The first commercial nuclear power plant in the Arab world is now fully operational, with all four units online and providing roughly a quarter of the country’s electricity. In a region traditionally defined by oil wealth, Barakah represents an intentional shift toward a diversified, low-carbon economy aligned with long-term sustainability goals.

The urgency behind this shift stems from rising domestic energy demand, climate commitments, and the need to hedge against volatility in fossil fuel markets. The UAE’s strategy positions nuclear power not as a replacement for hydrocarbons, but as a stabilising foundation within a broader clean-energy system. With global competition intensifying over clean-technology leadership, the UAE’s nuclear program has become a key pillar of national planning, industrial policy, and diplomatic signalling.

Barakah’s completion is notable in a world where many nuclear projects are delayed or cancelled. Built with South Korea’s KEPCO and operated by Nawah Energy Company, the reactors were brought online between 2021 and 2024 on a timeline that compares favourably with international benchmarks.

The program is overseen by the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), which maintains a comprehensive regulatory framework and publishes transparent safety and inspection assessments. This regulatory credibility underpins both domestic public confidence and international recognition, distinguishing the UAE’s program from states whose nuclear ambitions raise proliferation concerns.

The impact on decarbonisation is already measurable. According to the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), Barakah currently avoids around 22.4 million tons of carbon emissions annually, equivalent to removing nearly 4.8 million cars from the road. This mitigation supports the UAE’s net zero by 2050 Strategic Initiative.

This forms part of wider clean-energy planning that includes hydrogen, expanded solar capacity, and carbon-efficient industrial development. Nuclear power provides stable baseload output that complements intermittent renewables and stabilizes the electricity system as demand grows.

The UAE’s nuclear program is also a catalyst for scientific and industrial capabilities. Prior to Barakah’s commissioning, the UAE invested in human capital through institutions such as Khalifa University, which established the Emirates Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) to support reactor safety, radiation science, and advanced materials research. Alongside operator training and regulatory capacity building, these programs expand domestic expertise in high-value sectors that extend beyond power generation. Over time, these skills contribute to cybersecurity, digital instrumentation, robotics for plant inspection, and reactor systems modelling.

This knowledge base has spillover effects in multiple fields. In nuclear medicine, investments in radiopharmaceutical production and imaging facilities have strengthened diagnostic and therapeutic services, enabling the UAE to become a regional hub for advanced cancer treatment. In agriculture, the application of nuclear techniques such as the sterile insect technique (SIT) has supported integrated pest management, reducing chemical pesticide use and improving food security. In industry, nuclear-powered low-carbon aluminium production demonstrates how nuclear energy can decarbonize energy-intensive exports, positioning the UAE competitively as global markets introduce carbon border adjustment mechanisms.

However, several longer-term challenges require sustained policy focus. First, the UAE’s nonproliferation model, which commits to no enrichment and no reprocessing, enhances international trust but requires resilient fuel-cycle logistics. Ensuring diversified fuel suppliers and clearly articulated strategies for spent-fuel management will be essential over the fleet’s 60- to 80-year operational life.

Second, as more renewable energy is integrated into the grid, nuclear power plants will need to operate flexibly to maintain system stability. This will require advanced forecasting, large-scale storage solutions, and coordinated dispatch strategies.

A third challenge is ensuring that the nuclear workforce remains locally grounded and resilient. While Emiratization in the sector has advanced, retaining specialised talent requires clear career progression pathways, applied research opportunities, and continued collaboration with global operators, research laboratories, and regulatory bodies. Sustaining this talent pipeline is vital not only for Barakah’s long-term success but also for future reactor projects or advanced nuclear applications.

These considerations are particularly important as the UAE explores a potential second nuclear plant, which has been signalled in government discussions and energy planning reports. A second site could reinforce fleet-level operations, enhance outage scheduling, expand industrial applications, and deepen domestic supply-chain maturity. If pursued, the contracting and technology-selection process will become a significant geopolitical signal in the Gulf energy landscape, particularly as other states in the region show growing interest in nuclear power.

The UAE is now uniquely positioned to shape the trajectory of civil nuclear development in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Establishing a GCC Nuclear Regulation and Safety Forum, anchored in FANR’s experience, could enable shared emergency preparedness frameworks, cybersecurity standards, and safety culture norms. Similarly, coordinating research networks in radiopharmaceutical production, nuclear-enabled agriculture, and advanced reactor technologies could support regional industrial integration. These collaborative frameworks would not only enhance security and performance standards but also reduce duplication of effort among neighboring states.

