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		<title>Snapback Sanctions: The Collapse of Western Diplomacy with Iran</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/snapback-sanctions-the-collapse-of-western-diplomacy-with-iran/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/snapback-sanctions-the-collapse-of-western-diplomacy-with-iran/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sidra Shaukat]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Nov 2025 13:36:07 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31779</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On September 28, 2025, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) re-imposed previously lifted sanctions against Iran. The move occurred when the European powers triggered the “snapback” mechanism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on August 28, 2025. This marked the collapse of a decade-long diplomatic agreement that once promised to restrain Iran’s nuclear [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/snapback-sanctions-the-collapse-of-western-diplomacy-with-iran/">Snapback Sanctions: The Collapse of Western Diplomacy with Iran</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On September 28, 2025, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) re-imposed previously lifted sanctions against Iran. The move occurred when the European powers triggered the “snapback” mechanism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on August 28, 2025.</p>
<p>This marked the collapse of a decade-long diplomatic agreement that once promised to restrain Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The re-imposition of UN sanctions on Iran through the JCPOA snapback mechanism underscores not only Iran’s isolation, but also the failure of Western diplomacy. By abandoning reciprocity, relying on coercion, and aligning with Washington’s “maximum pressure” strategy, European powers not only eroded trust but also exposed their inability to sustain credible agreements, making sanctions a symbol of diplomatic defeat rather than success.</p>
<p>The roots of Iran’s sanctions regime date back to <a href="https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/new-iaea-resolution/">2005</a> when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared Iran non-compliant with its safeguard obligations. In <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2006/sc8928.doc.htm">2006</a>, the UN Security Council unanimously approved sanctions restricting uranium enrichment materials, missile technology, and related financial transactions. Successive resolutions in <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2007/sc8980.doc.htm">2007</a> and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2008/03/251122">2008</a> further tightened the restrictions. In <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2010/sc9948.doc.htm">2010</a>, sanctions were expanded to target Iran’s <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/international-sanctions-iran">oil revenues and banking sector</a>, linking them directly to proliferation concerns.</p>
<p>These sanctions were lifted under the <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf">JCPOA</a> in 2015, an agreement between Iran and world powers. The agreement also included a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/27/middleeast/iran-snapback-nuclear-sanctions-intl">snapback clause</a>; if Iran violated its obligations, any party to the agreement can activate the snapback mechanism and re-impose sanctions before the expiration date of the JCPOA on October 18, 2025. On <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10330/">August 28, 2025</a>, after repeatedly accusing Iran of non-compliance, the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) activated the snapback mechanism that will re-impose UNSC sanctions on Iran after a 30-day time period.</p>
<p>The snapback that went into effect on September 28, 2025, reinstates UNSC sanctions, originally imposed <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/un-security-council-resolutions-iran">2006–2010</a>. These sanctions include an arms embargo, ban on ballistic missile technology transfers, and restrictions on oil revenues and financial services—including Iran’s central bank. This decision aligns Europe more closely with the American position, despite Washington having withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018. However, the sanctions are not binding on China and Russia, and both remain aligned with Iran and critical of the European move.</p>
<p>Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c39rpgpvwy1o">condemned</a> the sanctions as “unfair, unjust, and illegal.” Tehran <a href="https://en.mehrnews.com/news/237003/Iran-recalls-ambassadors-from-Germany-France-UK?utm_source=politico.eu&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_campaign=politico.eu&amp;utm_referrer=politico.eu">recalled</a> its ambassadors from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany for consultations but <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/iran-president-says-no-plans-to-leave-non-proliferation-treaty-106cec44">clarified</a> it had no immediate plans to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Any further response, however, will likely be determined by the Iranian parliament.</p>
<p>The JCPOA was built on reciprocity and trust, but after the US withdrew, Europe failed to deliver promised economic benefits. Instead, Iran faced escalating accusations and even sabotage.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-07/news/israel-and-us-strike-irans-nuclear-program">Coordinated attacks</a> by the US and Israel in June 2025 on Iran’s nuclear facilities during negotiations eroded any remaining trust in Western intentions. Today, Iranian officials view Western diplomacy less as a pathway to compromise and more as a tool for coercion and deception.</p>
