As the international community struggles to manage the escalating crisis, the prospect of a peace process remains distant. Russia maintains that peace is only achievable when its objectives are met. These objectives, central to Moscow’s stance from the beginning of the war, include the demilitarization and neutralization of Ukraine, as well as changes that align with Russia’s security interests. These include control over Crimea and influence in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, dismissed peace talks with Russia, insisting that any resolution must involve the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.

He emphasized that Russia, as the sole aggressor, must be compelled to comply with international law and respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Despite ongoing military engagements and international diplomatic efforts, both sides remain entrenched in their positions, with Russia demanding territorial concessions and Ukraine insisting on sovereignty and territorial integrity.

A potential resolution could involve establishing a neutral zone in contested areas, facilitating a phased withdrawal of both Russian and Ukrainian forces. Ukraine’s commitment to its territorial integrity should be upheld, while Russia could receive assurances regarding its security concerns, particularly concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) commitment to Ukraine’s future membership. Such a balanced approach could open avenues for dialogue, encourage a more stable regional environment, and ultimately benefit both nations while contributing to broader international stability.

Russia’s Domestic Situation

Russian President Vladimir Putin outlined Russia’s conditions for ending the war in Ukraine, which focus on Ukraine’s full withdrawal from the entire territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia—regions Moscow claims as Russian land. He also demands that Ukraine abandon its bid to join NATO—addressing Russian concerns about NATO’s eastward expansion. Furthermore, Putin called for Ukraine’s demilitarization and insisted on the lifting of Western sanctions that, while not crippling, impact Russia’s economy.

Domestically, Putin frames the war as essential to Russia’s security and national identity, maintaining significant support despite economic hardships caused by sanctions. The extended nature of the war, however, is seeing inflation, falling living standards, and localized protests over conscription. Despite these pressures, Putin shows little interest in peace, viewing the war as vital to Russia’s strategic objectives. Without significant internal shifts or international pressure, it is unlikely that Russia will pursue peace soon. Putin’s current stance suggests that the conflict will persist, with little sign of de-escalation unless broader geopolitical changes occur.

Ukraine’s Domestic Conditions

In Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky maintains strong public support despite the immense challenges the country faces. The Ukrainian population remains united in their resistance against Russian aggression, bolstered by a deep sense of national pride and resilience. However, the ongoing conflict has taken a severe toll on the country’s infrastructure, economy, and civilian population.

Ukraine’s desire for peace is clear, but not at the cost of sovereignty or territorial concessions. Zelensky’s government has repeatedly stated that any peace deal must include the withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.

President Zelensky dismissed the idea of peace talks with Russia, urging for decisive global action to compel Moscow into peace. Speaking at a United Nations Security Council meeting, he emphasized that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion violated numerous international laws and will not cease through negotiations. Zelensky’s government consistently maintains that any peace deal must include the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea. He argued that as the sole aggressor, Russia must be forced into peace, underscoring the need to uphold the UN Charter’s principle of respecting every nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Collapse of Peace Proposals for the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Multiple international peace efforts failed to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict. China’s 12-point peace proposal for the Russia-Ukraine conflict advocated for an immediate cease-fire and respect for national sovereignty. It called for the lifting of non-UN sanctioned sanctions, protection of civilians, and the promotion of dialogue while emphasizing humanitarian issues and global energy security. The plan also included a cease-fire that would freeze Russian troops in place on Ukrainian territory and urged cooperation among nations to achieve lasting peace.

However, it was dismissed by the West for favoring Russia and not addressing Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty. The Geneva talks regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict sought to establish a framework for dialogue aimed at addressing security concerns and finding pathways to a peaceful resolution. Key topics included NATO expansion, security guarantees for Ukraine, and managing the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. These discussions, however, have faced obstacles due to differing views among the parties involved, leading to limited progress and a continuing stalemate in negotiations.

Hungary’s attempts to mediate in the Russia-Ukraine conflict faced significant challenges, culminating in the European Union’s (EU) decision to strip Budapest of its right to host foreign and defense ministers’ meetings due to Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s meeting with Vladimir Putin. EU leaders viewed it as undermining a united European response to the war. As a result, Hungary’s role as a mediator has been called into question, with criticism from various EU member states highlighting the lack of consensus around its diplomatic initiatives.

Is Peace Possible?

The prospect for peace in the Ukraine-Russia conflict remains vague at best. A potential resolution could involve creating a neutral zone, phased troop withdrawal, and maintaining Ukraine’s territorial integrity while addressing Russia’s NATO-related concerns. However, entrenched geopolitical dynamics may prolong the conflict for years, worsening devastation, and complicating diplomatic efforts.

Seher Intikhab is a university student majoring in international relations. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Ukraine’s Incursion into Russia: What’s Next for the Peace Process? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The recent decision by Hungary’s Prime Minister, Victor Orban, to open its borders to Russian and Belarusian immigrants is an example of a NATO member-state failing to see the large security implications of an act that is not directly tied to security. The mistake could, however, have broader implications for Europe.

