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		<title>Applying the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model to Defeat Iran in the Gray Zone</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/applying-the-olympus-mons-problem-solving-model-to-defeat-iran-in-the-gray-zone/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Oshawn Jefferson]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 12:11:29 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Here is a comma separated list of keywords from the article: Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: June 3, 2026 In an age of persistent great power competition, the fight for influence is the decisive precursor to any potential conflict. Adversaries like Iran, who cannot compete symmetrically with the U.S., have poured resources into the information domain, recognizing it as the critical battlespace. As detailed in “In an Asymmetrical War, Iran Seeks [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/applying-the-olympus-mons-problem-solving-model-to-defeat-iran-in-the-gray-zone/">Applying the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model to Defeat Iran in the Gray Zone</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i><span data-contrast="none">Published:</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> June 3, 2026</span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">In an age of persistent great power competition, the fight for influence is the decisive precursor to any potential conflict. Adversaries like Iran, who cannot compete symmetrically with the U.S., have poured resources into the information domain, recognizing it as the critical battlespace. As detailed in “</span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/28/business/iran-propaganda-war-ai.html"><span data-contrast="none">In an Asymmetrical War, Iran Seeks an Edge With Its Information War</span></a><span data-contrast="none">,” Iran is waging a sophisticated offensive to win the war of perception first, shaping the cognitive battlefield to paralyze U.S. decision-making. This poses a direct challenge to the U.S. Department of War’s core focus on &#8220;maximum lethality,&#8221; as outlined in the </span><a href="https://safe.menlosecurity.com/doc/docview/viewer/docN9BBD0C110897018cbdf4d6b9bf38037372495e6dcd443e16720c8ecbb7dd8fd3c88164b72dc7"><span data-contrast="none">2026 National Defense Strategy</span></a><span data-contrast="none">. That goal, however, is unachievable if the information battlespace is lost. Cognitive dominance in the operational information environment is not a distraction from lethality; it is the fundamental prerequisite for it. To win, the joint forces must complement their pursuit of kinetic overmatch with a mastery of the cognitive domain.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><a href="https://safe.menlosecurity.com/doc/docview/viewer/docNA89DA7A0986A2f79201a87db1e5553493b961b3f1a127407a63d481d09d7bdc677d3a0661752"><span data-contrast="none">Iran’s gray zone strategy</span></a><span data-contrast="none">, a mix of proxy warfare and calibrated escalation detailed in analyses by CSIS and Michael Eisenstadt, is designed to create dilemmas and exploit the seams in Western military thought. The U.S. response was to elevate &#8220;</span><a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1490517/introducing-information-as-a-joint-function/"><span data-contrast="none">Information</span></a><span data-contrast="none">&#8221; to a joint function, a critical doctrinal step. But as then-Brigadier General Grynkewich noted when introducing the concept, doctrine-on-a-shelf changes nothing without a corresponding shift in the force’s &#8220;cultural mindsets.&#8221; The real work is building cognitive architecture to apply it.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">This is where a &#8220;Global Mindset,&#8221; defined by scholars in “</span><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/288959604_A_whole_new_global_mindset_for_leadership"><span data-contrast="none">A Whole New Global Mindset for Leadership</span></a><span data-contrast="none">” as &#8220;the capability to influence others unlike yourself,&#8221; becomes a warfighting imperative. This mindset is not an abstract virtue, but a tangible capability built on three pillars: (1) Intellectual Capital: The cognitive horsepower to understand the complex web of political, cultural, and social factors in a contested environment. (2) Psychological Capital: The resilience and fortitude to operate effectively in ambiguous, long-term struggles, countering an adversary’s &#8220;long game.&#8221; (3) Social Capital: The behavioral skill to build trust and show intercultural empathy, allowing for the creation of authentic partnerships and resonant counter-narratives.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">Yet, how do you build this mindset at scale? The answer lies in a structured, teachable framework. The </span><a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315641720-11/enhancing-global-mindset-military-public-affairs-karen-naumann-oshawn-jefferson"><span data-contrast="none">Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model,</span></a><span data-contrast="none"> a methodology developed at The Air University and Defense Information School. It was designed specifically to make the abstract actionable. It provides a repeatable process for planners to solve &#8220;wicked problems&#8221; in the information domain. Its five core elements are:</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">(1) Complex Adaptive Systems Thinking: This foundational mindset shifts planners from linear predictable models to seeing the information environment as a dynamic ecosystem. It allows them to anticipate ripple effects and identify high-leverage nodes in an adversary’s network.