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		<title>Hollow Ranks &#038; Ghost Soldiers: Nigeria&#8217;s Corruption-Fueled Security Collapse</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/hollow-ranks-ghost-soldiers-nigerias-corruption-fueled-security-collapse/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/hollow-ranks-ghost-soldiers-nigerias-corruption-fueled-security-collapse/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arman Sidhu]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2026 12:15:09 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: May 11, 2026 Nigeria’s worsening security crisis is, at its core, a story of military breakdown. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) overran at least 15 military bases in 2025, captured and executed a brigadier general, and deployed armed drones that outmatched the defending units. The pattern of base overruns, mass desertions, and [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hollow-ranks-ghost-soldiers-nigerias-corruption-fueled-security-collapse/">Hollow Ranks &#038; Ghost Soldiers: Nigeria&#8217;s Corruption-Fueled Security Collapse</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: May 11, 2026</em></p>
<p>Nigeria’s worsening security crisis is, at its core, a story of military breakdown. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/lake-chad-basin-s-military-bases-in-iswap-s-crosshairs">overran</a> at least 15 military bases in 2025, captured and executed a brigadier general, and deployed armed drones that outmatched the defending units. The pattern of base overruns, mass desertions, and failure to reinforce troops under attack points to deep organizational failure.</p>
<p>Events like the February 2026 Kwara massacre, in which jihadists killed over 200 people as well as the December 2025 <a href="https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/36158/us-africa-command-conducts-strike-against-isis-in-nigeria">U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile strikes</a> on Nigerian soil and the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2026/03/22/us-troops-in-nigeria-using-drones-to-detect-and-disrupt-terrorist-activity/">deployment</a> of American troops amount to the clearest sign yet that Africa’s most populous nation can no longer secure itself.</p>
<p><strong>The Mosul Parallel</strong></p>
<p>Iraq, before the fall of Mosul in 2014, offers the closest comparison. When 1,500 ISIS fighters routed 60,000 Iraqi soldiers, the collapse came not from lack of firepower but from corruption. The Iraqi military had roughly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/12/11/how-iraqs-ghost-soldiers-helped-isil">50,000 ghost soldiers</a> on its payroll, troops who existed only on paper so commanders could pocket their salaries. Nigeria faces the same problem. <a href="https://www.declassifieduk.org/ghost-soldiers-britains-shadow-war-in-west-africa/">Leaked</a> UK diplomatic cables found that of the 20,000 troops Nigeria claims to deploy in the northeast, the real number is significantly lower, with thousands of ghost soldiers generating salaries collected by officers. The corruption is not incidental; it is systemic. <a href="https://ti-defence.org/gdi/">Transparency International</a> gave Nigeria’s defense sector an ‘E’ rating for “very high” corruption risk.</p>
<p>The human cost falls on ordinary soldiers. A Nigerian private earns $31 to $38 per month. Soldiers spend three to five years <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/documentary-reveals-low-morale-in-nigerian-army">deployed</a> without rotation, creating conditions for mass desertion. Iraq’s military eventually reformed after Mosul through fingerprint-based troop verification and coalition mentoring, but that reform only happened because Mosul was a shock too large to ignore. Nigeria faces a harder problem, a slow bleed rather than a single catastrophe, which gives political leaders room to delay action indefinitely.</p>
<p><strong>ISWAP’s Tactical Evolution and the Sahel Corridor</strong></p>
<p>ISWAP’s 2025 “Camp Holocaust” campaign has been the most successful in the group’s history. ISWAP systematically <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2025/08/iswap-assaults-target-military-bases-in-lake-chad-region/">destroyed</a> forward operating bases across the Lake Chad Basin using drones, night-vision gear, and coordinated swarm attacks. The capture and execution of Brigadier General Musa Uba in November 2025 was not simply a battlefield loss. It revealed that ISWAP now operates with better intelligence than the forces it fights. ISWAP <a href="https://saharareporters.com/2025/11/17/nigerian-army-commander-brig-gen-uba-killed-iswap-after-terrorists-intercepted-his">intercepted</a> his communications and tracked his position after his convoy was ambushed 88 kilometers from regional military headquarters in Maiduguri. A force with 230,000 troops and a multibillion-dollar budget could not locate its own brigade commander.</p>
