In 2022, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, it did not domestically produce any Geran-2 (Shahed-136) drones. They initially purchased a small quantity (up to around 6000) from Iran and quickly set their sights on building manufacturing plants. By 2023 they had the Alabuga drone factory where they were able to produce around 200 Geran-2 drones per month. In 2024, they saw a major increase in production and by December of that year it was reported that they were able to produce up to 2000 Geran-2 drones per month. By May of last year, Russia’s production capacity was up to around 2700 Geran-2 drones and another 2500 ‘simulator’ drones used to overwhelm air defenses in a single month (according to Ukrainian intelligence), and production is likely to increase further.

Mass production of these drones has changed what it means to be ‘war ready.’ A massive reduction in Iran’s arsenal of missiles, air capabilities, and ground capabilities would weaken the regime but Trump’s pronouncement should not convince anyone they are no longer a threat. If Iran follows Russia’s blueprint, even heavy losses today are unlikely to prevent them from sustaining a long campaign of drone attacks tomorrow.

Besides, Iran’s strategy is to delay. They retain the ability to threaten American bases in the Gulf, as well as Gulf allies, with their current stockpile of drones and missiles. From almost anywhere in Southern or Central Iran they can launch a Shahed which could reach the Strait of Hormuz, meaning that even if missile and naval drone production slows, they will continue to threaten global trade flows, should the status quo continue.

Russia’s continuation of the war against Ukraine should have shown to the United States what modern war looks like, and how a state can remain a threat at a low cost. Iran is more than capable of continuing this conflict, and their recent statements reaffirming their lack of interest in diplomacy a makes that clear.

Iran’s current stockpile of Shahed-136 drones has not been made public. Before the war started, estimates indicated it could be up to around 80,000 drones. Considering Russia’s demonstrated ability to create and grow a drone industry whilst at war, there is no reason Iran’s drone industry will not grow similarly. Between 2023 and 2025 Russia’s Geran-2 drone production grew by 1250%. Iran will not require this level of growth and is in a better placed position to start having produced a significant quantity of these drones.

The significance of this threat lies in the unique importance of the Strait of Hormuz to the global economy. A sizable portion (around 25%) of the world’s oil supply passes through the Strait, so even limited disruptions can have huge consequences for energy prices. Crucially, Iran does not need to secure a complete shutdown of the Strait to achieve its aims, as even the threat of attacking merchant ships drives insurance premiums and forces ships to reroute. By demonstrating that the Strait can be reached, Iran has created an atmosphere of uncertainty and can maintain this very atmosphere without their arsenal of long-range missiles by building Shahed-136 drones. In this instance, drones are not strictly a military asset, but a way of exerting economic pressure on adversaries.

Securing the Strait of Hormuz to a point of trade continuation will prove to be almost impossible without either a negotiated settlement or a complete capitulation from the Iranian regime. If during this conflict Iran retains even a small portion of their current Shahed-136 stockpile, or the ability to manufacture them, then ships passing through the Strait cannot be guaranteed safe travel.

In short, claims that the Iranian threat has been significantly reduced are short sighted and ignore many of their existing capabilities. Their existing missile stockpile, combined with their production capacity, means that even heavy strikes will not eliminate their ability to project their power across the region. Just as Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated, modern warfare requires cheap and easily mass-produced systems and Iran is very well positioned to meet these requirements. Until a diplomatic solution is reached, or the Iranian regime is somehow forced to end their war efforts, the threat to world trade and to the world energy market will persist.

Raphael Chiswick writes on Diplomacy, International Security, and the Defense Industry. He is based in the United Kingdom. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

From Shaheds to Strait Control: Why Iran Can Still Influence Global Trade was originally published on Global Security Review.

Nearly a century later, Russian planners still view Deep Battle as a foundational concept. Yet the war in Ukraine has exposed the performance gap between theory and practice.

Deep Battle in Russian Military Thought

Deep Battle was designed as a holistic operational approach: massed firepower, rapid penetration, and exploitation by mobile formations. It required tight coordination, robust logistics, and the ability to sustain momentum across multiple echelons. Soviet forces demonstrated aspects of this during World War II, and the concept remained embedded in Russian doctrine long after.

Modern Russian operations—at least on paper—still aspire to this model. Analysts note that Russian commanders have attempted to regain maneuver by applying Deep Battle principles, seeking rapid breakthroughs and deep strikes to disorganize Ukrainian defenses. However, the conditions required for successful Deep Battle are far more demanding than the theory suggests.

Why Deep Battle Has Struggled in Ukraine

Several factors have undermined Russia’s ability to execute Deep Battle effectively. Logistical fragility has plagued Russian operations, as sustaining supply to fast-moving units proved difficult; forces entering Ukraine in 2022 quickly outran their logistics, leading to stalled advances and exposed columns. Scholars argue that this logistical weakness fundamentally compromised Russia’s ability to maintain operational tempo. Additionally, Ukrainian resilience and adaptability have presented unexpected challenges. Ukrainian forces have been far more agile and technologically integrated than Russian planners anticipated, employing precision fires, dispersed command structures, and Western intelligence support to blunt Russian attempts at operational shock and interrupting supply lines and replacement equipment. Their use of drone and counter-drone technology exemplifies adaptive learning that has already been noted and copied by other state militaries.

Russia’s attempts at Deep Battle are further hindered by insufficient force quality and added maneuver complexity, as the doctrine relies on well-trained, coordinated echelons. Russia’s reliance on mobilized troops, fragmented command structures, and heavy attrition has made synchronized deep operations difficult to sustain. The loss of air superiority has limited Russia’s ability to shape the battlefield making the battlefield more complex. As intended by doctrine, Soviet Deep Battle assumes overwhelming air support to suppress enemy depth, but contested airspace in Ukraine has prevented this crucial element.

Where Russia Has Adapted

Despite these challenges, Russia has applied Deep Battle concepts in modified ways. In adapting the principles of Deep Battle to modern conflict, Russia has focused on targeting Ukrainian infrastructure with long-range strikes. This campaign has prioritized attacks on energy systems and logistics nodes, aiming to disrupt Ukrainian depth and sustain pressure even without accompanying maneuver. By striking critical assets far from the front lines, Russia attempts to weaken Ukraine’s ability to resist and maintain its war effort.

Rather than achieving rapid breakthroughs as originally envisioned by Deep Battle doctrine, Russia has shifted to a strategy of incremental, attritional “deepening.” This approach relies on massed artillery and slow, grinding advances to steadily erode Ukrainian defenses. The result is a war of attrition where progress is measured in small territorial gains instead of dramatic operational shifts, demonstrating an adaptation of Deep Battle’s objectives without its characteristic momentum.

In addition to these methods, Russian military planners and observers continue to pursue efforts to reconstitute maneuver forces. Despite ongoing challenges, such as limited operational success, attempts are being made to rebuild the capacity for operational-level breakthroughs. These efforts underscore a persistent desire within Russian strategy to reclaim the maneuver warfare and deep operational reach that are central to Deep Battle theory, even as practical limitations remain.

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Deep Battle

Vladimir Putin has repeatedly issued veiled or explicit warnings regarding the potential for Russian nuclear first use concerning the possibility of Russian nuclear first use in response to perceived unacceptable threats. This stance is further reflected in Russian military exercises, which have frequently included simulated launches with tactical nuclear weapons systems. However, it is important to note that some Soviet assessments during the Cold War adopted a realistically pessimistic outlook on the conduct of military operations in a nuclear environment, recognizing the immense challenges such conditions would impose.

Taken together, these perspectives highlight the duality in Russian strategic thinking: while nuclear signaling and preparation remain integral to Russia’s military posture, there is also an awareness—rooted in historical experience—of the profound difficulties associated with waging war in a nuclear-affected battlespace.

Implications for the Future of the War

Understanding Russia’s attachment to Deep Battle helps explain both its ambitions and its limitations. Russia will continue seeking opportunities for operational breakthroughs, even if conditions rarely allow them. The concept remains deeply embedded in Russian military culture. At the same time, Ukraine’s strategy of disrupting Russian logistics and command nodes directly targets the prerequisites of Deep Battle, making it harder for Russia to generate momentum. If Russia can rebuild its logistics, improve training, and integrate drones and electronic warfare more effectively, it may regain the ability to conduct deeper operations—but this remains uncertain. The war is likely to remain attritional because neither side currently possesses the combination of mass, mobility, and air dominance required for true Deep Battle.

Conclusion

Deep Battle remains a conceptual framework and historical marker for understanding Russian military behavior. But the war in Ukraine has shown that doctrine alone cannot compensate for structural weaknesses, resilient opposition, and the realities of modern precision warfare. Russia’s struggle to translate Deep Battle theory into battlefield success underscores the widening gap between its strategic aspirations and its operational capabilities.

NOTE: The author provides a grateful acknowledgment that is made to David Glantz and the late Dr. Jacob Kipp for the author’s appreciation of this topic. None bear any responsibility for arguments herein.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy.  He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025).

The Russian View of Deep Battle: Implications for the War in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

Although the war in Ukraine firmly established the utility of drones in warfare, the relationship between drones and nuclear deterrence is still a largely unsettled topic. Suggesting that they are relevant is unlikely to draw much disagreement, but the exact form that relevance takes is where there may be disagreement. This leads to the following discussion.

Nuclear deterrence is a psychological effect where the perceived costs of taking an action that is undesirable to an adversary outweigh the perceived benefits. During the Cold War, the threat of catastrophic retaliation prevented the Soviet Union and the United States from initiating a nuclear attack against the other.

Historically, this doctrine relied on the survivability of nuclear arsenals in the event of a first strike by the adversary. Secure second-strike and a robust early-warning system were key elements of deterrence credibility. The introduction of drones into this framework in the years ahead creates new dimensions to the deterrence dynamic. Drones may enhance surveillance, improve command and control, and/or potentially deliver nuclear weapons.

Drones offer several advantages that make them attractive in the context of nuclear deterrence. They can provide continuous monitoring of adversary activities, bolstering early warning systems and reducing the risk of surprise attacks. Such a capability could increase strategic stability.

Advanced drones equipped with artificial intelligence (AI) could execute highly accurate first strikes, which could neutralize enemy nuclear assets preemptively. This would likely prove destabilizing.

Fielding drones capable of ensuring the survivability of nuclear forces by serving as mobile and/or concealed platforms could ensure a state maintains a credible second-strike capability. Again, this would likely prove stabilizing.

Drones could also serve as command-and-control platforms in a degraded environment when, for example, space assets are lost early in a conflict. Such a capability could serve as a deterrent to attack.

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into drones has significantly expanded their operational capability. AI-enabled drones can autonomously navigate complex environments, identify targets, and execute missions with minimal human intervention. This autonomy is particularly valuable in nuclear scenarios, where rapid decision-making and precision are critical.

Moreover, drones are being developed to carry nuclear payloads, although this remains a controversial and largely theoretical capability. The miniaturization of warheads and improvements in drone propulsion systems make this possibility increasingly plausible. If realized, nuclear-armed drones could offer stealthier and more flexible delivery options compared to traditional ballistic missiles.

Recent conflicts demonstrate the strategic value of drones. In Ukraine, for instance, drones are used extensively for reconnaissance and precision strikes, prompting global powers to accelerate their investment in drone technologies. While these applications are conventional, they underscore the potential for drones to play a role in strategic deterrence.

In the United States, China, and Russia, military doctrines are certain to evolve and incorporate drones into nuclear command-and-control systems. These developments reflect a broader trend toward automation and digitization in defense strategies, raising questions about the future of human oversight in nuclear decisionmaking.

