It was not until June 6, 1944, four years later, that the allies landed on the Normandy coast. Over 200,000 troops, in a 48-hour period, in the largest amphibious operation in history, stormed the beaches to do what the Germans thought impossible. Eight months later, Germany was defeated.

The cost was high, however. With the German Army facing little opposition in the Rhineland, Austria, or Czechoslovakia, the German invasion West into the low countries and France was easy. Western Europe fell in a matter of three months from April to June 1940. At the end of the day, once deterrence was lost, World War II led to the death of over 60 million people. Getting deterrence back was a tough proposition.

In 1949, the United States withdrew its military from the Republic of Korea. Then, in January 1950, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, asserted that the Republic of Korea (ROK) was beyond the US defense perimeter. In early June, the US Congress approved an aid package for the ROK, but it was not delivered until after the North Korean invasion that began on June 25, 1950. Undermining American deterrence of North Korea with Acheson’s speech ultimately cost 2 million Korean lives and nearly 200,000 allied casualties.

Although the US was able to reestablish deterrence in Korea seven decades later, in 2014, the United States lost effective deterrence once again—this time in Europe. That was the year Washington declared that Ukraine was not of interest to the United States, leaving Ukraine to the tender mercies of the Russian Army. Russia soon took Crimea and ultimately launched a brutal invasion in 2022.

In 2021, the US withdrew ignobly from Afghanistan, further signaling the nation’s enemies that the US was not in the deterrence business. The consequences of that act are still unknown.

Later in 2021, the administration hesitated in making it clear whether Washington would or would not defend Ukraine from further Russian aggression. Though the mistake was later rectified, the damage to deterrence was done.

Further harm came to Ukraine, the US, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) European member states when it became clear Washington was fearful of a Russian escalation of the conflict should the allies get serious about pushing back against Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly threatened the use of nuclear weapons should Ukraine and the allied coalition get serious about rolling back Russia’s aggression—the successful use of Russian deterrence.

To counter the American loss of deterrence, Congress agreed to markedly increase defense spending and investments in America’s nuclear deterrent, space capability, and missile defense. Over time, and coupled with a sense of urgency, the United States can restore deterrence if these new investments are sustained.

The nation’s legacy nuclear deterrent, which is now between 35 to 65 years old, will soon age to obsolescence. The Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), and the B21 Raider strategic bomber, along with the long-range nuclear cruise missile, once built, will markedly restore nuclear deterrence. An improved theater nuclear deterrent, with a new sea-launched nuclear cruise missile and a stand-off nuclear capability for the F-35, would also significantly improve deterrence.

These systems give the nation the capability required to deter China and Russia. However, the second part of deterrence is will. Whether the United States has the will to employ its deterrent capability is uncertain.

How the administration handles Iran will say a great deal about how adversaries see American will. The administration is committed to preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Washington said you could do this the easy way or the hard way. A negotiated deal is one way but military strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is the other.

With the Israelis and Americans on the same page and the war already begun, the die is now cast and the US does not have endless patience. But whether it is willing to use military force is uncertain. Although Henry Kissinger once said that diplomacy without the threat of force is without effect, the conventional wisdom in Washington is that no military action will be forthcoming.

The Trump administration carefully laid out a challenge to the Iranians. There were 60 days for negotiations. Now, it is widely known that on day 61 the Israelis, with US missile and air defense assistance, took out most of the above ground Iranian nuclear capability as well as the top Iranian nuclear leadership.

Perhaps Israeli deterrence credibility was restored, but whether that is true of the United States is far less certain. The Trump administration did what it said it would do. The Israelis did what they had to do. Both nations did what was necessary to restore deterrence. The Iranian nuclear capability is gone. How this will affect Chinese and Russian aggression, that requires more insight.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Restoring Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

From the perspective of the United States government and the US Air Force (USAF), awarding the contract to Boeing is a welcome choice since it ensures that there are at least two fighter manufacturers left in the United States; there were dozens at the end of the World War II. This means that the production of fighter aircraft is no longer a seller’s market as when the USAF shortsightedly awarded both the F-22 and F-35 contracts to Lockheed, which effectively gave leverage to that corporation.