<p>While <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/09/1165974">Russia and China</a> echoed Iran’s position and warned that the European move would fuel further instability in the region, the E3 <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/e3-joint-statement-on-iran-activation-of-the-snapback">maintained</a> that Iran’s nuclear activity crossed red lines. E3 members also <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/09/iran-vote-on-a-draft-resolution-to-delay-the-snapback-of-un-sanctions.php">emphasized</a> that diplomacy was not over by offering to delay sanctions for six months if Iran restored access for inspectors and engaged in talks with the US.</p>
<p>The reactivation of sanctions primarily reflects Europe’s failure to secure diplomatic gains after the 12-day war earlier this year. Western powers assumed Iran’s weakened position, given that <a href="https://www.brandeis.edu/stories/2025/june/inside-iran.html">internal unrest, economic strain, and military pressure</a> would push it toward compromise. Instead, Iran resisted demands for <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2025-06/zero-enrichment-unnecessary-unrealistic-objective-prevent-iranian-bomb">zero enrichment</a> and even presented <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/19/iran-hits-out-ahead-of-un-vote-on-nuclear-sanctions">partial solutions</a> at the UN, which were rejected. The E3’s alignment with Washington now resembles Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy, raising the risk of further escalation rather than resolution.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the first brunt of these sanctions will fall on ordinary Iranians. Currency devaluation, unemployment, and economic stagnation will intensify along with the hardships caused by protests and war. The Iranian banking sector, already fragile, faces further isolation. Yet for Iran’s leadership, these sanctions may not dramatically alter strategic calculations. Having endured American sanctions since 2018, Tehran has adapted by relying increasingly on its <a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2018/irans-eastern-strategy/">Look East</a> strategy to deepen economic and diplomatic ties with China and Russia.</p>
<p>The energy sector will again come under strain, but much depends on how aggressively the US enforces secondary sanctions, particularly against China, one of Iran’s largest oil buyers. If oil exports continue through alternative routes, Iran will remain financially afloat, albeit constrained. Thus, the sanctions are more likely to weaken Iran internally while leaving its external policies largely intact.</p>
<p>Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of the snapback is the possibility of renewed Israeli strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. In June 2025, Israel used IAEA findings as justification for bombing Iranian facilities, sparking a costly 12-day conflict. Israel could again resume attack under the guise of re-imposition of UNSC sanctions.</p>
<p>The attacks stalled Iran’s nuclear program by roughly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/3/us-says-its-strikes-degraded-irans-nuclear-programme-by-one-to-two-years">two years</a>, thus dragging the US into a wider regional confrontation with little strategic gain. By contrast, the JCPOA achieved restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program without military confrontation and provided economic benefits and political openings for both sides. It shows that diplomacy slows proliferation more effectively and cheaply than war. Yet with sanctions restored, Israel may once again seek a military solution, raising the risk of escalation across the region.</p>
<p>The re-imposition of UN sanctions through the snapback mechanism signals both the collapse of trust in the JCPOA framework and the deepening rift between Iran and the West. For Iran, the sanctions reinforce the perception that Western promises are unreliable, and diplomacy is a trap.</p>
<p>For Europe, the move highlights its limited influence, as it increasingly gravitates toward Washington’s approach rather than pursuing independent solutions. Ultimately, sanctions will punish ordinary Iranians more than they will alter Tehran’s strategic direction. With China and Russia unlikely to comply, Iran’s external lifelines remain intact. What has been lost, however, is the fragile trust built over a decade of negotiations.</p>
<p>The JCPOA demonstrated that diplomacy could restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions without war; the snapback demonstrates how easily that progress is undone. As tensions rise, the international community faces a choice, either double down on coercion or return to diplomacy. The lesson of the past decade is unmistakable: military and economic pressure may delay Iran’s nuclear program, but only diplomacy can stop it.</p>