Despite their strategic benefits, drones introduce several risks that could undermine nuclear stability. Autonomous drones conducting reconnaissance near sensitive sites could be misinterpreted as precursors to a nuclear strike, triggering unintended escalation. Increased autonomy in drone operations may reduce human oversight, heightening the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The accessibility and affordability of drone technology could lead to its proliferation among non-nuclear states or rogue actors, complicating global arms control efforts. None of the challenges are guaranteed, but they are possibilities.

To mitigate the risks associated with drones in nuclear deterrence, the following policy measures are recommended. First, nuclear-armed states should develop treaties and agreements that define acceptable uses of drones in strategic scenarios, including restrictions on nuclear payloads. Second, there is a need for information-sharing among nuclear weapons states, designed to reduce misinterpretation of actions and build trust. Third, ensuring that critical decisions involving nuclear weapons remain under human control, even in automated systems, is an important component of any international agreement. Fourth, developing tools to monitor drone deployments and verify compliance with international agreements is also needed.

The potential for drones to enhance surveillance, improve targeting, and support second-strike capabilities makes them valuable assets in maintaining strategic stability. On the other hand, their autonomy, the potential to misinterpret their use, and the proliferation risks of some drones pose a significant challenge. As drone technology continues to evolve, it is imperative that policymakers and military experts work collaboratively to understand its benefits while safeguarding against its dangers. The future of nuclear deterrence stability may be influenced in significant ways by how well or poorly we adapt to drone technologies.

Steve Cimbala is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Adam Lowther is the Vice President for Research at NIDS. Views express in this article are the author’s own. 

The Role of Drones in Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The war was not won by overwhelming force—it was won by precision, persistence, and a new kind of visibility. This shift was not just tactical; it was existential. Drones lowered the cost of engagement and shattered the old logic of deterrence. Military planners who once relied on large arsenals and conventional firepower now face a battlefield defined by bandwidth, optics, and algorithms. Nagorno-Karabakh was not an anomaly; it was a preview of what is coming.

Drones Tilt the Balance of Power

Azerbaijan’s drone fleet, led by Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2s and Israeli loitering munitions, did more than support ground troops. These drones destroyed tanks, artillery, and air defense systems with surgical precision.

Drone footage flooded social media and state television, galvanizing public support and intimidating adversaries. The battlefield became a stage and drones the lead actors in a performance of technological supremacy.

This was not a remote skirmish; it was a full-spectrum demonstration of how drones can tilt the military balance. Azerbaijan used converted Soviet-era aircraft as bait to expose Armenian air defenses, then struck with precision-guided drones. Air dominance was no longer reserved for wealthy superpowers; it was achieved through strategy and innovation.

Deterrence No Longer Works the Way It Used To

Deterrence did not fail for lack of firepower; it failed because the rules changed faster than anyone could adapt. Armenia’s conventional forces, built on Cold War assumptions, could not withstand the precision and persistence of drone strikes. The belief that large-scale military assets could prevent escalation collapsed under the weight of smaller and smarter systems.

This was not just a tactical failure; it was a conceptual one. Drones lowered the threshold for engagement and allowed Azerbaijan to strike decisively without risking pilots or exposing vulnerable assets. Deterrence, once rooted in overwhelming retaliation, now faces a new reality: speed, precision, and deniability.

Hybrid Warfare Is the New Normal

The war was not fought only in the skies; it unfolded across screens, networks, and supply chains. Azerbaijan blended conventional ground operations with cyber tactics, information warfare, and economic pressure. This hybrid model reflects a broader shift in twenty-first century warfare, where victory depends as much on narrative as on firepower.

Azerbaijan’s goals were clear: reclaim a contested enclave and secure vital energy corridors. But its drone-led offensive carried a deeper message—technological capability is political will. The signal to adversaries was unmistakable: resistance will be met with precision, persistence, and total visibility.

Small States Can Now Challenge Big Powers

            For Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh represents cultural survival and historical identity. Its defense relied on asymmetrical tactics and guerrilla resilience. But against a technologically superior adversary, these methods faltered. Civilians and soldiers alike were left exposed, sheltering under skies that no longer offered cover.

This vulnerability is not unique to Armenia. Small states with access to drones can now challenge larger powers. Taiwan, for instance, is rapidly scaling up domestic drone production to counter China and support Western allies. Its “Drone National Team” initiative aims to produce 15,000 drones per month by 2028, positioning the island as a global hub for secure, AI-enabled drones.

Deterrence Must Be Reimagined

Nagorno-Karabakh may be the first war won by drones, but it will not be the last. The conflict offers a sobering lesson; deterrence must evolve or risk obsolescence. Integrated deterrence—blending military, economic, cyber, and diplomatic tools—is no longer optional. Unlike nuclear weapons, drones are accessible, scalable, and deniable. Their proliferation is horizontal, not vertical, spreading across small states, insurgent groups, and private firms.

As drone technology spreads, so does the risk of escalation, miscalculation, and asymmetric retaliation. The battlefield is no longer bound by geography; it is shaped by bandwidth, optics, and algorithmic intent.

Conclusion

            Nagorno-Karabakh was not just a battlefield; it was a turning point. It exposed how technological agility can dismantle legacy doctrines and how drones, once tactical novelties, now shape strategic outcomes. In this new era, deterrence is not about mass or might; it is about adaptability, integration, and speed. For nations still clinging to Cold War paradigms, the message is clear: evolve or be outmaneuvered. The future belongs to those who understand not just how to fight, but how to think in bandwidths, algorithms, and stories that shape the battlefield before the first shot is fired.

Evolution demands more than procurement; it requires imagination. Nations must rethink not only how they defend, but what they defend and why. As drones blur the line between war and surveillance, between deterrence and provocation, the strategist of tomorrow must be fluent in both geopolitics and code. The age of unmanned warfare is here and it is rewriting the rules faster than most doctrines can keep up.

Vikramaditya Shrivastava is a master’s student in international relations, security, and strategy at OP Jindal Global University.

Drones and the Death of Deterrence: Lessons from Nagorno-Karabakh was originally published on Global Security Review.

The ceasefire is fragile and does not apply to all shipping. It was on July 7, 2026, that the Houthis struck a Liberian-flagged cargo ship in the Red Sea. The threat to maritime safety and regional security posed by the Houthis persists. Unfortunately, it is difficult to fully eliminate the Houthi threat. This was a challenge even the United States found daunting.

The answer lies not just in firepower or military presence but in the complex interplay of geography, asymmetric warfare, intelligence dynamics, and the limitations of conventional maritime doctrine that lacks ground operations. The Houthi threat endures because it defies traditional military logic and thrives in the gaps of established security architecture. Prior to American airstrikes on Iran, the Houthis announced that they would resume attacks on American ships if the US participated in attacks on Iran.

As a proxy for Iran, Houthi aggression now serves as an indicator of Iran’s seriousness in reaching a deal with the United States. There is ample reason to look with great scepticism on any real agreement with Iran.

Naval Power Alone Cannot Neutralize a Land-Based Threat

At the heart of the issue is a basic operational reality; sea power cannot fully degrade threats on land. While advanced naval systems can intercept drones or missiles once launched, they cannot destroy the infrastructure, personnel, or supply chains that enable those attacks. Although airstrikes from the US, the United Kingdom, and Israel took place on Houthi infrastructure, the Houthis’ armed capabilities appear to be far from effectively degraded.

The Houthis operate deep in Yemen’s mountainous interior, far from the coastlines where naval assets patrol. Their launch teams are mobile, embedded in terrain that offers natural cover, and often operate without electronic communications, making them extremely difficult to detect via traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance methods. As a result, naval operations remain fundamentally reactive—capable of defending shipping lanes but unable to effectively dismantle the source of the threat.

A Strategic Use of Terrain and Simplicity

Unlike other non-state actors such as Hamas or Hezbollah, the Houthis have constructed an insurgent model that leverages geography, minimalism, and adaptability. Houthi missile-launch platforms, embedded in Yemen’s mountainous terrain, remain inaccessible to naval gunfire or airstrikes launched from the sea. In addition, many of the launch platforms are highly mobile and concealed within civilian zones. Additionally, the Houthis work in small, independent groups that use very little communication, which helps them avoid being tracked by signals since many of their units do not use radios or satellites, making it hard for traditional signal intelligence to find them.

Among the challenging features of the Houthis operational model is their geographic depth, where their bases are located far inland, making them nearly impossible to strike without a sustained ground presence. Moreover, they have effortless access to the coast. When needed, they move toward Yemen’s Red Sea coast to launch attacks, then retreat to the mountains before they are targeted. This cycle—emerge, strike, vanish—is extremely difficult to disrupt without coordinated land operations or robust human intelligence networks on the ground.

Asymmetric Tools, Strategic Impact

The Houthis do not rely on expensive platforms or sophisticated technology. Their toolkit is based on low-cost, high-impact weapons such as drones, cruise missiles, remote-controlled explosive boats, and sea mines. An example of such a cost-effective weapon is found in a $20,000 Houthi missile that was able to bring down a $30 million Reaper drone. Houthis do not need to win a naval war. Their objective is to undermine confidence in the maritime security system and inflate the cost of commercial activity while utilizing relatively low-cost tech in their attacks.

Their asymmetric maritime doctrine relies on the fact that each successful strike, even if not strategically decisive, has a massive economic and psychological impact, including disrupting Suez-bound shipping routes and reinforcing the narrative of Western and Arab military impotence.

This doctrine aims to disrupt commerce and challenge perception. Even a single drone strike that damages or delays a ship can increase global insurance premiums, force shipping companies to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, and, most importantly, undermine confidence in Western and regional naval dominance.

This economic and psychological toll is precisely the kind of impact the Houthis seek, demonstrating that a modest insurgent force can challenge global trade routes and project defiance against superior powers. In doing so, the Houthis sustain more local support and project symbolic power across the region—energizing other non-state actors and defying deterrence models based on superior force.

Intelligence and Great Power Enablers

What complicates the threat further is the suspected intelligence support the Houthis receive from external state actors—primarily Russia and China. Western defense sources indicate that satellite data and targeting assistance is helping the Houthis refine their maritime strikes. Accordingly, the Houthi campaign cannot be understood in isolation from its transnational intelligence ecosystem and other global geopolitical considerations that may include benefiting from the targeting of Western nations’ trade and shipping interests in the Red Sea.

This raises the conflict to a new level. It is no longer just a regional security issue—it is also a theater for proxy competition, where great powers use irregular actors to undermine Western-led security efforts.

This means that efforts to counter the Houthi threat must go beyond naval interception and include counterintelligence operations, diplomatic pressure to isolate enabling states, and cyber defense and spoofing to disrupt targeting. This again requires regional and international security cooperation built upon solid intelligence fusion from all nations at risk from Houthi activities.

The Political and Legal Dilemma of Land Operations

Many military planners agree that land operations are required to degrade the Houthi threat. This would require human intelligence operations, special forces, airstrikes on inland launch facilities, and proxy-supported sabotage missions. However, this runs into several challenges, including sovereignty concerns over operating in Yemen, lack of consensus among international actors, and the advancing risk of escalation with Iran.

Thus, the most effective solutions remain off the table politically, leaving naval forces to operate in a defensive posture while the Houthis continue to regenerate their capabilities from protected inland zones. To respond effectively, maritime strategy must evolve from defensive naval posturing to integrated hybrid operations that allow for effective land-sea-air doctrine integration.

