Russia’s Strategic Mistakes and Their Consequences

Russia’s decision to attack Ukraine in 2022 was clearly a strategic blunder. Russian President Vladimir Putin believed he could seize control of Ukraine with a swift military strike, install a government aligned with Russian interests, and prevent the admission of Ukraine into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, the invasion stalled and is now widely seen as a disaster for Russia.

Now, two years after the start of the war, Russia has neither installed a government aligned with its interests in Ukraine nor succeeded in increasing its own security. On the contrary, the war led to economic sanctions, severed Russia’s relationship with the West, and diminished Russia’s military reputation, which was once formidable to its rivals.                                           Putin also underestimated the probability that he would require assistance from China, Iran, and North Korea to maintain the fight, and, incorrectly, assumed that NATO member-states would fail to act in effective coordination and support Ukrainian independence. Russia is now trapped in a prolonged war, Russia is beholden to its junior partners, and the Russian military is now proven to be largely ineffective. NATO is now working more closely together than it has since the Soviet Union collapsed and two new countries (Finland and Sweden) are now members of the alliance. Entering the war in Ukraine was a strategic mistake for Russia, which has exposed the country as an aggressor that is driving defensive preparation in Europe.

The West has imposed more than 11,000 sanctions on Russia, about 3,500 Western companies left the country, and nearly 1,000 Russian elites left their country. Russia’s relations with the West have deteriorated significantly, leading to political and economic isolation from the free world.

These strategic mistakes not only weakened Russia’s competitive position but also revealed its wider vulnerabilities. Russia is now caught in a prolonged war from which it is difficult to exit with dignity. Recognizing this opportunity, the United States and its allies are unlikely to allow Russia to easily escape this crisis. As a result, Russia is being forced to move closer to China and regional powers such as Iran and North Korea. Although this proximity is necessary for Russia economically and strategically, it primarily benefits China and increases China’s influence in global competition. Therefore, in this geopolitical game, Russia has not only failed to achieve its goals, but has also significantly fallen behind its competitors, diminishing its prospects of emerging as a great power in the international system.

America’s Strategic Mistakes and Their Consequences

The war in Ukraine is not in the United States’ best interest because it distracts from America’s larger effort to deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan and elsewhere in Asia. This distraction is allowing China to expand their influence globally, especially in areas where American influence is waning.

Early in the war, the United States tried to weaken Russia through extensive economic sanctions. Although these sanctions damaged the Russian economy temporarily, they did not achieve American objectives in the long run as Russia found new outlets for its energy products. Unexpectedly, Western pressure brought China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia closer together, strengthening China’s position vis-à-vis Russia—making China the senior partner.

The increasing economic and military cooperation between these countries helped China expand its influence directly and indirectly. Because the United States was deterred by Russian nuclear threats from providing Ukraine war-winning military tools, the war has dragged on—all to the benefit of China.

America’s distraction by Ukraine, the conflict in Israel, the presidential election, and other issues is leading the United States to neglect long-term strategic threats. As a result, while China, avoiding direct military conflicts, is increasing its economic and technological power globally. The disastrous American withdrawal from Afghanistan is attributed by some analysts as an important reason why Vladimir Putin thought he could get away with an invasion of Ukraine—the perception of American weakness.

The sum of these strategic mistakes puts America in a position where Russia and the United States are weakened by the war. When America is seen as weak, anti-American groups in different parts of the world see an opportunity. The same is true of all of America’s enemies.

China’s Opportunity in Global Competition and Its Benefits

Unlike Russia and America, China gained a significant advantage in global competition by choosing a strategy of self-restraint and prioritizing economic growth and technological advancement since the war began. Despite predictions that China would invade Taiwan because the United States is focused on Ukraine—and Israel—China’s lack of military action is a sign of this country’s smart and accurate calculations about any such invasion. By pursuing an economic oriented approach, China is focusing on addressing its own internal economic issues while trying to outpace the United States. By focusing at the operational level, avoiding military conflicts, China is using this time to petter position itself for a war that it too sees as likely.

China’s strategic partnerships and economic engagement, especially with developing countries, are gradually changing the balance of global power. This change is evidenced by the increase in the number of countries that are willing to interact with China on its terms and see it as a balancer against Western influence. By capitalizing on the strategic mistakes of other great powers and presenting itself as a champion of global peace and economic development, China is positioning itself as a leader in the new world order.