<p>The broader Sahel security framework has collapsed around Nigeria, and the timing could not be worse. Niger’s <a href="https://www.military.africa/2025/03/niger-withdraws-from-mnjtf-counter-terror-coalition/">withdrawal</a> from the Multinational Joint Task Force in March 2025 ended joint border patrols along a vast open frontier. Into this gap has moved <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-february-6/">Lakurawa</a>, an Islamic State Sahel Province subgroup operating across Sokoto and Kebbi states with surveillance drones. Al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM launched its first recorded <a href="https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/sahel-monitoring-may-2025">attack</a> on Nigerian soil in 2025.</p>
<p><strong>The Air Power Deficit</strong></p>
<p>The Nigerian Air Force shows what happens when procurement runs ahead of maintenance capacity. Three JF-17 fighters from Pakistan were delivered in 2021. By May 2023, only one could still fly. The result is an air force that cannot protect civilians or support ground troops. SBM Intelligence estimates over 400 Nigerian civilians <a href="https://impactpolicies.org/news/483/zamfara-airstrike-tragedy-understanding-civilian-casualties-and-security-challenges-in-nigeria">killed</a> in erroneous military airstrikes between 2017 and 2025. The <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/anb/africa/nigeria/massacre-kwara-state-heightens-nigerias-security-challenges">February 2026 Woro massacre</a> showed what this means in practice. A military aircraft appeared overhead during a ten-hour attack that killed at least 162 civilians but did not engage.</p>
<p><strong>External Partners and the Limits of Assistance</strong></p>
<p>The United States launched <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2025/12/25/politics/us-strikes-isis-nigeria">16 Tomahawk cruise missiles</a> against Lakurawa camps in Sokoto State on Christmas Day 2025 and deployed troops to Bauchi Airfield. <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-did-united-states-conduct-strikes-nigeria">CSIS assessed</a> that one-off strikes are unlikely to reduce the terrorist threat significantly. The pattern is familiar: outside firepower treats the symptoms while the underlying disease, institutional corruption, goes unaddressed. Nigeria’s own Defense Minister Christopher Musa has acknowledged that military action addresses only 30 percent of the conflict. The <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/africa-report-n-237-nigeria-challenge-military-reform">International Crisis Group’s 2016 reform blueprint</a> called for fingerprint-based troop verification and open defense spending records. It remains unimplemented a decade later.</p>
<p><strong>The Coup Question and the Criminal-Terror Nexus</strong></p>
<p>Recent history across the Sahel makes this risk real. In Burkina Faso and Mali, troops who felt abandoned by civilian leaders seized power. Nigeria shows each of these warning signs. Soldiers earn $31 a month while generals oversee billions in unchecked spending. The Nigerian Armed Forces mostly ruled the country between 1966 and 1999, and the memory of military government has not faded.</p>
<p>A second risk deepens the picture. ISWAP brings in an <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/07/24/when-rebels-rule-iswap-formula-winning-support-nigeria-northeast-tax-control">estimated</a> $191 million per year by taxing trade across the Lake Chad Basin, ten times what the Borno State government collects. Furthermore northwest bandit networks took in an estimated <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-november-25/">$1.42 billion in ransom</a> in a single year.</p>
<p>Every overrun  base sends vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to ISWAP and other groups, fortifying their governance with economic and military assets. This is the critical danger: the longer reform is delayed, the more these groups entrench themselves as alternative governments with independent revenue. Once that happens, as Sudan’s civil war has shown, the window for reversing the trend narrows sharply.</p>
<p><strong>Outlook</strong></p>
<p>The 2026 Nigerian defense budget includes <a href="https://statehouse.gov.ng/president-tinubu-presents-%E2%82%A658-18-trillion-2026-appropriation-bill-vows-stronger-discipline-in-budget-execution/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CThese%20outcomes%20are%20not%20accidental,revenue%20of%20%E2%82%A634.33%20trillion.">5.41 trillion naira ($3.9 billion)</a>. However, 62 percent goes to personnel costs and the naira’s collapse has cut real spending power by two-thirds since 2023. Nigerian President Tinubu’s security emergency declaration has not changed the picture. At least 316 civilians were killed across 15 states in the 71 days that followed.</p>
<p>Three patterns deserve attention: the self-arming cycle, where weapons from overrun bases fuel the next attack; the intelligence gap, where ISWAP knows more about the military than the military knows about ISWAP; and the governing contest, where ISWAP’s services undercut public trust in the state. Until the corruption at the heart of Nigeria’s military is confronted, no amount of outside help will change the course. The question facing Abuja is whether reform comes through deliberate action or through the kind of devastating loss that forced Iraq’s hand after Mosul.</p>