Hungary’s recent decision to implement a liberal immigration policy, allowing Russian and Belarusian citizens to enter as guest workers without vetting or security checks, poses a significant threat because it will allow Russian agents, and there are certainly Russian agents mixed within the larger mass of migrants, to freely move within European Union (EU) member-states. With the policy also allowing guest workers to bring their family with them, without vetting for ties to the Russian military or security services, makes the concern that Russian agents will infiltrate Europe even more likely. Russian efforts to undermine European democracies through disinformation and misinformation is already well known. There is certainly no need to make the problem worse.

This policy flies in the face of an EU ban on Russian airlines to the Schengen Area (the borderless area inside the EU that does not require a passports for travel) and individual bans of hundreds of people connected to the Kremlin and the War in Ukraine. This is also contrary to the actions of many other EU countries. For example, Finland closed its border with Russia, preventing all immigration, noting serious security concerns.

Hungary did not consult with the EU or NATO. Strangely, this act took place while Orban is serving as the rotational head of the EU. The body is now considering legislation designed to halt Hungary’s immigration policy.

Orban is the only head of an EU or NATO member-state that maintains ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russia since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Orban is sometimes called a pawn of Putin and one of his “useful idiots”—a term used by Soviet leaders to describe unsuspecting collaborators in the West.

However, it is unclear whether or not Orban is aligning himself with Putin because of ideological similarity, economic necessity, or both. During his time in office, Hungary voted to sanction Russia in the European Parliament and even condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. More recently, however, Orban tried to rally Central Europe behind Russia.

The question regarding Orban’s motivations is vital because the EU needs to reverse this new policy as quickly and painlessly as possible or Russia will gain a significant strategic advantage. This is particularly important as NATO ramps up efforts to counter Russian aggression elsewhere across Europe.

The infiltration of Russian spies across Europe is no trivial matter. In Western democracies, personal freedoms make it harder to determine who is working for an adversary government. Once into the Schengen Area, movement is unchecked to 29 participating states. Given the recent attacks on the French high-speed rail line before the 2024 Olympics in Paris, there is clear reason to worry.

The attack that shut down France’s high-speed rail for almost a week was low-cost and required very little training on the part of the saboteurs. Simple arson and explosive attacks on the rail lines wreaked havoc on travel. The attack is suspected to have emanated from far-left French extremists, but that does not preclude Russia from encouraging, training, and equipping domestic groups from undertaking such attacks. The Russians also use their special forces for covert attacks against civil targets.

Hungary’s liberalization of immigration policy, favoring easy access for Russian and Belarusian citizens, is detrimental to the security of the European Union and NATO. At this early stage, Western leaders must ascertain whether it is possible to persuade Victor Orban away from openly supporting Russia in word and deed. This latest development gives Russia a strategic weapon that is useful in conducting warfare below the threshold of conventional war.

The Russians cannot be given greater operational freedom. It may become necessary to punish or alienate Hungary if it will not act in solidarity with other Western nations.

Dan Cox, PhD is a professor of political science at the US Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The Impact of Hungary’s New Liberal Immigration Standards was originally published on Global Security Review.

This is hardly surprising to many—Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbàn has been espousing an anti-European and pro-Russian campaign for some time now. While Hungary has not outright rejected all of Europe’s values, he is firmly against immigration and increasingly receptive towards the overtures of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Russia agrees to supply Hungary with natural gas via the TurkStream pipeline—bypassing Ukraine.

The European Union imports the majority of its natural gas from Russia. For some time, this relationship has relied on the free flow of gas through Ukraine. In recent years, the trading relationship between the E.U. and Russia has been under increasing strain due to the war in Eastern Ukraine, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and rising prices.

For Eastern European member-states, this has meant a certain degree of uncertainty with regards to energy acquisition. Therefore, it will be critical to monitor a recently signed agreement under which Russia will supply natural gas to Hungary beginning in 2020, “regardless of agreements on gas transit between Moscow and Kiev.”

The gas transit arrangement between Russia and Ukraine will expire at the end of 2019. Given that Ukraine and Russia remain in a de facto state of war, it is unlikely that a new transit agreement will be implemented. What does this mean for Hungarian natural gas imports? According to Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó, Russian gas exports to Hungary will transit via the TurkStream pipeline.

Europe’s dependence on Russian energy is growing.

Europe’s dependency on Russian gas is an increasingly contentious issue in the realm of international relations. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline—a project led by Gazprom—will directly connect Germany with Russia, bypassing Ukraine.

Germany’s commitment to Nord Stream 2 has been repeatedly criticized by the United States. Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo both strongly opposed the pipeline because Nord Stream 2 will increase Europe’s dependency on Russian energy while simultaneously harming Ukraine’s economic and national security.

It’s not likely that Russia would move to cut off European gas supplies if the E.U. failed to support specific policies, but the possibility is nevertheless a matter of concern for both European and American policymakers. Furthermore—beyond the energy sector—further amelioration in an already warm Hungary-Russia relationship is a matter of concern for the E.U. as many worry Hungary could serve as a Trojan horse in an increasingly fragmented European Union.

