ath of carrying out the attacks with foreign support, which merits closer scrutiny. Not only did the Easter bombings occur on the tenth anniversary of the Tamil’s defeat by Sri Lankan government forces, but the National Thowheeth Jama’ath has historically carried out acts of vandalism rather than terrorism. If the group was, in fact, responsible for the Easter Sunday bombings, their use of explosives and suicide bombers indicates a substantial qualitative leap in terms of their capabilities. It’s essential that the ongoing investigation clarifies the National Thoweeth Jama’ath’s involvement. 

Furthermore, the attacks were the result of an intelligence failure, according to Sri Lankan authorities. Pujith Jayasundara, a senior Sri Lankan government official, reportedly received a warning from a foreign intelligence service concerning a possible terrorist attack against Christian churches in the country and issued a warning. Unfortunately, the information failed to reach policymakers in time, according to telecommunications Minister Harin Fernando.

Breaking the nexus between violent separatists and jihadist groups.

Should the National Thowheeth Jama’ath be proven to be responsible for the attacks, it will serve as further proof that violent acts by small numbers of jihadist militants can gravely threaten a country’s national security and socio-economic interests, mainly if tourism is a significant economic driver. Domestic and regional cooperation between police and intelligence services urgently needs to improve as it’s becoming easier and easier for local militants and smaller groups to connect across borders to disseminate instructions, training, and logistics information from larger terrorist organizations.

In Southeast Asia, a region deeply affected by internal conflicts, the growth of violent jihadist and separatist movements significantly impacts both political and social stability. Separatist movements are inherently a threat to national security, especially as separatism and the desire for recognition are increasingly connected with ethnonationalist and jihadist movements. Existing gaps in counter-terrorism efforts only serve to deepen the increasing interconnection and interdependence of jihadist and separatist movements.

Although local separatist movements maintain different strategies and objectives from both global and localized jihadist groups, many employ transnational jihadist rhetoric and propaganda to achieve religious-political goals. Separatist groups may use jihadist tactics for their attacks because they are hard to counter and have the desired impact on local and international media outlets. It is critical that Southeast Asian re-adapt their counter-terrorism efforts to break the nexus between political insurgency and jihadism—especially now that well-trained and experienced militants are returning home from Syria and Iraq.

Sri Lanka: Jihadism and Separatism in an Ethnically-Divided Country was originally published on Global Security Review.

This article is a continuation of a previous analysis of the Pulwama attack that examined how the attack and the way in which India responded threatened South Asian security. 

Following a terrorist attack on an Indian security forces convoy in Pulwama, Kashmir, India and Pakistan engaged in airstrikes, dogfights and cross-border shelling along the Line of Control (LoC). Since their independence and partition in 1947, India and Pakistan have fought several wars and low-intensity conflicts.

There was, however, an aspect of this latest incident that changed the game and had potentially catastrophic consequences: both states are nuclear powers. Excluding the 1999 Kargil War, this is the only time in history that nuclear powers have attacked each other. Possibly more significant is that India displayed a willingness to strike targets in mainland Pakistani territory—outside of Kashmir.

Overview

It started when the Indian Air Force (IAF) struck what it claimed to be a Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) terrorist camp in the town of Balakot in Pakistan—the first time an Indian aircraft violated Pakistani airspace since the War of 1971. Pakistan, in response, shot down an Indian jet and captured its pilot, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman.

To de-escalate, Pakistan released the pilot within forty-eight hours of detaining him. India’s response was to unleash a barrage of shelling across the LoC. All the while, an aggressively jingoistic Indian media apparatus was disseminating information that was inconsistent, confusing or outrightly false. In some reports, details would be altered within just a few hours.

At the time of writing, both countries seem to have stood down and ceased hostilities. Many would call this a stroke of luck, considering the cataclysmic ramifications of further escalation. Lessons must be learned by both sides to prevent a situation like this happening again. Such a crisis could spin wildly out of control, threatening the security of Southeast Asia—and the world.

Lessons for India

Arguably, India has the most to learn. Prime Minister Narendra Modi took a significant gamble ordering the initial strikes in Balakot. Driven by revenge for the Pulwama Attack, Modi assumed that appearing tough on Pakistani-sponsored terrorism, while securitizing the province of Kashmir, would win him votes in April’s Indian elections, a dangerous gamble considering both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers.

That assumption has since been shattered, as 21 opposition parties, led by Rahul Gandhi’s Congress Party, have banded together to oppose Indian military action in Pakistan. Alongside this twenty one-party alliance, prominent Indians have taken to social media to express their dissatisfaction at the ongoing military operation, criticizing the Indian government and mass media for acting irrationally and fostering a vitriolic nationalism throughout the country and broader Indian diaspora. 

Another lesson to learn is how the Indian media covers Pakistan, and by extension counter-terrorism operations like the Balakot strike. News coverage was inconsistent at best and toxic at its worst. Information disseminated was either debunked within hours or fabricated completely, the most prominent example being Indian coverage of the initial Balakot strike.

Indian media outlets declared that over 300 JeM militants had been killed. Within a few hours, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR)—the Pakistani military’s media wing—had posted images of the bomb site on Twitter. Later confirmed by satellite, the images showed that Indian ordnance fell on a mostly uninhabited forest far from the intended target.

A debate has sparked whether Indian ordnance hit uninhabited territory with the purpose of provoking a Pakistani response, or if there was indeed a camp and the weapons simply missed; odd considering they were state-of-the-art Israeli SPICE bombs. Other dubious claims include those regarding Pakistani F-16 fighter jets being shot down by Indian MiGs, which were disproven by Indian experts in television studios. Even the release of Abhinandan was treated as the result of Pakistani weakness rather than a genuine attempt to de-escalate the crisis.

By this point, it became clear that the Indian narrative—and indeed Modi’s government—had lost credibility within a matter of hours. What had started as a pre-emptive response to terrorist groups in Pakistan had quickly descended into a military operation within the sovereign airspace of another state. It also became evident that India had overlooked the fact that both countries possess nuclear weapons, so de-escalation was in the interest of both countries.

The BJP government stands to learn a great deal from the events of that week. Given the lack of conclusive evidence of Pakistani involvement in the Pulwama attack, it is clear that the focus must be on terrorist networks within Kashmir rather than fomenting nationalistic fervor and attacking another country. Pulwama showed that Kashmir is experiencing a homegrown terrorist movement and that India must shift its focus to performing counterinsurgency (COIN) rather than blaming its neighbor for each incident as a knee-jerk response.

COIN, however, can only work with the support of the Kashmiris. Achieving this means giving Kashmiris a forum to air grievances and express any desire for self-determination. Making concessions of this nature will reduce terrorism and consequently stabilize the region—even at the expense of Indian prestige.

Lessons for Pakistan

Modi’s Pakistani counterpart, Prime Minister Imran Khan, took a far more reasonable and—according to some commentators—“mature” approach to the conflict, prioritizing peace and de-escalation over victory. This, coupled with the release of the Indian pilot, earned him praise from within Pakistan and from the wider international community. Some have gone as far as advocating that Khan be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his handling of the issue.

Restraint and sensibility are conducive to effective Pakistani state policy, as opposed than the nationalistic belligerence exhibited by the Indian government. Thus, Khan should adopt sensible approaches to future policy initiatives outside of security.

However, Khan needs to seriously address the elephant in the room: the presence of terrorist groups like JeM operating or based within Pakistan. The presence of JeM and other Kashmiri militant and terrorist groups within Pakistan has been a key issue in Indian-Pakistani Relations since the 1980s. These groups have been responsible for some of the deadliest attacks on Indian soil, such as the 2008 Mumbai attacks and the 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament.

Though Pakistan has had no direct involvement in these events, their inability to target and apprehend these groups and their leadership, or hand them over to India, has contributed to poor relations and the modus operandi of India blaming Pakistan for any Jihadist terrorist attack in its territory. This cannot continue, and something must be done.

Since 2014, Pakistan’s counterterrorism apparatus has proven effective, having managed the defeat, split, and expulsion of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and established a condition of security nationwide. Monitoring or tracking terrorist groups like JeM is entirely feasible and an intuitive approach to ensuring Pakistan’s national security.

As of April 2019, Khan has implemented wide-ranging crackdowns to limit the ability of these groups to operate, both within Kashmir and Pakistan. Should this harder-line policy prove effective, it could lead to a reduction in the capability of armed groups to carry out acts of terrorism on either side of the LoC. Only time will tell if these initiatives are successful.

Read Part One of The Pulwama Incident: The Razor’s Edge

The Pulwama Incident Part Two: Pakistan and India Have Much to Learn was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Pulwama bombings in Kashmir on February 14^th, 2019 sent shockwaves throughout South Asia. An unstable and tense region, to begin with, the bombing brought about greater instability and tension between the region’s two leading powers: India and Pakistan. The terrorist attack nearly brought about a catastrophically destructive event.

What happened?

On February 14th, a car laden with explosives was driven into a Central Reserve Police Force (CPRF) convoy near the town of Pulwama in Kashmir. The bomber, later identified as 20-year-old Aadil Dar, had recently joined the Pakistan-based terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), who claimed responsibility for the attack, and the deaths of 40 Indian policemen—the deadliest terrorist attack in Kashmir to date. Kashmir is no stranger to terrorism, nor Pakistan and India struggling over it, as control of the mountainous province has been a key bone of contention between the two nuclear-armed states since their independence in 1947.

Within hours of the attack, Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi leveled blame for the attack on Pakistan and declared them responsible for the bombing. Pakistan denied any involvement, even though JeM is based in the Pakistani city of Bahawalpur. The international community has since weighed in, condemning Pakistan and its involvement in supporting terrorist groups in Kashmir. In the week following the raid, Indian security forces conducted raids on JeM cells and operatives in Kashmir, resulting in the death of the attack’s alleged mastermind, known as Kamran.

Despite finding and killing those behind the attacks, the accusations set in motion a chain of events that raised tensions between the two states to their highest in recent times, even resulting in military action. On February 26^th, Indian Air Force (IAF) planes violated Pakistani airspace to conduct air raids, bombing what it claimed to be a JeM camp in the Pakistani-Kashmir town of Balakot. 

This was the first time an Indian aircraft violated Pakistan’s airspace since 1971, and the first instance in which nuclear-armed nations have bombed each other. From that day, conflict and tensions between the two escalated, to the point where Pakistan shot down and captured an IAF pilot, Wing Commander Abhinanadan Varthaman, who was subsequently released on March 1^st. Since that week, there has been mutual shelling from both sides of the Line of Control (LoC).

This is incredibly problematic for maintaining South Asian Security at large, mostly because there is little conclusive evidence that Pakistan was directly involved in the Pulwama Bombing, but more so because of the presence of nuclear weapons and a history of interstate warfare in the region. The risk this poses cannot be understated, as if both states were to use their nuclear weapons, it would bring about the end of modern civilization through famine and the spread of radioactive fallout. 

Instability and its Effects

There is an element of truth to the accusations laid unto Pakistan supporting terrorist groups in Kashmir. Since the 1980s, the Pakistani security apparatus has funded mujahideen and Jihadist insurgent groups in Afghanistan. Initially, this was to counteract the Soviet Union when they invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Once they withdrew in 1989, these mujahideen had no conflict left to fight, until they declared jihad on India, and went to fight them in Kashmir.

Groups responsible for attacks in India, such as JeM, have been banned within Pakistan and their membership and leaders arrested, more intensely since Khan announced a recent string of crackdowns in response to almost being put on the Financial Action Task Force “grey list”, a list of countries that have engaged in money laundering and terrorist financing, which India has accused Pakistan of doing. To be put on the list would lead to increased costs for money transfers and running businesses, severely damaging Pakistan’s already weak economy.

However, India has also contributed to the condition of insecurity experienced since February 14^th, through blaming Pakistan for the attacks without providing evidence or intelligence, and more recently the use of air raids. Arguably, this posture is due to General Elections in April, with the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Government aiming to use harsh action on Pakistan and Kashmir to secure votes.

In the week following the bombing, media focus on blaming Pakistan ended up mainly ignoring that the attack was a textbook case of homegrown terrorism. Dar was a Kashmiri who was radicalized by other groups before he joined JeM, and according to officials in the Indian Military, the explosives were locally sourced. The vehicle used to attack the Indian convoy was Indian and had changed hands several times within Indian territory. This shows that a Kashmiri insurgency is now self-sufficient, and no longer needs Pakistani support to conduct operations. 

It also shows that India needs to enact a more nuanced counterinsurgency strategy to deal with the issue, rather than dragnet crackdowns and mass arrests. Mistreatment and human rights violations have led to Pakistani-sponsored terrorism in the 1980s mutating into the more homegrown insurgent campaign today. To blame Pakistan and subsequently conduct strikes on targets on their soil is an extremely dangerous and counterintuitive tactic, considering the minuscule margins for error associated with nuclear weaponry.

The attack has had the most significant impact on Kashmiri Muslims throughout India, however. Kashmiri students have been forced to leave their universities, and others have been victims of Islamophobic abuse or forced into hiding following wide-scale government-led crackdowns across the country.

Kashmiri militants have used violence in response to repressive measures taken out by Indian security forces and police against Kashmiri protesters, such as the use of pellet rifles to disperse protests, which happens to be a violation of human rights and international law. This latest incident has not made life any easier for them, who have been protesting for independence since 1948, though these became far more violent in 2016. It also creates an environment ideal to radicalize disenfranchised Kashmiris, giving Kashmiri militant and Jihadist groups more fighters. It is a vicious cycle, one that can be closed through India entertaining the Kashmiri desire for self-determination and giving them a forum to air their grievances.

Lessons to be Learned

Pakistan and India stood at the precipice and stared down the barrel of a nuclear war. Thankfully, neither side escalated further, and both appear to have stood down for the most part, except for drone flights and air patrols of the LoC and the international border. There are lessons that both sides need to learn though, especially considering the Kashmir crisis.

Read Part Two of the Pulwama Incident: Pakistan and India Have Much to Learn

The Pulwama Incident Part One: The Razor’s Edge was originally published on Global Security Review.

What’s Happening?

As part of a renewed pushback against Chinese influence, India announced in February that it would allocate $361 million for aid to the Maldives, a fourfold increase from 2018-19.

Key Insights

• Beijing and New Delhi are competing for influence throughout the Indian Ocean, an area which has traditionally been a part of India’s sphere of influence but has recently seen a surge of Chinese economic and military activity.
• Indian Ocean countries such as the Maldives owe a substantial debt to China; New Delhi worries that debt-trap diplomacy could lead to Chinese military bases in the region.
• India will bolster its economic and military efforts in its near abroad while continuing to call on like-minded allies to play a larger role in countering Chinese influence in the region.

The Maldives: Trouble in Paradise an Opportunity for India

Dispensing foreign aid is hardly the primary concern of Indian policymakers. Faced with debilitating poverty levels, the South Asian nation still receives aid from a number of countries such as the UK and the US. Yet the announcement of a new foreign aid component for the 2019-2020 budget has triggered the interest of Indian foreign policy pundits because of one notable outlier. Compared to 2018-2019, aid to the Maldives has seen a 460% increase, with $361 million being allocated to the island nation. The budget boost follows New Delhi’s declaration in December 2018 that it would provide $1.4 billion in financial assistance to Malé, after a meeting between Maldives President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Recent political upheaval in the Maldives provides the backdrop for these decisions. The newly elected Solih defeated pro-China authoritarian leader Abdulla Yameen in a surprise election result in October 2018. Solih’s victory was clearly a welcome relief for politicians in New Delhi who described the victory as a ‘triumph of democratic forces’.

During Yameen’s five-year rule, the Maldives strengthened ties with China, solidifying a free trade deal and welcoming considerable investment while sidelining Indian concerns over the relationship. Yet the spending spree was no free lunch. The Maldives accumulated between $1.5 billion and $3 billion in debt to Chinese lenders due to an infrastructure construction boom. Solih is now actively trying to reduce this debt. India’s financial assistance will go a long way towards alleviating Malé’s financial distress. It also represents New Delhi’s intention to forge closer ties with neighboring countries and signals a broader pivot back to the Indian Ocean.

