The amalgamation of emerging technologies and nuclear weapons systems is significantly impacting the landscape of strategic stability. The primary problem associated with such technologies is their dual-use nature, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), hyper sonics, quantum computing, and cyber warfare. These technologies are evolving more rapidly than the treaties meant to regulate them.

The most significant emerging technology is Artificial Intelligence (AI), a prominent dual-use disruptor. In the civilian domain, it can help process large amounts of data based on its training. Meanwhile, in the nuclear domain, it affects among other things, the nuclear decision making process.

The U.S. is currently considering incorporating AI into its NC3 modernization process while maintaining a human-in-the-loop policy for launches, using AI to monitor abnormal patterns in adversary movements. Russia, on the other hand, is developing AI-driven upgrades to its automated retaliatory strike system to ensure that if the country’s leadership is decapitated, the system can autonomously verify a nuclear strike via seismic and radiation sensors before launching a retaliatory strike. These change decision timing and the deterrence dynamic.

The incorporation of hypersonic technology into delivery vehicles has revolutionized the exchange of weapons in warfare. The speed at which hypersonic systems travel can exceed Mach 5 (five times the speed of sound), potentially inducing miscalculation for an adversary, since it compresses the time window to clearly assess whether a missile is conventional or nuclear. In late 2024 and early 2025, India tested its Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) technology. Since these vehicles travel at such high speeds and at low altitudes with the ability to maneuver, it impacts the deterrence strategy between two nuclear countries. In response, Pakistan accelerated the Fatah series missiles, which are designed as flat-trajectory rockets. The geographical proximity of India and Pakistan compresses the decision-making window during a crisis.

The world’s largest naval force, the U.S. navy, is currently integrating the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic system onto Zumwalt-class destroyers. A Zumwalt-class ship may appear as a nuclear threat on radar but carries conventional weapons, risking warhead ambiguity for an adversary who might launch a nuclear strike if provoked. The recent exchange of delivery vehicles during the Iran and Israel conflict of 2024-2025 has shown the effect of hypersonic missiles in military operations. Iran used the Fattah-2 hypersonic missile, capable of Mach 5+ speeds with mid-flight maneuverability. Such weapon-delivery systems create strategic ambiguity for the adversary because they provide only a few seconds’ window to decide whether to retaliate with conventional or nuclear missiles.

Advancements in quantum computing change warfare by providing more powerful algorithms producing vulnerabilities in secure systems. Nuclear launch codes, for example, are considered among the most secure encryption systems, which cannot be broken by classical computer methods. However, with advanced quantum computing methods, they become more vulnerable to hacking.

Additionally, Quantum sensing, which is facilitated with quantum electronic systems, allow for detection of minute changes in gravity or magnetic fields, which could produce systems that detect submarines, reducing their element of surprise. For example, China has made a huge leap by developing Quantum SQUID (Superconducting Quantum Interference Device) sensors. These devices may be able to detect the magnetic signature of US Ohio-class stealth submarines from miles away, threatening the ultimate nuclear deterrent.

Cyber warfare has recently moved to the forefront of modern warfare tactics with potential impacts on nuclear deterrence. Cyber warfare may produce uncertainties due to disruption of detection mechanisms and nuclear command and control that could produce unstable strategic situations. The classic Cold War model of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) was based on the visible, slow-moving, threat of nuclear weapons exchange. Cyber warfare introduces complexity and confusion. Thus, the deliberate nature of threats; instead, may instigate miscalculations driven by algorithms or false cyber signals.

A good example of how cyber operations can offset traditional military operations was the venture to physically damage Iranian nuclear centrifuges using malicious software (malware). The operation was carried out using Stuxnet malware installed from a USB drive that destroyed centrifuges without a single kinetic device. Similarly, Russian hackers have been carrying out cyber-attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and government agencies since 2015. Vis-à-vis in 2025, during the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, Ukrainian intelligence conducted a cyber-operation shutting down the Russian railway and affecting digital infrastructure.