Why does the Hungarian-Russian relationship matter?

The European Union is based on the principle that democratic states are stronger and more peaceful when they act together rather than alone. Unfortunately, for the past few years, neither the E.U. nor Hungary has seen eye-to-eye.

Under Prime Minister Orbàn, Hungary has been accused of breaching democratic norms. Orbàn’s government has severely weakened the plurality of the country’s media while cracking down on civil society as well as educational freedom. Orbàn has touted Hungary as Europe’s first “illiberal democracy,” going so far as to object to E.U. sanctions on Russia. Furthermore, in June 2018, Hungary was the only E.U. member to vote against providing increased aid to Ukraine.

The destabilization of the European Union and other Western institutions is a crucial objective for the Kremlin, and one that has been successful with regards to Hungary. Natural gas deals that thumb the nose at the European Union coupled with Orbàn’s anti-European rhetoric all act in Putin’s favor. Even more concerning is the International Investment Bank (IIB)’s imminent move to Hungary.

The IIB is a Moscow-based development bank that is seen by many European officials as a cover through which Russia can subvert European institutions. Orbàn has already granted the IIB immunity from any regulatory or prosecutorial authority and has accorded IIB officials with diplomatic status in Hungary. For European and American policymakers, the Hungarian-Russian relationship is one that merits increased scrutiny for the foreseeable future.

Hungary’s Relationship with Russia Poses a Risk for Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

This September, Poland was also suspended from the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary due to concerns over the level of judicial independence in Poland. Many in Poland and throughout the European Union have raised questions about the independence of the Polish judicial system from political interference, in light of a judicial reform law that came into effect on April 3, 2018.

40% of Polish Supreme Court justices are over 65—including Chief Justice Malgorzata Gersdorf.

Not only does Poland's judicial reform legislation terminate the term of office for existing members by decreasing the retirement age and making it mandatory, it also gives the parliamentary majority the right to nominate a majority of their replacements.

In other words, all judges over the age of 65—over a third of all judges—will be forced to retire unless the president expressly approves an extension. Chief Justice Malgorzata Gersdorf’s mandated six-year term is also set to be terminated early.Some judges have asked for presidential approval. However, many are concerned that only judges with politically agreeable views will be approved.

This law gives the PiS complete control over the supreme court, which acts as the highest court in the land. The Supreme Court is responsible for validating elections, thus implying that PiS could have the option to contest the outcome of unfavorable elections to a court that is politically dependent on the party.

Maintaining rule of law and other essential rights is essential for a functioning democracy.

In July 2017, a similar attempt was made to reform the constitution, in particular the judicial branch’s National Judiciary Council. That is the council which makes judicial appointments. The European Commission even threatened to trigger Article 7 of the EU treaty. However, protestors and observer’s collective sigh of relief was evidently short-lived.

The controversial bill was signed into law by President Andrzej Duda in December 2017. In January 2018, the Polish Supreme Court released a strongly worded statement claiming that the law goes “against the standards of the Polish Constitution, in addition to violating the principle of separation of powers, the independence of the courts and judges and the security of tenure of judges.”

Alongside the Supreme Court’s condemnation of the law, the European Commission elected to officially trigger sanctions under Article 7. These sanctions would strip Poland of its voting rights within the E.U. However, the chances of this are slim because enacting the sanctions requires a unanimous vote in the European Council, where Hungary has vowed to oppose it. The lack of meaningful response on the part of the council forced the European Commission’s hand in referring the matter to the European Court of Justice.

While this European Court cannot directly strip Poland’s voting rights, it can impose large fines. Despite the passage of the law, most of the Supreme Court justices also came into work after the law was implemented. There is widespread confusion over which judges are members of the court.

Poland is divided over its judges.

All of this controversy begs the question – why is there such a societal dislike of the judicial system in Poland? The majority of this rhetoric came from the PiS party, which has called judges a “caste of superhumans” and labeled the judiciary as “a state within a state.” Currently, polls indicate that Poles are split over the reforms, which 44% agreeing that judges should be forced into retirement at 65 with 33% disagreeing.

The rule of law is one of the common values upon which the European Union was founded. Therefore, the E.U. is bound to respond to any attempt to curtail it. While it is unlikely that that the Article 7 will enter fully into force, it is notable that the European Union felt it necessary to move to this step. It remains to be seen how the E.U. can respond effectively while maintaining strong partnerships with its more illiberal members.

E.U. Commission Refers Poland to European Court of Justice Over Rule of Law Concerns was originally published on Global Security Review.

The sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United States, Canada, and their allies were targeted against a host of Russian individuals, officials, banks, corporations, and organizations. Western sanctions have targeted Russian energy, defense, and financial firms, limiting their access to western markets while prohibiting the sale and export of certain oil exploration and production technologies to Russia.

U.S. and E.U. sanctions remain in effect, with the E.U. announcing that it will extend them until January 31, 2019. However, sanctions have failed to produce the results that were anticipated when they were implemented.

