In February 2022, days after Russian forces crossed into Ukraine, Putin placed his nuclear arsenal on high alert and warned that any nation interfering would face consequences unlike any in its history. The warning to those who might intervene – specifically NATO. Four years on, NATO has provided extensive military and economic support to Ukraine without paying the price Putin had threatened. However, the threat still begs a question the U.S. has never answered. How would Washington protect the homeland, rather than merely avenge a nuclear strike? President Biden warned Moscow of severe consequences for any nuclear use in Ukraine but kept the American response ambiguous. The U.S. may or may not use nuclear weapons against Russia in defense of Ukraine, but a different reaction may occur if the target were a NATO country.  

Because of the distance between the two countries, a Russian strike on the U.S. would likely require long-range ballistic missiles launched from land or submarine. Even though eighty years of deterrence have kept that prospect remote, a single failure such as a misinterpretation or escalatory mobilization of forces could lead to a catastrophic reaction. The U.S. fields layered interceptors, yet the possibility of wide devastation remains. In January 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14186 which launched the “Golden Dome” initiative. The order, titled “The Iron Dome for America,” directed the Pentagon to develop a more sophisticated, layered shield against ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles. The concept is analogous in purpose to Israel’s “Iron Dome,” but the planned U.S. architecture is far broader. It calls for space-based sensors, interceptors, and  non-kinetic capabilities. Potential systems could even include directed-energy weapons such as lasers.  

Antimissile defense is not new. In the 1980s, President Reagan initiated the Strategic Defense Initiative, more widely known as Star Wars. The program envisioned, among others, a space-based antimissile system that could provide a comprehensive defense against enemy missiles. That vision never came to fruition. However, technology has evolved, and the U.S. now operates Ground-Based Midcourse Defense, Aegis, THAAD and Patriot which are foundations for Golden Dome. These could build on and be consolidated to add new space-based antimissile capabilities. However, there are problems with this approach. The Government Accounting Office has documented challenges in transitioning DOD directed-energy prototypes, including high-energy lasers, into operational use and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) assesses that directed-energy weapons, such as lasers, are unlikely to be fielded soon. Another problem is that the Golden Dome’s cost is still unknown. The CBO’s estimate is that a national missile defense architecture broadly consistent with the executive order could cost upwards of $1.2 trillion to develop, deploy, and operate over two decades. Every dollar carries an opportunity cost, reducing the: money that could be used to modernize other systems or reduce the national debt.  

Further, determining the Golden Dome’s effectiveness is problematic due to the difficulty of  intercepting ballistic missiles, and the need is to stop multiple missiles or further influence an adversary’s actions. The CBO found that a national missile defense architecture of this type could fully engage a regional-adversary attack or a small-scale attack by a peer adversary, but it could be overwhelmed by a full-scale attack from Russia or China.  

The CBO also warned that deployment could prompt adversaries to increase missile inventories, expand long-range arsenals, or pursue more effective countermeasures, including nuclear weapons. While the intention of the dome would be to make America safer, it could do the opposite. A commonly cited anecdote, known as the cobra effect, offers a warning about best-laid plans. This anecdote purports that British officials in colonial India offered a bounty for dead cobras; residents allegedly began breeding them for the reward, and when the bounty ended, the snakes were released which made the metropolitan areas in India more unsafe. A policy intended to reduce the cobra population produced the opposite result. The same could be true of the Golden Dome and must be considered in the calculus for its implementation.  

Concerns for Golden Dome go beyond the dome antimissile defense. A shield intended to reduce American vulnerability could make an adversary feel more exposed, encouraging it to build or diversify forces in other areas. Russia condemned Golden Dome arguing weapons in space are a provocation and they militarize space. The Soviets had a similar reaction to the Star Wars program. Russia may simply build more missiles and decoys to ensure enough survive. Russia is positioned to do so with impunity given that New START expired in February 2026. For the first time in decades the largest arsenals on earth are no longer bound by a bilateral cap.  

Whoever follows Putin may well prove worse. Even thought the forgoing text focusses on Russia, other adversaries are not far behind. North Korea continues to expand and diversify its nuclear and ballistic-missile capabilities. China continues a major expansion of its nuclear and missile forces. An even with the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the Iranian regime continues to show an unwillingness to curb their pursuit of missiles and weapons of mass destruction.  

Will Russia’s current nuclear weapons levels increase like the cobras in India? It is unknown, but regardless, the argument for the dome is strong. An imperfect defense would still complicate Russia’s planning and could improve protection against limited or accidental launches. Golden Dome could make America safer, however there is risk that it may do the opposite; no one can yet say. However, uncertainty is not a reason to abandon the concept, but a reason to keep exploring and to field it once it is ready. The dangers are not diminishing, and the world is growing less predictable. A nation must mitigate the dangers that exist and find a way not to release the bounty on the cobras.  

