In February 2026, more than 200 personnel from Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States gathered on Australia’s east coast for the latest AUKUS Maritime Big Play exercise, where operators tested roughly thirty next-generation autonomous capabilities, including a live strike by a one-way attack munition. Earlier iterations of the series had already demonstrated something more consequential than any single platform: the ability of the three navies to control autonomous assets belonging to one another. Allied autonomy has moved out of the laboratory and into operational formations, and it is moving faster than the alliance frameworks that govern who may authorize a machine to act. 

The Seam in the Umbrella 

Extended deterrence has always rested on shared expectations about decision-making. The United States and Japan formalized this in December 2024, when the two governments issued their first Guidelines for Extended Deterrence, reinforcing consultation and communication procedures for the gravest decisions the alliance could face. Consultation procedures of this kind assume that the decisions in question move at human speed, through ministers and commanders who can meet, confer, and align. Autonomous systems introduce a class of alliance decisions that will not wait for a meeting. 

Every ally that fields autonomous systems encodes national rules about when a machine may engage, when it must ask a human, and when it must stop. The United States codifies its approach in Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, which sets rigorous verification, testing, and senior-review requirements designed to minimize unintended engagements. Allies maintain their own rules, shaped by their own laws, doctrines, and political constraints. 

Those national rule sets do not automatically align, and in a combined force the differences become seams. A coalition formation may contain systems that would engage a given contact under one national authority profile and hold fire under another. Adversaries study seams. 

The probing will not be hypothetical. China has spent more than a decade practicing pressure beneath the threshold of armed conflict, from maritime militia swarms to coercive air intercepts, precisely because ambiguity about an alliance response is exploitable. Russia has run the same playbook against NATO members in the air and undersea domains. A coalition whose autonomous systems answer that pressure under visibly different national rules hands its adversaries a map of where the alliance hesitates. 

The consequences for deterrence are direct. The most immediate risk is entrapment at machine speed: when an allied autonomous system engages inside the American security umbrella, the United States can inherit an escalation decision it never made, at a pace that forecloses the consultation the alliance promised itself. Mismatched authority thresholds also invite probing, because an adversary can calibrate provocations that one member’s systems would answer and another member’s system would not, and can harvest knowledge of alliance rules from the pattern of responses. 

Assurance suffers as well. An alliance that cannot state clearly how its machines hold fire loses precision in its guarantees at exactly the moment allies under threat are asking for more precision, not less. Credibility in the machine age includes the credibility of restraint. 

Authority Interoperability 

The building blocks for closing the seam already exist. Directive 3000.09 gives the United States a mature national template. The Five Eyes cybersecurity agencies showed in May 2026 that allied governments can speak with one voice on machine autonomy when they jointly published guidance on agentic artificial intelligence, urging organizations to prioritize “resilience, reversibility and risk containment over efficiency gains.” The Maritime Big Play program has likewise turned toward shared command-and-control software and a common autonomous baseline across the three AUKUS navies. Each of these efforts is necessary. What none of them yet delivers is the specific artifact extended deterrence requires: a legible statement of each ally’s engagement authority rules that coalition systems and coalition commanders can rely on before they operate together. 

Allied autonomy needs authority interoperability, built as deliberately as data interoperability was built over the past three decades. Three practical steps would supplement the work already underway. Allies could publish national authority profiles, meaning standardized declarations of the engagement tiers their systems may exercise, the conditions that trigger human review, and the recall mechanisms that stop a pending action. Combined forces could adopt shared reversion standards, so that any coalition system can be halted through a common, tested procedure regardless of which flag it flies. Extended deterrence consultations, on the model the United States and Japan set in 2024, could add an autonomy annex that establishes in advance how allied autonomous engagements inside the umbrella will be communicated, reviewed, and, where necessary, walked back. 

These steps ask allies to formalize what alliance staffs already negotiate informally under time pressure. Deterrence theory has long held that credibility rests on capability and will. Combined autonomy adds a third term: legibility. An alliance whose machines carry legible, compatible, and reversible authority is an alliance an adversary cannot divide at the seam. Extended deterrence in the machine age will belong to the alliances that make their authority architecture as interoperable as their ammunition. 

Burak Oktenli is an independent researcher in Washington, DC, conducting research on human-machine authority architecture and the governance of autonomous military systems. He is the author of the ten-volume Authority and Architecture series on the governance of autonomous decision authority, and his analysis has appeared in RealClearDefense, Task and Purpose, and The Space Review. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Allied Autonomy Is Creating a New Seam in Extended Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

During the Cold War, deterrence centered on missiles, troop deployments, and nuclear escalation. Military power still matters enormously, but modern strategic competition increasingly unfolds far from conventional battlefields. Rival states now seek influence through weaker institutions, compromised elites, illicit financial systems, infrastructure dependence, and strategic corruption. In many cases, adversaries no longer need to defeat a country militarily to weaken its strategic position. 

This shift has blurred the line between governance problems and national security threats. Corruption no longer acts solely as a domestic political issue tied to ethics or economic inefficiency. Increasingly, it functions as strategic infrastructure that hostile states and aligned networks can exploit to gain influence, undermine institutions, and weaken deterrence from within. The result is a form of hybrid warfare that operates quietly below the threshold of conventional military conflict. 

