Contemporary disagreements between the U.S. and its NATO allies have intensified over political, economic, and security issues. Disputes over trade, tariffs, defense spending, and expeditionary support reveal an unhealthy frustration with burden-sharing demands and a strategic recalibration rather than a wholesale fear of U.S. abandonment. Some European leaders’ reactions to U.S. demands for burden-sharing and strategic reciprocity have ranged from performative indignation to explicit efforts to redefine NATO on more European terms and push America out of the alliance. 

The complaint of an underfunded NATO is not new; it is a recurring theme in American strategic discourse. In 2002, President Bush called for NATO reform with new capabilities and interoperability. In 2016, President Obama used the term ‘free riders’ to argue that Europe must take more responsibility. Recently, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz admitted, “We have been free riders in the past, and the Americans guaranteed our freedom and our security.” 

This friction highlights the main operational tension NATO 3.0 seeks to address. At the June 2026 NATO Defense Ministerial in Brussels, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth described NATO 3.0 as “modeled on NATO 1.0 that won the Cold War, with allies leading Europe’s defense.” He said NATO should be “a hard-edged war-fighting organization.” He also described NATO 2.0 as the post-Cold War effort “no longer focused on defending Europe” but on “climate change and defense austerity.” While some may sneer at these descriptions, they are hard to argue against. NATO 3.0 is likely to be a bold reboot, with European countries leading their defenses while the U.S. shifts focus to the Indo-Pacific and homeland defense, remaining a strategic and nuclear safety net. 

The U.S. is reducing or redeploying its forces to pre-2022 levels and urging a more self-reliant Europe. This does not mean weakening NATO; instead, it aims for a stronger, Europe-focused defense to support NATO’s long-term sustainability. A capable Europe could enhance deterrence and security by lessening its reliance on large-scale U.S. intervention, but European military growth should complement, not replace, American power. 

To resemble NATO 1.0, Hegseth’s NATO 3.0 must understand and embrace the future role of nuclear weapons. The key difference is the size and scope of nuclear arsenals, with fewer weapons overall. While Russia’s non-strategic nuclear arsenal remains more than ten times larger than NATO’s, the aggregate nuclear stockpiles have declined by more than 80 percent since 1992. Smaller arsenals render each remaining weapon more significant and more vulnerable, making allied nuclear forces increasingly valuable instruments of deterrence. NATO 3.0’s success depends on three focus areas. 

First, NATO must abandon the presumption that a smaller nuclear arsenal can effectively deter Russia. Equally flawed is the belief that maintaining fewer weapons automatically signals reduced threat to Moscow. Deterrence credibility does not rest on symbolic restraint; it relies on perceived capability and willingness to impose unacceptable costs. In today’s competitive nuclear environment, NATO needs more—not less—nuclear capability in Europe, to ensure credible deterrence. Smaller arsenals make each weapon’s survivability more critical, increasing the risk of vulnerability, technical failure, or denied retaliation. A strong nuclear posture enhances resilience, confidence, and the capacity to absorb loss whilst ensuring NATO can deter nuclear coercion and attack. 

Expanding NATO’s nuclear capacity involves more than adding American weapons. Macron’s idea of “forward deterrence” seeks to integrate France’s nuclear forces into European security without formal guarantees. While the U.S. shares its arsenal with allies, France would retain sole control over its nuclear weapons, targeting, and use. Macron states France’s core interests may include defending against attacks on European partners that could threaten French sovereignty. Poland, interested in the French offer, also seeks its own nuclear capability. President Nawrocki recently emphasized strengthening Poland’s security “even with nuclear potential.” More nuclear-armed states in the alliance could be necessary to deter Russia and reassure uneasy allies. 

Second, NATO 3.0 must focus its nuclear deterrent on active escalation management and theater warfighting. During the NATO 1.0 era, Cold War doctrines like “Massive Retaliation” relied on the threat of overwhelming nuclear strikes in response to acts of aggression rather than protracted war. Later doctrines such as “Assured Destruction,” which largely focused on direct US-USSR deterrence, and “Flexible Response,” which tested allies’ willingness to fight a third conventional war on the Continent, demanded a significant and costly increase in Europe’s conventional forces. 

