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		<title>Turkey’s ICBM: Ambition for Autonomy</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/turkeys-icbm-ambition-for-autonomy/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Curtis McGiffin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 12:13:22 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Yildirimhan]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32714</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: May 26, 2026 At the recent SAHA Expo 2026, Turkey unveiled a mock-up of the Yildirimhan (Thunderbolt) and released details about the long-range, four-engined, liquid-fueled ballistic missile. The designation “Yildirimhan” refers to Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I, known as “the Thunderbolt,” circa 1400 AD. He was known for acting faster than his enemies, striking before [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/turkeys-icbm-ambition-for-autonomy/">Turkey’s ICBM: Ambition for Autonomy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: May 26, 2026</em></p>
<p>At the recent SAHA Expo 2026, Turkey <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/05/08/turkey-touts-propellant-breakthrough-for-yildirimhan-long-range-ballistic-missile/">unveiled</a> a mock-up of the Yildirimhan (Thunderbolt) and <a href="https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2026/tuerkiye-unveils-yildirimhan-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-challenging-china-df-26-range">released</a> details about the long-range, four-engined, liquid-fueled ballistic missile. The designation “Yildirimhan” refers to Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I, known as “the Thunderbolt,” circa 1400 AD. He was <a href="https://www.turkiyetoday.com/culture/yildirim-bayezid-sultan-who-struck-like-lightning-3214325?s=3">known for</a> acting faster than his enemies, striking before alliances formed, and crushing resistance with swift effectiveness. The naming approach sends a geopolitical message as loud as the missile itself.</p>
<p>Turkey’s pursuit of an advanced long-range missile capability reflects a broader shift in its strategic ambitions, regional influence, and state security priorities. Once seen as sufficient to defend NATO’s southeastern flank but not fit for EU membership, Turkey has increasingly sought to redefine itself as an independent geopolitical power. No longer willing to be merely a buffer state for Western interests, Ankara is actively transforming into an independent, assertive geopolitical power capable of shaping the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even Europe itself.</p>
<p>A key part of this transformation has been Turkey’s increasing focus on defense self-sufficiency, domestic military technology, and <a href="https://www.anixneuseis.gr/turkeys-defence-industrial-ambition-from-dependence-to-strategic-autonomy/">strategic autonomy</a>. Within this context, Turkey’s declared <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2026/05/turkey-rolls-out-intercontinental-missile-with-purported-6000km-range/">goal to develop long-range ballistic</a> capabilities, including at Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) levels, demands America’s full attention.</p>
<p>We may be witnessing the ultimate manifestation of a state seeking to decouple its sovereign interests in security and power projection from historical external arms dependence and traditional “alliance reliance” Western security guarantees.</p>
<p>Turkey’s missile ambitions are likely part of a broader effort to reduce its dependence on foreign defense suppliers that either <a href="https://nordicmonitor.com/2023/07/turkeys-defense-industry-suffers-from-undeclared-embargoes/">restrict access to advanced weapons</a> capabilities or sell suboptimal weapons systems that are difficult to integrate, costly to maintain, or are just ineffective. Turkish leaders have frequently expressed frustration with <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R44000/R44000.97.pdf">arms embargoes, sanctions</a>, and <a href="https://nordicmonitor.com/2023/07/turkeys-defense-industry-suffers-from-undeclared-embargoes/">restrictions</a> imposed by allies during political disputes. These tensions have accelerated Turkey&#8217;s investment in domestic aerospace, drone, missile, and satellite-launch industries, framing these programs as symbols of national sovereignty, technological progress, and strategic independence.</p>
<p>Concurrently, Turkey’s increasingly unstable security situation has incentivized its need for long-range deterrent capabilities. Ankara is not only positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, but it is also close to several regional flashpoints involving Ukraine, Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and ongoing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey desires increased geopolitical influence and greater operational freedom. Developing long-range missile systems, therefore, has both military and political importance, boosting deterrence and signaling Turkey’s rise as a regional power capable of independent strategic action. In short, Turkey intends to shape these challenges moving forward, and more autonomy is the price of leadership.</p>
