Recently, however, the ground has been shifting. As we point out in a recent article, Ethiopia has attempted to take advantage of the recent involvement of various Arab Gulf States in the Horn of Africa’s coastal zone to reduce its dependency on Djibouti’s port. The port currently accounts for 95% of Ethiopia’s imports and exports. It has done so by actively trying to interest partners in the refurbishment and development of other ports in the region: Port Sudan in Sudan, Berbera in the Somaliland region of Somalia, and Mombasa in Kenya.

But it is Berbera, in particular, that will prove the most radical in terms of challenging regional power dynamics as well as international law. This is because a port deal involving Somaliland will challenge Djibouti’s virtual monopoly over maritime trade. In addition, it may entrench the de-facto Balkanization of Somalia and increase the prospects of Ethiopia becoming the regional hegemon.

Ethiopia’s regional policy

Ethiopia’s interest in Berbera certainly makes sense from a strategic perspective. It is closest to Ethiopia and will connect the eastern, primarily Somali region of Ethiopia to Addis Ababa. It will also provide a much needed outlet for trade, particularly the export of livestock and agriculture.

The development and expansion of the port at Berbera supports two primary pillars of Ethiopia’s regional policy. The first is maintaining Eritrea’s isolation. The aim would be to weaken it to the point that it implodes and is formally reunited to Ethiopia. Or it becomes a pliant, client state.

The second pillar rests on maintaining the status quo in post-civil war Somalia. Simply put, a weak and fractured Somalia enables Ethiopia to focus on quelling persistent internal security difficulties. It also keeps up pressure on Eritrea.

Ethiopia’s ambitions for Berbera have been hampered by two problems. Firstly the Republic of Somaliland – a de-facto independent state since 1991 – still isn’t recognised internationally. This makes engagement a political and legal headache. Secondly, Ethiopia, doesn’t have the critical resources needed to invest and build a port.

Ethiopia had been trying to get Abu Dhabi and Dubai interested in the Berbera Port for years. It’s latest push was assisted by a number of factors. These included a shift in the UAE’s military focus in Yemen and Ethiopian assurances of more trade and some financing to upgrade the port.

Ethiopia’s diplomatic push – which coincided with developments across the Gulf of Aden – finally got it the result it craved. In May 2016, DP World, a global mega-ports operator, signed an agreement to develop and manage Berbera Port for 30 years.

The Berbera Port deal

It is unlikely that DP World would have signed the deal if it didn’t see some long-term commercial benefit. The deal also includes economic, military and political dimensions.

Economically, for example, there will be investments in Somaliland’s fisheries, transportation and hospitality industry. The UAE will also establish a military installation in Berbera. The base is intended to help the UAE tighten its blockade against Yemen and stop weapons being smuggled from Iran.

Politically, the Berbera Port deal has provoked mixed reactions in Somaliland. There has been some popular anger aimed at Somaliland’s former president, Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud aka “Silanyo”, and his family who reportedly benefited personally from it. Anger also stems from inter-clan and sub-clan rivalry over land, particularly in the Berbera area.

But the anger in Somaliland pales in comparison to the reaction in Mogadishu. This is because the Somaliland government has remained largely isolated internationally – until the port deal.

Somalia Federal Government ministers have publicly challenged the right of Somaliland to enter into official agreements with any country. The Ethiopian-driven deal means that Mogadishu’s claims over the breakaway territory have weakened substantially. The deal means that Somaliland has partially broken the glass ceiling of international recognition by entering into substantive deals with viable business partners and states operating on the global stage. Mogadishu can no longer pretend it controls the government in Somaliland’s capital Hargeisa.

Ethiopia’s wins

The bottom line is that Ethiopia has engineered access to another port and enhanced its security and strategic economic interests. With the growth in annual volumes of transit cargo, Ethiopia has, for a long time, needed alternative routes from Djibouti.

In addition, Ethiopia has ensured its presence in the running of the port by acquiring a 19% share in the deal.