NATO 3.0 requires a keen focus on European-centric escalation management. Since adversaries see low-yield theater nuclear weapons as usable coercive tools in an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy, NATO must have an abundant, diverse, and flexible nuclear arsenal. Maintaining credible low- and high-yield options and non-nuclear systems allows NATO 3.0 to match any rung on the escalation ladder, thereby reinforcing crisis stability. 

Third, NATO 3.0 must emphasize both forward based and strategic U.S. nuclear forces for extended deterrence, which is crucial for alliance security. NATO 1.0’s success depended on America’s nuclear umbrella, with ample modern forces and deployments reassuring allies, deterring enemies, and preserving the alliance. NATO remains a nuclear alliance. However, complacency and reliance on aging U.S. arsenals during NATO 2.0 led to budget cuts, reduced force postures, and misaligned goals.  

Going forward, NATO 3.0 will require greater nuclear capability to deter effectively. The American nuclear umbrella deters nuclear coercion against U.S. allies by providing a credible strategic deterrent that France and the UK cannot single-handedly offer against an assertive Russia with the largest, most diverse nuclear stockpile in the world. British and French arsenals are combined eight times smaller than Russia’s, leaving NATO countries like Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states more vulnerable to Russian intimidation or invasion. If NATO and the U.S. are driven apart, the remaining alliance states will need to rapidly grow their nuclear forces. However, a strong American nuclear arsenal, supported by credible, mutual commitments, remains crucial to binding the alliance, reassuring partners, deterring enemies, and preserving strategic stability. 

Rather than signaling the end of the transatlantic alliance, NATO 3.0 would mark a new phase, one that adapts to an aggressive, revanchist Russia and a shifting global power balance. NATO 3.0 may be one in which the United States remains Europe’s principal strategic partner and nuclear guarantor, while Europe assumes far greater responsibility for its own conventional defense. This reflects strategic growth, not alliance end. Despite $40 trillion in debt, the U.S. remains the only great power capable of countering China and North Korea, threats not contained in Article 6 of NATO’s charter. Expecting allies to bear a greater share of defense responsibilities is sound policy and demonstrates empowered trust within NATO. 

Colonel Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of MCG Horizons LLC, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has three decades of experience in uniform and DoD civil service, is the co-editor of the book “Learning to Love the Bomb,” and is the co-host of the weekly The NIDS View podcast. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and MCG Horizons LLC, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other organization. 

NATO 3.0 and the Nuclear Arsenal It Requires was originally published on Global Security Review.

President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized U.S. European allies for their alleged failure to assume a larger share of the responsibility for NATO deterrence and defense. Although most U.S. angst about European burden sharing concerns preparedness for a larger conventional war on the continent, the sharing of risk with respect to nuclear escalation has received less attention. Past practice suggested that the American nuclear umbrella would suffice to deter Russian threats of nuclear escalation. On the other hand, Europe’s indigenous nuclear forces may have the potential to serve as a sufficient deterrent against Russian nuclear first use.

French “Forwardism”

In March 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron announced a doctrine of “forward deterrence” regarding the future of French nuclear declaratory and employment policy. His statements amounted to the most important shift in French nuclear posture in decades. The more important components of this policy change are as follows: First, France will increase the size of its nuclear deterrent force (force de dissuasion) for the first time since 1992. The assumption behind this move is that the current nuclear force is too small to deter aggression beyond France’s borders. Second, France would permit the temporary deployment of nuclear-armed aircraft to allied countries. However, France will not delegate nuclear employment authority to other countries. Stationing nuclear forces outside France will reinforce France’s commitment to its European partners. Third, France would work more closely with allies to develop shared understandings of the nature of the Russian threat and to coordinate on the management of escalation control in the context of a conventional war. The first stage of this collaboration will include visits to strategic sites and/or joint exercises with Germany, the UK, and other NATO countries.