Mini-Lateral Coalitions vs. Multilateral Limitations

The lack of mini-lateral groupings, such as maritime security coordination between Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, is preventing faster, more focused responses compared to that of the existing larger multilateral effort, like combined maritime forces (CMF). Mini-lateral formats and security frameworks between countries facing the same direct threat from the Houthis will allow for tighter intelligence sharing, better regional synchronization, and security integration, as well as greater operational agility towards theater-specific interoperability. Such mini-lateral coalitions are tactically nimble and more politically aligned than broad-based multilateral organizations such as the CMF or European Union naval force, which are encumbered by consensus-based mandates and diluted strategic clarity.

The lack of mini-lateral coalitions with international legitimacy, institutional resources, and long-term political sustainability only leads to the fact that no security arrangement can fully secure the region’s maritime corridors. This fragmented architecture, where some international actors act swiftly but lack reach and other regional actors have legitimacy but not urgency, has created gaps the Houthis exploit.

Rethinking Strategy in the Red Sea

The Houthis are not invincible, but they are well-adapted to the nature of modern warfare. Their strength lies in asymmetry, geography, and strategic patience, while their adversaries rely on conventional superiority constrained by politics and doctrine.

To change this equation, regional and international actors must shift from defensive naval operations to proactive hybrid strategies; reinvest in human intelligence, covert operations, and regional partnerships; and adapt legal and institutional frameworks to allow pre-emptive action against embedded threats.

A regional mini-lateral coalition of nations surrounding the Red Sea is a must, which then would allow for a tactically agile and politically aligned grouping that can possibly be plugged into US-led multilateral legitimacy and a sustainable burden-sharing operational model that would also build upon the existing US deterrence capabilities within the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Until then, the Houthi threat will persist, not because of its strength, but because the system built to counter it is designed for another kind of war.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

Why the Houthi Threat Persists was originally published on Global Security Review.

This was not an isolated incident. Civilian-grade drones and other dual-use technologies are increasingly being used to survey or target public infrastructure. From energy grids to airports, the connective tissue of modern life is exposed to risks once confined to traditional warzones. These developments are reshaping global security policies and blurring the boundary between civilian and military domains.

Civilian Tech, Strategic Impact

Cheap unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are now accessible worldwide. While drones were initially developed for military use, the most commonly deployed platforms today, such as DJI’s Mavic series, were originally built for civilian applications like aerial photography and videography. Their affordability, portability, and high-spec cameras made them commercially popular, but those same features have made them easy to repurpose for military contexts.

In particular, first-person view (FPV) drones, designed for immersive recreational flying, were rapidly adapted for frontline use in conflict. These drones are now routinely deployed with improvised explosives or used for precision reconnaissance. In Ukraine, both sides repurposed off-the-shelf drones in vast numbers; nearly two million were produced in 2024 alone. Many of these are equipped with AI-enabled navigation and targeting, underscoring how quickly civilian tech can be weaponised.

Non-state actors are following suit. Armed groups are using FPV drones for low-cost, high impact strikes on infrastructure, blurring the lines between military and civilian threats. This second drone age shows that national security vulnerabilities now stem as much from consumer technology as from conventional arsenals.

The broader implication is clear: private-sector innovations, often created without any defense intent, are shaping the battlefield. These companies bring novel use cases, technical advantages, or agile design processes that legacy defense contractors may overlook. Civilian tech is not just a risk; it is a potential strategic asset. Tapping into this ecosystem, especially among start-ups and experts, could redefine how the country protects critical infrastructure in an era of hybrid conflict.

Infrastructure in the Crosshairs

Modern infrastructure is a key target in modern conflicts or hybrid attacks, just like military bases traditionally were. In 2022, after the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, over 70 drone sightings were reported near Norwegian offshore oil platforms. Oslo feared Russian-linked hybrid operations targeting Europe’s energy supply and deployed naval assets and invited NATO allies to assist in patrols.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s energy grid suffered repeated drone and missile attacks, with waves of low-cost Shahed drones used to disable power plants. By spring 2024, roughly half of Ukraine’s electricity capacity was destroyed, forcing nationwide blackouts.

Outside conflict zones, attacks on infrastructure are also rising. In Sudan, a drone strike on a power station caused regional outages, and other drone attacks on water purification stations left the country on the brink of a significant Cholera outbreak. In the US, federal officials stopped an attack on a power grid by a man using an explosive-carrying drone.

Transportation hubs are vulnerable, too. In January 2025, drone activity shut down Riga Airport, disrupting dozens of flights.

 Gaps in Governance

 Despite growing risks, legal and operational frameworks remain fragmented. Drones and AI-driven surveillance systems often fall outside traditional arms control regimes. As a recent executive order put it, “Criminals, terrorists, and hostile foreign actors have intensified their weaponization of drone technologies, creating new and serious threats to our homeland.”

Jurisdictional confusion is common. In many countries, local authorities lack legal authority to respond to rogue drones above critical sites. Aviation safety rules and privacy laws create hesitation, giving bad actors a head start.

Even when threat awareness exists, coordination is inconsistent. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency warns that drones are used for surveillance and sabotage, yet they lack the comprehensive tools to oversee private-sector resilience or cross-border response.

 A Global Security Challenge

 Drone and AI threats are not confined by borders. In 2023, the European Commission launched a new counter-drone strategy, urging member states to harden infrastructure and coordinate airspace protections. NATO has added counter-UAS exercises to its joint drills, while AUKUS partners are beginning to share emerging drone and AI tactics.

But international law is lagging. There is still no global treaty governing the use of armed drones or autonomous surveillance. Export control regimes struggle to manage proliferation of AI-enabling components. At the UN, efforts to establish binding norms on autonomous weapons are stalled. Ad hoc coordination is, however, slowly improving.

When Norway’s oil platforms were threatened, NATO allies were called in within days. After drone sightings near Dutch and Belgian ports, neighboring governments exchanged countermeasure plans. These models suggest a path forward: rapid and collective responses based on shared tools, shared doctrine, and shared threat intelligence.

The future of civilian dual-use technologies will not be defined by innovators alone. Whether drones or AI software, these tools are already reshaping how adversaries threaten public safety and economic continuity. What is at stake is not just national security, but the resilience of infrastructure that supports daily life.

The Crucial Role of Start-ups in National Defense

 Civilian-origin technologies are now driving the next wave of defense capability. From FPV drones to AI surveillance tools, some of the most disruptive military applications today are emerging not from traditional defense primes but from commercial markets, often developed by start-ups with no military background.

A coordinated international framework is urgently needed, one that does not just support innovation and infrastructure protection but actively integrates civilian tech into defense planning. This means lowering the barriers for experts and start-ups to meaningfully contribute alongside legacy contractors. The United Kingdom’s recent Defence Review hinted at this shift, recognising that smaller firms are vital to national resilience, particularly when civilian infrastructure is under threat.

What is truly needed is a NATO-wide or broader allied framework that enables cross-border collaboration, streamlines regulation, and opens up procurement pathways.

Today, many start-ups working at the intersection of security and technology face steep hurdles: limited access to capital, opaque compliance regimes, and procurement processes designed around, and for, large incumbents. Yet by creating space for their innovation, we can modernize collective defense from the ground up, using the very same civilian tools that adversaries are already turning into weapons.

A coordinated international framework is urgently needed, one that not only supports innovation and infrastructure protection but also lowers barriers to experts and start-ups to contribute more meaningfully alongside traditional defense primes. The UK’s recent Defence Review hinted at this shift, recognizing the value smaller firms bring to national resilience. It is time to take similar action at home.

Harry Geisler is the CEO of YAVA.

How Civilian Dual-Use Technologies Are Reshaping Global Security Policies was originally published on Global Security Review.

These unmanned and precision attacks targeted strategic locations, ranging from early warning radar sites to critical military installations. They did not provoke the feared nuclear response. Instead, these operations exposed a new threat calculus where persistence, precision, and the power of perception are paramount.

Recent analyses suggest that such drone operations contributed to shifting risk assessments within adversary states, where even a 10 percent to 15 percent error in perception could lead to miscalculation. American nuclear strategists now contend with an urgent need to rethink deterrence as the boundary between conventional and nuclear erodes.

Spectral Shifts: Rethinking Strategic Assumptions

For decades, American nuclear strategy hinged on the assumption that any conventional attack on nuclear command and control assets would inevitably trigger a nuclear counter-response. Data from Cold War–era exercises and subsequent real-world incidents reinforced this mindset among defense planners. Ukraine’s repeated drone strikes on sensitive Russian assets, including radar installations integral to Russia’s early warning systems, force a reconsideration of long-held assumptions.

The Kremlin’s response is notably restrained, treating these incursions as manageable costs rather than triggers for nuclear escalation. This strategic restraint, observed in multiple public and classified communications from Moscow, signals that deterrence may now rely less on the brute force of nuclear capability and more on the sophistication of targeting and intent. The takeaway for modern policymakers is that deterrence must now incorporate a broader array of factors, including technology-driven precision and the adversary’s threshold for escalation.

Phantom Impact: Redefining Strategy Beyond Nuclear Might

The era when the primary measure of strategic impact was synonymous with nuclear firepower is ending. Ukraine’s innovative use of low-cost, high-precision drones demonstrates that small platforms can disrupt traditional security calculations. Recent reports from defense think tanks estimate that the unit cost of drone operations is less than 1 percent of what a conventional fighter aircraft mission might cost, yet their operational impact in terms of intelligence and tactical disruption is comparable in key areas.

These drones infiltrate deep into adversary territory and strike high-value military and economic assets once presumed invulnerable. Such operational dynamics challenge the long-standing monopoly of nuclear-armed states over credible homeland threats. American planners must now recalibrate their threat models to integrate non-nuclear options, recognizing that the future of strategic impact is both more economical and more technologically complex than ever before.

Haunted Homelands: The Crumbling Illusion of Sanctuary

During the Cold War, vast distances, natural barriers, and the geographic isolation provided by oceans created the comforting illusion that major powers could enjoy an impenetrable sanctuary. Today, that illusion is crumbling. Ukraine’s drone operations are a vivid demonstration that even regions thought to be well-protected can be penetrated. Attacks targeting Russia’s early warning networks, critical oil infrastructure, and military bases reveal that no area can rest on its laurels.

American infrastructure, ranging from energy grids to communication systems and early warning radars, face elevated risks in an age of highly agile autonomous systems. Consider that the global market for unmanned aerial vehicles is projected to reach nearly $50 billion by 2030. Considering this, there is an immediate imperative to overhaul homeland defense strategies. Rapid response protocols, increased situational awareness, and investment in counter-drone technologies are no longer optional. They are emerging as essential components of modern deterrence.

Phantom Signals: How Optics and Intent Drive Escalation

One of the most remarkable aspects of Ukraine’s campaign is its ability to secure tactical advantages without spiraling into uncontrolled escalation. The success of these drone strikes lies in their careful timing, precision, and measured execution. Ukrainian forces consistently space out operations and meticulously choose targets that convey national resolve without risking mass casualties. This dual messaging, delivering a tangible operational effect while sending a clear political signal, underscores a critical evolution in deterrence thinking.

Today, the optics and perceived intent behind an action can be as decisive as the physical impact. One analysis points out that misinterpretations of strategic intent now pose as much risk of inadvertent escalation as traditional force-on-force scenarios. For the United States, this means that developing clear, well-articulated signaling frameworks is crucial. Such frameworks must enable policymakers and military leaders to assert credible force while avoiding actions that might be misread as provocative by adversaries. In a world where every action is scrutinized and the margins for error are thinning, clarity in communication becomes a cornerstone of modern deterrence.

