First, SDI was not an actual defense initiative as much as it was a response to the Soviet Union’s rapidly growing strategic nuclear offensive forces and their own anti-satellite space forces. As William Van Cleave wrote in his 1986 report,

The Soviet Union has long been developing a multifaceted ballistic missile defense and, in fact, has already begun deploying such a defense. The Soviets have also began exploiting space for military purposes nearly two decades ago. They have already deployed anti-satellite (ASAT) space weapons. The overriding threat to American security today—that is, a rapid growth in offensive nuclear and conventional weapons systems—has come about precisely because the Soviet Union has been racing to build a weapons system, while the United States has not.

The same can be said of China today and is true of Golden Dome.

While there are plenty of Chinese, Russian, and Western arms control advocates criticizing Golden Dome as weaponization of space and an imbalance of forces, they all fail to note that Golden Dome is a response to the current imbalance of nuclear and space forces that advantages China and Russia. The utility of nuclear weapons, coupled with the advancement of hypersonic and space-to-ground attack options in the hands of the nation’s enemies grew in recent years.

The Chinese are in the midst of a breakout in the size and capability of their nuclear forces. Both China and Russia are engaging in a similar effort with their space attack forces. Both deployed ASAT and other space weapons systems that not only threaten American critical space infrastructure, but the homeland itself. As such, Golden Dome is a response to the already de-stabilizing activities of the Chinese and Russians. They, not the United States, are actively building weapons systems, especially in space.

Second, the narrative that SDI was a weapons development program is false. President Reagan’s speech directing SDI called it a research or “study” program. The 1985 Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative said that “it should be stressed that SDI is a research program that seeks to provide the technical knowledge required to support a decision on whether to develop and later deploy advanced defensive systems. It is not a program to deploy those weapons.”

President Trump understands this by his comments that while Reagan pursued SDI, “[he] didn’t have the technology.” However, Golden Dome is, in fact, a weapons deployment program. As his directive in the executive order states, “The United States will provide for the common defense of its citizens and the nation by deploying and maintaining a next-generation missile defense shield…[including] the development and deployment of proliferated space-based interceptors capable of boost-phase intercept,” among other sensors, trackers, and other weapons capable of defeating various threats from hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missiles. While SDI was a study for a future decision to deploy space-based missile defenses, Golden Dome is the decision to deploy before Trump leaves office.

Finally, another false narrative in the anti–Golden Dome commentaries is that the system will be full of “untested technology.” This is not the case. If anyone looks at the systems listed in the executive order from January 2025, one will see that several of the sensors and layers are already in the current programs of record, many of which have already started deployment in orbit.

While some of the systems, such as the space-based interceptor, are not deployed yet, the technology for intercepting such missiles is in various forms of testing and/or use—for decades. Just because SDI had grand visions of lasers bouncing off mirrors or large chemical lasers in space, does not mean that Golden Dome’s space-based interceptors must be based on those concepts. Current anti-ballistic missile tech gained considerable ground over the past four decades and is ready for deployment sooner than later.

Vulnerability is not an option. Protecting Americans and the homeland from space and missile attack is a strategic imperative that must not fail. Congress must ignore the false narratives of the late 20th century. The threat is real, the technology is real. It is time to field Golden Dome for America.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies in Washington, DC. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The views and positions are those of the author and do not reflect the positions and opinions of the Department of Defense or the author’s employer.

A Second Look at the Critiques and Narratives Against Golden Dome for America was originally published on Global Security Review.

Engineering & Intelligence Combined
What began in 2009 with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s monitoring of Iran’s Fordow site evolved into a cutting-edge capability. The 30,000‑lb GBU‑57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) was precisely engineered—tested hundreds of times and customized in fuse timing and impact parameters—to penetrate deeply buried facilities

Strategic Collaboration & Planning
This achievement isn’t just about hardware. It reflects 15 years of close collaboration between military planners, intelligence analysts, and industry leaders—including Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and the Air Force’s Quick Reaction Capability program

Execution with Precision
On June 22, B‑2 stealth bombers launched Operation “Midnight Hammer,” striking Iran’s Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan sites with surgical accuracy. The MOP penetrated as planned—leaving minimal surface signatures while delivering deep destruction

What This Means for National Security
This operation showcases how sustained investment in R&D, intelligence integration, and interagency coordination can yield mission-defining capabilities. It exemplifies the strategic patience and partnership necessary for complex, high-stakes operations.