Looking ahead, discussions around small modular reactors (SMR) and microreactors are expanding globally. These technologies offer potential applications for district cooling, desalination, and off-grid industrial clusters. For the UAE, SMRs could complement rather than replace large-scale reactors. Any adoption pathway must be grounded in demonstrated vendor maturity, regulatory readiness, supply-chain localization, and long-term cost predictability. The UAE’s existing regulatory and operational foundation gives it a comparative advantage in evaluating such options pragmatically rather than rhetorically.

The UAE’s experience demonstrates that new nuclear programmes can be delivered on time, integrated into a national climate strategy, and used to catalyse broader scientific and economic development. The challenge now is to advance from successful construction to strategic expansion, ensuring fuel-cycle resilience, embedding research translation, supporting workforce depth, and strengthening regional cooperation mechanisms. If these next steps are taken with the same planning discipline that characterised the first phase, the UAE will not only retain its role as the GCC’s leader in civil nuclear power but also provide a model for how emerging economies can balance energy security with strategic ambition in a decarbonizing world.

Tahir Azad, PhD, is a Research Scholar in the Department of Politics at the University of Reading. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Energy Security and Strategic Ambition: Evaluating the UAE’s Nuclear Journey was originally published on Global Security Review.

The near completion of Iran’s nuclear weapon brings to mind another rogue state’s activities. In 2006, after years of global efforts aimed at preventing the Kim regime from obtaining nuclear weapons, North Korea (DPRK) conducted its first nuclear test. Today, the DPRK has an estimated 50 nuclear weapons and fissile material for 6 or 7 more.

An in-depth comparison of US engagement with Iran and the DPRK’s nuclear programs requires a much longer paper. However, a brief comparative analysis of American deterrence of these adversaries is possible. Applying national interests, objectives, and activities, a methodology employed by decision analysis experts yields interesting results.

Globally, the United States has an enduring interest in safeguarding its national security and sovereignty. Underneath this enduring interest, it has a core objective of defending allies and partners, including through credible deterrence (e.g., preventing conventional and/or nuclear attacks on allies and partners by the DPRK, China, Russia, and Iran). Other major American objectives include safeguarding the free flow of commerce, countering transnational threats, preventing regional domination or aggression, and advancing nonproliferation.

The United States advances deterrence through a range of activities, including the presence of its own military assets and security cooperation with allies and partners. In the Indo-Pacific, this includes mutual defense treaties with Australia, the Philippines; South Korea, and Japan (the latter two of which are explicitly covered by the US nuclear umbrella); arms sales to Taiwan; and military exercises with allies.

More recently, the Trump administration emphasized increased allied defense spending to support “burden-sharing.” Given the limitations of the American industrial base, this is necessary even as the US maintains efforts to prevent Chinese and North Korean aggression.

Deterrence against North Korea is successful insofar as it keeps the North from invading the South or launching nuclear strikes on US Indo-Pacific allies. However, this deterrence is increasingly complicated by Chinese and Russian protection of the DPRK through mutual defense treaties.

This lends greater urgency to the American call for allies to increase defense spending, as there is a real risk of simultaneous conflict with China and North Korea, a scenario requiring substantial military assets in the region. Fulfilling the objective of regional deterrence also requires containing aggression from adversaries and bolstering security cooperation with allies and partners.

The United States supports deterrence in the Middle East by deploying its military forces and cooperating with allies and partners. However, regional deterrence, which does not formally extend the US nuclear umbrella to regional allies and partners (including Israel), often manifests as kinetic operations against adversaries, whether through security assistance or direct attacks. Thus, in the Middle East, deterrence also means advancing the goals of counter proliferation and degrading terror groups who threaten allies.

Unlike in the Indo-Pacific, where the United States prefers to contain aggression and expansion from nuclear-armed adversaries without firing a shot, in the Middle East, it will employ kinetic means to fulfill its objectives. For decades, the United States deterred Iran through sanctions, negotiations, and the threat of military action. It was when President Trump believed Iran’s uranium enrichment program was “at its highest levels and…unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons” that the US conducted kinetic attack.

The deep rifts in Middle East politics complicates the activities needed to maintain deterrence in the region. Prospects for security cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states, for example, are challenging given the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Israel’s recent strike against Hamas in Qatar.

Deterrence must also account for energy security concerns, given that US attempts to contain a nuclear-armed Iran may lead the regime to weaponize its control over the Straits of Hormuz. It is also unclear how far back American strikes set Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran’s proxy network persists, they can also commit further violence against the United States, its allies, and partners through attacks on military, commercial, and civilian targets.