Ghosts in the Arsenal: Integrating Drones into Deterrence

Drones are transcending their traditional role on the battlefield and are emerging as indispensable strategic assets. Modern unmanned systems serve multiple roles, from surveillance and intelligence gathering to direct precision strikes against key targets. Their integration is revolutionizing how military operations are conducted without risking human life. Moreover, these systems have the added benefit of being less politically charged than manned strike platforms. However, their growing prominence also introduces the potential for miscalculation.

With investments in drone technology doubling over the past decade in many leading militaries, the United States must swiftly incorporate these assets into its overarching deterrence framework. This requires the formulation of robust policies that define the operational limits and acceptable contexts for drone employment, comprehensive training programs for commanders in escalation management, and public messaging that reinforces strategic resolve without escalating tensions. The rapid pace of technological adoption means that the window for effective integration is short, and strategic agility is paramount.

Phantoms of the Future: Recasting Deterrence in the Drone Age

Retaining U.S. strategic credibility in the coming decades will demand an evolution beyond a deterrence model solely anchored in nuclear might. Although nuclear forces remain critical, they are no longer the exclusive instruments that shape adversary behavior in today’s multidomain conflicts. The future of deterrence depends on a seamless strategy where nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities are coherently integrated. This entails developing a comprehensive national doctrine for drone utilization that explicitly defines clear thresholds for action, acceptable target sets, and robust escalation-management protocols. In parallel, efforts must focus on modernizing homeland defenses to counter the threat of long-range, autonomous drone attacks, especially in sectors such as space-based assets, energy, and telecommunications. Data from defense budget analyses show that if every NATO member met the 2 percent gross domestic product defense spending target, the alliance’s budget would increase by over $100 billion annually. Such investments, along with analogous U.S. initiatives to enhance technological resilience, are crucial if deterrence is to remain credible and effective in this new operational environment.

Final Haunting: Embracing the Ghostly Evolution of Deterrence

“Ghosts in the Skies” is not just a metaphor; it encapsulates the profound transformation underway in modern deterrence. Ukraine’s innovative use of drone technology is forcefully redefining the conventional wisdom that has long informed global security policy. This paradigm shift challenges entrenched assumptions and demands a rapid evolution of U.S. military strategy. In an era of hybrid threats and rapid technological change, our global security environment is more complex and interdependent than ever before. The future of deterrence will rely on the capacity to adapt swiftly, integrate non-linear threat responses, and build flexible defense systems that are as agile as the adversaries they are designed to deter. The message for policymakers is clear: embrace this ghostly evolution now, for in the emerging multidomain battlefield every misstep carries the risk of destabilizing not only regional security but also global order.

The transformation in deterrence prompted by Ukraine’s drone operations is a stark reminder that innovation in warfare can render old paradigms obsolete. As nations invest in cost-effective, high-precision autonomous systems, the calculus of deterrence will continue to shift, compelling the United States and its allies to rethink both doctrine and defense spending. In this new era, where even the faintest ghost can upend strategic balance, the ability to adapt and respond with agility will be the true measure of national security.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author alone.

Ghosts in the Skies: How Ukraine’s Drone Tactics Recast Modern Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

As it stands, Ukraine cannot rely entirely on aid packages from Europe and especially not the US who, under Trump, is taking a much more careful role in European conflict. So far, support for Ukraine from the international community is limited, costly, and dependent on repayment either in natural resources or as the United Kingdom said, “the extraordinary profits on immobilized Russian sovereign assets.”

There are certain things which, due to their higher cost, Ukraine must receive from aid deals with foreign governments, such as missile systems and larger manned vehicles. These more expensive items must be produced by larger defense contractors as they have greater access to raw materials and a larger production budget. UAVs, however, can be produced as effectively by smaller companies which are able and willing to provide the Ukrainian government a better deal financially. Over the past few years, a German AI company, Helsing, has filled an important role in providing affordable drone systems to the Ukrainian military. Four thousand reconnaissance drones, designed and manufactured by Helsing, are already operational in Ukraine, and a recent deal was struck to provide 6,000 of their new HX-2 attack drones.

The HX-2 attack drones are similar in design to the Russian Lancet drone, produced by Russian aerospace giant ZALA, but come with a few key advantages and innovations. The HX-2 is technologically advanced and able to avoid signal disruption, a feature which can transform drone capabilities on the Ukrainian battlefield. The engagement range is also far higher, at 100 kilometers (km) compared to the Lancet’s 40–60 km. Helsing is the developer of an AI software which allows the drones to travel on missions in a swarm, where many are piloted by one individual, allowing for incredibly destructive capabilities.

The key advantage of a company like Helsing, over a larger aerospace company with a wider range of products, such as ZALA, is the significantly lower production cost, which Helsing offers. Helsing has plans to increase output, building “resilience factories” across Europe, which allow for countries to carry out domestic production.

The Ukrainian government clearly spotted some of the advantages in giving smaller defense companies the opportunity to develop new and innovative products. Brave1 is an initiative run by the Ukrainian government, where investors, engineers, defense companies, and military experts are able to meet to address some of the gaps and issues that Ukraine faces on the battlefield. The idea is to fix issues and fill gaps as fast as possible, and so far, it has been successful. The Ukrainian government incentivizes both smaller and larger technology companies to innovate by offering them a shot at a lucrative government contract.

Another similar program aimed at kickstarting innovation in the European defense industry is the Darkstar Coalition. Listed as one of the partners of Brave1, Darkstar is a team of European tech start-up owners and investors who joined forces to boost European defense. Darkstar hosted two boot camps, where small tech start-ups demonstrate their creations and compete for the winning prize: cash to expand their operations. A third boot camp will take place in Spring of 2025, with a total of €1.5 million awarded to the two most successful companies. Even companies which do not win the funding will benefit from attending, as they are given the opportunity to carry out field testing, network with other companies, gain technical advice, and potentially receive funding externally from other interested attendees. The success of the boot camps demonstrates the previously underutilized talent and innovative ability in Europe in sectors such as engineering, robotics, AI, and cybersecurity. When incentivized and supported, these smaller start-ups can have a real impact on the war in Ukraine and European security more broadly.

It is not just defense manufacturing companies that are stepping up to meet the changing requirements of the Ukrainian government, but also AI programming companies such as Swarmer are also innovating. Swarmer is a company that creates drone swarm programs with huge capabilities in modern warfare. It is also a company which is consistently present at Brave1 tech summits, meeting with investors and Ukrainian military officials.

As the war enters a new phase, with reduced support from the US and the prospect of limited support from Europe, stretching the Ukrainian defense budget as far is it will go will become even more of a priority. This is where these smaller defense and tech start-ups will thrive. Whilst giants such as Lockheed Martin, BAE, or Airbus typically fill a majority of the orders during long-term conflicts, Ukraine recognized the power in allowing smaller, newer, more nimble defense technology companies to innovate.

Raphael Chiswick is an independent author. Views expressed are his own.  

AI Defense Start-ups was originally published on Global Security Review.

Their low cost, flexibility, and ability to operate without putting human pilots at risk make drones increasingly valuable in conventional military conflicts. Their capabilities already include reconnaissance and surveillance, long-range strike missions, electronic warfare, and precision killing.

With their precision-targeting ability, drones can be integrated into nuclear deterrence strategies. For instance, they could be used to ensure the survivability of a country’s nuclear forces by providing continuous surveillance and early warning against potential nuclear threats. Drones could also support a more viable second-strike capability, potentially increasing the credibility of nuclear deterrence by ensuring that a country retains a means to retaliate even after a nuclear first strike.

The use of drones in situations where nuclear escalation is a possibility could lead to unintended consequences. The increasing autonomy of drones raises the risk of misinterpretation, as drones could be perceived as a precursor to a larger attack, even when they are only conducting reconnaissance. This could trigger a preemptive nuclear strike by an adversary, leading to an inadvertent escalation into full-scale nuclear war. Cold War and subsequent histories show that the danger of inadvertent nuclear escalation is not trivial.

The possibility that expansion of the war in Ukraine from conventional weapons into nuclear first use could occur from Russian views of Ukrainian deep strikes into Russian territory, with NATO ballistic and cruise missiles, provides one example of concerns in this category.  Lewis A. Dunn suggests that President Donald Trump is faced with a world sliding into nuclear anarchy. He writes:

Brinkmanship among major nuclear powers is rising. China is relentlessly expanding its nuclear forces but rejecting serious engagement with the United States on arms control. US–Russia cooperation on nuclear matters, already in a dire state, has deteriorated further with President Vladimir Putin’s repeated nuclear threats in the course of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Recent reports based on information from senior US officials indicate that the United States, too, could modify its posture and expand its arsenal to strengthen deterrence of coordinated Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear adventurism. All these developments have eroded critical pillars of nuclear order and raised the risk of nuclear warfare.

Drones are relatively fast, low-cost, and difficult to detect, which makes them ideal for preemptive strikes against high-value targets. In theory, a nation could deploy a drone strike against an adversary’s nuclear command-and-control infrastructure or missile silos, aiming to disrupt or neutralize a potential nuclear retaliation before it can be launched. In addition, drones equipped with nuclear payloads or advanced conventional weapons could be used as part of a disarming strike. The ability to carry out such strikes could shift the strategic calculations of nations, as adversaries might feel more vulnerable to a preemptive attack, especially if they believe their nuclear retaliation capabilities could be neutralized by fast-moving drone strikes.

As drones become more autonomous, the risk of them making decisions without human oversight increases. In a nuclear context, where the consequences of any action are catastrophic, the delegation of decision-making to machines is highly controversial. The potential for autonomous drones to trigger a nuclear response or make fatal miscalculations due to algorithmic errors presents a possible threat to strategic stability.

Given that drones can operate autonomously, one challenge is ensuring that their actions do not trigger unintended escalation. Moreover, the reliance on technological systems for communication and control in a nuclear context raises concerns about vulnerabilities in these systems, especially if adversaries employ cyberattacks or electronic warfare tactics to disrupt drone operations.

Future generations of drones will interact with artificial intelligence that also supports other elements in the matrix of deterrence and defense. AI will privilege deterrence by denial compared to deterrence by credible threat of unacceptable retaliation. It will do so because states will have to quickly manage the deterrence and/or conduct conflicts in multiple domains: land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, and the information or knowledge domain. The knowledge domain wraps around all the others. It is the “gnostic center” that controls, connects, and prioritizes among the component parts of the various domains in order to provide for the correct response to threats or attacks.

AI-assisted attacks on the gnostic center will require immediate responses by AI-assisted defenses that can defeat or diminish the cost of those attacks. Absorbing the first blow and then retaliating may not be a choice that is available to beleaguered and time-pressed decision-makers. This situation poses an especially concerning challenge for nuclear deterrence. Decisions for or against nuclear war should allow policymakers sufficient time to deliberate alternatives with their advisors and to select the most appropriate option for the exigent circumstances. But the potential speed of AI-boosted attacks against space and cyber assets, together with the rising speed of kinetic strikes from hypersonic weapons, may leave leaders fearful of an enemy nuclear first strike to choose preemption instead of retaliation.

Just as we can conceive of drones as reconnaissance and strike platforms for offenses, it is also possible that drones can be part of any state’s comprehensive antimissile and air defense plan. One illustration is the use of drone swarms to defeat attacking drones tasked with reconnaissance or strike missions. Another example would be the use of drones for electromagnetic “hit to kill” within the atmosphere or, even more ambitiously, in midcourse intercept against attacking ballistic missile forces. Drones based on one or more lunar spaceports could protect American interests in cislunar space.

Futuristic drones with embedded AI and space-to-space weapons could defend orbital satellites against attack (so-called DSATs) or engage another state’s satellites that appear threatening (ASATs). Priority DSATs and ASATs would deter or defend against any threat to the viability of American satellites for warning and assessment; command, control, and communications; geolocation; and other missions.