The Red Dragon in the Indian Ocean

Rather than being India’s canary in the coal mine, the Maldives represents just one aspect of China’s increasing presence across the Indian Ocean. Through its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – which India vehemently opposes – Beijing has sought to strengthen its economic and diplomatic relations with Indian Ocean nations. China sees this as a ‘win-win’ opportunity for all parties involved to enhance development and connectivity and denies any form of nefarious motive behind the sprawling scheme. Yet India doesn’t see the BRI as wholeheartedly benign. Instead, New Delhi believes that Beijing is putting some countries in significant debt stress to gain leverage for the ultimate purpose of pursuing its own strategic aims, a concept known as  ‘debt-trap diplomacy’.

Perhaps the best-known example of Chinese debt-trap diplomacy is in Sri Lanka. Colombo built Hambantota port on the southern coast using Chinese loans that it ultimately couldn’t repay, resulting in a debt-equity swap that left the port under the control of state-owned enterprise China Merchants Group on a 99-year lease. The fear for Indian policymakers is that this port will eventually be used as a military facility for Chinese naval vessels, as part of a scheme to ultimately establish a ‘String of Pearls’ – a series of Chinese military bases across the Indian Ocean – that would threaten India’s lines of communication and ability to project force in the event of a military crisis.

China’s opening of a military base in Djibouti in 2017, its operation of the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, and its increased naval presence throughout the Indian Ocean to protect sea lines of communication and enhance anti-piracy efforts are perceived by India to be a threatening combination. Coupled with reports that the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are all facing high BRI-related debt distress, India is extremely concerned that these countries could become beholden to China’s will in the future.

Battles for Influence, Calls for Allies

Perceptions of China have soured in the Maldives since Solih came to power. The cheap loan binge by former president Yameen has come to an end and the hangover is starting to set in. Solih has already pledged to pull out of the free trade deal with China, claiming that deal was ‘very one-sided’.

The competition for influence is unlikely to be confined to the Maldives, with Sri Lanka on the radar for both nations. Rival bailout bids have been tabled for the debt-stressed country: the Reserve Bank of India agreed to a $400 million currency swap arrangement with the Central Bank of Sri Lanka in January 2019, while the Bank of China allegedly offered a $300 million loan. In this respect, Sri Lanka presumably welcomes competition from the bigger powers if it results in a better outcome for debt reduction, and will more than likely hedge between the two nations rather than simply picking sides.

India will increasingly call on like-minded allies to play a larger role in countering Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. The French naval destroyer FNS Cassardrecently docked into a military port in Mumbai after India and France solidified a Joint Strategic Vision deal to increase co-operation between the two countries. Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne also reminded audiences at the Raisina Dialogue – a multilateral geopolitical conference held in New Delhi – that Australia remained committed to securing the Indian Ocean through close collaboration with joint naval exercises and support for regional institutions.

Expect this kind of diplomatic signaling to continue and strengthen in the future, with the possibility of a revival in more military exercises within the ‘Quad’ group, a security cooperation arrangement between the US, Japan, Australia, and India. Extra funding may also be dedicated to promoting and implementing the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, a sea corridor promoting development across the Indian Ocean and into Africa that India has developed with Japan to rival BRI.

On the flip side, China will double down somewhere that India can’t compete: Pakistan. The $62 billion China Pakistan-Economic Corridor (CPEC), with the Gwadar port as the flagship project, has come under increased scrutiny due to concerns among the new Pakistani leadership about the country’s debt levels. As other countries across the Indian Ocean begin to doubt the viability of some BRI projects, China can’t afford for its close strategic relationship with Pakistan to sour. Expect Beijing to continue pouring investments into the country. The addition of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to participate in CPEC allows China to diversify its risks whilst also strengthening its relationships with the Middle Eastern countries. More partners could join that align with China’s strategic goals, with Iran pointing out that it too had ambitions to take part.

India’s renewed influence in the Maldives shows that foreign policymakers in New Delhi are aware that for the country to remain a significant force in the Indian Ocean, they need to focus on a few key objectives. These include maintaining close ties to nearby countries by offering incentives and assistance, calling on powerful allies to support its efforts across the Indian Ocean, and also displaying independent expressions of force projection. The ensuing competition with China over influence in the Indian Ocean will likely only intensify over the coming months and years.

New Delhi’s Foreign Policy in the Indian Ocean was originally published on Global Security Review.

In January 2019—in a landmark turn of events—the Supreme Court of Pakistan acquitted and ordered the immediate release of Aasia Bibi, a Christian woman accused of blasphemy and placed on death row in 2010. While her release was cause for celebration among Pakistan’s political liberals, it greatly angered religious conservatives and those on the extreme right-wing of Pakistan’s political spectrum. 

Clerics like Khadim Hussain Rizvi and his Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP) party started demonstrating by blocking roads in Pakistan’s major cities and paralyzing the country, as well as making calls to extremist elements in government and the country’s Armed Forces to mutiny and overthrow or kill judges involved in the verdict, Prime Minister Imran Khan and the Chief of Army Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa – essentially an open call for sedition. Party workers were also responsible for vandalizing and burning vehicles across the country’s urban areas.

Aasia had been jailed since 2010, on death row for violating Pakistan’s ambiguous blasphemy laws. Anyone who spoke out in support of her, who violated blasphemy laws, or simply spoke out against the laws themselves found themselves under attack from religious conservatives and right-wing extremists. Nobody was safe; in 2011 Salman Taseer, the sitting Punjab governor, was gunned in Islamabad by his bodyguard for speaking out against the court’s verdict. His assassin, Mumtaz Qadri, was hailed by the religious right as a hero. 

The laws themselves are subject to intense criticism by human rights organizations and Pakistan’s Supreme Courts. The laws are ambiguously written and open to interpretation, thus undermining the rule of law. Accusations of blasphemy are enough to warrant mob violence and vigilantism. Indeed, there is a precedent for such violence taking place, especially against minorities. 

Negotiating From a Position of Weakness

These recent events and the protests forced Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) government to enter negotiations with the protesters to end the demonstrations— a counterintuitive approach to ending the crisis while maintaining Pakistan’s internal sovereignty and security.

Khan’s government announced plans were to place Aasia on the ECL and for her case to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, all to appease the TLP while undermining the judiciary and putting her life in danger. Since those negotiations were conducted, the government denied her exit from the country, despite talks for asylum with the U.S., the U.K., and Canada. Recently, however, the petition to have the case reviewed was overturned, meaning that Aasia was (and is at the time of writing) a free woman.

The denial of safe passage for Aasia greatly angered Pakistani liberals while also putting the relatively new PTI government in a precarious position, stripping it of support and legitimacy. Concessions to extremists—let alone the mere act of entering into negotiations—are detrimental to not only the survival of the Khan’s government but to Pakistan’s national security, as well.

There is at least a decade of precedent that evidences the counterintuitive nature of negotiating with extremists. Doing so weakens the state and empowers extremists and militants. To fulfill the demands of extremists is to invite further challenge, which, in turn, requires further concessions to resolve. 

Khan entered into negotiations on the back foot; he approached the TLP to convince them to cease demonstrations, as the blocking of major roads in Karachi and other big cities had paralyzed the country and would adversely impact Pakistan’s already weak economy. Khan was negotiating from a position of weakness, as he perceived the deal as a political necessity instead of restoring social order.

Militant Groups Rarely, if Ever, Uphold Their End of the Deal

This is not the first time the state has attempted negotiation out of necessity. The Swat Agreement is probably the most notable instance of state capitulation in Pakistan’s history. The agreement, signed in April 2009, essentially handed control of the Swat Valley over to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), to induce the group to cease hostilities and terrorist attacks. 

The terms of the agreement allowed the TTP, led by Maulana Fazlullah, to set up Sharia courts within the areas of Swat and Malakand, from where the state had agreed to withdraw its troops. Both sides got what they wanted, and a short cessation of hostilities was observed, with emphasis on the word “short.” By mid-April (the same month the agreement was signed), the TTP had forcibly taken over a police station in Swat, breaking the terms of the deal.

The issue with negotiating with non-state actors in Pakistan merely is that it is not possible to bind the militants to the terms of an agreement. They are not a state agency, nor is there any overarching authority governing their actions. Though the TLP are not militants or terrorists, they violate the function of the state by blocking major roads, therefore obstructing commerce, policing, and the public’s general movement. 

Alongside their blockade, TLP followers and workers were seen vandalizing cars and public transport, a clear violation of the Pakistan Penal Code. Given this behavior and based on the TLP’s historical failure to follow through on promises, Khan shouldn’t have entered into negotiations in the first place. 

Negotiation, in this instance, is a poor strategy given the nature of the TLP as an organization. To understand why, one must look at the ideology of the TLP and the teachings of Barelvi Islam. Like Deobandism, Barelviism was developed in India in the 19^th Century. However, unlike Deobandism, there is little to no influence from Salafism or Wahabbism.

The TLP and other Barelvi groups do not share the aims of Deobandi extremist groups like the TTP, such as implementing Sharia Law or creation of a new Islamic state. Barelvis instead preach the prophethood and finality of Muhammad (PBUH). This is a problem.

The Influence of Barelvi Islam on Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan

The TLP and extremist Barelvi preachers can reach and influence more people than their Deobandi counterparts. The TTP’s goal of implementing Sharia law doesn’t resonate with all Muslims in Pakistan, whereas merely preaching about the Prophet will resonate with the core beliefs of a much larger segment of Muslims in Pakistan. This, coupled with the TLP’s hardline anti-Ahmadi and blasphemy-related rhetoric has created a situation where increasing numbers of people are influenced to hold negative views towards Ahmadis and engage in vigilantism against accused blasphemers.

The Barelvi ideology resonates with a large proportion of Muslims and reaches a large population throughout the Indian subcontinent. Because of this, religious minorities are more likely to be subjected to violence, harassment, and discrimination. From a strategic communications perspective, the immense size of the target audience presents a high risk to security in Southeast Asia, as there are more Muslims in the Indian subcontinent than in the Middle East and North Africa.

Negotiation with extremists, violent or otherwise, empowers such groups and harms national security. By negotiating with the TLP, Khan is enabling it and similar groups to engage in extrajudicial murder, terrorism, and a wide range of other criminal activity. Because of the scale of audience that could potentially be influenced by extremist messaging, such groups pose a threat to the long-term security of Pakistan and the broader region.

Negotiating With Extremists Threatens Pakistan’s National Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

Many countries, both regional and global powers, are working in Afghanistan to secure their interests in Southeast Asia. Afghanistan’s strategic location is of substantial value for India; increased and ongoing engagement in the country by India is likely.   India’s foreign policy goals are centered on enhancing India’s economic and political influence in Asia and around the world.  For instance, India’s long-term economic development will be assured if trade corridors are opened to connect India with Central Asian countries, and ultimately Europe through Afghanistan. This economic growth, in turn, will support increased Indian political influence throughout Southeast and Central Asia. Ensuring pro-Indian governments and sustained internal stability in Afghanistan are critical factors in cementing Indian regional hegemony.

India has been aggressively investing in the Middle East and Central Asia, with some of the more prominent initiatives being the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and the acquisition and development of the Chabahar port in Iran. Both examples illustrate India’s substantial economic, political, and strategic interests in the region. Ensuring the flow of oil from oil-rich Central Asian states is crucial for India’s continued economic growth. According to the Economic Times, India is the third-largest importer of crude oil in the world. Some Indian officials have categorized India’s dependency on oil imports as an economic crisis. India has been urgently seeking alternative sources of crude oil in the region, in an effort to diversify in light of sanctions imposed by the United States on the Iranian oil industry, and Saudi Arabia’s close alignment with India’s arch-rival Pakistan.

India seeks to expand commerce and trade throughout Central Asia and Eurasia. India’s growing economy requires access to substantial energy resources like those found throughout the Eurasian landmass. Indian companies see tremendous opportunity for growth, as they are well-positioned to provide Central Asian states with technology and services. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Lapis Lazuli transit corridor in the region are competing to India’s International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) that they can marginalize India’s trade in the region. The INSTC connects India to Russia, central Asian countries, Baltic, Nordic and Arctic regions. It is an Indian version of Chinese One belt One Road Initiative.

Should the United States lose a substantial amount of influence in Afghanistan, India’s goals of regional hegemony will be difficult to achieve. The U.S. expects India to play an increasingly major role in the region—particularly in Afghanistan.  India is connected with Central Asia through Iran and Afghanistan. Given that Iran is presently sanctioned by the U.S., Afghanistan is seen as a more viable option. While there are certainly discouraging factors—such as a lack of security—for heightened engagement in Afghanistan, there are a number of factors which could induce expanded regional cooperation. India is not only a major energy market for Central Asian energy, but it is also a way for smaller states to balance against China. Those countries who supply India with energy through Afghanistan could, theoretically, play a part in ensuring Afghanistan’s stabilization to facilitate efficient energy trade.

Neither Pakistan nor China is in favor of a substantive Indian presence in Afghanistan. Both countries have their own historical issues with India. From a strictly economic perspective, India’s activities in the region are seen by China as a threat to its ambitious BRI. For instance, Iran supports the INSTC as it would facilitate the export of Iranian natural gas and oil to Europe. India has also invested in port infrastructure in Iran in an apparent effort to disconnect Afghanistan from Pakistan. Additionally, India’s efforts to build hydropower dams along rivers in Afghanistan that flow into Pakistan and Iran is evidence of India’s strategic interests in the country, and will be hard-pressed to relinquish influence—even after a U.S. withdrawal.

India must extend assistance and support to the Afghan government in a way that benefits both countries to ensure India’s interests in the region. U.S. and Indian interests in Afghanistan are in alignment, as are both powers’ respective strategic goals. Therefore, it would be pragmatic for India to take advantage of the opportunities being provided by the U.S. One such opportunity being the exemption to specific Iranian sanctions granted to India by the U.S. State Department. The exemption will allow for the Indian-led development of a port in Iran as part of a transportation corridor designed to boost Afghanistan’s economy. India will have a harder time achieving its goals without support from the U.S and NATO, as Pakistan’s interference in Afghanistan, coupled with China’s growing influence in Central Asia are major obstacles to India’s dreams of hegemony.

India’s Strategy for Regional Hegemony Depends on Afghanistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Eighteen candidates have registered themselves for what is ultimately expected to be a tight race between the incumbent, President Ashraf Ghani and his charismatic former National Security Advisor, Mohammad Haneef Atmar, who has assembled a strong team of political heavyweights. Both known for their strong credentials as visionaries and leaders, they have embraced a progressive agenda for Afghanistan are anti-corruption advocates.

However, the two men have different approaches to governance; President Ghani is known to be short-tempered, impatient, and a results-based micromanager while Haneef Atmar has a reputation as a patient, strategic thinker and as a unifying figure who calls for moderation, inclusivity, and a broad-based government. Many political analysts predict that they might unite in the event of a second round given the complementary nature of their respective qualities, a fact which made them win the first presidential election of the post-Hamid Karzai era.

Afghan elections have always been chaotic but are a manifestation of how far the country has come.  Former archrivals are now settling scores at the ballot box, not with bullets. One of the highlights of the upcoming election is the candidacy of the infamous warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who once fought a bloody civil war against his rivals over the control of capital Kabul and until recently considered the Afghan government to be an illegitimate puppet. He later reconsidered and now seeks the Afghan presidency.

Furthermore, Afghanistan’s current Chief Executive Officer and former foreign minister, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, known to be a chronic campaigner, is a candidate for the fourth time. Out of five elections, Abdullah’s name has been on the ballot in four of them. This election is a clash between political titans who have different visions for a post-U.S. Afghanistan that is more self-reliant. This narrative is already present in the rhetoric used by the candidates; terms such as “Afghanization”. “ownership,” “standing on our own feet,” and “taking responsibility” are some of the buzzwords used by the candidates to signal preparation for a post-American future in Afghanistan.

What is on the Ballot?

The 2019 Afghan Presidential Elections will be a referendum on the devolution of power from the presidency to provincial units versus further centralization of power in the administration. With no constitutional justification, President Ghani has removed the Chief Executive Office, which created on the basis of the National Unity Government agreement mediated by former Secretary of State John Kerry, and has called for a strong, centralized, and united presidency. Ghani’s his main rival, Mohammad Haneef Atmar,  has pledged to further devolve the powers of the presidency by creating a third vice president position and an Executive Prime Minister office after the approval of an Afghan Loya Jirga.

