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		<title>A Counterintelligence Profile: Are High-Fliers Ready?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-counterintelligence-profile-are-high-fliers-ready/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hamza Chaudhary]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 12:12:41 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32664</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: May 7, 2026 For the geopolitics of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), it is a time of great anxiety. With the non-Arab actors engaging in another tense series of regional infighting, coercive diplomacy and modern warfare have halted episodic interventions from the Arab counterparts. The MENA high-fliers have moved from their traditional [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-counterintelligence-profile-are-high-fliers-ready/">A Counterintelligence Profile: Are High-Fliers Ready?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: May 7, 2026</em></p>
<p>For the geopolitics of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), it is a time of great anxiety. With the non-Arab actors engaging in another tense series of regional infighting, coercive diplomacy and modern warfare have halted episodic interventions from the Arab counterparts. The MENA high-fliers have moved from their traditional stances of diplomatic arrangements and prioritized military readiness in the current spiraling crisis. For decades, the dominant challenge for the Arab nations has not been Israel’s aggression nor Iran’s ambitions, but their inability to sustain collective agreement in coalitions. The MENA region has seen countless alliances fracturing over the years, resulting in a region without one superpower. If the Gulf states continue to rely on the United States’ changing focus in the Middle East, it will end up losing more than its economic potency and military confidence. It will lose the ability to arrange the chessboard.</p>
<p>The inability of the Arab world to synchronize with its proximate neighbors has weakened the prospects of creating a counterintelligence structure in regional flare-ups. Is staying mutually vulnerable to modern intelligence operations a mistake worth repeating in traditional alliances?</p>
<p>To mitigate conflict spillovers, the Arab nations have prioritized active defense <a href="https://manaramagazine.org/2025/07/missile-defense-in-the-middle-east-a-smart-investment-that-must-evolve/">investments</a> and air denial <a href="https://thesvi.org/from-air-superiority-to-air-denial-the-global-turn-toward-integrated-air-defence-systems-iads/">practices</a>. Systematic <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/sponsors/2025/02/global-snapshot-middle-east-and-north-africa-defense-environment/402670/">defense</a> procurements have <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2025/07/27/arab-gulf-states-multilayered-air-defenses-are-all-battle-tested/">streamlined</a> their multi-domain operations to prevent entanglements, but out-spying Iran’s asymmetric warfighting or Israel’s intelligence warfare remains a political test. Israel’s intelligence <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/report-israel-hacked-tehran-traffic-cameras-to-track-khamenei-ahead-of-assassination/">directives</a> of movement profiling and persistent surveillance of the Supreme Leader highlight the necessity to advance intelligence methodologies. MENA’s defensive architecture requires an additional protective layer over deterrence: counterintelligence. Not <a href="https://www.thedailyjagran.com/world/why-dont-arab-and-muslim-countries-unite-to-support-iran-against-israel-5-reasons-10301373">synchronizing</a> against a common enemy caused several problems: domestic fracturing, outdated doctrines, historical distrust, and interoperability gaps. Investing rapidly in modern war equipment has erased the Arab world’s warfighting inferiority. Still, the mismatch continues to exist in indigenous productions of air defenses, military intelligence, and technical expertise. Despite inter- and intra-regional strategic <a href="https://strategyinternational.org/2025/10/09/publication207/">connections</a> existing as a starting point, the underlying factors of alliance fragmentation have increased.</p>
<p>Consistent <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190827-the-middle-east-strategic-alliance-is-just-another-marginalised-initiative/">strategic</a> differences are fracturing the prospects of political reconciliation and strategic retrospection. Facing multiple power projectors, shared security architecture has <a href="https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/how-the-gulf-states-can-navigate-the-middle-easts-new-alliance-politics/">reshaped</a> how the geography collaborates during political flare-ups. MENA’s high-fliers see this geography without one dominant actor. This vacuum has yet to be filled, but complete dominance requires incremental layering, which Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, and Iran seek. The Gulf’s current strategy to <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-890655">combine</a> deterrence with diplomacy has been met with historical, geopolitical tests. From Kuwait (1990) to Bahrain (2011), this geography has had its <a href="https://www.crownprince.bh/en/speech/1924/">fair share</a> of regional adventures. The fear of exposing warfighting weaknesses has halted political adventures in MENA. Aside from weak engagements in Yemen and Syria, and confused performances with Israel and Iran, the geopolitical awareness to arrange the Middle East offers a</p>