None of these challenges are simple. In the coming years American deterrence guarantees to allies and partners may look very different as the nation shifts focus to the homeland and the Indo-Pacific. It remains to be seen how this imperative is realized in the forthcoming National Defense Strategy. Some critics note that, in practice, the United States remains heavily focused on the Middle East and Europe. Much of the ability to deter Iran and North Korea will be determined by these larger strategic shifts.

As American decision-makers face questions about effectively deploying American power across the globe, analyzing national interests, objectives, and activities can provide a helpful framework. Assessing the requirements needed to advance larger regional goals brings trade-offs into focus, better preparing the American warfighter for multiple threat scenarios. In short, this approach can yield meaningful results for those in the decision-making chair at critical moments when faced with complex problems, including maintaining credible deterrence.

Nathan Heath is an analyst at NSI. Views expressed are his own.

Deterrence of North Korea and Iran: Interests-Objectives-Analysis Framework was originally published on Global Security Review.

With the record high gas prices of this past summer still on the minds of American voters, some in Congress are hoping to revive an old proposal that they claim would help prevent future pain at the pump. Known as the No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act (NOPEC), the measure, if passed, could unfortunately seriously backfire, creating more volatility in the oil market as well as hurting the American economy and international relations.

From my time in Congress, I recall many instances of knee jerk reactions to “do something” legislatively even if the result would have unintended effects of harming American interests. The NOPEC bill fits that example. Both during the lame duck session and in the new Congress come January, this counterproductive policy should be rejected.

While naming a culprit may be easy, the reality is that oil markets are notoriously complicated. At a time when the United States and European Union are tightening sanctions on Russian oil exports in response to the Ukraine conflict, policymakers should be looking to promote stability in oil markets and encourage domestic American production.

Yet despite this reality, some lawmakers are pointing to NOPEC as a possible tool to better control oil markets. Passage of NOPEC would do the opposite, not only creating volatility in oil supplies but also removing a safety net of sorts that prevents prices from dropping precipitously or spiking astronomically. This stability allows for planned investments to be made in future American production capacity, which benefits U.S. energy exporters and our European allies who face an uncertain energy future.

Passage of NOPEC could also further upset already strained U.S.-Saudi relations and create a spiral where American companies doing business in Saudi Arabia are retaliated against and vice versa. In the wake of an awkward diplomatic meeting earlier this year between President Biden and Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman and with American and Saudi energy production efforts so closely intertwined, this could jeopardize domestic refining capacity and oil supplies.

Operating U.S. refineries are already running full-out, at about 95% of total capacity and the Motiva refinery in Texas – which is the largest oil refinery in the U.S can process a staggering 607,000 barrels per day (b/d) – is Saudi-owned. Meanwhile, while U.S. crude oil production has risen to 11.9 million b/d, almost back to its pre-pandemic high, Saudi Arabia is still the largest OPEC petroleum exporter to the United States, accounting for 5% of U.S. total petroleum imports.

Additionally, NOPEC’s broad anti-trust mandate could deter foreign investment in the U.S and lead to greater legal liabilities. An initial version of the bill that was introduced in 2000 proposed to strip state immunity from national oil companies of OPEC member countries, a theme that has carried through the no less than 16 iterations of the bill that has been introduced since.

This could also lead to “tit-for-tat” laws or sanctions that target American energy firms. A Rice University Baker Institute report suggests that a retaliatory OPEC “could include avoiding dollar transactions and the American financial system,” creating a strong economic blow. Added to those business concerns are the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s warning that suing nations over alleged oil market tampering could be met with similar lawsuits against the U.S., its agents, and possibly even the military.

Further efforts that would allow federal prosecutors to sue other nations under the assertion of unfair competition, despite the fact that this action is already allowed under the Sherman Antitrust Act, could also prove problematic. The text of S.977 would “make oil-producing and exporting cartels illegal” which, upon passage, arguably would place OPEC’s twenty-one (21) sovereign nations, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Mexico, in violation of US statutes and complicate international relations.

Would OPEC accept US claims their pre-existing agreements are illegal?  More importantly, is the US willing to go to war against some countries that are considered allies to impose NOPEC law on OPEC nations?  At a minimum, NOPEC would result in market disruptions resulting in higher prices and at worst could result in a second oil embargo.