Darrell Allen II is a graduate student in the Defense and Strategic Studies program at Missouri State University, where his research focuses on national security, deterrence, and international affairs. He also publishes a newsletter on Substack. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Would Golden Dome Make America Safer? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Cold War made the High North a proving ground for nuclear strategy. Even though the powers and weapons have changed, the same geography matters again. China now fields long-range conventional and nuclear missiles capable of reaching Alaska and the American West Coast, while Russia is reinforcing its sea-based nuclear deterrent throughout the Arctic. Washington should no longer treat the Arctic as a periphery to monitor for missile warnings. Instead, it must insulate the American homeland from threats that traverse both the Atlantic and the Pacific.  

Alaska sits at the center of this shift. It hosts the bulk of America’s homeland missile defense infrastructure and, according to Senator Dan Sullivan, is undergoing its largest military buildup since World War II amid rising Chinese and Russian activity along its coastline.  

China, Russia, and Strategic Cohesion  

The Pentagon’s 2025 China Military Power Report confirmed that China has fielded the DF-27, an intercontinental ballistic missile with an estimated range of 5,000 to 8,000 kilometers. Analysts writing in Maritime Executive noted that the missile makes China the first nation to field an operational, conventionally armed (non-nuclear) ICBM, one capable of striking Hawaii, Alaska, and much of the West Coast without crossing the nuclear threshold. The DF-27 supplements a broader high seas program that includes the JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile, carried aboard Jin-class submarines, and extends China’s deterrent well into the Pacific.  

China also pursues a dual-use strategy in Arctic waters. In July 2026, the Coast Guard tracked the research icebreakers Xue Long and Xue Long 2 as they transited the U.S. exclusive economic zone and the extended continental shelf in the Bering Sea, prompting the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Munro to shadow them under Operation Frontier Sentinel. The transit itself was lawful, but the vessels carry equipment capable of mapping the seabed and acoustic conditions, which can later be used for enhanced submarine navigation.  

Russia, meanwhile, is deepening its own bastion. The 2026 Annual Threat Assessment found that the Kola Peninsula now hosts roughly two-thirds of Moscow’s second-strike nuclear capability, including seven ballistic-missile submarines armed with Sineva and Liner missiles that can reach open waters in under a day, thereby evading the historical chokepoint at the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. Russia has also commissioned its first armed icebreaker, the Ivan Papanin, which Maritime Executive reports can mount containerized launchers for up to eight potentially nuclear-armed Kalibr cruise missiles, concealable within ordinary shipping traffic along the Northern Sea Route. In short, the two oceans that once insulated the U.S. from a two-front conflict are becoming a liability as Russian and Chinese submarines evade conventional detection by operating at higher latitudes. 

This coordination extends to joint operations. In July 2024, Russian Tu-95 bombers and Chinese H-6 bombers flew their first joint patrol near the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone, where NORAD fighters intercepted them. Neither nation violated American or Canadian airspace, but such patrols, along with a joint Chinese and Russian coast guard patrols observed in the Bering Sea, signal a deepening willingness to operate near the American homeland. 

U.S. Response 

Washington has made investments to close these gaps. Boeing has completed twenty additional Ground-Based Interceptor silos at Fort Greely, bringing the total to sixty. Congress is integrating the site into the larger Golden Dome missile defense architecture, which the Congressional Budget Office estimates could cost roughly $1.2 trillion over twenty years. The Army Corps of Engineers has also awarded a $399 million contract for the first phase of the nation’s first Arctic deep-water port at Nome, intended to eventually deepen the harbor from eighteen to forty feet and host Coast Guard cutters and icebreakers. Icebreaker production is expanding through the trilateral ICE Pact among the United States, Canada, and Finland. The disparity remains stark,  the Coast Guard currently operates only two Arctic-capable icebreakers, compared to dozens fielded by Russia. NORAD has paired these investments with Arctic Edge 2026, a multinational exercise that tested cruise missile defense across Alaska and Greenland. Nonetheless, these measures remain reactive, and the United States still trails its rivals in the Arctic domain. 