<p><em>Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at SVI. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Snapback.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="223" height="62" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 223px) 100vw, 223px" /></a></p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/snapback-sanctions-the-collapse-of-western-diplomacy-with-iran/">Snapback Sanctions: The Collapse of Western Diplomacy with Iran</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Why the Houthi Threat Persists</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-the-houthi-threat-persists/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed ELDoh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 31 Jul 2025 10:59:22 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31281</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Despite months of high-profile naval deployments by the United States and its European allies, Yemen’s Houthi movement launched disruptive attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The majority of attacks only stopped in May, after the United States struck Houthi targets to great effect. This led Houthi leaders to [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-the-houthi-threat-persists/">Why the Houthi Threat Persists</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Despite months of high-profile naval deployments by the United States and its European allies, Yemen’s Houthi movement launched disruptive attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The majority of attacks only stopped in May, after the United States struck Houthi targets to great effect. This led Houthi leaders to seek a <a href="https://www.axios.com/2025/05/06/houthi-ceasefire-trump-yemen-attacks">ceasefire</a>.</p>
<p>The ceasefire is fragile and does not apply to all shipping. It was on July 7, 2026, that the <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/other/israel-launches-airstrikes-targeting-yemen-s-houthi-rebels-and-houthis-launch-missile-at-israel/ar-AA1I56QZ?ocid=BingNewsSerp">Houthis struck a Liberian-flagged</a> cargo ship in the Red Sea. The threat to maritime safety and regional security posed by the Houthis persists. Unfortunately, it is difficult to fully eliminate the Houthi threat. This was a challenge even the United States found daunting.</p>
<p>The answer lies not just in firepower or military presence but in the complex interplay of geography, asymmetric warfare, intelligence dynamics, and the limitations of conventional maritime doctrine that lacks ground operations. The Houthi threat endures because it defies traditional military logic and thrives in the gaps of established security architecture. Prior to American airstrikes on Iran, the Houthis <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2025/06/21/houthis-threaten-to-target-us-ships-in-the-red-sea-if-they-participate-in-any-attack-on-ir">announced</a> that they would <a href="https://www.twz.com/news-features/houthis-launch-first-red-sea-attack-on-shipping-since-december">resume</a> attacks on American ships if the US participated in attacks on Iran.</p>
<p>As a proxy for Iran, Houthi aggression now serves as an indicator of Iran’s seriousness in reaching a deal with the United States. There is ample reason to look with great scepticism on any real agreement with Iran.</p>
<p><strong>Naval Power Alone Cannot Neutralize a Land-Based Threat</strong></p>
<p>At the heart of the issue is a basic operational reality; sea power cannot fully degrade threats on land. While advanced naval systems can intercept drones or missiles once launched, they cannot destroy the infrastructure, personnel, or supply chains that enable those attacks. Although airstrikes from the US, the United Kingdom, and Israel took place on Houthi infrastructure, the Houthis’ armed capabilities appear to be far from effectively degraded.</p>
<p>The Houthis operate deep in Yemen’s mountainous interior, far from the coastlines where naval assets patrol. Their launch teams are mobile, embedded in terrain that offers natural cover, and often operate without electronic communications, making them extremely difficult to detect via traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance methods. As a result, naval operations remain fundamentally reactive—capable of defending shipping lanes but unable to effectively dismantle the source of the threat.</p>
<p><strong>A Strategic Use of Terrain and Simplicity</strong></p>
<p>Unlike other non-state actors such as Hamas or Hezbollah, the Houthis have constructed an insurgent model that leverages geography, minimalism, and adaptability. Houthi missile-launch platforms, embedded in Yemen’s mountainous terrain, remain inaccessible to naval gunfire or airstrikes launched from the sea. In addition, many of the launch platforms are highly mobile and concealed within civilian zones. Additionally, the Houthis work in small, independent groups that use very little communication, which helps them avoid being tracked by signals since many of their units do not use radios or satellites, making it hard for traditional signal intelligence to find them.</p>
<p>Among the challenging features of the Houthis operational model is their geographic depth, where their bases are located far inland, making them nearly impossible to strike without a sustained ground presence. Moreover, they have effortless access to the coast. When needed, they move toward Yemen’s Red Sea coast to launch attacks, then retreat to the mountains before they are targeted. This cycle—emerge, strike, vanish—is extremely difficult to disrupt without coordinated land operations or robust human intelligence networks on the ground.</p>
<p><strong>Asymmetric Tools, Strategic Impact</strong></p>
<p>The Houthis do not rely on expensive platforms or sophisticated technology. Their toolkit is based on low-cost, high-impact weapons such as drones, cruise missiles, remote-controlled explosive boats, and sea mines. An example of such a <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/article/ryfmgpnege">cost-effective</a> weapon is found in a $20,000 Houthi missile that was able to bring down a $30 million Reaper drone. Houthis do not need to win a naval war. Their objective is to undermine confidence in the maritime security system and inflate the cost of commercial activity while utilizing relatively low-cost tech in their attacks.</p>
<p>Their asymmetric maritime doctrine relies on the fact that each successful strike, even if not strategically decisive, has a massive economic and psychological impact, including disrupting Suez-bound shipping routes and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/25/houthi-fighters-down-200m-worth-of-us-drones-in-under-six-weeks">reinforcing</a> the narrative of Western and Arab military impotence.</p>