And by wangling a legally binding agreement between Somaliland and another state, Ethiopia has potentially paved the way for eventual international recognition of Hargeisa.

Ethiopia has also further cemented its hold over Somaliland through a combination of pressure and material incentives. By bringing significant outside investment and recognition, Ethiopia can also increasingly meddle in its internal affairs. This is a conundrum for Hargeisa. It finds itself increasingly emboldened to act independently. Yet it remains constrained by the need to get Addis Ababa’s approval.

As Ethiopia begins to move increasing amounts of goods and services on Somaliland’s new highway to the refurbished port of Berbera, Hargeisa may begin to question key aspects of the port deal.

But one aspect will not be in question: Ethiopia’s rising power and influence over the entire region.

How an Ethiopia-backed port is changing power dynamics in the Horn of Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is worth considering Britain’s wider role in Africa as Theresa May visits this critical part of the world on a trade and investment tour. This latest diplomatic endeavor provides an opportunity to evolve UK’s Africa strategy in the context of forging a new path for a global Britain that seeks to maximize the opportunities of leaving the European Union. This is a crucial area of a global Britain approach, ensuring that the UK remains competitive in an ever-increasingly competitive global market.

In Cape Town, the prime minister announced an ambitious new approach to Britain’s spending on the continent, wishing to overtake the US by 2022 as the largest foreign investor in Africa, which would see Britain becoming Africa’s largest trading partner in the G7. This would seek to build upon the already high levels of existing British investment in Africa; with bilateral trade between the UK and Africa totaling $37 billion in 2016 and set to increase further post-Brexit.

With 29 business executives accompanying the prime minister and other officials on this trip, the overriding purpose of the mission is clear: to drum up business with some of the world’s fastest growing economies. The key stops on the Prime Minister’s tour include South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya. These three countries, traditionally strong British allies, are widely regarded as the core engine of future African growth.

By 2030, household consumption across the continent is expected to reach $2.5 trillion, up from $1.1 trillion in 2015. A third of that will come from these three states alone. Other countries with high growth rate forecasts over the next decade include Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, Ethiopia and Ghana. They all maintain strong relations with Britain, leaving considerable scope for developing these ties further.

Britain’s combined imports and exports with African countries more than doubled between 2005 and 2014, however exports to Africa still only represents 2.5% of total British exports. Considering Africa is a continent whose the population is set to increase by half a billion people by 2030–43% of whom will acquire middle and upper class status–it is remarkable that Britain has not sent such a top trade delegation to Africa sooner.

In that sense, Britain is somewhat late to the party. The U.S., despite seeing exports to Africa halve from 2014 – 2016, still has a bilateral trading relationship with the continent worth $53 billion. However. even this is dwarfed by both China and the E.U.-27’s trade numbers with Africa: in 2015 worth $188 billion, and $269 billion respectively.

In particular Beijing’s role in Africa has solidified in recent years. This trend goes well beyond the seven fold increase in trade with the continent since 2005. China is also seemingly aiming to become the preeminent security actor across Africa in an attempt to displace the legacy role still played by the former European colonial powers. In addition to establishing its first overseas base in Djibouti in 2017, Beijing also has 2,466 troops currently on active duty across Africa.

In recent years, Chinese military personnel have taken part in United Nations peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Sudan, with an 800-strong combat deployment sent to South Sudan in 2015, a country with significant Chinese oil investments. The security relationship between China and the UN contrasts sharply with the majority of western states, often more militarily risk-adverse regarding African deployments.

However, after meeting with Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, Mrs. May announced the two countries had signed a defense and security partnership which would see the British forces train full Nigerian army units to combat insurgents in the north-east of Nigeria. Furthermore, the UK will assist Nigeria in countering the use of improvised explosive devices used by Boko Haram, and in strengthening Nigeria’s lawless northern borders.

In order for the UK Government’s post-Brexit Africa strategy to really pay off, especially in the face of increasingly stiff international competition from the Chinese, Britain’s strengths as a security partner must be firmly emphasized as a reminder of why we should remain the firmest African ally. By leveraging Britain’s increasing role as a security actor in Africa, it should seek to press this advantage regarding trade deals post-Brexit.

