The existing US-led hub-and-spoke alliance system in the Asia-Pacific is fundamentally different than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the 1950s the US investigated the possibility of establishing a regional multilateral alliance, but this soon proved infeasible. Unable to forge a Northeast Asian equivalent to NATO at the onset of the Cold War, the US opted instead for the “hub-and-spoke” architecture, where the spokes radiate out from Washington in a network of asymmetrical ties reinforcing American regional dominance. Why?

First, compared to Europe, the Asia-Pacific has very little history of multilateral institutions and alliance formation. Modern European states have a history of doing so dating back well before the Treaty of Westphalia was established in 1648. European sovereign political systems emerged out of Westphalia; Europe came to develop different notions of international community and international order, based, in part, on the concept of international law. Asia did not have such a tradition of legalistic international agreements.

Second, geography also plays a significant role in the nature of warfare, and therefore the ability of countries to come to one another’s aid. European nations border each other, but they do so in a land context. As such, not only is it easier to move around troops and military equipment, but it is faster.

The nature of geography and distance also inform countries’ threat perceptions. NATO continues to endure because of a shared common adversary—Russia. Countries neighbor each other, making for an easily delineated bloc. The distances between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia are formidable compared to Europe. Moreover, the sheer size of China, and the formidable military power of Japan, made it harder for smaller competitors to balance against them.

There were some attempts at bridging East and West. In 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was established because of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty. It included Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the US and was designed to curb the spread of communism in Asia. A major reason SEATO failed and was disbanded in 1977 was because there was a lack of a common threat perception.

What did survive was the U.S. hub-and-spoke system: the US-Japan alliance as a means of curbing any potential regional Japanese aggression after World War II, the US- South Korea alliance to protect South Korea from a North Korean invasion, and the US alliance with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) to protect both nations from perceived threats of communist invasion by China and Indonesia.

Central and critical to the credibility of any alliance system is how it deters conflict. This is arguably much harder to achieve in a multilateral alliance than in the current hub-and-spoke system. Conventional deterrence in the Asian maritime theater is difficult. The most significant work on conventional deterrence was done by John Mearsheimer. However, Mearsheimer’s analysis may be persuasive for eras preceding the development of nuclear weapons, but the pre-nuclear era did not involve missiles. His analysis was based on a European land context, not an Asian maritime context. As such, thinking on conventional deterrence is incomplete.

There are significant logistical challenges that come with trying to establish a multilateral alliance system in Asia. Tasks include the need to ensure the prompt replenishment of destroyed combat ships, establish defensive perimeters for fleet support, and ensure the safety of fleet replenishment oilers and dry cargo/ammunition supply ships, just to name a few.

Budget constraints brought on by sequestration (2013), coupled with longer-term financial uncertainty, was raising questions about the US Navy’s Military Sealift Command and its combat logistics force more than a decade ago. Europe was, and remains, one single geostrategic entity connected by an excellent road network. In the Asia-Pacific, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are more dispersed, with neutral and non-aligned states between them, not to mention a growing Chinese submarine fleet.

American forces need to move around large numbers of ships, aircraft, troops, and munitions. Unless the US establishes more permanent bases on allied territory, it is not clear that the US is able to adequately deploy replacement capabilities on very short notice, especially once conflict breaks out. Whilst American declaratory policy that requires a defense of allies in Asia is sound, it needs to be backed up by raw capability, the two components of deterrence.

For more than a decade, analysts have encouraged the US to improve readiness and sustainment of the US Navy. In 2014, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments warned of many more similar issues, including how quickly cruisers and destroyers exhaust their missiles and how adversaries will attempt to use “cheap” missiles (such as the BrahMos cruise missile) to attack US warships to get them to use their most effective defenses first,  such as the long-range SM-6 missile, and then strike with more effective weapons to destroy carriers and their escorts.

The foundation of power projection was and remains sea control. As Hugh White argues, what has contributed to making the US such a decisive power in the region is a robust sea-control capacity with low risk, and therefore little cost. The modern concept of sea control has its origins in the writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. Sea control was about naval superiority, the concentration of forces, and decisive battles.

Sea control is the condition in which one has freedom of action in specified areas and for specified periods of time and, where necessary, to deny or limit its use to the enemy. Sea control is different from sea denial. The latter refers to attempts to deny an adversary’s ability to use the sea without necessarily seeking to control the sea. When it comes to Asia, China and the United States are gradually trading places when it comes to sea control.