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">(2) PESTLE and Ecosystem Analysis: Using a structured analysis of the Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal, and Environmental domains, this step builds the deep situational awareness required to uncover the root grievances an adversary like Iran exploits.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">(3) </span><a href="https://www.consuunt.com/cynefin-framework/"><span data-contrast="none">Cynefin </span></a><span data-contrast="none">Sensemaking Framework: This framework helps leaders correctly categorize the environment. The gray zone is a &#8220;Complex&#8221; domain, where the only effective approach is to &#8220;Probe-Sense-Respond,&#8221; in essence to conduct small-scale, reversible actions, see how the system reacts, and adapt accordingly. This neutralizes an adversary&#8217;s probing tactics and reduces the risk of miscalculation.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">(4) Wicked Solutions for Complex Problems: This approach is the engine for building social capital. It forces planners to see the problem from the diverse perspectives of all stakeholders, enabling the creation of sustainable, locally resonant strategies that can &#8220;flip the script&#8221; on an adversary&#8217;s propaganda.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">(5) Strategic Foresight: This element breaks Iran&#8217;s “long game” advantage by shifting the U.S. focus from short-term reactions to long-term competition, allowing planners to anticipate future conflict domains and build strategic patience.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">Defeating our adversaries in the gray zone is a cognitive, not purely a kinetic, challenge. To achieve the Department of War&#8217;s goal of decisive lethality, we must first win the war of ideas. The time has come for U.S. military leaders to stop treating information as a supporting effort and recognize it as the central battlefield in modern competition. This requires a deliberate, sustained investment in the intellectual and cultural readiness of our warfighters. We must integrate cognitive frameworks like the Olympus Mons model into professional military education and operational planning. This is not just about improving human decision-making today; it is about future-proofing our force. The structured, logic-based nature of this model is the most compatible framework for integration with the Information Advantage large language models that will define the next generation of warfare, allowing our warfighters to serve as the critical &#8216;human-in-the-loop&#8217; for AI-enabled operations in the information environment.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">The character of conflict is evolving, but the core of American strength, the ingenuity and adaptability of its warfighters, remains unchanged. The next generation of warfare will not be won by military might and technology alone, but by those who can master the cognitive battlefield of the Operational Information Environment which includes the complex human terrain where influence is wielded and will is broken. Frameworks like the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model do not replace the warrior&#8217;s ethos; they sharpen it, forging leaders who can out-think, out-maneuver, and out-compete our adversaries in the war of ideas. Seizing this cognitive high ground is the ultimate expression of &#8216;peace through strength.&#8217; The tools to build this future are within our grasp; what is required now is the vision and the will to forge the victory of tomorrow.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><i><span data-contrast="none">Oshawn Jefferson is a national security professional and strategic communication expert with over two decades of experience in the U.S. military and academic sectors. He is the creator of the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model and a leading voice on developing cognitive readiness and a global mindset within the Joint Force. The views of the author are his own.</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Applying-the-Olympus-Mons-Problem-Solving-Model-to-Defeat-Iran-in-the-Gray-Zone.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="198" height="55" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 198px) 100vw, 198px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/applying-the-olympus-mons-problem-solving-model-to-defeat-iran-in-the-gray-zone/">Applying the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model to Defeat Iran in the Gray Zone</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Navigating the AI and Nuclear Nexus</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/navigating-the-ai-and-nuclear-nexus/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Shahzad Akram]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 12:12:47 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: June 1, 2026 As the world gears up for the 2026 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, a new and multifaceted factor is complicating the global strategic calculus: Artificial Intelligence (AI). The “nuclear-AI nexus” has evolved from a niche technical interest to a prominent feature in global security discussions, with implications for every aspect [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/navigating-the-ai-and-nuclear-nexus/">Navigating the AI and Nuclear Nexus</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: June 1, 2026</em></p>