The Future Perspective of Global Competition

However, America still remains the greatest of great powers because it still carries the most influence in world affairs. Chinese power has, however, increased, leading Chinese leaders to be more sensitive to the expression position in the international system. Contrary to the prevailing opinion, the war in Ukraine does not benefit the United States. It benefits China.

China continues to strengthen its position and turned the game in its favor by taking advantage of the strategy of restraint and economic growth. The United States has inadvertently helped strengthen China’s position by focusing too much on Russia and the Ukraine war. Russia is clearly falling behind its great power peers.

If China continues with its current policies, it should avoid conflict and continue to grow economically and in its influence over other nations. There are still opportunities to change China’s trajectory.

America should adjust its approach by focusing on its vital interests and associated threats—China—instead of focusing on lesser interests. Additionally, preventing the increase of China’s influence in various regions of the world, especially in Asia and Africa, should be the priority of American foreign policy. It is not too late, but the time to act is now.

Dawood Tanin is a professor of political science at a private university in Afghanistan. The views expressed are his own.

The Ukraine War: Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

Two issues are at play today. First, a direct military confrontation between the United States and China appears inevitable, despite the economic entanglement that was intended to prevent it. Second, two nations that are so closely tied economically have rarely waged war, leaving such conflict’s second and third order effects unknown. Should the United States follow Reagan’s approach and challenge China’s economic rise, there may be a path to avoiding conflict. Oil may be a good place to begin such an effort because China is so highly dependent on oil imports.

President Reagan began by initiating a change in US oil price policy that commenced what National Security Council official Roger Robinson called a policy of “economic warfare” against the Soviet Union. One of Reagan’s first moves was to decontrol the price of oil. This lowered the price of oil and markedly decreased the earnings of the Soviet government, which relied heavily on oil and gas sales to generate foreign currency reserves.

A second move was to encourage the expansion of American oil and gas production over the long-term—driving down prices. In 1984, President Reagan persuaded the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to markedly increase oil production by seven million barrels a day, again seriously reducing Moscow’s export earnings. As an importer of oil, driving prices down would help, not hurt, the Chinese economy. Thus, the United States would need to put Chinese oil imports at risk and more expensive.

China is growing its ability to project military power astride key maritime choke points which see the transit of 60 percent of global oil production—58.9 million barrels of oil per day. This includes four choke points where China is seeking a military presence. These include: the Straits of Hormuz (with the help of Iran); the Straits of Malacca (through military construction in the South China Sea); Bab el-Mandeb (with Iranian/Houthi help); and the Suez Canal.

While China fears an oil cut-off during a military conflict, it appears China is seeking to turn the tables on the United States. As part of China’s belt and roads initiative, overland routes for petroleum export are under construction, with a specific design to prevent American interference.

Given the stakes, the United States must act with urgency and circumspection as it looks for ways to economically disentangle from China—a country which clearly seeks to supplant American global influence. As the Chairman of the Committee on the Present Danger warned in a recent “Xi’s Pearl Harbor”  broadcast, many American institutions may not be up to the challenge. Employing oil as a deterrent force is no simple task.

If China were to achieve a stranglehold on oil tanker transportation, America’s NATO allies stand to suffer most. Michael Klein and Robert Zubrin point out that it is no coincidence that each recession since 1975 began with sharp spikes in oil prices.

Currently, the United States is the largest oil producer in the world despite the Biden administration’s efforts to constrain oil production. Should administration’s change or President Biden change his position on hydrocarbons, the United States could, in a time of crisis, ramp up production to counter Chinese efforts to constrain oil flows.

There is real value in the United States securing the sea-lanes and thwarting Chinese plans to build overseas bases at key the key geographic points mentioned above. One of China’s weaknesses is that it uses economics in a purely coercive way that seem attractive at first, but always carry heavy burden on the back end. States participating in the Belt and Road Initiative are now coming to regret their decision. Buyer’s regret is a key tool the United States can use to thwart Chinese expansionist efforts.

Maintaining a sufficiently sized and capable US Navy that can patrol sea lanes remains a core capability and coercive tool of American diplomacy. The sight of American warships in foreign ports, rather than Chinese warships, speaks volumes to those countries considering which superpower to support. This is proving particularly true in the Middle East as oil rich nations are reconsidering their cooperation with the United States.