<p>Turkey’s long-range missile development, fueled by its <a href="https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/news/news-from-turkey/pages/president-erdogan-unveils-turkiye-2030-industry-technology-strategy.aspx">National Technology Initiative</a>, is part of a larger investment in <a href="https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/we-want-to-maximize-our-technological-independence">civilian space and satellite launch</a> initiatives, which were officially presented as peaceful technological advancements designed to strengthen communications, scientific research, and national prestige. Turkey’s commitment to this effort is now on display in <a href="https://www.turkiyetoday.com/nation/turkiye-begins-construction-of-space-launch-facility-in-somalia-3211221">Somalia</a>, of all places, where it is constructing a spaceport to support future launch operations. The technologies required for satellite launch vehicles closely overlap with those needed for ballistic missile systems, including multi-stage rocket propulsion, precision guidance, and reentry vehicle engineering. As a result, advances in Turkey’s space program will expedite its long-range ballistic missile development.</p>
<p>Although Turkey does not possess nuclear weapons and is a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, occasional statements by <a href="https://nordicmonitor.com/2025/07/turkeys-fm-criticizes-nuclear-weapons-treaty-as-unjust-questions-turkish-endorsement/">Turkish officials criticizing</a> the global nuclear order have fueled international speculation that Turkey might seek its own nuclear arsenal in the future. Any ICBM <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2026/05/turkey-rolls-out-intercontinental-missile-with-purported-6000km-range/">capable of carrying</a> a 6,000-pound weapons payload over approximately 6,000 kilometers would have limited strategic value as a conventional weapon, but with a nuclear warhead, it would dramatically alter the strategic calculations across the region and beyond.</p>
<p>The possibility of a reduced American nuclear commitment to NATO Europe could increase Turkey’s importance in the same way. If European governments keep pushing Washington out of NATO, the result will be that Europe must pay for and <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-05/features/europe-moving-independent-nuclear-deterrent">develop its own nuclear capabilities</a>—another form of deterrence. France has introduced its <a href="https://warontherocks.com/disperse-to-survive-the-logic-of-french-forward-deterrence/">new doctrine of “forward deterrence,”</a> which <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/what-macrons-changes-to-french-nuclear-policy-mean-for-european-security/">advocates</a> for an expanded nuclear arsenal and a broader nuclear deterrence umbrella over all of Europe, but only under French operational control. Both <a href="https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/nuclear-bombs-poland-germany-weapons-3pwvwdwhz?msockid=3393505b86306ec71fdc452087506f0e">Poland and Germany</a> have conveyed interest in alternative nuclear arsenals to bolster European deterrence. In this context, Turkey could see its long-range missile capabilities as an opportunity to fill the deterrence gap identified by other NATO leaders and as a pathway toward future nuclear delivery capability if political circumstances change.</p>
<p>At the same time, Turkey’s pursuit of advanced missile systems could generate tensions within NATO if those capabilities are not carefully integrated into the alliance’s broader strategic framework. Some European allies may view Turkish missile development—and any potential future nuclear ambitions—as destabilizing, given Ankara’s sometimes contentious relationships with other NATO members. Such developments would inevitably raise questions regarding missile security, command-and-control arrangements, escalation risks, and about whether Turkey’s long-term strategic objectives remain fully aligned with broader alliance priorities.</p>
<p>Whether Turkey ultimately seeks to develop an arsenal of nuclear-armed ICBMs remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that Turkey’s long-range missile ambitions are real and appear to support both a broader long-term strategy of autonomous power projection and a more immediate effort to expand capabilities that could contribute to NATO’s evolving long-range strike and nuclear deterrence requirements.</p>
<p>Turkey’s growing missile capabilities reflect a clear strategic goal: to make itself an independent, technologically advanced, and influential military power in an increasingly unstable region; thereby, demonstrating that Turkey is not only a force to be reckoned with but also a partner to be allied with. Its growing missile ambitions reflect a strategic objective of establishing Turkey as an independent, technologically advanced, and regionally influential military power capable of operating with greater strategic autonomy in an increasingly unstable security environment. Turkey should not be viewed merely as a state to be reckoned with, but as an indispensable ally and arms supplier.</p>