Many fear that, if left unchecked, both cases pose a real danger to the governance structures and overall unity of the country. On the one hand, there is concern that a centralized state in the hands of President Ghani, given his temperament and impatience, could descend into authoritarianism. On the other side, further devolution of power and the creation of a Prime Minister’s office could pave the way for federalism and the subsequent disintegration of Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the 2019 elections represent a contest between two generations of Afghan politicians and political activists, and between two different visions of the country’s future. The first is the old generation, a mixture of jihadi-communists and royalists. The second group is the new generation of post-9/11 Afghans, mostly educated in the West and adhere to western values of democracy, freedom of speech, and fundamental human rights. The standard bearer of each of these visions will set the tone of the Afghan political landscape for many years to come.

Whoever takes the helm will have the tough job of providing security and developing a stagnant Afghan economy in light of dwindling U.S. resources and interest in Afghanistan. Furthermore, a divided and chaotic region is resulting in geopolitical spillover effects on the security and political situation in Afghanistan. Therefore, peace, security, the economy, and a balanced foreign policy will be critical priorities for the next Afghan presidential administration.

The Tyranny of Duality: Elections or Peace Process.

A new class of Afghan elites, politicians, and former officials have joined the Taliban in calling for an interim administration and the postponing the presidential election to a later date to accommodate the ongoing peace talks between the U.S. and the Afghan Taliban. Many others don’t see the peace talks and the election as mutually exclusive. Instead, they see them as complementary and parallel to one another.

Both the peace talks and presidential elections can proceed concurrently for three purposes. The first is to put pressure on the Taliban to participate in the elections. The second purpose is to demonstrate the realities of a new Afghanistan to the Taliban, and the third being that the candidates can use peace as a rallying point to boost public opinion for the peace and reconciliation process. The choice should not be between either the election or peace talks, but rather both the peace process and the Afghan presidential elections can be mutually inclusive, complementing one another.

The Crisis of Afghan Electoral Bodies

The ineffectiveness, incompetence, and politicization of Afghanistan’s electoral bodies are primarily rooted in two areas. The first is a lack of political will on the part of the Afghan government to build strong, impartial, and competent bodies. The second is the failure of the United Nations and the international community at-large to efficiently invest donor money and resources in electoral bodies to build capacity and systems.  These two factors are the key drivers of many of the problems within Afghanistan’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) today.

Successive Afghan governments and UN mission chiefs vowed to address these problems but to no avail; dozens of roadmaps and electoral reform programs were drawn up to overhaul the electoral bodies’ legal and policy frameworks significantly, but many of those plans remained on paper. Successive Afghan governments saw it as being to their benefit to keep Afghan electoral bodies weak to exploit their vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities will give a government the opportunity to machinate and engineer the results of elections.

Afghan elections are considered to be one of the costliest elections per capita in the world. Hundreds of millions of dollars are spent on the logistical and security arrangements for elections in the country. Generous donations from various donor countries provide these funds. For Afghans to be able to afford elections in future, they will have to fundamentally change the economics of their electoral system and switch to more affordable technologies. Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s electoral bodies require a significant legal, policy, and operational overhaul. At present, however, it seems impossible to carry out such a process given the limited timeframe, the risks of the election being engineered, and a lack of trust. Many in Afghanistan question the legitimacy of any election held under the current legal, policy, and institutional structures.

The Role of Kingmakers

The Afghan kingmakers are three distinct groups which play an essential role in shaping and paving the way for any potential candidate to win the seat of the presidency in the country. The first group depend of personalities such as former President Hamid Karzai, Jihadi leader Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf, and Atta Noor, among others. The second group is made up of influential families such as legendary former commander Masood’s family, former Vice President Marshal Fahim’s family, the Mojaddidi family, the Gilani family, and others. The third and final group are foreign powers in the region, the broader Islamic world, and the United States..

As of now, the majority of these factors favor the incumbent’s main rival, former National Security Advisor Mohammad Haneef Atmar, who has garnered the support of many of these personalities, families, and countries. However, unseating an incumbent president remains a difficult task given the state of the resources at his disposal.

The Role of the United States and the Region in the Afghan Elections

Regional and global politics have always played out in the Afghan elections with rival countries supporting one or several Afghan candidates to win favors with the Afghan political elites.  The support of external actors in the Afghan election scene has mainly been through three mediums: campaign money, propaganda through their state media outlets, and by leveraging their influence through proxies in favor or against one candidate or the other.

Unfortunately, these bitter realities still have not changed and play out in the Afghan electoral scene. It is increasingly evident that this time there will be three types of candidates from a geopolitical viewpoint which will face off in the Afghan presidential race: a candidate of the region, a candidate of the West, and others. In previous races, one or two of the candidates have been favored by both the region and the west, but in this race, it is clear that the preferred candidate(s) of regional powers differs from the candidate(s) favored by the United States and the West.

Afghan Elections: Unifiers or Dividers?

Elections are double-edged swords in post-conflict and conflict-ridden societies. Elections can be both a unifying entity and a divisive power. In Libya. an election drove a large divide in a country where there are two administrations in two capitals. The last presidential election in Afghanistan could have resulted similarly, sending Afghanistan into disarray and a bloody civil if not for the wisdom and farsightedness of the candidates and the diplomatic skills of former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry.

This time around, the threat of a disputed or drawn-out election remains. The legitimacy and acceptability of the presidential race depends upon the conduct of the electoral bodies and on the incumbent not to use government resources for campaign purposes. In fact, there is a high risk of a “non-government” this time if we the election is disputed.

Afghanistan’s presidential elections are set for July 2019, typically the peak of the Taliban’s summer offensive which will detrimentally impact the security and accessibility of electoral sites, which will be highly vulnerable and susceptible to Taliban attacks. Thus, certain population centers and pockets of Afghan towns and cities will be prevented from voting in the presidential elections. Such an outcome could lead to questions about the credibility and viability of the elections.

What to Expect: Winners and Losers

Many experts believe that due to the high number of candidates and a divided electoral landscape, the Afghan elections will go to a second round between the two candidates who manage to secure the most votes. In this case, many experts believe a runoff would be between the incumbent and his former National Security Advisor Haneef Atmar. Success will be contingent upon the coalition building and negotiation skills of both candidates. There is also the chance of a coalition government to avoid a deadlock.

Of course, there is always the possibility that the election won’t be held in the event of a breakthrough in peace talks with the Taliban, or if U.S. President Donald Trump makes an abrupt decision to withdraw all U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Of course, nobody can predict the future, but if history is any indicator, it seems highly likely that the 2019 Afghan Presidential Elections will be tightly contested and will result in a runoff vote, followed by drawn-out negotiation period until the formation of the next Afghan government.

The Politics of Ballots over Bullets: Afghan Elections and Peace Process was originally published on Global Security Review.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. and its allies have deployed cutting-edge aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. What is missing, however, is good human intelligence (HUMINT) collection capabilities. Afghans have been entrusted with the task of HUMINT collection, but multiple Taliban infiltration and sabotage operations illustrate the need for comprehensive reform of Afghanistan’s intelligence apparatus.

The Afghan intelligence community requires a robust overhaul. This includes investment in both human and technical capabilities alongside a comprehensive reform program. Afghanistan’s intelligence community is comprised of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), Police Intelligence (PI) and Military Intelligence (MI). Some coordination centers, including Tawheed, NASRAT, and the Presidential Information Coordination Center (PICC) connect and share strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence between the individual agencies.

Regarding organizational hierarchy, the Afghan intelligence community is structured like a pyramid, with the powerful National Directorate of Security at the top. The NDS oversees Afghanistan’s overall intelligence machinery as it pertains to both internal and external security.

Though vested with substantial powers, the Afghan intelligence community has become heavily politicized and suffers from a lack of investment coupled with an old and inefficient bureaucracy. Afghanistan’s intelligence collection efforts are primarily focused on gathering HUMINT through long-standing networks of tribes, local commanders, traders, and government employees. This HUMINT is augmented with basic signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection capabilities.

The Five Eyes countries (the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) have done much to transform the Afghan intelligence community. However, more needs to be done to create professional, disciplined, and adequately equipped intelligence services. At present, arbitrary political appointments, a lack of professional intelligence schools, and the ongoing politicization of Afghanistan’s intelligence agencies have profoundly undermined their institutional integrity and credibility.

The Institutional History of Afghan Intelligence

Intelligence collection and analysis as organized tradecraft is a relatively new phenomenon in Afghanistan. It started with the creation of the Edara e Zabt Ahwaalaat of the 18^th century King Abdul Rahman Khan. The founding father of modern Afghan intelligence is former Prime Minister and President Sardar Dawood Khan; he transformed Edara Zabt Ahwalaat Sedarat to establish the first-ever State Intelligence Services—Edara Estikhabarat Dawlati. This agency was later ideologically refined as communist governments took power with the help of the Soviet KGB, and renamed as KAM, AGSA, and KHAAD.

Today, a significant number of Afghan intelligence agents and officers are graduates of KGB training centers in Russia and former Soviet republics or satellite states such as Uzbekistan, East Germany, and the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, police and military intelligence agencies were established during the communist period to conduct surveillance on political opponents, conduct counterintelligence operations and gather intelligence on criminals and crime syndicates in major urban centers.

The institutional history of the Afghan intelligence community has created legal and policy frameworks that are in dire need of reform. Updating and revising these frameworks to define and clarify the authorities, responsibilities, and roles of the various intelligence agencies is essential to safeguard their legitimacy, integrity, and professionalism. At present, there is considerable overlap between the mandates and activities of Afghanistan’s military and civilian intelligence, especially in the areas of intelligence on criminal or terrorist activities, tactical-level intelligence, and strategic intelligence. These overlaps need to be clarified through a comprehensive, cross-agency review, which will serve as a road map for subsequent updates and revisions to the legal and policy frameworks used by the Afghan intelligence services.

Furthermore, robust investment is required to upgrade and equip intelligence training schools in the military and civilian sectors. These schools should be the Afghan intelligence community’s sole supplier of human capital to ensure job security, professionalism, and discipline while avoiding any politicization of the intelligence services. The only political appointees in positions of authority in the Afghan intelligence community should be the Director of the NDS and his first deputy; both should have a term limit of two to three years. The career professionals in the services must be immune from political appointments, while service chiefs and NDS personnel who have been discharged from service should be prohibited from engaging in any political or business activity for ten years. This will ensure that sensitive information they may have had access to will not be used for political or financial gain.

There is also the fact that the NDS is spread too thin. As such, there is a dire need to establish three new intelligence agencies: a foreign intelligence agency, a counter-intelligence agency, and a joint intelligence committee consisting of the various intelligence service chiefs chaired by the President of Afghanistan. This improved institutional arrangement will clarify the roles and responsibilities of each agency, improve oversight, increase inter-agency coordination, and enable each agency to better focus on its core mission.

The Intelligence Cycle and Modus Operandi

Afghanistan’s intelligence services currently lack a coherent methodology governing the collection and analysis of intelligence, and the delivery of final intelligence products. Little attention is paid to analyzing and corroborating raw intelligence, which is often presented as a final product. These shortcomings are primarily due to a lack of a coherent institutional culture and the absence of a system of intelligence development. The modus operandi of the three existing services needs to be upgraded with the right systems, procedures, and personnel. This process can start with the implementation of a robust intelligence development cycle, and clarification as to the roles and responsibilities of various agencies, and of departments within each agency.

Furthermore, the Afghan intelligence community would benefit from higher numbers of western-trained intelligence officers. Retirement incentives should be offered to older, KGB-trained officers. At the same time, existing intelligence training schools in Afghanistan need to update their curricula and increase their enrollment as older officers retire and demand for new officers rises.

Information Sharing and Coordination

While secrecy and information compartmentalization are fundamental aspects of the intelligence tradecraft, timely and effective sharing and coordination of information is an ongoing challenge for any intelligence service. While many improvements have been made with the establishment of coordination centers such as TAWHEED, PICC, and NASRAT, more needs to be done at the tactical and operational levels.

The fall of the provinces of Kunduz and Ghazni are examples of intelligence sharing failures in Afghanistan. Agencies were unable to coordinate and share intelligence regarding imminent Taliban attacks promptly. Information needs to be distributed in an efficient and timely manner to those with the proper capabilities to address the issue. Optimized inter- and intra-agency information sharing capabilities will change the face of the Afghan war.

Foreign Partnerships

Partnerships with external intelligence services are essential. Given Afghanistan’s geopolitical circumstances, the Afghan intelligence community can not afford to rely on a single partnership. Instead, it should diversify its foreign partnerships while distinguishing between strategic and non-strategic partners. The United States and the other Five Eye countries are examples of strategic partners.

The Afghan intelligence services should structure its foreign partnerships in three tiers. The first tier would be Afghanistan’s principal partners, such as the U.S. and the Five Eyes countries. The second tier should be comprised of the intelligence services of India, Russia, China, and neighboring countries. The third tier would include the rest of the world.

Paramilitary Forces

Like all intelligence agencies, Afghanistan retains a paramilitary force that is tasked with carrying out quick and effective counter-terrorism operations. These forces have been essential for actions taken against the Taliban, foreign terrorists, and Daesh (Islamic State, ISIS, ISIL). In the event of a reorganization or restructuring of the Afghan intelligence community, these forces and their operational capabilities should be maintained due to their critical role in counter-terrorism.

There is a critical need to improve inter-agency coordination when it comes to operational targeting, planning, and execution with other branches of Afghanistan’s security services. Due to the sensitive nature of operations carried out by paramilitary forces, there are often duplicate or overlapping operations. However, structures such as the Joint Services Operations Command (JSOC) can play an essential role in avoiding redundancies regarding efforts and resources.

SIGINT vs. HUMINT in Hybrid Warfare

The Afghan conflict has changed from insurgenct-proxy warfare to a hybrid war much like the ongoing conflict in the Donetsk and Donbass regions of Ukraine. Alongside covert involvement by Russia and Iran, Pakistan has employed a combination of proxy groups, psychological warfare operations (PsyOps), and economic blockades against Afghan forces, while simultaneously discrediting U.S. and NATO operations in the country. Much of the SIGINT Afghanistan has access to is provided by the U.S.-led coalition forces.

Afghanistan’s intelligence services primarily focus on developing intelligence products utilizing HUMINT capabilities and assets, albeit without much success given the significant number of attacks in major cities and military installations. A robust overhaul is needed to reform and develop full-spectrum capabilities that will enable Afghan government forces to counter hybrid warfare tactics employed by the Taliban and their foreign backers. Integrating HUMINT and SIGINT is a critical step that will improve the efficacy of intelligence products on the battlefield. The Afghan war won’t be won by drones, PC-12s, and other aerial capabilities alone; ground-based networks and sources can have a significant impact when coupled with the proper capabilities and resources.

Oversight and Control

During the eighties and nineties, the Afghan intelligence services—KAM, AGSA, and KHAD—were notorious for atrocities such as arbitrary arrests, mass executions, and forced disappearances. The predecessor of these agencies, Edara e Zabt Ahwaalaat Sedarat, was a tool used for domestic surveillance of political opponents and dissidents of Afghanistan’s kings. Accordingly, intelligence and spycraft are looked at with suspicion by the Afghan people, as it brings back memories of KAM, AGSA, and KHAAD. Thus far, the NDS has been successful, to an extent, in its efforts to improve its reputation, but much more needs to be done.

The Afghan intelligence community’s budget is in need of a robust legal and policy framework to ensure accountability, both operationally and fiscally. In a democratic state, intelligence agencies are required to operate within the rule of law and uphold values like human rights. To their credit, the National Directorate of Security and its sister agencies have done much in this area, but more is required to improve their reputational standing. Measures such as quarterly reports to the parliamentary intelligence committee, ensuring access to detainees by domestic and international human rights organizations, and robust oversight by and reporting to the presidency and the National Security Council are all measures that would contribute to an increase in public and international confidence in Afghanistan’s intelligence apparatus.

Information Trade and Budget Controls

Information is an asset, and if corroborated and verifiable, can be a game changer for Afghanistan. However, there is much more disinformation and rumors than solid, actionable intelligence. Raw data that is not put through a proper intelligence cycle before being included in a final intelligence product is virtually useless. In the intelligence tradecraft, most of the raw information turns out to be rumors and uncorroborated hearsay.