Theresa May met members of the British military contingent based in Kenya, east Africa’s economic power and the focus of Britain’s greatest African security commitment. Kenya is utilized as a training area for British troops going on high readiness operations in other theaters, in addition to providing training and support for regional states engaged in the fight against al-Shabaab across east Africa. Ranging from Mali to Djibouti, Kenya to Gabon, the British military maintains a significant involvement across sub-Saharan Africa.

Currently providing training and support to no less than nine African states, small teams of specialized British personnel conduct a range of missions, from counter-terrorism to anti-piracy and anti-poaching. These missions are designed to build up the capability of host nations, by training their leaders and instructors in military skills often hard-learnt over recent British campaigns, now passed on to other states to assist in their own security development.

These training missions have tangible impact and results. For example, over 22 separate training missions by British forces in Uganda since 2011 have developed the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces, who undertake the majority of the heavy fighting in Somalia under the African Union mission. The success witnessed by the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) has led to increased international confidence in the security situation in Somalia, resulting in a gradual reduction in African Union personnel from the Horn of Africa.

Mrs May will seek to highlight the threats posed to both European and international stability through letting the security challenges occurring across Africa go unaddressed. These challenges include the current situation in the DRC; ongoing Ebola outbreaks across the country, coupled with increasing civic strife has led to over four million internally displaced people throughout the DRC.

Considering the rising numbers of individuals wishing to flee internal conflicts, ethnic tensions, human trafficking and large scale poverty and corruption, Europe faces potentially a second wave of millions of migrants from the African continent escaping war and famine and seeking new opportunities. The case has already been made that Britain, in ensuring a strategic partnership with Africa, can do more to help mitigate these developments by training security personnel in the DRC to better cope with the country’s many crises.

Additionally, al-Shabaab poses a lethal security threat in the east of the continent, while Boko Haram and al-Qaeda affiliates threaten its western areas. UK military assistance is a key part of the multi-national efforts to contain and ultimately defeat these terrorist organisations. Concurrently with training Kenyans, Ugandans and Somalis in the fight against al-Shabaab, Britain has also trained over 30,000 Nigerian soldiers since 2015 in counter-insurgency operations to help the fight against Islamic militancy in Nigeria.

By highlighting the threats facing African security, combined with the pragmatic methods with which Britain utilizes its armed forces in developing local-level state actor security, a Global Britain approach to a new Africa strategy should therefore seek to combine increased trade and investment into African economies, with a renewed focus on strengthening existing bilateral military relationships.

This twin-tracked approach based around trade and security will seek to achieve the government’s target to be the G7’s largest African trading partner post-Brexit; filling a geostrategic void left in the wake of a withdrawing US. If Britain is to assert itself as Africa’s most valuable G7 trading partner, then Britain must seek to fulfill African desires for investment whilst simultaneously offering the continent a type of security assistance that is beyond China’s military skills and capabilities.

Security and Trade: The Need for a Global Britain Approach in Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

The battle for influence in Africa is one of the greatest power-plays left to upset the traditional balance of power in the international community. Africa’s relatively young labor force, untapped business opportunities, thirst for technological injection, strategic location and role as a resource bridge between east and west is attractive to many.

But China’s dedication to penetrating Africa and winning influence is second to none, intricately weaving its intentions across all of its trade and foreign policies.

Critical infrastructure has been at the heart of foreign aid and development policies of Africa’s largest investors (the U.S., E.U., and China). But while the U.S. attempts to navigate a new “America First” policy under President Trump and the EU continues to negotiate the terms of Brexit and its own growing right-wing movements, China has been focused.

Following on his systematic “one belt, one road” campaign, President Xi Jinping has worked at embedding China at the heart of African infrastructure to protect and cement its regional interests for decades to come.