Key Takeaways for Defense & Tech Leaders:

1. Vision Meets Execution – Long-term defense projects require a clear vision, persistent funding, and cross-disciplinary alignment.
2. Testing & Validation – MOP’s success was no accident—it was the result of rigorous modeling, simulation, and live testing.
3. Partnership Power – Defense agencies, military services, and industry must collaborate seamlessly over years to deploy such capabilities.
4. Strategic Deterrence – Precision technologies like the MOP expand strategic options, offering alternatives to broader or more escalatory responses.

As our world grows more complex, this operation demonstrates that when foresight, perseverance, and technological excellence coalesce, they can deliver decisive outcomes.

Let’s discuss: How can lessons from this mission inform future innovation in defense tech and strategic deterrence?

15 Years in the Making: U.S. Precision Strike on Iran’s Fortified Nuclear Site  was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 1966, he directed the establishment of the military-controlled Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) and made nuclear weapons research a primary focus. Over the next two decades, Taiwan aggressively pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Its remarkable advancement came to an abrupt halt in 1988 because of one Taiwanese scientist who was also a Central Intelligence Agency informant. What if that had not happened?

Continuing tensions in the Taiwan Strait along with conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have renewed conversations about the validity of the extended deterrence provided by the United States. Understandably, states may doubt the veracity of these current security guarantees.

We offer a counterfactual historical analysis to assess the traditional tradeoffs between a state’s right to nuclear weapons for security versus the established US foreign policy commitment of extended deterrence, which costs the United States significant human and material resources. If Taiwan was permitted to build a successful nuclear weapons program, what would the security environment in the Taiwan Strait look like today? Could the United States have prevented its own security dilemma with China, or would it have become more precarious? Can a what if scenario help inform a what’s next scenario for American foreign and nuclear policy?

To begin the analysis, a baseline understanding of nuclear postures is needed. Vipin Narang offers a simple construct for nuclear posture. It is the combination of a state’s capabilities, employment doctrine, and its command-and-control structure.

In his book, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, Narang introduces a framework that systematically explains the nuclear posture choices made by regional powers based on two variables: whether there is a third-party patron able to defend them and the proximity of a conventionally-superior threat. It then applies several unit-level variables when the security environment is indeterminate.

Moving through his decision tree (below), regional nuclear powers fall into three potential postures: catalytic, asymmetric escalation, or assured retaliation.

A catalytic posture depends on a third-party patron to intervene and de-escalate the situation before nuclear exchange happens.

An assured retaliation posture is assumed when a nation can keep its nuclear forces secure from a potential disarming first strike and assure a costly retaliation on the aggressor. An asymmetric escalation posture is designed to deter conventional attacks by credibly showing the ability and willingness to escalate to nuclear first use options at first sign of conventional attack.

With the groundwork laid, it is possible to examine the PRC’s nuclear posture and posit a hypothetical Taiwan posture. Historically, China maintained an assured retaliation posture. According to the Federation of American Scientists, by 1970, China had approximately 50 nuclear weapons and by 1980 that number was 200. It maintained a small arsenal for over 30 years while maintaining its assured retaliation posture. It was an arsenal that Taiwan could counter, if allowed to continue to build its own weapons.

There are some assumptions required to run through this historical counterfactual. First, Taiwan would have been able to start developing nuclear weapons by 1990. When program shutdown began in January of 1988, Taiwan was assessed to be “at least a year or two away from having a three to six-month breakout capability.” Second, Taiwan would have been able to match a similar pace of production that China achieved from 1964-1979.

Third, China would not have intervened militarily to dismantle Taiwan’s nuclear program. This assumption is based on protections by the United States remaining intact, creating enough deterrence at a time when the People’s Liberation Army, though nuclear capable, was relatively weak.

Fourth, the great powers would not have engaged in counterproliferation efforts against Taiwan. In reality, this was not the case.