Policy Implications 

The combined weight of Chinese missile innovation, a hardening Russian Arctic bastion, and growing coordination between the two nations means Alaska can no longer be treated as an unexposed flank. Interceptor silos at Fort Greely address only part of the problem, since the system was designed to counter a limited North Korean-style threat rather than the hypersonic and maneuverable warheads China now fields. Chinese icebreakers currently outpace the U.S. Coast Guard in undersea surveillance, while Russian submarines increasingly route around NATO’s traditional Arctic barrier. A sustained U.S. funding for the Nome port, additional icebreakers, and persistent maritime patrol aircraft would close the detection gap more effectively than interceptors alone, helping reduce the threat. 

Policymakers should treat the Arctic and North Pacific as a single, interconnected theater, as China and Russia already appear to be doing. For the first time in its history, the U.S. is watching the geographic assets of two oceans turn into a liability as its Arctic posture atrophies. 

Jack Lindstrom is the Founder and Publisher of Arctic Ledger, an independent research and publishing platform, and a Junior Researcher at the Mackinder Forum, where he studies Arctic governance, critical minerals, and great power competition. He has authored and co-authored papers on Arctic security, submarine warfare, and Sino-Russian polar cooperation for Arctic Ledger. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

China’s Long-Range Missiles, Russia’s Arctic Bastion, and the Alaskan Gap was originally published on Global Security Review.

The ongoing conflict involving Iran, the United States, and Israel has produced one of the most significant case studies in the evolution of contemporary warfare. Iran, a state that lacks a competitive air force and possesses limited naval power, has demonstrated that ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems can offset some conventional disadvantages and impose serious costs on technologically superior adversaries. This development is not confined to the battlefield. It represents a doctrinal shift with lasting implications for American deterrence strategy, allied defense planning, and the long-term viability of current U.S. force structures. Understanding what Iran has and has not achieved is essential for making sound policy going forward.

The Cost-Exchange Problem 

At the operational level, Iran’s most consequential contribution has been exposing a structural vulnerability in layered air defense: the cost-exchange dilemma. Systems such as Patriot, THAAD, and Iron Dome were engineered to intercept high-value ballistic and cruise missile threats. When deployed against coordinated waves of low-cost drones and short-range missiles, these systems are forced to expend interceptors valued at hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars per shot against threats that cost a fraction of that amount. The arithmetic is unsustainable at scale. As analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies have noted, saturation attacks can exhaust defensive inventories faster than replenishment is possible, creating windows of vulnerability that adversaries are quick to exploit. For the United States, this is not merely a technical problem, it is a strategic one that requires urgent attention in both procurement and doctrine.

The development of the Golden Dome missile defense architecture and expanded investment in directed energy and electronic warfare systems reflect growing official awareness that current interception models are not cost-competitive. These are necessary steps. However, technology alone cannot resolve a dilemma that is fundamentally about the economics of offense versus defense. Adversaries will adapt their tactics faster than procurement cycles can respond unless the U.S. also changes the strategic logic driving their calculations.

Attrition Without Decision: The Limits of the Iranian Model

The Iranian approach has imposed genuine costs on its adversaries, but it has not produced decisive military outcomes. This distinction is critical. Iran’s missile and drone campaigns have disrupted logistics, strained defensive inventories, and created operational uncertainty. They have not, however, defeated U.S. or Israeli military power, seized or held territory, or forced a negotiated settlement on Iranian terms. The model is one of strategic attrition, not strategic victory. Survivability and persistence are not equivalent to effectiveness, and the broader narrative of a drone revolution rendering conventional military power obsolete requires significant qualification.

The claim that air superiority is no longer a necessary condition for strategic effectiveness also warrants scrutiny. Air superiority remains essential for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; for close air support of ground operations; and for denying adversaries freedom of movement. What Iran’s campaign demonstrates is that a state without air superiority can still impose costs and delay adversary operations—not that air power has been rendered irrelevant. The bar for what air superiority can guarantee has been raised. Its strategic value, however, has not disappeared. Policymakers and analysts should resist the temptation to draw sweeping conclusions from a conflict that remains ongoing and whose full operational record is still emerging.

Implications for American Deterrence

The proliferation of precision strike capabilities across state and non-state actors undermines the assumption that technological overmatch alone is sufficient to deter conflict. When adversaries can field asymmetric capabilities that challenge U.S. and allied defenses at an acceptable cost to themselves, deterrence by denial becomes increasingly difficult to guarantee. The U.S. must prioritize cost-effective interception technologies, particularly directed energy weapons, that can neutralize mass drone and missile attacks without depleting high-value interceptor stocks. This is a resource allocation problem as much as it is an engineering one, and it demands serious engagement at the budgetary and strategic planning levels.