<p><em>Arman Sidhu is an American geopolitical analyst and writer. He regularly covers the commodities market, international trade, and foreign investment. He is a regular contributor to Geopolitical Monitor and his work has previously appeared in The Diplomat, Eurasia Review, Economic &amp; Political Weekly, and RealClearWorld, among several other outlets. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Hollow-RanksGhost-Soldiers-Nigerias-Corruption-Fueled-Security-Collapse-.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="202" height="56" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 202px) 100vw, 202px" /></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hollow-ranks-ghost-soldiers-nigerias-corruption-fueled-security-collapse/">Hollow Ranks &#038; Ghost Soldiers: Nigeria&#8217;s Corruption-Fueled Security Collapse</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Much Ado About Nothing: The Proliferation Debate Post Venezuela</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/much-ado-about-nothing-the-proliferation-debate-post-venezuela/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/much-ado-about-nothing-the-proliferation-debate-post-venezuela/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Soumyadeep Bidyanta]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Mar 2026 13:27:28 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32388</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The morning of January 3rd, 2026, a U.S. Army delta-force team conducted an operation in Caracas, Venezuela, capturing President Maduro and his wife. The operation comes in the wake of constant threats of regime change in Venezuela made by President Trump. Trump accuses the Maduro regime of supporting cartels that supply fentanyl to America, a [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/much-ado-about-nothing-the-proliferation-debate-post-venezuela/">Much Ado About Nothing: The Proliferation Debate Post Venezuela</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The morning of January 3rd, 2026, a U.S. Army delta-force team conducted an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/trump-maduro-venezuela-presidential-palace-blowtorches-7969152ae48510003fe9cbde92f3c102">operation</a> in Caracas, Venezuela, capturing President Maduro and his wife. The operation comes in the wake of constant <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/regime-change-venezuela">threats</a> of regime change in Venezuela made by President Trump. Trump accuses the Maduro regime of supporting cartels that supply fentanyl to America, a claim contested by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/19/us/politics/trump-venezuela-fentanyl.html">many</a>. The U.S. has previously doubted the legitimacy of the 2019 <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-44187838us">elections</a> that brought back Maduro to power, viewing Maduro’s presidency since as illegitimate and instead recognizing opposition leader Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/recognition-of-juan-guaido-as-venezuelas-interim-president/">interim</a> president (although this recognition <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/01/04/us-stops-recognizing-juan-guaido-venezuela">shifted</a> in 2023).</p>
<p>While the coming days will clarify what will happen in Venezuela, security studies scholars are concerned with broader systemic implications of this operation. Specifically, what effect will this have on nuclear proliferation? While some may think actions like this (and the <a href="https://opencanada.org/from-compliance-to-target-the-strategic-death-of-nuclear-non-proliferation/">bombing</a> of nuclear sites in Iran) will hasten proliferation, this article argues that this may not necessarily be the case.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>Causes of Proliferation</strong></p>
<p>The academic literature on nuclear proliferation has identified several factors that affect a state&#8217;s decision, including security, technology, economic, and normative-institutional factors. The realist school argues that security is the foremost reason behind states’ motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. Due to the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, they are deemed a guarantor for a state&#8217;s sovereignty. Nuclear weapons can deter both nuclear attacks and conventional attacks from more powerful states.</p>
<p>Concerns over sovereignty have been attributed to nuclear programs of several states in the past (including successful pursuits such as North Korea, Pakistan, and Israel, and unsuccessful pursuits such as Sweden, Taiwan, and Libya). As such, many security studies scholars and experts have argued that external intervention (like what is happening in Venezuela) would have systemic effects and hasten nuclear proliferation, potentially undoing the years of good done by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime.</p>
<p><strong>Lessons from Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine: Would Nuclear Weapons Have Helped?</strong></p>
