As Iran signals its willingness to pursue fighting, one of the most important power struggles to watch in the Middle East today is not between Iran and the United States, nor between Iran and Israel. It is unfolding inside the Iranian state itself if emerging reports concerning the growing divide between the government and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are even partially accurate. Assessments suggest significant differences between elements of the IRGC and President Masoud Pezeshkian’s government regarding the management of war, negotiations, economic recovery, and relations with neighboring Gulf states. Reports said Pezeshkian has criticized military escalation actions not coordinated by the government and supported diplomacy and economic stability, in contrast to the more confrontational stance of influential security hardliners in the IRGC.  

For many years, Iran has tried to frame itself as a highly centralized and unified actor. The supreme leadership, presidency, parliament, clerical bodies, Supreme National Security Council, Basij forces, official army, and IRGC all play roles in shaping Iranian policy, including the current course of the war. What is likely to change is not the existence of disagreements, but their intensity and growing visibility. Pezeshkian’s statement that decisions on the war and negotiations with the United States rest with Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and the Supreme National Security Council further suggests the limited role of Iran’s president.  

At the core of the tensions between the government and the IRGC are two competing assumptions about Iran’s current strategic environment. The first is that Iran’s long-term strength depends on economic recovery, sanctions relief, and reducing regional tensions. Supporters of this view recognize that Iran has demonstrated resilience under pressure, but they also understand that resilience alone is not enough for economic growth or relief felt by citizens. Years of sanctions, inflation, and currency depreciation have created structural challenges that cannot be solved through military actions alone.  

The second assumption is aligned with the strategic thinking traditionally associated with the IRGC and hardline security circles within the Supreme National Security Council. Under this view, Iran remains an ongoing target of military pressure, sanctions, intelligence operations, and efforts to limit its regional influence. The IRGC believes that any compromise carries risks. This approach reflects a key element of the IRGC doctrine: security must come before prosperity. The IRGC spokesperson similarly emphasized readiness for confrontation and warned that the types of weaponry utilized would be “completely different.”  

Understanding these distinctions is essential for anticipating how Iran is likely to act. Too often, analyses reduce Iranian actions to ideology alone. However, even policies that appear hostile from abroad are usually justified internally through an intertwined framework of deterrence and strategic depth aimed at regime survival following the campaign to counter the Iranian threat. Even if reports of internal political tensions are inaccurate, they still show the limited ability of elected government institutions to shape strategic decisions against the IRGC.  

The implications of this internal power struggle extend well beyond Tehran. For the United States and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, a visible divide inside Iran presents both opportunities and challenges. Pragmatic voices within the Iranian government indicate an interest in diplomatic normalization, economic engagement, and regional stability. These  potentially allow for confidence-building measures and dialogue on their nuclear and ballistic missile programs and facilitate a full opening of the Hormuz Strait. However, this remains highly unlikely given that power and control lie with hardliners in the IRGC.  

On the other hand, it would be wrong to assume that internal debates lead to moderation. The IRGC and Basij continue to wield significant influence, especially in times of crisis. The Basij’s ability to suppress civilian protests remains critical to the regime’s survival. Recent conflicts have further reinforced the importance of deterrence in Iran’s strategic thinking, and there are no indications that the IRGC intends to retreat from its central role in Iran’s national security affairs and external security agenda.  

For the United States and GCC policymakers, the takeaway is not to choose between diplomatic engagement and deterrence, but to pursue both while emphasizing a continuous military deterrence posture given Iran’s history of hostile and regionally destabilizing actions. This is particularly important because negotiations over the Hormuz Strait, nuclear program, and ballistic missile capabilities remain unsettled.  

Regardless of any growing divide in Iran’s internal power structure, the main question now is what these developments tell us about the future trajectory of military and diplomatic engagement with Iran. Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has sought to balance overarching clerical power, revolutionary institutions, and elected bodies. But this balance has never been firmly established, and the ongoing conflict shows the IRGC playing a more visible role than before. Whether this is a temporary wartime adjustment or a deeper structural consolidation of power remains to be seen. This is why the current debate inside Iran deserves close attention. 

Will economic recovery and regional integration become the primary pillars of Iran’s national power and ongoing negotiations following the end of the current 60-day ceasefire? Or will security considerations and regional hegemony ambitions embedded in the IRGC doctrine continue to dominate decision-making at the highest levels of the state? The answer will shape not only Iran’s future but also the future security landscape of the region.  

For military strategists, the growing differences between Iran’s civilian leadership and the IRGC reinforce an enduring lesson: degrading military capabilities does not immediately produce political outcomes. If the IRGC continues to expand its influence over strategic decision-making, the United States would have to confront a more centralized, security-driven adversary that will likely be less responsive to economic incentives and more willing to absorb costs in pursuit of regime survival.  

Military campaigns against Iran must therefore be reassessed not just in terms of their operational outcome, but in terms of how they impact and reshape internal power dynamics within the Iranian state. Tactical gains that empower hardline actors may ultimately undermine broader Western strategic objectives.  

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defence and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate from Grenoble École de Management, France, an MBA from the EU Business School, Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defence cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. The views of the author are his own.

The Political Power Battle in Tehran was originally published on Global Security Review.