Sanctions have not only failed to change the course of Russia’s foreign policy towards the West; they’ve neither deterred Russian aggression nor created any incentives for Moscow to alter its behavior. On the contrary, sanctions have contributed to a widening divide within the European Union, and within the transatlantic alliance with growing calls for the elimination of sanctions.

What is the point of sanctions?

Sanctions are limitations that are introduced by one country or a group of countries against another in retaliation, in an attempt to change the behavior of the country with regards to its domestic or foreign policy, or sometimes even attempts at regime change i.e. by increasing the cost of international isolation.

In general, the idea behind imposing sanctions is to preserve the state of legality or to establish the state of peace and security. Considering the coercive and non-coercive impact of sanctions on the economy, businesses, diplomatic channels, and reputation of the targeted country, the aim of sanctions is to prevent, deter, or limit opportunities for possible undesirable behavior.

The idea is that if the targeted country does not change its course of action, then the cost of sanctions would either enforce compliance or create incentives for the country to comply with international rules.

How effective are the sanctions on Russia?

Although sanctions have had a detrimental impact on the Russian economy, the costs imposed by sanctions are outweighed by the Kremlin’s desire to regain and sustain geopolitical influence within what it considers to be its traditional sphere of influence (i.e. the former Soviet Union).

The downturn in Russia’s economy that began in 2014 was not the result of economic sanctions alone, rather, it was the result of a combination of factors made exponentially worse by the Russian government’s inability to reduce the economy’s dependency on energy exports, in addition to a steep decline in oil prices.

The government managed to stabilize the economy by tapping into its sovereign wealth fund, which provided badly-needed time to implement anti-crisis monetary policies in addition to reducing the economy’s vulnerabilities to external events.

Western sanctions do not target a significant segment of the Russian economy. The E.U. and the U.S. sanctions target specific Russian elites and companies, in order to limit the severity of their effect on the Russian population.

If sanctions were too harsh, the Kremlin could see them significant or even existential threat. Nation-states often react when they pushed beyond the threshold of what they perceive as acceptable; extreme sanctions would likely result in Russia retaliating in a manner that would endanger the security of eastern European countries.

According to former Russian finance minister Alexei Kudrin, sanctions managed to shave off a mere 0.5 percent of GDP each year. Sanctioned firms that have lost access to western markets have been bailed out by the Kremlin with public funds, the National Welfare Fund is one example.

Tit-for-tat measures employed by Russia imposed a ban on American and European food imports, enabling local agriculture businesses to grow their businesses by selling domestically-manufactured products to domestic consumers.

Lastly, tightening restrictions on Russian oligarchs and their investments has done little to change the Kremlin’s behavior. In fact, as many have argued it has played into the hands of Russian President Vladimir Putin, enabling him to effectively  “nationalize” the elite.

Are sanctions helping Putin politically?

The domestic narrative provided by the sanctions and trumpeted by the Kremlin has given a political boost to Putin. Russian state media portrays Putin as a president fighting to protect Russian interests against NATO aggression.

Sanctions also offer Putin with an easy scapegoat for lackluster economic performance,  allowing him to shift the blame for low economic growth to western economic sanctions, providing increased time to address major structural issues with the Russian economy, and reduce its over-dependence on energy exports.

In other words, the sanctions imposed on Russia following the annexation of Crimea have done little to alter Russian foreign policy towards Ukraine, nor have they impacted the Russian economy in a way that would induce any change in Russian policy. Furthermore, if oil prices continue to rise, the detrimental impact of sanctions on Russia will be further reduced.

This raises an important question over whether or not European states would consider the long-term continuation of sanctions necessary.  Sanctions have been one area where European Union member states have shown solidarity in standing against Russian aggression. This solidarity, however, is increasingly frayed.  Hungary and Bulgaria have both stated their opposition to continuing sanctions on Russia.

In a January 2017 interview, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó stated that “the Hungarian economy has sustained a loss of some $6.5 billion due to the sanctions implemented against Russia.”

Many Central and Eastern European countries like Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, and Italy depend significantly on Russian oil and gas exports. Many believe that it is futile to continue imposing economic sanctions without achieving any meaningful results while incurring substantial economic costs.

Matteo Salvini, Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister, and Interior Minister made headlines during his trip to Russia in July 2018 when he stated that he would like to see the E.U. drop sanctions against Russia by the end of the year. Salvini also issued a statement of support for Russia to rejoin the Group of 7 (G7), once more making it the “G8.”

A similar tone was adopted by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, during his visit to Russia during the World Cup, where he denounced E.U. sanctions against Russia during his meeting with President Putin.

The growing voices of dissent within the European Union are largely those who are most critical of the E.U. as an institution. It may be the case that Italy and Hungary are using sanctions as leverage in migrant and refugee resettlement negotiations, or as a way to resist the economic heavy-handedness exerted by Germany in dictating European fiscal policy.