Meanwhile, large sums of money are spent to develop sources and produce intelligence products with little parliamentary or presidential oversight. The operational budgets of all three existing services under parliamentary and presidential oversight need to be assessed using a cost-benefit analysis that weighs the value of final intelligence products against the costs required to develop those products. While a degree of secrecy surrounding the budgets of intelligence services is warranted, there must be proper oversight to provide a check-and-balance mechanism to monitor corruption, inefficiency, and ensure a positive return on investment.

Intelligence in War: Fixing and Fitting Intelligence in the Afghan War was originally published on Global Security Review.

Though the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs hasn’t provided any details of the meeting, the visit is indicative of an Iranian effort to maintain relations with the Afghan government as the government negotiates with the Taliban. Furthermore, the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, has confirmed that Tehran and the Taliban were previously engaged in direct talks. On December 31, the Iranian government confirmed that a Taliban delegation had visited Iran for another round of negotiations.

Tehran is not only hedging by maintaining a dialogue with the radical extremist group; it’s assuming the role of a disruptor in the peace process to ensure its interests are secured in the ongoing negotiations between the United States and a select group of regional stakeholders. While the U.S. includes Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in its deliberations, it is excluding key stakeholders—Afghanistan, Iran, and India.

The Iranian government justifies its disruptive involvement by citing “legitimate concerns” regarding the rise of militant extremist groups in Afghanistan. Tehran previously adopted a similar approach in its engagements with Islamabad, which provides aid and haven to the Taliban. Iran’s willingness to engage with the Taliban is not unprecedented—the relationship dates back to 1994 when the Taliban was under the leadership of Mullah Omar. Relations continued under Omar’s successor, Akhtar Mansoor, who was killed in May of 2016 while returning to Pakistan after visiting Iran. According to his Pakistani passport, Mansoor spent two months in Iran before being targeted by a U.S. drone strike on the highway leading into Pakistan from the country’s Iranian border. 

Tehran does not want to sever ties with the Afghan Government while simultaneously maintaining a relationship with a resurgent Taliban, which is in control of more territory than at any time since 2001. Tehran considers the rise of militant Islamic extremist groups to be a key “legitimate concern,” along with the threat of a Taliban takeover of the Afghan government and the illegal drug trade originating in Afghanistan. Keeping Afghanistan in a perpetual state of instability guarantees the flow of Afghan surface waters to Iran, and ensures a steady stream of black market U.S. dollars into the Iranian economy.

Ensuring the continued flow of surface water from Afghanistan to Iran is a crucial priority for Tehran. The Afghan government recently opened the Salma Dam, which was constructed with financial support from India. Following in dam’s inauguration, Tehran increased support for the Taliban insurgency in provinces of Western Farah and Herat to disrupt any further dam development of dams on the Afghan side of the Afghanistan-Iran border along the Helmand river.

In late 2018, Farah City was overrun by the Taliban—despite public outcry from the local population over Iranian support for the Taliban in Western Farah province, which lies along the Helmand river. A single water agreement exists between Iran and Afghanistan; a 1973 treaty provides Iran with 820 million cubic meters of water annually. Iran has been hit with regular water shortages, leading Tehran to protest plans to construct dams along the Helmand river intended to increase Afghanistan’s agricultural capacity to approximately $20 billion (U.S.). 

Iranian engagement with the Taliban facilitates ongoing instability along the Afghanistan-Iran border, which provides an illegal route for Iran to import U.S. dollars from merchants in the Herat and Farah provinces. As the Iranian currency continues to depreciate against the dollar, Tehran’s interest in sustaining this black market source of hard currency will grow. 

The rise of Salafi extremist groups—facilitated with support from Gulf states—is another phenomenon motivating Iran to engage with the Taliban. Iranian overtures to the Taliban are an effort to ensure militant Islamist ideology imported into Afghanistan does not flow to Iran. Russia exhibited similar concerns when the Kremlin claimed that “Daesh [Islamic State] imported into Afghanistan” had expanded over Northern Faryab and Jawzjan provinces along the Afghan border with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Russia reportedly met with Taliban representatives to negotiate a settlement agreement, as well as coordinate efforts to block and topple any Daesh activity in Afghanistan’s Northern provinces. 

Beyond fomenting ongoing insecurity within Afghanistan, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has been training Afghan refugees as Fatemiyoun mercenaries to fight against Daesh in Syria in support of the Assad regime. Thousands of vulnerable refugees who are devout Shias have joined the Fatemiyoun ranks to change their families’ legal status as refugees in Iran. They had reportedly returned to Afghanistan to counter Salafi extremism activity alongside the Taliban and combat militant Islamist activity in the western region of Afghanistan on behalf of the Revolutionary Guard.

Iran’s cooperation with a hardline Sunni extremist group like the Taliban group to counter threats to its interests in Afghanistan is a dangerous strategy. Going forward, Iran must act strategically; history has proven that engagement with the Taliban along with the selective use of terrorism will not achieve the end-result Tehran is expecting. The Iranian government must respect Afghanistan’s sovereignty, recognize the Afghan state, and develop a bilateral relationship based on culture, trade, and legitimate interests for Tehran within a stable Afghanistan. 

In a stable Afghanistan, a priority for Tehran should be increasing trade between the two countries. Trade between Iran and Afghanistan is valued between two and three billion dollars annually. Afghanistan is the fourth-largest importer of goods from Iran, which is suffering from crippling U.S. sanctions. Between March and August of 2018, Iran exported over $1.43 billion worth of goods. Iran has a role as a responsible stakeholder in the growth of the Afghan economy. Therefore, the U.S. has exempted Afghanistan from Iran sanctions. The strategic Chabahar port is one way of improving Iranian trade ties with Afghanistan. Chabahar port, which provides Afghanistan access to seaborne trade routes, decreasing Afghanistan’s dependency on Pakistan. Moreover, a renewed water agreement could serve the interests both sides in addressing persistent water shortages while increasing Afghan-Iranian agricultural-based trade.

Iran must play the role of a good neighbor to Afghanistan; the latter has never posited a threat to Iranian national security.  Iranian concern over the activities of Salafi extremist groups in Afghanistan is a legitimate one, however bypassing the Afghan Government in favor of non-state actors will not alleviate this concern, however justified. 

An Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies research finding shows that a majority of the Afghan elite (between 57 and 66.4 percent) has expressed satisfaction with Iran’s social, religious, and economic policies. However, the same survey findings show that 55 percent of the Afghan elite have expressed dissatisfaction towards the Islamic Republic of Iran’s political and security policies as they relate to Afghanistan. Iran has a role in the Afghan peace process, but it must act in good faith. 

Iran’s Interests in Afghanistan: Water, Black Market Currency, & Extremism was originally published on Global Security Review.

As it stands, a mineral-based economy is one of the few options available when it comes to establishing a solid foundation on which to develop Afghanistan’s economy. The development of the country’s mineral sector has been hampered by insecurity, political instability, poor policy direction, the absence of a basic legal framework, and a lack of necessary infrastructure and transit agreements with neighboring countries. However, Afghanistan’s mineral deposits present an alternative to the country’s increasing over-reliance on an economy dependent on foreign aid.

Afghanistan’s mineral deposits consist of metals and non-metals. Many strategically essential minerals can be found in the country, including beryllium (used in airplanes, helicopters, ships, missiles, and spacecraft), uranium, lithium, and niobium (a rare soft-metal use in semiconductor production). According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), Afghanistan’s mineral wealth is estimated at around (US) $1 trillion. This figure is based on previously conducted Swedish, British, and Soviet geological surveys, in addition to more recent studies performed by the USGS. In total, however, only about 30% of Afghanistan’s territory was covered by previous geological surveys. Even though the earlier Swedish, British, and Soviet studies have been updated with more recent aerial geophysical and geochemical studies, a complete geological survey is required to understand the full potential of Afghanistan’s mineral deposits.

Existing data only accounts for 30% of the country, and isn’t comprehensive enough to confidently estimate the value and depth of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth. Furthermore, a complete geological study of Afghanistan would enable for a more accurate determination of the economic feasibility of developing the country’s mineral extraction and distribution capabilities. In other words, all that is known from existing geological surveys is that there are signs of what could be a substantial presence of minerals elsewhere in the country, but the details of specific deposits remain unknown. Already, doubts have been raised that Afghan mineral deposits could be economically unviable to develop resource extraction capabilities around. While these doubts may sway potential investors, the country’s known mineral deposits remain attractive from an investor’s standpoint.

There is a near-unanimous consensus in Afghanistan that the country must develop its mineral sector. When it comes to the pace of such development, however, there are three primary schools of thought within Afghan policy-making circles and the country’s political establishment. In the first camp are those who believe that the mineral sector development should be pursued without delay. They argue that Afghanistan must supplement declining foreign aid with revenues drawn from mineral extraction. Those in the second group posit that mineral sector development should be prioritized based on the revenue-generating potential of individual deposits. The third group opposes any progress until the political and security situation in the country stabilizes so that Afghans can explore any development in a more secure environment. Given the economic circumstances, combined with the urgent need to build a domestic economy that isn’t dependent on foreign aid, Afghanistan has no choice but to move aggressively to develop its nascent mining industry.

Fast-paced development requires up-to-date and complete geological information concerning mineral deposits. However, such data is unavailable. Providing access to a comprehensive geological survey is a significant challenge, and undertaking such a study is a costly exercise. A complete study will be impossible without the outside investment, legal reform, and decisive political action that is needed to build a strong and apolitical Afghanistan Geological Survey, an agency which currently is deeply politicized and has a limited functional role, having been monopolized by a generation of Soviet-trained geologists.

Traditionally, it is the responsibility of the state to provide potential investors with the necessary geological survey data. Geological studies are essential when it comes to soliciting both private and public sector investment, at home and abroad. Complete geological surveys are expensive, costing millions of dollars the Afghan government cannot afford. This is where Afghanistan’s foreign aid donor community can play a crucial role.

To date, the Afghan government has received eight tenders and awarded two significant contracts with support from the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.K. Department for International Development (DfID), and the World Bank. These include tenders for developing the Aynak copper mine, the Hajigak iron ore deposit, the Badakhshan gold mine, the Shaida copper mine, and the Ghazni gold and copper deposits. Almost all have their flaws, but the initiation of bidding processes and the awarding of contracts nevertheless sends a strong signal to the global investor community that the Afghan mining industry is open for business.

Recently, however, the National Unity Government (NUG) has announced its decision to review all received bids and awarded contracts. This announcement sends the wrong signal to investors, on the top of Afghanistan’s myriad of security, political, and infrastructure problems. It is well within the Afghan government’s right to review or even revise existing contracts and bids, however, halting the process altogether will be disastrous for the development of Afghanistan’s mining industry. All face shortcomings or obstacles concerning feasibility clauses, energy and water shortages, human capital challenges, and an absence of transit agreements, to name a few. The best way to address these shortcomings, however, is through bilateral negotiations and contract revision mechanisms, rather than canceling bids outright and effectively shutting down the bidding process.

On the other hand, artisanal and small-scale mining (for construction materials and precious stones, for example) remain a source of financial revenue for the Afghan government but, at the same time, are a significant driver of instability in regions of the country where government presence is little-to-nonexistent. The black market economy from these mines fuels the conflict within the country, particularly in the northern and eastern provinces. Today, part of the unrest in regions in the country’s north and east—such as the Logar province—is due to local rivalries over mineral revenues from small mineral deposits. In the short-term, the best way to tackle these issues is through the gradual incorporation of smaller-scale mining operations into the country’s overall strategy, as the rule of law and the reach of the country’s security forces extend to all parts of the country.

The Afghan government institutions responsible for the development of the country’s mineral sector (i.e. the MOMP and AGS) have little-to-no experience with managing the tendering process and the awarding of large mining contracts. The eight existing tenders, along with many of the awarded contracts represent are Afghanistan’s first experiences awarding substantial mineral rights contracts. They were solicited or awarded with technical expertise and assistance provided by foreign partners including the U.S. Department of Defense Task Force for Business Stability Operation (TFBSO), the World Bank, and DfID, amongst others. Many contracts have been awarded in a mostly noncompetitive environment where global mining corporations such as MCC or CNPCI, with years of experience negotiating large-scale mineral rights contracts, are entering into negotiations with Afghan officials lacking the necessary negotiating skills or expertise.

On the other hand, certain circles within the Afghan public and private sectors oppose awarding mining contracts to foreign firms and are advocating for the establishment of large state-owned oil and gas, iron, and copper corporations—possibly employing a public-private partnership model. However, this view loses sight of the fact that the Afghan labor force lacks the necessary technical expertise, and Afghanistan itself lacks the necessary financial capital to pursue a state-owned industrial model. The necessary technical knowledge, skilled human capital, and financial resources can only come from foreign firms for the foreseeable future. Afghanistan’s existing state-owned enterprises—such as the Afghan Gas Enterprise (AGE) and the Afghan Fertilizer Factory in the country’s north—are struggling financially and operationally, suffering from antiquated machinery and incompetent management resulting from years of conflict and instability.

The Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MOMP) has been primarily occupied in recent years with the management and awarding of small-scale constructing material and precious stone extraction contracts through the MOMP Cadastre department. However, the role of such an vital institution shouldn’t be confined to the awarding of minor contracts. Instead, the MOMP should be empowered to oversee the proper implementation, oversight and control, audit, and financial revenue management, and technical oversight of all large and small mineral extraction rights contracts. The ministry is in desperate need of a severe overhaul if there is to be any substantive, long-term development in the Afghan mineral sector.

The Afghan tax and royalty regimes are further obstacles to the development of the country’s mining industry. The country’s tax structure is burdensome for investors and is internationally non-competitive—the country’s taxes are much higher than those in South American or African states. Royalty payments for the Aynak Copper Mine are set at nearly twelve percent, and rates for the Hajigak Iron Ore mine are around eight percent, far higher than international norms—which are between four and six percent. Simply put, the financial and economic regime presently governing the Afghan mineral economy is not attractive to potential investors. These factors must be changed if any long-term, sustainable development of Afghanistan’s mineral sector are to be seriously considered.

Another major obstacle to the development of the Afghan mineral sector is a lack a lack of necessary infrastructure to facilitate the export of minerals. Afghanistan is poorly connected to regional ports, both due to the country’s geography and the current security situation. An integrated infrastructure development strategy for the establishment of resource corridors to ports in the region as well as the construction of energy pipelines to power the plants for processing minerals before export. Such an integrated infrastructure development program would require billions of dollars in capital and technical expertise that is presently lacking in the country. The Afghan government should aggressively engage in resource diplomacy with its neighbors to gain access to ports to export commodities to international markets.

Despite these challenges, the Afghan mineral sector remains an attractive opportunity for both domestic and foreign investors. None of the difficulties mentioned above are formidable enough that they cannot be addressed by measures gradually enacted by the Afghan government. In the immediate-term, Afghanistan must present a strategic framework for the development of its nascent mineral sector—one that attracts both domestic and international investment. This framework must include reform of the country’s legal system, in addition to providing policy direction to attract foreign investors.

While Afghanistan’s mineral deposits present a tremendous economic opportunity for the country, the government must prioritize the mineral deposits it intends to put to domestic and international tender. Just a few successful bids and their successful implementation would serve as a pilot project, paving the way for further investment—a necessary step for the development of Afghanistan’s mineral sector.

Are Afghanistan’s Mineral Deposits the Answer to the Country’s Economic Woes? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The ISI Directorate in Pakistan has enjoyed unparalleled power since its creation in 1948. As the ISI Director-General is selected by the Military Branch, the agency has remained steeped in army and military affairs for seventy years. From its outset, the ISI has backed terrorist organizations that provide strategic depth within India and greater influence in Afghanistan.

These efforts are designed to promote Pakistan’s regional hegemony—all while wreaking havoc on the national security interests of both India and Afghanistan. ISI support and aid for several terrorist organizations, including the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network, have resulted in international condemnation of the ISI’s failures to prevent “systematic and persistent human rights violations,” albeit with little effect.

