The democratic transition in Sudan was halted in October 2021 when General Abdel Fattah al-Burhane conducted a military coup. Ongoing confrontations between the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces keep the country in perpetual instability. They have also drawn civilians into the bloodshed.

Guinean president Alpha Condé was ousted in a September 2021 coup, and his successors pledged to bring in a civilian government by 2024. This has yet to happen.

Two coups occurred in Mali within a short period of time. The first coup occurred in August 2020, and the second one took place in May 2021. The military government promises to restore civilian control. It has not.

Shortly after Gabon’s President, Ali Bongo Ondimba, was re-elected in August 2023, a military coup d’état removed him from power, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the election. Ondimba is but one more example of this trend.

Leaders of these coups frequently use security and governance failures as justification for the actions taken. In reality, they tend to worsen stability and undermine democratic processes. The frequent occurrence of military takeovers in such politically unstable countries adds complexity to diplomatic endeavours and presents substantial obstacles to regional development, stability, and security, including the proliferation of insurgencies and terrorist organizations.

However, a notable trend among these nations in recent years is the steady rise of Russian presence and influence. Over the past few months, there were significant events involving Russian armed groups in Africa, which highlighted Moscow’s growing influence and strategic interests in the region. Russian actions have far-reaching consequences for countering Western influence, especially from the European Union and the United States.

Russia is already strengthening its military ties with several African nations, including those that saw political upheaval in recent years. In May, Russia began implementing a military cooperation agreement with São Tomé and Príncipe, which involves joint exercises, education, training, and logistics.

Guinea-Bissau further strengthened connections with Russia, as President Umaro Sissoco Embalo engaged in discussions with Russian officials regarding diverse areas of collaboration. These include military training and oil exploration.

Russia is also working towards establishing a logistics center on the Red Sea in Sudan. This will strengthen its naval capabilities and strategic presence in the region. Sudan has restated its dedication to Russia in building a naval base on the Red Sea. This development is because of the growing military cooperation between Sudan and Russia, showcasing Moscow’s wider aspirations to enhance its military influence in strategic African nations.

According to experts, there is concern that Russian armed groups are taking advantage of migration routes, specifically those that pass through the Sahara. This exploitation could potentially result in a rise in irregular migration towards Europe. Russia may be seeking to create instability in European nations by intensifying the refugee crises, with the intention of impacting elections and weakening support for Ukraine.

Russia is also actively pursuing economic engagements and resource extraction deals in Africa. Russian officials explored cooperation on infrastructure and natural resource projects, particularly in Chad, Mali, Niger, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Russia also sought to dominate the uranium market by acquiring assets in Burkina Faso and Chad. President Vladimir Putin’s strategy to support local regimes, coups, and insurgencies facilitates these economic engagements, as evidenced by recent developments in West Africa.

Furthermore, Russian paramilitary groups, particularly the Wagner Group, or as it is now known, Africa Corps, remained active in supporting local regimes and insurgencies with activities in different African nations, including Sudan, Burkina Faso, the Sahel, the Central African Republic, and Libya. In Libya, for example, Russian forces protect oil and gas interests, which constrains Western access and increases European dependence on Russian energy.

Regardless of the obvious fact that Russia, along with China, has a strategic interest in controlling Africa’s natural resources, Russia has a clear objective of countering the West’s influence in Africa. The impacts manifest on several fronts.

First, when it comes to strategic military positioning, cementing the presence of its paramilitary forces while also establishing military bases and logistical centers in key African locations enhances Russia’s ability to project power and influence regional dynamics—potentially disrupting Western naval operations and trade routes.

Second, by exploiting African migration routes to Europe, Russia can create social and political instability within the EU countries, thus influencing elections and weakening public support for EU policies, including sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine.

Russia’s investments in African natural resources also provide alternative revenue streams and reduce the impact of Western economic sanctions. Control over critical minerals and energy resources increases Russia’s leverage in global markets, including control of gold mines in Sudan and oil exploration endeavours in various African nations. Russia’s expansion of influence through military cooperation has benefited the latter. Strengthening military cooperation with African nations did indeed help Russia build a network of supportive regimes, limiting Western influence in these countries. Furthermore, by forging closer ties with African countries, Russia is proving successful in undermining Western diplomatic efforts in the region, complicating Western economic strategies, and creating votes and positions in international forums that align with Russian interests.