Solving energy supply and oil prices won’t come from passing NOPEC. In fact, the measure is likely to create more unpredictability and more negative consequences. If lawmakers really want to help, they should pursue efforts that strengthen American energy production and infrastructure, creating more long-term supply and a hedge against OPEC production. It’s time to hang up the idea of NOPEC and focus on more helpful solutions.

Lame Duck Energy Bill Threatens International Relations was originally published on Global Security Review.

Currently, Russia holds a third of Europe’s gas imports and imports 140 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas annually through Ukrainian pipelines. The two most important reasons for Russia’s gas monopoly are economical and practical: distance and cost. Geographic proximity makes Russian gas not only more reliable than other competitors but also cheaper and closer.

Why Build Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream?

The pre-existing monopoly begs the question of why build two new pipelines, both of which have attracted ardent criticism from the United States and certain European countries. Many critics claim, for example, that Russia has the potential to exploit that energy dominance for political gain. Others argue that Nord Stream 2 would supply gas to Germany first, effectively removing other EU nations from the decision-making process and exacerbate inter-EU tensions.

However, building two new pipelines broadly serves Russian interests. Both projects not only cement Russia’s monopoly on gas but also open the door towards Russian gas exports reaching China as well as seize a share of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) market. Nord Stream 2 mainly helps Russia export gas to the northern European market and bypass Ukraine and the corresponding political situation there. TurkStream also plays a role in circumventing Ukraine, carrying gas to south and southern Europe and Turkey.

To answer critics’ concerns about energy security, many European politicians point to proposed legislation that aims to prevent Russian market manipulation, long-term goals to address the security of supply challenges, and diversification away from fossil fuels. The Third Energy Package, for example, aims to liberalize and integrate natural gas markets—ultimately aiming to break up the Russian-state own monopoly (i.e., Gazprom and Rosneft).

The EU’s Energy Union strategy further commits to ensuring that every EU state has access to at least three different sources of gas. Additionally, many EU states are moving away from fossil fuels. Some Baltic states, for example, are developing LNG terminals (ex: the Klaipeda LNG terminal) to diversify their gas imports and supporting low-carbon energy sources.

Despite these attempts to become more energy-dependent, Europe truly does not have a leg to stand on. Up until 2030, Russian pipeline gas and global LNG will remain the two main sources of gas for the EU. Further, no significant pipeline gas that does not already originate in Russia will be available in the EU before 2025.

TurkStream

After the cancellation of Russia’s South Stream project in 2014, Russia quickly moved to replace one pipeline project with another. The South Stream project was led by Gazprom and aimed to transport Russian gas across the Black Sea to Bulgaria and, from there, disperse within Europe. However, in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent invasion of Eastern Ukraine, along with a regulatory dispute between Gazprom and the EU, the project was canceled.

In response, Gazprom signed a Memorandum of Understanding with BOTAS Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (Turkish state-owned gas company) to construct TurkStream in December 2014. In 2019, TurkStream was officially completed and on January 8, 2020, Russian President Putin and Turkish President Erdogan inaugurated TurkStream and certified it ready for use.

Nord Stream 2

In 2012, after the successful construction of the initial Nord Stream pipeline, Gazprom also moved to expand to additional lines (later named Nord Stream 2). In 2015, Gazprom signed an agreement with Royal Dutch Shell, E.On, OMV, and Engie to build Nord Stream 2. Poland blocked this plan in 2017—leading Gazprom to develop a financing plan with Wintershall, Engie, OMV, Royal Dutch Shell, and Uniper instead.

In 2018, Germany approved Nord Stream 2’s construction permits in German waters. Although the U.S. has threatened sanctions on companies that work with Gazprom—causing Allseas to pull its support—Gazprom has claimed that it would complete construction alone and would finish by 2020.

Many observers note that TurkStream is likely a counter to the original U.S. backed Southern Gas project, which was developing a pipeline from Azerbaijan to Europe and that Nord Stream 2 is a bid to replace Ukraine as a transit state. Not surprisingly, members of the U.S. government have expressed concern over TurkStream and Nord Stream 2—claiming that it threatens European energy independence and security.

Many Central and Eastern European states see the pipeline as an attempt to undermine European unity and bypass transit states such as Poland and Ukraine—also depriving those countries of transit fees. However, Germany has argued that the pipeline was purely market-driven. In response to threatened U.S. sanctions, Germany warned the U.S. to “mind its own business.”