The ISI Regularly Fails to Implement Counter-Terrorism Policy

Within Pakistan, terrorist attacks have declined in recent years following legislation and ISI counter-terrorism policies enacted between 2013 and 2016. However, the ISI’s continued covert support for extremists has fostered a growing radical community and new splinter groups that have spread throughout the region.

After former President Musharraf’s pledge to join the War on Terror, the ISI vacillated between continued sponsorship of extremist groups in support of its interests and cracking down on radical anti-ISI groups within Pakistan. Ultimately, due to inconsistencies in its counter-terrorism campaign, Pakistan’s intelligence agency was quietly listed as a terrorist organization in U.S. military documents, instructing that ISI officers be treated the same as terrorists.

The ISI is plagued by a persistent hesitancy to destroy terrorist groups, instead hoping to nurture them and use them in the future against Pakistan’s regional rival, India. According to Pakistan’s police officials, ISI officers regularly halt investigations involving terrorist groups they support, further perpetuating violent extremism so long as it serves to enhance Pakistan’s regional influence.

What This Means for Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan

Why does Pakistan, through the ISI, support terrorist groups? Following the partition of British India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Pakistan’s leaders became almost fanatical about one thing: the idea that India sought to destroy the Pakistani state. While this claim has been repeatedly disputed by India and has overall been assessed as unfounded, Pakistan and its ISI have worked to limit India’s regional influence as much as possible.

Often, this has come in the form of support for anti-India terrorist groups—even at the expense of Pakistan’s security and internal radicalization. These terrorist groups have been released to carry out attacks in both India and Jammu and Kashmir while providing protections to the Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan—using the state as a proxy in its perceived conflict with India.

In Afghanistan, Pakistan’s primary goal is to prevent India from gaining ground and obtaining too much influence. As the Taliban vies for more control, the ISI has provided it with military aid to ensure Afghanistan remains in a state of perpetual instability. Should the Taliban gain power, Pakistan will have bought itself a staunch ally in the region, with the potential to form a strategic partnership against India. Should the Taliban fail to gain power, Pakistan will have done its best to destabilize the country and prevent a potential strong governmental alliance with India. Pakistan is effectively hedging its bets on radical groups to foment insecurity within Afghanistan, as a more stable neighbor that decides to align itself with India is perceived as a threat to Pakistan’s national security, at least from the Pakistani perspective.

On December 11, 2018, in a surprising turn of events, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, acknowledged that the establishment of an Afghan peace is a “shared responsibility” of Pakistan and its neighbors. A “solution through dialogue” would be a step in the right direction for the region, despite the ISI’s recent subversive actions in Jammu and Kashmir. Currently, the words of Pakistan’s intelligence agency and senior government officials seem contradictory. While the state allegedly seeks peace in the region, the ISI remains committed to subversive activities that will foment ongoing regional insecurity.

The Future of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency

If the attempts at an Afghan peace and a combined effort towards normalization in relations between India and Pakistan are to be successful, the ISI and the Pakistani state must renounce support for the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and other militant groups to be taken seriously. Such a declaration must occur before terrorism, and interstate conflicts further destabilize the region. According to the International Crisis Group, counter-terrorism in the region will be ineffective as long as the ISI continues to make distinctions between “good” and “bad” terrorist groups.

With is decades-long support for terrorist organizations targeting India, it will be difficult for the agency to break from this pattern any time soon. Instead, it will be up to the state to align its intelligence agency with the government’s regional goals. Without the ISI’s confrontation of extremist ideologies and a reassessment of its alliances, radicalization will continue to threaten regional security and inflame its perceived conflict with India. Until the “threat of India” has been recognized as a falsehood, it’s likely that the ISI will continue to build a haven for extremism.

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Contributes to Regional Instability was originally published on Global Security Review.

Following the India-Russia summit in Sochi this past summer, a pivotal Eurasian arms agreement is emerging that is creating an opportunity to weaken the relationship between India and the United States. 23 bilateral agreements are being finalized in which Russia will sell India $5 billion-worth of Russian-made S-400 air defense systems. The S-400 air defense systems have a range of up to 250 miles, and are capable of stealth aircraft detection.

India is an important partner of the U.S and the S-400 is a major arms export for Russia. As a result, President Trump responded to the summit and subsequent arms deal by threatening possible sanctions on India. These would be added to the sanctions India potentially faces for purchasing oil from Iran. The monumental India-Russia arms deal sends multiple signals to the international community by both countries.

First, Russia has played an increasingly larger role in challenging U.S. dominance in global geopolitics. Russia conducting arms sales with a country in which the U.S. maintains good relations signals further challenging to the dominance of the U.S. there. As India has an important relationship with both the U.S. and Russia, signing a $5 billion arms agreement with Russia may perceived as India’s increased reliance on Russia rather than the United States. This is significant because, despite deteriorating relations between Russia and India in recent years, the S-400 sale indicates both sides are opting to strengthen bilateral ties.

Second, the Russia-India arms deal represents increased tensions along the China-Indian borders. China and India had a standoff along their border during the summer of 2017. By the end of August, the Chinese government warned India to withdraw troops from the Doklam border. A few days later, both agreed to withdraw troops from the Himalayan border.

In June 2018, Chinese envoy to India, Luo Zhaohui said that the two countries could not handle another border dispute: “We need to control, manage, narrow differences through expanding cooperation. The boundary question was left over by history. We need to find a mutually acceptable solution through Special Representatives’ Meeting while adopting confidence-building measures.” India purchasing an air defense systems of this magnitude can be interpreted as an attempt to deter China from further border clashes.

Lastly, the purchase of Russian air defense systems creates the opportunity for a shift in India’s security dilemma. It directly represents an increase in India’s preparation and willingness to defend itself – and the perceived need to do so. This is a reaction to the fact that China has a similar S-400 defense system which it bought from Russia in 2015. The first shipment of Russian S-400s arrived in China this May. Consequently last month, Chinese President Xi Jinping remarked on the relationship between China and Russia: “We have unique geographic benefits. China and Russia are the biggest neighbors, we have solid political ties … Chinese and Russian relationships are at an all time high level.”

As a response to the increased China-Russia partnership, India has also turned to Russia. On October 4, India Prime Minister Narendra Modi welcomed Russian President Putin to India. During a joint press meeting, Prime Minister Modi explained: “India gives top priority to its relations with Russia. Changing the fast, our relationships in this world have become more relevant.”

The Indian purchase from Russia sends many indicators to the international community. India is clearly and deliberately increasing its air defense capabilities to deter China, protect itself, and retain its ties with Russia. The international community—and the United States as a global power—should respond to India’s clear military buildup and the increased India-Russian partnership. This must be done before signals are misread and a dangerous shift in geopolitics occurs. American sanctions on India may not result in desired effects.

Strengthened relations between India and Russia could weaken ties between the United States and India. To counter Russia’s influence in Southeast Asia, the U.S. must move quickly to strengthen and solidify the U.S.-India partnership. To do so, the U.S. should host Prime Minister Modi to reinforce the American-Indian partnership and avoid inadvertently pushing New Delhi closer to Moscow.

India Agrees to Buy Russian S-400 Air Defense System: What Does it Signify? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Governments and institutions will be tested by considerable challenges over the next decade as the international order is restructured and global trends converge.

All forms of government in every region will face increasing tensions both domestic and foreign. In the short-term, these global trends will increase the threat posed by all types of terrorism, and the ability for asymmetrically-powerful state and non-state actors to adversely affect the International order and the global balance of power.

Tensions are rising because citizens around the world are raising questions about the relationship that exists between governments and themselves. The social contract that exists between society and their governments is unraveling as people demand increasing levels of security and prosperity. Globalization means that domestic conditions are shaped, to an ever-greater degree, by occurrences overseas.

Growing populism in the West threatens an international order governed by rule-of-law. Tensions between governing elites and their citizens are reshaping global geopolitics. A weakened United States would mean less of an emphasis on human rights and maintenance of global order.

Less of a U.S. presence on the global stage creates gaps for authoritarian powers like China and Russia. It also means a heightened risk of conflict arising between competing for regional powers like India and Pakistan or Iran and Saudi Arabia, and an international order comprised of competing “spheres of influence.”

1. Sharpening tensions and heightened doubts concerning the U.S. role in the world will continue for several years.

In the short term, the U.S. will have a diminished presence abroad due to domestic political divisions. These political divisions compounded by with the Trump administration’s preference for unilateral action, which threaten to isolate the U.S. diplomatically.

Economic crises and inequality have contributed to widening societal and class divisions. The number of men who are not working and not seeking work is at its highest since the Great Depression. However, incomes have risen slowly, and investors see high rates of return on both domestic and foreign investments.

Politically, the country is still profoundly divided. However, growing solidarity and activism around critical issues such as healthcare have been useful in checking executive and congressional power.

2. The European Union will need to implement badly needed reforms to maintain its legitimacy.

The Brexit vote of 2016 and rising popularity of far-right nationalist political parties in Western Europe has led many observers to question the long-term viability of a united Europe. In the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, many were concerned that European far-right politicians like Marine Le Pen would gain traction in their electoral contests.

However, despite considerable attempts by Le Pen’s campaign—and the Kremlin—Emmanuel Macron led a stunning rebuke of the populist trend circumventing the globe. Europe initially seemed to be trending away from the right as the United States Government continued to be paralyzed by the competing factions of the governing Republican Party. In light of a slew of populist and right-wing victories across E.U. member state, however, it’s clear that politics on both sides of the Atlantic are increasingly polarized.

Rising ethnic, demographic, and economic tensions will make European integration more difficult. Furthermore, Europeans must repair the structural problems in E.U. institutions.

For example, E.U. agencies set monetary policy for members of the Eurozone; however, member states retain control over their financial and security obligations. This leaves poorer E.U. states like Greece with vast amounts of debt and decreasing growth prospects. There is no unified E.U. security policy; each member state determines its national security strategy.

3. Ongoing uncertainty surrounding the future North Korea’s nuclear program threaten East Asian security.

In North Korea, Kim Jong Un has consolidated his grip on power through patronage and fear and has doubled down on his nuclear and missile programs, developing long-range missiles that may soon endanger the continental USA.

Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington have a shared incentive to handle security risks in Northeast Asia, but a history mutual distrust, warfare, and occupation makes cooperation between the different parties difficult.

A resumption of North Korean provocations, such as nuclear and missile tests, may destabilize the balance of power in the region and result in the North’s immediate neighbors potential taking unilateral action to defend their security interests.  Kim is determined to secure international recognition of the North as a nuclear power, for security, prestige, and political legitimacy.

Contrary to his father and grandfather, he’s had substantial success in terms of achieving those goals.  He codified the North’s nuclear status in the party constitution in 2012 and reaffirmed it during the Party Congress in 2016.

Beijing faces a continuing strategic conundrum about the North.  Pyongyang’s behavior both undermines China’s argument that the US army presence in the region is anachronistic and demonstrates Beijing’s lack of influence–or perhaps lack of political will to exert influence—within its neighbor and customer.

North Korean behavior leads to tightening U.S. alliances, more assertive action by US allies, and, on occasion, greater cooperation between these partners themselves—and might lead to a change in Beijing’s approach to North Korea with time. However, long-simmering tensions between South Korea and Japan fueled by the South’s historical grievances may hinder Washington’s efforts to present a united front against North Korea.

4. Populism and dissent will spread across Latin America.

Leftist governments have been kicked out in Argentina, Peru, and Guatemala. Venezuela’s left-wing populist government is stripping the country of its democratic institutions in a sharp slide towards authoritarianism, leading to a sharp increase in lawlessness across the country.

Furthermore, while Venezuela doesn’t produce drugs, it’s become a major transport hub for drugs going to Europe or  Africa before being routed to Europe. Drug trafficking increases under as the rule of law decreases. After a 2009 coup in Honduras, the country was run by a fragile government—lawlessness increased dramatically.

Honduras now has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Countries like the United States are seeing a significant increase in the number of people arriving from countries like Honduras that are plagued with violence.

5. Expect increasing assertiveness from Beijing and Moscow as both governments seek to lock in competitive advantages.

Beijing and Moscow will seek to lock in competitive advantages and also to right what they perceive as historical wrongs before economic and demographic trends can present impediments and the West regains its foundation.

Both China and Russia maintain worldviews where they’re rightfully dominant in their regions and able to form regional politics and economics to match their security and material interests.

Both have moved aggressively in latest years to exert more considerable influence in their regions, to contest the U.S., and also to force Washington to accept exclusionary regional spheres of influence—a situation that the US has historically opposed.

6. The standoff between Russia and the West will continue throughout 2019.

Diplomatic spats, strategic political and political tensions will last between Russia and the U.S. In Washington, U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration may have few choices for relieving the strain because of increased checks on the president’s power and enlarged sanctions from the U.S. Congress.

In Moscow, meanwhile, forthcoming local and national elections will prevent the Kremlin from creating significant concessions. Consequently, sanctions enacted on Russia from the US along with the European Union probably will stay through the end of the year. Depending upon how investigations into Russia’s role at the 2016 U.S. Presidential election shape upward, Washington might even ramp up the political and financial pressure on Russia.

Similarly, North Korea will remain a factor in determining the direction of U.S.-Russian relations over the next several months. Russia will keep going along with the overtures that Washington has made to Pyongyang, but will skirt sanctions requirements and continue provide economic aid to North Korea as it sees fit.

7. China, for its part, may have domestic concerns to grapple with this year.

The Chinese Communist Party’s careful preparation for a change of direction was realized in the October 2017 party congress. The event reshuffled the highest ranks of the party and was a proof of President Xi Jinping’s near-absolute consolidation of power.

To date, all indications point to the Xi’s success in strengthening his grip over top decision-making bodies of both the Party and the state. Xi has already achieved the status of core leader of the Communist Party, the Chinese state and People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Xi has also managed to quickly promote a lot of his partners to prestigious positions in 2017 and 2018. Even more significant, party members nearly unanimously endorsed the addition of Xi’s philosophy of the Communist Party Constitution at the Party Congress, positioning him alongside the venerated figures of Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong.

8. Expect Persisting Volatility in Southeast Asia

Nuclear deployment requirements for naval-based delivery vehicles remove a safety valve that, until now, has kept atomic weapons stored separately from missiles in South Asia.

At-sea deployments of atomic weapons by India, Pakistan, and perhaps China, would increasingly militarize the Indian Ocean throughout the next two decades.

The presence of multiple nuclear powers with uncertain doctrine for controlling your stresses at sea incidents between nuclear-armed vessels increases the potential risk of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation.

New Delhi, however, will continue to offer smaller South Asian nations a stake in India’s financial growth through development assistance and increased connectivity to India’s economy, contributing to India’s broader effort to assert its role as the predominant regional power.

India will be the world’s fastest-growing economies throughout the next five years as China’s economy cools and growth elsewhere sputters, but internal tensions over inequality and religion will complicate its expansion.

9. Violent extremism, terrorism, and instability will continue to hang over Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region’s fragile communal relations.

The threat of terrorism, from Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and al-Qaeda and its affiliates as well as the Islamic State’s expansion and sympathy for associated ideologies—will remain prominent in the area.

Competition for jobs, coupled with discrimination against minorities, might contribute to the radicalization of the region’s youth, especially given unbalanced gender ratios favoring males in several nations.

Populism and sectarianism will intensify if Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan fail to provide employment and education for growing urban populations and officials continue to govern principally through identity politics.

10. The Middle East and North Africa will see continued, if not escalating instability.

Continuing conflict and lack of political and economic reform threaten poverty reduction, the area’s one last bright spot.  Resource dependence and foreign assistance have propped up elites even as it fostered widespread reliance on the nation by inhibiting markets, employment, and human capital.

With oil prices unlikely to recover to levels of the petroleum boom governments may have to limit cash payments and subsidies.  In the meantime, social networks have provided new tools for citizens to vent their political frustrations.  Conservative religious groups—including Brotherhood affiliates and movements—and ethnically-based organizations like those based on Kurdish identity are poised to be superior alternatives to weak governments in the region.

Such groups typically supply social services better than the nation and their politics resonate with a general public that is more conservative and religious than the region’s political and economic elites.

11. Sub-Saharan Africa will struggle with authoritarian regimes

Practices have changed, civil society groups have proliferated, and citizens across the region demand better and more just governance.  However, many nations continue to struggle with authoritarian rule, patronage politics, and favoritism.  Many leaders remain focused on political survival as opposed to reform–with a few term limitations.