<p>As the world gears up for the 2026 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, a new and multifaceted factor is complicating the global strategic calculus: Artificial Intelligence (AI). The “<a href="http://www.nuclear-abolition.com/language/the-impact-of-artificial-intelligence-in-nuclear-decision-making/">nuclear-AI nexus</a>” has evolved from a niche technical interest to a prominent feature in global security discussions, with implications for every aspect of the NPT’s three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, as experts recently cautioned at the “<a href="https://wise-materials.org/external/from-algorithms-to-atoms-machine-learning-meets-materials-science-2-2-3/">Atoms for Algorithms</a>” webinar, we need to cut through the speculative “AI hype” to ensure this technology remains a means for peace, not an avenue for unintentional escalation.</p>
<p>To regulate the nuclear-AI connection, we first need to understand the technology. As a United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research researcher, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6MuwZJ48cic">Dr. Yasmina Fina</a> suggests, AI is not a monolithic entity, but a “construct” and a “system of systems,” made up of code, software, data, hardware, and sensors. It is a system used to fulfill certain functions, not a threat capable of usurping human decision-making. The risk is the “<a href="https://thebulletin.org/2025/12/lessons-from-the-uns-first-resolution-on-ai-in-nuclear-command-and-control/">speed and scale</a>” of AI, which can have myriad implications for performance and strategy. Moreover, Fina warns that comparing <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6MuwZJ48cic">nuclear governance to AI governance</a> is unhelpful because the technologies are not the same; nuclear materials are limited and tangible, whereas AI is ubiquitous and digital.</p>
<p>In the context of non-proliferation, AI is touted as a game-changing <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2025/12/lessons-from-the-uns-first-resolution-on-ai-in-nuclear-command-and-control/">verification tool</a>. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could potentially use “AI agents,” semi-autonomous machines capable of processing large <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2025/12/lessons-from-the-uns-first-resolution-on-ai-in-nuclear-command-and-control/">data streams and satellite images </a>to verify the accuracy of declarations by states at a pace humans cannot match. However, <a href="https://medium.com/@ian-j-stewart/generative-ai-and-weapons-of-mass-destruction-will-ai-lead-to-proliferation-c4476580bbc6">Dr. Ian Stewart</a>, Executive Director of the CNS Washington, states that AI will not help states develop nuclear weapons they could not otherwise build, for two physical reasons: AI cannot “magic up” <a href="http://www.nuclear-abolition.com/language/the-impact-of-artificial-intelligence-in-nuclear-decision-making/">fissile material</a>, and there is no evidence that large language models can transfer the “tacit knowledge” necessary for weaponization.</p>
<p>When it comes to AI and nuclear weapons, political concerns are high. States have been reluctant to allow the IAEA to use open-source data or “black box” algorithms. Should an AI detect an event, the absence of “explainability” or how the machine arrived at its decision could lead to a crisis of <a href="https://medium.com/@ian-j-stewart/generative-ai-and-weapons-of-mass-destruction-will-ai-lead-to-proliferation-c4476580bbc6">political legitimacy</a> for the safeguards system.</p>
<p>The most fraught part of the nexus is disarmament. We are now seeing a “<a href="https://www.sipri.org/publications/2025/sipri-insights-peace-and-security/advancing-governance-nexus-artificial-intelligence-and-nuclear-weapons">race to adopt</a>” AI in military strategies due to the perceived speed advantage it offers. AI can speed up threat identification and data integration, potentially freeing up more time for decision-making (or, on the other hand, reducing decision-making cycles to the point that humans are simply rubber-stamping decisions).</p>
<p>Aliche Sultini, senior research lead at the Rhode Island School of Design, explains that AI systems create new <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2025/12/lessons-from-the-uns-first-resolution-on-ai-in-nuclear-command-and-control/">levels of uncertainty</a>. If a state cannot grasp how an adversary’s AI operates in its decision-making, it might fall into worst-case scenarios, reinforcing alert postures that prevent disarmament. To <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2025/12/lessons-from-the-uns-first-resolution-on-ai-in-nuclear-command-and-control/">support disarmament</a>, AI must be used to enhance technical verification and confidence, not to shorten the path to war. Possibly the most disruptive aspect of this interaction is the NPT’s third pillar: peaceful nuclear energy applications. According to <a href="https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/INF/7">Mr. Shota Kamishima</a> of the IAEA, an “affinity” is emerging between nuclear power and AI. We are now moving into a world where energy-hungry AI data centers need the clean, scalable, and reliable power offered by nuclear power, and where nuclear generation and maintenance are improved through AI.</p>
<p>This alliance is especially important for the rollout of <a href="https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/INF/7">Small Modular Reactors</a> (SMRs), for which AI-optimized construction schedules and supply chains are critical. By enhancing predictability and avoiding cost overruns, a major issue for nuclear construction, AI could make nuclear projects more “bankable” and thus more attractive for the global shift towards clean energy. Despite technological progress, the experts agree: human responsibility is essential. Whether it is a safeguards inspector at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or a human commander in a nuclear-armed nation, humans are the “<a href="https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/INF/7">last line of defence</a>”.</p>