Now, by awarding the contract to Boeing, the Trump administration ensured that there will be multiple players in the combat aircraft manufacturing sector. Keep in mind, Northrop Grumman is manufacturing the B-21 stealth bomber. This leaves three prime contractors making combat aircraft.

The decision is also a good one because other nations are developing their own sixth-generation aircraft. The French and the Germans are collaborating on a Future Combat Air System while Britain and Japan are in a partnership to develop their own aircraft. The United States, therefore, could not afford to be left behind in this technological race.

Further, the fact that the F-47, as the plane is designated, is to be mated with a semi-autonomous drone is a welcome outcome because this acts as a force multiplier and gives the country an export drone for partners. For the record, it is time to stop playing to the egos of pilots and labeling drones as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). The Russians and Ukrainians have no problems with nomenclatures and, instead, use drones to effectively carry out combat operations.

The Boeing award does not mean Lockheed is now left to languish. The production of the F-35 will, unless terminated, continue into the 2040s. Lockheed also continues to benefit from the excellent record and affordability of the F-16 Viper. Despite attempts to close the production line or move it offshore (India is one favored destination) the jet has proved to be so popular with partner air forces that Lockheed has a backlog of 128 fighters at its Greenville, South Carolina, plant and sees the potential for the sale of up to 300 aircraft worldwide.

While the F-47 is a welcome addition to the future arsenal of the USAF, it will be hugely expensive as it will cost in the hundreds of millions of dollars, thus making a large buy difficult.  One should remember that the original plan was to buy over 800 F-22s but cost escalation led to only 187 aircraft being procured. Thus, it is likely that a small number of these airplanes will be purchased, leaving the USAF to figure out how to maintain its force levels in the face of escalating cost.

The former Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. (Ret.) Charles Brown Jr., had an answer when he suggested that the force needed a high-low mix of aircraft saying that you do not drive your Ferrari to work every day. Brown was calling for a low-end fighter that could carry out the day-to-day missions which are currently fulfilled by the F-16. Yet building new F-16s, he argued, was not an option since it was too difficult to upgrade the aircraft with modern software, hence the requirement for a clean sheet design.

A low-end fighter still makes sense, because the United States must maintain squadron numbers which is difficult to do with expensive aircraft like the F-35 and the future F-47. And this might be a project for Lockheed, giving the company another incentive to remain in the fighter aircraft game.

The problem for many allies is that they cannot afford a fourth-generation-plus fighter. This leaves a hole for the Chinese and Russians to fill. The time has come, therefore, to go back to a 1960s idea of an export fighter. In those days it was the F-5 Freedom Fighter. The plane was sold in Asia and even Switzerland and for decades served in the air forces of these nations.

The United States, in its current arsenal of F-16s, F-15s, and F-35s does not have a plane that could be an affordable fighter. It is developing an excellent candidate to serve in this role—the T-7 Red Hawk trainer. The USAF is committed to acquiring 351 of these aircraft, which will allow for an economy of scale to make the aircraft an affordable fighter for the world. If the aircraft is upgraded with a basic radar and the ability to deliver weaponry, and perhaps a more powerful engine, it would be highly competitive in the global fighter market. Boeing does have plans to convert the plane into an export fighter (provisionally labeled the F-7) but this would require a policy choice by the Trump administration to fund this modification.

The fact is that friendly nations would like to buy American since it helps build the relationship with the United States and reinforces American security interests in some of these countries—Latin American countries are a case in point given their limited military budgets.  Even a country like Brazil with its indigenous aircraft industry could be tempted by an F-7, which would be the low-end complement to its Gripens.

In the end, the F-47 is a welcome development, but the United States needs to look after its allies. They have the requirements for a new fighter but lack the budgets to buy expensive state-of-the-art aircraft.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Sixth-Generation Fighter: A First Step to a New Generation of Airpower was originally published on Global Security Review.

Some commentators believe the submarine launched nuclear cruise missile (SLCM-N) is a better approach. Others believe the existing low-yield submarine launched ballistic missile (W76-2) and the new air launched cruise missile are all that is needed to assure allies well into the future.

One issue with the W76-2 is the fact that an adversary cannot tell the difference between a low- or high-yield weapon until after it detonates. The low-yield cruise missile element avoids that problem but only offers a unilateral American solution to potential NATO inability to quickly responding with observably non-strategic nuclear weapons.