Comparatively inexpensive drones could thus take over some of the strategic defense burden, otherwise requiring both upgraded terrestrial missile launchers and kill vehicles or, eventually, sophisticated ballistic missile defenses based on space-to-earth weapons such as lasers or particle beams. Future planners should expect a more crowded space domain, including newer generations of orbital satellites with diverse missions, space stations, and additional reconnaissance and strike weapons along with smarter drones and larger swarms.

The preceding discussion about drones and their possible relationship to nuclear deterrence has implications for nuclear arms control. It is important for a peace agreement to terminate the war in Ukraine for many reasons. One reason is so that the United States and Russia can resume negotiations about an arms control regime to succeed the New START agreement, due to expire in 2026.

The “beyond New START” consultations should include discussions about the two states’ arsenals of non-strategic nuclear weapons and protocols for nuclear first use. Vladimir Putin’s repeated warnings about the possibility of Russian nuclear first use in Ukraine is dismissed by some as bluffing for effect, a form of coercive diplomacy. On the other hand, Russia’s doctrinal shifts appear to move toward a more permissive standard as the war continues. In addition to clarifying this matter, the United States and Russia must acknowledge that China is an aspiring nuclear peer and include China in discussions about nuclear policy issues, including transparency about force structures and military doctrines. China is unlikely to be interested in arms reductions per se, but dialogue should be initiated at the expert level to clarify China’s thinking about strategy, arms control, and related issues.

The character of war changes with the advent of new technologies and strategic thinking.  But the nature of war is perennially the environment of competition and conflict, uncertainty, chance, and friction. The relationship between drones and nuclear deterrence represents a mixed blessing for military planners and arms control. Drones have the potential to enhance nuclear deterrence, but they also introduce significant risks in terms of escalation control and first-strike stability. As drone technology advances, it will be critical for policymakers to develop strategies that account for the unique challenges drones pose in nuclear deterrence and, as well, their future roles in space and cyber wars.

Professor Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Nuclear Deterrence and Drones: An Unpredictable Mix? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The EAR Report is a must read for National security professionals to stay informed about rapidly evolving global threats and the strategic implications for U.S. defense policy.

This report addresses critical developments in nuclear deterrence, missile defense, and geopolitical trends, and equips professionals with actionable insights to navigate the complexities of modern security challenges effectively.

Commentary and Quotes of the Week

• Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin: Reaffirmed the U.S.-ROK alliance and the strengthening of extended deterrence through the Nuclear Consultative Group.
  Peter Huessy: Detailed the financial and strategic implications of eliminating the ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, emphasizing the costs of alternative measures for maintaining current deterrence levels.
  Jon Finer, Deputy National Security Adviser: Highlighted Pakistan’s emerging threat with the development of long-range ballistic missile capabilities.
  Bill Gertz: Revealed China’s rapid nuclear buildup and the expansion of its missile capabilities.
  Russian Leaders: Asserted advancements in missile systems and dismissed arms control as a relic of the past.
  Rep. Chuck Fleischmann: Stressed the urgency of modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent, citing contributions from Tennessee’s Oak Ridge Lab.

Strategic Developments of the Week

• China’s Military Build-Up: The Pentagon report highlighted Beijing’s dramatic advancements in hypersonic missile technology, nuclear warheads, and ‘intelligentized warfare.’
  Russia’s Strategic Actions: Russia’s legislative shift regarding the Taliban and progress in missile systems underlined its geopolitical maneuvers.
  U.S. Missile Defense Challenges: Reports emphasized the lag in U.S. hypersonic missile capabilities compared to China, pressing the need for enhanced missile defense systems.
  Space and Drone Developments: New legislation and technological advances highlight the increasing role of space and drones in modern warfare.

Important Reports of the Week

1. “President Trump Must Put the Nuclear Enterprise on a Wartime Footing” by Robert Peters:
   • Advocates for accelerating nuclear arsenal modernization to restore deterrence credibility.
     Calls for a stronger commitment to stockpile stewardship and missile defense.
2. “Importance of Building Homeland Missile Defense” by Robert Joseph:
   • Reiterates the vision of a comprehensive missile defense system to counter emerging threats.
     Proposes leveraging space-based systems for more robust and efficient protection.
3. “What Happens if the United States Eliminates the ICBM Leg of the Triad?”:
   • Examines the repercussions of removing the ICBM leg, including massive financial costs for alternative deterrence methods and strategic vulnerabilities.

Download the Full Report

ICBM EAR Report for December 20th was originally published on Global Security Review.

Contacts with foreign sources were not very informative. The Chinese Ministry of Defense denied any use of drones over American or other territory, and their spokesperson added, “We get all the information we need from hacking into US government and industry sources.” They referred Americans to the Russians.

The Russian Security Council denied any involvement in flying drones over the East Coast. “Iran provides most of our drones, go talk to them,” was the only response we could get from officials. They added that President Putin has his own personal drone for use when he is hunting while riding bare chested in the Far East.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry was no more helpful on the issue saying, “Any drones we have will be used for surveillance of Israel or sent to the Russians for the Ukrainians to shoot down.”

Having exhausted foreign sources, Americans turned to domestic agencies. The Department of Homeland Security had no information about drones. “We are fully challenged to cope with unprecedented illegal border crossings, a meltdown of the Secret Service, and a FEMA fiasco in North Carolina to worry about drones,” said one agency official, on background.

The Department of Defense was not any more helpful. They denied having any information about drones, other than to say that there was no evidence of aliens being connected to drone activity in the United States. On the other hand, there was no evidence that the drones were not connected to aliens. They referred Americans to past episodes of The X Files.

The State Department reported that they had no contact with drones other than some foreign ambassadors who were posted to the United States and predictably uninformed about their activities.

The intelligence community said they did not necessarily know anything about drones, but even if they did, it would be classified and could not be shared with the media. This was an understandable reply.

A Republican member of Congress from New Jersey claimed that Iran had launched drones from a “mother ship” somewhere off the coast of the United States and that this information came from highly classified sources. This was corroborated by some boardwalk vendors of pizza in Ocean City and Wildwood, New Jersey. Their credibility was not challenged.

Some residents of New Jersey thought that tourists from Pennsylvania who visit New Jersey beaches during the summer are retaliating for exorbitant rental charges paid in previous years. Given prices, this is certainly an option worth exploring.

Others claimed that the drones were the work of environmentalists angered by shore communities’ wars against sea gulls, including the importation of hawks to chase gulls away from their natural habitats. Recent destruction of irreplicable works of art by environmentalists makes the illicit flying of drones over New Jersey easily conceivable.

Residents of New York suggested that New Jersey was seeking publicity to compensate for its comparative insignificance in national and regional affairs. “New Jersey is simply a suburb of New York and otherwise has no reason to attract news coverage,” was the explanation provided by one New Yorker.

But a New Jersey native came to her state’s defense. New Jersey residents, she said, were mentally exhausted from driving around in their infamous traffic circles until their brains boiled over; aliens or foreign enemies would be a welcome distraction.

An expert in artificial intelligence (AI) suggested that the drone swarms might be the result of an AI experiment gone awry, given the widespread use of “deepfakes” pervasive in social media and other sources. “The Jersey drone swarm could be the opening scene in the next Hollywood spectacular mixing fictitious events (alien invasions) with real events (military drone attacks) in order to smash box office records,” he noted.

Whatever the case may be is still undetermined. Needless to say, the longer it takes to find an answer, the more numerous the conspiracy theories will become. They will also grow increasingly more interesting for sure.

Professor Steve Cimbala, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Professor of Political Science at Penn State-Brandywine.

Drones on the Loose was originally published on Global Security Review.

One example is instructive. The rate at which aircraft locations are electronically manipulated, “spoofed,” increased 500 percent in the first three quarters of 2024. An average of 1,500 flights a day were impacted by the beginning of September. In a recent survey of almost 2,000 flight crew members, 70 percent described their concerns about the impact on aviation safety as either “very high” or “extreme.”

The world depends upon signals from GPS and other global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) to underpin virtually every technology. Yet the essential positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) service they provide is incredibly vulnerable.

Weak and Vulnerable Signals

These signals from space are, of necessity, very weak. The sun shining produces stronger radio signals than a GPS satellite. Yet, through a miracle of technology, receivers on earth can find coded signals in the radio noise floor, decipher them, and tell Americans where they are and the exact time.

Exceptionally weak signals mean that almost any interference on the right frequency can prevent them from getting through. For less than ten dollars, delivery drivers looking to electronically hide from their employers, people worried about being tracked by their spouse or the government, and bad actors wanting to disable receivers can buy a GPS “jammer” from any number of internet vendors. Such sales are illegal in most countries, as is the use of such devices. However, enforcement is almost always lax or nonexistent.

Keep in mind, signal specifications were made public as part of GPS becoming America’s “gift to the world,” with the US government encouraging GPS’s broad use. Other GNSS operators did the same.

While incredibly successful in promoting the wide adoption of signals, it has also facilitated spoofing. Compounding the problem, advances in digital technology brought inexpensive software-defined transmitters into the world. Now, for a few hundred dollars, a reasonably sophisticated hobbyist can easily imitate GPS and other satellite navigation signals.

The necessity of PNT services for everyday life and over-reliance on GPS/GNSS for PNT makes the vulnerability of signals to denial and imitation a primary weapon in conflicts around the globe.

This impacts millions of those not involved in these conflicts because any receiver within line-of-sight of the interfering transmitter can be affected. Thus, cell phone systems in Finland are degraded by drone defenses in St. Petersburg. First responders across the Middle East must use paper maps because of ongoing conflicts. Ships and aircraft, hundreds of miles from military actions, lose their navigation and collision avoidance systems. Given the number of conflicts around the planet, many regions of the world are adversely affected.

To date, appeals by international maritime and aviation professional organizations have failed to make an impact on the problem. The same is true for resolutions by the United Nation’s International Maritime Organization and International Civil Aviation Organization. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which seems to have the principal jurisdiction for this, is proving similarly ineffective.

At its World Radio Conference in December 2023, ITU delegates approved what, at first glance, appears to be a strong resolution enjoining member states to refrain from interfering with GNSS signals. The only way the resolution could pass was with an exception allowing interference “for security or defense purposes.” It is hard to imagine any other reason for which a state would disrupt signals.

Despite the failures of international diplomacy to mitigate this growing problem, there is likely a path for it to be much more successful. Attacks on GPS and other GNSS signals are useful only because most nations and systems over-depend on them with few alternatives.

Fortunately, many countries are actively considering establishing robust and resilient terrestrial PNT systems to complement signals from space. These can provide GPS-like information, but do not have common vulnerabilities and failure modes with GNSS.

The US Department of Transportation, the lead in America for civil PNT issues, said that intelligently using a combination of independent signals from space, terrestrial broadcast, and fiber cable can be the foundation of a resilient national PNT architecture.

Establishing such a system of systems will not make the services invulnerable. However, it will make them hard enough to disrupt so that antagonists will look elsewhere for opportunities to create mischief. Some nations are already taking significant steps toward achieving such resilience.

South Korea and Saudi Arabia field high-power terrestrial systems that provide PNT. The United Kingdom fields a partial system and seems poised to expand it, as well as a deployable capability. Much of Russia is also served by such a system.

China has the world’s most complete and advanced resilient PNT architecture. It includes three constellations of satellites in different orbital planes, an extensive terrestrial broadcast system, and a 20,000-kilometer fiber timing network with 295 “timing stations.”