Russia’s specific involvement in Libya is also important to consider. Controlling significant oil and gas resources is the central focus of Russia’s presence there. By maintaining influence over Libyan oil fields, Russia will constrain Western access to these resources and increase European dependency on Russian energy supplies. The increasing presence of its paramilitary Wagner Group, which is influencing and supporting strongly armed factions within Libya and safeguarding Russian interests, cements this control.

This involvement includes securing key infrastructure and providing military support to local allies. Russian involvement in Libya includes smuggling oil and gas, generating revenue, and undermining EU efforts to cut off Russian energy imports.

Another critical aspect is Libya’s role as a transit point for migrants heading to Europe, which allows Russia to influence migration flows and destabilize European nations—exacerbating the refugee crisis. Overall, Libya’s strategic location on the Mediterranean Sea provides Russia with significant geopolitical leverage, allowing it to project a threat into the Mediterranean and challenge the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s presence.

The actions of Russian paramilitary groups in different African countries, along with their emphasis on safeguarding Russia’s economic interests, are fuelling the rise of terrorism in the region. The growing presence of Russian forces is already exacerbating regional conflicts and heightening local tensions, potentially fuelling the rise of terror groups. This is particularly concerning as organizations with ties to ISIS are gaining momentum in West Africa and the Sahel. The withdrawal of French forces from Mali and Niger, along with the departure of American forces from Niger, resulted in a significant rise in extremist groups in the region. This is having a detrimental impact on the West’s counterterrorism efforts in the region.

Overall, the situation in some African states is proving increasingly worse. The growing influence of Russia comes at the expense of Western powers, resulting in proxy conflicts and potentially destabilizing the continent even more. This can create environments that are conducive to the growth of terror groups. Russia’s manipulation of migration flows can result in worsening the refugee crisis. Terror groups can take advantage of this to bolster influence, bases, and activities in Africa and beyond. The dangers of worsening local conflicts are becoming more pronounced and the escalating violations of human rights in numerous African countries pose a range of intricate consequences that could potentially affect the stability of African.

In short, Russian action in Africa is bad for its inhabitants and bad for the West. At some point the West must counter Russia’s malicious efforts.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management-France, an MBA from the EU Business School-Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St. Andrews, UK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Russia’s Influence in Africa: Understanding the Big Picture was originally published on Global Security Review.

According to the 2018 Global Slavery Index, an estimated 40.3 million men, women, and children were victims of modern slavery. Women and girls made up 71 percent of victims. Modern slavery is most prevalent in Africa, where 9.2 million live in servitude, followed by Asia and the Pacific region.  State-imposed forced labor and forced marriages constitute the primary culprits of enslavement, which are compounded by recurrent or protracted bouts of armed conflict, especially in fragile and grossly underdeveloped states, such as Burundi, Eritrea, or Mauritania. Slavery or enslavement is a distinct legal concept. It is defined in Article 7(2)(c) of the Rome Statute  as “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in person, in particular women and children.” The 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery regards slavery as being constituted by four states of servitude, among them debt bondage, servile marriage, exploitation of children, and serfdom. Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), on the other hand, in Article 8 prohibits the use of forced or compulsory labor and provides for the opportunity to freely choose the means of one’s gainful employment. Forced labor must not entail an element of ownership to constitute slavery but many forms of slavery often involve forced labor which can take many forms, including forced labor exploitation, forced sexual exploitation, and state-imposed slavery, which persists in contravention of Article 4 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. In Mauritania, for instance, individuals become property of their masters, who exercise total ownership over their human ‘property’ and over their descendants. It is not uncommon for slaves, which account for an estimated 155,000 of population, to be inherited by family, to be bought, sold or rented out, and be given away as gifts.

Children are especially prone to various forms of enslavement and become particularly vulnerable to conditions involving forced labor. “Worldwide, 218 million children between ages 4 and 17 are in employment. Among them 152 million are victims of child labor; almost half of them, 73 million, work in hazardous child labor.” One in four victims of modern slavery is a child.