The Iranian model is also exportable, and this may prove to be its most consequential long-term dimension. States with limited defense budgets that are aligned with China or Russia can observe the operational lessons from this conflict and apply them in their own regional contexts. The proliferation of domestically produced or externally transferred missile and drone capabilities across the Middle East, South Asia, and the Indo-Pacific represents a compounding deterrence challenge. American extended deterrence commitments to allies in these regions will become harder to sustain if the cost-exchange problem is not structurally resolved. As Defense News reported, the proliferation of drone technology is already forcing militaries worldwide to reconsider their approach to air and missile defense.

There is also a crisis stability dimension that deserves serious attention. Rapid, sustained missile and drone strikes compress decision-making timelines and increase pressure for early, and potentially disproportionate, responses. In a multipolar environment where multiple actors possess similar strike capabilities, the risk of miscalculation is elevated. The U.S. should pursue updated arms control frameworks and diplomatic mechanisms to manage the proliferation of these systems alongside its technical and procurement investments. Deterrence cannot be reduced to hardware alone.

Conclusion

Iran’s missile and drone campaign has not rewritten the principles of warfare, but it has exposed critical assumptions underpinning American deterrence in ways that cannot be ignored. Distributed, low-cost, high-impact systems are now accessible to a wider range of actors and the gap between offensive capability and defensive cost is widening. The United States requires a

deterrence posture that integrates cost-effective defense, credible offensive options, active non-proliferation diplomacy, and sustained alliance management. Meeting this challenge demands strategic adaptation across doctrine, procurement, and diplomacy, not simply an incremental increase in interceptor production.

Dr. Tahir Mahmood Azad is currently a research scholar at the Department of Politics & International Relations, the University of Reading, UK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran’s Missile-Drone Campaign and Its Implications for the United States’ Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The fundamental aim of Golden Dome is to protect the United States from air or space-based missiles armed with a variety of warheads: nuclear, chemical, biological, or conventional. Golden Dome will be made available to key allies should they deem it necessary for their own defenses in an increasingly complex global security environment. However, the level of interest these allies have in negotiating the terms of missile defenses from the U.S. remains to be seen.

While moving beyond the technical development of SDI, Golden Dome is not ushering a new age of missile defense strategy. A national missile defense policy has been in place since the 1990s following a hotly debated period in Congress where a “placebo defense” was finally deployed. The term “placebo defense” was coined by prolific political strategist Dr. William Van Cleave, who advocated for a layered concept of missile defense while he was a member of “Team B.” Team B was commissioned by the-then Director of Central Intelligence, President George H.W. Bush for the purpose of providing the government with alternative intelligence assessments and policy guidance regarding the Soviet strategic threat.

Dr. Van Cleave first used the term “placebo defense” in lectures at the Department of Defense & Strategic Studies at Missouri State University in 1996. While not officially defined in any academic paper, “placebo defense” describes the U.S. policy of deploying limited missile defenses incapable of defending against significant ballistic missile attack from either Russia or China. Rather, such limited missile defenses instead minimize the threat by rogue states like North Korea and Iran. The goal in part was to silence the critics who claim the U.S. must at least be able to defend itself from those rogue nations more likely to launch one or two missiles at U.S. forces overseas, or key coastal areas of the country.

The Team B concept of layered missile defense was supported by former SDI officials who advocated for a space-based laser (SBL) system to provide the most effective method of intercepting ballistic missiles. While this would be ideal for balancing technical feasibility and overall program cost, SBLs were not supported by Congress and follow-on administrations. Valuable research and development have since been neglected, making SBLs unlikely achievable anytime soon.

Golden Dome is now poised to move forward with some of the Team B concepts and additional strategists since the 1990s. To move Golden Dome forward rapidly, it is time to reconsider Brilliant Pebbles, which is also referred to as Future Space-Based Interceptors. Designed by Lawerence Livermore National Laboratory, Brilliant Pebbles envisioned placing small space-based interceptors (weighing around 10 kilograms) in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) capable of colliding with intercontinental ballistic missiles during the boost-phase of their trajectory. These interceptors would remain in orbit for only 18 months. Brilliant Pebbles was cancelled in 1993 due to a lack of political support in Congress despite some strategists arguing the technical feasibility of the program and its technical readiness for deployment in the near term.

Since the program’s end, the technical efficiency of small pump-fed engines and the impulse of solid axial engines, the areas of technological development that limited the concept in the late 1980s, have improved. It is now possible for an interceptor to reach 20g acceleration and cover a range of 800 km, well beyond the capabilities in the original project. Further mission analysis is still needed to determine the number of Brilliant Pebbles required to provide adequate missile defenses within the Golden Dome strategy. Furthermore, the cost to deploy Brilliant Pebbles using this concept will also be vastly reduced using current U.S. space launch capabilities provides by companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin.