A major problem lies with warhead ambiguity (conventional vs. nuclear), which poses a huge risk for accidental nuclear escalation. During the height of the May 2025 crisis between the two South Asian rivals, cyber operations were at their peak. Consequently, in the post-crisis scenario, India is enhancing its cyber deterrence. In future conflicts, any state’s cyber space will be one of the primary targets; in a scenario where lines are already blurred, a single attempt to disrupt the cyber space of NC3 could be the initiating point of nuclear escalation.

The evolution of dual-use emerging technologies is fundamentally changing the traditional pillars of nuclear deterrence by compressing the action/reaction time required for rational decision-making. A major problem lies with warhead ambiguity (conventional vs. nuclear), which poses a huge risk for accidental nuclear escalation. In the volatile context of South Asia, dual-use technologies appear to destabilize a fragile strategic stability.

Ultimately, as machines outpace human thought in the decision loop, there is a danger that the resulting disruption is not just a technological arms race but the erosion of human-centric control, creating the risk of an accidental, algorithmically driven nuclear escalation as the defining strategic challenge of the future.

Muhammad Usama Khalid is a Research Officer at the Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), BUITEMS, Quetta. He can be reached at: usama.khalid.uk456@gmail.com. The views of the author are his own.

Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Emerging Technologies was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is important to remember that election-related violence and unrest do not just happen spontaneously. There is a long build-up of tension leading to such events, and much of this tension is deliberately instigated by adversarial nation-states that are engaged in spreading misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation through social media influence operations.

During non-election times, the general goal of these influence operations is simply to cause as much polarization and divisiveness within American society as possible. But during election time the goal becomes more specific: sow confusion, suspicion, mistrust, and chaos regarding the American political process to undermine democracy.

The problem is that this post-election period is still a prime time to achieve that specific goal. To ensure the peaceful transfer of power and preserve democracy, it is essential to understand why the level of risk remains high.

More Actors Are Getting Involved

The first factor to consider is that the number of adversaries Americans should be legitimately concerned about, with respect to social media information operations, continues to grow. Where Russia and China were the two primary nation-states to worry about, Iran is increasingly entering the picture as a formidable adversary. While Iran is already a threat in terms of conventional cyberwarfare, it is not known for its prowess in influence operations.

However, this is changing, and Iran is proving itself a formidable adversary on the information warfare front. Just last August, for example, American intelligence officials revealed that Iran attempted to hack the presidential campaigns.

They were successful in hacking the Trump campaign, but this was not a conventional cyberattack. Their main objective was not the hack itself. Rather, it was the influence operations made possible by the information gained from that hack.

This was evidenced by Iran offering the Biden campaign access to information stolen from the Trump campaign. The Biden campaign did not respond.

In addition to the more obvious nation-states such as China, Iran, and Russia, there are also potential influence operations being carried out or in planning by other threat actors that the US must not ignore. Overly focusing on just the usual suspects can lead to overlooking other players in the game which include not just external nation-state adversaries but also domestic threat actors.

Despite Iran’s hack of the Trump campaign, in this and in other election-related influence operations, the goal is not necessarily to favor one presidential candidate over the other. With Trump’s victory, that is now a moot point anyway. Instead, the goal is to use misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation to confuse and overwhelm Americans, regardless of their political persuasions, and to trigger their negative emotions to sow as much chaos and discord as possible.

The ultimate end game is to get the American populace to lose trust in their political system, thereby undermining democratic society. This, in turn, would open the way for these nation-state adversaries to further assert their own interests.

Election Day Was Just the Beginning

Thankfully, election day came and went with few and only minor incidents. This was not due to lack of harmful activity. In fact, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued joint statements advising the public that their respective agencies observed adversarial states—namely Iran and Russia—conducting influence operations “intended to undermine public confidence in the integrity of US elections and stoke divisions among Americans.” They added, “The IC expects these activities to intensify through election day and in the coming weeks, and that foreign influence narratives will focus on swing states.”

