During the Cold War, the Navy contributed significantly more to the nuclear arsenal. The current limitation is traced back to the George H. W. Bush administration’s response to the successful outcome of the Cold War. President Bush recognized that with the end of the Cold War the United States needed to draw down its nuclear forces as the Soviet threat receded into history. Pushing for more arms control and assurance measures to allow for the new world order to take shape made strategic sense.

The Soviets were no longer a threat, the Chinese did not have sufficient capability to harm the United States, and there was no other rising nuclear power. Thus, the Bush administration eliminated all tactical nuclear forces from the Navy’s inventory. However, today’s geopolitical realities are very different.

The Current Challenge

The Trump administration recognized the deficiency in nuclear strategy and capability. Trump both sought to develop the nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) and fielded the W76-2 low-yield warhead for the Trident D5. Whether the W76-2 is a tactical weapon or a low-yield strategic weapon is debatable, but its purpose was to offer an alternative to the limited capability of Europe-based nuclear-armed dual-capable fighter aircraft.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review stated that the administration’s goal with the SLCM-N was to diversify nuclear delivery platforms that would not rely on allied support and hedge against any so-called breakout scenarios by adversaries, which is exactly what the Chinese began by the end of the Trump administration. Recognizing the risks from emerging threats and additional nuclear powers, President Trump’s SLCM-N proposal offered a credible means to deter multiple hostile nations while continuing to provide assurances to allies and partners.

Indeed, with China and Russia modernizing their strategic deterrent and seeking unique delivery means that undermine arms control agreements and North Korea making significant gains in its nuclear arsenal, it now makes strategic sense for the Biden administration to not only pursue SLCM-N, but also additional nuclear capabilities—to prevent conflict.

There are many in the arms control community that object to adding any new systems.  Some argue that new weapons would lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons, particularly if they are considered theater or tactical nuclear weapons. They argue such a move turns deterrence into warfighting. The Congressional Research Service also claims that the Navy would sacrifice conventional capability and introduce unneeded friction into ally operations and cooperation.

Yet there are other issues that nuclear strategists should consider. Since the elder Bush eliminated tactical nuclear weapons from the Navy’s arsenal, the surface fleet and naval air forces do not possess the knowledge or means to deploy nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict where it becomes a necessity. Such a requirement generates significant need for training and certification of surface combatants and air assets. Nuclear weapons handling, storage, security, and employment are all part of the equation. Today, the Department of Defense and the Navy lack a feasible and suitable plan to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons into the surface fleet and among assets, if required, which escalation over Taiwan could generate. With the Biden administration scrapping the SLCM-N in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, it appears that the status quo for the Navy will see no expansion of the sea leg.

However, it is time for the United States and the Navy to take a hard look at the capabilities required to both deter and, if necessary, defeat the Chinese in a Pacific conflict.  Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran are all growing increasingly belligerent and seeking to change the American-led world order to one that better suits their authoritarian goals. This is nothing new.

Nuclear weapons are becoming the go-to means to deter the United States and America’s allies. To address the challenges discussed, reintroducing tactical nuclear weapons into the Navy makes strategic sense. This is not to “mirror” the adversary, but to give decision-makers more options for both deterrence and warfighting. A good start is to field SLCM-N in the Navy arsenal, but this is not the only system nuclear strategists should consider.

Additional Recommendations

Two additional recommendations are worth noting. First, as the B61-12 and B61-13 come available, returning a fighter-delivered gravity bomb to naval air wings is worth examination. Given their variable yield and short range, they have the ability to meet specific targeting needs in naval warfare. The very fact that that they are deployed to the fleet may also prove a sufficient deterrent to prevent conflict in the first place.

Second, the long-range stand-off (LRSO) cruise missile may also be useful for deployment on surface ships. These weapons may also have a similar effect in convincing an adversary that the complexity of the deterrence calculation, and its failure, is not worth the risk.