Traditional military deterrence assumes that states seek to avoid direct escalation because the costs remain too high. Yet modern rivals increasingly prefer indirect approaches that create long-term political leverage without triggering military confrontation. Strategic corruption fits this model well because it weakens institutional resilience gradually and often without attracting immediate international attention. 

Infrastructure financing offers one example of this evolving landscape. Major infrastructure projects can generate economic growth, but opaque financing arrangements, weak procurement oversight, and political favoritism can also create long-term dependency and strategic leverage. Ports, telecommunications systems, energy infrastructure, and logistics hubs increasingly carry geopolitical significance alongside their economic value. Foreign influence over critical infrastructure may shape political decisions long before any military crises emerge. 

Illicit financial networks create additional vulnerabilities. Sanction evasion systems, offshore financial structures, and corruption-linked patronage networks allow authoritarian governments and criminal actors to preserve influence even under significant economic pressure. These systems often connect political elites, business interests, criminal organizations, and external state actors in ways that complicate accountability and obscure responsibility. 

The challenge becomes even more serious when state and non-state actors begin to overlap. Modern hybrid competition increasingly operates through networks rather than formal battle lines. Organized crime groups, private intermediaries, corrupt officials, and geopolitical rivals often interact inside the same gray zones. Those overlapping relationships make it harder to identify where criminal activity ends and strategic competition begins. 

The Western Hemisphere illustrates this problem clearly. Across parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, organized criminal groups now exert considerable influence over trafficking routes, local economies, migration systems, illicit mining operations, and even municipal governance. Criminal organizations often provide dispute resolution, employment, or social services that weak governments struggle to deliver. This creates fragmented sovereignty in which state authority exists unevenly across territories and institutions. 

These unstable environments create opportunities for external rivals seeking geopolitical access or influence. Weak oversight systems, corruption within procurement processes, and institutional distrust make states more vulnerable to strategic penetration. In these circumstances, foreign influence does not always arrive through military alliances or ideological movements. Instead , it emerges through infrastructure contracts, illicit finance, commercial dependency, or relationships with politically connected elites. 

Traditional deterrence frameworks struggle to address these dynamics because they still focus heavily on conventional military indicators. Defense planners understandably prioritize readiness, force posture, weapons modernization, logistics, and operational capability. These areas remain essential. However, military strength alone cannot fully protect states whose institutions face sustained internal erosion. 

States often weaken politically before they weaken militarily. Public distrust, elite fragmentation, corruption scandals, feeble judicial systems, and declining institutional legitimacy can reduce a government’s ability to respond effectively during periods of strategic pressure. Adversaries increasingly recognize this and exploit those vulnerabilities patiently over time. 

This problem extends beyond developing countries or fragile democracies. Advanced democracies also face growing concerns involving foreign influence operations, cyber-enabled corruption, disinformation campaigns, opaque lobbying networks, and strategic investments tied to geopolitical objectives. Hybrid competition increasingly targets the political and institutional foundations that support deterrence itself. As a result, national security discussions must broaden beyond military hardware and battlefield concepts alone. Deterrence depends not only on weapons systems, but also on institutional credibility, public trust, transparency, and political resilience. Governments that cannot maintain confidence in procurement systems, electoral institutions, judicial independence, or regulatory oversight may struggle to sustain strategic cohesion during periods of crisis. 

This reality does not mean every corruption scandal represents foreign subversion or hybrid warfare. Domestic political dysfunction often emerges from local conditions and internal failures. However, strategic rivals increasingly exploit those weaknesses opportunistically once they appear. Corruption creates openings that adversaries can leverage quietly and incrementally. 

The United States and its allies therefore need a broader understanding of deterrence in the twenty-first century. Military modernization remains necessary, particularly as rival powers continue expanding nuclear, cyber, and space capabilities. Yet strategic competition increasingly unfolds inside institutions as much as along borders or within contested seas. 

Institutional resilience should now be a centerpiece of national security planning. Strong oversight systems, transparent procurement practices, anti-corruption enforcement, independent courts, investigative journalism, and trusted public institutions all contribute to long-term strategic stability. These systems strengthen national resilience against both domestic corruption and external exploitation. 

In the emerging era of hybrid competition, states may not lose strategic position through invasion alone. They may lose it gradually through institutional erosion that weakens deterrence long before conventional conflict formally begins. 

Jeffery A. Tobin is a senior advisor and partner with Pan-American Strategic Advisors, conducting research on democracy, corruption, and institutional health. His work has appeared in outlets including Lawfare, Just Security, Foreign Policy in Focus, the Modern War Institute, and Small Wars Journal. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Strategic Corruption and the Future of Hybrid Warfare was originally published on Global Security Review.

Nigeria’s worsening security crisis is, at its core, a story of military breakdown. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) overran at least 15 military bases in 2025, captured and executed a brigadier general, and deployed armed drones that outmatched the defending units. The pattern of base overruns, mass desertions, and failure to reinforce troops under attack points to deep organizational failure.