<p>complex silver lining. The ongoing crisis demands more than a <a href="https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/to-protect-its-strategic-interests-the-gulf-must-form-a-more-cohesive-bloc/">cohesive</a> block from the Gulf. Moving in line with other MENA actors invites multidimensional risks, gambles, and prospects in managing the evolving theater.</p>
<p>Israel’s <a href="https://politicsociety.org/2025/09/24/the-evolution-of-israeli-intelligence-in-the-technological-and-military-context/?lang=en">versatile</a> intelligence alters political <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-us-israel-regional-hezbollah-huthis/33693186.html">entanglements</a> for the Gulf. It introduced a hybrid wave of <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/opinion/5165943-israel-and-iran-usher-new-era-psychological-warfare">targeted</a> psychological operations (PSYOPS). The open <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2026-03-25/the-war-that-israel-never-loses-its-secret-services-once-again-carry-out-assassinations-in-iran.html?outputType=amp">presence</a> of Israel’s intelligence in the Middle East has resulted in its neighbors’ doctrinal fatigue. This ‘eye in the sky’ layering impacts the susceptibility, vulnerability, and recoverability of MENA’s doctrinal postures. It pushes the Persian Gulf to <a href="https://linkdood.com/how-technology-powering-new-digital-battlefield-in-the-persian-gulf/">enhance</a> battlespace in three settings: Iran’s <a href="https://www.inbarspace.com/missiles-intelligence-and-nukes-irans-arms-race-reaches-space/">predictive</a> intelligence, the Gulf’s <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/security-challenges-and-threats-gulf-0">threat</a> assessment, and <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/how-each-gulf-country-is-intercepting-iranian-missiles-and-drones/">integrated</a> weapons systems. Still, the <a href="http://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/1/7/why-doesnt-the-middle-east-have-a-nato">absence</a> of collective military intelligence and interoperability is glaring.</p>
<p>To keep a watchful eye on regional aggressors, the Gulf adopted a <a href="https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/02/08/analysis-gulf-defense-industry-shifts-buyer-manufacturer/">threefold</a> approach, by formalizing passive defense, security clusters, and proactive diplomacy. With multiple doctrines, MENA struggles to <a href="https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/why-does-the-arab-world-fear-the-blue-and-white/">succeed</a> in collectively <a href="https://www.thestandard.com.hk/world/article/311619/Iran-and-Egypt-lead-push-for-NATO-style-alliance-in-Middle-East-at-emergency-Islamic-summit">preserving</a> power, let alone <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/cmt/middle-east-north-africa/united-arab-emirates/myth-emerging-mideast-nato">projecting</a> it. Be it Iran or Israel, a common pattern in the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) strategic behavior was observed. It preferred<a href="https://alhurra.com/en/7633"> personalized</a> military innovations and <a href="https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/saudi-pakistan-defense-deal-rewiring-the-kingdoms-gulf-strategy/">investments</a>, while securing inter-regional <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/27/zelenskyy-saudi-visit-us-troops-middle-east-iran-ukraine-aid-shahed-drones.html">strategic</a> alliances. From the Levant to North Africa, the GCC to Iran, and Tukey to the broader Middle East, this reality articulated the <a href="https://www.iemed.org/publication/regional-powers-in-a-transforming-middle-east/">disconnected</a> objectives. However, the Gulf’s common direction to domestically upgrade remained constant, and it offers three scenarios for a future strategy.</p>
