Both sides subsequently took steps to militarize the border and there was talk in New Delhi of following a more aggressive policy towards the Chinese. It was quite a surprise, therefore, that before the 2024 BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit at Kazan, India announced that it reached an agreement with the Chinese on how to patrol the border without clashes. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping also had a bilateral meeting in Kazan. Several factors led to this turn of events.

The Indians knew for some time that to dislodge the Chinese from the positions they occupied in the Himalayas would lead to an expensive war where India would likely not succeed in achieving its objectives. The alternative was to negotiate a settlement on resuming patrolling along the border and move towards improving the relationship in other areas, as the Chinese had suggested, notably by increasing trade and foreign direct investment in India.

The first sign that a policy shift was taking place came when the Ministry of Finance’s publication, “The Economic Survey of India,” called for seeking Chinese foreign direct investment to boost the economy. Such a statement could only come with the approval of the prime minister’s office signaling a change in thinking in New Delhi. While India’s bureaucratic and military establishments wanted a hard line towards China and to move closer to the United States, India’s three major business houses—Ambani, Adani, and Tata—all wanted closer economic ties with the Chinese, as did others in the business community. China provides the necessary equipment for Indian industry as well as the much-needed middle managers for India’s bourgeoning high-tech industries.

Further, while the United States was engaged in discussions with India it could not provide anything concrete and meaningful to New Delhi. Foreign direct investment from the United States was not forthcoming in significant amounts. Militarily, Washington was not providing the high-tech weaponry that India badly needed—at least not without terms and conditions that India found onerous. On the other hand, India lacked the financial resources to pay for the more advanced technology it wanted.

In terms of the Quadrilateral Alliance (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), the Indians were always the outliers since their military technology could not operate seamlessly with the American, Australia, and Japanese systems. Moreover, the Indians were cautious about the extent to which they wanted to aggravate the Chinese, worrying about Beijing’s potential to complicate the security environment in South Asia.

The budding bilateral alliance between Beijing and Moscow also worried New Delhi. Beijing and Moscow are moving towards a much closer political and economic relationship that is partly aimed at transforming the dollar-dominated international financial system.

Militarily, the emergence of closer military ties between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK) is worrying not only to the West but also to India since Russia is a major supplier of weaponry to India and New Delhi does not want to see this supply chain disrupted because Moscow decides to favor Beijing and reduces supplies to India.

Moreover, within BRICS there is a move towards accepting the Beijing-Moscow position on an alternative world order—the Law Based International Order—that while India accepts it, it is also concerned that it would be dominated by Beijing (and India would be shut out of framing the new narrative). All these reasons required mending fences with the Chinese.

Outcomes

             At the very least, this move is welcome because it is going to lead to a lowering of tensions along the border, which helps the internal position of the incumbent prime minister. Narendra Modi was weakened in the May-June 2024 general elections where his party went from having an absolute majority to being forced into a coalition with untrustworthy partners.

In such a situation, a bad military outcome along the border would severely weaken Modi’s internal standing and lead to calls for him to be replaced. Stabilizing the border, therefore, removes an irritant in domestic politics.

India needs foreign direct investment and despite all the talk from Tokyo and Western capitals, China is the most likely source of such financial resources. Chinese companies, despite the downturn in India-China relations, now control over 70 percent of the country’s cellphone market with companies like OnePlus, Redmi, Oppo, and Vivo outselling Apple, Samsung, and Sony.

Huawei and Hisense are making inroads in India’s white goods market while Chinese electric scooters (or ones powered by Chinese batteries) are becoming the ride of choice for young Indians. Paytm, the mobile payment service, has a Chinese majority share in its ownership and it is one of the leading players in the Indian market.

All of this has happened while relations between the two countries were sour. There is, therefore, considerable room for growth if the political climate between the two countries improves significantly. There is talk, in fact, that China may do a substantial foreign direct investment in India because, unlike Pakistan and Sri Lanka, there is less worry about nonperforming loans in India.

Some worry that the Indian rapprochement with China could have an adverse impact on US policy toward the Indo-Pacific and will give greater momentum to a BRICS-inspired move to de-dollarize the global economy. The Indians have a residual distrust of China and, therefore, are not going to bail out of Western-directed initiatives in the Indo-Pacific just because New Delhi is now the recipient of Chinese largesse.

Instead, India will encourage the development of Western-crafted institutions in the Indo-Pacific and participate in them particularly if they lead to economic growth. As far as de-dollarization is concerned, the Indians want to go to payments in one’s own currencies within BRICS but are not talking of displacing the dollar. In part, this is because the alternative could be the yuan or a Chinese-dominated BRICS currency.

The rapprochement between the two countries is good because it deescalates tensions and makes room for investment that India badly needs to reinvigorate its economy. At the same time, it does not shift India into the Chinese camp since New Delhi is a long way from trusting Beijing and entering into an anti-Western partnership with it. For the West, the best move is to wait and see, while remaining on good terms with India.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Advisor to the Forum of Federations Ottawa. The views in this article are his own.

Why India Made Up with China at the BRICS Summit was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia’s Strategic Mistakes and Their Consequences

Russia’s decision to attack Ukraine in 2022 was clearly a strategic blunder. Russian President Vladimir Putin believed he could seize control of Ukraine with a swift military strike, install a government aligned with Russian interests, and prevent the admission of Ukraine into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, the invasion stalled and is now widely seen as a disaster for Russia.