Events like the February 2026 Kwara massacre, in which jihadists killed over 200 people as well as the December 2025 U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile strikes on Nigerian soil and the deployment of American troops amount to the clearest sign yet that Africa’s most populous nation can no longer secure itself.

The Mosul Parallel

Iraq, before the fall of Mosul in 2014, offers the closest comparison. When 1,500 ISIS fighters routed 60,000 Iraqi soldiers, the collapse came not from lack of firepower but from corruption. The Iraqi military had roughly 50,000 ghost soldiers on its payroll, troops who existed only on paper so commanders could pocket their salaries. Nigeria faces the same problem. Leaked UK diplomatic cables found that of the 20,000 troops Nigeria claims to deploy in the northeast, the real number is significantly lower, with thousands of ghost soldiers generating salaries collected by officers. The corruption is not incidental; it is systemic. Transparency International gave Nigeria’s defense sector an ‘E’ rating for “very high” corruption risk.

The human cost falls on ordinary soldiers. A Nigerian private earns $31 to $38 per month. Soldiers spend three to five years deployed without rotation, creating conditions for mass desertion. Iraq’s military eventually reformed after Mosul through fingerprint-based troop verification and coalition mentoring, but that reform only happened because Mosul was a shock too large to ignore. Nigeria faces a harder problem, a slow bleed rather than a single catastrophe, which gives political leaders room to delay action indefinitely.

ISWAP’s Tactical Evolution and the Sahel Corridor

ISWAP’s 2025 “Camp Holocaust” campaign has been the most successful in the group’s history. ISWAP systematically destroyed forward operating bases across the Lake Chad Basin using drones, night-vision gear, and coordinated swarm attacks. The capture and execution of Brigadier General Musa Uba in November 2025 was not simply a battlefield loss. It revealed that ISWAP now operates with better intelligence than the forces it fights. ISWAP intercepted his communications and tracked his position after his convoy was ambushed 88 kilometers from regional military headquarters in Maiduguri. A force with 230,000 troops and a multibillion-dollar budget could not locate its own brigade commander.

The broader Sahel security framework has collapsed around Nigeria, and the timing could not be worse. Niger’s withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force in March 2025 ended joint border patrols along a vast open frontier. Into this gap has moved Lakurawa, an Islamic State Sahel Province subgroup operating across Sokoto and Kebbi states with surveillance drones. Al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM launched its first recorded attack on Nigerian soil in 2025.

The Air Power Deficit

The Nigerian Air Force shows what happens when procurement runs ahead of maintenance capacity. Three JF-17 fighters from Pakistan were delivered in 2021. By May 2023, only one could still fly. The result is an air force that cannot protect civilians or support ground troops. SBM Intelligence estimates over 400 Nigerian civilians killed in erroneous military airstrikes between 2017 and 2025. The February 2026 Woro massacre showed what this means in practice. A military aircraft appeared overhead during a ten-hour attack that killed at least 162 civilians but did not engage.

External Partners and the Limits of Assistance

The United States launched 16 Tomahawk cruise missiles against Lakurawa camps in Sokoto State on Christmas Day 2025 and deployed troops to Bauchi Airfield. CSIS assessed that one-off strikes are unlikely to reduce the terrorist threat significantly. The pattern is familiar: outside firepower treats the symptoms while the underlying disease, institutional corruption, goes unaddressed. Nigeria’s own Defense Minister Christopher Musa has acknowledged that military action addresses only 30 percent of the conflict. The International Crisis Group’s 2016 reform blueprint called for fingerprint-based troop verification and open defense spending records. It remains unimplemented a decade later.

The Coup Question and the Criminal-Terror Nexus

Recent history across the Sahel makes this risk real. In Burkina Faso and Mali, troops who felt abandoned by civilian leaders seized power. Nigeria shows each of these warning signs. Soldiers earn $31 a month while generals oversee billions in unchecked spending. The Nigerian Armed Forces mostly ruled the country between 1966 and 1999, and the memory of military government has not faded.

A second risk deepens the picture. ISWAP brings in an estimated $191 million per year by taxing trade across the Lake Chad Basin, ten times what the Borno State government collects. Furthermore northwest bandit networks took in an estimated $1.42 billion in ransom in a single year.

Every overrun  base sends vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to ISWAP and other groups, fortifying their governance with economic and military assets. This is the critical danger: the longer reform is delayed, the more these groups entrench themselves as alternative governments with independent revenue. Once that happens, as Sudan’s civil war has shown, the window for reversing the trend narrows sharply.

Outlook

The 2026 Nigerian defense budget includes 5.41 trillion naira ($3.9 billion). However, 62 percent goes to personnel costs and the naira’s collapse has cut real spending power by two-thirds since 2023. Nigerian President Tinubu’s security emergency declaration has not changed the picture. At least 316 civilians were killed across 15 states in the 71 days that followed.

