Some eighty years after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the global community still struggles with the strategic, political, and ethical implications of nuclear arms races. The Cold War’s bipolar competition once defined the global nuclear dynamics, but today’s landscape is more complex, involving multiple nuclear-armed states, emerging technologies, and shifting geopolitical alliances.  

From Bipolar to Multipolar Competition and Arms Racing  

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a massive arms buildup driven by deterrence theory, ideological rivalry, and fears of vulnerability. The end of the Cold War lowered tensions and decreased the number of nuclear weapons, but it did not eliminate them completely. Instead, the global system has evolved into a multipolar environment with nine nuclear-armed states, each with distinct strategic cultures and security concerns. Although most states in the United Nations have endorsed the principle of nuclear disarmament, no current nuclear weapons state has embraced the concept or taken even small steps in that direction.  

New Drivers of Competition  

The current nuclear environment is shaped by a mix of technological advances, growing regional rivalries, diminishing arms control agreements, and renewed great-power competition. Unlike the organized bipolar order of the Cold War, today’s strategic landscape is becoming more multipolar, faster-paced, and less predictable based on emerging factors. 

 Technological innovation: Hypersonic weapons, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, and missile defense systems introduce new uncertainties about the survivability of nuclear arsenals. Another source of potential instability is the growing effectiveness of conventional weapons for long‑range precision strike, with destructive capabilities that might provoke a responsive nuclear first use or first strike. In addition, modern information and manufacturing systems, compared to earlier generations, shorten the timelines between concept and prototype, and between prototype and mass production.  

Regional rivalries: Regional military competition between India and Pakistan, North Korea and South Korea, China and India, and among China, North Korea, Japan, and the United States, threatens to escalate conventional war into nuclear first use, and even short of crossing the nuclear threshold, exacerbate regional and global nuclear tensions.  

Erosion of arms control: The termination of nuclear arms control agreements, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the New START Treaty, has created a situation of arms control anomie that invites competitive distrust among nuclear powers and increases uncertainty about their nuclear‑strategic thinking.  

Great‑power competition: The almost inevitable arrival of China as a third nuclear superpower creates an additional axis of uncertainty compared to the two‑sided Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. China’s involvement in a tripartite format for exchanging strategic thinking on nuclear weapons and arms control is an important, albeit challenging, imperative for all three states and their military leaders.  

Risks and Consequences of Renewed Arms Races  

The modern nuclear landscape is increasingly defined not only by military competition but also by growing concerns over strategic stability, economic sustainability, and ethical responsibility.  

Strategic Instability: As states pursue more sophisticated and diversified arsenals, the risk of miscalculation grows. Technologies that compress decision‑making time—such as hypersonic glide vehicles or AI‑enabled early‑warning systems—could increase the likelihood of accidental or preemptive nuclear use. AI‑enhanced technology for intelligence, warning, and estimation of others’ options and intentions will become standardized among great powers, raising the issue of shared guardrails in military applications of AI technology for crisis management.  

Economic and Opportunity Costs: Nuclear modernization programs require enormous financial investments. For many states, the pursuit of nuclear capabilities reflects a tradeoff between perceived security benefits and long‑term societal needs. Even within the umbrella of defense needs per se, there are important tradeoffs among preferred weapons systems and supporting infrastructure. For example, in the case of the United States, the costs of developing and deploying the proposed Golden Dome antimissile defense system may compete with the demands of military services for new generations of offensive strategic nuclear weapons.  

Normative and Ethical Concerns: The continued reliance on nuclear weapons raises profound ethical questions. The humanitarian consequences of any nuclear exchange—intentional or accidental—would be catastrophic. The potential erosion of norms against nuclear testing and against cavalier threats of nuclear first use threatens decades of progress toward the avoidance and management of nuclear crises.  

Future Pathways: Escalation or Restraint?  

As nuclear and non-nuclear systems become increasingly entangled, states, international institutions, and civil society organizations will play an important role in developing risk-reduction measures, strengthening strategic dialogue, and preserving norms to prevent nuclear escalation and maintain global stability.  

Technological Governance: Technological “black swans” have the potential to upend previously understood mechanisms for reassuring nuclear-weapon states against fears of preemptive nuclear attack. As AI, cyber operations, and autonomous systems become intertwined with nuclear command and control, states may need new norms or agreements to prevent destabilizing uses. Establishing shared understandings of “red lines” in cyber‑nuclear interactions could be a starting point.  

Regional Security Architectures: In regions with acute nuclear tensions, tailored diplomatic frameworks may help reduce risks. Confidence‑building measures in South Asia, renewed dialogue on the Korean Peninsula, and discussions on European security could all contribute to stability. The containment of growth in the numbers and lethality of non‑strategic or tactical nuclear weapons, in the context of preserving regional deterrence and security, is of immediate importance.  

The Role of Civil Society and International Institutions: Nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions, and international bodies continue to play a vital role in shaping public discourse, conducting research, and advocating for risk-reduction measures. Their influence may be especially crucial as formal diplomatic channels encounter political obstacles. One challenge is the relative shortage of nuclear deterrence and arms control studies in research university departments nowadays, compared to the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War periods.  