Fifth, American concerns over political instability in Taiwan were more muted, which reality would later vindicate.  Again, there were always real concerns with Taiwanese autocracy.

Accepting these assumptions and following the above framework, we suggest Taiwan could have fielded approximately 50 nuclear weapons as early as the mid-1990’s. This nuclear arsenal would have been sufficient to achieve an asymmetric escalation posture, which is best suited and specifically designed to counter conventional attacks from a conventionally superior neighbor.

To be credible, Taiwan would need to declare that any attempt to unify Taiwan and China by force will lead to a nuclear response. With this posture Taiwan would improve its ability to use asymmetric escalation to deter by denial—using nuclear weapons to deny the aggressors military objectives—and deterrence by punishment.

Had Taiwan been able to reveal an asymmetric escalation posture in the mid-1990s, would it have improved the balance of military power, sustained the status quo, and created a more stable security environment? There is no doubt Taiwan could inflict damage and deter a rational actor. Would it have been enough to deter China, who equated its national destiny with unification, including by force? Alternatively, would the revelation of Taiwan’s nuclear program intensify the cross-strait security dilemma by accelerating China’s own potential nuclear expansion? The unknowns of China’s decision calculus perplex even the modern analyst.

If the United States afforded Taiwan the space to develop a nuclear arsenal, would that have absolved America from any security commitments? One might argue the United States may have become more entangled in containing proliferation and a potential cross-strait nuclear war.

Certainly, the Republic of Korea (ROK) would not have appreciated another neighbor obtaining nuclear weapons while it faced its own nuclear-armed adversary. And Japan, given its tenuous history in the region, would likely have been unhappy to see the ROK field nuclear weapons without achieving its own equitable defense.

The discussion of alternative history matters in 2025 because middle states have witnessed what happened with Ukraine—a country without indigenous nuclear capability nor under the umbrella of protection from a third-party patron. Middle states across the world are recognizing that the security guarantees of a nuclear power extend only as far as its national interests.

It is no wonder that Ukraine now seeks a stronger security guarantee in the form of either “nukes or NATO.” And by extension, it’s not surprising that other middle states in comparable situations, like Taiwan, would re-evaluate their trust and confidence in the United States’ security promises. They see the writing on the wall with waning political interest and resources to combat adversaries in a multi-polar world.

Graham Allison observed that the United Kingdom learned, in the late nineteenth-century, rising German, Russian, French, and American navies meant its “two power standard” for naval supremacy was no longer a viable security formula without over-extending its resources. A century later, the United States finds itself in the position of Britain, compelled to re-evaluate its policies as a multipolar world challenges American dominance.

Chief among these policies must be exploring an international security strategy that defines and is faithful to American national security priorities, within available resources, unambiguous, and exploits the broad array of instruments of power. The nation must avoid the mistake of treating everything as a national security priority, rendering nothing a priority. This results in under-resourced and under-supported engagements, which erodes trust and confidence in the United States.

There will be winners and losers if the United States strikes a truly prioritized strategy.  But Thucydides argues that this is the nature of international politics, however unfortunate; the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. However, as the alternative history above suggests, left to their own devices, vulnerable middle states may lean towards obtaining their own nuclear weapons.  Thus, creative new security solutions must replace resource-intensive extended deterrence in those cases, if nuclear non-proliferation remains a top national security priority. 

Kira Coffey is a 2024 Air Force National Defense Fellow and International Security Program Research Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. She is a graduated squadron commander, combat pilot, and China Foreign Area Officer. Her research focuses on Great Power Competition with the People’s Republic of China. 

Ryan Fitzgerald is a 2024 National Defense Fellow and Security Studies Program Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a graduated squadron commander and combat pilot. His research focuses on International Relations and Nuclear Deterrence.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

Taiwan’s Nuclear What-If: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Global Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

Contacts with foreign sources were not very informative. The Chinese Ministry of Defense denied any use of drones over American or other territory, and their spokesperson added, “We get all the information we need from hacking into US government and industry sources.” They referred Americans to the Russians.

The Russian Security Council denied any involvement in flying drones over the East Coast. “Iran provides most of our drones, go talk to them,” was the only response we could get from officials. They added that President Putin has his own personal drone for use when he is hunting while riding bare chested in the Far East.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry was no more helpful on the issue saying, “Any drones we have will be used for surveillance of Israel or sent to the Russians for the Ukrainians to shoot down.”