Together, TurkStream and Nord Stream 2 provide Russia with over 140 bcm in capacity—amounting to almost the same as Ukraine’s total transit capacity. TurkStream not only provides Russia with a stronger monopoly on gas in southern and southeastern Europe but also strengthens an already-strong Turkish-Russian relationship. Given the financial incentives to be Europe’s new gas hub, it is no wonder that Nord Stream 2 has also led to a stronger German-Russian relationship.

Russia’s Energy Dominance: Reinforced

The construction of TurkStream and Nord Stream 2 reinforce Russia’s dominance of the energy market, even though it may not lead to the political leverage that many critics expect. With one pipeline already completed and another expected in 2020, both TurkStream and Nord Stream 2 illustrate Russia solidifying its grip on the European market while also expanding its reach to other markets. This monopoly on gas is strengthened by Europe’s gas market—where demand is only growing.

In 2019, Europe imported 123 bcm of gas last year, nearly twice as much as 2017. Further, critics who point to energy security and independence, such as the U.S. do not affect policy in practice. While sanctions against working with Gazprom have somewhat of an effect in cooling interest, in this case, economic interests trump security interests. Russia’s geographic proximity to Europe means that Russian gas will be closer and cheaper than other competitors for the foreseeable future.

However, while Europe’s gas markets may be inherently dependent on Russian gas, Russia is similarly reliant on the European market as a buyer for its gas. In short, Europe is Russia’s most important market for Russian natural gas exports. This limits Russia’s ability to manipulate energy politically without severely compromising its economic relations with Europe. Therefore, Russian renewed energy dominance in Europe is certainly on the horizon with the imminent arrival of Nord Stream 2 and preexisting TurkStream. However, it is not nearly as concerning as Russophobic critics would have the public believe.

Russia’s Renewed Energy Dominance in Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

Yet, even a cursory glance at the project’s participants unveils the complex, if not confounding, geopolitical, and security ramifications that await the pipeline. Negotiations over the Afghan portion have been particularly contentious, with the Taliban taking a capricious approach toward the initiative, vowing once to defend, and once to destroy, the integral project.

Transnational efforts, led by the Asian Development Bank, the project’s promoter and adviser, renewed the dormant dream, pushing forth a narrative that ancillary benefits await each of the stakeholders involved.

For Turkmenistan, TAPI offers an opportunity to diversify the country’s export markets for its’ natural gas. Although global demand for natural gas persists, particularly in neighboring South Asia, the number of customers able to tap into the abundant supply in landlocked Turkmenistan has been limited due to a shortage of supply routes.

Sales to Russia, once the biggest customer of Turkmen gas, have waned due to pricing disputes, making China the current top importer. Nevertheless, as lucrative as the Chinese markets are, fear of overdependence on a handful of powerful hegemons has compelled Ashgabat to make pipeline projects like TAPI a foreign policy priority.

However, perhaps no country stands to gain, or lose, more from TAPI than Afghanistan. As a necessary transit point, initiatives like TAPI demonstrate Afghanistan’s potential to boost badly needed government revenues as a regional energy transit hub. With nearly $400 million (USD) in transit fees at stake, Afghanistan simultaneously serves as the project’s greatest benefactor and its’s biggest bottleneck as fears mount regarding the Afghan government’s ability to protect the pipeline.

For both India and Pakistan, participation in TAPI is driven by a need to satiate local demand for natural gas. Both countries are expected to purchase over 40% of the gas pumped through TAPI. Such access would likely alleviate acute supply shortages in Pakistan. Shortages have spurred a major energy crisis in the volatile southern provinces of Balochistan and Sindh, where chronic power outages have decimated local industry and hindered the growth outlook for both provinces.

In response to security risks, observers have suggested that Pakistan’s dire energy crisis would dissuade temptation to “weaponize” the pipeline in the event of armed conflict with India, as well as ensure that the Taliban, which Pakistan retains a considerable amount of influence over, not interfere in the operation of the pipeline.

Yet, it is this very concern that has informed India’s stance on the viability of the project, which has been idyllically dubbed the ‘peace pipeline.’ Estimates suggest that India could satisfy up to one-third of its gas needs via TAPI, but such exposure would likely foster dependence on dangerous overland routes in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Hence, ambivalence on the part of the Modi government has generated speculation that India prefers Turkmen gas to be routed via Iran. Although this route would likely incur a higher cost than present estimate for the TAPI pipeline of $10 billion, India’s justification of any premium would be reflected in the reliability of such a pipeline.

Thus, New Delhi’s lack of confidence in Islamabad to securitize TAPI remains an impediment, if not a deal-breaker. Threats emanating from within Pakistan and from the Taliban have coerced India to seek insurance by forging regional projects with neighboring Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, and Bangladesh for its’ energy needs.