Three patterns deserve attention: the self-arming cycle, where weapons from overrun bases fuel the next attack; the intelligence gap, where ISWAP knows more about the military than the military knows about ISWAP; and the governing contest, where ISWAP’s services undercut public trust in the state. Until the corruption at the heart of Nigeria’s military is confronted, no amount of outside help will change the course. The question facing Abuja is whether reform comes through deliberate action or through the kind of devastating loss that forced Iraq’s hand after Mosul.

Arman Sidhu is an American geopolitical analyst and writer. He regularly covers the commodities market, international trade, and foreign investment. He is a regular contributor to Geopolitical Monitor and his work has previously appeared in The Diplomat, Eurasia Review, Economic & Political Weekly, and RealClearWorld, among several other outlets. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Hollow Ranks & Ghost Soldiers: Nigeria’s Corruption-Fueled Security Collapse was originally published on Global Security Review.

West Africa has experienced an increasing number of national security challenges over the past two decades. Violent extremism, political instability, transnational organized crime, and maritime insecurity have created complex threats that undermine governance, economic development, and regional stability. According to the United Nations Africa Renewal, instability in the Sahel has become one of the most pressing security concerns on the African continent, with escalating violence and growing humanitarian consequences. Countries such as Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have faced persistent security crises that require coordinated responses at both national and regional levels; issues that the world should be paying attention to.

One of the most serious security challenges in the region is the rise of violent extremist organizations operating in the Sahel. Groups affiliated with global jihadist movements have expanded their activities across national borders, transforming local conflicts into regional security threats. The Boko Haram insurgency in northeastern Nigeria is a prominent example. Since its emergence in the early 2000s, Boko Haram has conducted numerous attacks targeting civilians, government institutions, and security forces. The conflict has resulted in thousands of deaths and the displacement of millions of people. The insurgency has destabilized large parts of the Lake Chad Basin and continues to pose a significant threat to regional stability.

The spread of extremist violence is not limited to Nigeria. Countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso have experienced rapid increases in militant attacks over the past decade. Armed groups have exploited weak state presence in rural areas, limited economic opportunities, and political grievances among marginalized communities. In many cases, extremist organizations present themselves as alternative authorities capable of providing protection and financial support to local populations. Militant organizations in the Sahel increasingly operate across national borders, making regional coordination essential for effective counterterrorism responses.

Political instability has further complicated the security environment in West Africa. In recent years, several countries in the region have experienced military coups, including Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger. These political disruptions often occur in contexts where governments struggle to address security threats and economic challenges. Military interventions in politics can weaken democratic institutions and create governance gaps that extremist groups may exploit. Governance failures and security crises have contributed significantly to the resurgence of military coups in parts of Africa.

Another important dimension of insecurity in West Africa involves organized transnational crime. Criminal networks operating across the region engage in activities such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, and arms smuggling. West Africa has become a major transit hub for cocaine shipments traveling from Latin America to European markets. Weak border controls and limited law enforcement capacity make it difficult for governments to combat these illicit networks effectively. Organized criminal networks in the region frequently intersect with extremist groups, enabling the trafficking of weapons and illicit commodities across borders.

Maritime insecurity also represents a growing challenge for coastal states in West Africa. The Gulf of Guinea has become one of the most dangerous maritime regions in the world due to piracy and armed robbery at sea. Criminal groups often target oil tankers and commercial vessels, stealing valuable cargo, and disrupting international shipping routes. These activities have significant economic consequences for regional trade and energy production. The International Maritime Organization has identified the Gulf of Guinea as a major global hotspot for maritime piracy and maritime crime.

Several structural factors contribute to the persistence of security threats in West Africa. Elevated levels of poverty and youth unemployment create conditions that extremist groups and criminal networks can exploit for recruitment. Many young people lack access to education and stable employment opportunities, making them vulnerable to financial incentives offered by militant organizations. The United Nations Development Program highlights how socio-economic marginalization and limited state services contribute to instability in fragile regions.

Climate change has also intensified competition over natural resources in the Sahel region. Desertification and declining rainfall have reduced agricultural productivity, leading to conflicts between farming and pastoralist communities. These local disputes can escalate into broader security challenges when armed groups become involved. The World Bank has emphasized that environmental pressures and climate variability are increasingly linked to conflict dynamics in the Sahel.

Addressing national security threats in West Africa requires a comprehensive strategy that combines military responses with governance reforms and socio-economic development. Governments must strengthen democratic institutions and improve transparency to build public trust and reduce political instability. Effective governance is essential for preventing the conditions that allow extremist groups to expand their influence.

Regional cooperation is also critical for managing transnational threats. Organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States play a key role in coordinating peacekeeping missions and promoting political stability. Joint military operations and intelligence-sharing initiatives can improve the ability of governments to respond to cross-border insurgencies.

Economic development programs should be prioritized in regions most affected by insecurity. Investments in education, infrastructure, and job creation can help address the underlying socio-economic drivers of violence. Providing young people with economic opportunities reduces the likelihood that they will join extremist groups or criminal networks.

West Africa’s security challenges are complex and interconnected. However, through stronger governance, regional cooperation, and sustainable economic development, governments and regional organizations can significantly improve the prospects for long-term peace and stability in the region.