Having exhausted foreign sources, Americans turned to domestic agencies. The Department of Homeland Security had no information about drones. “We are fully challenged to cope with unprecedented illegal border crossings, a meltdown of the Secret Service, and a FEMA fiasco in North Carolina to worry about drones,” said one agency official, on background.

The Department of Defense was not any more helpful. They denied having any information about drones, other than to say that there was no evidence of aliens being connected to drone activity in the United States. On the other hand, there was no evidence that the drones were not connected to aliens. They referred Americans to past episodes of The X Files.

The State Department reported that they had no contact with drones other than some foreign ambassadors who were posted to the United States and predictably uninformed about their activities.

The intelligence community said they did not necessarily know anything about drones, but even if they did, it would be classified and could not be shared with the media. This was an understandable reply.

A Republican member of Congress from New Jersey claimed that Iran had launched drones from a “mother ship” somewhere off the coast of the United States and that this information came from highly classified sources. This was corroborated by some boardwalk vendors of pizza in Ocean City and Wildwood, New Jersey. Their credibility was not challenged.

Some residents of New Jersey thought that tourists from Pennsylvania who visit New Jersey beaches during the summer are retaliating for exorbitant rental charges paid in previous years. Given prices, this is certainly an option worth exploring.

Others claimed that the drones were the work of environmentalists angered by shore communities’ wars against sea gulls, including the importation of hawks to chase gulls away from their natural habitats. Recent destruction of irreplicable works of art by environmentalists makes the illicit flying of drones over New Jersey easily conceivable.

Residents of New York suggested that New Jersey was seeking publicity to compensate for its comparative insignificance in national and regional affairs. “New Jersey is simply a suburb of New York and otherwise has no reason to attract news coverage,” was the explanation provided by one New Yorker.

But a New Jersey native came to her state’s defense. New Jersey residents, she said, were mentally exhausted from driving around in their infamous traffic circles until their brains boiled over; aliens or foreign enemies would be a welcome distraction.

An expert in artificial intelligence (AI) suggested that the drone swarms might be the result of an AI experiment gone awry, given the widespread use of “deepfakes” pervasive in social media and other sources. “The Jersey drone swarm could be the opening scene in the next Hollywood spectacular mixing fictitious events (alien invasions) with real events (military drone attacks) in order to smash box office records,” he noted.

Whatever the case may be is still undetermined. Needless to say, the longer it takes to find an answer, the more numerous the conspiracy theories will become. They will also grow increasingly more interesting for sure.

Professor Steve Cimbala, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Professor of Political Science at Penn State-Brandywine.

Drones on the Loose was originally published on Global Security Review.

Hypersonic technology encompasses both aircraft and missiles that travel at speeds exceeding five times the speed of sound. These vehicles leverage advanced propulsion systems, such as scramjets (supersonic combustion ramjets), to achieve and sustain such high velocities. The potential applications of hypersonic technology are vast, ranging from rapid global strike capabilities to enhanced missile defense systems.

However, interest in hypersonic technology is not new. Scientific research began during the Cold War, but only in recent years have significant breakthroughs been made towards advancing hypersonic technology from theory to practicality. The primary drivers of this renewed focus include advancements in materials science, computational fluid dynamics, and propulsion technology. Nations such as the United States, China, and Russia are at the forefront of hypersonic research, each vying for technological supremacy, with China and Russia attempting to challenge the status quo.

The strategic advantages of hypersonic technology are multifaceted. One of the most significant benefits is the ability to deliver payloads at unprecedented speeds, drastically reducing the time available for adversaries to detect, track, and intercept these threats. This capability enhances both offensive and defensive operations.

Hypersonic vehicles can reach their targets much faster than conventional missiles or aircraft. This rapid response capability is crucial in scenarios requiring immediate action, such as neutralizing high-value targets or responding to emerging threats. The ability to strike quickly and precisely could deter adversaries from initiating conflict, knowing that retaliation would be swift and devastating.