Discussions about a multilateral alliance would arguably have to address the unavoidable question of nuclear weapons and extended nuclear deterrence (END). Discussions within NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group during the Cold War about targeting and basing helped calm nervous allies, helped hold NATO together, and, in some cases, helped stem the tide of proliferation.

Both the US–Republic of Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) and the US–Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue were established after the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review for a similar purpose. There were growing concerns around the ability of the US to overcome China’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities and American support in the event of specific contingencies involving the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Could these bilateral dialogues become multilateral fora? This applies just as much to conventional weapons, but where the members of the alliance are far apart from each other, the potential red lines of escalation and conflict are much less identifiable than they would be in a land context.

But the technical challenges in the credibility of American extended deterrence to Australia, Japan, and South Korea matter less than the reasons why the US would want to do nuclear strategy again, this time in East Asia, a vastly more complicated theater. What matters is interest.

Hugh White raised the uncomfortable but critical issue when he suggested that Tokyo’s desire for a closer defense relationship with Australia is all about lining Australia up to support Japan against China, and that is the way Washington and Beijing will see it, too. Tokyo and Washington believe that Australia should defend the US-led international order and refuse concessions to China’s ambitions. Australians have not decided whether they agree with the US and Japan and are predisposed to seek a compromise with China—all while retaining a strong American role.

As White argued, no possible US nuclear posture, even the best possible, would eliminate the risk that a conflict with a nuclear-armed great power like China might lead to direct nuclear attacks on US territory. This leaves America’s East Asian allies to ponder whether American interests in the Western Pacific are strong enough for Washington to justify running the risk of conflict going nuclear.

Professor Paul Bracken of Yale University expressed concerns about American alliances in Asia. He found it nearly inconceivable that the US would actually use nuclear weapons to defend Australia, Japan, or Taiwan. Bracken noted that he played out countless scenarios, and that when it came down to it, American leaders were unwilling to use nuclear weapons. Bracken went so far as to suggest that the United States may not engage in a conventional hi-tech war with China, either.

Ely Ratner’s article is thought-provoking, valuable, and timely. But there are significant challenges in alliance credibility in Asia, because interests do not align as easily as they do in Europe. As former US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles remarked in 1952, “The North Atlantic Treaty reflected a sense of common destiny as between the peoples of the west, which grew out of a community of race, religion, and political institutions, before it was finalised. But that element does not clearly exist as yet anywhere in the Pacific area.” The same is true today, seven decades later.

Christine Leah, PhD, is a fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  

American Alliances in East Asia: An Australian Perspective was originally published on Global Security Review.

This issue is not new. In his 1957 book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Henry Kissinger made a controversial, yet analytically compelling, argument for the possible utility of tactical nuclear weapons in limited wars. He warned that massive retaliation was neither credible nor effective for deterring limited aggression and that a rigid dichotomy between conventional and strategic nuclear responses risked inviting coercion at the lower rungs of the escalation ladder. For Kissinger, introducing the possibility of limited nuclear use was not a call to war, but a recognition of strategic reality; the ability to escalate with restraint could deter adversaries from escalating first.

Fast forward to the 2030 scenarios modeled in Guardian Tiger I and II, and Kissinger’s insights remain disturbingly relevant. In the exercise, North Korea carried out a low-yield nuclear strike targeting South Korean naval vessels. American decision-makers, faced with the risk of horizontal escalation with China and the lack of consensus among allies, struggled to identify a proportional yet credible response. The idea of a retaliatory tactical nuclear strike was floated, but the simulated American leadership hesitated, reflecting both doctrinal ambiguity and an operational gap in American nuclear capabilities.

The risks of such hesitation are manifold. First, American restraint may be misinterpreted as indecision or weakness, particularly by allies like South Korea and Japan, who are directly exposed to North Korean and Chinese threats. Second, it creates an opening for adversaries to believe they can escalate to the nuclear level without inviting proportional retaliation. Third, it undermines the entire architecture of extended deterrence that underpins regional security.

