In February 2022, days after Russian forces crossed into Ukraine, Putin placed his nuclear arsenal on high alert and warned that any nation interfering would face consequences unlike any in its history. The warning to those who might intervene – specifically NATO. Four years on, NATO has provided extensive military and economic support to Ukraine without paying the price Putin had threatened. However, the threat still begs a question the U.S. has never answered. How would Washington protect the homeland, rather than merely avenge a nuclear strike? President Biden warned Moscow of severe consequences for any nuclear use in Ukraine but kept the American response ambiguous. The U.S. may or may not use nuclear weapons against Russia in defense of Ukraine, but a different reaction may occur if the target were a NATO country.  

Because of the distance between the two countries, a Russian strike on the U.S. would likely require long-range ballistic missiles launched from land or submarine. Even though eighty years of deterrence have kept that prospect remote, a single failure such as a misinterpretation or escalatory mobilization of forces could lead to a catastrophic reaction. The U.S. fields layered interceptors, yet the possibility of wide devastation remains. In January 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14186 which launched the “Golden Dome” initiative. The order, titled “The Iron Dome for America,” directed the Pentagon to develop a more sophisticated, layered shield against ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles. The concept is analogous in purpose to Israel’s “Iron Dome,” but the planned U.S. architecture is far broader. It calls for space-based sensors, interceptors, and  non-kinetic capabilities. Potential systems could even include directed-energy weapons such as lasers.  

Antimissile defense is not new. In the 1980s, President Reagan initiated the Strategic Defense Initiative, more widely known as Star Wars. The program envisioned, among others, a space-based antimissile system that could provide a comprehensive defense against enemy missiles. That vision never came to fruition. However, technology has evolved, and the U.S. now operates Ground-Based Midcourse Defense, Aegis, THAAD and Patriot which are foundations for Golden Dome. These could build on and be consolidated to add new space-based antimissile capabilities. However, there are problems with this approach. The Government Accounting Office has documented challenges in transitioning DOD directed-energy prototypes, including high-energy lasers, into operational use and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) assesses that directed-energy weapons, such as lasers, are unlikely to be fielded soon. Another problem is that the Golden Dome’s cost is still unknown. The CBO’s estimate is that a national missile defense architecture broadly consistent with the executive order could cost upwards of $1.2 trillion to develop, deploy, and operate over two decades. Every dollar carries an opportunity cost, reducing the: money that could be used to modernize other systems or reduce the national debt.  

Further, determining the Golden Dome’s effectiveness is problematic due to the difficulty of  intercepting ballistic missiles, and the need is to stop multiple missiles or further influence an adversary’s actions. The CBO found that a national missile defense architecture of this type could fully engage a regional-adversary attack or a small-scale attack by a peer adversary, but it could be overwhelmed by a full-scale attack from Russia or China.  

The CBO also warned that deployment could prompt adversaries to increase missile inventories, expand long-range arsenals, or pursue more effective countermeasures, including nuclear weapons. While the intention of the dome would be to make America safer, it could do the opposite. A commonly cited anecdote, known as the cobra effect, offers a warning about best-laid plans. This anecdote purports that British officials in colonial India offered a bounty for dead cobras; residents allegedly began breeding them for the reward, and when the bounty ended, the snakes were released which made the metropolitan areas in India more unsafe. A policy intended to reduce the cobra population produced the opposite result. The same could be true of the Golden Dome and must be considered in the calculus for its implementation.  

Concerns for Golden Dome go beyond the dome antimissile defense. A shield intended to reduce American vulnerability could make an adversary feel more exposed, encouraging it to build or diversify forces in other areas. Russia condemned Golden Dome arguing weapons in space are a provocation and they militarize space. The Soviets had a similar reaction to the Star Wars program. Russia may simply build more missiles and decoys to ensure enough survive. Russia is positioned to do so with impunity given that New START expired in February 2026. For the first time in decades the largest arsenals on earth are no longer bound by a bilateral cap.  

Whoever follows Putin may well prove worse. Even thought the forgoing text focusses on Russia, other adversaries are not far behind. North Korea continues to expand and diversify its nuclear and ballistic-missile capabilities. China continues a major expansion of its nuclear and missile forces. An even with the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the Iranian regime continues to show an unwillingness to curb their pursuit of missiles and weapons of mass destruction.  