As Paul Giarra writes, the Cold War Navy’s deployment of nuclear weapons across the fleet had a “sobering effect” on the Soviets. That effect deterred conflict. It is time to apply the lessons of the Navy’s past experience to the growing Chinese naval threat. It may aid in deterring conflict over Taiwan.

CDR (Ret.) Todd Clawson is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The US Navy’s Nuclear Posture: Fit for Purpose was originally published on Global Security Review.

These challenges suggest two questions. First, does the announcement that the United States will field a new B61-13 nuclear gravity bomb address the perceived weakening of extended deterrence credibility? Second, does the B61-13’s development also effectively signal deterrence credibility to adversaries like Russia and China?

Will the B61-13 Repair US Nuclear Deterrence and Assurances?

The Department of Defense is embarking on a significant endeavor: the development of the B61-13, a modern variant of the B61 nuclear gravity bomb. The project awaits approval from Congress, driven by the imperative to bolster deterrence against potential adversaries while equipping the president with a versatile set of options to address targets formerly assigned to the B83 megaton class nuclear gravity bomb, but at less than half the expected yield.

The foundation of this ambitious project lies in the insights gleaned from the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. The document sheds light on the expansion and modernization of Russian and Chinese nuclear forces, prompting a recalibration of US nuclear strategy. The cornerstone of this recalibration is a balanced approach that includes investments in deterrence capabilities while concurrently emphasizing a commitment to pursuing arms control measures.

The B61-13’s ability to enhance deterrence across several crucial dimensions is central to its development. Foremost among these is the bomb’s ability to broaden the spectrum of potential targets the United States can strike with the weapon. Its ability to address harder and larger-area military targets poses a formidable challenge to potential adversaries, pushing them to consider an extended array of possible objectives.

This expansion of target sets introduces an element of unpredictability into the calculations of would-be aggressors, thus, aspirationally at least, reinforcing deterrence. The B61-13’s development appears a small step in the return to a nuclear policy based on “calculated ambiguity.” Such a policy may have played an important role in explaining why the Cold War never turned hot.

Moreover, the B61-13 assumes the role of safeguarding the credibility of the United States’ nuclear deterrent by demonstrating American ability to design and field new weapons. Effective deterrence hinges on the perception that a nation possesses the determination and the means to respond effectively to various threats. By elevating its nuclear capabilities, including the development of the B61-13, the United States reinforces the credibility of its response options. Such enhancements discourage potential adversaries from testing the resolve of a nation armed with a potent and adaptable nuclear arsenal.

The B61-13’s provision of tailored response options is critical to note, and a testament to its flexibility. This empowers the president to select a response that is appropriate and proportionate to specific threats, serving as a deterrent by signaling to potential aggressors that the United States can deliver a precise and calibrated response, discouraging reckless actions.

Additionally, the B61-13 improves assurance with allies and partners, underscoring the United States’ unwavering commitment to collective defense. Its inclusion among the array of nuclear capabilities reinforces the assurance that the United States will stand by its allies. Keith Payne of the National Institute for Public Policy wrote, “It is imperative for US and allied security, and for the assurance of US allies, that the United States be capable of deterring and defending against this eccentric rogue power.” This assurance factor discourages potential adversaries from targeting U.S. allies, as they acknowledge the presence of a robust and flexible nuclear deterrent designed to support collective defense efforts. Will the B61-13 announcement alleviate concerns from our allies in the Pacific?

Finally, the B61-13 plays a crucial role in advancing strategic stability. By upholding a credible and adaptable nuclear deterrent, the United States contributes to an environment characterized by predictability and reduced risk of miscalculation or inadvertent escalation in times of crisis. The assurance of a stable and predictable American response fosters strategic stability, discouraging actions that could precipitate conflict or escalation.

The B61-13 should strengthen deterrence by broadening target coverage, preserving deterrence credibility, offering tailored response options, assuring allies, and promoting strategic stability. These interconnected elements collectively enhance the United States’ capacity to deter potential threats and promote international security in an ever-evolving geopolitical landscape.

Will the B61-13 Repair US Nuclear Deterrence and Assurances? was originally published on Global Security Review.