<p>First, to become innovative by forming a layered intelligence coalition with regional military sectors in different geographical quadrants, making <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-israels-famed-intelligence-agencies-have-always-relied-on-help-from-their-friends-264818">Five Eyes</a> a blueprint to align domains, departments, and systems. Second, to continue <a href="https://www.deloitte.com/middle-east/en/Industries/government-public/perspectives/gcc-creation-localized-defense-industry.html">investing</a> in personalized, ad-hoc <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/15/global-arms-transfers-level-off-but-middle-east-imports-grow">security</a> investments before <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2632756">active</a> defense localization. In the current situation, this strategy <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/gulf/5256035-gulf-defenses-continue-confront-iranian-threats-high-efficiency">provided</a> the Gulf with ample psychological and operational confidence to fuse other arrangements together. Third, use the <a href="https://icds.ee/en/the-shifting-patterns-of-alliances-in-the-middle-east-surveying-the-fluid-geostrategic-landscape/">previous</a> geopolitical arrangements of MENA to innovate. The Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) was the rump administration’s <a href="https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/the-middle-east-strategic-alliance-uphill-struggle">idea</a> to bring the Arab states together for a joint cause: unifying against Iran. The Qatar blockade and Egypt’s <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/israels-attack-on-qatar-and-the-failure-of-gcc-defense-cooperation/">withdrawal</a> soured the idea MESA became a memory. Therefore, the prospects of coordination by cross-regional powers require a consensus.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/why-arab-states-now-oppose-us-israel-attack-iran">Currently</a> the urgency to upgrade counterintelligence structures is neither lacking incentives nor temptations. The urgency to innovate in multiple spheres of traditional power is a matter of strategic inevitability. MENA has found a cogently balanced geostrategy to maneuver in multidirectional geopolitical dimensions. Natural resources, chokepoints, and trade passages give significant bargaining chips to MENA. It has shaped its strategic profile to constructively depend on geostrategic positioning. Using traditional elements of power with natural commonalities and conditionalities offers alliance politics. In a not-so-friendly neighborhood, finding common ground remains an Achilles &#8216; heel. Bringing elements of confidence-building from <a href="https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/816888">inter-regional</a> coalition lessons is one go-to strategy.</p>
<p><em>Muhammad Hamza Chaudhary is a student of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan. He has published his work in the </em><em>Small Wars Journal, Modern Diplomacy, and the Center for Strategic and Contemporary Research (CSCR). The views of the author are his own.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-counterintelligence-profile-are-high-fliers-ready/">A Counterintelligence Profile: Are High-Fliers Ready?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Beyond the Atmosphere: Strengthening US Space Deterrence in a Contested Domain</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/beyond-the-atmosphere-strengthening-us-space-deterrence-in-a-contested-domain/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brandon Toliver]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 17 Feb 2025 13:14:37 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>In November 2021, Russia launched an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test that destroyed one of its own defunct satellites. This act generated thousands of pieces of space debris. It also underscored a growing reality; space is no longer a sanctuary but a contested warfighting domain. As adversaries such as China and Russia develop counterspace capabilities, the [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/beyond-the-atmosphere-strengthening-us-space-deterrence-in-a-contested-domain/">Beyond the Atmosphere: Strengthening US Space Deterrence in a Contested Domain</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In November 2021, Russia launched an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test that destroyed one of its own defunct satellites. This act generated thousands of pieces of space debris. It also underscored a growing reality; space is no longer a sanctuary but a <a href="https://swfound.org/counterspace/">contested warfighting domain</a>. As adversaries such as China and Russia develop counterspace capabilities, the United States must <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/defense-against-dark-arts-space-protecting-space-systems-counterspace-weapons">strengthen its space deterrence</a> strategy to ensure security, stability, and freedom of operation in orbit.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/56003/chapter-abstract/440992395?redirectedFrom=fulltext">challenge is clear</a>; adversaries are developing ASAT weapons, electronic warfare capabilities, and cyber threats that can disable American satellites—disrupting military operations, global communications, and economic stability. Without a robust deterrence framework, adversaries are emboldened to target space infrastructure. To counter these threats, the US must enhance resilient space architectures, strengthen policy frameworks, and refine operational doctrine to deter and, if necessary, defeat adversarial actions in space.</p>