Regardless, disagreements over sanctions threaten to create further divisions within the E.U. After all, the bloc operates on consensus, and all it would take for that consensus to break is the objection of a single E.U. member state.

The Impact of U.S.-Imposed Sanctions on the Transatlantic Relationship

Following Donald Trump’s victory in the November 2016 U.S. presidential elections and subsequent inauguration, the Trump administration has moved aggressively against long-term U.S. allies, including Japan, South Korea, and the European Union.

While a substantial amount of the rhetoric emanating from the White House has focused on efforts intended to reduce the U.S. trade deficit, the administration has also threatened E.U. allies that continue to do business with Russia.

The Nord Stream II pipeline has become a point of contention on both sides of the Atlantic. Republican Senators John Barrasso and Cory Gardner have introduced a bill that would mandate the imposition of U.S. economic sanctions on European companies building the Nord Stream II pipeline.

While the bill is intended to increase U.S. energy exports to Europe, it threatens western firms like France’s ENGIE, Austria’s OMV, the German firms Uniper and Wintershall, as well as British-Dutch multinational Royal Dutch Shell, all of which are contributing to the pipeline’s development.

Threatening European firms engaged in the construction of the Nord Stream II pipeline with sanctions at a point when tension among transatlantic partners is high puts the transatlantic alliance in a precarious position.

The threat of sanctions levied by an ally widens divisions between the U.S. and Europe. Maintaining a united front is essential, not only against Russian aggression, but on a host of economic, security, and political issues that persist on both sides of the Atlantic.

It Might Be Time to Rethink Western Sanctions on Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.

The European ‘bad boy’, Viktor Orban, the man who can be single-handedly attributed to Hungary becoming a semi-authoritarian regime, claims yet another victory in the Hungarian elections. An infamous figure in Hungarian politics since the late 1980s, Orban is a symbol of anti-communism and the face of nationalism in a state that is increasingly ostracised by its liberal European neighbors.

Perhaps the Eastern bloc and the legacy of its demise penetrates far deeper than we could have assumed. Orban’s condemnation of the petering Christian sentiment across the continent is microcosmic for the swelling rifts between his beliefs and the liberal swathes of his neighbors: Orban’s re-election doesn’t spell unity across Eastern Europe.

Orban’s ‘illiberal democracy’ stirred the pot of international cohesion with its rather uncouth response to the refugee crisis that has shaken Europe since 2015. His plans to hold immigrants in prison-like shelters to prohibit their exploitation of the Schengen area unmasks the blatantly xenophobic sentiments that have plagued his reign. Orban himself has insinuated that his agenda is beginning to infiltrate popular opinion across Europe and that the election of Trump has near advocated his anti-immigrant perspective.

Orban presents significant challenges for the E.U.

Orban’s third term presents significant challenges for the European Union; it’s conscious liberality and the leaders of Brussels attempting to dispel Brexit fever. An orchestrated media, a judicial system under the thumb: Hungary continues to polarise itself against the swathe of shared European values. The almost satirical likening by Orban of the relationship between Hungary and the E.U. as a ‘peacock dance’ laughs in the face of European unity.

It’s difficult to anticipate the behavior of Orban and his Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance. Since his march of alliance alongside other European heavyweights in retaliation to the Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015, the erratic behavior of the Hungarian leader couldn’t have been predicted. From building walls to prohibit the movement of refugees, to actively denouncing Islam, it’s difficult to sketch a trajectory for the future of Hungarian foreign policy.

Of course, it’s cruel to demonize Orban without looking at the bigger picture. Jingoism and xenophobia have run rampant in the streets of Budapest for some time. Gyongyosi (a member of the Hungarian far-right Jobbik party) publically demanded a list of professional Jews in 2012, arguing they posed a ‘national security risk.’ This charge has been ineffective with Orban witnessing another landslide victory—but despite his ‘reinvention,’ Gyongyosi’s remarks are a conceit that riddles through the policy of Hungarian Parliament.

The trouble with Hungary is that it’s seen to use Poland as its proxy, that Hungary has its foot on the pedal of Polish foreign policy. The conflation of these two states is easily justifiable; the two most overtly authoritarian countries in Europe are likely to bear a few parallels. When Junker and his European posse condemned Poland to face E.U. sanctions, Orban was the first to offer an olive-branch in defense of his ally.

Kaczynski and Orban’s love affair as the “bad-boys of Europe” can only maintain for a certain amount of time before they conclude that their lack of well-established democratic values and far from up-standing economies would collapse unaided. This story has a happier ending for Hungary than Poland however, as it is only Poland that is being threatened with Article 7, and in such its European voting rights. This is as much of a threat as Trump is with a nuclear response to North Korea: one is aware that it’s doubtful, but the threat itself is resounding.

Hungary is doing her best to propel the presupposition that she will continue her pursuit of weakening the E.U. to prohibit any imposition on the nationalistic endeavors of her foreign policy. German foreign policy inclinations, that being a balmy opposition to the Visegrad Group, might be Hungary’s only hand to coerce Berlin into addressing its concerns—including both migration to and within Europe, alongside economic growth in the East.