First, the fact that these three agencies felt the need to issue joint statements is highly significant and they would not have done so had the level of risk not justified it. The lack of major incidents is therefore a testament to their vigilance. But pay special attention to this part of their statement: “These activities will intensify through election day and in the coming weeks.”

What this means is that even though there is a clear winner, and the public has peacefully accepted the outcome, from the viewpoint of the nation’s adversaries, now is the time to strike. Now is the time to flood social media with misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation.

In fact, adversaries may very well have prepared months’ worth of content in advance to use in the case of either presidential candidate’s victory. That way, regardless of who won, they were ready.

A quick search of popular media platforms brings up posts claiming that the winner cheated. Are these sincere, good faith actors with real evidence to back up their claims? Or are they part of an influence operation? In today’s age, especially with powerful AI tools widely available, it is difficult for citizens to tell at a glance.

As a nation, regardless of individual politics, the US has gone through too much and fought too hard to preserve its democracy to allow malicious actors to put that hard-won fact at risk. Although it passed an important milestone, the election itself, it is not time for the country to breathe a collective sigh of relief.

It should not be assumed that the time between now and inauguration day, January 20, 2025, will be uneventful. Now is precisely when the intelligence and cybersecurity communities, the media (especially social media platforms), and the American people need to remain watchful and vigilant.

Craig Albert, PhD, is Professor of Political Science & Graduate Director of the Master of Arts in Intelligence and Security Studies at Augusta University. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Election May Be Over, but the Threat of Foreign Interference Is Not was originally published on Global Security Review.

“America’s Strategic Posture Report: Get Behind It” by Jonathan Trexel highlights the urgent need for the US to revise its strategic posture in response to escalating global threats. It emphasizes the changing international security environment, underscoring the necessity for the US to adapt its defense planning. The report suggests enhancing conventional, nuclear, and strategic defense forces to address these threats, including those from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The recommendations also cover aspects like modernizing nuclear weapons, missile defense systems, and developing offensive and defensive space assets. The author argues for the urgent adoption of these measures to maintain national and global security.

“Congressional Dysfunction Impacts American Defense in the Pacific” by Christophe Bosquillon highlights concerns about American defense strategy in the Pacific, specifically due to congressional delays in funding the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with Pacific island-states. The article underscores the strategic importance of these island-states, such as Palau, for American defense, particularly against China. Bosquillon argues that congressional inaction undermines American commitments in the region, potentially inviting Chinese influence and jeopardizing American security interests in the Pacific.

“Deterrence in Space: It’s Not Complicated” by Michael J. Listner examines the concept of space deterrence, arguing it’s a simple yet often over-complicated idea. He discusses the importance of understanding different perspectives on deterrence, especially from adversaries like Russia and China. Listner emphasizes the need for the US to have the capability and will to apply force in space. He critiques the reliance on resilience as a method of deterrence, stating it’s not a substitute for actual defensive and offensive capabilities in space. The article advocates for a straightforward approach to deterrence in space, stressing the importance of capability, will, and communication.

“Japanese Space Strategy: Deploying a Credible Deterrent” by Christophe Bosquillon analyzes Japan’s evolving space strategy in the context of regional security challenges, particularly threats from North Korea and China. The article discusses Japan’s shift from pacifist policies to developing credible deterrence in space, including the use of anti-satellite capabilities and enhancing space situational awareness. It underscores the importance of Japan’s cooperation with the US for security in the Indo-Pacific region and highlights the challenges Japan faces in establishing a credible deterrent in space.

“Nano Aquabots and the US-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement” by Alexis Littlefield explores the dual-use nature of nano aquabots and other advanced technologies, emphasizing the risks and benefits of the US-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement. Littlefield discusses how these technologies, while beneficial for society, can also be weaponized. The article critically examines the implications of US government-funded research in collaboration with China, highlighting concerns about intellectual property transfer and national security. The author’s perspective sheds light on the complexities of international science and technology agreements and their impact on strategic interests.