Global economic headwinds also threaten improvement by keeping commodity prices low and investment weak.  Some nations who’ve made progress toward democracy remain fragile and predisposed towards violence corresponding elections.  Tensions between Muslim and Christian groups can escalate into conflict.

12. Threats from terrorist and insurgent groups will persist and are likely to become more decentralized.

The threat of terrorism is likely to increase as the means and the motivations of states, groups, and people to impose harm diversify. Prolonged conflicts and the info age allow terrorists to recruit and operate on a large scale, demonstrating the evolving nature of the threat.

Terrorism kills fewer people globally than crime or disease, but the potential for new capabilities reaching the hands of people bent on apocalyptic destruction is all too real. This ultimate low-probability, high-impact event underscores the imperative of international cooperation and state attention to the issue.

Terrorists will continue to justify their violence by their very own interpretations of religion, but several underlying drivers are also in play. Within nations, the breakdown of state structures in much of the Middle East carries on to create space for extremists.

The world order is changing. The question is, how?

The post-World War II international order that enabled today’s political, economic, and security arrangements and institutions is in question. As power diffuses worldwide, seats at the table of global decision making are reshuffled.  Today, aspiring powers seek to adjust the rules of the game and international context in a way beneficial to their interests.

This complicates reform of international institutions such as the UN Security Council or the Bretton-Woods institutions, also brings into question whether political, civil and human rights—hallmarks of liberal values and US leadership since 1945—will continue to be so.

Norms that were believed to be settled will be increasingly threatened if present trends hold, and consensus to build standards can be elusive as Russia, China, along with other actors such as the Islamic State seek to shape regions and international norms in their favor.

12 Predictions for Global Geopolitics for 2019 through 2025—and Beyond was originally published on Global Security Review.

In New Delhi, the “two-plus-two” dialogue was at long last able to complete an agreement to enhance communications sharing on defense platforms—something called the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement, or COMCASA. It will allow India access to more advanced communications technology for defense equipment purchased from the United States, and as a result will also make it easier for India and the United States, as well as U.S. allies with similar equipment, to coordinate more fully in real time (or, in defense speak, enhance interoperability). It’s been under negotiation for years, so this achievement deserves praise.

Naval exchanges, counterterrorism cooperation, and North Korea

The two plus two produced several other important advances:

• A new “tri-services exercise,” increasing the complexity of military cooperation.
• More military personnel exchanges, and in particular a new exchange between the U.S. Navy’s Central Command and the Indian Navy. This will help deepen their naval cooperation across Asia, especially in light of the United States’ and India’s very different conceptions of how they delineate the Indo-Pacific.
• A new agreement on defense innovation.
• The reaffirmation of existing areas of agreement on counterterrorism and cybersecurity. The joint statement calls on Pakistan to do more to stop terrorism emanating from territory under its control and pledges more cooperation in cyberspace and more support for an “Afghan-owned, Afghan-led” peace process.
• The launch of secure hotlines between Pompeo and Swaraj, and Mattis and Sitharaman, building on the high-level hotlines established in the Obama administration.

Also of interest in the joint statement is the brief paragraph on North Korea, which included a pledge “to work together to counter North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs and to hold accountable those countries that have supported them.” North Korea has not traditionally been an area of significant U.S.-India cooperation, so it will be interesting to see where this leads.

Missing pieces and next steps

Absent from the statements were any details on U.S.-India trade frictions, but given the security focus of the two plus two, this should not surprise. The U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum, which will meet in November, is a more apt venue for technical discussion of trade issues.

Also absent were any resolutions on two thorny issues: first, whether President Donald J. Trump will provide a waiver to India for its long-in-the-works purchase of a Russian air defense missile system, thus avoiding sanctions that could result from the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) legislation focused on Russia, and second, what will happen with U.S. sanctions and India’s oil procurement from Iran. Despite the dialogue’s progress, these questions will continue to hover over the security relationship for the time being.

What Next for U.S.-India Military Ties? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The legitimacy and authority of governments and institutions across the globe will the called into question. All forms of government in every region will face increasing tensions both domestic and foreign.

In the short-term, these global trends will increase the threat posed by all types of terrorism, and improve the ability for asymmetrically-powerful state and non-state actors to adversely affect the international order and the global balance of power.

Why are global tensions rising?

Tensions are rising because citizens around the world are raising questions about the relationship that exists between governments and themselves. The social contract that exists between society and their governments is unraveling as people demand increasing levels of security and prosperity. Globalization means that domestic conditions are being shaped, to an ever-greater degree, by events overseas.

Growing populism in the West threatens a rules-based international order. A weakened United States would mean less of an emphasis on human rights and maintenance of global order. Less of a U.S. presence on the world stage creates gaps that can be exploited by authoritarian, revisionist powers like China and Russia.

Multipolarity may also heighten the risk of conflict arising between competing for regional powers like India and Pakistan or Iran and Israel, and an international order comprised of competing “spheres of influence.”

The world order is increasingly multipolar.

Questions were raised about the long-term viability of a rules-based international order in the wake of the 2016 Brexit vote and election of Donald Trump. The era of U.S.-led globalization seemed to be at an end.

While globalization has dramatically increased the degree of economic interdependence among the world’s major powers, it is not, in-and-of-itself, a guarantor of stability. Countries like Russia and Iran are perpetually searching for ways to decrease their dependence on adversarial powers, reducing their vulnerability to economic pressures like sanctions while allowing them to pursue their national interests more aggressively.

As international relations trend from a unipolar to a multipolar order, the threat of terrorism remains ever-present but will be eclipsed by increased competition between adversarial great powers.  This trend, combined with rapidly developing technologies, disinformation (“fake news” propaganda), employment shortages, and demographic trends mean greater disorder on a global scale. Thus, fundamental questions will need to be resolved regarding laws, institutions, and the balance of power in the international order.

Tensions between governing elites and their citizens are reshaping global geopolitics.

Liberal democracies—like Canada, the United States, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and South Korea—will face considerable challenges throughout the next several years. Growing populism and nativist nationalism will need to be tempered by governments, as stagnant living standards, rising wealth inequality, and demographic problems persist. This concentration on domestic issues could mean less bandwidth for engagement overseas.

Overseas events increasingly determine domestic realities. However, rising populist and nationalist sentiments are leading citizens to demand national solutions to global problems. Western governments will need to educate their voters on the importance of foreign policy effectively, and the role it plays in supporting domestic tranquility, rather than giving into xenophobic rhetoric and nativist policies to appease voters.

Liberal democracy is under threat.

Liberal Western powers like Germany and France lack the resources—and in the former’s case, political unity—to fill the void created by the isolationist and unilateral rhetoric and behavior emanating from the United States. In Europe, infighting between E.U. member states is obstructing badly-needed reform.

Newton’s third law—“for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction”—applies to international relations just as much as it pertains to physics. Abrupt and sudden departure from the established policy by one actor will result in numerous responses by that actor’s allies, rivals, dependents, and institutions that will impede or exacerbate the impact of that action.

The Early Stages of a Multipolar World Order was originally published on Global Security Review.

China’s President Xi Jinping is known for his predisposition towards grand diplomatic gestures that demonstrate to the world that the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” is underway. As China seeks to play a leading role on the international stage and integrate regional players into its own multilateral institutions, expect there to be significant growing pains.

On June 9-10, leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states will meet in Qingdao for their 18th annual meeting. For the first time in the organization’s history, India’s Prime Minister Modi will participate in the meeting as a full-fledged participant. This elevation in India’s standing comes on the heels of strained Sino-Indian bilateral relations, most notably the Doklam standoff in the fall of 2017.

The SCO was founded in 2001 as a security cooperation organization between China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. Billed as a new type of international organization that eschews the traditional U.S. alliance structure in favor of a consensus-driven approach, the SCO was China’s first serious foray into shaping the rules governing multilateral institutions.

As China continued to broaden its own priorities and engagement within Central Asia beyond the SCO’s initial counterterrorism mandate, the scope of the SCO’s cooperation similarly expanded. In recent years, China utilized the organization as a vehicle to sound out its ambitious economic projects, typified the Belt and Road Initiative; to develop a new framework for international cybersecurity law, and to conduct joint military exercises with regional partners.

Although India and Pakistan were admitted as SCO observers in 2005, this year’s transition to full member state status enables both to significantly shape the organization’s positions and priorities. In India’s case specifically, the SCO’s consensus-driven model will compel China and India to face incongruities in their own regional security priorities.

Nowhere is this split more evident than in Prime Minister Modi’s approach to President Xi’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative, which was made clear in India’s engagement with China earlier this spring.

In a break with usual practice, Prime Minister Modi and President Xi did not issue any official statements alongside their “informal summit” in Wuhan this April. Chinese Foreign Ministry officials commented that the purpose of their meeting, “was not to address specific problems, but to enhance strategic communication.” By lowering the stakes of engagement, Chinese and Indian officials were able to draw attention away from any substantive shortcomings and focus the public’s attention on the optical successes of Xi and Modi strolling along the lake.

Only days later, the Foreign Ministers of the SCO convened in Beijing to prepare for this weekend’s leader-level meeting. The official press release noted that all ministers, except India, formally endorsed China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). That India was unwilling to compromise its own position in the face of multilateral support underscores the government’s skepticism of BRI’s role in the broader region.

Prime Minister Modi’s participation in the SCO summit comes on the heels of his landmark Shangri-La Dialogue keynote speech outlining India’s vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. Although Prime Minister Modi noted the importance of a stable India-China bilateral relationship, his regional objectives align closely with the free and open Indo-Pacific strategies previewed by the United States and its allies.

This could cause friction during the upcoming summit. Official Chinese media outlets have publicly depicted the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy and enhanced Quadrilateral cooperation between India, the United States, Japan, and Australia as a containment strategy designed to diminish China’s regional influence.

Where President Xi and Prime Minister Modi are more likely to find common ground is charting the broader trajectory of the international system. Both have publicly affirmed the need for an increasingly multipolar world order underpinned by multilateral institutions, rather than protectionism and isolationism.

However, beyond surface-level concurrence, do not expect to see agreement between China and India on the definition of a “multipolar world.” For India, multipolarity offers a new opportunity for ascending states to reaffirm the values and principles long-cherished by those participating in the existing rules-based international order. China’s interpretation of multipolarity feeds into broader revisionist objectives, including the creation of a sphere of influence on its

Undoubtedly, India’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will constrain China’s ability to use the institution as a cheerleader for some of its most controversial policies. But what China will lose in control, it could gain in legitimacy and prestige. This added clout could prove useful if China and Russia continue to use the SCO to press the United Nations to take controversial actions, such as considering the organization’s proposed internet governance measures.

Enlisting India’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization could provide the grouping with a mandate beyond its current scope. But where President Xi will find added prestige and status, he will be forced to reckon with the costs of an empowered India willing and able to challenge his own foreign policy goals.

What to Expect from Modi’s Participation in China’s Upcoming SCO Summit was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Donald J. Trump administration has adopted the term Indo-Pacific to describe its larger strategic area of interest across the pan-Asian region. Fully realizing this strategy’s potential will require reconciling differences over the boundaries of the Indo-Pacific and what can and should be done across this enormous geography.

The term’s descriptive value matters strategically. As Australian national-security strategist Rory Medcalf wrote in 2013, the term Indo-Pacific recognizes deepened connections between the Indian Ocean region and the Western Pacific. China’s increasingly active presence in the Indian Ocean (e.g., a military base in Djibouti and intensified ties with countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives) illustrates a new reality in this maritime space.

As important, the Indo-Pacific framework inherently places India at the heart, rather than as an appendage to a concept of Asia focused on East Asia. Indeed, as Carnegie India’s C. Raja Mohan has written, the concept of Indian centrality revives a colonial-era framework that situated India in the middle of a larger maritime strategic space. This larger maritime area, described as the “confluence of the two seas” by Japanese Prime Minister Abe during a 2007 speech to the Indian parliament, has important implications.

It’s hard not to see India’s inherent relevance in this broader region—a country on the brink of becoming the world’s most populous; a stable democracy with the world’s sixth-largest economy, third-largest military by personnel strength, and fifth-largest defense budget; and a commitment to rule of law and the liberal international order.

Oceans Apart?

The Trump administration has elevated the Indo-Pacific to a top-level regional priority, as suggested by its placement in the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) [PDF]. The strategy describes the Indo-Pacific as a region in which “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place” and where “China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda.”

While the NSS calls for working in concert with U.S. allies and partners, including boosting “quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India,” otherwise known as the Quad, the newly formulated strategy also welcomes India’s rise as a “leading global power” and emphasizes expanded defense ties with New Delhi. Notably, the framework appears focused on pulling India more intensively into regional activities to its east but does not necessarily take into account India’s own interests in the Indian Ocean.

The NSS defines the Indo-Pacific region [PDF] as stretching from “the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States” (page 46). This section has no reference to Indian Ocean maritime space, including the area off the east coast of Africa, the Arabian Sea, and the Bay of Bengal. In this light, the Indo-Pacific described by the Trump administration has a lot more Pacific than it does Indo. Meanwhile, India’s sense of the region includes the larger maritime space to its west. The members of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), a minilateral organization India co-created with South Africa to better institutionalize consultation across this poorly linked area, includes countries spanning this geography.

In Search of an Agenda

If the NSS hinted at the challenges across this amorphous region, the Trump administration’s statements to date have not clarified its plan. Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy speech, delivered during his November 2017 visit to Vietnam for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum’s CEO summit, provided the highest-level vision of what the strategy intends to cover. He called for fair and reciprocal trade and infrastructure investment from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, and he affirmed the importance of rule of law, individual rights, and freedom of navigation. Still, the speech relayed no specific indication of how the administration would support these priorities in any manner that differs from the past, and it did not specify a U.S. approach to a more comprehensive Indo-Pacific geography.

Last October’s foreign policy speech delivered by then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson ahead of a visit to India—one of the few policy speeches during his brief tenure—placed heavy emphasis on working closely with India on defense and security across the Indo-Pacific, as well as providing alternatives to the “predatory economics” of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, no specific initiatives have since emerged.

This issue of “seams,” or arbitrary bureaucratic separations, bedevils Washington’s ability to cover the Indo-Pacific adequately. This is certainly true within the State Department, where the bureaus of East Asia and the Pacific, South and Central Asia, Near Eastern Affairs, and African Affairs would all be required to cover countries in the larger region. Or take the divisions within the Defense Department’s combatant commands. U.S. Pacific Command covers the Asia Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the South Asian countries of Bangladesh, India, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. But it does not cover Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are part of U.S. Central Command, nor does it encompass the islands in the Indian Ocean off the east coast of Africa, which are contained within the U.S. Africa Command area of responsibility.

For its part, India seeks further coordination with the United States not only on the eastern portion of the region—Southeast and Northeast Asia—but also to its west, spanning Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Gulf, the islands of the Indian Ocean, and the eastern coast of Africa. Finding a way to better integrate India into the larger pan-Asian region to the east, as well as better cooperating on issues that are of significant concern to India, such as counterterrorism and maritime security to the west, could go a long way toward creating an Indo-Pacific strategy that aligns with both U.S. and Indian interests.

How to Realize a Fully Indo-Pacific Strategy

First, a compelling Indo-Pacific strategy needs to incorporate an economic through-line that offers an alternative to China’s expansive regional economic framework. The U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) eliminated Washington’s proactive model for trade. Both China and India advocate an alternative trade grouping, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—an agreement of more limited ambition but whose presence, without the prospect of U.S. leadership, underscores how the United States has withered its ability to shape regional trade rules of the road. The Trump administration should reconsider joining the TPP, especially given the leadership gains it would engender from reengaging with partner countries. A TPP-rooted economic strategy for the broader region could ultimately incentivize India to join the trade pact.

Second, and closely related, Washington should champion Indian membership in APEC as a show of good faith on Indian priorities. India, with a more than $2 trillion economy, has been denied entry for more than twenty years, and its exclusion makes little strategic sense. Keeping India on the outside of a multilateral organization vital to economic activity across Asia undermines the strategic goal of expanding the Asia-Pacific framework to a larger Indo-Pacific region. An APEC with India included would expand the organization’s geography to more accurately reflect the centers of economic activity at scale, and it would be a concrete step toward realizing an Indo-Pacific region.

