During the Cold War, deterrence centered on missiles, troop deployments, and nuclear escalation. Military power still matters enormously, but modern strategic competition increasingly unfolds far from conventional battlefields. Rival states now seek influence through weaker institutions, compromised elites, illicit financial systems, infrastructure dependence, and strategic corruption. In many cases, adversaries no longer need to defeat a country militarily to weaken its strategic position. 

This shift has blurred the line between governance problems and national security threats. Corruption no longer acts solely as a domestic political issue tied to ethics or economic inefficiency. Increasingly, it functions as strategic infrastructure that hostile states and aligned networks can exploit to gain influence, undermine institutions, and weaken deterrence from within. The result is a form of hybrid warfare that operates quietly below the threshold of conventional military conflict. 

Traditional military deterrence assumes that states seek to avoid direct escalation because the costs remain too high. Yet modern rivals increasingly prefer indirect approaches that create long-term political leverage without triggering military confrontation. Strategic corruption fits this model well because it weakens institutional resilience gradually and often without attracting immediate international attention. 

Infrastructure financing offers one example of this evolving landscape. Major infrastructure projects can generate economic growth, but opaque financing arrangements, weak procurement oversight, and political favoritism can also create long-term dependency and strategic leverage. Ports, telecommunications systems, energy infrastructure, and logistics hubs increasingly carry geopolitical significance alongside their economic value. Foreign influence over critical infrastructure may shape political decisions long before any military crises emerge. 

Illicit financial networks create additional vulnerabilities. Sanction evasion systems, offshore financial structures, and corruption-linked patronage networks allow authoritarian governments and criminal actors to preserve influence even under significant economic pressure. These systems often connect political elites, business interests, criminal organizations, and external state actors in ways that complicate accountability and obscure responsibility. 

The challenge becomes even more serious when state and non-state actors begin to overlap. Modern hybrid competition increasingly operates through networks rather than formal battle lines. Organized crime groups, private intermediaries, corrupt officials, and geopolitical rivals often interact inside the same gray zones. Those overlapping relationships make it harder to identify where criminal activity ends and strategic competition begins. 

The Western Hemisphere illustrates this problem clearly. Across parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, organized criminal groups now exert considerable influence over trafficking routes, local economies, migration systems, illicit mining operations, and even municipal governance. Criminal organizations often provide dispute resolution, employment, or social services that weak governments struggle to deliver. This creates fragmented sovereignty in which state authority exists unevenly across territories and institutions. 

These unstable environments create opportunities for external rivals seeking geopolitical access or influence. Weak oversight systems, corruption within procurement processes, and institutional distrust make states more vulnerable to strategic penetration. In these circumstances, foreign influence does not always arrive through military alliances or ideological movements. Instead , it emerges through infrastructure contracts, illicit finance, commercial dependency, or relationships with politically connected elites. 

Traditional deterrence frameworks struggle to address these dynamics because they still focus heavily on conventional military indicators. Defense planners understandably prioritize readiness, force posture, weapons modernization, logistics, and operational capability. These areas remain essential. However, military strength alone cannot fully protect states whose institutions face sustained internal erosion. 

States often weaken politically before they weaken militarily. Public distrust, elite fragmentation, corruption scandals, feeble judicial systems, and declining institutional legitimacy can reduce a government’s ability to respond effectively during periods of strategic pressure. Adversaries increasingly recognize this and exploit those vulnerabilities patiently over time. 

This problem extends beyond developing countries or fragile democracies. Advanced democracies also face growing concerns involving foreign influence operations, cyber-enabled corruption, disinformation campaigns, opaque lobbying networks, and strategic investments tied to geopolitical objectives. Hybrid competition increasingly targets the political and institutional foundations that support deterrence itself. As a result, national security discussions must broaden beyond military hardware and battlefield concepts alone. Deterrence depends not only on weapons systems, but also on institutional credibility, public trust, transparency, and political resilience. Governments that cannot maintain confidence in procurement systems, electoral institutions, judicial independence, or regulatory oversight may struggle to sustain strategic cohesion during periods of crisis. 