The resurgence of widespread and pervasive forms of modern slavery on the African continent coincides with the reinvigoration of the mining industry, which in turn, benefits from an amalgamation of human vulnerabilities. Poverty and civil conflict, fragile peace, debilitated post-conflict economy, low income, poor health and education of the general population increase opportunities for debt-bondage and resource depletion through unauthorized, poorly monitored and rudimentary illicit digging. Economies of fragile or underdeveloped states remain subservient to governmental fiat whose monopoly on the means of production open prospects for graft and political corruption. Military rule and state ownership of key resource extraction industries on the continent, on the other hand, contributes to the prolongation of civil wars and rebellions, growth of the black market and rise in organized criminal activity. Resource-rich African countries like Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, to name but a few, have long suffered from the consequences of internal skirmishes, conflicts and outbursts of unstable peace, while also being home to substantial mineral, gem and diamond deposits. This paradox of plenty combined with poor growth and anemic developmental outcomes has been dubbed by scholars as the resource curse, which does not go unnoticed by enterprising Western as well as also increasingly Chinese resource extraction entities.

Africa’s wealth…

Africa “hosts 30% of the earth’s mineral reserves, including 40% of gold, 60% of cobalt, and 70% of platinum deposits, and produces about 30% of the world’s gold, 70% of the world’s platinum, 28% of the world’s palladium, and 16% of the world’s bauxite … and 595,507 kg of gold-bearing ores.” The Democratic Republic of Congo, alone, according to Forbes, is endowed with over $24 trillion worth of untapped mineral deposits, including copper, diamonds, and coltan. The promise of high earnings potential combined with an unquenchable hunger for key mineral resources by China boosts foreign direct investment on the continent, stimulating an export economy, encouraging large-scale labor migration, and feeding irregular smuggling industries. Employment of child labor in mining is not uncommon and the involvement of political classes in resource extraction profiteering – by legal and illegal means – contributes to an exacerbation of already anomalous patterns in income and wealth distribution in fragile, poverty-stricken yet resource-rich African states. Even the established agrarian economies and subsistence farming become prone to major shifts in output as mining relocates workforce, supplants food production, and contributes to noticeable market declines in the agricultural sector of the economy. Poor man’s hopes of sharing in the wealth of gem, diamond and mineral deposits become dashed by revenue capture by large multinational corporations and political and organized criminal enterprises, polluting the local environment and depleting the land, while amplifying opportunities for civil unrest.

… and its inglorious colonial past

Today, the African continent faces its own peculiar set of especially difficult problems, split between a colonial past and a Chinese-dominated future. The cycles of boom and bust in the global supply chains of valuable minerals, coal, copper, uranium, gold, gems and diamonds have played an especially prominent role in Africa’s economic (under)development. Historical exploitation of the continent’s natural resources over the years put a cumulative stress on the traditional agricultural prowess of Central and Southern African states, straining familial and tribal relations and deeply affecting the moral and social fabric of its traditional orders. “Between 1867 and 1935, more than £1,200 million of public and private capital was invested in Africa.” Infusion of capital resulted in high demand for land and labor which caused “a massive decline in rural productivity” and “destroyed the economic, social, and political structures which had held African society together.” Colonial administration of African lands attracted French, German, Belgian, British, and German interests, which invested heavily in the mining industry, “whose dominant units [were] the major international corporations, that cause[d] and reproduce[d] the continent’s underdevelopment.”

The period of decolonization brought with it the globalization of the mining industry, which introduced American and Japanese stakeholders and developed new deposits in Australia and Canada, financed by the profits from Africa. Foreign interests brought capital resources, financial finesse, and technological innovation, yet profits have been one-sided and have disproportionately accrued to Western companies and their financial sponsors – large banking institutions such as Barclays, Deutsche Bank, or First National City Bank of New York – who upon entering into agreements with African governments were guaranteed unobstructed market access and little to none opposition to their projects, while Africa descended into  poverty, civil conflict, and war. Between 1868 and 1928, the South African diamond- and gold-mining industry alone generated “£340 million worth of diamonds, while the total amount of foreign capital invested in the diamond industry was probably no more than £20 million. The dividends of the diamond-producing companies, excluding the profits made by the individual diggers, exceeded £80 million.” Any foreign investments made around the African mineral resource economy were made to ensure the infrastructurally sound and reliable access and export of the mined goods. Investments in transportation links – railways and river barges – had been made to link Africa’s mineral wealth to the main trading routes that fed into the global economy; they had not been made to equip the continent with suitable standards of living and a sure path to development and independence.