<p>Colonel Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of <em>MCG Horizons LLC</em>, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has three decades of experience in uniform and DoD civil service and is the co-host of the weekly <em>The NIDS View</em> podcast. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and <em>MCG Horizons LLC</em>, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other affiliated organization.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Turkeys-ICBM-Ambition-for-Autonomy.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="209" height="58" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 209px) 100vw, 209px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/turkeys-icbm-ambition-for-autonomy/">Turkey’s ICBM: Ambition for Autonomy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>AI Paris Summit and Emerging Paradox of AI Haves and Have-Nots</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/ai-paris-summit-and-emerging-paradox-of-ai-haves-and-have-nots/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Huma Rehman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Apr 2025 11:54:22 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30505</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p> The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming industries, economies, societies, and global politics. However, this artificial intelligence and technological revolution also exacerbates existing competitions, creating a stark divide between states that are AI haves and AI have-nots. This digital divide is not just about access to technology but also about the ability to [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/ai-paris-summit-and-emerging-paradox-of-ai-haves-and-have-nots/">AI Paris Summit and Emerging Paradox of AI Haves and Have-Nots</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong> </strong>The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming industries, economies, societies, and global politics. However, this artificial intelligence and technological revolution also exacerbates existing competitions, creating a stark divide between states that are AI haves and AI have-nots.</p>
<p>This digital divide is not just about access to technology but also about the ability to harness AI’s potential for economic, social, and global political empowerment. The implications of the AI divide are leading to a tech race that impact geopolitical power dynamics, exacerbating competition major powers like the US, China, France, and India. Depending on how the race ends, it could swing the balance of power in a negative direction.</p>
<p><strong>AI Paris Summit</strong></p>
<p>The recent <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/en/sommet-pour-l-action-sur-l-ia">AI Action Summit</a> held in Paris emerged as a pivotal event that highlights both the opportunities and challenges associated with this evolving AI tech race. This summit serves as a beacon of innovation, encouraging <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/2527932/frances-macron-calls-for-equal-access-to-ai-for-all-nations">France</a> and India to collaborate more closely, while also exposing the complex interplay of international reactions, particularly from major powers like the United States, United Kingdom (UK), and China.</p>
<p>The summit focused on expanding AI’s boundaries while respecting environmental and ethical obligations. France’s President Emmanuel <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2025/02/11/statement-on-inclusive-and-sustainable-artificial-intelligence-for-people-and-the-planet">Macron</a> reaffirmed his nation’s commitment to AI innovation, while maintaining high regulatory standards that draw parallels to Notre Dame Cathedral’s restoration. Such a strategy will likely accelerate AI ventures and foster innovation.</p>
<p>However, the regulation proposed was also a noose around the neck of the summit’s emphasis—deregulation. It is worth considering whether drastic deregulation will lead to genuine advances or the weakening of certain crucial safety nets as the world grapples with how to handle ever expanding data and the fragmentation that result from the intersection of geopolitical interests and the private ownership of data and capability. The US and China approach the issue differently than Europe, whose <a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai">adoption of the AI Act</a> (2023) will see the first comprehensive AI regulation in the world.</p>
<p>Many wondered how agentic AI will impact the balance of power. Whether AI will have a net positive or negative effect is uncertain. The rate at which agentic AI is developed and adopted in the three main economic blocs of China, Europe, and the United States will determine much.</p>
<p><strong>India-France AI Alliance </strong></p>
<p>India and France are forming a partnership to leverage AI’s full potential globally, sharing knowledge, resources, and best practices to create a robust framework for AI initiatives and global dialogue. <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/frances-ai-action-summit">During the summit</a>, leaders from both countries addressed how their alliance could facilitate joint ventures, research collaborations, and talent exchange programs. <a href="https://in.ambafrance.org/India-France-will-harness-AI-s-potential-for-global-good">Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Macron foresaw</a> great potential for future cooperation in 2019 when they endorsed the <em>Indo-French Roadmap on Cybersecurity and Digital Technology</em>. India and France, founding members of the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, aim to develop a safe, open, secure, and ethical AI for human development and global commons.</p>