On track with its Belt & Road Initiative

President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an incredibly ambitious strategy to broaden Chinese access to international and domestic markets by securing and leveraging land and maritime trade routes, resulting in new patterns of trade, capital flow, resource access and business expansion.

It has the potential to facilitate regional collaboration on the most extensive global scale ever seen, reaching as much as a third of the world’s GDP, 65 percent of the world’s population and tapping into a quarter of the movement of goods and services globally.

Africa serves as a linchpin for the BRI, but many of the continent’s countries lack the requisite infrastructure to accommodate such a vision. Making inroads in Africa will require reliable power systems, roads and transport systems, broadband coverage, and compliant bureaucracies – and that is precisely what China is targeting.

Aggressive investment in critical infrastructure and the industries supporting these functions has been China’s number one mode of entry. In fact, China has established itself as one of the largest investors in critical infrastructure in nations across Africa.

Investment Means Influence

Through the Forum on Chinese-African Cooperation (FOCAC), China committed $60 billion in funding in 2015 alone, tripling its 2012 commitment of $20 billion.

Recent reports estimate Chinese banks, contractors and the government combined have extended $94.4 billion between 2000 and 2015. Success in the development of pilot programmes engaging local infrastructure industry in development and skills exchange, including construction of large industrial parks, has proved profitable for all parties.

Critical infrastructure such as water, power, broadband, transport, and logistics through these programmes means that Africa can provide the foundation for China’s BRI vision, but also remains indebted and dependent on China to maintain and pay for these new structures. Consequently, the facilitation of such developments ensures Chinese influence and political favor from partner countries.

Large-scale programs and investments support Xi’s goals to ensure the reach of China is felt everywhere not just a financially, but also a physically – and in particular wherever America may also have a presence. This sentiment was reflected by U.S. Marine Corps Commander Gen. Robert Neller speaking before a U.S. House Appropriations Committee meeting in March, “The Chinese are playing the long game … Everywhere I go, they’re there.”

Neller outlined the current Chinese strategy as to “win without fighting,” leveraging soft power capabilities and infiltrating national infrastructures to support their foreign policy ambitions.

China has pursued this strategy across the continent providing targeted investment and turnkey technological and logistical solutions, positioning themselves at the heart of these nations and leaving them vulnerable to both political and financial influence.

Additionally, these government efforts are being amplified by an increase in ordinary Chinese businesses heading to Africa, even without state-backing.

The Trappings of Dependence

While traditional foreign aid and investment have promised external funding or lower-interest loans in return for favorable trade relations and local commitments, China’s investments are tied with high-interest loans with impossible terms.

With billions of dollars already invested in the campaign, developing countries are becoming increasingly saddled with crippling debt and growing dependence on China.

In a March report, the Center for Global Development flagged eight countries at heightened risk of significant debt distress due to China’s One Belt One Road initiative.

Asia author and analyst Gordon Chang highlighted this “new form of colonialism” at a March House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing on China’s role in Africa, testifying that once such dependence develops, “Beijing gets their support for geopolitical goals, and one of these goals is undermining democracy.”

Djibouti is one country which has been marked at heightened risk of debt distress, having received $14 billion in Chinese investment. This has won China critical local political support for Chinese interests and goodwill with the population. More importantly, local political support has led to the establishment of China’s first permanent overseas military base in Djibouti.

With unbound strategic importance, guarding the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and the oil-rich Persian Gulf, Djibouti also offers an excellent vantage point from where it may observe the U.S. military base, again reflecting Gen. Neller’s earlier sentiments. This isn’t the first sign of China ruffling security feathers on the continent. French news source Le Monde reported earlier in the year on alleged daily cyber breaches of the A.U. headquarters’ IT framework.

The infiltration was traced back to Shanghai, although it was vehemently denied by Chinese officials and minimized by representatives from the African Union. Further investigations were said to have revealed hidden microphones in desks and walls throughout the Chinese-built building in Ethiopia.