Critics will rightly point out the perils of normalizing nuclear use. Introducing tactical nuclear weapons into a conflict zone invites moral hazards, increases the risk of miscalculation, and breaks long-standing nuclear taboos. It also challenges existing declaratory policies, such as the 2022 P5 Joint Statement affirming that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

But these arguments, while valid in principle, must be weighed against the operational reality that a low-yield nuclear strike by an adversary may not be deterred by threats of massive retaliation. As the Atlantic Council report noted, North Korea’s nuclear doctrine increasingly incorporates elements of pre-delegated authority, tactical nuclear use, and efforts toward a more survivable second-strike posture. If the United States signals that it will not respond proportionally to a limited nuclear attack, North Korea may calculate that it can use nuclear weapons to coerce the South or constrain American action without triggering regime-ending consequences.

Moreover, the credibility problem is not confined to North Korea. China, observing Washington’s reluctance to respond in kind, may also be emboldened to engage in horizontal escalation, confident that the United States’s nuclear threshold is politically—and perhaps operationally—immobile. This perception could unravel the strategic coherence of integrated deterrence.

To address these challenges, US Forces Korea (USFK) and Indo-Pacific Command should adopt a more robust approach across multiple dimensions. First, the United States should consider forward-deploying platforms capable of delivering low-yield nuclear weapons. This could include the reintroduction of dual-capable aircraft or sea-based assets positioned in or near the Korean Peninsula. Such deployments must be both survivable and possess the ability to clearly signal an adversary of will, while being fully integrated into bilateral operational planning with the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Second, escalation options must be clarified through updates to American declaratory policy. This does not mean issuing public ultimatums or fixed thresholds but rather ensuring that adversaries understand the United States is willing to conduct proportional nuclear responses if deterrence fails. Strategic ambiguity must not become strategic paralysis.

Third, while the US and South Korea launched the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) in 2023 to enhance extended deterrence coordination, further institutionalization is needed. A structure modeled more closely on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Nuclear Planning Group would help deepen transparency, signal unity of purpose, and reduce the risk of fragmented responses during crises.

Fourth, both US and ROK forces must be equipped and trained to operate in the aftermath of a limited nuclear strike. This includes rehearsals and exercises focused on base survivability, radiological detection and decontamination, logistics continuity, and the resilience of command-and-control (C2) systems.

Fifth, strategic communication must be strengthened. Clear and consistent messaging to both adversaries and allies is critical. Deterrence depends not only on military capabilities, but also on the perceived credibility of those capabilities and the intentions behind them.

Ultimately, the goal of these measures is not to normalize the use of nuclear weapons, but to reinforce the threshold against their use by making deterrence more credible and responsive.

If that threshold is ever crossed and the United States fails to respond proportionately, the credibility of its extended deterrence architecture could unravel. The Guardian Tiger exercises highlight this grim possibility and should serve as a clarion call to action for policy and defense leaders alike.

As Kissinger warned in 1957, the danger of total war arises not so much from a deliberate decision to embark on it as from a series of actions which, though rational in themselves, cumulatively lead to disaster. The United States must ensure that its rational desire to avoid nuclear escalation does not lead to an irrational loss of deterrence. Tactical nuclear flexibility, responsibly exercised and credibly signaled, may be the painful but necessary insurance policy to uphold peace in East Asia.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, President of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

The Case for US Low-Yield Nuclear Options in Korea was originally published on Global Security Review.

In this still frequently neglected or covered-up existential rivalry, the two sides face equally monumental but decidedly asymmetrical consequences. Should Beijing lose, the CCP will likely fall and fade. The Chinese nation, people, and state, even with the same name, will survive and likely thrive. Should Washington lose, however, not only will the American system of government likely fail, but the American way of life and national independence will diminish as American power and influence is superseded by a domineering PRC.

After long delays, hesitations, and self-delusions, a rare American consensus emerged to focus on the epic PRC-USA competition and fending off China’s effort to spread illiberal Chinese power. Given its vast well of resources, extensive network of alliances, great pool of talent, still functional democratic decision-making mechanism, and vibrant marketplace of ideas, the United States is coming up with cost-effective measures to win this competition, likely cheaper and more peaceful than what was required during the Cold War.

Critically, the United States should aim to achieve three hierarchical objectives in the PRC-USA race. They are ranked in descending order of importance. First, prevent the CCP from reordering the world by taking over global leadership. Second, prepare for but deter an all-out war with the PRC. Third, work toward a sociopolitical and ideological transformation of the PRC into a constructive peer. In the end, the US must ensure that Beijing is unwilling and/or unable to replace American leadership in the world.