Fortress Hungary

The impact that Fortress Hungary will have on the rest of Europe is uncertain. The increasingly shadowy relationship between Orban and Putin, some say, should be a cause for concern. As Orban is courted by Putin’s financing of the Hungarian Soviet-era nuclear plant to reduce dependency on Russian oil (or so we’re told), our knowledge of allies and enemies in the E.U. muddies.

Of course, the relationship between Russia and Hungary is more sinister than one may believe—Russian linked paramilitary organizations are embedded into Hungarian territory, the Hungarian National Front a specter of fear for any minority residing within the ‘Fortress.’

Orban, his Hungarian Parliament, and his xenophobic attitudes pose a considerable threat to the European Union. His anti-immigrant policies have far from assuaged the right-wing fever spreading across Europe, and his intolerance of anything dispelling traditionally Hungarian values exemplifies how he is feeding rhetoric of anything anti-E.U.

His re-election poses a threat in many ways, but those whom must be protected chiefly are the immigrants. Perhaps the damning marriage of Poland and Hungary in international politics shall peter away, and Putin’s puppeteering of Orban will cease—but until then Hungary poses a genuine threat and its leader a real menace.

What Viktor Orban’s Victory Means for Europe and Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.

Earlier in the negotiation process, Radio Free Europe reported that Hungary additionally wanted to include helicopter spare parts to the exemption list along with biathlon rifles and small caliber sports guns. However, this was later taken off the table. With these two exceptions, both Hungary along with Slovakia see the potential for the small arms market in Belarus. Sports hunting is popular in the post-Soviet country; both small caliber guns and biathlon rifles are popularly used.

Why the embargo?

The arms embargo was initially announced in 2011 after Belarusian officials initiated a violent crackdown on protestors in the 2010 presidential election. This election brought Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko another term in office, an office he held which he’s held since 1993. Four Belarusian companies had their assets frozen and access to EU visas restricted. Also, 174 individuals, including President Lukashenko, were sanctioned.

EU-Belarusian relations were somewhat tarred with the feathers of human rights violations, and the rule of law violations and a lack of press freedom. That all began to change in 2015 when Belarus released the country’s final remaining six political prisoners. Why bother? As a dictator, what could motivate Lukashenko to don a mantle of European civility?

The answer is Russian leverage. Lukashenko was under pressure to allow a Russian airbase to be constructed in Belarus. In the background of this Russian move towards a more concrete show of their power was the fear of NATO beginning to reach eastward. Rather than agree with Russia, however, Lukashenko believed that the construction of such a base would exacerbate tensions. So, when Belarus began to court the European Union, the reasoning was not so difficult to understand.

Two years ago, in February of 2016, the EU removed four companies and 170 individuals from the sanctions list, leaving four individuals remaining. The rationale given was that the human rights situation in Belarus had improved. However, the four individuals remain on the sanctions list. The EU claims that these four individuals played roles in the unresolved political disappearances of four Belarusians in 1999-2000. They consisted of opposition politicians Yuri Zakharanka and Viktar Hanchar, businessman Anatol Krasouski and journalist Dzmitry Zavadski.

So, who is still sanctioned?

• Former Interior Minister Uladzimir Naumau
• Former Head of the Presidential Administration Viktor Sheiman
• Former Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Yury Sivakou
• And Former Commander of the Special Forces Brigade of the Interior Ministry Dzmitry Paulichenka

It’s an interesting list—particularly given that Uladzimir Naumau, Dzmitry Paulichenka, and Yury Sheiman are also included on the list of sanctions in the United States. Though given their role in the earlier repressive steps taken by the Belarusian government, it’s not surprising. Their continued lack of ability to travel to Europe and the United States as well as their overseas assets being frozen is business as usual.

The arms embargo today is more a symbolic statement, a sign that the European Union is promoting democracy and human rights, even in countries with which they share a border. But if the tendency to add more and more exceptions continues to grow—it won’t be surprising if all that remains is the four individuals associated with political disappearances. After all, more often than not, economic gains rates higher on the scale of political choice than the idealistic urges of human rights advocates.

European Union Extends Arms Embargo Against Belarus was originally published on Global Security Review.

Egypt’s Presidential Election, Sometime Between February and May. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi came to power in July 2013 by ousting his predecessor, Mohammed Morsi, in a military coup. Sisi was then elected president in May 2014 with roughly 96 percent of the vote, which seems suspiciously high for a free-and-fair election. The odds are good that Sisi will enjoy continued electoral success, even though he has failed to deliver on his promises to jumpstart economic growth, has been accused of widespread human rights abuses, and has had Egyptians living under a state of emergency since April 2016. The Trump administration, which isn’t much troubled by autocrats, has been so unimpressed with Sisi’s government that it cut nearly $100 million in military and economic aid to Egypt back in August. Sisi’s popularity at home has slipped, though he has a few advantages as the incumbent. Khaled Ali, a prominent opposition leader who announced his presidential candidacy last month, said back in June, “If we had fair elections, anyone could defeat Sisi.” Ali’s reward? He was convicted of “violating public decency” and sentenced to three months in prison. That sentence will likely end Ali’s candidacy; the Egyptian constitution prohibits any candidate who has been convicted in any “public indecency” cases form running.