This reality does not mean every corruption scandal represents foreign subversion or hybrid warfare. Domestic political dysfunction often emerges from local conditions and internal failures. However, strategic rivals increasingly exploit those weaknesses opportunistically once they appear. Corruption creates openings that adversaries can leverage quietly and incrementally. 

The United States and its allies therefore need a broader understanding of deterrence in the twenty-first century. Military modernization remains necessary, particularly as rival powers continue expanding nuclear, cyber, and space capabilities. Yet strategic competition increasingly unfolds inside institutions as much as along borders or within contested seas. 

Institutional resilience should now be a centerpiece of national security planning. Strong oversight systems, transparent procurement practices, anti-corruption enforcement, independent courts, investigative journalism, and trusted public institutions all contribute to long-term strategic stability. These systems strengthen national resilience against both domestic corruption and external exploitation. 

In the emerging era of hybrid competition, states may not lose strategic position through invasion alone. They may lose it gradually through institutional erosion that weakens deterrence long before conventional conflict formally begins. 

Jeffery A. Tobin is a senior advisor and partner with Pan-American Strategic Advisors, conducting research on democracy, corruption, and institutional health. His work has appeared in outlets including Lawfare, Just Security, Foreign Policy in Focus, the Modern War Institute, and Small Wars Journal. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Strategic Corruption and the Future of Hybrid Warfare was originally published on Global Security Review.

Current responses, ranging from US, UK, and Israeli airstrikes to maritime task forces, aim to degrade the Houthis’ operational capabilities. Except for recent American bombing efforts, they have fallen short of effectively neutralizing the group’s capacity to pose a critical threat to maritime trade in the Red Sea as well as the wider threat of destabilizing the region.

What it would truly take to dismantle the Houthi threat, in a sustainable and strategic manner, requires a multi-dimensional, coalition-led effort that combines kinetic force, strategic isolation, regional realignment, and political recalibration. Many of these key strategic components are still missing in the current response to the Houthis’ actions.

The Houthi Threat: Tactical Capabilities, Strategic Leverage

Beginning in 2023, the Houthis began escalating their attacks against civilian and military vessels in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and even the Gulf of Aden—utilizing Iranian-supplied drones, cruise missiles, and unmanned suicide boats. These attacks achieved several objectives for the group and its backers in Tehran. First, the attacks successfully disrupted global shipping, raising insurance rates and negatively impacting Egypt’s Suez Canal, which saw a decrease of almost 60 percent of its annual revenue from $10.3 billion in 2023 to $4 billion in 2024. Second, the Houthis’ attacks provided a clear projection of Iranian deterrence without a confrontation with the US. Third, the attacks repositioned the Houthis as a pan-regional “resistance” actor, not merely a Yemeni faction.

Despite Israel’s effective strike on Yemen’s sea port of Hudaydah followed by another set of strikes a day later, including ones on the main airport in Sanaa, which probably prompted the Houthis to inform the US that they “don’t want to fight anymore,” the Houthi leadership still exists and their armed capabilities are far from degraded.

If anything is beneficial out of such ceasefire, it is only for the Houthis as it would ultimately allow them to reorganize their resistance and offensive capabilities. Furthermore, the Houthis’ obvious ballistic missile and drone capabilities pose a threat to Israel more than ever before.

The Inadequacy of Current Approaches

Western-led responses include airstrikes on Houthi launch sites, naval deployments like Operation Prosperity Guardian, and diplomatic pressure via the UN Security Council. Yet, these actions failed to produce long-term deterrence for four main reasons.

First, Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt, lack strategic unity regarding Yemen. Conflicting Arab views on how to engage the Houthi threat, along with differing opinions on the alignment of the US military response to the Houthis, are significantly limiting the effectiveness of the US efforts to degrade Houthi capabilities.

Second, Houthi adaptability and decentralized operations make targeting difficult. Houthi leadership, in several interviews, praised their unique structure and claimed it is different from that of Hamas and Hezbollah in terms of not relying on any communication technologies within the group and yet having a decentralized distribution in the mountains in Yemen.