The United States and its allies should curb the idealistic but toxic enthusiasm for globalization and world governance. The evolving ideals of the right to intervene (RTI) in other sovereign countries for the responsibility to protect (RTP) other country’s citizens, for example, should remain an inspiring ideal rather than a legal norm. Extremely rare and absolutely necessary cases of RTI and RTP are acceptable.

Americans must unapologetically strengthen the United States by maintaining dominance in economics, military power, education, and innovation. It must also remain a nation that is admired for its freedoms at home. It is in the greater interest of the world (including the Chinese people) to put America First, make America strong, rebuild America back better, and let America lead again. These campaign slogans were not only useful for presidential campaigns in 2016, 2020, and 2024, but they are important in reminding the rest of the world what is in their own best interest—a strong America.

These ideas should be delinked from the shortsightedness of isolationism and disassociated from any particular politician. The US must succeed in the international competition for power. It must also use its immense power judiciously to be ever more cost-effective.

A quick look at Taiwan may be a good illustration. Taiwan is critical for Beijing and the primary point of contention in the PRC-USA rivalry. The ROC (Republic of China) was a major US ally after World War II. However, the ROC’s international status was literally traded away by the United States over 40 years ago. The desire to enlist the PRC in the fight to win the Cold War against the Soviet Union proved more important.

Taiwan subsequently evolved to become the first democratic Chinese polity of and, in many ways, a leader across Asia. It has also drifted away from the monolithic Chinese world, to seek its own self-rule, autonomy, and independence.

The CCP, for its own political interest rather than the Chinese national interest, desires to absorb Taiwan with bribery, tricks, intimidation and force. Should Beijing accomplish that goal, it would achieve a major objective of its “great power” strategy, making a giant leap to dominate the Asia-Pacific and score a significant victory over the US and its allies.

The United States must not let Taiwan fall to Beijing. This is not because of the island’s beauty (its old name Formosa means beautiful island in Portuguese). Nor is it because of the advanced microchips that Taiwan makes. It is because the United States cannot allow the CCP to win the PRC-USA rivalry. American interests and the interests of a free world dictate that the US must ensure Beijing does not take Taiwan over the will of the Taiwanese people.

Without fundamental sociopolitical reform at home, even peaceful unification of Taiwan and the PRC should be objectionable to the United States. It sends the wrong signal to every nation watching the outcome of this competition. Winning the PRC-USA rivalry is much more important than the Beijing-Taipei dispute.

The United States must use its power well in defending Taiwan against the PRC. Between peaceful unification of the island with the Chinese Mainland in a framework of democratic federation on the one end, and Sino-American military conflict in response to an invasion of an independent Taiwan on the other end, there are many options. The US can employ numerous and inexpensive options like destroying the “Great Firewall of China,” providing smart weapons to Taiwan, fighting at the time and place of American choosing, and altering the nuclear balance in East Asia. The list can go on.

Imagination, wisdom, persistence, and perseverance, more than mere force and material power, will enable the United States to safeguard world order. The Taiwanese people are counting on an American victory in the PRC-USA rivalry.

Fei-Ling Wang, PhD, is a Professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Views expressed in this article are his own.

The PRC-USA Rivalry and Taiwan was originally published on Global Security Review.

After World War II, the nation abandoned the independent Poland cause, despite so many Poles fighting alongside the allies against the Nazis. Two decades later, the United States did not intervene in the Czech uprising (1968) when there was a cry for freedom from behind the Iron Curtain. The United States left allies in South Vietnam (Hmong), Lebanon (Maronites), and, most recently, Afghanistan. Other nations who fought with the United States were abandoned for political expediency. Once-allied regimes became undesirable and were left to their fate at the hands of revolutionary communists. The new revolutionary regimes often turned out not only worse than their predecessors but were devoted enemies of the Unted States.

American foreign policy is rightly called schizophrenic because it is rarely consistent.  Built into the American system of government was mutual agreement between the executive and legislative branches of government. It took two-thirds of the Senate to ratify a treaty and an act of Congress to declare war. Early presidents were loathe to act without the endorsement of Congress in real and tangible ways.

Until World War I, American foreign policy was largely stable regardless of the political party in power. Whether democratic or autocratic in their form of government, allies of the United States could trust in agreements they made with the Americans. Unfortunately, that has changed as American foreign policy vacillated widely in the post–World War II period. This is a problem not only for allies but also for the United States.