<p>“Black box” systems are incompatible with a strong safety culture. <a href="https://unidir.org/event/the-nuclear-ai-nexus-implications-for-the-three-pillars-of-the-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference/">Governance policies</a> must ensure that AI is implemented with transparency, traceability, and “explainability”. We must also be alert to the potential for AI to be employed by “agents” to monitor sites, which could result in disinformation and the distortion of threat perception through “<a href="https://unidir.org/event/the-nuclear-ai-nexus-implications-for-the-three-pillars-of-the-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference/">anomaly detections</a>.” As the 2026 Review Conference draws near, policymakers’ mission should be to “denoise.” <a href="https://unidir.org/event/the-nuclear-ai-nexus-implications-for-the-three-pillars-of-the-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference/">Nuclear policy decisions</a> must not be based on science fiction or fear of competition. Rather, we should prioritize “lower stakes” opportunities where AI can help us now, such as employing AI agents to navigate the overwhelming output of the NPT process — making it searchable and highlighting inconsistencies in delegation positions.</p>
<p>The relationship between nuclear and AI is not a bug to be fixed with more software, but a circumstance to be managed by the international community. By prioritizing evidence-based policy and law, human-in-the-loop systems, and the common ground of the peaceful <a href="http://www.nuclear-abolition.com/language/the-impact-of-artificial-intelligence-in-nuclear-decision-making/">“Atoms for Algorithms”</a> alliance, we can ensure that the digital revolution supports, rather than undermines, the global nuclear order. In the end, the fate of the NPT will not be determined by algorithms, but by human intelligence.</p>
<p><em>Muhammad Shahzad Akram is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is an alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Centre for Strategic Studies, National Defence University (NDU), and Washington, DC. His expertise includes cyber warfare and strategy, arms control, and disarmament. Views expressed in this article are the author&#8217;s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Navigating-the-AI-and-Nuclear-Nexus.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="216" height="60" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 216px) 100vw, 216px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/navigating-the-ai-and-nuclear-nexus/">Navigating the AI and Nuclear Nexus</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Emerging Technologies</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/nuclear-deterrence-in-the-age-of-emerging-technologies/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Usama Khalid]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Apr 2026 12:16:11 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: April 21, 2026 The amalgamation of emerging technologies and nuclear weapons systems is significantly impacting the landscape of strategic stability. The primary problem associated with such technologies is their dual-use nature, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), hyper sonics, quantum computing, and cyber warfare. These technologies are evolving more rapidly than the treaties meant to [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/nuclear-deterrence-in-the-age-of-emerging-technologies/">Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Emerging Technologies</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: April 21, 2026</em></p>
<p>The amalgamation of emerging technologies and nuclear weapons systems is significantly impacting the landscape of strategic stability. The primary problem associated with such technologies is their dual-use nature, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), hyper sonics, quantum computing, and cyber warfare. These technologies are evolving more rapidly than the <a href="https://jqas.org/modernizing-arms-control-the-case-for-codifying-oversight-in-ai-and-nuclear-command-policy-marcellus-policy-analysis/">treaties meant to regulate them</a>.</p>
<p>The most significant emerging technology is Artificial Intelligence (AI), a prominent dual-use disruptor. In the civilian domain, it can help process large amounts of data based on its training. Meanwhile, in the nuclear domain, it affects among other things, the <a href="https://media.nti.org/documents/NTI_Paper_AI_r4.pdf">nuclear decision making</a> process.</p>
<p>The U.S. is currently considering <a href="https://jqas.org/modernizing-arms-control-the-case-for-codifying-oversight-in-ai-and-nuclear-command-policy-marcellus-policy-analysis/">incorporating AI into its NC3 modernization</a> process while maintaining a human-in-the-loop policy for launches, using AI to monitor abnormal patterns in adversary movements. Russia, on the other hand, is developing AI-driven upgrades to its <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-russia-reshaping-command-and-control-ai-enabled-warfare">automated retaliatory strike system</a> to ensure that if the country’s leadership is decapitated, the system can autonomously verify a nuclear strike via seismic and radiation sensors before launching a retaliatory strike. These change decision timing and the deterrence dynamic.</p>
<p>The incorporation of hypersonic technology into delivery vehicles has revolutionized the exchange of weapons in warfare. The speed at which hypersonic systems travel can exceed Mach 5 (five times the speed of sound), potentially inducing miscalculation for an adversary, since it compresses the time window to clearly assess whether a missile is conventional or nuclear. In late 2024 and early 2025, India tested its <a href="https://vajiramandravi.com/current-affairs/drdos-hypersonic-missile/">Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) technology</a>. Since these vehicles travel at such high speeds and at low altitudes with the ability to maneuver, it impacts the deterrence strategy between two nuclear countries. In response, Pakistan accelerated the <a href="https://www.gids.com.pk/land">Fatah series</a> missiles, which are designed as flat-trajectory rockets. The geographical proximity of India and Pakistan compresses the decision-making window during a crisis.</p>