Will Russia’s current nuclear weapons levels increase like the cobras in India? It is unknown, but regardless, the argument for the dome is strong. An imperfect defense would still complicate Russia’s planning and could improve protection against limited or accidental launches. Golden Dome could make America safer, however there is risk that it may do the opposite; no one can yet say. However, uncertainty is not a reason to abandon the concept, but a reason to keep exploring and to field it once it is ready. The dangers are not diminishing, and the world is growing less predictable. A nation must mitigate the dangers that exist and find a way not to release the bounty on the cobras.  

Darrell Allen II is a graduate student in the Defense and Strategic Studies program at Missouri State University, where his research focuses on national security, deterrence, and international affairs. He also publishes a newsletter on Substack. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Would Golden Dome Make America Safer? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Is North Korea winning? Along with the country’s expanding nuclear arsenal and delivery systems, North Korea continues to develop and demonstrate expertise in cyber and space warfare that soon may threaten U.S. vital interests and complicate the broader competition between great powers. North Korea’s deepening ties with Russia, including valuable lessons gained from its participation in Russia’s war against Ukraine, will further embolden an already aggressive regime. While each of these developments has been analyzed individually, their cumulative strategic implications have received far less attention. A comprehensive assessment is overdue. The world needs to understand how North Korea’s advancing nuclear, missile, conventional, cyber, and space capabilities, along with its growing strategic partnership with Russia, will influence the regional and global security environment in the coming decades. 

North Korea has proven to be adept at using its cyber capabilities to evade or mitigate the effects of economic sanctions. The theft of cryptocurrency and other assets from financial institutions has evolved into a complex and sustained effort. Pyongyang’s strategy now includes penetrating Western firms that unknowingly hire North Korean IT workers. North Korea has been able to generate billions of dollars from these activities, both through earned income and the theft of intellectual property, and the funds are then used to finance the regime’s missile and nuclear programs: a lose-lose proposition for the U.S. and its allies. 

At present, Western governments are struggling to respond to these challenges even as China and Russia continue to provide North Korea with cyber-related training and support. Coordinated cyber operations between these three powers will be a logical outgrowth. Accurate and timely attribution of cyberattacks is already challenging. In a crisis or conflict, North Korea could serve as a proxy for China and Russia to leverage against the U.S. 

North Korea has recently shown an interest in developing military capabilities in space. This includes surveillance and so-called “counterspace capabilities” to inhibit an adversary’s assured access to space. Russia is increasingly providing North Korea with space-related expertise, including launch infrastructure and launch assistance. With ongoing Russian support, North Korea could achieve significant technological breakthroughs that typically take other countries decades. It remains uncertain what restrictions Moscow is willing to impose on technology transferred to Pyongyang. Considering North Korea’s willingness and history of proliferation, the U.S. might face new threats from other states seeking counterspace capabilities. 

The U.S. is dependent on assured access to space for the functioning of its economy and to conduct military operations. Thanks to its missile program, North Korea could seek to develop a capability to knock out U.S. satellites. Additionally, North Korea has shown interest in using nuclear weapons at high altitudes to generate an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to negate U.S. technological dominance. Because North Korea does not rely on space as the U.S. does, these developments would give the regime significant leverage in a future confrontation. As in the cyber domain, China and Russia may leverage North Korea as a deniable proxy actor in space to threaten or attack U.S. interests. 

As the U.S. watches from the sidelines, North Korea continues to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has stated that the regime has recently added infrastructure at its Yongbyon complex, which will allow it to increase the yearly production of nuclear warheads. North Korea is developing and testing a wide range of missiles, including hypersonics, some of which can hold the U.S. homeland at risk. North Korea is expected to have 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles by 2035. Worse yet, as North Korea’s nuclear-tipped ballistic missile arsenal grows, the existing U.S. missile defense architecture is at risk of being overwhelmed and becoming obsolete. Golden Dome for America could strengthen homeland defense against North Korea by improving missile detection, tracking, and interception. As Pyongyang expands its missile arsenal, a layered and expanding missile defense architecture could diminish North Korea’s nuclear strike credibility and boost U.S. resilience. 

While significant emphasis is placed on analyzing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, it is important to highlight that the regime is believed to possess a significant biological and chemical weapons capability. Biological and chemical weapons provide an adversary with deniability. Continued investment in production and research infrastructure indicates the regime values these asymmetric capabilities despite international tones and laws. In February 2017, Kim Jong Nam, the half-brother of North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un, was assassinated in the Kuala Lumpur International Airport after being exposed to the VX nerve agent. North Korea’s ability to produce biological and chemical weapons at an industrial scale, along with its proliferation history and willingness to employ such weapons, presents significant challenges for the U.S. 