China’s drive to gain greater global influence is clear

China’s method of partnering with those excluded from the Western-led world order does not isolate African governments but continues to prove strategic in protecting and promoting its national interests. China’s lack of reservations in striking deals with authoritarian leaders or governments with poor human rights records remains its advantage over western nations.

As the strategic environment in Africa becomes more crowded and competitive, U.S. General Waldhauser warns that “We will never outspend the Chinese on the continent,” and instead must be smarter about policies and actions connected to the region.

This is true for any country looking to win influence or maintain good relations with the continent. Ultimately, China stands as the lone power with both the sufficient economic might and political unification to succeed in this new scramble for influence in Africa.

China Positions Itself at the Heart of African Infrastructure was originally published on Global Security Review.

Over the last few years, China and Russia have been quietly exporting their models of online information controls through the supply of surveillance and censorship equipment, as well as providing training in the latest information control techniques. However, Beijing and Moscow differ considerably in the way they control information online, and these differences will determine which is more popular with authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa.

Despots, dictators, and autocrats will pick the model they prefer using two criteria: the ambition of the censorship system (e.g. how much information can a system filter) and the technology and services required to maintain the system. China’s model outcompetes Russia’s model in both categories.

First, ambition. China’s model is more ambitious in the sense that it prioritizes real-time censorship as armies of censors—both in government and Chinese tech giants—scrub offending posts from online discussion. Beijing is also perfectly comfortable banning entire platforms and websites—Facebook, Google and Twitter have been inaccessible from the mainland for years. By contrast, rather than blocking these platforms, Russia relies on inducing chilling effects with the aim of ensuring a culture of continued future self-repression of information. For example, an administrator of a popular anti-government page on VK (a Russian analog to Facebook) or website might get a visit from the FSB in the middle of the night or charged with embezzlement. When chilling effects fail Moscow relies on sowing disinformation. In St. Petersburg for instance, hundreds of trolls are blogging in a full-time professional capacity and are being paid around $800 a month to write pro-Kremlin posts.

In essence, China filters the information as it is posted whereas Russia tries to scare people from posting offending material in the first place, as well as overwhelming any information that evades the chilling effect.

Second, technology and services. If you’re a despot looking to import information controls, you need to buy them from a country that has a good tech sector that can supply the hardware and related support services. While Russian companies, such as Protei, Oniks-Line and Signatek, provide information controls capabilities to some in the former Soviet Union, countries beyond Russia’s near abroad remain reluctant buying Russian equipment. This may be because they perceive Russian kit as less advanced or simply more expensive.

Chinese gear and techniques, in contrast, are in greater demand. China’s technological approach to censoring social media and its Great Firewall, also known as the Golden Shield Project, have diffused to Vietnam and Thailand. In Sri Lanka, Chinese representatives have provided counsel and support to local authorities on how to censor the internet. Chinese experts are reported to have installed surveillance and censorship equipment in Zambian networks. In Zimbabwe, Chinese gear was applied to jam independent broadcasts. In Ethiopia, ZTE and Huawei signed a contract worth $1.6 billion to develop that country’s telecommunications system and both companies are suspected of providing technical assistance to monitor citizens. Huawei and ZTE have also helped build Russia’s information controls, given that the country lacks some of the requisite technology to do so itself.

In sum, the future of an ever more balkanised internet, marked by national firewalls, censorship, and surveillance may be more Chinese than Russian. China’s information controls model may serve as an attractive example given that, contrary to exhortations from Western and donor governments, rapid economic growth does not suffer from pervasive information controls. Beijing seems to have found a recipe for a successful censorship model based on technology that is being readily adopted. This does not only pose a challenge to the Russian information controls model, but to an open and interoperable internet more broadly.

With a lack of new initiatives from Western countries leading the internet freedom agenda,  and an unwillingness to reign in their own companies in the provision of information controls equipment to authoritarian countries (e.g. BAE, Hacking Team, NSO Group, Blue Coat Systems), freedom of information will continue to decline, IP address by IP address, 32 bits at a time.

Why China’s Internet Censorship Model Will Prevail Over Russia’s was originally published on Global Security Review.