Now, two years after the start of the war, Russia has neither installed a government aligned with its interests in Ukraine nor succeeded in increasing its own security. On the contrary, the war led to economic sanctions, severed Russia’s relationship with the West, and diminished Russia’s military reputation, which was once formidable to its rivals.                                           Putin also underestimated the probability that he would require assistance from China, Iran, and North Korea to maintain the fight, and, incorrectly, assumed that NATO member-states would fail to act in effective coordination and support Ukrainian independence. Russia is now trapped in a prolonged war, Russia is beholden to its junior partners, and the Russian military is now proven to be largely ineffective. NATO is now working more closely together than it has since the Soviet Union collapsed and two new countries (Finland and Sweden) are now members of the alliance. Entering the war in Ukraine was a strategic mistake for Russia, which has exposed the country as an aggressor that is driving defensive preparation in Europe.

The West has imposed more than 11,000 sanctions on Russia, about 3,500 Western companies left the country, and nearly 1,000 Russian elites left their country. Russia’s relations with the West have deteriorated significantly, leading to political and economic isolation from the free world.

These strategic mistakes not only weakened Russia’s competitive position but also revealed its wider vulnerabilities. Russia is now caught in a prolonged war from which it is difficult to exit with dignity. Recognizing this opportunity, the United States and its allies are unlikely to allow Russia to easily escape this crisis. As a result, Russia is being forced to move closer to China and regional powers such as Iran and North Korea. Although this proximity is necessary for Russia economically and strategically, it primarily benefits China and increases China’s influence in global competition. Therefore, in this geopolitical game, Russia has not only failed to achieve its goals, but has also significantly fallen behind its competitors, diminishing its prospects of emerging as a great power in the international system.

America’s Strategic Mistakes and Their Consequences

The war in Ukraine is not in the United States’ best interest because it distracts from America’s larger effort to deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan and elsewhere in Asia. This distraction is allowing China to expand their influence globally, especially in areas where American influence is waning.

Early in the war, the United States tried to weaken Russia through extensive economic sanctions. Although these sanctions damaged the Russian economy temporarily, they did not achieve American objectives in the long run as Russia found new outlets for its energy products. Unexpectedly, Western pressure brought China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia closer together, strengthening China’s position vis-à-vis Russia—making China the senior partner.

The increasing economic and military cooperation between these countries helped China expand its influence directly and indirectly. Because the United States was deterred by Russian nuclear threats from providing Ukraine war-winning military tools, the war has dragged on—all to the benefit of China.

America’s distraction by Ukraine, the conflict in Israel, the presidential election, and other issues is leading the United States to neglect long-term strategic threats. As a result, while China, avoiding direct military conflicts, is increasing its economic and technological power globally. The disastrous American withdrawal from Afghanistan is attributed by some analysts as an important reason why Vladimir Putin thought he could get away with an invasion of Ukraine—the perception of American weakness.

The sum of these strategic mistakes puts America in a position where Russia and the United States are weakened by the war. When America is seen as weak, anti-American groups in different parts of the world see an opportunity. The same is true of all of America’s enemies.

China’s Opportunity in Global Competition and Its Benefits

Unlike Russia and America, China gained a significant advantage in global competition by choosing a strategy of self-restraint and prioritizing economic growth and technological advancement since the war began. Despite predictions that China would invade Taiwan because the United States is focused on Ukraine—and Israel—China’s lack of military action is a sign of this country’s smart and accurate calculations about any such invasion. By pursuing an economic oriented approach, China is focusing on addressing its own internal economic issues while trying to outpace the United States. By focusing at the operational level, avoiding military conflicts, China is using this time to petter position itself for a war that it too sees as likely.

China’s strategic partnerships and economic engagement, especially with developing countries, are gradually changing the balance of global power. This change is evidenced by the increase in the number of countries that are willing to interact with China on its terms and see it as a balancer against Western influence. By capitalizing on the strategic mistakes of other great powers and presenting itself as a champion of global peace and economic development, China is positioning itself as a leader in the new world order.

The Future Perspective of Global Competition

However, America still remains the greatest of great powers because it still carries the most influence in world affairs. Chinese power has, however, increased, leading Chinese leaders to be more sensitive to the expression position in the international system. Contrary to the prevailing opinion, the war in Ukraine does not benefit the United States. It benefits China.

China continues to strengthen its position and turned the game in its favor by taking advantage of the strategy of restraint and economic growth. The United States has inadvertently helped strengthen China’s position by focusing too much on Russia and the Ukraine war. Russia is clearly falling behind its great power peers.

If China continues with its current policies, it should avoid conflict and continue to grow economically and in its influence over other nations. There are still opportunities to change China’s trajectory.

America should adjust its approach by focusing on its vital interests and associated threats—China—instead of focusing on lesser interests. Additionally, preventing the increase of China’s influence in various regions of the world, especially in Asia and Africa, should be the priority of American foreign policy. It is not too late, but the time to act is now.

Dawood Tanin is a professor of political science at a private university in Afghanistan. The views expressed are his own.

The Ukraine War: Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.