The ability of Golden Dome to effectively protect the U.S. from air and space missile threats fundamentally relies on selecting the most effective space-based missile defense system. Brilliant Pebbles is a system whose maturity can be advanced quickly and cost effectively to provide a boost-phase intercept capability. This could finally put to an end to the “placebo” missile defense system which leaves the U.S. insufficiently defended.

Dr. Matthew Mowthorpe is currently working at BAE Systems where he is responsible for space control. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Brilliant Pebbles Can Provide a Real Space-Based Missile Defense for Golden Dome was originally published on Global Security Review.

Bottom line: The center of gravity in deterrence is shifting to space-enabled, long-range, rapidly replaceable kill webs, and our adversaries are acting as if they know it. NATO voices now openly frame space as a war-fighting domain, while Europe moves from point defense to deep strike, Washington debates force-design trades (B-52J vs. more B-21s), and Iran/Russia press for coercive advantage amid sanctions friction. The strategic task is to turn language and spending into tested, resilient, allied operational architectures, and fast.

Unifying Trends

1. Space goes operational, not “supporting.”
   NATO leaders’ tone shift (Germany, France, Spain, Canada) treats space as a domain for defense and offense (“shield and sword”), demanding common doctrine, delegated authorities, and tactically responsive launch (<96 hours) to restore/augment constellations under attack.
2. From point defense to deep strike.
   Denmark’s decision to field long-range precision fires (Tomahawk/JASSM-ER class and European options) reflects a continental realization: you can’t intercept your way out of massed salvos—you must hold launchers, C2, and magazines at risk.
3. U.S. force-design inflection.
   Cost/schedule breaches on B-52J upgrades collide with contested-airspace realities, strengthening arguments to expand and accelerate B-21. This is a survivability vs. standoff trade with industrial-base and budget consequences.
4. Great-Power coercion is coordinated.
   ISW’s readout on Moscow’s aims, Iran’s missile signaling and suspected tests, and Beijing’s pressure campaigns (incl. Taiwan wargaming counters) form a convergent pressure track seeking to outlast Western cohesion and exploit cost-asymmetry (cheap counter-space/EW vs. exquisite satellites).
5. Homeland defense as a system-of-systems problem.
   “Golden Dome” can work only if rigorous end-to-end (E2E) testing—across space sensors, comms, C2, effectors, cyber—starts now and leverages commercial testbeds/digital twins. Otherwise, the architecture risks beautiful fragility.
6. Forward posture debates return.
   Talk of re-entering Bagram underscores a broader theme: geography for deterrence matters again, but must be weighed against access, legitimacy, and escalation dynamics with the Taliban and China.

What This Means Operationally

• Speed is deterrence. Time to detect-decide-deliver (and to replace space capacity) is now a primary measure of merit.
• Proliferation beats pedigree. Multi-orbit, proliferated constellations with rapid reconstitution are more survivable than few exquisite assets.
• Kill webs over platforms. Advantage will come from tested integration of sensors, AI-enabled C2, and multi-domain effectors, not any single “silver bullet.”
• Allies are moving—synchronize them. Europe’s deep-strike pivot and NATO’s space posture create a window to standardize doctrine, data, and munitions.

Risks to Watch

• Doctrine lag in space. Without common allied space ROE/authorities, response times will miss the fight.
• Testing shortfalls. If E2E campaigns are under-funded or staged too late, integration debt will surface in crisis.
• Budget whiplash. Raiding legacy accounts for survivable capacity is necessary—but undisciplined shifts can hollow critical standoff magazines and training.
• Cost asymmetry. Adversaries’ cheap EW/dazzling/cyber vs. our pricey satellites remains a structural vulnerability.

Priority Actions (next 6–12 months)

1. Adopt an Allied Space Operations Doctrine 1.0
   Codify protect/defend, attribution thresholds, delegated authorities, and tactically responsive launch across NATO.
2. Stand up a Joint Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS) pipeline
   Contract now for rideshare, hot-spare payloads, and 96-hour launch/checkout drills; exercise quarterly.
3. Golden Dome: lock an Integrated Master Test Plan
   Fund E2E test events that include on-orbit sensing + ground C2 + live/interoperable interceptors + cyber red-teaming. Mandate industry-in-the-loop from day one.
4. Rebalance the bomber portfolio toward survivability
   Protect B-21 ramp; scrutinize B-52J scope/schedule to preserve standoff munitions buys and mission-planning AI.
5. European deep-strike integration
   Fast-track common mission planning, targeting data standards, and logistics for JASSM-ER/Tomahawk/European LR strike across F-35 and surface fleets.
6. Harden the space kill web
   Deploy optical crosslinks, jam-resilient waveforms, PNT alternatives, and autonomous battle management aids to ride through EW/cyber.
7. Tighten economic levers against Russia/Iran
   Enforce oil price caps/leakage, expand sanctions on dual-use microelectronics, and close maritime re-flag loopholes that fund attritional strategies.
8. Wargame access/logistics for any Afghanistan posture
   If Bagram re-entry is pursued, pre-plan overflight, basing, sustainment, and escalation controls; build non-permissive extraction branches.