Huseini Kamara is a researcher with academic interests in national security, terrorism studies, and regional security dynamics in West Africa. His previous publication examined the role of artificial intelligence in ECG interpretation. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Rising Security Threats in West Africa and Regional Responses was originally published on Global Security Review.

Advances in space technology are making the extraction of lunar and asteroid materials increasingly feasible. These capabilities promise the potential for significant economic gains, greater energy security, and new avenues of geopolitical influence for any spacefaring nation capable of developing and sustaining resource-extraction operations. As competition accelerates, the question is no longer whether space mining will occur, but who will shape the rules, norms, and capabilities that govern it.

To preserve American power in space, the United States must take formative policy action and protective research and development (R&D) measures to define the future of space mining before rival nations do. Building on the strategic momentum established in the space domain during the first Trump Administration, namely the creation of the U.S. Space Force, securing an early foothold in space mining will help counter adversarial efforts to undermine American leadership and preserve space as a key frontier for American power.

Formative Policy Action in Space Mining

In emerging domains, the first actors often leave a legacy that serves as a reference point for subsequent laws and behavior, such as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union pushed outer space beyond its initial symbolic and scientific uses. Concerns over nuclear escalation prompted the creation of a legal framework that addressed non-weaponization and restrictions on national sovereignty. Despite approaching its 60th anniversary, the OST remains a foundational pillar of outer space governance, demonstrating how proactive U.S. leadership defined the rules of engagement and established operational precedents in an emerging domain. Sustaining this proactive approach is critical if the U.S. is to seize the strategic opportunities in outer space.

Space mining is among the more recent technical opportunities to emerge, alongside satellite constellations, orbital maneuvering, and AI-enabled platforms. Yet space mining is unique in that it offers potential energy security and trillions of dollars in economic value to those possessing return-to-Earth capabilities (currently limited, forcing a focus on in-situ resource utilization (ISR) for propulsion and life support). According to NASA’s Asterank database, extracting resources from the ten most cost-effective asteroids could yield profits exceeding $1.5 trillion. The promise of energy resilience and economic gain has captured the attention of global powers and middle-state actors alike, leading to a growing number of spacefaring nations and sparking geopolitical friction.

The U.S. and Luxembourg were among the first to formalize space mining in their legal frameworks, recognizing outer space resources as property subject to ownership and commercial trade. Conversely, Russia cites the Outer Space Treaty’s designation of space as the “province of all mankind” as a basis for prohibiting resource extraction and ownership. In response to the Trump Administration’s proposed lunar mining initiatives, Russian officials went so far as to accuse the U.S. of orchestrating an “invasion” of the Moon, likening it to “another Afghanistan or Iraq.” Russia’s actions, however, contrast sharply with its public stance, given its willingness to explore an agreement on space mining with Luxembourg in 2019.

Yet American space mining laws have been relatively insulated from further international criticism because they align with formative international frameworks. For example, the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 reflects Article II of the OST, which prohibits national appropriation of celestial bodies. Additionally, the 2020 National Space Policy aligns with the Artemis Accords by emphasizing transparency in national space policies and space exploration plans, as well as the sharing of scientific information. The legitimacy of U.S. legal principles has been strengthened by demonstrating its commitment to sharing the space domain as a collaborative partner while advancing its own interests and strategic advantages.

Critical questions about access to mining sites, extraction limits, and fair participation remain unanswered because frameworks such as the OST predate the concept of space mining. Addressing these questions and providing certainty before capabilities mature or competing nations establish their own frameworks is essential to preserving a U.S. strategic advantage in space.

Protective R&D Measures for Space Mining Capabilities

As the future of space mining and its economic potential threaten to catalyze geopolitical tensions, it is crucial for the U.S. not only to be among the first to establish governance frameworks but also to develop tangible space mining capabilities. Yet space is no longer a domain of uncontested U.S. dominance, as China has evolved from a near-peer to a peer competitor. Initiatives such as the Tiangong Space Station and the International Lunar Research Station underscore China’s growing space capabilities and its ambitions to assume a leadership role.

China’s rapid rise may be attributed in part to its exposure to U.S. space technologies, as bilateral cooperation agreements have provided avenues for interaction with U.S. research and development efforts. Despite the Wolf Amendment, which prohibits bilateral cooperation with China without explicit authorization from Congress and the FBI, numerous violations of the provision have likely conferred strategic benefits on China, eroding the competitive edge the U.S. seeks to maintain. In 2024, the Office of the Inspector General investigated a state University for violations of the Wolf Amendment and announced in December that the University agreed to pay $715,580 to resolve civil allegations. When applying for and receiving NASA research grants, the University failed to disclose a professor’s affiliations with and support from the Chinese government. Similarly, according to a report published by the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), hundreds of articles crediting NASA funding were identified that were jointly published by U.S. researchers (including public universities and federal research entities) and CCP institutions. In early February 2026, the University of Texas at San Antonio agreed to pay nearly $130,000 in penalties after federal investigators alleged that the lead principal investigator for a NASA-funded Center for Advanced Measurements in Extreme Environments failed to disclose affiliations with researchers in China.