In a future strategic environment where China attempts to use oil as a coercive tool, the United States must be prepared to push back or prevent such a set of circumstances from ever materializing. The time is now for American policymakers to contemplate the role oil can play in economic warfare with China. Xi Jinping is certainly thinking about it.

Peter Huessy is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Economic Deterrence: Chinese Style was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today, international order is breaking down. Essays by Walter Russell Mead, Victor Davis Hanson, and Nadya Schadow, for example, detail this breakdown, and all reference China and Russia as top culprits. The October 2023 report from the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States likewise weighs in with an acute warning that China, Russia, North Korea (DPRK), (and soon Iran) are now in the business of using nuclear weapons as a coercive tool with which to secure their objectives—raising the danger of nuclear conflict to the highest level since the 1945 dawn of the nuclear age.

American nuclear deterrent strategy is part of the international order and prevented direct military conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Throughout the Cold War, American extended deterrence over NATO and allies in the Pacific prevented, respectively, a Soviet invasion of Western Europe and a repeat of the DPRK invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK).

During the Cold War’s nearly five-decade-long struggle, the US faced one nuclear-armed peer adversary. In  2022 as the head of US Strategic Command warned, the US will soon face not one but two nuclear-armed peer competitors and do so for the first time in its history.

The unique dangers of this environment are reflected by the manner with which Russia and China see deterrence. Their goals are not designed to prevent war, but to embolden both nations to successfully engage in aggression—such as against Ukraine and potentially against Taiwan. Their nuclear capability acts as an umbrella under which they succeed in preventing the United States from defending the rules-based order. If the US stands down, military aggression succeeds and is not deterred.

Today’s emerging strategic environment contains a change that is not fully appreciated. American conventional military superiority, for example, is believed to help guarantee American and allied security. The US kicked Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991, defeated the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, and decimated ISIS a decade later—all through conventional military superiority. American strategy, then and now, relies on superior technology and precision weapons, all backed by the nation’s nuclear arsenal.

However, when President Yeltsin decreed in April 1999 that the Russian military would develop highly accurate and very low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons, he set Russia on a path that now enables President Vladimir Putin to dominate warfare in Europe. China is in the process of adopting a strategy that threatens to introduce limited nuclear strikes into the conventional battlefield mix—“escalate to win”—leading the former commander of US Strategic Command to conclude that American conventional battlefield superiority “cannot hold.”

Without a robust and credible nuclear deterrent to restrain adversaries from using nuclear weapons, American plans to prevail on the conventional battlefield will no longer hold. And equally invalid is the Global Zero assumption that the US can prevail on the battlefield if the United States relies on conventional forces in a conflict that goes nuclear.

What then can the US make of the push by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran to rewrite the rules of international behavior? That is, what should Americans make of what Russia describes as the unfair unipolar agenda and Iran describes as the great “global arrogance”? Americans should certainly worry that the nation is unprepared for the years ahead.

China’s growing nuclear arsenal emboldens President Xi Jinping to run roughshod over the South China Sea and its Philippine neighbors—flying military aircraft and steaming naval vessels recklessly in international waters. China may also be assisting Venezuela’s effort to grab oil-rich areas of Guyana. This is all taking place at a time when China is seeking bases on the Persian Gulf and near Gibraltar.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and regular threats to use nuclear weapons need little description. This is at a time when Russia maintains at least a 10 to 1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons over the United States.

Nearly nuclear-armed Iran, partially under the protection of Moscow and Beijing, wages war through Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and the Houthis. The Iranians and their allies are killing thousands, grabbing commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf, assassinating regime opponents, and ransoming hostages. The American response is, at best, muted.

North Korea recklessly and with impunity fires hundreds of missiles over Japanese and ROK territory and manages a vast international criminal complex of drug running, human trafficking, and weapons transfers, all while imprisoning millions of its own people in the world’s worse gulag. This is all made possible by China. It is through Chinese banks that North Korea avoids sanctions and finances its ongoing mayhem, including its nuclear program.

In short, the United States faces a daunting challenge that it must manage if the American-led international order has any hope of surviving the growing challenges the mayhem brothers present. The time to act is now.

The Mayhem Brothers: Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.