<p><strong>Resilient Space Architectures: Hardening the Backbone of American Space Operations</strong></p>
<p>One of the most effective deterrence measures is making space assets more difficult to target and replaceable, if attacked. The United States is shifting from large, centralized satellite systems to disaggregated and proliferated constellations, reducing the risk posed by any <a href="https://www.ida.org/research-and-publications/publications/all/g/gl/global-trends-in-space-situational-awareness-ssa-and-space-traffic-management-stm">single point of failure</a>. The Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA), led by the Space Development Agency, aims to deploy a network of small, low-cost satellites that provide redundancy, making it harder for adversaries to cripple American space capabilities with a single strike.</p>
<p>Additionally, on-orbit servicing, maneuverable satellites, and rapid launch capabilities enhance resilience. SpaceX’s Starlink and the Rapid Agile Launch Initiative ensure that the US can quickly replenish space assets, <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203016640/astropolitik-everett-dolman">denying adversaries</a> the ability to achieve lasting effects through space attacks. By maintaining a dynamic, self-healing space architecture, the US strengthens deterrence by signaling that any attempted disruption will be ineffective.</p>
<p><strong>Counterspace Capabilities: Strengthening Active and Passive Defenses</strong></p>
<p>While resilience is key, deterrence also requires credible counterspace capabilities to impose costs on adversaries. The US Space Force and other defense agencies are <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctv1453js4">investing in defensive counterspace measures</a>, such as jamming-resistant communications, maneuverable satellites, and cyber-hardened space systems to protect critical assets.</p>
<p>At the same time, the US must maintain offensive counterspace capabilities as part of a deterrence posture. This includes electronic warfare tools to disrupt enemy satellite operations, rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) for on-orbit inspection and intervention, and ground-based kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to neutralize hostile space threats. By demonstrating both defensive resilience and credible response options, the US reinforces deterrence by denial and punishment.</p>
<p><strong>Policy and Alliances: Strengthening Space Norms and Collective Security</strong></p>
<p>A strong policy framework and allied cooperation bolster deterrence by shaping adversary behavior and reinforcing international stability. The Artemis Accords, a multinational agreement on responsible space conduct<a href="https://www.routledge.com/Space-Warfare-in-the-21st-Century-Arming-the-Heavens/Johnson-Freese/p/book/9781138693883?utm_source=cjaffiliates&amp;utm_medium=affiliates&amp;cjevent=a70deaf2e33011ef83a903860a1eba24">, establish norms that promote transparency and discourage hostile activities</a>. The US must continue leading diplomatic efforts to build consensus on space security standards, making aggressive actions politically and strategically costly for adversaries.</p>
<p>Additionally, alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), partnership with the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the US), and Five Eyes intelligence network provide collective security in space. The Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative, which includes Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the UK, and the US, enhances shared situational awareness and rapid coordination in space crisis scenarios. By integrating allied capabilities, the US deters adversaries by presenting a unified, multinational response to any hostile space activity.</p>
<p><strong>Space Domain Awareness: Gaining the Tactical Advantage</strong></p>
<p>Deterrence depends on knowing when and where threats emerge. The US Space Force and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) are advancing Space Domain Awareness (SDA) through advanced radar systems, AI-powered surveillance, and persistent monitoring of space objects. Programs like the Deep Space Advanced Radar Concept (DARC) and the Space Surveillance Telescope provide real-time tracking of adversary satellite maneuvers, ensuring that hostile actions do not go undetected.</p>
<p>By integrating AI and machine learning, the US can predict and respond to potential threats before they escalate. Improved SDA capabilities deny adversaries the element of surprise, reinforcing deterrence by ensuring that any aggressive move is immediately identified and countered.</p>
<p><strong>Military Space Operations: Defining Rules of Engagement</strong></p>
