However, one area the report does not cover is how the United States can ensure the advantages created by an expanding critical space infrastructure will remain “enduring” under direct threat of space attack without the weapons systems capable of deterring or defeating such aggression. Without a US Space Force capable of achieving measurable space superiority against a continual growth in Chinese and Russian space attack forces, new technologies and capabilities for terrestrial advantage will create more targets and vulnerabilities.

At present, there is much to do in space to continue to maintain what advantages and leadership the United States has managed to keep in the past twenty years of passivity and talk. At present the Space Force and its combatant command cousin US Space Command, while capable organizations for enabling terrestrial actions and providing situational awareness of space activities, are fully incapable of addressing the threat of armed aggression in and from space. Having an ability to take a hit and not proactively retaliate in and from space creates more, rather than less, vulnerability for exploitation and weakness in times of conflict. Would the nation take this type of approach with other services? Take the Air Force as an example.

Suppose the US was seeking to maintain its airpower advantage through the improvement of fuel efficiency, navigation routes, wing design, air traffic control modernization, and speed and distance characteristics of aircraft. Meanwhile, the enemy is building vast integrated air defense systems of missiles and fighter-interceptors, and long-range bombers, to take out the industrial and operational infrastructure of American civil and military aviation.

While the US has the advantage of outstanding technology in the air, the adversary fielded an ability to deny, degrade, and destroy that advantage in rapid fashion. Instead of building a US Air Force that fights, the nation responds by building an Air Force that can conduct limited electromagnetic jamming, overhead reconnaissance, and movement of equipment.

The Air Force’s position is that the service can take the hits and replace the airplanes in a reasonable time frame. All the while, in a great-power war, airports, air bases, and aircraft that provide an enduring advantage in economic and military support are now smoking debris. Regardless of the advantage airpower provides in this scenario, the United States possesses no means for strategic attack or air superiority.

This is exactly where the nation is with the Space Force. The urgency of the times is having little effect in shaping the actions of planners or political leaders.

At the low end, the Space Force has a very small number of electromagnetic jammers and geolocation systems. While such a small number was good for rotating them over time into a largely uncontested Middle East operating environment in the Global War on Terror, such numbers are wholly inadequate for requirements in the Indo-Pacific theater, much less the entirety of combatant command requirements worldwide.

The United States lacks options that are known to friends, neutrals and enemies alike with a clear declaratory policy highlighting American willingness and ability to project force in and from space to deter or win a conflict in space. Knowing what is happening in space is important, but there is no such thing as deterrence by attribution. Americans knew the Russians were amassing troops outside Ukraine and communicated that publicly, but Putin still invaded. The United States is pushing for norms of behavior and bans on destructive ASAT testing—to mitigate long-lived debris fields—but Russia and China oppose these efforts and continue to test, deploy, and use their space forces on a near daily basis, as former Vice Chief of Space Operations, General David Thompson, noted before his retirement.

The time has come to fix this and to do so publicly and aggressively. Passivity and resiliency alone will not defend America’s critical space infrastructure and the advantage that it provides. Only with a force projection capability that can achieve space superiority in and from space, as the Chinese and Russians both believe is key to deterrence, can the nation achieve credible deterrence in the minds of our adversaries.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and the former special assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the US Government.

There Can be No “Enduring Advantage in Space” without Space Superiority was originally published on Global Security Review.

It calls for a coordinated response using all available tools and those of member states. This includes dual-use space systems and services. However, the policy remains confined to an emphasis on resilience of space assets and confidence-building measures to clarify intentions behind various space activities. While this is not a bad thing, it does not express the European Union’s readiness to prevent and respond to space attack by deterring adversaries from hostile actions.

 Space Threat Analysis

The EU proposes an annual classified analysis of space threats called the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), a system of systems where both civilian and military contributions are used for all-sources intelligence assessments. This integrates all space threat analyses within the broader EU threat analysis process. However, its key asset, the EU Satellite Center, requires timely geospatial and orbital intelligence capabilities. It needs to see that long-acknowledged technological shortcomings in early warning and conflict analysis  are effectively addressed.

Space Threat Response Architecture

When responding to space threats, the strategy calls for a comprehensive toolbox of joint EU state responses but goes no further in stating what these responses might look like. It does emphasize information-sharing and regular exercises. While the EU considers preventive and restrictive measures under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, it has yet to determine whether to treat attacks in the space domain as armed aggressions under Article 42(7) of the EU Treaty.

The EU rightly acknowledges the need to enhance the use of space for security and defense and intends to do so by integrating the space dimension into Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. Strengths include additional communication services through IRIS² and relying on assured independent access to space. IRIS² is the new EU secure satellite constellation which stands for Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity, and Security by Satellite. However, while IRIS² is a credible prospect, European independent access to space remains hindered by bureaucratic processes.

Indigenous Launch Capabilities

The EU made the strategic mistake of not developing any heavy lift reusable launch vehicles and the maiden flight of its expendable heavy lift launcher program, Ariane 6, is delayed until 2024. Even if successful, it will remain expensive and subsidized to survive. This led to contracting SpaceX for launch services for such EU mainstays as the Galileo navigation satellites.

Space Norms of Behavior

On norms for responsible behaviors in space, the EU reaffirms its commitment to norms and joined the US in condemning destructive anti-satellite missile (ASAT) tests. The strategy underscores the priority of dialogue with spacefaring nations and international organizations to ensure norm implementation. While the establishment of a structured dialogue on space norms between the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United Nations (UN) is a step in the right direction, the strategy falls short in acknowledging that normative cooperation alone will not deter adversary behavior. This is due in part to Russia and China’s opposition for such norms and their rapid buildup in ASAT weapons and other offensive space forces. In short, the EU is posturing for resilience, not deterrence.

Resilience-based Posture

Back to the very core of the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence, which is to “enhance resilience and protection of space systems,” the document emphasizes the need for a common resilience framework, proposing the creation of an EU Space Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (ISAC). In the realm of defense space systems, EU member states tend to develop indigenous capabilities. The United Kingdom leads with the sixth-generation Skynet for military telecoms, followed by France’s Syracuse, and Italy’s Sicral. Despite attempts at common definitions, a shared system remains elusive. An exception is the joint high-speed communication satellite Athena-Fidus by France and Italy. The EU Commission aims for the GOVSATCOM system, providing secure government communications. Observation satellites for reconnaissance see France pioneering with Helios, while European collaboration efforts falter due to national-centric approaches and protective industrial interests.

Strengthen EU Space Industry

Overall, the intention to reduce European strategic dependencies on foreign-produced critical technologies, while keeping the industrial base for its civilian and defense value chains sovereign and competitive, is a good goal. This will be easier said than done, considering the entanglement of Europe with technologically advanced economies such as the US and Japan. Moreover, challenges stem primarily from economic dependency on China. The solution has been defined as “de-risking” rather than “decoupling.” It is not entirely clear how that might work.

In conclusion, the new EU strategy addresses challenges and outlines goals for strengthening capabilities and cooperation in the space domain. Unfortunately, it fails to address gaps in deterrence measures and consider the evolving geopolitical landscape to ensure the security of EU space systems. While Russia showed some restraint in orbital warfare by relying on non-kinetic and reversible capabilities against Ukrainian and Western space assets, there is no guarantee China would similarly restrain itself. Are the EU and its allies ready for prime time in a major space conflict? The answer to that question might come earlier than we think.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin.

European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defense was originally published on Global Security Review.