The moment allies doubt American commitment, they are no longer incentivized to work with the United States. This matters because the US is losing standing amongst allies and adversaries. For example, over the past two years the United States imposed every possible sanction against Russia. Yet the Russian economy grew faster than the American economy in the first quarter of 2024. Two years ago, the newly elected president of South Korea discussed the need for a South Korean nuclear arsenal because the United States was seen as an unreliable ally.

China is regularly expanding its navy and coast guard and using them to prevent the transit of international waters by its own neighbors. This week, the Chinese attacked a Philippine ship in Philippine waters. China also brokers deals with the Saudis to reestablish relations with Iran.

The US Navy claims it ensures freedom of navigation for all nations as a principle but is clearly challenged to follow through on that promise. The US is unable to provide effective escort of ships through the Red Sea because the US Navy is the smallest it has been in over eight decades. The lack of American commitment to sea power is but one example of inconsistency in foreign policy. Some argue that the Houthi terror campaign in the Red Sea is succeeding, and the United States is failing.

The Budapest Memorandum (1994) offered security assurances to Ukraine if it returned Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia, yet when Russia violated that agreement in 2014 with its invasion of Crimea, the American response was muted. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the United States provided indirect support for Ukraine that is prolonging the war but is insufficient to ensure Ukrainian victory. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the American approach to Ukraine, the simple fact is that the past 30 years of American action offer a bewilderingly inconsistent view to Vladimir Putin as he seeks to advance Russian interests.

Despite the fact that 32 Americans were murdered and at least 10 taken hostage on October 7, 2023, President Joe Biden failed to actively join Israel in defeating Hamas. Instead, he chose to spend more time criticizing Israel for waging war on a regime that employs terror tactics. Israel, a long-time ally, can no longer count on American support because domestic radicals in the United States are a large voting block for the president.

Israel is not the only ally President Biden insulted. He insulted Japan as well and has demanded they fundamentally change Japanese culture and society. The US State Department is also engaging in bizarre practices of ridiculing and insulting strategic allies by pressuring them to adopt cultural practices that are patently offensive to them. This behavior is a result of government’s capture by progressives. It is a recipe for American foreign policy disaster and inconsistent with long-time American tradition.

It would be incredibly difficult for the US to act in the Pacific without the use of air bases and ports in Japan. In the event of a territorial war in East Asia, both Japan and South Korea will be at significant risk of attack on their civilian population. Their navies and air forces are force multipliers for the United States. Again, the point is not whether the reader agrees with an individual decision by one presidential administration or another. The point is that the United States all too often vacillates in its positions and makes it difficult for allies and adversaries to predict the American position in the future.

Consistency, whether hands off or activist, is critical for the United States because stability and predictability in foreign policy is important to friend and foe. The Weinberger Doctrine of former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger was an effort to offer a consistent framework for judging American action, but that effort largely fell on deaf ears. In the four decades since Weinberger offered his doctrine, American foreign policy has lunged from one failed military effort to the next.

The United States is no longer the global superpower it once was. It is more important than ever that the United States make wise decisions in its foreign policy. Allies are more important than ever, and they seek stability across administrations. A revanchist Russia and China are bad for the world. A consistent American foreign policy is the opposite. It is time the nation moved in that direction.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Is America’s Foreign Policy Incoherent? was originally published on Global Security Review.

This tough stance may seem puzzling. For one thing, Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), having a Taiwan-centered orientation, has historically been far less keen than the Kuomintang (KMT) to press on issues of ROC territorial claims outside of Taiwan proper, as these are widely seen as a holdover from the era of Republican China. For this same reason, Tsai has been perceived as being more amenable to developing deeper Taiwan-Japan ties, especially in such areas as security cooperation and trade relations—this latter would help both countries avoid keeping too many eggs in the China basket.

Likewise, from the Japanese perspective, there has been an embrace of—and high hopes for—the Tsai administration, as it promised an end to the previous Ma Ying-jeou administration’s China-friendly policies.

In short: Taiwan and Japan make natural allies in a region and an era marked by an increasingly aggressive China. Why, then, Taiwan’s tough talk on the Senkakus, an issue which few Taiwanese people care about?