<p>This doctrine aims to disrupt commerce and challenge perception. Even a single drone strike that damages or delays a ship can increase global insurance premiums, force shipping companies to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, and, most importantly, undermine confidence in Western and regional naval dominance.</p>
<p>This economic and psychological toll is precisely the kind of impact the Houthis seek, demonstrating that a modest insurgent force can challenge global trade routes and project defiance against superior powers. In doing so, the Houthis sustain more local support and project symbolic power across the region—energizing other non-state actors and defying deterrence models based on superior force.</p>
<p><strong>Intelligence and Great Power Enablers</strong></p>
<p>What complicates the threat further is the suspected intelligence support the Houthis receive from external state actors—primarily <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/10/26/russia-provides-targeting-support-to-houthi-attacks-on-commercial-shipping/">Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/how-china-turned-the-red-sea-into-a-strategic-trap-for-the-us/">China</a>. Western defense sources indicate that satellite data and targeting assistance is helping the Houthis refine their maritime strikes. Accordingly, the Houthi campaign cannot be understood in isolation from its transnational intelligence ecosystem and other global geopolitical considerations that may include benefiting from the targeting of Western nations’ trade and shipping interests in the Red Sea.</p>
<p>This raises the conflict to a new level. It is no longer just a regional security issue—it is also a theater for proxy competition, where great powers use irregular actors to undermine Western-led security efforts.</p>
<p>This means that efforts to counter the Houthi threat must go beyond naval interception and include counterintelligence operations, diplomatic pressure to isolate enabling states, and cyber defense and spoofing to disrupt targeting. This again requires regional and international security cooperation built upon solid intelligence fusion from all nations at risk from Houthi activities.</p>
<p><strong>The Political and Legal Dilemma of Land Operations</strong></p>
<p>Many military planners agree that land operations are <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-yemen/">required</a> to degrade the Houthi threat. This would require human intelligence operations, special forces, airstrikes on inland launch facilities, and proxy-supported sabotage missions. However, this runs into several challenges, including sovereignty concerns over operating in Yemen, lack of consensus among international actors, and the advancing risk of escalation with Iran.</p>
<p>Thus, the most effective solutions remain off the table politically, leaving naval forces to operate in a defensive posture while the Houthis continue to regenerate their capabilities from protected inland zones. To respond effectively, maritime strategy must evolve from defensive naval posturing to integrated hybrid operations that allow for effective<strong> </strong>land-sea-air doctrine integration.</p>
<p><strong>Mini-Lateral Coalitions vs. Multilateral Limitations</strong></p>
<p>The lack of mini-lateral groupings, such as maritime security coordination between Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, is preventing faster, more focused responses compared to that of the existing larger multilateral effort, like combined maritime forces (CMF). Mini-lateral formats and security frameworks between countries facing the same direct threat from the Houthis will allow for tighter intelligence sharing, better regional synchronization, and security integration, as well as greater operational agility towards theater-specific interoperability. Such mini-lateral coalitions are tactically nimble and more politically aligned than broad-based multilateral organizations such as the CMF or European Union naval force, which are encumbered by consensus-based mandates and diluted strategic clarity.</p>
<p>The lack of mini-lateral coalitions with international legitimacy, institutional resources, and long-term political sustainability only leads to the fact that no security arrangement can fully secure the region’s maritime corridors. This fragmented architecture, where some international actors act swiftly but lack reach and other regional actors have legitimacy but not urgency, has created gaps the Houthis exploit.</p>
<p><strong>Rethinking Strategy in the Red Sea</strong></p>
<p>The Houthis are not invincible, but they are well-adapted to the nature of modern warfare. Their strength lies in asymmetry, geography, and strategic patience, while their adversaries rely on conventional superiority constrained by politics and doctrine.</p>
<p>To change this equation, regional and international actors must shift from defensive naval operations to proactive hybrid strategies; reinvest in human intelligence, covert operations, and regional partnerships; and adapt legal and institutional frameworks to allow pre-emptive action against embedded threats.</p>
<p>A regional mini-lateral coalition of nations surrounding the Red Sea is a must, which then would allow for a tactically agile and politically aligned grouping that can possibly be plugged into US-led multilateral legitimacy and a sustainable burden-sharing operational model that would also build upon the existing US deterrence capabilities within the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Until then, the Houthi threat will persist, not because of its strength, but because the system built to counter it is designed for another kind of war.</p>