The former Polish prime minister’s recent comments about his desire to host nuclear weapons in Poland, was based on his concern that conventional forces may fail to convince Russia that Poland has the will or capability to retaliate to Russian aggression. When then-prime minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, said he wants to “act quickly”  to begin hosting US nuclear weapons, it was this concern that drove his thinking, which leads back to the opening proposition; build the needed facilities.

Alternatively, the Biden administration made a non-weapon based assurance move with South Korea by involving them more in nuclear planning. The development of military facilities for nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles is, however, a way for allies to draw attention to their willingness to respond to existential or nuclear attack, which can be done almost entirely on their own.

If Poland, South Korea, or other US nuclear umbrella beneficiaries are serious about sending a stronger message to their adversaries (and the United States) they can demonstrate resolve through the suggested defense spending. Constructing weapons storage and security system (WS3)sites with the same, or greater, security and survivability as those built across Central Europe in the 1980s eliminates at least one argument against direct participation in nuclear sharing.

Specific design criteria necessary to calculate just how survivable WS3 sites are or how much the cost to build is of course classified. A feel for cost from publicly available congressional testimony is possible. Government accountability office products and a blue ribbon panel report. Congressional testimony puts nuclear weapon storage improvements at about $50 million per base, each with several individual nuclear storage units. This is in line with the cost of building new F-35 hardened shelters. At least a thousand hardened shelters already exist across Europe and the Pacific, so the actual cost for adding just the WS3 element might actually be lower.

The presence of American nuclear weapons on NATO territory is what sets it apart from other bilateral extended deterrence promises. Although German officials publicly talk about removing nuclear weapons from their territory to reduce the chances of becoming a nuclear target, the idea is always rejected. However, just voicing this opinion begs the questions, would Germany allow allies to sortie nuclear weapons from their airbases and, more importantly, is that friction exploitable? The Morawiecki  seemed to think so. The most credible threat of nuclear retaliation is of course for the Poles to have their own nuke, but that is neither plausible nor desirable for all involved.

The next most credible threat would be Polish pilots flying Polish F-35s out of Polish airfields to deliver NATO assigned weapons requiring the United States do nothing but provide the codes. The same logic would apply in Asia, improving deterrence for South Korea, Japan, or even Singapore. Because the F-35 was born nuclear capable, each country with a squadron of them and WS3 sites is just one US policy decision and a nuclear code box away from being able to deliver a nuclear strike.

Training all NATO F-35 pilots to deliver nuclear weapons was recently recommended as a low-cost means of improving deterrence. Even if NATO stores no greater number of weapons nor are any re-introduced to the Pacific, the simple fact that capability improved sends a “clear and visible signal” of partner resolve. Partners who build WS3 sites and already have F-35s take virtually all the cost, time, and training issues out of hosting American nuclear weapons.

Building a WS3 site is not only about sharing the financial burden, but it also shows backbone by making one’s airfields an even more important target for the adversary trying to take even one inch of territory. Bringing (almost) all the necessary elements of a nuclear retaliatory capability within one’s border virtually eliminates the age-old worry of whether the US is willing to trade New York for Paris. It is true that extended deterrence partners may have to do without one or even two F-35s to afford the several WS3 sites necessary to preclude their easy targeting. But spending that money and accepting the risk shows that America’s partners see credible nuclear retaliation as valuable.

Even without weapons in hand, simply having nuclear certified storage capacity turns F-35 partner nations into nascent nuclear self-defense capable states. This approach costs the US nothing, discourages nuclear technology proliferation, and does not necessitate expanding American stockpiles.

Partner nations building WS3 sites go a long way toward showing their belief in the value of nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing. Increasing the number of targets an aggressor must destroy to deny nuclear retaliation decreases the likelihood of the aggressor going nuclear in the first place.

Perhaps fielding a slew of secure and hardened nuclear weapons storage sites is a deterrence dream, but if they build them, perhaps the weapons will come. At worst this investment creates a classical deterrence threat by leaving something to chance with the future “upload” possibility for a more amenable American presidential administration.

If You Build It, They Might Come was originally published on Global Security Review.