Conclusion  

In the twenty-first century, nuclear arms racing is no longer defined by the relatively stable bipolar logic of the Cold War, but by a far more complex and uncertain multipolar environment shaped by emerging technologies, regional rivalries, weakened arms control structures, and renewed great-power competition. The combination of emerging technology and increasingly sophisticated strike systems has compressed decision-making timelines and introduced new risks of miscalculation, escalation, and strategic instability among nuclear-armed states. At the same time, the financial costs of nuclear arsenals and the potential catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any nuclear exchange continue to raise profound ethical and political questions about unchecked nuclear capacities.  

Preventing future nuclear crises will require renewed commitments to arms control, technological governance, regional confidence-building measures, and sustained dialogue among both states and nonstate actors. In an era when formal diplomatic channels are increasingly strained, international institutions, academic communities, and civil society organizations may help preserve norms of restraint and advance practical risk-reduction measures. Ultimately, the challenge facing the international community is not only how to manage nuclear competition, but how to prevent technological change, geopolitical rivalry, and strategic mistrust from producing a new era of nuclear instability with potentially irreversible consequences.  

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own. 

Arms Control is No Panacea, But It Helps was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Role of First Use in Deterrence

American nuclear posture has long relied on an ambiguous first-use policy to enhance deterrence. Unlike a no-first-use policy, which commits a country to only retaliate in response to a nuclear attack. Ambiguity forces adversaries to consider the possibility that any aggression could provoke a devastating nuclear response, even in a non-nuclear conflict.

Today, the US faces a diverse array of threats from state and non-state actors, including revisionist powers like China and Russia, nuclear-armed rogue states like North Korea, and potential proliferators like Iran. The credibility of the American nuclear deterrent is critical in this environment. A first-use option deters conventional aggression from adversaries who may believe that their superior non-nuclear forces could overwhelm the US or its allies without triggering a nuclear response. If the US were to adopt a no-first-use policy, adversaries could be emboldened, believing they can engage in limited conflicts or conventional escalations without risking catastrophic consequences.

Credibility of Use

Nuclear deterrence rests not only on the existence of weapons but also on the belief that they will be used, if necessary. The credibility of the American nuclear deterrent, therefore, depends on a consistent and robust posture that leaves room for ambiguity. Even if morally troubling, this ambiguity serves to keep adversaries in check.

Credibility is essential in preventing both conventional and nuclear conflicts. The US must signal that it is willing to escalate when necessary, ensuring that adversaries believe they have no safe avenues to challenge American power. Both Moscow and Beijing are expanding their military capacities, with the Russian nuclear arsenal modernized and China rapidly growing its arsenal. Without the possibility of nuclear first use, these powers might test American resolve in regions like Eastern Europe, Taiwan, or the South China Sea, believing that Washington is reluctant to escalate.

This is where critics often misunderstand the moral and ethical dimensions of nuclear deterrence. A no-first-use policy may appear more humane, but by removing the strategic ambiguity that underpins deterrence, it risks emboldening adversaries to start conflicts that could spiral out of control. Paradoxically, maintaining a first-use option can be the best way to prevent nuclear war by ensuring adversaries never push the US into a corner where nuclear retaliation becomes necessary.

Continuity across Administrations

Regardless of who wins the November election, as Matthew Costlow noted, continuity in nuclear policy is essential for maintaining credibility. The US has had a bipartisan consensus on maintaining nuclear deterrence since the dawn of the atomic age. Both Republican and Democrat administrations preserved the first-use option because they recognize the value of strategic ambiguity in deterring aggression.

A Trump administration might be inclined to preserve a muscular nuclear posture to project strength, while a Harris administration might come under pressure from progressives to move towards a no-first-use policy—aligning with global disarmament movements. However, any shift towards no first use would erode the credibility of US commitments to allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in particular, relies on the American nuclear umbrella, and a no-first-use policy could cause allies to question Washington’s willingness to respond to conventional or nuclear threats. Such a policy could cause a cascading effecting of nuclear proliferation amongst our allies and adversaries.

Moreover, a shift in policy during an administration change could create instability by signaling to adversaries that US nuclear posture is fluid and negotiable, making deterrence less effective. Credibility in nuclear deterrence is not just about weapons but also about long-term consistency and resolve, which are crucial in managing the expectations of allies and adversaries alike.

Moral and Ethical Considerations

The moral and ethical dilemmas posed by nuclear weapons are undeniable. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear use make it tempting to adopt a policy that seeks to limit the circumstances under which such weapons might be employed. But the ethics of deterrence also hinge on preventing war in the first place. If the fear of nuclear first use keeps adversaries from initiating conflicts that could escalate into full-scale war, then the policy serves a larger ethical purpose: preserving peace.

In the real world of international politics, where states act for self-interest and survival, moral purity often clashes with pragmatic necessities. Nuclear deterrence, including the first-use option, is a grim but necessary strategy for ensuring peace and stability in a world still defined by competition among great powers.

Conclusion

As the 2024 election approaches, the future of American nuclear policy should be beyond partisan politics. The US must maintain its nuclear first-use policy regardless of which administration takes office, whether led by Donald Trump or Kamala Harris. The strategic logic of deterrence, the credibility of use, and the need to prevent adversary aggression all argue for preserving this policy. While the moral and ethical concerns surrounding nuclear weapons are valid, the preservation of peace and the deterrence of large-scale conflicts depend on maintaining the ambiguity that has underpinned nuclear strategy for decades. A stable and secure world requires that the US continue to hold the line on its nuclear posture—now and in the future.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Maintaining America’s First-Use Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.