Proliferation of unmanned systems in modern warfare has popularized the notion that traditional platforms have reached the end of their operational relevance. Particularly, the Russia-Ukraine war has deepened the perception that small, agile, and inexpensive drones have rendered manned platforms in land, air, and sea domain obsolete.

This argument gains credibility while assessing drones’ performance against manned armored vehicles which are now routinely labelled as outdated systems against drone-enabled precision strikes. Yet, what is often depicted in the media is only one side of the coin. Drones often fail to find targets, are intercepted, or manage to hit their target, thus not achieving intended results. Despite proliferation of first-person view (FPV) drones, armored vehicles continue to play a vital role in maneuver warfare and protected mobility. Modern armor strategies have evolved to include combined arms and dispersion rather than mass for increasing survivability and combat efficiency. In the Russia-Ukraine war, several rudimentary measures like installation of cope cages atop turrets, have been implemented by both militaries to enhance the survivability rate of tanks against kamikaze drones. Vehicle mounted jammers have also shown promising results. Defensive technologies, like active protection systems (APS) and electronic countermeasures (ECM), have proven their efficiency against FPV drones. Thus, it can be argued that drones have not turned armored vehicles obsolete; they have forced them to evolve into more refined systems.

Similarly, in the aerial domain, many analysts perceive unmanned aerial systems (UAS) as cost effective alternative vis-à-vis manned aircraft. Yes, UASs have shown impressive evolution. From dropping laser-guided bombs (LGBs) to firing cruise missiles, air-to-air missiles, torpedo, and even smaller drones, drones have come a long way in changing warfare. Increasingly, drones have pushed manned aircraft aside as a more efficient option for operational engagement. In Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan innovatively employed aerial drones to expose Armenian air-defenses’ positions making them vulnerable to subsequent Azerbaijan’s targeted strikes. This unique use of drones as a crucial component of SEAD/DEAD (Suppression & Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses) kill chain marked a watershed moment in modern warfare.

However, the inherent limitations of drones are obvious too. UASs are more susceptibility to electronic warfare (EW) disruption and have unproven records in complex battlespace with dynamics rules of engagement (ROEs). Claims that unmanned systems will soon replace fighter jets overlook the enduring advantages of human decision-making in contested and escalation-sensitive environments. Manned aircraft provide operational flexibility and command judgment that are yet to be replicated through automation alone. The developmental trajectory suggests that instead of perceiving UAVs as one-one-one substitute for piloted aircraft, the future lies in Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) where manned aircraft will serve as command nodes while accompanied unmanned systems will provide mass, persistence, and attainability.

In the naval domain, the successfully employment of kamikaze surface and aerial drones by Ukraine in the Black Sea conflict is now frequently cited as an indicator that large surface combatants will soon turn into relics of past. Besides sinking multiple Russian warships in the Black Sea, Ukraine has even damaged a Russian Kilo class submarine stationed at Novorossiysk harbor using an underwater suicide drone. The Russian Black Sea Fleet, despite having overwhelming superiority over Ukrainian counterpart, has failed to establish sea-control in the Black Sea primarily due to remarkable performance of Ukrainian naval drones.

Similarly, in the Red Sea crisis, the Houthis’ rudimentary drones have challenged the operational persistence of Western naval powers. Kamikaze drones have compelled American, British, French, and German warships to deplete expensive air-defense missiles, which in some cases resulted in pre-mature withdrawal. Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) is usually considered a potent point of defense against all types of aerial threats in the maritime domain. However, both gun-based and missile-based CIWS have limited magazine capacity and engagement range. This suggests that against a more capable adversary, drone swarms can saturate warships’ defenses and can cause mission-kill by damaging critical instruments onboard, rendering them inoperable for extended time duration.

Although naval drones have added an additional layer of threat for warships, they do not, in themselves, render them obsolete. Novel defensive capabilities for countering drone threats are already in the developmental phase. Few systems have been deployed and evaluated in real combat. For example, on 03 March 2024, an Italian Andrea Doria class destroyer shot down an incoming kamikaze drone threat in Red Sea using DART projectiles fired from 76mm deck gun, a move far more economically feasible than air-to-surface missile. Similarly, high-energy lasers (HELs) onboard warships are being tested for countering drones. Besides kinetic defensive application, soft-kill measures such as jammers and decoy systems are also emerging as critical components of warships defensive suite.