Trump’s Frustrations

The decision taken by Macron reflects a perceived need for upgrading the proficiency of France’s nuclear deterrent. It also represents a political statement about his doubts regarding the U.S. commitment to NATO. Despite improvements in European defense readiness and preparedness, President Trump has continued to disparage NATO as weak and “free riding” on the backs of the U.S. military. Trump has announced that he plans to remove 5,000 American troops from Germany and has suggested that the U.S. should leave the alliance despite being prohibited by Congress from unilaterally doing so.

There are several prompts for this continuing cold shoulder from Washington to Brussels. First, Trump is frustrated by Putin and Zelensky and their inability to negotiate a cease-fire and peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. Second, the U.S. President launched a pre-emptive combat operation against Iran on February 28, 2026, without either consulting or informing NATO allies before the fact. Understandably, in this regard, European leaders have been hesitant to provide military support, and some have refused to grant access to American bases or airspace for Operation Epic Fury, further frustrating President Trump. Third, the stalemate in the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted global supply chains and driven up the prices of fossil fuels and fertilizer worldwide.

European and U.S. Support for Ukraine

Despite distractions, NATO members remain committed to supporting Ukraine as long as needed. An agreement allows U.S. allies in Europe to buy weapons from the U.S. and pass them to Ukraine. The U.S. continues to upgrade its nuclear deterrent, especially the strategic nuclear triad, with a $71.4 billion FY27 plan for next-generation intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, strategic bombers with new Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missiles, and improved nuclear command and control.

It is doubtful that France’s nuclear force, which includes several hundred warheads with delivery systems such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles and both land- and sea-based aircraft, can replace the U.S. nuclear extended deterrent – nor was it meant to. Instead, France’s independent nuclear deterrence, designed to defend its own interests and sovereignty, along with the United Kingdom’s small ballistic missile submarine force, offers a minimal deterrent against nuclear threats from Russia at a level below strategic nuclear weapons.

Since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly reminded international audiences that Russia, under certain conditions of adversity in conventional war, might resort to nuclear first use of non-strategic or theater nuclear weapons (NSNW). These weapons, having shorter ranges and lower yields than strategic weapons, can be launched from land, sea, and airborne platforms and could number as many as 2,000 in Russia’s available inventory. In comparison, the U.S. deploys some 200 available NSNWs at several NATO bases.

U.S. Nuclear War Planning and NATO

This disparity in the number of NSNWs is not as alarming as it might seem because the nature of U.S. nuclear war planning has changed since the Cold War. Current U.S. operational plans include the full spectrum of nuclear and conventional kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities within one comprehensive plan. U.S. nuclear forces are expected to provide options for graduated escalation and flexible response. Toward that end, U.S. bomber deployments and military exercises provide additional support to U.S. European Command, bolstering NATO deterrence. In addition to the increased bomber presence, the Trump administration wants to add the flexibility of the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) for the deployment of weapons with variable yields. The purpose of SLCM-N is to deter limited nuclear use by adversaries and to provide reassurance to U.S. European and Asian allies.

France recognizes that deterrence is not only about the size of military forces, including nuclear arms, despite Macron’s plan to increase the number of French nuclear weapons. It also depends on perceived resolve among allies and potential adversaries. In Macron’s view, Russia should not expect that democratic Europe can be intimidated by threats of limited nuclear war because (in Russia’s mind) that threat is more realistic compared to strategic nuclear war. Nor should Russia expect that French support for NATO excludes the possibility of deploying French nuclear-capable launchers outside French national territory. French training exercises with NATO countries closer to Russia’s border will help send that message.

Conclusion

A more forward-leaning French military doctrine does not mean abandoning France’s commitment to European security. Nor does it replace the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Macron recognizes that, in defense matters, truth counts more than words: the United States cannot completely detach itself from NATO, nor can NATO sever its ties with America. NATO without the U.S. invites nuclear coercion upon Western Europe, while the U.S. without NATO risks political and military isolation instead of credible deterrence. The American and European pillars of NATO, as the French might say, are “condemned to succeed” together.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

Trump Wants NATO Allies to Step Up-Can France Lead the Way was originally published on Global Security Review.