The high speed and maneuverability of hypersonic vehicles make them difficult to detect and intercept. Traditional air defense systems, designed to counter slower, more predictable threats, may struggle to adapt to the dynamic flight paths of hypersonic weapons. This enhanced survivability increases the likelihood of mission success, particularly in contested environments.

Hypersonic vehicles can cover vast distances in a short amount of time, providing global reach without the need for forward-deployed bases.

This capability is especially valuable for nations looking to project power and influence across the globe. It also reduces the logistical burden associated with maintaining overseas bases and allows for more flexible deployment strategies.

Despite their potential, hypersonic technologies face significant technological challenges. Overcoming these obstacles is essential for the successful development and deployment of hypersonic systems.

One of the primary challenges is managing the extreme heat generated during hypersonic flight. At speeds exceeding Mach 5, air friction can cause the surface temperature of a vehicle to reach several thousand degrees Celsius. Developing materials and cooling systems capable of withstanding and dissipating this heat is crucial to maintaining the structural integrity and performance of hypersonic vehicles.

The materials used in hypersonic vehicles must endure not only high temperatures but also extreme pressures and aerodynamic forces. Advanced composites, ceramics, and metal alloys are being developed to meet these demanding requirements. Researchers are also exploring innovative manufacturing techniques, such as additive manufacturing, to create components with enhanced durability and performance.

Maintaining control and accuracy at hypersonic speeds is another significant challenge. Hypersonic vehicles must navigate through rapidly changing atmospheric conditions, requiring sophisticated guidance and control systems. These systems must be able to make real-time adjustments to the vehicle’s trajectory, ensuring that it stays on course and reaches its intended target.

Developing reliable propulsion systems capable of sustained hypersonic flight is a major technological hurdle. Scramjets, which operate efficiently at hypersonic speeds, are still in the experimental stage. Achieving a balance between thrust, fuel efficiency, and structural integrity is critical for the success of these systems.

The deployment of hypersonic technology has profound strategic implications for global security. As nations race to develop and deploy hypersonic weapons, the balance of power could shift, necessitating new defense strategies and international regulations.

The development of hypersonic technology has the potential to trigger an arms race among major powers. Nations may feel compelled to develop their own hypersonic capabilities or invest in advanced defense systems to counter these threats. This escalation could lead to increased military spending and heightened tensions on the global stage.

Hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence by providing a credible and rapid response option. However, their deployment also raises the risk of miscalculation and escalation. The speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons could shorten decision-making windows, increasing the likelihood of accidental or preemptive strikes. That said, the opportunity to discuss potential gains and losses for both development and implementation of hypersonic weapons is an opportunity to help drive future strategy development.

Developing effective countermeasures against hypersonic threats is a priority for many nations. Advanced radar systems, directed-energy weapons, and missile defense systems are being explored as potential solutions. Integrating these technologies into existing defense frameworks is essential for maintaining a robust defense posture.

The proliferation of hypersonic technology underscores the need for international regulations and agreements. Establishing norms and guidelines for the development, testing, and deployment of hypersonic weapons could help mitigate the risks associated with their use. Diplomatic efforts to promote transparency and confidence-building measures are crucial for maintaining global stability.

Regardless of the naysayers, hypersonic technology represents the next frontier in military airpower, offering unparalleled speed, agility, and reach. While the strategic advantages are significant, the technological challenges and strategic implications cannot be overlooked. As nations continue to invest in hypersonic research and development, the race for air superiority will intensify, shaping the future of global security. Balancing the benefits and risks of hypersonic technology will be essential for ensuring a stable and secure international environment.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS) with nearly 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection.

Hypersonic Horizons: The Next Generation of Air Superiority was originally published on Global Security Review.

While this is a welcome comment from the former president, it is not a new argument to have a Space National Guard. This argument, however, was much maligned, mocked, and ignored for years. Lately, much reporting on the topic is misinformation that confuses both the American people and Congress.

Many who oppose the Space National Guard wrongly believe that space defense is a strictly federal mission. They believe the Guard’s deployable space operations, a function since the 1990s, and the nearly 300 years of the Guard’s legal and constitutional role does not justify a Guard element for Space Force. They argue that bypassing the constitutional framework and the law of the land, which requires a governor’s consent on decisions regarding their state guard forces, is a “one off.”