Third, the Trump administration should develop clear infrastructure investment initiatives with India, Japan, Australia, and others to provide transparent financing alternatives to China’s BRI, as Tillerson proposed. This is an excellent idea, but it lacks an implementation strategy. U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin initially rejected capital base expansion for the World Bank but thankfully changed his position, which should permit the United States to partner with other countries on infrastructure finance within a multilateral framework.

Existing U.S.-India-Japan consultations include a working group on infrastructure, which could identify opportunities. Tokyo and New Delhi have been working closely on this front through the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor partnership, whose vision for cross-regional connectivity [PDF] is designed to link the larger Indian Ocean region via infrastructure development, skills training, people-to-people exchange, and cooperative projects in areas including agriculture, health, and disaster management.

Fourth, Washington should take seriously the priorities and suggestions emerging from the IORA platform. The United States became an IORA dialogue partner in 2012, and it could more actively rely on the body as a forum for ideas and new Indo-Pacific-wide initiatives. Australia, India, and Indonesia are active members; the group also includes Kenya, Somalia, South Africa, and Tanzania; and U.S. allies France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom are dialogue partners. The IORA has a wide range of focus areas, from maritime security and disaster management to the blue economy, which comprises economic activity centered on the oceans, and women’s empowerment, so it should not be difficult to develop test projects amenable to all.

Fifth, diplomatic coordination should be increased not only among the Quad countries but also throughout the larger region. It could encompass regional counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts or relate to specific political or humanitarian crises, such as those in the Maldives and along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. Such a framework will require, within the U.S. system, reaching across bureaucratic boundaries. (The announcement that an Indian defense attaché will be posted at the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command in Bahrain indicates a move in this direction.)

Successive U.S. administrations have strengthened ties with India and developed strategic frameworks for a broad U.S.-India partnership. The Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific emphasis could be its most consequential strategic initiative, building on the work done by the Obama administration’s U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region. But it will need—very soon—to identify and implement some specific projects for the grand strategy to become reality.

The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Needs More Indian Ocean was originally published on Global Security Review.

• The seven largest emerging market countries could grow, on average, around two times as fast as advanced G7 economies.
• Six of the seven largest economies in the world are projected to be emerging economies. In 2050, the global economy will be led by China, with India in second place, followed by Indonesia in fourth place.
• The United States is projected to be the world’s third-largest economy in 2050, based on gross domestic product (GDP).
• The European Union’s share of world GDP could fall below 10% by 2050.
• The U.K. could drop to tenth place, with France potentially cut from the top 10, and Italy falling from the top 20. They are projected to be overtaken by countries with faster-growing economies like Mexico, Turkey, and Vietnam (respectively).

The global economy could more than double in size by 2050, far outstripping population growth, thanks to continued technology-driven productivity improvements. Emerging markets will drive global financial growth, and will progressively increase their share of world gross domestic product, based on an analysis of World Bank economic projection data. The global economy is projected to approximately double in size by 2042, growing at an annual average rate of around 2.6% between 2016 and 2050.

This growth is expected to be primarily driven by emerging market and developing nations, with the Emerging-Seven (E7) economies of Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey growing at an annual average rate of almost 3.5% during the next 34 years, compared with an annual average growth rate of 1.6% for the G7 countries of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.

 Half of the seven largest economies in the world are still considered emerging markets.

A continued shift will be observed in international economic power away from high-income advanced economies towards emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere. The E7 could account for nearly 50% of the globe’s gross domestic product by 2050, while the G7’s share of global GDP declines to just over 20%.

China has already overtaken the U.S. to become the world’s largest economy in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, while India currently stands in third place and is projected to overtake the U.S. by 2050. In terms of PPP, the United Kingdom is projected to. fall to tenth place, France is forecasted to fall out of the top ten, and Indonesia could climb to fourth place by 2050

While looking at Gross domestic product measured at market exchange rates (MERs), one doesn’t see quite such a radical shift in international economic power, representing the lower average price levels in emerging economies.

However, China is projected to be the world’s largest economy by 2030, and India the third largest in the world by 2050. This reveals a considerable and gradual shift in economic power towards Asia and the Indo-Pacific region.

Emerging economies will take center stage by 2050.

By 2050 economies like Indonesia, Brazil, and Mexico are likely to be bigger than those of the United Kingdom and France, while Egypt and Pakistan could overtake Italy and Canada. With regards to growth, Vietnam, India, and Bangladesh may be the most rapidly growing economies from 2015-2050, averaging an increase of around 5% annually.

Nigeria has the potential to be the fastest growing major African economy, and could potentially increase its national gross domestic product ranking from place to fourteenth by 2050. However, Nigeria will only realize this possibility if it can diversify its economy away from oil and strengthen its democratic institutions and national infrastructure.

Poland and Colombia exhibit great potential and are projected to be the quickest growing large economies in their respective regions; Latin America and the E.U. Many emerging economies will be supported by a relatively rapidly growing populations, boosting domestic demand and the size of the workforce.

Investments in education and improved economic freedoms are necessary to ensure there are enough jobs for the growing number of young individuals in these countries, providing a path of sustainable growth for countries with emerging markets and developing economies. 

Today’s advanced economies will continue to have higher average incomes, but developing countries will likely make progress towards eliminating that gap. With the possible exception of Italy, each of the G7 will rank above the E7 states in 2050, based on rankings of projected gross domestic product per capita.

Emerging Economies Will Hold Increasing Amounts of Global Economic Power by 2050 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The real question is, how? The post-World War II international order that enabled today’s political, economic, and security arrangements and institutions is in question as power diffuses worldwide, shuffling seats at the table of global decision making.

Today, aspiring powers seek to adjust the rules of the international order and alter the global context in a way beneficial to their interests.

This complicates any reform of international institutions such as the UN Security Council or the Bretton-Woods institutions, also brings into question whether political, civil and human rights—hallmarks of liberal values and US leadership since 1945—will continue to be so.

Norms that were believed to be settled are increasingly threatened if present trends hold, and consensus to implement and follow standards can be difficult to build as Russia, China, and Iran seek to shape regions and international norms in their favor. Some features of the evolving global order are apparent:

Rising and Declining Powers Exert Their Influence

Competition is on the increase as China and Russia seek to exert more considerable influence over their neighboring regions and encourage an order wherein US influence doesn’t dominate.

Although nations and organizations will continue to shape citizen anticipation about the future order, citizen and sub-national concerns will increasingly push states to the stage that international and domestic politics won’t be separable.

This may result in the near term in waning responsibilities to security concepts and human rights among several nations, even as many individuals and smaller groups advocate for ideas through platforms, venues, and institutions.

Authoritarian regimes are likely to reinterpret and manipulate human rights norms increasingly.  This may probably lead to decreasing consensus in the international arena on the extraterritorial obligations of nations, which might have implications for domestic societies and the resolution of humanitarian conflicts.

International Norms are Changing

The norms and practices emerging around climate change—and their influence on global and state development policies—are the more than likely candidates for fostering a twenty-first-century set of universal principles.  Majorities in 40 nations, according to a poll by Pew, say that climate change is a significant issue, with a median of 54 percent saying it’s an issue.

The near-term likelihood of international competition leading to doubt and global disorder will stay raised as long as ad-hoc internationalism persists.

As dominant nations limit cooperation to a subset of issues while asserting their interests in regional matters, international norms and institutions are likely to hamper and the global system to fragment in favor of contested regional spheres of influence.

A Multipolar Global Order Doesn’t Mean the West is “in Retreat” was originally published on Global Security Review.

Donald Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State Rex Tillerson made some surprising remarks about China and the South China Sea during his recent Senate confirmation hearings. He said the US should “send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops, and second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.”

His comments created a furor in the international media as it seems the US might resort to force by blockading the Chinese-occupied features in the South China Sea.

James Mattis, Trump’s defense secretary nominee, was more circumspect in his remarks to the Senate Armed Services Committee. He identified defense of so-called “international waters” as the “bottom line” for the US, suggesting the US would defend freedom of navigation in the South China Sea without challenging the Chinese presence there.

Mattis’ comments were in line with US policy towards the South China Sea while Tillerson’s remarks were not. But why is the South China Sea so strategically crucial to the US anyway?

The Chinese regularly castigate the Americans for “meddling” in the area and have difficulty understanding why the US takes a stand on the issue. In their view, the US is making trouble for China and preventing its rise as a high power. The Chinese want to see the Americans abandon the South China Sea and withdraw from the western Pacific.

Some commentators in the US and elsewhere agree. They argue that this would allow America to forge an accommodation with China, which would remove the prospect of conflict between the world’s two largest economies and bring peace and stability.

Others have called for a G-2 or a US-China accord that would settle global problems. They claim that the US is already overstretched and should return to the “offshore” position that it had before the Korean war broke out in 1950. Why let the South China Sea get in the way of this possible accommodation?

Chinese regional presence

The South China Sea has become critical to the US because of China’s challenge to the liberal rules-based order that America has promoted since the Pacific war. The post-war regional order was based on the American presence, which set the stage for impressive economic growth and regional prosperity without the threat of war or conflict.

It ensured that maritime disputes and territorial claims would be resolved through negotiation and not military power. And it served as the basis for the development of trade and regional economic relations from which all countries in the region benefited.

America’s concern with the South China Sea is a result of China’s effort to secure control over the maritime territory and the resources it contains. China insists on “indisputable sovereignty” over the area but some other claimants – Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines – have the law on their side.

All have exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the South China Sea, which is their right under UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and which the Chinese dismiss. To clarify the matter, the Philippines appealed to a tribunal convened under UNCLOS to rule on the situation.

In July 2016, the tribunal issued its judgment and upheld the rights of the ASEAN claimants to their EEZs, noting that the Chinese claim had no legal basis. China, however, has ignored legality in this dispute and is prepared to back its claim with military power. If it does not recognize the rules, the regional order that the US has been promoting breaks up.

China has militarized the Spratly Islands by engaging in reclamation projects in the South China Sea. The Chinese have been dredging sand from the ocean floor and extending the size of seven reefs they have occupied.

They have constructed three airfields there; two are 3,000 meters in length, one is 2,600 meters. These airfields can support military aircraft including bombers and large transport aircraft. With this military presence, China would be able to control the South China Sea. And its strengthened position has geopolitical consequences for the US.

The way ahead

The South China Sea has become an essential area for the implementation of China’s naval strategy, including blockading Taiwan, and power projection into the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It also has some of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.

The Chinese often say that they respect freedom of navigation but can they be trusted? The Japanese think not. During a territorial dispute with Japan in 2010, the Chinese banned the supply of rare earth metals, which were necessary for Japan’s electronics industry, to the country.

The Chinese could block Japanese trade, which would need to be diverted elsewhere at considerable cost. Indeed, control of the South China Sea would allow China to interfere with Japanese and South Korean trade conducted through the area.

For America, then, the future of the current regional order and the security of its allies – Japan and South Korea – is at stake. To maintain its geopolitical position in the western Pacific, the US is obliged to defend the regional alliance system and reassure local powers who are concerned about China’s intentions.

Leaving the South China Sea to the Chinese would undermine that alliance system and America’s presence in the western Pacific. China would become the dominant power in the area, and regional countries would gravitate towards it.

In October 2015, the Obama Administration responded to China’s actions by launching “freedom of navigation” naval patrols in the South China Sea, sending a clear signal that America would not be chased out of the area.

By all indications, the Trump administration is likely to be more aggressive in resisting China in the South China Sea and more forceful about preventing the erosion of America’s position in the region.

Trump has already broken with diplomatic convention by speaking with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen over the phone. More can be expected to demonstrate a new American assertiveness.

One possibility is the formation of an American South China Sea naval squadron that would maintain a regular presence in the region to show the Chinese that they cannot dominate the area. The Trump administration might also strengthen security ties with Japan and attempt to orchestrate the creation of a coalition of powers bringing together Australia, India, as well as Japan, to stand up to China.

Why is the South China Sea So Important to the U.S.? was originally published on Global Security Review.

• At-sea deployments of nuclear weapons by India, Pakistan, and perhaps China, would increasingly nuclearize the Indian Ocean throughout the next two decades.
• The presence of multiple nuclear powers in the Indian ocean operating nuclear-armed vessels increases the potential risk of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation.

Nuclear deployment requirements for naval-based delivery vehicles remove a safety valve that, until now, has kept atomic weapons stored separately from missiles in South Asia.

Pakistan will feel compelled to address India’s economic and conventional military capabilities through asymmetric means. Pakistan will seek to enhance its nuclear deterrent against India by expanding its nuclear arsenal and delivery means, including pursuing battlefield nuclear weapons and sea-based options.

India will focus its attention on both Islamabad and Beijing—seeking military partnerships with Europe, Japan, the US, and others—to boost its conventional capabilities while striving for escalation dominance vis-a-vis Pakistan.

India will continue to offer smaller South Asian nations a stake in India’s financial growth through development assistance and increased connectivity to India’s economy. This strategy will contribute to India’s broader effort to assert its role as the predominant regional power. At the same time, violent extremism and extreme ideology-based terrorism continue to spread throughout South Asia.

Violent extremism, terrorism, and instability will continue to hang over nuclear-armed Pakistan.

The threat of terrorism, from Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and al-Qaeda and its affiliates as well as ISIL’s expansion and sympathy for associated ideology—will remain prominent in the area.

Competition for jobs, coupled with discrimination against minorities, might contribute to the radicalization of the region’s youth, especially given abnormal sex ratios favoring males in several nations.

In increasingly volatile Pakistan, which neighbors India, there is a significant concern at the regional and global levels that a non-state actor could obtain a nuclear weapon in Pakistan. This scenario would be particularly challenging to manage, as conventional deterrence practices don’t deter a non-state actor like a trans-national terrorist group, creating a significant threat for neighboring India.

Disaster in South Asia: Nuclear Deployments & Violent Extremism was originally published on Global Security Review.

India’s GDP trajectory over the next 34 years is distinctly separate from its GDP per capita progression, demonstrating that while strong population growth can be an integral driver of Gross domestic product growth, it may also make it more challenging to boost income levels.

Nevertheless, this gap is closing. U.S. Gross domestic product per capita is presently around four times the size of China and almost nine times that of India. By 2050, these openings are projected to reduce to about double China and approximately three times India’s, demonstrating long-term income convergence.

The global economy will slow down with time, with a marked moderation in growth rates following the year 2020. Annual worldwide financial growth will average around 3.5% until 2020, slowing down to 2.7% for 2021-2030, 2.5% for the decade following that, and then to 2.4% for 2041-2050.

This will happen because many advanced economies are experiencing and will experience a marked decline in their working-age population. At the same time, emerging economy growth rates will average out as these economies grow.

Challenges for policymakers in achieving a long-term, sustainable expansion

To realize their full economic potential, emerging market governments must implement structural reforms to improve their macroeconomic stability, infrastructure and institutions, evaluations show the high possibility that emerging economies must grow and thrive in the coming decades.

But to realize this opportunity in total, they must undertake sustained and adequate investments in education, infrastructure, and technology. Worldwide demand growth and falling oil price over latest years have highlighted the significance of savings for long-term sustainable growth. Underlying all this is the requirement to develop political, economic, legal and social institutions to create incentives for innovation and entrepreneurship, making economies wherein to do business.

Looking forward, the global economics faces many challenges to profitable economic growth. Structural developments, like aging populations and climate change, require forward-thinking policies that equip the workforce to be able to make societal contributions later in life while promoting sustainable development.

Falling international trade growth, rising inequality, and increasing economic uncertainties will intensify the need to achieve economies which generate opportunities for everybody in a broad selection of industries. Businesses will need to adopt flexible and proactive approaches to navigate fast-changing and aging markets.

Market developments will create opportunities for business.

These will appear as these economies advance to new industries, to engage with world markets as well as their populations—which will be more youthful on average than in advanced countries—get more affluent.

As these emerging nations develop their institutions, fostering social stability and strengthening their macroeconomics principles, they’ll become more attractive places to conduct business and live, bring talent and investment. These economies are often volatile and quickly evolving, however, so companies will need operating strategies to succeed in them. Businesses should be ready to adjust their brand and market positions to match and preferences.