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was intended to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, and it has achieved remarkable success. Since the treaty was entered into force in 1970, only three states have managed to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, namely India, Pakistan, and North Korea. The collective West initially opted for peaceful measures to ensure non-proliferation, such as the formation of NSG after India’s 1974 test aimed at limiting the flow of nuclear fuel and technology to “could be” nuclear states.

However, there have also been forceful measures to prevent nuclear proliferation. The U.S. and Israel have repeatedly engaged in counterproliferation (CP) and in some cases, “offensive counterproliferation” such as in Iraq, and Syria, and most recently Iran. But does this forceful compliance achieve lasting non-proliferation goals? Or does it entrench the target state’s psychological dependence on nuclear weapons for survival?

As the decade of 1980s unfolded, non-proliferation efforts turned violent when the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak was attacked by Israel and subsequently destroyed. Although the reactor program was severely damaged, Iraq continued to pursue a nuclear weapon. Thereafter, the Gulf-War of 1991 put an end to Iraq’s nuclear program forever. Although Richard Betts argues otherwise; he notes that Osirak was not the key component to weapons production.

Like Osirak, the Al-Kibar nuclear facility in Syria was targeted by Israeli airstrikes in 2007. The site was alleged to be a plutonium production facility based on a North Korean reactor. Syria, a signatory of the NPT, could not protest Israeli violation of its airspace and the destruction of a site undeclared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 2008, the IAEA concluded, after a visit, that chemically processed uranium traces were found around the site of the destroyed reactor. The IAEA requested further inspection, but the Syrian government denied access. The attack on Al-Kibar demonstrates limited success in offensive CP. Although it is not yet certain whether Syria was close to making a bomb or even attempting to make one, the attack certainly imposed a logistical setback on Syria, triggered the IAEA inspections on a site which was undeclared to the agency, and resulted in greater international scrutiny of Syrian nuclear activities.

The most significant factor in the Israeli CP strategy is Iran. The CP strategy in Iran was marked by the targeted assassination of individuals associated with Iran’s nuclear program. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who was considered responsible for the Iranian nuclear weapons program, was assassinated in 2020. In addition to this, another peculiarity of the Iran CP involves the use of cyber-attacks to disrupt reactor operations. The infamous Stuxnet had damaged a considerable number of centrifuges in the Natanz nuclear facility and highlighted lapses and vulnerabilities in its cyber and operational security.

In 2025, Iranian nuclear facilities became targets of kinetic attacks by the U.S. and Israel. The U.S. claimed victory by announcing the “obliteration” of the targeted Iranian nuclear facilities. However, Iran, several independent analysts, and even the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) disagreed with the U.S. president. Nonetheless, the twelve-day war concluded in a ceasefire, which did not last and the U.S. and Israel resumed actions to curtail Iranian nuclear ambitions.

Contrary to the instances in Iraq and Syria, the IAEA agrees more with Iran than with the U.S. and Israel on matters of Iran’s enrichment, nuclear facilities, and nuclear weapons ambitions. As the war began in early hours of March 2026, the IAEA chief Antonnio Grossi said that Iran has “no structured program to build nuclear weapons”. Not to mention Iran is a signatory to the NPT, its government has no plans to acquire nuclear weapons, and the late Ayatollah Khamenei had even issued a religious verdict, acting as the principal block to Iran’s nuclear weapons.

In Iraq, Syria, and Iran, it can be argued that offensive CP yields unsatisfactory results and often backfires on legitimate, peaceful non-proliferation efforts. The 2003 U.S. invasion, which forced regime change in Iraq, was initiated under the pretext of Iraqi WMDs and nuclear weapons program. It was later concluded that no substantial proof existed that the Iraqi nuclear weapons program continued after the 1991 Gulf War. David Allison and Tyler Brown note that “The Gulf War destroyed much of Iraq’s ability to acquire material for a nuclear weapon, and the program was abandoned in the early 1990s in the face of international sanctions and inspections.”

But the Iranian case might become the most striking example of a failed offensive CP effort. The assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, politico-military leadership, and nuclear facilities has only emboldened Iran and the hardliners within. According to John J. Mearsheimer, Iran’s new Ayatollah may consider going nuclear. Although offensive CP may reduce a state’s opportunity to build a nuclear weapon, it always backfires as far as the willingness of the target country to acquire nuclear weapons is concerned. A state that becomes vulnerable to foreign invasions/surgical strikes will certainly be more inclined than before to acquire nuclear deterrence.

In conclusion, non-proliferation efforts tend to yield positive results if they remain peaceful. The NPT’s peaceful mechanisms have prevented even technologically capable states, such as Japan and Germany, from acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, it is to the NPT’s credit that Libya stopped its nuclear program. Ukraine was disarmed in 1994, and South Africa abandoned its fully operational nuclear weapons between 1989 and 1991. Using military means against a proliferator not only does not dismantle the target nuclear program but may instead bolster the target country’s resolve to rely more on nuclear deterrence to secure state sovereignty. The same effect is generated in other states too, those who may fear their survival and seek nuclear weapons to offset adversary disarmament or decapitating strikes. With treaties faltering, increased signaling, and continued breach of state sovereignty, states that subscribe to hardcore realist points-of-view will inevitably choose the nuclear route over arms control.

Ali Abbas is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network. He writes on Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Stability, Arms Control, and Emerging Disruptive Technology. He can be reached at aliabbas_changezi@hotmail.com.  Views expressed in the article are the author’s own. 

The Pitfalls of Offensive Counterproliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.