Third, Iranian support continues uninterrupted through land and maritime smuggling. Reports from 2024 revealed that UN mechanisms failed to inspect most ships heading to Houthi-controlled ports.

Fourth, the proximity of civilian infrastructure to military targets limits the rules of engagement for Western forces. Furthermore, there is no insufficient political strategy to undercut Houthi legitimacy among Yemenis, and still, many of the Yemeni population appeal to the Houthi group. Based on the above, an effective strategy for neutralizing the Houthis’ capabilities requires escalation dominance across the military, economic, information, and political domains.

A Multi-Domain Campaign to Neutralize the Houthis

A shift to precision airstrikes by the United States was necessary, but more is needed. This includes high-value targeting of command-and-control (C2) nodes, drone operation sites, missile production sites, and technical assembly sites. Covert special operations strikes by Arab and American forces, to sabotage radar arrays, smuggling depots, and launchpads in areas like Al-Hudaydah and Sa’ada, is also needed.

Furthermore, border security cooperation from Oman is crucial in addition to placing an effective security cooperation framework with Eastern African states, where much of the Iranian weapons smuggling is taking place. Enforcement of naval dominance will occur through the establishment of exclusion zones in the Red Sea, supported by AEGIS destroyers and Gulf-based airpower.

Although the US Navy is taking the lead role in such functions, establishing a regional US-Arab naval cooperation is a key factor in eliminating the threats posed by the Houthis as well as further preventing the smuggling of weapons, missile components, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components to the Houthis via the sea. Cyber disruptions targeting the Houthis’ satellite navigation, drone-control networks, and internal communications is needed. This function is far more complex than it may appear, given that reports indicate that Russia supports the Houthis with targeting data.

Furthermore, it is also reported that the Houthi leadership coordinates directly with Chinese officials regarding safe passage for Chinese vessels. In addition to US sanctions against Chinese satellite and shipping firms, providing evidence that China’s technological support strengthens Houthi capabilities is needed.

Accordingly, effective US-Arab intelligence cooperation should be further enhanced to isolate Houthi access to foreign powers. This military approach must be continuous, not episodic, and paired with intelligence fusion centers involving the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egyptians.

Strategic Isolation of the Houthis from Iran

Without eliminating the Houthi connection to Tehran, no solution can succeed. This requires the interdiction of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps maritime routes, especially between the Bandar Abbas–Socotra–Horn of Africa corridor. Hence, the situation ultimately requires enhanced maritime domain awareness, including the use of satellites to ensure effective monitoring of vessels coming to Yemen, not to mention the essential need for regional security cooperation among all the nations surrounding these locations.

The financial isolation of the Houthis and associated members by pressuring banking entities and crypto exchanges that facilitate Iranian transfers to Houthis requires improvement. Continuously drying up the cash sources provided to the Houthis is a key factor in dismantling their operational capabilities. Additionally, increasing regional pressure on Oman to improve its border monitoring and security efforts is crucial for reducing overland routes used for arms and cash smuggling.

Overall, Iran’s support for the Houthis is part of its “ring of fire” doctrine. To dismantle this arc, the Houthis must be made a liability, not an asset, for Tehran.

Recalibrating the Regional Arab Response

Arab unity is a missing ingredient in the fight against the Houthis. A new Red Sea Defense Compact is required, comprising a joint command structure involving the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and, ultimately, Oman. Having a regional naval and airbase integration with a primary role for Egypt and Saudi Arabia would provide a forward-operating presence across the Red Sea. Given that Houthi disruption of Red Sea commerce and maritime passage directly threatens Egypt’s economic security, strategic re-engagement is particularly important. Such an arrangement would also create a strategic opportunity for a further deepening of US-Egypt defense cooperation and alignment of mutual regional interests.

The need for a Saudi-UAE reconciliation over Yemen’s future is essential, possibly via American mediation. Otherwise, even after neutralizing the Houthi threat, the region risks a politically unstable Yemen. If Arab states continue to act independently, they risk being played against each other, benefiting Iran and prolonging the conflict.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

What It Takes to Neutralize the Houthi Threat was originally published on Global Security Review.