For decades, observers have confidently declared that North Korea is on the verge of collapse. Yet, despite years of domestic, economic, and geopolitical sanctions, the regime has not only survived but also thrived in measurable ways. Throughout its history, North Korea has shown a tendency for brinkmanship, coercion, and deception to achieve its goals. Furthermore, Kim Jong Un has integrated the proliferation of military technology, cyber-enabled theft, and sanctions evasion into his broader strategy for sustaining the regime and advancing its military modernization programs. Supported by China and Russia, North Korea has moved from being an isolated rogue state to a dangerous regional power with proxy potential. If Pyongyang effectively combines its growing cyber, space, and WMD capabilities into a coordinated denial and coercion strategy, the U.S. may have limited options during a crisis or conflict. Given the high stakes, Washington must holistically reevaluate its goals, objectives, and means toward Pyongyang before it is too late. The U.S. must ensure that North Korea cannot succeed in coercing the world, threatening the U.S. homeland, or fundamentally altering the strategic balance in Northeast Asia. 

Nathan A. Heard is a doctoral student in the Defense and Strategic Studies Program at Missouri State University, focusing on deterrence and strategic competition. Heard holds a master’s degree in defense and strategic studies and a graduate certificate in countering weapons of mass destruction from Missouri State University, as well as undergraduate degrees in business and information systems management. He authored the December 2025 graduate thesis, “A Novel Deterrence Strategy: Denial Through Space and Cyberspace.” The views expressed in this article are solely his own.

The Coming Crisis with North Korea was originally published on Global Security Review.

First, SDI was not an actual defense initiative as much as it was a response to the Soviet Union’s rapidly growing strategic nuclear offensive forces and their own anti-satellite space forces. As William Van Cleave wrote in his 1986 report,

The Soviet Union has long been developing a multifaceted ballistic missile defense and, in fact, has already begun deploying such a defense. The Soviets have also began exploiting space for military purposes nearly two decades ago. They have already deployed anti-satellite (ASAT) space weapons. The overriding threat to American security today—that is, a rapid growth in offensive nuclear and conventional weapons systems—has come about precisely because the Soviet Union has been racing to build a weapons system, while the United States has not.

The same can be said of China today and is true of Golden Dome.

While there are plenty of Chinese, Russian, and Western arms control advocates criticizing Golden Dome as weaponization of space and an imbalance of forces, they all fail to note that Golden Dome is a response to the current imbalance of nuclear and space forces that advantages China and Russia. The utility of nuclear weapons, coupled with the advancement of hypersonic and space-to-ground attack options in the hands of the nation’s enemies grew in recent years.

The Chinese are in the midst of a breakout in the size and capability of their nuclear forces. Both China and Russia are engaging in a similar effort with their space attack forces. Both deployed ASAT and other space weapons systems that not only threaten American critical space infrastructure, but the homeland itself. As such, Golden Dome is a response to the already de-stabilizing activities of the Chinese and Russians. They, not the United States, are actively building weapons systems, especially in space.

Second, the narrative that SDI was a weapons development program is false. President Reagan’s speech directing SDI called it a research or “study” program. The 1985 Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative said that “it should be stressed that SDI is a research program that seeks to provide the technical knowledge required to support a decision on whether to develop and later deploy advanced defensive systems. It is not a program to deploy those weapons.”

President Trump understands this by his comments that while Reagan pursued SDI, “[he] didn’t have the technology.” However, Golden Dome is, in fact, a weapons deployment program. As his directive in the executive order states, “The United States will provide for the common defense of its citizens and the nation by deploying and maintaining a next-generation missile defense shield…[including] the development and deployment of proliferated space-based interceptors capable of boost-phase intercept,” among other sensors, trackers, and other weapons capable of defeating various threats from hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missiles. While SDI was a study for a future decision to deploy space-based missile defenses, Golden Dome is the decision to deploy before Trump leaves office.

Finally, another false narrative in the anti–Golden Dome commentaries is that the system will be full of “untested technology.” This is not the case. If anyone looks at the systems listed in the executive order from January 2025, one will see that several of the sensors and layers are already in the current programs of record, many of which have already started deployment in orbit.

While some of the systems, such as the space-based interceptor, are not deployed yet, the technology for intercepting such missiles is in various forms of testing and/or use—for decades. Just because SDI had grand visions of lasers bouncing off mirrors or large chemical lasers in space, does not mean that Golden Dome’s space-based interceptors must be based on those concepts. Current anti-ballistic missile tech gained considerable ground over the past four decades and is ready for deployment sooner than later.