Concrete Measures of Effectiveness

• Time-to-Replace-On-Orbit (TTRO): target ≤ 96 hours from loss to restored coverage.
• Find-Fix-Finish latency: median time from first detection to effect in minutes, not hours.
• E2E test cadence: quarterly cross-domain integrated events; zero critical interoperability defects carried forward.
• Allied deep-strike coverage: % of NATO targets held at risk at >500 km with validated comms/targeting.
• Resilience index: % of space services with disaggregated backups (multi-orbit/multi-vendor).

Longer Perspective

Deterrence now hinges on resilient connections more than singular platforms: space that can fight and recover, kill webs that integrate fast, and alliances that can reach deep. If we test as we will fight, standardize with allies, and bias for speed and survivability, we deny adversaries the slow-motion coercion they seek—and keep escalation ladders short, clear, and in our control.

This Week in Deterrence (September 15-19, 2025) was originally published on Global Security Review.

First, SDI was not an actual defense initiative as much as it was a response to the Soviet Union’s rapidly growing strategic nuclear offensive forces and their own anti-satellite space forces. As William Van Cleave wrote in his 1986 report,

The Soviet Union has long been developing a multifaceted ballistic missile defense and, in fact, has already begun deploying such a defense. The Soviets have also began exploiting space for military purposes nearly two decades ago. They have already deployed anti-satellite (ASAT) space weapons. The overriding threat to American security today—that is, a rapid growth in offensive nuclear and conventional weapons systems—has come about precisely because the Soviet Union has been racing to build a weapons system, while the United States has not.

The same can be said of China today and is true of Golden Dome.

While there are plenty of Chinese, Russian, and Western arms control advocates criticizing Golden Dome as weaponization of space and an imbalance of forces, they all fail to note that Golden Dome is a response to the current imbalance of nuclear and space forces that advantages China and Russia. The utility of nuclear weapons, coupled with the advancement of hypersonic and space-to-ground attack options in the hands of the nation’s enemies grew in recent years.

The Chinese are in the midst of a breakout in the size and capability of their nuclear forces. Both China and Russia are engaging in a similar effort with their space attack forces. Both deployed ASAT and other space weapons systems that not only threaten American critical space infrastructure, but the homeland itself. As such, Golden Dome is a response to the already de-stabilizing activities of the Chinese and Russians. They, not the United States, are actively building weapons systems, especially in space.

Second, the narrative that SDI was a weapons development program is false. President Reagan’s speech directing SDI called it a research or “study” program. The 1985 Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative said that “it should be stressed that SDI is a research program that seeks to provide the technical knowledge required to support a decision on whether to develop and later deploy advanced defensive systems. It is not a program to deploy those weapons.”

President Trump understands this by his comments that while Reagan pursued SDI, “[he] didn’t have the technology.” However, Golden Dome is, in fact, a weapons deployment program. As his directive in the executive order states, “The United States will provide for the common defense of its citizens and the nation by deploying and maintaining a next-generation missile defense shield…[including] the development and deployment of proliferated space-based interceptors capable of boost-phase intercept,” among other sensors, trackers, and other weapons capable of defeating various threats from hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missiles. While SDI was a study for a future decision to deploy space-based missile defenses, Golden Dome is the decision to deploy before Trump leaves office.

Finally, another false narrative in the anti–Golden Dome commentaries is that the system will be full of “untested technology.” This is not the case. If anyone looks at the systems listed in the executive order from January 2025, one will see that several of the sensors and layers are already in the current programs of record, many of which have already started deployment in orbit.

While some of the systems, such as the space-based interceptor, are not deployed yet, the technology for intercepting such missiles is in various forms of testing and/or use—for decades. Just because SDI had grand visions of lasers bouncing off mirrors or large chemical lasers in space, does not mean that Golden Dome’s space-based interceptors must be based on those concepts. Current anti-ballistic missile tech gained considerable ground over the past four decades and is ready for deployment sooner than later.