In addition, the Black Sea and the Red Sea are enclosed bodies of water, offering limited operational space for naval forces and providing tactical advantage to drone-based asymmetric tactics. In blue waters, however, the effectiveness of such drones would diminish considerably. In open seas, it is unlikely that even mass formations of drones would be able to penetrate modern naval armadas. Although suicide drones can be used in formation with cruise and ballistic missiles to outclass adversary air-defenses, but repeating such a feat against time-sensitive and well protected high-value naval ships would be a very challenging undertaking. Thus, it can be argued that sea drones can be employed as enablers or force-multipliers in conjunction with other systems, but not as decisive instruments of naval warfare.

The future of warfare will not be defined by the triumph of drones over manned platforms. Today, drones have turned into a potent tool of warfare and are also an integral part of the kill-chain of modern militaries around the globe. However, limitations cannot be ignored. In practice, drones work less as independent war-winning weapons but are enablers and force-multipliers. In the age of viral narratives and simplified conclusions, misperceptions regarding military technologies are bound to persist. No single military system determines the outcome of war, and no single innovation renders all others irrelevant. Military power is cumulative and contextual.

Ahmad Ibrahim is a Research Associate at Maritime Centre of Excellence (MCE), Pakistan Navy War College (PNWC), Lahore. The views of the author are his own.

Assessing the Credibility of Manned Platforms in Contemporary Drone-Rich Combat Environment was originally published on Global Security Review.

Their low cost, flexibility, and ability to operate without putting human pilots at risk make drones increasingly valuable in conventional military conflicts. Their capabilities already include reconnaissance and surveillance, long-range strike missions, electronic warfare, and precision killing.

With their precision-targeting ability, drones can be integrated into nuclear deterrence strategies. For instance, they could be used to ensure the survivability of a country’s nuclear forces by providing continuous surveillance and early warning against potential nuclear threats. Drones could also support a more viable second-strike capability, potentially increasing the credibility of nuclear deterrence by ensuring that a country retains a means to retaliate even after a nuclear first strike.

The use of drones in situations where nuclear escalation is a possibility could lead to unintended consequences. The increasing autonomy of drones raises the risk of misinterpretation, as drones could be perceived as a precursor to a larger attack, even when they are only conducting reconnaissance. This could trigger a preemptive nuclear strike by an adversary, leading to an inadvertent escalation into full-scale nuclear war. Cold War and subsequent histories show that the danger of inadvertent nuclear escalation is not trivial.

The possibility that expansion of the war in Ukraine from conventional weapons into nuclear first use could occur from Russian views of Ukrainian deep strikes into Russian territory, with NATO ballistic and cruise missiles, provides one example of concerns in this category.  Lewis A. Dunn suggests that President Donald Trump is faced with a world sliding into nuclear anarchy. He writes:

Brinkmanship among major nuclear powers is rising. China is relentlessly expanding its nuclear forces but rejecting serious engagement with the United States on arms control. US–Russia cooperation on nuclear matters, already in a dire state, has deteriorated further with President Vladimir Putin’s repeated nuclear threats in the course of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Recent reports based on information from senior US officials indicate that the United States, too, could modify its posture and expand its arsenal to strengthen deterrence of coordinated Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear adventurism. All these developments have eroded critical pillars of nuclear order and raised the risk of nuclear warfare.

Drones are relatively fast, low-cost, and difficult to detect, which makes them ideal for preemptive strikes against high-value targets. In theory, a nation could deploy a drone strike against an adversary’s nuclear command-and-control infrastructure or missile silos, aiming to disrupt or neutralize a potential nuclear retaliation before it can be launched. In addition, drones equipped with nuclear payloads or advanced conventional weapons could be used as part of a disarming strike. The ability to carry out such strikes could shift the strategic calculations of nations, as adversaries might feel more vulnerable to a preemptive attack, especially if they believe their nuclear retaliation capabilities could be neutralized by fast-moving drone strikes.