In his “Ile Longue” speech on March 2, 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a message that will echo across European capitals for years to come. For the first time, a European leader publicly articulated that France’s nuclear deterrent carries a distinctly “European dimension.” While the ultimate authority to launch remains the prerogative of the French President, Macron made it clear that an attack on a key European partner could trigger a French nuclear response. This is not a symbolic gesture: it reflects a growing recognition that Europe can no longer rely solely on the United States to guarantee its security. In a world where great-power priorities are increasingly transactional, Europe is beginning to define its own strategic boundaries.

The 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) reinforced this reality. By designating Russia as a “European responsibility,” the strategy signals a deliberate shift: Washington will focus its conventional forces on the homeland and the Indo-Pacific Theater, leaving Europe to confront the Russian threat largely on its own terms. The nuclear umbrella remains intact, but the implicit promise of automatic conventional reinforcement is fading. Even seemingly peripheral actions, such as elevating Greenland to a primary U.S. homeland interest alongside the Panama Canal, highlight an unmistakable message: European security is now secondary to America’s own global priorities. Transactions, not guarantees, define the relationship, and Europe is taking note.

This strategic recalibration has deepened a credibility gap that European policymakers cannot ignore. Repeatedly questioning of NATO’s relevance, combined with explicit demands for Europe to “Buy American,” has underscored a harsh truth: the U.S. is no longer a guaranteed partner for long-term security. European arms imports from the U.S. surged to $68 billion in 2024, a fivefold increase over the 2017–2021 average, while American threats of trade countermeasures in response to “Buy European” procurement rules have reinforced the perception that collective defense is contingent on economic acquiescence. For many in Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw, the lesson is stark: security can no longer be assumed; it must be actively prepared.

Europe’s response has been both practical and psychological. The continent is actively building a more integrated and networked continental defense architecture, driven by a growing demand for strategic autonomy—particularly in areas such as drone defense, air and missile defense, and long-range strike capabilities. This effort reflects a gradual shift toward forward deterrence, in which credible conventional capabilities are positioned to signal readiness and resilience in the face of potential aggression. Forward deterrence, therefore, is not simply about stationing troops or deploying hardware; it represents a broader strategic mindset in which Europe seeks to reduce its structural dependence on external guarantees. While European defense infrastructure is not yet fully independent of Washington, ongoing investments and integration efforts indicate a clear trajectory toward greater operational autonomy, with more robust capabilities expected to mature between 2025 and 2030.

Meanwhile, France and the United Kingdom through the Northwood Declaration are exploring ways to “Europeanize” their nuclear forces, offering broader protection to allied partners while retaining national control over launch decisions. Macron’s speech embodies this principle: strategic assets—including Rafale jets and the planned next-generation nuclear submarine, “The Invincible”—can now be dispersed across allied territory to provide strategic depth and complicate adversary calculations. For the first time, non-nuclear partners such as Germany and Poland are participating in joint exercises that directly interface with French nuclear capabilities. The psychological message is clear: Europe is beginning to assert a sovereign layer of deterrence that complements, rather than replaces, NATO’s structures.

Poland’s recent statement that it may eventually seek its own nuclear weapons, as President Tusk indicated, also highlights the accelerating sense of urgency in Eastern Europe. So here the question arises that While Macron’s “Europeanized” nuclear deterrent provides a layer of strategic depth, then why Poland seeks to own nuclear weapons? The answer is that Macron’s forward deterrence is not scaled to cover the entire continent comprehensively, particularly in regions most exposed to Russia. For Warsaw, the calculus is simple: if U.S. guarantees are increasingly transactional, and if NATO’s nuclear planning remains centered in France and the U.K., then relying solely on allied deterrence is insufficient.

This development illustrates two broader dynamics. First, it highlights the limits of “second-layer” nuclear deterrence. Even with France operationally dispersing assets and including non-nuclear allies in exercises, some countries may feel compelled to consider independent capabilities to ensure credible protection. Second, it signals that Europe’s forward deterrence is moving from theory into practice, not only in doctrine and exercises but in actual national policy deliberations. Warsaw’s potential pursuit of nuclear weapons is less a provocation than a symptom of the same trend already evident in France and Germany’s expanded conventional and nuclear postures: Europe is taking responsibility for its own security.