If the federal government is allowed to eliminate the role of governors, this would set a dangerous precedent. During congressional testimony, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendell discussed a legislative proposal that would do just that and suggested that going around the law “is not a big deal” and that National Guard is “an artifact of history.” Legislation requiring the support and inclusion of governors is not supported by Kendell.

The opponents of the Space National Guard repeat questionable arguments to confuse and distract the American people and Congress. The false arguments are many.

First, they claim a Space National Guard will result in increased and unsustainable costs and bureaucracy that are not supported by the Space Force and Air Force. This is false as documented by no less than six studies by the Department of the Air Force that supported a Space National Guard.

Five of these studies were deliberately withheld from Congress by actors external to the Pentagon. Importantly, these studies proved that the costs of establishing a space guard are insignificant because the existing budget will transfer from one line of accounting to another. They also dispute the findings of a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study (2020) that did not use actual Air Force and National Guard budget data points to project the cost of establishing a Space National Guard.

Shockingly, the CBO did not interview anyone from the National Guard Bureau, the individual state guard components, or the Department of the Air Force’s working groups when it conducted the study. In truth, no additional bureaucracy is needed to establish the Space Guard because the staff support and operational squadrons already exist in the Air National Guard and would transfer into the Space National Guard.

Second, detractors argue that states do not need a Space Guard for the limited protection of individual states. This is a mistaken perspective because the National Guard is the nation’s primary combat-reserve force—regardless of operating domain—and has been since 1636. It delivers strategic and operational depth to the nation. It is a lower cost alternative to the larger and more expensive federal force. For example, most of the nation’s air sovereignty mission is owned by the Air National Guard because the threat to American air space is not constant.

It is also important to remember that the states are dependent upon space systems for their domestic emergency operations and the capabilities of the National Guard are leveraged for events like wildfires, earthquakes, floods, and others. Space systems are linked to critical infrastructure and therefore fall into the state roles and missions for homeland security. Those who want to use the opportunity to consolidate military space power at the federal level ignore these realities.

Third, the military must have the support of the American people when it is time to go to war. The National Guard, by design, provides a clear and deep connection with the American citizenry. Support for a robust Space National Guard is vital if the nation is to field the force required to win in a time of war. Connecting main streets across the nation with space defense cannot occur through a single component service and the absorption of what is rightfully National Guard capability into the federal military.

The talking points used by Space National Guard opponents are fundamentally misleading and fail to acknowledge the immediate readiness costs associated with taking Air National Guard space units away from their respective states and governors. Keep in mind, about 80 percent of Guard personnel surveyed suggested that they will not transfer to the US Space Force unless there is a Space National Guard. All 50 governors oppose the removal of the space missions from the National Guard.

If opponents of a Space National Guard succeed, units and capabilities will become ineffective. Enormous experience will be lost from the loss of personnel. The Department of Defense will then have to fund recruiting and training efforts for the Space Force to rebuild that capability. Those who oppose the Space National Guard leave out that this would cost taxpayers at least $1 billion. Former President Trump, NGAUS, and all 50 state governors are correct; the Space National Guard should exist as the “primary combat reserve of the US Space Force.”

National Defense Authorization Act language should not ignore the states and their governors. It is time to establish a Space National Guard.

Christopher Stone is senior fellow for space deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The thoughts, opinions, and statements are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the Department of Defense.

Correcting the Record on the Space National Guard was originally published on Global Security Review.

The book is fast-paced and covers Nitze’s career in and around government in just 268 pages. James Graham Wilson, an historian at the US State Department, draws on voluminous archived notes of White House meetings and State Department documents to build his description of Nitze’s influence. This allowed the author to clearly and confidently identify what and how Nitze’s ideas were injected into treaties and American policy. Wilson also does not shy away from criticizing Nitze’s policy or personal shortcomings where warranted. This makes for a complete yet consumable treatment of Paul Nitze’s work.

Whether working in the Department of State or Defense, where Nitze served, aspiring national security professionals should be reading this book. Following Paul Nitze’s career path might be impossible today, but tracing it offers many useful insights.