“Russia and the Growing Danger of Satellite Cyber-Attacks” by Alexis Schlotterback highlights the increasing threat of Russian cyber operations targeting satellites. The article explores various satellite cyberattack methods such as data interception, data corruption, and seizure of control. It emphasizes Russia’s advanced capabilities in cyber warfare, including the use of GPS jammers and potential hacking of American satellite control systems. The discussion includes the need for enhanced security measures in satellite infrastructure to protect against these threats.

“The Comprehensive Strategy for the Space Force: The Good and Bad” by Christopher Stone critically evaluates the US Space Force’s strategy as outlined in a congressional report. Stone highlights the positives, such as acknowledging the Space Force’s role in supporting terrestrial forces. However, he points out significant gaps, arguing that the Space Force should focus more on warfighting capabilities to counter growing space threats from China and Russia, rather than merely supporting other forces. He emphasizes the need for combat-credible space forces capable of offensive and defensive operations, asserting that this should be the primary mission of the Space Force.

“The Danger of Minimum Deterrence” by Peter Huessy critiques the concept of minimal deterrence in nuclear strategy. Huessy argues that reducing the US nuclear arsenal to a minimal level undermines the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, impacts the deterrence of conventional conflict, and ignores the need for strategic stability. He emphasizes that a robust nuclear arsenal is crucial for credible deterrence and argues against the reduction of nuclear forces as part of a path to disarmament.

“The Faux Nuclear Arms Race that Isn’t” by Adam Lowther and Col (Ret) Curtis McGiffin challenges the notion of a new nuclear arms race, arguing that the current situation is not comparable to the Cold War era. They critique the assertion of an arms race, highlighting the significant reduction in nuclear weapons since the Cold War and the lack of expansion in US nuclear capabilities. The authors emphasize the importance of arms control agreements that align with US interests, and they critique the viewpoint that more nuclear weapons are inherently destabilizing, suggesting that strength, not weakness, deters conflict.

“The Pentagon’s China Military Report: Why Americans Should Be Alarmed” by Curtis McGiffin and Adam Lowther is a critical analysis of the Department of Defense’s 2023 report on China’s military developments. The authors highlight the significant increase in China’s nuclear capabilities and potential first-strike aspirations, which contradict its “No First Use” policy. They argue that the US needs a coherent strategy to counter this threat, emphasizing the urgency for more robust American deterrence measures in response to China’s rapid military expansion.

“The Strategic Posture Commission and the China Breakout” by Peter Huessy discusses the rapid expansion of China’s nuclear capabilities and its implications for US strategic posture. Huessy highlights the significant growth of China’s nuclear arsenal and the development of advanced delivery systems. He emphasizes the need for the US to enhance its nuclear deterrence and missile defense capabilities in response to China’s expanding nuclear force. The article urges the US to consider strategic adjustments to maintain a credible deterrent against the evolving threat posed by China.

“The Value of Panda Diplomacy” by Alexis Littlefield explores the geopolitical symbolism of pandas in Sino-American relations. The article discusses how pandas leased to zoos, such as Tian Tian and Mei Xiang in Washington DC, represent diplomatic ties between China and the US. The return of these pandas to China signifies a shift in relations, especially in the context of China’s global influence and the Belt and Road Initiative. Littlefield examines the broader implications of these changes, suggesting pandas as indicators of China’s international relationships.

“Understanding the Strategic Posture Commission Report” by Peter Huessy addresses the Congressional Commission’s findings on the strategic challenges posed by China and Russia. It highlights the United States’ unpreparedness in nuclear deterrence against these peer adversaries. The report recommends strengthening the nuclear triad, deploying air and missile defense systems, and increasing cooperation with allies. It emphasizes the urgency of these recommendations and the need for phased modernization of US nuclear capabilities, considering the evolving strategic environment and the growing threats from China and Russia.

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Global Security Review 2023 Article Compendium was originally published on Global Security Review.