<p>To deter and defeat adversary actions, the US must develop clear space warfighting doctrine and operational concepts. The Space Force’s “competitive endurance” strategy emphasizes continuous engagement with adversaries to counter gray zone tactics, such as cyber intrusions, satellite blinding, and electromagnetic interference. Establishing clear rules of engagement for responding to hostile actions in space strengthens deterrence by ensuring decisive and proportional responses when necessary.</p>
<p>Additionally, the integration of space with multi-domain operations ensures that any adversary attack on space assets is met with cross-domain retaliation, whether in cyber, air, land, or sea. This raises the stakes for adversaries, reinforcing deterrence by making space conflict an unattractive option.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion: A Comprehensive Approach to Space Deterrence</strong></p>
<p>The US must pursue a multi-layered strategy to deter and defeat adversary actions in space. Resilient architectures, credible counterspace capabilities, strong alliances, superior space domain awareness, and well-defined military operations are essential to ensuring freedom of action in space and securing national security interests. As space becomes increasingly contested, the ability to deter, detect, and defeat threats will determine whether the US maintains its strategic advantage beyond the atmosphere.</p>
<p><em>Brandon Toliver, PhD, is an engineer and career civil servant with the Department of the Air Force. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the US Air Force. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. </em></p>
<p><em> <a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Beyond-the-Atmosphere.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29719" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="346" height="96" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 346px) 100vw, 346px" /></a></em></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/beyond-the-atmosphere-strengthening-us-space-deterrence-in-a-contested-domain/">Beyond the Atmosphere: Strengthening US Space Deterrence in a Contested Domain</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Allied Contributions for Combined Space Operations and Deterrence</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/allied-contributions-for-combined-space-operations-and-deterrence/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/allied-contributions-for-combined-space-operations-and-deterrence/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Robert Atchison]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Jan 2024 13:07:40 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Space Deterrence & Conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ASAT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[five eyes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Royal Air Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[space deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=26805</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The United States is acknowledged as the global leader in both military and commercial space. Today’s geopolitical landscape is multipolar due to the rise of China as a potential rival to American space dominance. While the US maintains strong alliances, China has few allies it can use to achieve its aims. Instead, China resorts to [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/allied-contributions-for-combined-space-operations-and-deterrence/">Allied Contributions for Combined Space Operations and Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The United States is acknowledged as the global leader in both military and commercial space. Today’s geopolitical landscape is multipolar due to the rise of China as a potential rival to American space dominance. While the US maintains strong alliances, China has few allies it can use to achieve its aims. Instead, China resorts to coercion to achieve its terrestrial and space objectives. For the US to deter threats more effectively in space, in the long term, it must integrate like-minded nations to share the deterrence burden.</p>
<p>Today we see America’s allies supporting the fundamental rights of access to space and its derived services. The <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-push-for-landmark-un-resolution-to-agree-responsible-behaviour-in-space#:~:text=The%20UK%20is%20leading%20the,that%20could%20have%20catastrophic%20consequences.">United Kingdom</a> (UK) leads work in the United Nations to create a space norms of behavior mandate that will enable the UN to hold irresponsible nations accountable for their behavior. Holding nations accountable is vital. <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-03/features/russias-anti-satellite-weapons-asymmetric-response-us-aerospace-superiority">Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/saltzman-chinas-asat-test-was-pivot-point-in-space-operations/">China</a> are deploying anti-satellite (ASAT) and direct energy weapons (DEW) that can target commercial and military space infrastructure. The <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/22/2002942522/-1/-1/0/CSPO-VISION-2031.PDF">Combined Space Operations</a> (CSPO) Vision’s role is to develop and share a common understanding of military space operations and policy. It is a critical framework that serves as a foundation for such allied enforcement mechanisms. It recently expanded to include Italy, Japan, and Norway.</p>