Yet much of the world remains vulnerable to disruption. Those who interfere are therefore incentivized.

International diplomacy, in the form of the United Nations, can help improve the inevitable transition to resilient PNT by encouraging states to implement sovereign terrestrial systems. These systems will complement and cooperate with GNSS, while also operating independently.

As part of this effort, international standards can be developed to ensure aircraft, ships, and vehicles are able to seamlessly transit between nations. Technical assistance can be provided to nations with little local expertise in the field.

These efforts will greatly reduce the incentive to interfere with GNSS, thereby making it safer and more reliable. It will also reinforce the sovereignty and security of every involved nation.

The alternative is to continue down the path of increasing interference and increasing risk to life and property. Safety margins are already impacted. Ships are already colliding, and passenger aircraft are nearly straying, unannounced, into hostile airspace, all because of spoofing. It is only a matter of time before the world witnesses an avoidable tragedy.

The international community, perhaps in the form of a United Nations task force, must intervene to protect these fragile signals from space and disincentivize future disruptions.

Safer and more reliable signals from space and resilient sovereign terrestrial PNT are in the long-term interest of every nation. Diplomatic efforts must illuminate that shared interest bring parties together and nurture progress for everyone’s benefit.

Dana A. Goward is President of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, www.RNTFnd.org, an educational and scientific charity. He is a member of the president’s National Space-based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Advisory Board and formerly served as the maritime navigation authority for the United States. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

How Diplomacy Can Save GPS was originally published on Global Security Review.

Standoff warfare is characterized by the use of long-range weapon systems, such as cruise missiles, drones, and precision-guided munitions, to engage targets from a safe distance. This approach leverages advanced surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting technologies to identify and strike enemy assets without direct engagement.

Advantages of Standoff Warfare

One of the primary advantages of standoff warfare is the significant reduction in the risk to military personnel. By operating from a distance, forces are less exposed to direct enemy fire and ambushes, leading to fewer casualties and increased morale. By keeping forces out of the immediate reach of the enemy, standoff warfare helps preserve valuable military assets. This approach ensures that high-value equipment and personnel are available for prolonged engagements and future conflicts.

Modern long-range weapons are highly accurate, allowing for precision strikes on strategic targets. This capability enhances operational efficiency by focusing on high-value targets and minimizing collateral damage, which is crucial in maintaining public support and adhering to international laws of warfare.

The ability to strike from a distance can have a significant psychological impact on the enemy. The constant threat of unexpected precision attack can demoralize opposing forces and disrupt their operational planning and execution.

Standoff warfare allows for rapid deployment and response to emerging threats. With assets positioned at a safe distance, commanders can quickly adapt to changing battlefield conditions and execute strikes without the need for extensive mobilization.

Disadvantages of Standoff Warfare

Standoff warfare relies heavily on advanced technologies for surveillance, targeting, and weapon delivery. This dependence can be a vulnerability if these systems are disrupted by electronic warfare, cyberattacks, or other countermeasures.

The development, procurement, and maintenance of long-range weapon systems and associated technologies are expensive. The financial burden of sustaining a standoff warfare capability can strain defense budgets and divert resources from other critical areas.

Standoff warfare is most effective against concentrated, high-value targets. When facing adversaries employing dispersed, decentralized tactics, the efficiency of long-range strikes diminishes, necessitating alternative approaches.

Accurate intelligence and targeting data are crucial for successful standoff operations. The reliance on real-time, high-fidelity information can be a limitation if there are gaps in intelligence or if adversaries employ deception and concealment strategies.

The use of long-range strikes can be perceived as highly provocative and potentially escalatory in a conflict. Adversaries may respond with retaliatory measures, leading to a cycle of escalation that can spiral out of control.

China

China’s military modernization and expansion pose a significant challenge to American and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s development of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, including long-range missiles, sophisticated air defenses, and naval assets, necessitates a robust standoff strategy.

Standoff warfare allows the US and its allies to engage Chinese assets from a distance, mitigating the risk posed by China’s A2/AD systems. The ability to strike from afar can disrupt Chinese operations, degrade critical infrastructure, and maintain freedom of navigation in contested areas.

China’s advancements in electronic warfare, cyber capabilities, and counter-space operations could undermine the effectiveness of standoff warfare. Additionally, the vast expanse of the Indo-Pacific region presents logistical challenges for sustaining long-range operations.

Russia

Russia’s military doctrine emphasizes hybrid warfare, combining conventional and unconventional tactics. Its integrated air defense systems, long-range missile capabilities, and electronic warfare proficiency make it a formidable adversary.

Standoff warfare enables NATO forces to counter Russian aggression by targeting key military installations, command-and-control centers, and logistical hubs from a safe distance. Precision strikes can degrade Russia’s offensive capabilities and hinder its operational tempo.

Russia’s integrated air defenses and advanced electronic warfare capabilities pose significant challenges to standoff operations. The risk of miscalculation and escalation is also high, given the proximity of NATO forces to Russian borders and the potential for rapid conflict escalation.

Iran

Iran’s strategic posture relies on asymmetric tactics, including the use of proxy forces, ballistic missiles, and naval assets in the Persian Gulf. Its ability to disrupt critical waterways and target regional adversaries necessitates a nuanced approach.

Standoff warfare allows the US and its allies to target Iranian missile launch sites, naval assets, and command structures with minimal risk to their forces. This approach can help deter Iranian aggression and protect vital shipping lanes in the region.

Iran’s use of underground facilities, mobile missile launchers, and dispersed assets presents challenges for effective targeting. Additionally, the potential for retaliatory actions against regional allies and American interests necessitates careful consideration of the broader geopolitical implications.

Conclusion

Standoff warfare continues to offer significant advantages in terms of force protection, precision, and operational flexibility. However, its effectiveness is contingent on technological superiority, accurate intelligence, and the ability to adapt to evolving threats. Against adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran, standoff warfare provides a valuable tool for countering their respective military capabilities. Nonetheless, it must be integrated into a comprehensive strategy that addresses the unique challenges posed by each adversary and mitigates the risks of escalation and technological vulnerabilities. As hypersonic, low-observable, and other advancing technologies continue to develop, they will force the need for rapid evolutions of military doctrines which will need to consider the role of standoff warfare as a critical component of modern defense strategies.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS) with nearly 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection.

Striking from Afar: The Strategic Edge of Standoff Warfare was originally published on Global Security Review.

Now, Moscow is coming to understand what life is like outside the tent. Its new military connections with Iran and North Korea, and its political-economic alliance with China, are reason for concern in the West and more than enough reason to see if there is a way to bring Russia back inside the tent.

Background

Russia as a member of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has, unlike China, worked to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. Where China transferred nuclear technology to Pakistan, the Russians were careful in their transfers of items that could be used to proliferate. Thus, when it sold nuclear reactors to India the agreement was that the spent fuel would be reprocessed in Russia (then the Soviet Union), removing any concerns about the spent fuel being diverted for building nuclear weapons.

The Indians have also received two Russian submarines on lease, but both vessels were returned to Russia before the leases ended. When the Russians signed an agreement to build the supersonic Brahmos missile, they insisted that the missile’s range be within the limits imposed by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Similarly, despite the long-standing ties between Moscow and Pyongyang, there were no serious transfers of nuclear capabilities to the Hermit Kingdom—although there are questions about how the technology in the SS-18 missile made it to Pyongyang. The missile was manufactured in a cash-strapped factory in Ukraine and William Broad and David Sanger argue that this possibly led to a sale by rogue actors within Ukraine; the government of Peter Poroshenko denied any knowledge of the transfer. In contrast, the Chinese provided nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan, particularly the bomb design from their second nuclear test.

While Russia stuck with the international community’s goals to prevent nuclear proliferation, the war in Ukraine and the ensuing Western sanctions changed Russia’s strategic calculus and potentially its hesitation to supply technologies to other states.

Faced with sanctions, the Russians cut deals with both Iran and North Korea for the supply of weaponry—ranging from artillery shells and drones to ballistic missiles. It is not clear what will be given in return.  Most observers believe that North Korea may receive “direct military assistance from Russia to include fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles and ballistic missile production equipment or materials, as well as other advanced technology.”

It is the advanced technology part of the agreement that is worrying since the North Koreans may well seek technologies that increase the lethality of their strategic weaponry. This could include nuclear submarines and the technological capability to launch submarine-launched cruise missiles. It could also lead the Russians to transfer technology needed to increase the accuracy of North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and warheads. Such transfers can take place by giving the actual technology or providing the scientific manpower to make Pyongyang’s weapons more lethal.

In the case of Iran, Tehran filled an immediate need of Moscow by providing drones in large numbers to help the Russians better deal with the changed nature of warfare in the Ukraine conflict. Like Western nations, Russia allowed its munitions stockpiles to run low. Russia is now building up to 6,000 drones annually in a new factory near the Urals. Tehran also supplied close-range ballistic missiles to further beef up Moscow’s arsenal and, in return, Moscow is reportedly upping its supply of weapons to Iran.

Russia is considering the sale of the Su-35 fighter and the S-400 anti-missile system, but the biggest contribution by Moscow could be to help improve domestically manufactured Iranian weaponry. Again, giving advanced technology to the Iranians would increase the lethality of its missile force.

The Strategic Realm

It is in the nuclear realm that the removal of restraints by Moscow would be the most damaging. Russia has abided by the provisions of the NPT and the MTCR, but if the war continues, with increasing Western provision of weaponry to Ukraine and growing sanctions on Moscow, the Russians may decide to abandon the international treaties they helped create and enforce and, instead, start to become major proliferators.

This would create a global flow of weaponry and technology that will not only build up the capabilities of hostile nations but also severely complicate regional security settings and make American intervention more costly. The worst-case scenario would be the Russians basing nuclear weapons in one of these countries—creating a new level of global insecurity. This is not as far fetched as it seems since this was done by the former Soviet Union in Cuba. That move was seen as an existential threat by the US. It is not clear what the reaction would be to a Russian nuclear fait accompli in Iran or North Korea.

Options

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West was confident that its technological superiority, economic strength, and unified resolve would lead the Russians to back down. Instead, the Russian economy is growing, the West spent close to $300 billion in arming Ukraine, and Kyiv now faces an economic and demographic disaster. It is wishful thinking to suggest that this war may end with a favorable outcome for Ukraine. Bringing the Russians back into the tent may prove difficult.

In four months, the United States will have a new administration, giving the next president some leeway for pursuing a different policy towards Moscow. Carrots, rather than just sticks, may be the best approach. Included, however, in whatever cease-fire plan is created should be a commitment from the Russians that they will continue to abide with the provisions of the NPT and MTCR and ensure that Moscow will try to prevent the flow of Russian scientific labor to North Korea and Iran, specifically.

This will require a rethink in Washington and Brussels on how to end the war and what constitutes an equitable outcome rather than a maximalist view, as suggested by some in the West. Not doing so could lead to a new set of security problems in other parts of the world that are just as crucial for the United States.

Amit Gupta, PhD, is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

You Think the Ukraine War Was Bad? Imagine a Rogue Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.

India’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test, held on March 27, 2019, highlights its growing space capabilities and intent to weaponize space. India’s test, known as “Mission Shakti,” demonstrated its ability to intercept and destroy a satellite in low Earth orbit, positioning India as one of only four countries with such capabilities. While Indian officials maintain that the test was aimed at strengthening national security and not directed toward any particular country, such a capability would pose a significant threat to Pakistan’s space assets, which would undermine Pakistan’s situational awareness, communication, and command-and-control capabilities during a conflict.