China’s sustained intellectual property theft is eroding U.S. dominance in space and diminishing the impact of formative U.S. space mining policy measures. Prioritizing R&D for space mining, particularly return-to-Earth capabilities, is a central focus for spacefaring nations and must be a priority for the United States. However, R&D initiatives must be paired with enforceable oversight structures that protect intellectual property from adversarial appropriation. Enforcement entities should also demonstrate a clear commitment to implementing protective measures and punishing violators. Without such protections, any research investments risk benefiting adversarial states as much as the U.S., as evidenced by instances in which China has capitalized on U.S.-funded advancements.

Conclusion

Although the U.S. is facing increasing demands across emerging warfighting domains, with numerous competing national security concerns, space resource governance and capability development can no longer be sidelined. The U.S. must act decisively and with strategic clarity to build the legal and behavioral foundations for space mining, and to enact protections for space mining R&D, as competitors advance their own initiatives. Space mining has become a strategic imperative, one that this Administration must seize to ensure that American values, interests, and leadership define this emerging domain, resource governance and capability development resource governance and capability development.

Rachel Butler is a doctoral student in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University. She holds master’s degrees in history and strategic studies, with research interests focused on ethical and cognitive warfare. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Seizing the High Ground: The Case for U.S. Leadership in Space Mining was originally published on Global Security Review.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 was a seismic event, striking a blow to both Iranian and Russian influence in Syria. While Moscow, despite its war in Ukraine and mounting Western sanctions, remains committed to its military bases, Iran’s position is far more complex. Unlike Russia, whose primary interests are geopolitical and military, Iran sees Syria as an ideological and strategic battleground central to its regional ambitions.

The de facto regime in Damascus faces an uphill battle in asserting control over a fragmented and failing state. Recent upheavals have occurred, with over a thousand, including civilians, killed in Latakia and other coastal cities. These are historical Alawite strongholds, which highlights the government’s fragile grasp on power. These disturbances, fuelled by remnants of Assad’s rule, cannot be subdued through isolated security operations or curfews alone. They expose a deeper dissatisfaction that neither Damascus nor its external backer, Turkey, can easily suppress.

Despite its opposition to a Sunni Islamist regime in Damascus, Iran, as a Shia’ state, retains influence over the Alawite community—the backbone of Assad’s former regime. Tehran cultivated religious and political alliances with the Alawites, ensuring that its ideological footprint in Syria endures, even as the political landscape shifts.

The situation is further inflamed by the transitional constitution, which upholds Syria’s identity as the “Syrian Arab Republic”—denying the existence of non-Arab nationalities and imposing a Muslim president with near-absolute authority and Islamic law as “a main source” of legislation. This exclusionary framework was rejected by Kurds and Druze alike, who view it as a mere continuation of Assad’s rule, now under a Sunni Islamist veneer. The brutal repression that has accompanied the regime’s efforts to enforce this new order, resulting in thousands of civilian and military deaths, only fuels further opposition.

In southern Syria, the Druze, long wary of both Sunni Islamist factions and Iranian hegemony, are positioning themselves to consolidate local autonomy. Under Israel’s umbrella, the Druze are unlikely to align with any single faction, instead leveraging their position for greater self-rule. Meanwhile, Israel maintains a watchful eye on the evolving situation, preserving its military presence in the south of Syria. From Tel Aviv’s perspective, an extremist Sunni regime in Damascus presents a far greater security threat than a Shi’a-dominated government, making Israel’s calculations in Syria more complex than ever.

For Turkey, the evolving situation presents both opportunities and challenges. While Ankara may find common cause with Sunni factions seeking to assert dominance over Syria, it will remain constrained by Iran’s interests. Iran deeply embedded itself in Syria’s military, economic, and political structures, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) playing a pivotal role in shaping the previous regime’s policies. Iran has sacrificed thousands of Quds and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps ground forces and billions of dollars in Syria. Iran made significant efforts to keep Assad in power and no one can imagine that Tehran will simply walk away and abandon its investment.

The Iranian regime followed this strategy before. After eight years of war with Iraq and massive losses, it steadily expanded its influence over Iraq’s Shi’a sector. Even after the fall of Saddam and the rise of ISIS, Iran established military proxies, ensuring that Iraq remained unstable.

Through control over Shi’a political parties, it works to suppress the Kurdistan Regional Government and keep the Sunnis weak. Those with a stake in Syria’s future should expect a similar Iranian strategy, this time through the Alawites. Iran will seek an opportune moment to replicate the strategy and will not allow Turkey, which has invested significantly less in Syria, to reap the political and economic benefits that Syria offers.

Looking forward, Syria’s future will be shaped by the competing interests of regional and global actors, each pursuing their own trajectories. The western part of the country, where the new regime struggles to consolidate power, will remain a flashpoint for unrest. Meanwhile, Kurdish and Druze-controlled territories are likely to maintain relative stability. The Kurdish forces, with their well-organized military and political structures, have effectively consolidated power, establishing governance mechanisms independent of Damascus.