<p><em>Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Why-the-Houthi-Threat-Persists.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="198" height="55" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 198px) 100vw, 198px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-the-houthi-threat-persists/">Why the Houthi Threat Persists</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Counter Terror’s High-tech to Low-tech Backfire</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/counter-terrors-high-tech-to-low-tech-backfire/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/counter-terrors-high-tech-to-low-tech-backfire/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Justin Leopold-Cohen]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 28 Oct 2024 12:15:51 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA["Counter-terrorism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[analog communications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[armed assaults]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aum Shinrikyo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bombings]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cellular detection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Center for Strategic and International Studies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[chemical weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[commercial drones]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[couriers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[critical infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cyberattack]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[dead drops]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[dynamite]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[economic impact]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[gasoline]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Terrorism Index]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ground operation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[gunpowder]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hamas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[handwritten notes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hezbollah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[high-tech]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[homeland security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IDF]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[incendiary balloons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[inexpensive methods]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iranian missile attack]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[low-tech]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pagers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[power plant attack]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sarin gas attack]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[technology in warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Terrorism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[terrorism statistics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UAVs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[walkie-talkies]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29212</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As the media ponders how Israel will respond to Iranian missile attack, many remain awestruck by the September 17, 2024, Israeli pager attack and subsequent walkie-talkie detonations that killed or injured Lebanon-based Hezbollah fighters. While the legality of such an attack is debatable, some are considering this a next step in using technology in warfare. [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/counter-terrors-high-tech-to-low-tech-backfire/">Counter Terror’s High-tech to Low-tech Backfire</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As the media ponders how Israel will respond to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/01/politics/iran-missile-attack-israel/index.html">Iranian missile </a>attack, many remain awestruck by the September 17, 2024, Israeli <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/17/middleeast/lebanon-pager-attack-explosions-hezbollah-explainer-intl-latam/index.html">pager attack</a> and subsequent <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz04m913m49o">walkie-talkie </a>detonations that killed or injured Lebanon-based Hezbollah fighters. While the legality of such an attack is debatable, some are considering this a next step in using <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/19/us/politics/israel-hezbollah-pager-attacks.html">technology in warfare</a>. Some are concerned that terrorists may copy the method.</p>
<p>Hezbollah, now attempting to fend off Israel’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/30/world/middleeast/israel-hezbollah-lebanon-ground-invasion.html#:~:text=Sept.%2030,%202024.%20The%20Israeli%20military">September 30 ground operation</a>, is simultaneously working to adapt its own approach to technology, and, if history is any indicator of the future, the terror group will likely continue as it has, answering Israel’s high-tech efforts with ironically harder to trace low-tech options. That Hezbollah was even using pagers was to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/17/middleeast/lebanon-pager-attack-explosions-hezbollah-explainer-intl-latam/index.html">avoid cellular detection</a>. And as they adapt, their communications will likely go even more analog, perhaps communicating only through <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna42853221">couriers</a><u>,</u> as Osama Bin Laden was known to do, or using physical handwritten <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12068534">notes and dead drops</a>, as militant Italian anarchist groups did in the early 2000s.</p>