The implications of India’s recent MIRV test to its intent in the space domain have received little scrutiny, with one Indian analyst suggesting that the country’s MIRV efforts complement its space ambitions. However, analysts did not address the potential implications on regional stability. India’s development and testing of advanced missile technologies suggest that New Delhi could use these capabilities for counter-space missions, including the targeting of satellites, and their expansion of counter-space weapons may disrupt the strategic equilibrium in South Asia.

Bringing MIRVs to Space

While the primary use of MIRV ballistic missiles is not in counter-space missions, there are scenarios and technologies related to MIRVs that could potentially be adapted for anti-satellite (ASAT) roles. Instead of carrying nuclear warheads, the MIRV could be equipped with kinetic kill vehicles (KKV) or other payloads designed to disable or destroy satellites through collision or other means. A missile equipped with MIRV technology could launch multiple payloads into space, each with its own propulsion and guidance systems, allowing them to maneuver into specific orbits close to target satellites. Moreover, the independent targeting capability of MIRVs means each payload could be directed to a different satellite, potentially allowing for simultaneous attacks on multiple targets in different orbits.

In addition, co-orbital systems can loiter in space and potentially engage targets when needed, providing a persistent threat compared to direct-ascent ASAT systems. MIRVs could be adapted for co-orbital ASAT missions by modifying their payloads and utilizing their independent targeting capabilities. Russia and China have demonstrated co-orbital ASAT systems, while the United States maintains advanced space technologies that could potentially be used in similar roles. The adaptation of MIRVs for such purposes would be complex and carry significant strategic and legal implications.

Implications for Regional Stability

Outer space is considered a global common, a concept established by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which ensures that space is free for exploration and use by all countries, cannot be claimed by any nation, must be used for peaceful purposes, and should be preserved for future generations. It is crucial that this principle should be consistently applied to preserve space for the benefit of all states for communication, navigation, weather monitoring, and scientific research. However, the growing overlap between military and space technologies is blurring the lines between these fields and raises apprehensions about the militarization and potential weaponization of the domain.

The advancements made by India in military technology and satellite capabilities, which integrate military and space capabilities, have raised significant concerns about the weaponization of space in Pakistani policy circles. Pakistan also tested a MIRV capability on its Ababeel missile. However, it never demonstrated its intent to develop counter-space weapons through policy or capability development. Pakistan’s space policy and activities are focused on peaceful uses of outer space, such as satellite communications, remote sensing, and scientific research. Islamabad has participated in international initiatives aimed at promoting the responsible and peaceful use of outer space, including discussions on space security and arms control within forums such as the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).

Considering India’s development and modernization of its military beyond traditional security needs, such as its ASAT capability and advanced missile ranges, there is a possibility that New Delhi may use MIRVs for counter-space missions in the future. In a scenario of escalating tensions with Pakistan, India could conduct counter-space missions by either placing co-orbital ASAT systems during a brewing crisis or launch KKVs during a conflict by using MIRV capability. This would enable India to destroy Pakistani satellites, severely impairing Pakistan’s situational awareness, disrupting secure military communications, and degrading command-and-control functions.

As New Delhi strengthens its counter-space capabilities, its potential development of counter-space capabilities can upset the balance maintained by Pakistan’s effective deterrence posture in South Asia. The complex interplay between nuclear and conventional forces maintains this balance. However, there is a growing asymmetry between India and Pakistan in space capabilities.

New Delhi’s substantial advancements and investments in space technology and infrastructure outmatch Pakistan’s space capabilities, creating a significant power disparity where India has a much greater capacity to deploy and utilize space-based assets for various purposes, including military and intelligence gathering. India’s disproportionate expansion of space capabilities not only poses a threat to Pakistan but also China. Their reliance on satellites for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) functions is growing to address genuine security needs. Pakistan recognizes the strategic importance of information superiority in modern warfare.

With evolving security challenges, including border surveillance and counter-terrorism operations, Islamabad is enhancing its C4ISR capabilities through significant technological upgrades such as satellite programs and advanced communication systems, along with the integration of centralized command centers and secure communication networks. The expansion includes increased use of drones for surveillance and reconnaissance, development of electronic warfare capabilities, and robust cybersecurity measures.

Human resources are being developed through specialized training and international collaboration, particularly with China and Turkey, to facilitate technology transfer and interoperability. These efforts aim to improve situational awareness, decisionmaking, and operational effectiveness, strengthening Pakistan’s overall national security.

During a crisis, Pakistan may face the risk of its satellite assets being targeted which could have significant impact on its military and strategic capabilities. Pakistan could face severe constraints in its C4ISR capability. Moreover, the integration of satellite communication into Pakistan’s drone operations and C4ISR framework highlights the dependence on these assets for maintaining robust communication. Hence, the loss of satellite communication could disrupt command-and-control functions, impairing coordination and timely decisionmaking across the armed forces.

In view of these reasons, it is possible to conclude that India’s MIRV test represents a dangerous shift in the domain of space weaponization. The integration of MIRV technology with India’s missile systems not only enhances its nuclear deterrence but also signals its potential use for counter-space capability. Therefore, while India’s achievements in missile technology and space capabilities are notable, they carry significant risks for regional stability.

Maryyum Masood is working as a Research Officer & Associate Editor at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad. She is an MPhil scholar in the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU) Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the authors own.

India’s MIRV Development – A Latent Counter-space Capability was originally published on Global Security Review.

For NATO to improve its deterrence strategy it must prioritize cybersecurity, enhance space asset resilience, address hypersonic threats, improve missile defense systems, adapt to drone warfare, deter conventional-nuclear integration, monitor China’s nuclear capabilities, and strengthen political unity.

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The Evolving Context for Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The lessons from this experience are numerous. First, American and coalition air defenses performed marvelously in the political act of coordinating multiple nations in the defense of Israel. This required working out the logistical issues prior to taking a defensive posture ahead of time.

Second, the response proved the maturity of ballistic missile defenses. Israel’s Iron Dome (and other defenses), American SM-3s, and coalition systems were excellent. It was a practical demonstration of the technical improvements in air and missile defenses.

Third, the response was a demonstration of successful intelligence integration. Coordinating intelligence among coalition partners is never easy, but as the coalition response proved, it is possible.

Fourth, coalition members took full advantage of the geography and time provided by Iranian air strike. With the coalition expecting a response, they had the time needed to prepare for an attack. Moreover, due to the distances the cruise missiles and drones had to traverse, coalition defenders could best posture themselves at the optimal locations to intercept inbound weapons.

However, there are also negative lessons to learn from the coalition’s response to Iran’s attack. First, the response was expensive. At least $1 billion was spent to defend Israel from Iranian and Houthi attacks. Israel spent half a billion dollars to defend against this single attack.  Such expenditures are unsustainable. While this captures the immediate costs, more time is needed to determine the long-term/opportunity costs.

Second, the United States is continuing to deplete limited stocks of expensive and exquisite missile systems against relatively cheaper Iranian weapons. The US and coalition must reverse this exhaustion strategy.

The variation in responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Iran’s attack on Israel certainly create difficult political questions. Taiwan, for example, may look at its own situation and see this varied response as politically problematic for itself. Fears of escalation against a nuclear power are logical, but to defeat any of these nations equates to extinction. Defending these democratic nations’ right to exist is in the United States’ and NATO’s interest.

The United States does not, however, have the luxury of time in preparing for future Russian or Chinese attacks on Ukraine or Taiwan. Any attack will also see far more sophisticated weaponry than that employed by Iran. Thus, defending Ukraine and Taiwan requires persistent forces ready to defend these nations.

If the United States, NATO, and other American allies are committed to defending democracies like Ukraine and Taiwan, there are three moves the United States should make. First, it must take proactive and deliberate actions. It could include establishing defensive zones around critical infrastructure and civilian population centers. This includes combined land- and sea-based defenses for shooting down air attacks. The goal is to protect civilians and critical infrastructure against indiscriminate attacks.

Second, the United States should accelerate investments in inexpensive weapon systems.  Providing more inexpensive air defenses allows for sustained defense. Focusing on capabilities that disrupt adversary surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting systems along with electronic warfare effort should serve as a central focus. The US and NATO must counter the exhaustion strategy employed by Russia, China, and Iran.

Third, the United States and its allies should enhance their partnership by further exchanging lessons learned, innovative ideas, and best practices for defending against evolving attacks. Reducing bureaucratic obstacles that limit ally and partner access to critical air defenses is part of that effort.

The reasons for doing this are simple and best summarized in four points. First, it is important to improve American credibility. Nothing will aid American deterrence efforts more. There is ample reason to argue that Ukraine and Taiwan should receive the same support as Israel. All are fighting for their nations as enemies vow to destroy them. Thus, the US and NATO must do more to protect democratic nations.

Second, for the sake of deterrence, demonstrating to adversaries that the United States will not allow air strikes on democratic nations is important. Establishing protective cover with American and NATO forces can act as a deterrent that drives tensions down. The “responsibility to protect” concept is useful in deterring Russia, China, and/or Iran from attacking the infrastructure and citizenry of democratic states. There is always a risk of escalation by intervening, however. The risk of defeat and the elimination of democratic states by authoritarian regimes would, however, do irreparable harm to the United States’ standing in the world.

Third, there is value in creating and enforcing international norms. Even though Russia and China would veto any UN Security Council resolution supporting the defense of Ukraine or Taiwan, establishing such norms is worth the effort.

Fourth, the United States must defend democracy and freedom. Many nations are looking at both Western democracies and Eastern authoritarians to determine which path to follow. It is in the United States’ interest for them to take the democratic path.

It is time for the West to take a stand. While Americans may not seek war, authoritarian adversaries often believe that war is their best option for reshaping the world in their own image. The United States and some NATO member states demonstrated the means and will to defend Israel against Iranian air attack. Providing a similar defense to Ukraine and Taiwan certainly deserves further consideration if the United States aspires to continue leading the free world. Abrogating that position would be a mistake. It is now time for the US and NATO to take more risks in supporting friends in their hour of need.

CDR (Ret.) Todd Clawson is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  Opinions expressed are the author’s own and not those of the Department of Defense or the Department of the Navy. 

Allied Air Defense was originally published on Global Security Review.

The recent helicopter accident, which claimed the lives of Iran’s president and foreign minister, is expected to have an adverse effect on the region soon. The incident is already drawing international attention, with many countries closely evaluating the potential implications for regional security. The incident also occurred in an already geopolitically tense context after a month of confrontation with Israel.

The death of Iran’s foreign minister, Amir Abdollahian, will complicate Iran’s foreign policy, international relations, and diplomatic engagements. Abdollahian was instrumental in critical negotiations, including the deal with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) that was brokered by China in February–March 2023 and indirect talks with the United States via Oman, regarding key topics related to regional escalation in the Middle East—including Yemen’s Houthi attacks as well as Iran’s nuclear developments. Anticipating the development of these discussions is crucial, as it is likely to impact Iran’s foreign policy and engagements.

The death of Iran’s president, Ibrahim Raissi, also poses a test for Iran’s internal stability and order. Middle East instability since October 7, 2023, makes this incident even more significant. Thus, how events in Iran unfold in the coming weeks have domestic and regional consequences, including the direction of Iran’s proxies in the region. Conspiracy theories are circulating in Iran as to who was responsible for the crash.

Even though Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, is the country’s actual ruler and the presidential position has limited authority, Raissi’s death thrusts Iran into an uncertain future. Experts believe that Raissi, 63, was preparing to succeed the 85-year-old supreme leader. They also believe that Raissi and Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, are potential successors to the supreme leader. This suggests that Mojtaba, known for his strong ties to Iran’s military and intelligence services, as well as to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is a strong contender.