<p>These new initiatives are not just a good idea, they are threat driven and a reaction to adversarial space activity that threatens allied space infrastructure. ASAT deployments and rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) by China and Russia are of concern and the aggressor nations must be held to account—through strong allied military and political efforts. Attempts to reduce the risk of misunderstandings on orbit are also of paramount importance, because the United States does not want a Cuban Missile Crisis in space.</p>
<p>UK Space Command was created in April 2021 to act as the single UK military voice in allied enforcement efforts, and rather than duplicating American capabilities UK Space Command seeks to supplement American systems by enhancing resilience. This can be multifaceted. It can include the addition of novel sensors as well as increasing satellite communication capacity. CSPO members also provide capabilities that increase resilience and operational effectiveness. A few examples are instructive.</p>
<p>First, the UK and US share <a href="https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/articles/celebrating-60-years-of-raf-fylingdales/">Royal Air Force (RAF) Base Fylingdales</a> in Yorkshire. This base combines missile warning and space surveillance at one place. In addition, RAF space operators and planners have been leveraged in numerous command-and-control facilities worldwide, including US Space Command and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The UK is a leader in providing satellite communications’ capabilities to NATO through the SKYNET constellation.</p>
<p>Second, Australia, like the UK, has a <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook47p/OngoingMilitarisationSpace#:~:text=Australia%27s%20decision%20to%20establish%20the,%2C%20Sputnik%20I%2C%20in%201957.">Defence Space Command</a> and a civilian space agency working in unison. This civilian and military relationship ensures that if an adversary were to attack a commercial satellite the military could act to defend it. Australia has gone further to align itself to American space deterrence and warfighting capabilities by declaring possession of <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2023/03/aussie-space-command-looks-to-electronic-warfare-other-tech-to-deter-attacks-on-satellites/">offensive space control</a> capabilities. These capabilities are important to maintain credibility in the minds of adversaries. China maintains an “attack to deter” mindset, and without such capabilities the credibility of extended deterrence in space is lost.</p>
<p>Third, Canada contributes additional space situation awareness (SSA) capabilities, an example being their Sapphire satellite which feeds into several US and allied SSA systems. As is the case with the UK and Australia, Canada also contributes skilled space professionals to American and allied space commands, staffs, and space robotic systems to enhance resiliency in the face of threats in, from, and to space.</p>
<p>In addition to the “Five Eyes” partnership, NATO is a vital organization for deterrence in space and on earth. Article 5, and the commitment to collective defence, is one of the most potent forms of deterrence in place in any military alliance around the world and is applicable to elements of space infrastructure. To enhance NATO’s operational support to deterrence capabilities it established the <a href="https://www.space-coe.org/">NATO Space Centre of Excellence</a> in France and the NATO <a href="https://ac.nato.int/missions/we-coordinate-nato-space-matters">Space Operations Centre</a> in Germany. These initial steps enable NATO military commanders and political leaders to deter attacks on the critical space systems that enable successful terrestrial operations. For NATO to deter it must act upon the call for defensive capabilities and communicate coherently about rising threats. Failure to do so will erode the alliance’s unified front and therefore its credibility.</p>
<p>Deterrence in space is hard but by integrating the evolving capabilities of allies at a greater depth deterrence can be achieved not only in space but across all domains. The rise of allied space commands, capability integration, and enhancements of resiliency will only grow in importance as space expands its reach into the day to day lives of our peoples and societies.</p>
<p><em>Major Robert Atchison QRH is a British Army officer who serves as the Military Assistant to Commander of UK Space Command.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/allied-contributions-for-combined-space-operations-and-deterrence/">Allied Contributions for Combined Space Operations and Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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