Earlier this month, the Executive Yuan—the executive branch of the government of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan—promulgated the island’s first-ever marine policy white paper on June 4, 2020. This move came at a time when the maritime security environment in the East and South China seas is becoming increasingly volatile as a result of China aggressively pressing its territorial claims in these bodies of water. The document has as its primary goal to provide consistent guidelines to government departments for implementing the sustainable development of ocean-related policies. According to the head of the ROC Ocean Affairs Council, the idea behind the white paper is to transform Taiwan into a “marine country,” and one that is “ecological, safe, and prosperous.”

The white paper is the result of the framework for the country’s ocean management, as approved by the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan’s Congress) in November 2019. The “basic act for ocean affairs,” as it is called, is another attempt to integrate all government agencies that are stakeholders in marine and maritime issues.

The efforts of the administration of ROC President Tsai Ing-wen to implement more coherent and coordinated ocean policies could not be timelier. Taiwan is an island, and it is surrounded by waters that are especially turbulent, from a geopolitical perspective. Moreover, for too long, the ROC government has paid short shrift to its littoral holdings, being reticent to conceive of itself as a maritime power. But an island nation it is, and it is about time that the DPP administration acknowledges this with its actions.

The paper U.S. Strategic Mobility in Deployment to Ensure Regional Security, written by Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), a senior researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, affirmed Taiwan’s status as a nation with a stake in the events that transpire in the East and South China seas. Su pointed out that the PRC has been effective in leveraging the COVID-19 global pandemic to beef up Chinese power-projection capabilities, in the South China Sea and surrounding maritime areas, due in part to the reduced presence of the U.S. Navy. He also asserted that the instability has had a deleterious effect on key navigation channels such as the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel, as well as the East China Sea.

What Su did not take into account was domestic inertia and party rivalry: That the task of coordinating and integrating the many national and local marine agencies in Taiwan, and overcoming the inter-party conflicts over maritime ideologies, may be more daunting than facing the geopolitical maritime perils that await them offshore. These two elements have long been roadblocks preventing Taiwan from being able to respond adequately to its urgent marine and maritime challenges.

In terms of coordination, the ocean-related matters in Taiwan involve at least 15 different agencies—some of whose jurisdictions overlap—ranging from technical departments to a general ministry, and from agencies that are directly involved with maritime issues to those for which ocean-related matters are only peripheral.

The main consequence of the difference in scope, focus, and structure of these government agencies—as well as the destructive yet inevitable inter-agency rivalries that tend to emerge in bureaucracies with overlapping responsibilities—has been an inability to coordinate actions effectively. This makes it difficult to build up the momentum for the kind of change that is needed in order to remedy the above problems, making the proper administration of maritime affairs a difficult task.

Until now, nothing related to the marine or maritime policies in Taiwan has been integrated. Instead, there has been a patchwork of policies promulgated by a plethora of departments, each with its own marine-related area of oversight. Fishery issues are dealt with by the fishery agency, for example, and shipping issues, with the shipping agencies, and so on, until the proverbial right-hand doesn’t know what the left hand is doing.

Part of the reason for the different governing paradigms in Taiwan is that some sectors within the Pan-Blue camp (to wit: the KMT) still possess an outdated terrestrial or land-oriented mentality, inherited from the Chinese tradition from which this party evolved. This terrestrial mentality, however, also tends to make the KMT more assertive in terms of territory, as they see it essentially from the sovereignty perspective. It was under KMT leadership that the ROC laid the foundation for the modern Chinese maritime claims (adopted almost entirely by the PRC, interestingly). Thus, the PRC’s adherence to the U-shaped nine-dash line, originally published by the ROC in December of 1947. In this view, defense of the territorial claims in the area encompassed by this line is a natural position, and anything otherwise would be politically impracticable and ideologically contradictory.

On the other hand, the Pan-Green Camp, led by the DPP, tends to take the opposite tack. First, it prefers to focus on environmental questions, as this fits well with the DPP’s idea of being a friendly stakeholder in the disputes, given that the environmental protection discourse tends to have few opponents among the other claimants due to its nature as an issue of collective interests.