Vulnerability is not an option. Protecting Americans and the homeland from space and missile attack is a strategic imperative that must not fail. Congress must ignore the false narratives of the late 20th century. The threat is real, the technology is real. It is time to field Golden Dome for America.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies in Washington, DC. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The views and positions are those of the author and do not reflect the positions and opinions of the Department of Defense or the author’s employer.

A Second Look at the Critiques and Narratives Against Golden Dome for America was originally published on Global Security Review.

Golden Dome is focused on specific missile threats to the American homeland. AUKUS pillar two is designed to reduce the significant lead China has in dual-use emerging technologies. An “extended” Golden Dome approach that produces strong and resilient allies may provide greater strategic deterrence than an America alone approach.

As stronger allies contribute more to collective defense through burden sharing, this can reduce the financial and military burden on the United States. Capable allies can deter aggression and manage local conflicts, promoting regional stability without constant American intervention.

If allies are seen as weak and easily overrun, it may undermine the credibility of alliances and security guarantees, thereby emboldening adversaries. Strong allies often bring advanced technologies and capabilities that enhance joint operations through interoperability and innovation.

Defeating fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), hypersonic glide weapons, and land-attack cruise missile threats is the focus of Golden Dome, which “proposes a multilayered defense network capable of intercepting threats during the boost, midcourse, and terminal stages of missile flight.” Some analysts argue that it is easiest to target these threats in the boost/ascent phase.

Targeting the boost phase can either occur from allied territory, targeting North Korean missiles from South Korea, or the homeland. The boost phase can also be targeted from space. However, targeting from space is not without its own unique set of challenges. Either way, it will not be solved by America without its allies.

Arguably, five-eyes countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States) are already entangled in American nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3). Furthermore, the US operates in coordination with other military forces as part of broader coalition operations. Hence, extending Golden Dome to allies is not only possible, but can further leverage the AUKUS pillar two effort. Moreover, a missile defense system consists of sensors, interceptors, and command-and-control systems that work together to detect, track, and intercept incoming missiles.

These necessary components exist in AUKUS pillar two working groups like the cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy, quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, hypersonics and counter-hypersonics, electronic warfare capabilities, innovation and information sharing, and the deep-space advanced radar capability program (DARC).

AUKUS pillar two leadership should prioritize the development of technologies and supporting systems for an effective extended Golden Dome architecture. America is unlikely to solve the problem in isolation by building a “tightly integrated system of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, terrestrial radar stations, directed-energy platforms, and kinetic interceptors” that senses, decides, and neutralizes incoming missiles. The linkages and opportunities for the prioritization of advanced technology development for missile defense can be found in the following summaries.

Cyber capabilities encompass both offensive and defensive operations for missile defense. Offensive cyber tools are used to deter adversaries and disrupt their operations through tactics such as cyber-reconnaissance, communication isolation, targeted strikes, and network intrusions. Defensively, military forces can prioritize robust network protection, active threat disruption, and seamless coordination across units to safeguard critical systems. Cyber operations can enhance intelligence gathering, command and control, and information warfare to shape public perception and the broader information environment. As conflict evolves, training personnel in cyber tactics and integrating machine learning for threat detection and analysis can maintain strategic advantage.

AI and autonomy can transform missile defense and military operations by enhancing efficiency, precision, and decision-making. Autonomous weapon systems are used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and combat missions. AI-driven wargaming platforms simulate real-world combat scenarios to help strategists test tactics and improve readiness. In command and control, AI supports real-time data processing and analysis. AI optimizes logistics by improving resource allocation, supply-chain management, and transportation.

In intelligence and surveillance, AI analyzes vast datasets to detect patterns and identify threats. Additionally, AI monitors threats and predicts future events. Human-machine teaming allows AI systems to collaborate with human operators, combining strengths and minimizing errors.

Quantum technologies transform missile defenses through enhanced security, operational efficiency, and advanced training. In cybersecurity, quantum-resistant cryptography is being developed to protect against the threat quantum computers pose to traditional encryption. Quantum key distribution offers highly secure communication by transmitting encryption keys through quantum channels, making interception nearly impossible.

In military operations, quantum algorithms can optimize logistics, supply chains, and battlefield strategies by analyzing complex data in real time. Quantum computing could process data in real time, enabling missile defense systems to rapidly analyze incoming threats, allowing for quicker decision-making and more effective interception. Additionally, quantum computing could enable highly accurate simulations of complex systems like nuclear reactions and weapon designs.