Nitze made a personal fortune investing during the volatile years of the market crash and depression. He married into political connections and with his comfort secured, could have lived a life of leisure, but chose a life “in the arena” instead. Nitze first applied his exceptional analytical skills to a pressing national security issue—assessing the value of strategic bombing in World War II. It was here, with the US Strategic Bombing Survey, that the Nitze way came to prominence. As Wilson tells it, this “way” is to find the facts, use them to craft executable plans for securing American “predominance,” and then fight aggressively but patiently to get that plan implemented.

The Bombing Survey demonstrated that strategic bombing did not achieve the goals its advocates claimed, earning Nitze no friends in the Pentagon. His analytical accuracy, candor in presentation, and independence of thought earned him the respect of President Truman, Eisenhower, and most presidents that followed.

Paul Nitze has a particular policy related to nuclear weapons. His influence did not depend on his holding a position in government but transcended political partisanship. He saw himself as a “man of action” who fused his mathematical mind with the social sciences and balanced theory with his practical experiences to provide realistic policy. Wilson’s Nitze changed his views rarely and did not shy away from bullying when the tactic appeared useful.

Nitze’s laser focus on America first policies put the country on the path for peace through strength well before those were popular slogans. His loyalty to national interest over personal gain was showcased in a scathing op-ed he helped write that attempted to scuttle the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, once he came to see it as counter-productive to defense.

United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (NSC-68) was Paul Nitze’s first, and perhaps most important policy document. Wilson dedicates a chapter to this product, but it permeates the entire book. Wilson shows how this document was so much more than simply a plan to deal with Soviet nuclear weapons. It was close in impact to Kennan’s Long Telegram. While sensitive to the value of public debate on defense policy, Wilson demonstrates that Paul Nitze was self-conscious about publishing. However, Wilson credits Nitze with an impressive writing feat in NSC-68, functionally creating the first national security strategy. This document certainly echoes across the decades from its initial presentation to Truman in 1950 well past the Cold War.

Later in his career, Nitze led President Ronald Reagan’s negotiation team for the anti-ballistic missile and intermediate nuclear forces treaties. Nitze consistently pushed for a strong US nuclear posture to enable effective negotiations. This is reflected in deterrence theory today in books like Matt Kroenig’s The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters.

Advocacy for high defense budgets did not restrict Nitze from calling for complete nuclear disarmament later in life. He believed that the 1991 Gulf War showed that this could be achieved because of the strategic effects of precision-guided weapons and what the Biden administration calls integrated deterrence.

Some of today’s up and coming defense policy and strategy practitioners may have a hard time relating to Paul Nitze’s privileged upbringing or his self-made independent wealth. Wilson’s assertion that it is unlikely that anyone today could move back and forth across the political aisle like Nitze did is probably true. But there are many useful nuggets of Nitze wisdom and experience in this book that are useful for new and well-practiced policymakers. Wilson’s Nitze is a persistent yet practical advisor at the nexus of defense and diplomacy whose work covered most of the last century but whose impact will likely reach into the next. Paul Nitze’s professional life is worth your time and this book is a great introduction to his work.

James McCue is a retired USAF aviator and nuclear security professional. He is an expert on nuclear strategy and national defense policy. He is a fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Associate Editor for Global Security Review. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Reflections on America’s Cold Warrior was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States’ current National Security Strategy states that an era of “strategic competition” exists, which the recent Joint Concept for Competing defines as “a persistent and long-term struggle that occurs between two or more adversaries seeking to pursue incompatible interests without necessarily engaging in armed conflict with each other.” It notes how America’s “adversaries are employing cohesive combinations of military and civil power, below the level of armed conflict, to pursue objectives that threaten the strategic interests of the United States, its allies, and its strategic partners” and to “win without fighting.”

If NASA is a national security organization, then it may be a primary, even principal tool to protect America’s strategic interests and to achieve America’s strategic objectives and should act responsibly as a custodian of America’s security interests, rather than merely as a science and exploration agency. So, is NASA a national security organization?

Many will say no and argue that NASA has a science and exploration mission, and that “NASA doesn’t do security.” Some assert that NASA was specifically created by President Eisenhower, distinct from the military industrial complex to be a tool of diplomacy, with national security belonging elsewhere.