Finally, in diverting from the territorial-sovereignty discourse, the DPP intends to bring Western powers onside, by positioning its claims under the UNCLOS umbrella. Moreover, it will try to keep its distance from any mention of the U-shaped line map for two reasons: First, this presupposes a Chinese territorial centered view of the disputes, adoption of which would make the DPP undistinguishable from the KMT (and the PRC, for that matter). Second, the nine-dashed line map defense is not feasible under the UNCLOS perspective and would be perceived as extremely aggressive by the international community. These do not contribute to the way the DPP must position itself.

Therefore, the challenge of integrating ROC government departments and coordinating a coherent maritime policy is not a simple one. Whatever the effectiveness of the white paper presented by the Executive Yuan this year might bring in terms of day-to-day maritime and marine operations, a modus vivendi must be found between the Blues and the Greens. From this perspective, the Tsai administration’s tough talk on the Japanese redesignation of the Senkaku Islands may be interpreted as an olive branch to the Pan-Blue coalition—both politically, and to the many civil servants serving in the relevant ministries and departments who are known to have blue-leaning sympathies—in order to secure buy-in for this project.

If Tsai fails to find such common ground, then any of the eventual gains accrued from the current administration will be thrown away, just as both parties have done to each other every other time that a transition of power has taken place. The stakes are too high for the Taiwanese people to accept this outcome.

Confronting Japan to Defend Against China: Senkaku as a Case Study in Taiwan’s Politics was originally published on Global Security Review.

What’s Happening?

China’s military expansion is occurring at a time when Taiwan is becoming more resistant to cross-strait reunification, and the U.S. is altering its commitment to Taiwan, suggesting an increasingly dangerous decade ahead in the Taiwan Strait.

Key Insights

• Taiwan’s democratic consolidation means any future reunification with the mainland will be exceedingly difficult.
• China’s confidence in its ability to use force might mislead it into preparing for an invasion
• Misperceptions over shifts in U.S. commitment towards Taiwan could encourage an aggrieved China to use force in the future

The Taiwan Strait is reaching a critical juncture of heightened instability. Heading into the 2020s and 2030s, the struggle for independence, status quo, or reunification will be increasingly felt as each of the key actors—Taiwan, Washington, and Beijing—begin to unravel the twenty-five years of relative stability that has endured since the 1995-6 crisis. Since then, the consolidation of Taiwan’s democracy has become the greatest challenge to China’s quest for reunification. Taiwan continues to oppose any possibility of reunification on Beijing’s terms even if its future leaders do not seek formal independence. Indeed, the public majority and leaders of the traditionally pro-China pan-Blue coalition and independence-minded pan-Green coalitions, including next year’s election candidates, have opposed Chinese President Xi Jinping’s reintroduction of the “One Country, Two Systems” framework for reunification.

Although peaceful reunification is frustrated, mainland China is becoming more powerful and impatient under Xi’s leadership. This is not to suggest that the economic problems China faces are not acute. But the People’s Liberation Army is growing more confident in its ability to match the Taiwanese and U.S. armed forces in a contest of strength. If Xi fails to deliver the prosperity promises of his “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” he could very well resort to speeding up his other more revisionist ambitions of developing a world-class military and reunifying the territories lost during the “Century of Humiliation.”

Costs of Invasion

During the 1995-6 crisis, there was no doubt about the credibility of U.S. deterrent capabilities buttressing the might of the Taiwanese armed forces, which were then considered to be more advanced and powerful than the PLA. Decades later, China’s “military modernization effort has eroded or negated many of Taiwan’s historical advantages in deterring PLA aggression,” including “the PLA’s inability to project sufficient power across the Taiwan Strait, the Taiwan military’s technological superiority, and the inherent geographic advantages of island defense,” the U.S. Department of Defense noted in its 2017 report on Chinese military power. These shifts have purportedly led Xi to believe that the “tide of history”—that is, reunification with Taiwan—favors the mainland.

Assessing the cross-strait military balance generates doubts about the PLA’s capacity to subjugate Taiwan. Beijing lacks the amphibious and lift capabilities to land an invasion, and Taiwan possesses submarines and sea mines that could seriously damage any invasion fleet. Climatic conditions and the gradual build-up of Chinese forces also complicate any surprise offensive. The possibility of staging an urban, counterinsurgency warfare against a resilient Taiwanese society while simultaneously holding off U.S. forces in the Western Pacific also diminishes the success of a Chinese invasion. But with China’s continued acquisition of the relevant capabilities, these disadvantages will gradually erode in the coming decade.