Israel has little incentive to back any radical transformation that could empower hostile factions. What remains undeniable, however, is that the new regime in Damascus lacks the capacity to curb Iran’s entrenched influence. Tehran has invested too much in blood and resources to relinquish its foothold.

In the ever-shifting sands of Syrian politics, Iran remains a force—one that neither Turkey nor the new rulers in Damascus should ignore as its axis of resistance has the potential to reshape itself—as evidenced by the conflict between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Damascus and Hizballah in Lebanon. Iran’s ally, Russia, continues to maintain bases in the Alawite-controlled region, which leaves the Russians ever a concern.

Loqman Radpey, PhD, is a fellow at the Middle East Forum with over a decade of experience analyzing the international legal and political dimensions of the right to self-determination for peoples and nations, including the case of Kurdistan. He is the author of Towards an Independent Kurdistan: Self-Determination in International Law.

Iran Can Reconfigure Its Foothold in Post-Assad Syria was originally published on Global Security Review.

The relatively well-organized Hayat Tahrir al Sham rebel force liquidated the resistance power of government forces within just a few days. The regime change, and the resultant uncertainty in Syria, invite regional powers to intervene for political and strategic spoils. Israel also conducted numerous air strikes to dismantle Syrian military and strategic capabilities.

The Asad regime posed a significant challenge for the US, which led the US to support rebel factions. The loss of the regime is a major setback to Iran’s axis of resistance and also puts Russian strategic interests in jeopardy. In the aftermath of the current development either the model of Libya or Iraq can be the possible trajectories for Syria.

Middle Eastern Ba’athist regimes emerged, in the second half of the century, as Arab nationalist leaders, championed the ideologies of Pan-Arabism, socialism, secularism, anti-imperialism, and anti-Zionism. Despite their lofty ideals, these regimes, exemplified by Assad’s rule in Syria, devolved into deeply authoritarian systems characterized by the centralization of power, political repression, and a departure from their original revolutionary aspirations.

Political oppression by the Assad regime created numerous ethnic and sectarian fault lines that were later exploited by the regional and extra-regional powers. The alleged Iranian support and Russin aerial cover seem to have kept the Assad regime in power even after the so called Arab Spring removed numerous autocratic regimes across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

Syria exemplifies the emerging threat of rebel movements to dysfunctional polities and how they gain national legitimacy. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a Salafi-Jihadist organization and a splinter group of al-Qaeda. The avowed pronouncements of HTS allude to independence from al-Qaeda’s influence, thus forsaking any territorial claim in the name of the caliphate beyond Syria.

Assad’s Syria had also long been an irritant for US and Israeli interests by being a crucial component of Iranian perfidy in the region. HTS, however, is a United Nations designated terrorist organization and is also considered one by the European Union and the US. Irrespective of this fact, America and its partners expressed jubilance over the HTS takeover, which creates room for speculation that the US and others covertly supported HTS regime change in Syria.

Millions of Syrian refugees and the ongoing Kurdish desire for independence prompted Turkish involvement in the Syrian quagmire. Ankara makes little secret of its desire to neutralize the ambitions of Kurdish leaders demanding autonomy in the North of Syria. President Donald Trump described Turkey as the most important player on the Syrian chessboard after the fall of Damascus.

Having much at stake in the future of Syria, Turkish involvement and material support cannot be ruled out in the overthrow of the Syrian government under Assad. Kurds control 25 percent of Syrian territory, including much of the oil-rich area, while being less than 10 percent of the total population. Kurdish administration of North and East Syria is also a strong bulwark against the ISIS threat, and it was supported by the US in the past. HTS’s pronouncements regarding the formation of a secular and inclusive government will be tested in the crucible of time considering Kurd-Turkish animosity.

Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Assad regime stood the test of numerous crises in the Middle East. The so called Shia Cresent, along with the Houthis, provided a sense of strategic depth to Iran vis-à-vis military threats in the Middle East. With the axis of resistance being torn apart, Iran finds itself deprived of deterrence capabilities, in the backdrop of the fall of Damascus. Hence it must explore other strategic options to achieve its aims and objectives.

Russia has long used its strategic partnership with Damascus to project power across the MENA region through military and naval assets. Russian airstrikes were crucial instruments of subversion of the political dissent and armed struggle against the Syrian despot. The fall of Assad does not mean the strategic retreat for Russia. As Mohammad Al Jolani, the leader of HTS, stated, “We don’t want Russia to leave.”

This statement underscores the strategic importance of Russia in Syrian geopolitical calculus. It seems that Russia will stay in the region despite many analysts predicting a possible diminishing Russian presence in Syria.

China has emerged as a credible mediator on the Middle Eastern political horizon after the Saudi-Iran deal. China could potentially help resolve the differences among the warring factions within Syria. It could potentially transform the zero-sum strategic contestation in Syria. The importance of Syrian conflict for China could be discerned by its use of the veto eight times,  on related issues, during the past decade at the United Nations Security Council.

Syrians made history with their success in toppling the Assad regime, but their greatest challenge lies ahead, building a positive future. Syria is exactly at the point of its national history where Iraq and Libya were after the fall of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, respectively.