As drones become more autonomous, the risk of them making decisions without human oversight increases. In a nuclear context, where the consequences of any action are catastrophic, the delegation of decision-making to machines is highly controversial. The potential for autonomous drones to trigger a nuclear response or make fatal miscalculations due to algorithmic errors presents a possible threat to strategic stability.

Given that drones can operate autonomously, one challenge is ensuring that their actions do not trigger unintended escalation. Moreover, the reliance on technological systems for communication and control in a nuclear context raises concerns about vulnerabilities in these systems, especially if adversaries employ cyberattacks or electronic warfare tactics to disrupt drone operations.

Future generations of drones will interact with artificial intelligence that also supports other elements in the matrix of deterrence and defense. AI will privilege deterrence by denial compared to deterrence by credible threat of unacceptable retaliation. It will do so because states will have to quickly manage the deterrence and/or conduct conflicts in multiple domains: land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, and the information or knowledge domain. The knowledge domain wraps around all the others. It is the “gnostic center” that controls, connects, and prioritizes among the component parts of the various domains in order to provide for the correct response to threats or attacks.

AI-assisted attacks on the gnostic center will require immediate responses by AI-assisted defenses that can defeat or diminish the cost of those attacks. Absorbing the first blow and then retaliating may not be a choice that is available to beleaguered and time-pressed decision-makers. This situation poses an especially concerning challenge for nuclear deterrence. Decisions for or against nuclear war should allow policymakers sufficient time to deliberate alternatives with their advisors and to select the most appropriate option for the exigent circumstances. But the potential speed of AI-boosted attacks against space and cyber assets, together with the rising speed of kinetic strikes from hypersonic weapons, may leave leaders fearful of an enemy nuclear first strike to choose preemption instead of retaliation.

Just as we can conceive of drones as reconnaissance and strike platforms for offenses, it is also possible that drones can be part of any state’s comprehensive antimissile and air defense plan. One illustration is the use of drone swarms to defeat attacking drones tasked with reconnaissance or strike missions. Another example would be the use of drones for electromagnetic “hit to kill” within the atmosphere or, even more ambitiously, in midcourse intercept against attacking ballistic missile forces. Drones based on one or more lunar spaceports could protect American interests in cislunar space.

Futuristic drones with embedded AI and space-to-space weapons could defend orbital satellites against attack (so-called DSATs) or engage another state’s satellites that appear threatening (ASATs). Priority DSATs and ASATs would deter or defend against any threat to the viability of American satellites for warning and assessment; command, control, and communications; geolocation; and other missions.

Comparatively inexpensive drones could thus take over some of the strategic defense burden, otherwise requiring both upgraded terrestrial missile launchers and kill vehicles or, eventually, sophisticated ballistic missile defenses based on space-to-earth weapons such as lasers or particle beams. Future planners should expect a more crowded space domain, including newer generations of orbital satellites with diverse missions, space stations, and additional reconnaissance and strike weapons along with smarter drones and larger swarms.

The preceding discussion about drones and their possible relationship to nuclear deterrence has implications for nuclear arms control. It is important for a peace agreement to terminate the war in Ukraine for many reasons. One reason is so that the United States and Russia can resume negotiations about an arms control regime to succeed the New START agreement, due to expire in 2026.

The “beyond New START” consultations should include discussions about the two states’ arsenals of non-strategic nuclear weapons and protocols for nuclear first use. Vladimir Putin’s repeated warnings about the possibility of Russian nuclear first use in Ukraine is dismissed by some as bluffing for effect, a form of coercive diplomacy. On the other hand, Russia’s doctrinal shifts appear to move toward a more permissive standard as the war continues. In addition to clarifying this matter, the United States and Russia must acknowledge that China is an aspiring nuclear peer and include China in discussions about nuclear policy issues, including transparency about force structures and military doctrines. China is unlikely to be interested in arms reductions per se, but dialogue should be initiated at the expert level to clarify China’s thinking about strategy, arms control, and related issues.