Furthermore, the PLA does not need to be fully equipped to fight a war of reunification. Whether to wage war is not a decision based solely on military calculations, and having confidence in the PLA may mislead the Chinese Politburo into taking an aggressive posture. Given Beijing’s routinization of ‘island encirclement patrols’ and the creation of cross-strait military-civilian flight paths to familiarise the PLA with the terrain and conditions of airlift, an invasion may no longer require a gradual military build-up. By engineering a heightened state of military readiness, it is difficult for Taiwan to gauge when China decides to launch a surprise offensive.

It would be naive to assume that Xi does not have the political resolve to bear the responsibility of a post-invasion war-torn economy, whose share of trade to mainland China has declined to a mere 2% of total Chinese exports. Nor should it be assumed the fear of an anti-China international coalition and the repercussions to its “peaceful rise” image will restrain Beijing from using force. Since 2016, China has been engaging in a multi-faceted pressure campaign to reinforce an alternate reality of Taiwan as a “local affair” to curtail potential foreign criticisms of its cross-strait activities. This has included not just usual diplomatic isolation, but more recently a whole-of-society approach to bring the pressure to bear on the private individuals, commercial airlines and retail businesses of other countries. To a large extent, this has worked. Even the U.S., the primary security guarantor for Taiwan, quietly removed the Taiwanese flag from two of its government websites, suggesting an implicit yielding to Chinese pressure.

Potential U.S. Gradual Retreat

In the coming decade, the costs of invasion will have likely declined, while frustration with Taiwan’s democracy and impatience regarding delays to reunification will have increased. Taiwan will then have to rely not on itself but on U.S. resolve to deter a potential Chinese invasion. Although Washington has entered a period of “strategic competition” with Beijing, growing resource strain — especially with sustained budget sequestration — will force American administrations to reassess U.S. commitment overseas. However, U.S. policymakers, having witnessed President Donald Trump’s damage to U.S. international standing, are unlikely to retreat into isolation. But subsequent occupants of the White House will be forced to weigh the country’s commitments more carefully between vital and peripheral interests.

In this regard, U.S. interest in Taiwan has remained ambiguous since the post-World War II aftermath. While Taiwan sympathizers continue to uphold Taiwan as a vital U.S. interest, the stakes pale in comparison to other more pressing U.S. interests in Asia, such as support for Japan and maintaining the rule of law in the South China Sea. But the issues of prestige and reliability as the region’s primary security guarantor, the fear of China construing U.S. retreat as a sign of weakness, and the domestic sensitivities toward Taiwan as a “beacon of democracy” could conflate Washington’s priorities to stay committed in the face of aggression. Thus, while its ability and willingness to deter China from invading Taiwan is likely to decline over time, it will not retreat without putting up resistance. To make up for resource strain, Washington will demonstrate its symbolic gestures to Taiwan to caution China about the prospect of U.S. military intervention. This included the recent passing of the Taiwan Travel Act to allow two-way senior official exchanges, stationing U.S. military personnel to the new American Institute in Taiwan for the first time since 2005, potential port visits and new arms sales. But in doing so, Beijing could misread the gestures as signs of a growing commitment to Taiwan and be provoked into threatening the U.S. not to interfere in its “local affairs.”

Misreading of Signals

The Taiwan Strait has resumed its status as a dangerous flashpoint. In arranging for a politically viable way to reduce its commitment to Taiwan, Washington could find itself unwittingly confronting an aggrieved and more confident China while trying to preserve its domestic and regional reputation as best as possible. U.S. sales of 60 F-16V fighter jets to Taiwan demonstrated this challenge: the sale was praised as symbolically important but was perceived as an act of provocation by Beijing, resulting in the PLA’s intentional crossing of the ‘median line’ in the Taiwan Strait for the first time in twenty years.

While this has not escalated into further U.S.-China confrontation, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s decision to automatize the forceful expulsion of Chinese forces suggests that future transgressions of the ‘median line’ will no longer be safe from unprofessional encounters and shoot down incidents. The U.S. will then be pressured to respond with a stronger deterrent posture. But with little to no confidence-building mechanisms to manage cross-strait instability, the mutual signaling of threats between Washington and Beijing could turn into ever-more aggressive shows of force, entrapping both countries into a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis and with consequences they are not prepared to face.

The New Taiwan Strait Crisis: a Dangerous Decade Ahead was originally published on Global Security Review.