Of course, that might come as news to President Dwight D. Eisenhower himself, who partially created NASA as a cover for his top-secret National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO). It likely would also come as a surprise to President Kennedy and to the first generation of Cold Warriors at NASA, who heeded President John F. Kennedy’s call that “the eyes of the world now look into space, to the Moon, and to the planets beyond. And we have vowed that we shall not see it governed by a hostile flag of conquest, but by a banner of freedom and peace.” They won the first great victory of the Cold War—America’s first strategic competition.

President Lyndon B. Johnson said, “control of space means control of the world.” In fact, declassified documents reveal that NASA’s Mercury, Saturn, and the Apollo Manned Lunar Landing Programs were designated as the “highest national priority category” under the Defense Production Act.

It would surprise Congress, who authorized NASA, the most. NASA’s purposes are codified in Title 51–National and Commercial Space Programs of the United States Code. The law states,

Congress declares that the general welfare and security of the United States require that adequate provision be made for…space activities. Congress further declares that such activities shall be the responsibility of, and shall be directed by, a civilian agency exercising control over…space activities sponsored by the United States, except that activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States (including the research and development necessary to make effective provision for the defense of the United States).

It also unambiguously states, “the making available to agencies directly concerned with national defense of discoveries that have military value or significance,” and that “the administration and the Department of Defense, through the president, shall advise and consult with each other on all matters within their respective jurisdictions related to…space activities and shall keep each other fully and currently informed with respect to such activities.” In fact, NASA has a long history of direct cooperation, during the Cold War, with the Air Force,  DARPA, SDIO, and NRO to advance the nation’s security interests through peaceful means and applications.

NASA’s primary job during the first strategic competition was to showcase the vibrancy of democratic capitalism over the Soviet Union’s centrally planned economy. Landing a person on the Moon, a symbol for national strength, was a way to woo newly independent states to the West’s side of the Cold War.

When the Cold War ended, NASA still had a security mission, but without the broader context of strategic competition it was asked to enhance security through diplomacy. This also included employing Russian rocket scientists and engineers to prevent them from building intercontinental ballistic missiles for Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.

According to the NASA Administrator, America is in a new space race as part of a broader strategic competition with China and Russia. This time it is not using space technology as a symbolic proxy of national power, but rather developing space technology to secure long-term national economic power. Thus, NASA was given a mission to lead the “return of humans to the Moon for long-term exploration and utilization.”

The national vision begins with a “campaign to utilize…the surface and resources of the Moon, and cis-lunar space to develop the critical technologies, operational capabilities, and commercial space economy.” The National Cislunar Science and Technology Strategy explains that the United States will “leverage collaborations with private entities to enable capabilities for large-scale ISRU and advanced manufacturing at the Moon.”

Despite such clear policy direction from two administrations, it is not uncommon to hear NASA personnel eschew any mandate for economic development or industrial development in space, preferring to concentrate only on what advances their own exploration. The mandate is crystal clear in law.

In Title 51, NASA’s purpose includes, “the preservation of the United States preeminent position in…space through research and technology development related to associated manufacturing processes” and the “preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in…space science and technology.” Title 51 also calls for the “establishment of long-range studies of the potential benefits to be gained from, the opportunities for, and the problems involved in the utilization of…space activities.”

NASA is a national security organization whose duties include ensuring the pre-eminence of the United States. Its job is not to build weapons or engage in conflict—but to pursue American strategic objectives below the threshold of armed conflict. Now that the US is once again in strategic competition, it is time for NASA to return to its roots as a primary competitor in seeding and cultivating economic, industrial, and logistical expansion. Thus, NASA’s Artemis planning must not be only in the narrow context of a Moon-to-Mars exploration program, but also must be made in the broader context of securing long-term economic security for the United States and its partners.

Peter Garretson is a Senior Fellow in Defense Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC), co-director of AFPC’s Space Policy Initiative, and author of Scramble for the Skies: The Great Power Competition to Control the Resources of Outer Space and The Next Space Race: A Blueprint for American Primacy. The view’s expressed are the authors own.

Is NASA a National Security Organization? was originally published on Global Security Review.