Hence, Macrons’ speech represents a redefinition of European strategic autonomy. Between 2021 and 2024, EU defense spending rose by 30 percent, reaching €326 billion, signaling a growing recognition that reliance on Washington alone is no longer sustainable. European governments are investing not just in hardware, but in doctrine, interoperability, and the credibility of their deterrent posture. Strategic autonomy, once rhetorically flourishing, has become an existential imperative. Forward deterrence and strategic autonomy are complementary layers of security designed to mitigate the risk of over-reliance on an American partner whose priorities may shift.

Europe is thus navigating a delicate balance. It is neither abandoning NATO nor discarding the U.S. nuclear guarantee. Instead, it is learning to prepare for a future in which guarantees are no longer unconditional. The era of unquestioned extended deterrence is ending, and the continent must act with foresight. Forward deterrence is more than a strategic posture; it is a signal to Moscow, to Washington, and to Europe’s own citizens that the continent is willing and able to take responsibility for its own defense.

Europe is no longer a passive theater under American protection. It is a region preparing to defend itself, thoughtfully and decisively, in a strategic environment defined by uncertainty, transactional alliances, and shifting global priorities. Macron’s “Ile Longue” speech may have been delivered in France, but its message resonates across the continent: the future of European security will be determined not by the automatic extension of U.S. deterrence, but by Europe’s own willingness to claim responsibility for its survival.

Qurat-Ul-Ain Shabbir, a PhD scholar at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, is currently serving as a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies AJK. Her research interests lie in the global nuclear order and geopolitical dynamics. The views of the author are her own.

Beyond the American Umbrella: Europe’s Turn to Forward Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Based on the latest EAR Report, these are the critical points on global security, upcoming events, and the ongoing discourse on nuclear deterrence, modernization, and geopolitical strategy for 2025.

Quotes of the Week

• Xi Jinping (China): “No one can stop the historical trend” of China’s “reunification” with Taiwan.”
• U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg (South Korea): Reaffirmed the U.S.-South Korean alliance amidst geopolitical tensions.
• DPRK Kim Jong Un: Committed to implementing the “toughest” anti-American policy while criticizing the U.S.-South Korea-Japan security partnership.
• Antony Blinken (U.S. Secretary of State): Highlighted Russia’s intentions to share advanced space technology with North Korea.
• NATO Official: Warned of unconventional Russian attacks causing substantial casualties.

Upcoming 2025 Seminar Events

1. January 10, 2025, 10:00 AM: Robert Soofer & Mark Massa on “The Case for Homeland Missile Defense.”
2. January 31, 2025, 10:00 AM: Shoshana Bryen & Ilan Berman on “Middle East Update and the Iranian Nuclear Threat.”
3. February 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Stephen Blank & Mark Schneider on “Russian Intentions with Its Growing Nuclear Forces.”
4. February 28, 2025, 10:00 AM: Hon. Madelyn Creedon & Hon. Frank Miller on “Assessment and Update of the Posture Commission.”
5. March 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Gordon Chang & Rick Fisher on “The Chinese Nuclear Threat & Implications for US Security.”

Nuclear Derangement Syndrome

• Criticism of nuclear deterrence is gaining momentum, focusing on framing nuclear weapons as both unnecessary and dangerous.
• The Union of Concerned Scientists highlights essays opposing nuclear modernization, which are countered with arguments emphasizing deterrence as essential for stability.
• The critique overlooks the strategic necessity of nuclear weapons in preventing large-scale conflicts and ensuring global security.

The Biden-Trump Arms Race

• Criticism: The Biden and Trump administrations’ claims of an arms race are exaggerated. They focus on necessary modernization within New START limits.
• Reality: Modernization efforts (Columbia submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, B21 bombers) align with treaty commitments, aiming for readiness by 2042.
• Key Concern: Rising nuclear capabilities of Russia and China surpass New START limits, demanding U.S. responses to maintain strategic balance.
• Counterarguments: Opponents argue modernization fuels an arms race, while proponents emphasize deterrence and technological edge against adversaries.

Download the full report.

ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Prior to their defeat, the UK’s Conservatives advocated for raising defense spending to 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030, higher than NATO’s existing 2 percent goal for member states. Their 14-year record left much to be desired with programs cancelled, defense investment waning, and the British armed forces nearly “hollowed out.” Enter Labour, which also pledged to spend 2.5 percent of GDP on defense, subject to streamlining government finances. With an unwavering commitment to NATO and the UK’s nuclear deterrent, such an increase may be possible.

However, Labour’s immediate decision was to declare a “strategic” pause on the 6th-generation aircraft program whilst they investigate its feasibility. Chief of the General Staff General Sir Roland Walker predicted that Britain must be ready within three years to fight a war against an “axis of upheaval” of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. And when delivering his closing keynote address at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Land Warfare Conference (2024), Walker declared that he intends to double the Army in three years and triple it by 2030.

In France, foreign and defense policy are reserved for the president. However, it is the parliament that controls the purse, which is problematic when the president’s party does not hold a majority in parliament—the case for Macron. Because Macron was concerned with the strong showing of the “far right” National Rally in European Parliament elections, he abruptly dissolved the French Parliament, calling for constitutionally scripted elections in two rounds, for its 577 members (called “députés”) to be renewed.

The first round saw the National Rally come in first place, followed by an improvised grouping of “far left” communists, socialists, and greens, with Macron’s centrist party shrinking and the center-right Les Républicains barely surviving. Tactical voting in the second round had Macron’s party and the hastily coalesced left mutually desist to prevent the right-leaning candidates from reaching an absolute majority. This resulted in a hung parliament, with no pathway for coalitions leading to an absolute majority from which a prime minister could be selected.

Because of France’s election outcome, Macron might wait until September to nominate a prime minister. No one knows from which party the prime minister will come. The key is choosing a person who can ensure the government survives any parliamentary motion to terminate the government. Thus, it remains unclear how the potential ungovernability of France, until the 2027 presidential election, may affect defense policy.

The European Parliament’s swing to the right weakened German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social-Democrat Party and his Green Party allies. Former German defense minister, Ursula von der Leyen, recently won reelection to the presidency of the European Commission by a more comfortable margin than five years ago, grabbing the vote of Green Party members. She pledged to implement the Green Deal, albeit in diluted form. Von der Leyen also received support from Italian prime minister Georgia Meloni, who leads the right-wing coalition immediately on von der Leyen’s right, though not as “far” right as the coalition led by French National Rally’s Marine Le Pen and Hungary’s Victor Orban. As president of the European Commission, von der Leyen offers strong support for Ukraine, and stronger European defense—in areas where the European Commission can sway what national governments plan and implement.

At the NATO 75th anniversary summit in Washington, DC, the national leaders of member-states issued a plan for the next year, calling Ukraine’s path to membership in the alliance “irreversible.” That statement follows a document issued by NATO at the 2023 Vilnius, Lithuania, summit. For NATO accession to start, a country should not be involved in on-going conflict. So even if the NATO accession process could be accelerated for Ukraine, it is unlikely to happen any time soon. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, was not given an accession schedule.

In February 2024, at the annual Munich Security Conference, long before his selection as Donald Trump’s running mate, Senator JD Vance rang alarm bells among Europe’s political and foreign policy elites when he voiced his opposition to military aid for Ukraine and bluntly warned that Europe will have to rely less on the US to support NATO. Political rhetoric has a place in American elections, but the fact is, American presidents change their views as resources tighten.

Regardless of whether Donald Trump or Kamala Harris win the White House in November, the United States faces fiscal constraints in the years ahead because it faces a national debt that now exceeds defense spending. A perfect storm driven by the “Axis of Upheaval” may absorb American capability in the Indo-Pacific while the US is stretched thin elsewhere.

Europeans may signal which candidate they perceive as more hostile to their interest, but it is the geopolitical and budgetary math that ultimately shapes the nature of alliances. Unless Europe tackles the harsh reality that it must take its own defense seriously, French President Macron will be proven right after he once argued that it was not only an issue of sovereignty, but a matter of survival for Europe. How that works politically and fiscally is for Europe to figure out.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Political Uncertainties Are Affecting Europe’s Defense Buildup was originally published on Global Security Review.