Both nations followed a contrasting trajectory with Libya continuing its struggle to end its violent conflict and build state institutions while Iraq had a series of elections since 2005, which helped to develop mechanisms for political bargaining, particularly between Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish factions. Syria faces similar challenges including the sectarian fault lines and Kurd minority.

The consociationalism model for governance practiced in Iraq may best fit the social and political imperatives in Syria. Although foreign aid and rescinding the sanctions could help build the Syrian state and society, internal reconciliation and power-sharing mechanisms could only satiate the concerns of stakeholders for lasting peace. The idiosyncratic socio-political climate of Syria requires the restraint and political acumen on the part of the victorious group to avoid another civil war.

HTS’s leadership has announced that it may take at least four years before Syria will have a general election. Confidence in the state’s institutions must be restored and strengthened to create a viable state. Lifting sanctions and technical and humanitarian assistance can help build the Syrian state and society. But it will ultimately require the peaceful resolution of difference for any form of liberal government to succeed in Syria.

Muhammad Haseeb Riaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

The Geo-Political Implications of New Syria and Future Pathways was originally published on Global Security Review.

The recent passage of the Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence by the Council of Europe marks a significant turning point in the quest for effective and long-lasting control of AI. The document is a statement about how European states will harness AI, a relatively new and powerful technology, to empower humanity while limiting its abuses.

The March 2024 adoption of a US-led United Nations General Assembly resolution on seizing the opportunities of safe, secure, and trustworthy artificial intelligence systems for sustainable development also highlights the common ground the United States shares with Europe and democracies around the world. While the US differs in some important areas with Europe, the significant agreement is valuable. This convention provides a foundation for others to build on.

Although new technologies often appear benign at first glance, there are many ways AI, in particular, can negatively impact the values held dear by so many around the world. From facial recognition systems interfering with privacy to machine learning that amplifies injustice, the potential cost of AI’s misuse is high.

Until now, there was not an effort at global governance of AI. This fostered a string of national laws that lack the capacity to address the transnational nature of AI adequately. A system of fractured development silos creates a wide gap wherein technological advancement is prioritized over ethics.

There are a few AI regulatory developments  around the world for AI management worthy of note. First, the US House of Representatives debated the Digital Services Oversight and Safety Act of 2022 (H.R.6796) and the Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2023 (H.R. 5628). The AI Disclosure Act of 2023 (H.R. 3831) was also introduced before the House of Representatives.

Canada saw the introduction of the Artificial Intelligence Data Act (AIDA). The European Parliament began discussing the EU Artificial Intelligence Act in 2023, which represents a shift toward “hard law.” China is also addressing the issue and undertook the Interim Administrative Measures for the Management of Generative AI Services, which was enacted in 2023.

Recently, the United States passed the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, which included a five-year implementation plan to adopt AI applications to accelerate decision advantage for both business efficacy as well as warfighting capability.

China also released the Global AI Governance Initiative, “calling for all countries under the principles of extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits to enhance exchanges and cooperation, work together to prevent risks, and develop an AI governance framework based on broad consensus, to make AI technologies more secure, reliable, controllable, and equitable.”

The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention, discussed above, provides a comprehensive legal structure to protect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, besides promoting innovation. This strikes a balance where the use of technology should not be limited but society must ensure that development is in the right direction—with most of the technologies promoting ethical usage.

The Convention offers a set of guidelines for the advancement of AI that include respecting human dignity and upholding the idea that one should not infringe upon the rights and liberties of others. There is a significant urge to pursue explainability, which requires an explanation for each decision an AI makes and highlights how these systems have the power to significantly impact people’s lives in fields like criminal justice and healthcare. Additionally, the Convention calls for fairness in the creation of AI by considering prejudice in learning systems.

The Convention clearly aspires to international cooperation, which is important because it is a central element of the liberal international order. Numerous states agreed to the treaty, realizing that artificial intelligence is not a local problem. Such collaboration is required since artificial intelligence affects all states, and its advantages and disadvantages can only be addressed jointly. The agreement’s openness to other parties is crucial because it enables people from different backgrounds and cultures to voice their thoughts, enhancing and leveling the playing field.

As AI advances, concerns will grow about the agreement’s direction, applicability, and resource allocation. It implies that ethically right deeds now might turn unethical as technology develops, highlighting the necessity of a progressive framework for a code of ethics.

Since the development of AI must be accompanied by its ethical application, the Convention on Artificial Intelligence represents an important accomplishment in European regulation of the technology. Therefore, this treaty serves as a guide for how human rights, accountability, and openness should be upheld when integrating AI into society. The journey has only just begun. However, the political will and spirit to act, observe, and adopt the proper approach to governance can serve to achieve the benefits of AI.

Nevertheless, it will probably be difficult to put these rules and policies into foolproof practice. It will certainly be a work in progress. The European Council is certainly providing a road map for managing global mutual technology advancement concerns.

Huma Rehman is Director of Research at the Islamabad Policy Institute (IPI) and a Defense & Foreign Affairs Analyst. The views expressed are her own.   

Paving the Ethical Route for AI was originally published on Global Security Review.