The character of war changes with the advent of new technologies and strategic thinking.  But the nature of war is perennially the environment of competition and conflict, uncertainty, chance, and friction. The relationship between drones and nuclear deterrence represents a mixed blessing for military planners and arms control. Drones have the potential to enhance nuclear deterrence, but they also introduce significant risks in terms of escalation control and first-strike stability. As drone technology advances, it will be critical for policymakers to develop strategies that account for the unique challenges drones pose in nuclear deterrence and, as well, their future roles in space and cyber wars.

Professor Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Nuclear Deterrence and Drones: An Unpredictable Mix? was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is good to have a combat veteran as the new Secretary of Defense. It is also good to have someone who, while writing a book on the current state of the military, came to understand the difficulties service members face, why they choose not to resign or not re-enlist, and how hard it can be for some once they leave the service. That same research will also help you to eliminate the politicization that left the military hurting for recruits.

This understanding and experience will be helpful in correcting the course of the Department of Defense. Prioritizing warfighting capabilities and lethality over supporting the mission creep of bureaucracy is critical but antithetical to everything that is Washington, DC. The Pentagon was focused on budgets and bureaucratic infighting long before you arrived. The five-sided puzzle palace will fight back and has a long institutional memory.

Just remember, of all services and the department itself, only the US Air Force Airmen gave more money to Republicans than Democrats. There is at least one ray of hope.

For decades the military has had its combat forces slashed, bases closed or consolidated, and weapon systems and platforms reduced or retired—all while the Chinese, Iranians, North Koreans, and Russians expanded their military capabilities and plotted the destruction of the international order Americans built. While the war on terror was lost by the very people who hate the fact that you are Secretary of Defense, you have an opportunity to right the ship before it is too late.

No doubt, you will receive more input on what you should do than you can possibly digest. Let me offer a quick list.

First, a sovereign state, by definition, controls its borders. That is a military function. Help President Trump secure the border. There is no such thing as acceptable illegal immigration.

Second, adopt the Weinberger Doctrine as your overriding strategy for the use of military force. You will never go wrong if you do.

Third, the military may be the best socialist system in the world, but it is time to overhaul the personnel system and bring it into the twenty-first century. The military is unique, but do not let that be an excuse.

Fourth, modernization and expansion of the nuclear arsenal must be your top spending priority. A bigger Army, conventional Navy, or conventional Air Force will not deter China, Iran, North Korea, or Russia; only a robust strategic and theater nuclear arsenal can achieve that objective.

Fifth, service members, particularly junior enlisted, have lived in toxic base housing for far too long. This problem should not make this list, but after two decades it has yet to be solved.

Sixth, remove the cancerous social and political activism that inundates the military. Nothing harms unity more than pitting servicemembers against one another because of their race, gender, or some other contrived distinction. Based on your initial actions, your efforts are already moving ahead.

Seventh, there is simply too much duplication across the services and within the services. Ensuring command opportunities should not lead to the creation of unneeded commands. The services are too small to be inefficient.

Eighth, expand the number of combatant ships, missile defense systems, and the combat air force. Neither the Navy nor the Air Force has the capability to wage a sustained campaign against a peer. Not only does the nation lack the delivery platforms, but it will go Winchester in a matter of days. Thus, every kind of weapon is also needed.

Ninth, take the time to reset the baseline and see what the military really needs to defeat the Axis of Autocracy. Is it drone swarms, missile technology, robots? Whatever the answer may be, it is unlikely exactly what we already have.

Finally, get very good at telling the American people why it is more important to spend tax dollars on the military than the entitlements they know and love. This is perhaps your biggest task. In 2024, the federal government took in $4.4 trillion and spent $4.6 trillion on entitlement programs alone. That is unsustainable. The federal government was never meant to take care of the health, retirement, and education of Americans. It was specifically tasked to defend the nation.

You have a big job ahead of you. Good luck. Americans want nothing more than your success. The safety of the country depends on it.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Congratulations on Becoming the Secretary of Defense was originally published on Global Security Review.