Undersea capabilities encompass a wide range of offensive and defensive functions that contribute to missile defense. Offensively, submarines and other undersea platforms can strike surface vessels, submarines, and land-based targets. They are also instrumental in inserting special forces into hostile territory for reconnaissance or sabotage missions. Undersea vehicles play a key role in mine warfare, either by laying mines or clearing minefields. On the defensive side, these platforms are vital for anti-submarine warfare, enabling the detection and neutralization of enemy submarines. They also support surveillance and reconnaissance efforts, gathering intelligence on enemy naval movements. Undersea systems help protect vital infrastructure such as pipelines and communication cables and help ensure safe navigation.

Hypersonic weapons and counter-hypersonic systems are vital to missile defense operations. Hypersonic glide weapons and hypersonic cruise missiles are designed to strike targets with exceptional speed, maneuverability, and precision while evading traditional defenses. Counter-hypersonic capabilities include advanced sensors and tracking systems like radar and satellite imaging to detect and monitor hypersonic weapons. Hypersonic interceptors aim to neutralize threats mid-flight, while high-power lasers and microwave weapons can disrupt their guidance systems. Effective command-and-control systems are essential for coordinating these defenses, and soft-kill measures such as cyberattacks offer additional means to interfere with hypersonic weapons.

Electronic warfare is fundamental for gaining military advantages in cross-domain missile defense. Electronic attack includes jamming enemy communications, radar, and navigation systems. It also includes spoofing—sending false signals to enemy forces. Electromagnetic or directed-energy weapons disable or destroy enemy assets. Electronic protection ensures secure communication through encryption and satellite links and employs electronic countermeasures (ECM) to defend against attack. Electronic counter-countermeasures are used to overcome enemy ECM and maintain operational effectiveness. Electronic support can be focused on gathering intelligence through signals interception, using sensors for surveillance and target acquisition, and detecting threats in the electromagnetic spectrum.

            In short, under the auspices of AUKUS pillar two, Australia and the United Kingdom can contribute to Golden Dome in ways that many may not be thinking about. As longtime allies with a shared culture, history, and values, working together on Golden Dome just makes sense.

Natalie Treloar is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), a Non-Resident Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, and a cohost of the NIDS Deterrence Down Under Podcast.

Extending the Golden Dome: AUKUS Pillar 2 was originally published on Global Security Review.

• General Anthony Cotton: Emphasizes the importance of the Sentinel project and regrets the simultaneous tackling of multiple strategic modernization programs. ​
• Strategic Command: Highlights the vital role of the Nuclear Triad in national security. ​
• USAF Vice Chief of Staff General James Slife: Stresses the necessity of maintaining a nuclear arsenal. ​

Essay of the Week: Ukraine, Proliferation, & Deterrence ​

• Peter Huessy: Discusses the complexities of the US and NATO’s approach to Ukraine, the implications of a ceasefire, and the need for a robust deterrent against Russian aggression. ​
• Key Points:
  • Historical failures in responding to Russian aggression. ​
  • Current defense spending and military assistance to Ukraine.
  • The importance of a strategic security arrangement involving NATO and Ukraine. ​

Event of the Week ​

• Defense Conference: General Anthony Cotton calls for more B-21 bombers and underscores the urgency of nuclear modernization. ​

Administration Developments ​

• Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth: Plans to increase spending on space operations, highlighting the importance of the space domain in future warfare. ​

The AF Chiefs Corner ​

• Air Force Chief Gen. David Allvin: Sees an opportunity for additional funding for missile defense and nuclear modernization. ​

The Commanders Corner

• General Cotton: Advocates for increased production rates of B-21 bombers and more Long Range Stand-Off weapons due to evolving security threats. ​

Strategic Developments ​

• Taiwan: Defense budget to exceed 3% of GDP due to rising threats from China. ​
• NATO Air Command: Demonstrates interoperability and transatlantic unity through Bomber Task Force missions. ​

Top Essays of the Week ​

• Essay #1: Discusses the uncertainty surrounding US extended deterrence guarantees and the potential for nuclear proliferation among US allies. ​
• Essay #2: Emphasizes the importance of maintaining the US nuclear umbrella over its allies. ​

Congressional Budget Developments ​

• Defense Spending Tips: Recommendations for cuts and increases in various defense programs, including missile procurement and Air Force programs. ​

Economic Developments

• Stephen Moore: Highlights the shift towards a production-driven economy and its impact on inflation and economic growth. ​

Proliferation Concerns ​

• Colin Demarest: Discusses the global proliferation of nuclear weapons and the implications for international security. ​

Ukraine Corner ​

• Clifford May: Advocates for a realistic goal of achieving a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, leading to a frozen conflict. ​

Media Error of the Week ​

• Wall Street Journal: Criticized for suggesting negotiations with Houthis terrorists, which could lead to endless conflict.

ICBM EAR Report Week of March 17-23 was originally published on Global Security Review.