<p>While the idea of a terrorist group obtaining a more technologically advanced arsenal, such as nuclear or chemical weapons, or instituting a mass cyberattack is daunting, it is not exactly uncommon due to expense and required expertise. What is far more likely is that Hezbollah and other terrorist groups will downgrade methods, opting for cheaper and easier to implement weapons and methods which are more than capable of lethal outcomes.</p>
<p>Time and time again, society has seen heavy damage wrought on person and property via methods that seem relatively primitive.</p>
<p>In 2021, the Gaza-based terrorist group Hamas increased their use of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/16/middleeast/israel-gaza-incendiary-balloons-cmd-intl/index.html">incendiary balloons</a> when attacking Israel, causing more than 20 fires in southern Israel, straining civilian and IDF emergency service resources, and burning upward of 10,000 acres of farmland over the preceding three years. These “balloons are easily constructed and require little setup to launch compared to rockets, which are expensive and time-consuming to produce” but are still incredibly effective.</p>
<p>In 2013, a US power plant in California was victim of an as yet unsolved <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/02/05/272015606/sniper-attack-on-calif-power-station-raises-terrorism-fears">shooting attack</a>, damaging multiple transformers. Surprisingly set up with little to no security, the plant’s perimeter was breached and approximately 100 rounds of high-powered rifle ammunition were fired into 17 transformers before police arrived. The damage was severe enough that to avoid blackouts across Silicon Valley power had to be diverted from other areas during the months-long repair.</p>
<p>While these incidents are high profile, given the critical infrastructure connections, they did not result in any fatalities. However, that is not always the goal of terrorists and is hardly the reality for other common low-tech methods. Shootings, bombings, and melee attacks continue to make up the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/tactics-and-targets-domestic-terrorists">overwhelming majority</a> of terrorist attacks. Research from the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/tactics-and-targets-domestic-terrorists">Center for Strategic and International Studies</a> shows that from 2015 to 2020,  85 percent of terror attacks employed one of these methods, with 12 percent being unrealized threats, 2 percent other, and 1 percent vehicle ramming.</p>
<p>The numbers are remarkably similar for lethal attacks in 2023 according to the <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GTI-2024-web-290224.pdf">2024 Global Terrorism Index</a> published by Vision of Humanity. Out of the 50 most lethal terrorist attacks, only one, an incident in the Homs Province of Syria, featuring an explosive-laden unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) targeting a military graduation ceremony which killed 89 people, could be thought of as a high-tech weapon. The other 49 were made up of 43 armed assaults, five bombings, and one explosive projectile.</p>
<p>As terrorist groups get backed into a corner by high-tech counter methods like the Israeli pager attack, it is increasingly likely they will rely on time-proven simple methods. The world may even see them adapting and learning from accidents such as the September 2024 <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2024/09/17/texas-pipeline-fire-deer-park/75266574007/">car crash into a gas pipeline</a> in Texas which caused an explosion or the 2017 Hamburg, Germany, airport evacuation which resulted from the accidental discharge of a simple, lipstick-sized can of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/hamburg-airport-briefly-closed-after-dozens-injured-by-unidentified-substance/2017/02/12/7371809c-f129-11e6-a9b0-ecee7ce475fc_story.html">pepper spray</a>. While these were both accidents, one can imagine the economic and fear-induced impact if a terrorist group were to try to replicate the outcomes.</p>
<p>There are, of course, outliers to the terrorist use of low-tech methods. There is the terrorist cult Aum Shinrikyo’s launch of the notorious <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35975069">Tokyo Sarin gas attack</a> in 1995 or drone attacks along the lines of  2023’s drone attack in Syria, as well as other groups’ potential use of <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/flip-side-drone-boom-airports-stadiums-power-plants-need-defending-rcna128248">commercial drones</a>. But today’s would-be terrorist is likely not resorting to high-tech weapon or communication devices, and more often than not, going for something easy and/or available. To borrow from Chistopher Nolan’s Joker in the <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0468569/quotes/?item=qt0484253&amp;ref_=ext_shr_lnk"><em>Dark Knight</em></a>, items like “dynamite, and gunpowder, and gasoline [are] cheap” and are going to comprise the bulk of the future threats from terrorist groups.</p>
<p><em>Justin Leopold-Cohen is a homeland security analyst in Washington, DC. He has written widely on national and international security issues for outlets including </em>Small Wars Journal<em>, the Wavell Room, and Inkstick Media. Any views expressed in the article are his own and not representative of, or endorsed by, any organization or government.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/counter-terrors-high-tech-to-low-tech-backfire/">Counter Terror’s High-tech to Low-tech Backfire</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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