Vulnerability is not an option. Protecting Americans and the homeland from space and missile attack is a strategic imperative that must not fail. Congress must ignore the false narratives of the late 20th century. The threat is real, the technology is real. It is time to field Golden Dome for America.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies in Washington, DC. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The views and positions are those of the author and do not reflect the positions and opinions of the Department of Defense or the author’s employer.

A Second Look at the Critiques and Narratives Against Golden Dome for America was originally published on Global Security Review.

This important agreement, which places limits on strategic nuclear arsenals and provides verification mechanisms, may face an uncertain future under Trump’s leadership. During his first term, President Trump demonstrated a dislike of arms control, a trend that could seriously undermine multilateral efforts in maintaining global strategic stability.

 Trump’s Arms Control Record

 During Trump’s first term, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a landmark agreement with Russia that had eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. While the US cited Russian violations of the treaty as the reason for American withdrawal, the move is concerning for European security and removes a crucial safeguard against nuclear escalation.

Trump also expressed skepticism toward extending New START, instead demanding the inclusion of China in future agreements. While China is increasing its nuclear capabilities, its nuclear arsenal remains smaller than the American and Russian arsenals. Trump’s insistence on China’s inclusion delayed negotiations, nearly causing the treaty to lapse even before the Biden administration secured its five-year extension.

These actions reflect a broader pattern of undermining multilateral arms control frameworks. Trump’s transactional approach prioritizes American advantage over long-term global stability, raising concerns about the future of arms control agreements under his leadership. Given his resounding victory in the recent election, the American people support his “America first” agenda, which will embolden Trump’s efforts to pursue his approach further.

 The Risks of Unilateralism

 Arms control agreements like New START, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the now-defunct INF Treaty historically relied on multilateral cooperation to reduce the risks of nuclear conflict. These agreements were/are built on principles of mutual trust, verification, and a shared commitment to minimizing the threat of nuclear escalation. Russia’s suspension of New START and increasing US-China and US-North Korea tensions further empower Trump’s unilateralism. Taken together, the already fragile architecture of global arms control is likely to fracture.

If Trump allows New START to expire or pursues a renegotiation on his terms, the consequences could be severe, with both openly increasing their strategic nuclear forces.

A Fragmented Global Landscape

 The dissolution of New START would not only impact Russo-American relations but also have negative implications for global security. European NATO member states are, however, more concerned about the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. The bigger threat is Trump’s withdrawal from NATO, which could spur NATO member-states to expand their own arsenals in nuclear-sharing arrangements, while others might consider developing independent nuclear capabilities. This fragmentation could destabilize the transatlantic alliance and further weaken the global arms control regime.

Beyond Europe, arms control agreements are importantly observed by all states. In the Middle East, where tensions are already high, countries like Iran countries might accelerate its nuclear program. Similarly, North Korea may interpret American instability in arms control as an opportunity to modernize its arsenal.

Emerging Technologies and Strategic Instability

The erosion of multilateralism in arms control is compounded by the rise of emerging technologies such as hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence, and cyber warfare. These advancements could transform the nature of modern conflict, introducing new challenges that traditional arms control frameworks are ill-equipped to address.

Under Trump’s leadership, the US is likely to prioritize investments in these technologies, potentially at the expense of traditional arms control efforts. For example, Trump’s first term emphasized missile defense systems, which Russia perceives as destabilizing. In response, Moscow invested heavily in countermeasures like hypersonic weapons. The potential weaponization of space and advancements in cyber capabilities further complicates the strategic landscape, creating new risks of miscalculation and escalation.

Lessons from History and the Importance of Multilateralism in Arms Control

The history of arms control offers valuable lessons about the importance of cooperation. Agreements like the INF Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were not merely symbolic but played critical roles in reducing nuclear risks during the Cold War. These treaties demonstrated that even adversaries could find common ground in the pursuit of mutual stability.

To mitigate risks, the international community must reaffirm its commitment to multilateral arms control. Organizations like the United Nations and NATO have a critical role to play in facilitating dialogue and promoting transparency. Only through a renewed commitment to multilateralism can the world hope to navigate the complex challenges of the 21st century and maintain global stability in the face of evolving threats.

Syed Ali Abbas is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies in Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Trump 2.0: Unilateralism and the Future of Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.