<p><strong>Global Reactions</strong></p>
<p>As the world watches the developments in Paris, reactions from other global powers, notably <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/reports/essay-reframing-the-us-china-ai-arms-race/why-us-china-ai-competition-matters/">China and the United States</a>, added another layer of complexity to the conversation around AI regulation and collaboration. In recent years, both states have invested heavily in AI research and development, seeing it as critical to their national security and economic competitiveness.</p>
<p>China’s approach to AI governance contrasts significantly with that of France and India. While the <a href="http://fi.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/kxjs/201710/P020210628714286134479.pdf">Chinese government</a> prioritizes rapid innovation with minimal regulatory oversight, this led to concerns about privacy, surveillance, and ethical implications. The US, on the other hand, grapples with debates around data privacy, corporate responsibility, and the potential for AI misuse. As a result, the responses from these two states illustrate differing philosophies about how best to harness AI’s potential while safeguarding public interests.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/feb/11/us-uk-paris-ai-summit-artificial-intelligence-declaration">The US and UK declined</a> to sign a declaration on “inclusive and sustainable” artificial intelligence at the Paris summit, in a blow to hopes for a concerted approach to developing and regulating the technology. The document was backed by 60 other signatories on February 11, 2025, including France, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/china">China</a>, India, Japan, Australia, and Canada.</p>
<p>The reactions from the relevant stakeholders highlight the urgent need for international cooperation and dialogue. As AI transcends borders, creating harmonized standards and frameworks could mitigate risks associated with its deployment.</p>
<p><strong>Opportunities and Challenges Ahead</strong></p>
<p>The summit concluded by emphasizing the need for proactive state engagement in AI regulation, prioritizing innovation while protecting individual rights and societal values. This, participants believed, would allow the world to fully capitalize on AI’s benefits.</p>
<p>As the world grapples with the realities of increasingly AI-driven technology, <a href="https://www.innovationaus.com/is-the-paris-ai-declaration-as-vulnerable-as-the-climate-accord/">the voices of diverse stakeholders</a>, including technologists, ethicists, policymakers, and civil society must be heard in shaping the future of AI. Under the flag of the AI Paris Summit, the India-France AI alliance is entering into a new and more unpredictable phase. By defying red tape and cultivating a spirit of cooperation, states are setting the pace for unlocking unprecedented opportunities while highlighting the inherent challenges of this transformative technology.</p>
<p><em>Huma Rehman is a project consultant, consultant, and defense and foreign affairs analyst. She can be reached at X @HumaRehman1.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/ai-paris-summit-and-emerging-paradox-of-ai-haves-and-have-nots/">AI Paris Summit and Emerging Paradox of AI Haves and Have-Nots</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Now That Trump Is Back, What Should Arab States Do?</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed ELDoh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Dec 2024 12:35:07 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Arab states]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[belt and road initiative]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[counterterrorism]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[houthis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-Middle East-Europe corridor]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Mohamed ElDoh ​]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29704</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Arab states already face a pivotal moment in shaping their foreign policy. Known for his transactional diplomacy and “America First” approach, Trump is likely to prioritize issues that directly benefit the US economy and enhance its strategic power, particularly vis-a-vis China and Russia. For Arab states, the [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/now-that-trump-is-back-what-should-arab-states-do/">Now That Trump Is Back, What Should Arab States Do?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Arab states already face a pivotal moment in shaping their foreign policy. Known for his transactional diplomacy and “America First” approach, Trump is likely to prioritize issues that directly benefit the US economy and enhance its strategic power, particularly vis-a-vis China and Russia.</p>
<p>For Arab states, the current situation in the Middle East, US, and regional Arab partners presents an opportunity to work on realigning strategic interests and unify stances on critical files, including but not limited to the conflict in Gaza and Lebanon, the rising tensions in <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/12/01/middleeast/syrian-regime-airstrikes-opposition-forces-intl/index.html">Syria</a>, Iran’s regional agenda, the war in Sudan, and the increasing instability in Africa. This is all made worse by Russia’s growing influence across the continent, including but not limited to Libya and West Africa.</p>