Furthermore, current events in the region have complicated the pipeline’s progression. Tensions in the region have seldom been higher with India’s repeal of Kashmir’s autonomous status, followed by the abrupt cancellation of U.S.-Taliban peace talks. Both events could forestall any concrete steps toward operationalizing the TAPI pipeline.

Construction, which first commenced on the Turkmenistan portion in 2015, has been relatively opaque, with little information regarding progress on the Afghan or Pakistani sections of the pipeline. Several delays have imperiled earlier estimates that suggested the pipeline could be operational by 2020.

With an estimated 12,000 jobs and lucrative transit fees for Afghanistan, and energy access on the line for India and Pakistan, TAPI, in theory, could have satiated each stakeholder’s needs. Such conditions suggest that before its’ lofty ambitions can be realized, TAPI will have to contend with the inconvenient whims of mistrust and suspicion in the neighborhood of South Asia.

TAPI Pipeline Puts South Asia’s Prosperity in Peril was originally published on Global Security Review.

Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have all expressed concerns that their dependence on the Russian power grid network increases their exposure to Russian interference in their internal affairs and presents a grave threat to their sovereignty and national security.

As Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite noted, “that tool of blackmail, which was used [by Russia] to buy our politicians and meddle in our politics, will no longer exist,” should Lithuania acquire energy independence.

On June 28, 2018, Poland, the three Baltic States, and the European Union signed a deal in which all Baltic electricity systems will be connected to the Continental European Network (CEN) via Poland by 2025. The agreement is a significant step towards eliminating the Baltic states’ dependence on Russian energy, further bolstering their sovereignty as well as security.

The Polish-Lithuanian link will integrate the various power systems.

The Polish-Lithuanian interconnection, in particular, will serve to improve supply reliability for Baltic consumers, as well as open up new opportunities for energy trade and competition. The LitPol Link was set up to facilitate this integration. LitPol Link is co-owned by Polish and Lithuanian system operators.

In total, the project cost 494.4 million euros, with 244.5 million of those euros coming from the E.U.’s European Regional Development Fund. Using this system, Lithuania, as well as other Baltic countries, will be able to cultivate more diversity amongst their suppliers.

Russian actions spurred this move towards Baltic energy independence.

There is always a motivating factor, domestically or internationally, when there is a significant shift in global energy politics. In this instance, the motivator is Russian expansionism and aggression.

When Russia cut off gas flow to Ukraine in response to late payments from Ukrainian gas company Naftogaz in 2015, it was a warning signal to other states that were reliant on Russian gas. If it could happen to Ukraine, what was to say it wouldn’t happen to Lithuania or Latvia?

Since 2015, both Lithuania and Poland have worked to construct liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals to import such gas from other countries like the United States and atar. However, even with LNG terminals, much of these countries remained heavily reliant on Russian energy.

The deal struck in late June 2018 took nine years to negotiate, revealing not only the complexity of the negotiations but the involved states’ dedication to this shift in policy, as well. One of the reasons for the deal’s timing was impending E.U. funding deadlines, in addition to potential Russian upgrades which would allow Russia to decouple from the Baltics unilaterally.

Russia remains Europe’s largest supplier of natural gas.

Interestingly, Russia has never threatened to cut off power to the Baltic states. As these negotiations have entered into their final phases, Russia has neglected to speak out against this shift aggressively. Why? Perhaps the main reason is that while Russia does face being kicked out of the Baltic states, Gazprom, Russia’s top gas producer, is still Europe’s largest supplier.

In the first half of 2018, Gazprom increased gas production by 8.7 percent, with exports to Europe rising by 5.8 percent. Gazprom’s President, Aleksey Miller, reported that gas exports to Europe could reach a record high of 200 billion cubic meters. Why worry about three small states when you already supply most of the European continent?

While Baltic states may be excited about a move towards more energy independence in Europe, the Russian share of the European gas market increased to 34 percent last year. It may seem more reasonable for these countries to see this new opportunity as an option to diversify amongst suppliers, but Europe is caught between a rock and a hard place when it comes to gas diversification.

Russian gas will always be cheaper and more reliable than LNG from other countries such as the United States and Qatar. As such, are the Baltic states moving away from Russian reliance, or are they just shifting towards a new political reality where a wall of European bureaucracy serves to mitigate the immediate threat of Russian influence?

Poland and Baltic States Reduce Reliance on Russian Energy was originally published on Global Security Review.