Russian Presidential Election, March 18. Like President Sisi, Vladimir Putin is a good bet to win reelection. In Putin’s case, victory would mean his fourth term as president. He served two four-year terms as president between 2000 and 2008 and then won a third term for six years in 2012. The former KGB agent enjoys approval ratings around eighty percent, despite an underperforming economy and Western sanctions. An assertive foreign policy, especially in Ukraine and Syria, undoubtedly contributes to his popularity. But despite the high poll numbers, Putin isn’t leaving anything to chance. He has restricted press freedom and jailed political opponents, which limits the pool of opposition candidates. Alexei Navalny, one of Russia’s most prominent opposition leaders, has been told that he can’t run because of his conviction for “economic crimes.” Ksenia Sobchak, who has been called Russia’s “Paris Hilton” and is the thirty-year-old daughter of Putin’s political mentor, has thrown her hat into the ring. She may just be a Kremlin-approved critic; she reportedly met recently with Putin and had said she would not criticize him on the campaign trail. Pro tip: It’s hard to win an election by refusing to tell voters why the incumbent should be sent packing.

Hungarian Parliamentary Election, April or May. Hungarians longed for decades for democratic rule. They got their wish in 1989. But over the past seven years, Hungary has become an “illiberal democracy” under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz Party. Orbán does not value an independent judiciary, the free press, or fair election laws; he has had his disdain for these bedrock democratic principles enshrined in Hungary’s constitution. As a result, journalists and diplomats alike have taken to calling him a “dictator,” and the U.S. State Department recently set aside up to $700,000 to “increase citizens’ access to objective information about domestic and global issues in Hungary.” Orban dismisses his critics out of hand. He can do so because Fidesz dominates Hungarian politics; it currently holds roughly two-thirds of the seats in the Hungarian parliament. Things look good for Fidesz going into next spring’s election. The party is polling at 40 percent—a six-year high. Wresting power away from Orbán requires a unified opposition. Alas, Hungary’s political left is fractured. Orbán and Fidesz are aggressively courting votes from ethnic Hungarians who live in neighboring countries but are eligible to vote in Hungary. These voters could end up tipping the election result, and with it, the future of what’s left of Hungary’s democracy.

Iraqi Parliamentary Election, May 12. Assuming that Iraq’s parliament approves the recommendation of its electoral commission, Iraqi voters will head to the polls next spring to choose a new parliament. They have a lot to ponder. Nearly fifteen years after the U.S. invasion, Iraq remains in a perilous place. ISIS has lost its caliphate, but it remains a potent threat. The September vote by Iraqi Kurds to create an independent Iraqi Kurdistan raises the question of Iraq’s continued territorial integrity. The splintering of the two major Shia-dominated parties, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Sadrist Movement, adds layers of complexity. Iraq’s neighbors, and not just Iran, can all be expected to work behind the scenes to push the election in the direction they favor. Even if the vote goes smoothly, Iraq’s politicians may end where they have been before, struggling to put together a stable coalition government. And whoever emerges on top from that bargaining gets the privilege of trying to heal a country with far too many fractures and far too many problems.

Italian General Election, no later than May 20. Italians must love government; they have had sixty-five of them since Italy became a republic in 1945. That’s almost one new government a year. As Italian voters mull over government number sixty-six, polls show the 5 Star Movement neck-and-neck with Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni’s center-left Democratic Party. Could a right-wing, Eurosceptic, populist party do surprisingly well, as has happened elsewhere in Europe recently? It’s possible. The ingredients are there. Italians are upset over high unemployment, large government debt, and the ongoing refugee crisis. However, the 5 Star Movement casts itself as a populist party, so it is competing for the votes of the end-politics-as-we-know-it crowd. Should M5S finish first, Luigi Di Maio would be its candidate for prime minister. The thirty-one-year-old would face an immediate challenge, and it’s not the fact he has never held a professional job. Gentiloni pushed through a new election law this fall that makes it harder for any party to win an outright majority. But the 5 Star Movement says it will not give cabinet seats to another party to form a coalition. Other parties aren’t likely to enter a coalition government on those terms, so Di Maio and his colleagues could find themselves on the outside looking in even if they win the most votes.

Pakistani General Election, within 90 days of June 5. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resigned in July after Pakistan’s Supreme Court disqualified him for improper financial dealings that came to light with the release of the Panama Papers. Before the scandal broke, Sharif’s party, the Pakistan Muslim League, looked to be well positioned for the 2018 election. Now, however, the party’s future is unclear. The main opposition party is Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (Pakistan Movement for Justice), which is led by the former cricket player Imran Khan. It looks to be in a stronger position than it was a year ago, but that might not be saying much. The Pakistan People’s Party, the country’s oldest democratic political party, could also be a factor. Whichever party wins likely won’t change the fact that the army dominates the Pakistani government; little of significance gets done without its concurrence. Many Pakistanis would take the point even further, arguing that whichever party has the blessing of the army and the United States will win the election. However accurate that perception is, a lot is at stake in the election. Two thousand thirteen marked the first democratic transition of power in Pakistan’s history. That means 2018 would be just the second.