An in-depth understanding of the local marketplace, policy agendas, and consumer priorities will be crucial. Frequent collaboration with local partners will be essential. One key recommendation is that international companies along with other investors will be patient enough to ride out the short-term economic and political downs and ups which will unavoidably occur every once in a while in markets as they head toward adulthood. However, failure to interact with these markets means missing out on the bulk of the expected global economic development between now and 2050.

Acheiving Sustainable Economic Growth in the E7 was originally published on Global Security Review.

China does not engage in alliance structures targeted against third countries. This was to allow for China to retain an independent foreign policy stance while avoiding international entanglements due to its alliances with others.

The collapse of the Cold War system and the rise of China’s economic and military influence have brought this policy under scrutiny as well. Beijing has watched cautiously as NATO has expanded eastward and as the United States has strengthened its military alliances in the Asia-Pacific region.

Beijing’s no-alliance policy leaves China potentially facing these groups alone, something it has neither the military nor the economic strength to effectively counter.

The current semi-alliance structure employed by Beijing is designed to counter its weaknesses while ensuring China isn’t beholden to its partners.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China’s push for strategic bilateral partnerships (even with its ostensible rivals), and increased military and humanitarian disaster drills with other nations are part of this strategy.

The strategy is less about building an alliance structure against the United States than it is about breaking down the alliance structures that could be built against China by getting closer to traditional U.S. partners, making them less willing to take strong actions against China.

In its maritime strategy, Beijing is working with India, Japan and Korea in counter-piracy operations and engaging in more naval exchanges and offers of joint exercises and drills.

Multilateral security agreements support U.S. naval dominance in Asia.

Beijing’s strategy, however, is falling short as the United States begins to more openly embrace China as a potential entity to be countered against, and is courting allies and partners like India to play critical functions in bolstering a rules-based order throughout Southeast and East Asia.

China and India have similarly-sized populations, and by 2050 India may overtake China as the world’s largest and most populous economy. China’s one-child policy, exclusionary immigration policies, and population management efforts have wreaked havoc on the country’s demographic profile. China, in the coming decades, will play host to a much older population than other rising or developing powers like India or Vietnam.

Furthermore, an English-speaking democracy like India posits an ideal strategic partner for Washington, as it endeavors to strengthen its foothold in Southeast Asia, particularly as China begins to flex its newly-minted naval muscles around the South China Sea.

India has a competent green-water navy that can be significantly bolstered if provided with training and equipment by the United States. Traditional U.S.-allies like Australia and Japan were regularly participating in multi-lateral war games with the United States and India throughout the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.

The U.S. strategic plan for the Indo-Pacific.

In a 2017 speech, then-U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson laid out part of the Trump administration’s Asia strategy: re-orienting towards India and applying pressure to China.

The secretary said that the administration is “determined to dramatically deepen” the U.S.-India partnership at diplomatic, economic, and military levels.  Tillerson added, “President Trump and Prime Minister Modi are committed—more than any of our leaders before them—to building an ambitious partnership not only between our two great democracies but other sovereign nations working towards greater peace and stability.”

The secretary’s remarks on relations between the world’s largest democratic states emphasized the concept of an Indo-U.S. strategic partnership as “the eastern and western beacons” for a global, rules-based order that is currently—and increasingly—under strain. China responded with a statement saying it “contributes to and defends the rules-based world order” and seeks to advance international cooperation through the United Nations. It also hopes for a “healthy and sound” China-U.S. relationship.

State Department officials have indicated that this speech was designed to map out a strategy for a U.S.-India alliance or quasi-alliance over the next century. In this model, East Asia’s leading democratic states—namely Australia and Japan—would balance with the United States against China’s growing challenges to and influence over the international rules-based order.

With regards to the impact a re-positioning to India would have on U.S.-China relations, Tillerson stated that the United States continues to seek constructive relations with China, but “won’t shrink” from challenges posed by China when it “subverts the sovereignty of neighboring countries, and disadvantages the United States and our friends.”

Balancing China: The Foundations of an Indo-U.S. Strategic Partnership was originally published on Global Security Review.

• At-sea deployments of nuclear weapons by India, Pakistan, and perhaps China, would increasingly nuclearize the Indian Ocean throughout the next two decades.
• The presence of multiple nuclear powers in the Indian ocean operating nuclear-armed vessels increases the potential risk of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation.

India will be the world’s fastest-growing economies throughout the next five years

India will be the world’s fastest-growing economies throughout the next five years as China’s economy cools and growth elsewhere sputters, but internal tensions over inequality and religion will complicate its expansion.

New Delhi, however, will continue to offer smaller South Asian nations a stake in India’s financial growth through development assistance and increased connectivity to India’s economy, contributing to India’s broader effort to assert its role as the predominant regional power. The quality of India’s development depends on addressing general poor public health, sanitation, and infrastructure conditions.

The rate of malnourished kids, for instance, is higher in India than in Sub-Saharan Africa. Populism and sectarianism will intensify if Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan fail to provide employment and education for growing urban populations and officials continue to govern principally through identity politics.

Human health, food security, infrastructure, and livelihoods will deteriorate from pollution, earthquakes and the effects of climate change, including shifting monsoon patterns and increasing glacier melt.

South Asia’s openness to the private sector, community groups, and non-governmental organizations, however, should position it well for an era of empowered individuals, mainly if governments curb their support for chauvinistic groups that divide societies.

India will focus its attention on both Islamabad and Beijing—seeking military partnerships with Europe, Japan, the US, and others—to boost its conventional capabilities while striving for escalation dominance vis-a-vis Pakistan.

India will continue to offer smaller South Asian nations a stake in India’s financial growth through development assistance and increased connectivity to India’s economy. This strategy will contribute to India’s broader effort to assert its role as the predominant regional power.

Violent extremism, terrorism, and instability will continue to hang over nuclear-armed Pakistan.

The threat of terrorism, from Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and al-Qaeda and its affiliates as well as ISIL’s expansion and sympathy for associated ideology—will remain prominent in the area.

Competition for jobs, coupled with discrimination against minorities, might contribute to the radicalization of the region’s youth, especially given abnormal sex ratios favoring males in several nations.

In increasingly volatile Pakistan, which neighbors India, there is a significant concern at the regional and global levels that a non-state actor could obtain a nuclear weapon in Pakistan. This scenario would be particularly challenging to manage, as conventional deterrence practices don’t deter a non-state actor like a trans-national terrorist group, creating a significant threat for neighboring India.

Pakistan will feel compelled to address India’s economic and conventional military capabilities through asymmetric means. Pakistan will seek to enhance its nuclear deterrent against India by expanding its nuclear arsenal and delivery means, including pursuing battlefield nuclear weapons and sea-based options.

India, by contrast, will focus its attention on both Islamabad and Beijing—seeking military partnerships with Europe, Japan, the US, and others—to boost its conventional capabilities while striving for escalation dominance vis-a-vis Pakistan.

South Asia: India and Pakistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

India has ignored China’s August 19 deadline for withdrawing Indian troops from the Doklam Plateau. Despite Chinese threats of ‘annihilation,’ the deadline has come and gone, raising questions about how this dispute will be resolved—or further escalate. Both parties, at the time of this briefing, have agreed to stand down their respective troops deployed along the Line of Actual Control. However, India and China have both made it clear that they are not relinquishing their respective claims, leaving the door open for heightened tensions down the road as this dispute continues to develop.

For nearly two months, China and India have been engaged in a tense standoff on the Doklam Plateau. Indian and Chinese troops are positioned just meters apart along the Line of Actual Control. The dispute began on June 16 when Indian forces physically prevented Chinese soldiers and construction workers from constructing a roadway through the Doka La mountain pass. India justified its actions by stating that Bhutan had requested Indian assistance, under the terms of a Bhutan-India treaty agreement. Bhutan claims the pass is within its internationally recognized territory on the tri-junction border it shares with China and India.

While India ignores the August deadline, China has warned citizens against traveling to India.

China’s August 19 deadline for Indian withdrawal from the plateau was a rarity. In issuing such a deadline, China has backed itself into a corner, a potentially embarrassing scenario for Chinese President Xi Jinping. It can either find a way to save face (domestically and internationally) by ending the dispute with India on mutually beneficial terms, or it can escalate the situation further.

The former option would be risky in that China risks looking weak, like a “paper tiger.” Conversely, the latter option would hurt China’s image abroad but would give China’s leaders the ability to play upon growing domestic nationalist sentiments. However, conflict is highly risky in that China would also risk economic disruption which would hinder its’ strategic political and economic interests.

The Chinese government claims that the tri-junction is actually several miles south of Doka La, therefore placing the pass within Chinese territory.  China’s actions in the area are seen as a threat by India due to close proximity of Chinese troops and development projects to the Siliguri corridor, which narrowly connects India’s remote north-western territory to the Indian mainland. Maintaining sovereignty over the Siliguri corridor is a geostrategic priority for India; an incursion would cut off any connection between India proper and the Indian northwest.

Chinese Propaganda and Disinformation Tactics

On August 9, the Chinese government claimed that Bhutan’s government told Beijing through diplomatic channels that Bhutan doesn’t regard the Doklam standoff as being within Bhutanese territory. However, Bhutan refutes the Chinese claim and reiterated that the Bhutanese position is that Chinese actions violate existing agreements.

In an effort to craft an alternative narrative where Bhutan recognizes the Doklam Plateau as belonging to China, not Bhutan, Chinese state media has routinely insisted that Bhutan and China have no dispute. China also reportedly has been using disinformation campaigns and psychological warfare tactics against Indian targets to intimidate troops and manipulate public opinion.

Troop Deployments and Military Exercises on the Doklam Plateau

China has about 300 troops deployed on the Doklam Plateau.  Another 800 Chinese troops (not quite battalion-strength) are stationed in the nearby area. India has around 350 troops deployed facing Chinese troops, with three additional brigades stationed in nearby areas.

India’s armed forces do not plan for additional troop deployments to the plateau, as their intent is to deter China while avoiding an escalation in tensions. However, India’s military command has moved its forces into a state of “No war, no peace,” a state of alert where soldiers take up pre-determined positions in the event of a conflict.

The Indian Army also conducted its planned Operational Alert training exercise early. Originally planned for later in September or October, the Operational Alert exercise began in early August. It was designed to acclimate troops to operating high altitude, while showcasing the battle readiness and deployment of Indian troops, without provoking Chinese soldiers stationed just meters across the border.

Analysis: probability of conflict increases if China’s actions are influenced by Xi’s domestic political standing

The Doklam standoff could have domestic political consequences, particularly in China.  The Communist Party’s 19th Congress will convene in November. President Xi Jinping expected to further consolidate his power during the Congress.

But, if Xi’s political credibility is damaged due to perceived weakness, his political future will be in jeopardy, as would the legitimacy of the communist party he has structured around him. Alternatively, Chinese political discourse may alter in the aftermath of the conference, allowing the Chinese military to withdraw troops without running afoul of the more disruptive, nationalist voices within the country.

India-China Dispute on the Doklam Plateau was originally published on Global Security Review.

Beijing and Moscow will seek to lock in competitive advantages and also to right what they bill are historical wrongs before economic and demographics headwinds further slow their material progress and the West regains its foundation.

Both China and Russia maintain worldviews where they’re rightfully dominant in their regions and able to form regional politics and economics to match their security and material interests.

Both have moved aggressively in latest years to exert more considerable influence in their regions, to contest the US geopolitically, and also to force Washington to accept exclusionary regional spheres of influence—a situation that the US has historically opposed.

National Security and Energy Interests of Rising and Declining Powers

For instance, China views the continuing presence of the US Navy in the Western Pacific, the centrality of US alliances in the region, and US protection of Taiwan as obsolete and representative of the continuation of China’s “one hundred years of humiliation.” Recent cooperation has been tactical and is likely to come back to competition if Beijing jeopardizes China’s dramatic growth has highlighted greater gaps between poor and rich.

Russian interests in Central Asia and as Beijing enjoys options for inexpensive energy supply beyond Russia. Furthermore, it isn’t clear whether there’s a mutually acceptable boundary between what Russia and China consider their natural spheres of influence.

India navigates its path

In the meantime, India’s growing economic power and profile in the region will further complicate these calculations, as New Delhi navigates relations with Beijing, Moscow, and Washington to shield its own expanding interests. Russian assertiveness will harden viewpoints in the Baltics along with other portions of Europe, escalating the potential risk of conflict.

Russia will seek, and sometimes feign, international cooperation, although openly challenging norms and rules it perceives as a counter to its interests and providing support for leaders of fellow “handled democracies” which promote resistance to American policies and personal tastes.

Moscow has little stake in the rules of the international economics and may be counted on to take actions that weaken the United States’ and European Union’s institutional advantages. Moscow will test NATO and resolve, seeking to undermine Western authenticity; it will attempt to exploit splits between Europe’s both north and south and east and west, and also to drive a wedge between the US and the EU.

Likewise, Moscow will become more active in the Middle East and these areas of the world wherein it believes it can check US influence. Lastly, Russia will Stay dedicated to atomic weapons as a deterrent and as a counter to stronger conventional military forces, as well as it’s ticket to superpower status.

Russian military doctrine allegedly includes the limited use of nuclear weapons in a situation where Russia’s vital interests are at stake to “de-escalate” a conflict by demonstrating that continued conventional conflict risks escalating the emergency to a large-scale nuclear exchange.

The Assertions of Rising and Declining World Powers was originally published on Global Security Review.

There seems to have been a de-escalation between India and China in the border dispute over the Doklam Plateau, but the dormant battle across the Himalayas continues.

The Himalayas form a powerful barrier. But, there are areas where the boundary is contested, producing constant tension. The long frontier between India and China is disrupted by two nations south of the Himalayas primary variety and open to India’s heartland: Bhutan and Nepal.

As Bhutan and Nepal are strategically vital to India’s interests, New Delhi yields considerable influence on them, and can, at times, overstep.

India has exercised influence on their internal policies, including by enforcing trade restrictions. The Himalayas are still an efficient line of defense for India against potential Chinese aggression, since traversing them is very difficult. However stronger Chinese influence on Bhutan and Nepal might be strategically lethal for India.

India and China are both emerging world powers with ambitions of regional hegemony. India has numerous concerns aside from its Himalayan border. China became a close commercial and strategic partner of its longtime adversary, Pakistan. Furthermore, the Chinese navy is increasing its presence in the Indian Ocean as part of its One Belt, One Road initiative.

China’s Growing Influence in the Southern Hemisphere

Chinese influence is climbing in Africa, on the other side of the Indian Ocean, and its influence is growing in neighboring Burma, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. And on the other hand, India firmly supports Vietnam, that has repeating disputes with China over the South China Sea and works in close cooperation with the United States.

In the 1950s, China annexed Tibet, which is poorly populated because of its elevation and climate. It is located just north of the primary section of the Himalayas. It isn’t just strategically significant, but it’s a source of water to vast portions of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and China.

China has brought infrastructure such as improved railroads to Tibet. It’s now working on similar projects to connect China to neighboring states in the Himalayas. China has been improving access to the region with contemporary railroads and highways. It’s also increasing its presence in the area with major road and railway projects through the Himalayas, connecting it with Pakistan, and plans to construct comparable links to Nepal.

Improved rail infrastructure in the Himalayas would connect these states to China’s entire transportation network, which continues to be further developed and modernized. Additionally, China might use its control over the region’s water as a means of exerting influence.

Analysis: China is Unprepared for a Conflict with India

A big issue for China is the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, which is scheduled for October 19. A blunder in Doklam could, in the worst case, cause a power struggle that forces Chinese President Xi Jinping to step down. Xi might still face criticism in the Congress for having to back down in Doklam, but not as far as in other situations. China’s expansionist policies in the South China Sea and elsewhere have won praise throughout China.

Xi’s expansionist policies leave analysts with many questions about where he is leading China. Relations between China and neighboring states like Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, are tense.

Lastly, it is becoming more and more clear that there is a decreasing chance of a peaceful reunification with Taiwan. More pressingly, the ongoing North Korea nuclear weapons crisis presents extreme risks to China in the short term.

Asian Hegemony: Ongoing Tensions Between China and India was originally published on Global Security Review.