<p>Those who argue regime change would accelerate proliferation often point toward Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine. In all of these, they argue, nuclear weapons would have prevented regime change (or an attempt at it in Ukraine’s case). They further argue that other states would learn the lesson and seek a bomb to secure their state.</p>
<p>How true are these assertions? In <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/chronology-libyas-disarmament-and-relations-united-states">Libya</a> and <a href="https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/iraq-nuclear-facilities/">Iraq</a>, they had active nuclear weapons programs that they shut down due to external pressure (sanctions in Libya, the air campaign during the Gulf War in Iraq). It is likely that had they continued nuclear pursuit the United States would have more forcefully attempted to stop it. Ukraine is different; while it inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, it never had direct control over them, and had it not given them up, it is unlikely they could have been used.</p>
<p>Another country proliferation pessimists point to is North Korea. They argue that because North Korea has nuclear weapons, the U.S. has not attempted regime change. This overlooks three facts. Firstly, North Korea only tested its first nuclear weapon in 2006. If nuclear weapons prevented an American invasion, why did the U.S. not invade North Korea prior to that? Secondly, it is likely the massive artillery force North Korea has aimed at Seoul, South Korea&#8217;s capital and most populous city, has acted as a deterrent against external intervention, even as its effectiveness has <a href="https://tnsr.org/2025/06/lost-seoul-assessing-pyongyangs-other-deterrent/">declined</a> over time. Lastly, China&#8217;s support for North Korea, and possible involvement in any war over it, means that the U.S. is unlikely to engage in forced regime change even if North Korea never acquired nuclear weapons.</p>
<p><strong>Changes in The Proliferation Landscape</strong></p>
<p>It is unlikely the regime change operation in Venezuela will drastically change the proliferation landscape. Nuclear proliferation is an extremely complex decision with several factors. A single event, however important, is unlikely to tip over a state&#8217;s decision to pursue nuclear weapons. Even if one accepts the realist argument that nuclear acquisition is primarily rooted in security fears, the Venezuela incident changes little. A state vulnerable to external intervention would not be more vulnerable after the incident, even if they feel the probability of intervention has increased. A state cannot draw any lesson that it already did not draw from Iraq, Libya, or Ukraine.</p>
<p>Not to mention, the required technological knowledge and industrial base for a nuclear weapons program is immense. Not every state has the capacity to initiate one. In fact, the intersection of states which have the capability to start a nuclear program and are in the crosshairs of the United States for regime change is small. Moreover, any state that decides it needs nuclear weapons to protect itself from external intervention must also contend with the fact that until it acquires them, it remains vulnerable (with the added incentive of an external power to conduct intervention before the potential proliferator acquires nuclear weapons).</p>
<p><strong>Who is the Next Proliferator?</strong></p>
<p>With Iran previously on the precipice of acquiring nuclear weapons for a while, it seemed only a matter of time before the Middle East devolved into a nuclear domino scenario. However, strikes on Iranian nuclear sites appear to have extended the timeline for Iran to successfully acquire a nuclear weapon, if not extinguished the possibility altogether. This also means states like Saudi Arabia, which were most likely to respond to Iranian acquisition with their own nuclear program, are now further from the cliff&#8217;s edge.</p>
<p>U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites have another systemic implication: they signal that the United States would not stand by and let someone violate the nonproliferation regime by acquiring nuclear weapons and is willing to back this with force. Despite the turbulent nature of international politics in the last half decade, there is no evidence the world is on the verge of a</p>
<p>new wave of nuclear proliferation. The barriers to a program (political, economic, and technical) remain high, while benefits remain uncertain. It is unlikely that many, if any, new states will embark on a serious nuclear weapons program in the near to medium future.</p>
<p><em>Soumyadeep Bidyanta is a doctoral candidate at the University of Cincinnati, conducting research on the causes of nuclear proliferation. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Much-Ado-About-NothingThe-Proliferation-Debate-Post-Venezuela.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="227" height="63" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 227px) 100vw, 227px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/much-ado-about-nothing-the-proliferation-debate-post-venezuela/">Much Ado About Nothing: The Proliferation Debate Post Venezuela</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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