<p>There are three main pathways Middle Eastern governments should pursue in navigating the complex dynamics of Trump’s second term. These approaches can further enhance US-Arab cooperation.</p>
<p>First, they should strengthen regional security cooperation with the US. The Trump administration adopted a more “hands-off” approach during his first term, encouraging regional players to take greater responsibility for security issues. While this may seem advantageous, as it motivates America’s regional Arab partners to fortify their security frameworks, bolster the development of their defense capabilities, forge regional alliances, and cultivate rapid-response capabilities to manage intricate and intensifying threats, the region has never experienced such a high concentration of security risks and geopolitical tensions.</p>
<p>Accordingly, Trump’s return to the White House could significantly alter American engagement in Middle Eastern conflicts on a diplomatic as well as a military front. While Arab and American defense and security cooperation, particularly with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, steadily improved over the past several decades, escalating regional tensions necessitate closer security cooperation.</p>
<p>Furthermore, Arab states face multifaceted threats from non-state actors and cross-border insurgencies. The Houthis in Yemen, for instance, <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/cost-inaction-yemen">continue</a> to pose a serious risk through their use of drones, missiles, and other asymmetric tactics. Given the Trump administration’s prior backing of Saudi operations against the Iranian-backed Houthis, Arab states should use this time to rally support for a collective defense strategy.</p>
<p>This should involve the creation of a coalition to monitor Houthi activities in Yemen and across the Gulf, establish missile defense systems, and coordinate intelligence-sharing to counter both Houthi and Iranian influence in the region, which is likely to increase if not countered proactively. Regardless of the geopolitical context of the Houthis’ missile attacks on Israel, the firing capabilities they possess presents an existing threat to regional Arab states, especially those states perceived by Iran as American allies.</p>
<p>The situation with the Houthis in Yemen is even more complex than it seems. While it seems that Iran is the main influencer over the Houthis’ actions, <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/is-russia-helping-the-houthis-in-yemen-if-its-true-it-could-lead-to-a-major-problem-for-shipping/articleshow/115534358.cms?from=mdr">concerns</a> are growing over the possible support the Houthis are receiving from <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/07/russia-houthis-targeting-data-war-western-shipping-gaza/">Russia</a>. There is also a belief that Iran is facilitating negotiations with Russia to supply advanced missiles to the Houthis. If confirmed, this strategy already proved successful for Russia in West Africa. There, Russia succeeded in supplanting the West’s influence in the region. It appears that Russia is likely pursuing a similar strategy through the Houthis to expand its influence in the region surrounding the Red Sea.</p>
<p>The Red Sea remains strategically vital, not only for Arab states along its coast but for global energy markets and trade. With American forces taking the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/">lead</a> in trying to mitigate the Houthi threat to international maritime security, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will need to take a leading role in jointly securing these waters. Undoubtedly, the Red Sea requires enhanced security coordination. A joint Arab-Western naval task force could assist in patrolling shipping routes, countering smuggling and piracy, and monitoring hostile activities from Yemen. Establishing a formalized security alliance with a mandate to promptly respond to Red Sea threats would also empower Arab states to protect this vital trade route from disruptions caused by the escalating regional tensions.</p>
<p>Second, the Arab states should establish clear strategies for key regional conflicts. Trump already demonstrated a strong pro-Israel stance and a preference for rapid conflict resolution in areas like Syria and Yemen. Middle Eastern states should prepare for a Trump-led push toward “finishing” ongoing conflicts quickly. By articulating clear positions on key conflicts, Arab states can ensure their voices are considered in any accelerated diplomatic initiatives or negotiations aimed at de-escalating the rising tensions in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Iran’s influence in the Middle East remains a unifying concern for most of the Arab states, especially those in the Gulf. Trump previously adopted a “maximum pressure” policy against Iran, along with stricter sanctions and renewed efforts to isolate Tehran diplomatically. To capitalize on this stance, Arab states might consider forming a Gulf-led coalition that directly addresses Iran’s regional activities, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.</p>