Iran’s constitution mandates the temporary assumption of the presidential role by Mohamed Mokhber, the first vice president, and the holding of elections within 50 days. Regardless of the timing and identity of Iran’s next president, the informally chosen successor to the supreme leader is likely to delay such elections. The unpredictability of the country’s overall course poses a significant risk and threat to the region, as there is a possibility that Iran may adopt a more assertive stance in response to recent events, thereby demonstrating its power to the international community. Of course, the actions of its proxies in the region and advancements in the nuclear program already signal this, which necessitates an anti-Iran alliance.

The absence of an anti-Iran alliance is perhaps explained by what political scientist Randall Schweller referred to as “under-balancing” or the inability or unwillingness of nations to form the kind of blocking alliances that the balance of power theory would predict. This also sheds light on why states facing threats fail to recognize present dangers and do not react or respond except in a minimal way.

Iran appears to be the winner of recent escalations. Maritime safety in the Red Sea is low because of Houthi militias. Iran is also the most influential player in Iraqi politics and controls Shiite militias. Iranian influence in Syria is one of the main reasons Syrian autocrat Bashar al-Assad remains in power. Furthermore, in Lebanon, Iran-controlled Hezbollah remains the dominant force in Lebanese politics and probably the main first line of defense for Iran in the region.

Iran’s continued support for militant groups across the Middle East amplify the urgency of an anti-Iran alliance. The Iranian regime already has a long history of providing financial, military, and logistical assistance to terrorist organizations. These groups not only undermine the sovereignty of their host countries, but they generate violence, chaos, and instability. For example, Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden over the past few months have significantly impacted maritime safety. In this regard, the US called on Iran to halt “unprecedented weapons” transfers to the Houthis, which enables the attacks. Iran’s history of provocations along the Strait of Hurmuz also poses a threat to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations if regional tensions continue to escalate. Iran’s drone diplomacy is also proving successful, with many of its attack drone capabilities playing a central role in different fights, including the Russia-Ukraine war and Yemen’s Houthi maritime attacks.

The regime’s expansionist agenda and support for proxy groups are already destabilizing the fragile balance of power in the Middle East. Iran’s involvement in conflicts in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen fuel sectarian tensions and prolonged civilian suffering. However, Iran’s growing empowerment of proxy groups in these nations presents a serious threat to other neighboring nations, particularly the Arab countries that Iran views as US allies.

According to reports, Jordan successfully thwarted a suspected plot by Iran-backed militias to smuggle weapons from Syria into Jordan for sabotage purposes. On another front, Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen continued to launch attacks against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) until 2022. Even though China mediated a between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, ongoing developments in the Middle East, fueled by the Gaza war and the actions of Iran’s proxy groups, are testing China’s influence in the region and the viability of the KSA-Iran deal. Although the Iran-backed Houthis warned, in a statement, that KSA would be a target if it supported the US-led strikes on their locations, the recent events, particularly the death of Iran’s president and foreign minister, will likely have an impact on the development of KSA-Iran relations.

Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear ambitions continue to present a serious threat to regional and global security. Despite international efforts to curtail its nuclear program over the past decade, Iran continues to expand its nuclear capabilities, raising concerns about the high possibility the regime will field nuclear weapons. Following his recent visit to Iran, Rafael Grossi, the director general of the United Nations Nuclear Agency, declared that Iran has never been closer to achieving a nuclear bomb, estimating a matter of weeks if Iran’s ruler decides to proceed in this direction.

Kamal Kharrazi, a senior advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, said that Iran would have no choice but to modify its nuclear doctrine if Israel threatened its nuclear facilities or the regime’s very existence. However, it is safe to assume that Iran is using the narrative of Israel and the Gaza war, along with Arab sentiment, to advance its nuclear program.

Several key Arab states continued to encourage Washington to help manage Middle East security and contain Iran’s destabilizing activities on different fronts in order to prevent a broader regional war. Thus, it is expected that any anti-Iran alliance is led by the United States. KSA is already close to a deal on a bilateral defense pact with the US. The US and UAE also continue to work on advancing their bilateral defense relationship, and during the 34th US-Egypt Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), both sides agreed on the importance of advancing American-Egyptian military cooperation through joint training, exercises, and a strong desire to expand regional cooperation and security.

Arab nations clearly share Israel’s concerns and threat perception about Iran’s regional activities, particularly its growing influence through proxies. This serves as an area of dialogue, potentially reducing regional Arab tensions stemming from the ongoing Gaza war. Despite the perception of Iran as a threat, many Arab states remain reluctant to engage in direct confrontation with it. This is understandable since economic development projects fundamentally require regional peace. Regional peace, however, is not achieved without an anti-Iran alliance with a proper level of deterrence that is designed to at least halt, if not degrade, Iran’s activities and influence.

A Middle East Security Alliance (MESA), later dubbed by the media “Arab NATO,” was first announced during former US President Donald Trump’s visit to KSA in 2017. The announcement described MESA as an alliance that contributes to peace and security in the region and the world, encompassing all GCC states, Egypt, Jordan, and the US. Even though nothing has progressed in this proposal since then, ongoing developments in the Middle East do call for the need to revive such a proposal, with an emphasis on countering Iran.

By forming an anti-Iran alliance, countries in the region, in partnership with the US, can work together to address challenges as they emerge and anticipate different courses of action. Curbing the influence of Iran’s proxies and disrupting Iran’s support networks should remain a common and near-term goal for the international community.

Iran’s nuclear program also remains a core threat to the region and the world. A nuclear-armed Iran undoubtedly destabilizes the delicate balance of power in the region and heightens the risk of a catastrophic conflict with Israel as well as neighboring Arab states. Therefore, by forging an anti-Iran alliance, countries can coordinate efforts on multiple fronts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and avert a nuclear crisis in the Middle East.

Moreover, Iran’s aggressive foreign policy and expansionist activities exacerbate tensions in the region. Iran’s intervention in countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen undermine efforts toward peace and reconciliation, underscoring the imperative need to establish an anti-Iran alliance. Only coordinated action can effectively mitigate the threats emanating from Iran, paving the way for a more peaceful Middle East.

Mohamed El Doh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management, France, an MBA from the European Union Business School, Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The Middle East Needs an Anti-Iran Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

On paper, India looks like a good candidate. It is a nuclear weapons power. It has a large army that in recent years confronted China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) along the disputed border between the two countries. It shares democratic values with the United States as well as the objective of a free and open Indo-Pacific. There are several problems, however, on both sides that will prevent this partnership from achieving its objectives.

Militarily, the United States, Japan, and Australia have the same technology and weaponry making interoperability easy between the three countries. India, on the other hand, presents an obstacle since its weaponry is largely of Russian origin and its technology is a generation behind that of the other three Quad members. This means that the Quad is actually a 3+1, because in a real conflict it would be difficult for the four countries to successfully coordinate their efforts.

Politically, while the US, Japan, and Australia share values and are strong alliance partners, India has significantly divergent views from Washington on Russia and the Ukraine invasion, its position on nonproliferation issues, and because of its unwillingness to be in an open alliance against China.

Technologically, while India wants the latest technologies for its armed services, and would like to build these weapons systems domestically, it does not have the financial resources to pay for these systems or, arguably, the ability to absorb the latest technologies. The Indian government prioritizes butter over guns and has kept defense expenditure below 2 percent of gross domestic product to pay for social welfare programs. (And unlike the United States, the Indian defense budget includes the pensions paid to retired servicemen.)

These financial constraints led to India cutting its order for the Rafale fighter from 126 to 36 aircraft and to the government delaying acquisitions like a new conventional submarine, a new aircraft carrier, and additional fighter jets. Fully modernizing the Indian armed forces requires selling weapons at subsidized rates to the Indians—something the United States will not, and cannot, do, since this would up-end the United States’ arms-transfer policies that have been in place for decades.

Additionally, the Indian government has a policy of techno-nationalism which requires that new weapons systems be built in India. The problem with this approach is that such production is marked by delays and quality-control issues. The Indian Air Force’s long and troubled procurement history of the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft is testimony to these failures.  Not only is production marred by delays, but the procurement of weapons from foreign companies moves at a glacial pace and can take decades. It took twenty years for India to buy the Hawk Trainer and fifteen to purchase the Rafale. More recently, the Indian Navy has put out a tender for a new conventional submarine but the takers are few since the Navy’s requirements

are considered impractical by major suppliers and some have dropped out of the competition for supplying the new submarine.

The other problem for India, of course, is the cost of weapons systems and here the United States can be of little help to New Delhi because the latter would need high-quality arms at subsidized rates—something that the US has not done in significant numbers since the Cold War. Further, some of India’s most pressing needs—like a conventional submarine—cannot be met by the US which decades ago gave up producing those subs.

Despite these problems, if given proper assistance, Indian capabilities can be improved to the extent where the country’s armed forces can pose a greater challenge to China and in doing so complicate the threat calculus of the People’s Liberation Army in the Indo-Pacific. As of now the Chinese have two divisions in Xin Jiang which are heavy units with armor and over 10,000 soldiers in each of them. In Tibet, the Chinese have four brigades with 4,000 soldiers each and 10–12 regiments with 2,000 soldiers in each unit.

The units in Tibet face the India border, and as of now, there is no major Chinese build-up of forces in the region. Instead the Chinese are modernizing their air defenses and infrastructure to allow for the rapid movement of troops and materiel into the area. Facing an Indian Army that has better weaponry, and more effective intelligence assets, would force the PLA to divert more resources, especially manpower, to the border and tie down those forces.

Better weaponry does not necessarily mean better aircraft and submarines, it requires building up the fundamentals of the armed forces which is cheaper to do and leads to combat effectiveness. Thus, the Indian Army still does not have a decent assault rifle since the factory that is supposed to produce Russian AK-203s is still not fully functional and the Army was forced to import 73,000 Sig Sauer rifles from the United States. The Indian Army also operates largely without night-vision equipment and is only now beginning to acquire drones at the tactical level for its units. Given that it has engaged in skirmishes with the PLA, the Indians need to be in a better position to handle such localized conflicts.

The other area where the United States and India can cooperate is in developing a set of affordable drones for surveillance and carrying out tactical strike operations. The Indian Army is buying off-the-shelf First Person View (FPV) drones in sufficient numbers and, eventually, the three services will acquire 31 Reaper drones, although these are both expensive and, given the vast ocean, mountain, and desert territories of India, too few to make a substantial difference to Indian combat capabilities. What the country needs is an affordable Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drone to back up the FPV drones and provide a redundancy in drone capabilities. There are several medium-sized American companies that can collaborate with the Indians to build such drones thereby fulfilling the Indian desire to manufacture in India but also allowing for the procurement of affordable systems for the military.

The other key area where the US can help the Indians is by providing intelligence on Chinese positioning and basing along the border. This was done in 2022 because of an intelligence-sharing agreement that gave the Indians the location of Chinese forces, which allowed the Indians to successfully engage and deter the Chinese. Such agreements should expand to significantly enhance Indian capabilities along the border since New Delhi lacks the space-based assets to comprehensively monitor its border.

While the India-US military relationship may not prove as successful as those with NATO or Israel, it can develop to give the Indians a better ability to defend their interests along the disputed India-China border. That is good for America’s interest in containing China in the Indo-Pacific.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Advisor on Peace and Conflict Resolution to the Forum of Federations, Ottawa, Canada. The views in this article are personal. He can be contacted at agupta1856@gmail.com.

The views expressed by the authors are their own.

The Flawed US-India Military Relationship was originally published on Global Security Review.