Mexican Presidential Election, July 1. Mexico figured prominently in the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, thanks to Donald Trump. The United States will likely figure prominently in Mexico’s 2018 presidential election. President Enrique Peña Nieto, who is constitutionally barred from running for reelection, has trodden carefully in dealing with Trump. That has gone over poorly in Mexico and generated a crowded electoral field. The frontrunner is the former mayor of Mexico City, Andres Manual Lopez Obrador. “AMLO,” as he is called, finished second in the last two presidential elections, and lost the controversial 2006 election by less than a percentage point. As the leader of the left-wing National Regeneration Movement(MORENA), he vows to fight Trump’s “poisonous, hateful, xenophobic” policy toward Mexico. But like Trump, AMLO is a NAFTA critic, though MORENA’s platform talks about improving the trade deal rather than ditching it. Another contender is Margarita Zavala, the wife of former President Felipe Calderon, the man who beat AMLO back in 2006. Sometimes called the “Mexican Hillary,” Zavala recently split with her husband’s party, the right-of-center National Action Party(PAN), to run on her own. The PAN’s Ricardo Anaya is trying to lead a “broad coalition” with the left-of-center Democratic Revolutionary Party. Meanwhile, Peña’s Nieto’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) will likely nominate José Antonio Meade, a former finance minister. With four major candidates running in a first-past-the-post race, Mexico’s next president could move into Los Pinos with the support of a third or less of the Mexican electorate.

Cambodian General Election, July 29. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, the head of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and a former Khmer Rouge commander, has been in power since 1985. He shows no interest in letting anyone take his place. The Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), the country’s largest opposition party, had been making serious gains, winning 44 percent of the vote in June’s commune election. So how did Hun Sen’s government respond? It sued to ban the CNRP after police arrested its main leader, Kem Sokha, for treason. Last month, Cambodia’s Supreme Court ruled in Hun Sen’s favor and dissolved the CNRP, essentially turning Cambodia into the world’s newest single-party state. Sokha’s arrest comes after the passage of a law barring political parties from running candidates convicted of a crime. That move was widely seen as an attempt to prevent opposition leader Sam Rainsy, who has been effectively exiled to France, from campaigning for the CNRP from abroad. The United States and the European Union criticized the decision, while China (no surprise) supported it. The brazen 2016 public killing of Kem Ley, a Cambodian political activist, is also fresh in the minds of the Cambodians. If you doubt Sen’s willingness to keep power, consider this: he warned this summer that “War will happen if the CPP does not control the country anymore.”

Brazilian General Election, October 7 and October 28. It has been a tough few years for Brazil. The economy has tanked, with unemployment now at a twenty-year high. President Dilma Rousseff was impeached last year, former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was convicted of money laundering this past summer, sitting president Michel Temer has been formally accused of racketeering and obstruction of justice, and a festering corruption scandal has enveloped Brazil’s political elite. Not surprisingly, a recent poll found that 87 percent of Brazilians say it is “very important” that candidates not be tainted by corruption. That said, Lula, the long-time leader of the leftist Workers’ Party, leads in the polls. However, if he loses his appeal, he will be headed for the penitentiary and not the presidency. Candidates who might be competitive if Lula departs the race include Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right congressman, known for his homophobic and sexist outbursts, who has called himself a “threat to the stubbornly corrupt.” Another possibility is Marina Silva, who many thought might win the presidency back in 2014. Whoever does win will inherit a political inbox full of problems and a public deeply cynical about what its politicians are doing.

U.S. Midterm Elections, November 6. Midterm elections don’t go well for the president’s party. Over the past seven decades, the president’s party has, on average, lost twenty-five House seats in the midterms. Sometimes the results are much worse than that. President Obama saw House Democrats lost sixty-three seats in the 2010 midterms. Does this mean that 2018 will be a terrible year for Republicans? Not quite. True, President Trump’s public approval rating is south of 40 percent, the GOP has recorded few major legislative victories despite controlling both the White House and Congress, and voters tell pollsters that they prefer a generic Democratic candidate over a Republican one by the widest margin in over a decade. But the gerrymandering of House districts means that the Democratic candidates could win many more votes than Republicans and still end up with fewer seats. As for the Senate, Democrats have to defend twenty-three of the thirty-three seats at stake in 2018. To make matters worse for Democrats, they are defending ten seats in states that Trump won in 2016; only one Republican senator hails from a state that Hillary Clinton won. Of course, the election is still eleven months away. Events could help, or hurt, either party. What remains true is that the dynamics in Washington would shift dramatically if Democrats take back either house of Congress.

10 Elections to Watch in 2018 was originally published on Global Security Review.