<p>Iran is also trying to influence the conflict in <a href="https://gulfif.org/irans-concerted-efforts-to-secure-a-foothold-in-sudan/">Sudan</a> and other parts of Africa via different means, including the <a href="https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/evidence-iran-weapons-deliveries">supply</a> of drones. Enhanced joint counterterrorism programs, intelligence sharing, and military exercises with Arab, African, and Western states would ultimately improve their collective capacity to deter Iran’s influence and destabilizing operations.</p>
<p>Iran’s nuclear program remains a daunting issue. Iran continues to <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241122-iran-to-launch-advanced-centrifuges-in-response-to-iaea-censure">progress</a> its nuclear capability and may one day decide to break out of current restraints.</p>
<p>The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially the Gaza situation, remains a flashpoint with the potential to escalate regional instability given the growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Trump is likely to adopt a pro-Israel stance, perhaps further supporting Israel’s objectives in Gaza and across the West Bank, which could lead to intensified confrontations.</p>
<p>Arab states, especially those participating in the Abraham Accords, are likely to strike a delicate balance. Arab states will mostly maintain new alliances with Israel to counter Iran and its proxies in the Middle East while simultaneously supporting Palestinian civilian and humanitarian rights. Establishing diplomatic channels and regional communication frameworks dedicated to de-escalating potential violence in Gaza and supporting humanitarian efforts could prevent larger-scale disruptions.</p>
<p>Third, engage proactively with the US on trade and economic reforms. Trump’s “America First” policy often includes economic demands, which could translate into renewed expectations for favorable trade agreements or investments. Arab states should be ready to highlight their contributions to American economic interests, particularly in energy, infrastructure, and tech investments, including artificial intelligence and the acquisition of advanced defense and security platforms. By advancing reforms that make their markets more attractive to American investors, Arab nations can enhance their economic relationship with the US and position themselves as valuable trade partners, thus securing a foothold in Trump’s strategic calculus.</p>
<p>However, Trump’s likely shift to a more confrontational <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/29/china/trump-cabinet-picks-china-response-intl-hnk/index.html">stance</a> toward China could offer both challenges and opportunities. Middle Eastern states, particularly those heavily involved in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and oil exports, should prepare for potential pressures from Washington to limit Chinese economic influence. To balance these dynamics, Arab states could focus on diversifying alliances beyond the US-China dichotomy, enhancing relations with countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe.</p>
<p>That said, the ambitious India-Middle East-Europe corridor (IMEC) project announced during the 2023 G20 summit still holds great potential for regional integration and trade. Furthermore, the project which mainly involved India, Israel, Jordan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and the UAE has the full <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/us-uae-discuss-progress-on-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor/articleshow/113614959.cms?from=mdr">support</a> of the US. In this respect, despite the <a href="https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-india-middle-east-europe-corridor-challenges-ahead/">challenges</a> facing IMEC, it still presents an opportunity for all the involved nations to strategically engage with Trump on an economic front.</p>
<p>Understanding the internal divides within the US will be crucial for Arab states as they navigate the Trump administration. Trump’s “America First” base and his support among conservative Americans may reshape US foreign policy in ways that do not align with traditional Arab interests. By strengthening ties not only with Trump but also with Congress, local leaders, and both major US political parties, Arab states can foster a more balanced approach and create broader support for their long-term interests within American policy circles.</p>
<p>Trump’s return to the White House brings new opportunities and challenges for Arab states, particularly during a period of reshaping the region’s geopolitical power. By proactively engaging with the US, strengthening alliances, and enhancing their regional security frameworks, Arab nations can adapt to the changing American foreign policy landscape. In doing so, they will be better positioned to secure their interests and foster regional stability amid Trump’s renewed presidency.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Now-That-Trump-is-Back.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/now-that-trump-is-back-what-should-arab-states-do/">Now That Trump Is Back, What Should Arab States Do?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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