<p>The world&#8217;s largest naval force, the U.S. navy, is currently integrating the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic system onto Zumwalt-class destroyers. A Zumwalt-class ship may appear as a nuclear threat on radar but carries conventional weapons, risking warhead ambiguity for an adversary who might launch a nuclear strike if provoked. The recent exchange of delivery vehicles during the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Israel-Iran-conflict">Iran and Israel conflict of 2024-2025</a> has shown the effect of hypersonic missiles in military operations. Iran used the <a href="https://mylibrarianship.wordpress.com/2025/06/15/irans-fattah-2-hypersonic-missile-a-game-changer-in-regional-military-power/">Fattah-2 hypersonic missile</a>, capable of Mach 5+ speeds with mid-flight maneuverability. Such weapon-delivery systems create strategic ambiguity for the adversary because they provide only a few seconds&#8217; window to decide whether to retaliate with conventional or nuclear missiles.</p>
<p>Advancements in quantum computing change warfare by providing more powerful algorithms producing vulnerabilities in secure systems. Nuclear launch codes, for example, are considered among the most secure encryption systems, which cannot be broken by classical computer methods. However, with advanced quantum computing methods, they become more vulnerable to hacking.</p>
<p>Additionally, <a href="https://www.9dashline.com/article/quantum-sensors-and-submarine-invulnerability">Quantum sensing</a>, which is facilitated with quantum electronic systems, allow for detection of minute changes in gravity or magnetic fields, which could produce systems that detect submarines, reducing their element of surprise. For example, China has made a huge leap by developing <a href="https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/is-the-stealth-submarine-era-over/">Quantum SQUID (Superconducting Quantum Interference Device) sensors</a>. These devices may be able to detect the magnetic signature of US Ohio-class stealth submarines from miles away, threatening the ultimate nuclear deterrent.</p>
<p>Cyber warfare has recently moved to the forefront of modern warfare tactics with potential impacts on nuclear deterrence. Cyber warfare may produce uncertainties due to disruption of detection mechanisms and nuclear command and control that could produce unstable strategic situations. The classic Cold War model of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) was based on the visible, slow-moving, threat of nuclear weapons exchange. Cyber warfare introduces complexity and confusion. Thus, the deliberate nature of threats; instead, may instigate miscalculations driven by algorithms or false cyber signals.</p>
<p>A good example of how cyber operations can offset traditional military operations was the venture to physically damage Iranian nuclear centrifuges using malicious software (malware). The operation was carried out using Stuxnet malware installed from a USB drive that destroyed centrifuges without a single kinetic device. Similarly, Russian hackers have been carrying out <a href="https://jsis.washington.edu/news/cyberattack-critical-infrastructure-russia-ukrainian-power-grid-attacks/">cyber-attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure</a> and government agencies since 2015. Vis-à-vis in 2025, during the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, Ukrainian intelligence conducted a <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-ukraines-future-cyber-and-space-forces">cyber-operation shutting down the Russian railway</a> and affecting digital infrastructure.</p>
<p>A major problem lies with warhead ambiguity (conventional vs. nuclear), which poses a huge risk for accidental nuclear escalation. During the height of the May 2025 crisis between the two South Asian rivals, cyber operations were at their peak. Consequently, in the post-crisis scenario, India is enhancing its cyber deterrence. In future conflicts, any state’s cyber space will be one of the primary targets; in a scenario where lines are already blurred, a single attempt to disrupt the cyber space of NC3 could be the initiating point of nuclear escalation.</p>
<p>The evolution of dual-use emerging technologies is fundamentally changing the traditional pillars of nuclear deterrence by compressing the action/reaction time required for rational decision-making. A major problem lies with warhead ambiguity (conventional vs. nuclear), which poses a huge risk for accidental nuclear escalation. In the volatile context of South Asia, dual-use technologies appear to destabilize a fragile strategic stability.</p>
<p>Ultimately, as machines outpace human thought in the decision loop, there is a danger that the resulting disruption is not just a technological arms race but the erosion of human-centric control, creating the risk of an accidental, algorithmically driven nuclear escalation as the defining strategic challenge of the future.</p>
<p><em>Muhammad Usama Khalid is a Research Officer at the Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), BUITEMS, Quetta. He can be reached at: </em><a href="mailto:usama.khalid.uk456@gmail.com"><em>usama.khalid.uk456@gmail.com</em></a><em>. The views of the author are his own.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/nuclear-deterrence-in-the-age-of-emerging-technologies/">Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Emerging Technologies</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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