The world’s ferocious demand for Africa’s resources, over decades of Western domination and exploitation, only exacerbated the continent’s underdevelopment and increased its dependence. The scramble for Africa’s wealth encompassed material and human goods leaving the continent’s men, women and children at the mercy of the supply and demand chains of the global economy. Mining in Zaire by near-monopolistic power of international capital, for example, “distorted the country’s social structure” through land expropriation leading to the pauperization of the peasantry and blocking the emergence of national bourgeoisie. The need for “cheap black labor” in Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) and the desire to stabilize the supply of labor force resulted in the colonial imposition of a land tax on the African population with an aim of preventing lucrative yields from land cultivation and forcing the local population into industrial mining. Despite Liberia’s position as “a country exceptionally well endowed with natural resources, of iron ore as well as diamonds and other minerals, with good soil, a huge potential in forestry and a booming export trade” the serious budgetary deficits which the country faced in 1968 were largely due to the generous concession agreements, relaxed government supervision of accounting and financial reports, and the inevitable “enormous outflow of resources to the mining companies.” Nearly a third of the country’s GNP of the monetary sector of the economy was consumed by the outflow of cash to foreign interests. Similarly, parasitic practices repeated many times over across the continent – from Zambian copper, South African gold, Namibian and Gabonese uranium, to Togolese phosphates – produced thriving Belgian, British, German, French, and American economies while sentencing Africa to the distressing Third World status. The seizure of land and deliberate suppression of indigenous industries and agricultural development is known to have been replicated by European colonial powers in French North Africa, Anglo-Dutch East and South Africa as well as India. As Shashi Tharoor has shown in Inglorious Empire: What the British Did in India (2017), when the East India Company was established in 1600, Britain accounted for a mere 1.8 percent of global GDP and India for the impressive 23 percent. In 1750, India and China together accounted for three-quarters of the global industrial output. However, by the time of India’s independence in 1947, after decades of systematic plunder and transformation by British imperial rule, India’s contribution to world GDP decreased to 3%, while Britain’s was three times as high, reversing the large imbalances of wealth and political leverage which have lasted well into the 21^st century.

History doesn’t repeat itself, but it rhymes

Today, Africa’s developmental path is heavily influenced by Chinese mining and resource extraction interests, substantial investments in agriculture, infrastructure, peacekeeping, and formal and informal security arrangements, which once again, set the continent firmly on the path of protracted material dependence. According to Brookings, between 2000 and 2017, China provided $143 billion in loans to African governments and their state-owned enterprises in the form of concession loans, credit lines, and development financing and pledged additional $60 billion at the 2018 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).¹ The Export-Import Bank of China loan guarantees involve confiscation of resource-rich lands in the event of default. The world’s second largest economy imports $100 billion worth of base metals every year and its interests in Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural wealth in cobalt, chromium, iron ore, copper, gold, manganese, among others, will undoubtedly change the social-economic trajectory of Ghana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia. Mining alone, however, implicates cognate conflicts over land ownership, human rights abuses, and environmental degradation on the continent. The impact of mining on the environment has already caused much disaffection and concern. Harmful levels of radioactivity and poor corporate social responsibility paired with inadequate state oversight and corruption of state and local elites threaten to further exaggerate Africa’s vulnerabilities and accelerate social and economic inequalities of already disempowered local populations. In exchange for African countries’ symbolic political support in global institutions and multilateral fora, China – in substantially instrumental yet strategic ways – is gobbling up Africa’s vast natural resource wealth in order to ensure its own global dominance by 2049, the centennial of China’s Communist Revolution.

The many temptations of Chinese direct foreign investment in largely acquiescent Africa are bound to overlook the substantial human cost of forced or state-sanctioned labor, which all-too-frequently assist in the states’ rapid industrialization and upward economic growth.

Despite great legal strides being made in the form of the 1926 Slavery Convention, the 1956 United Nations’ Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, the 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 1957 Convention of the Abolition of Forced Labor, states and corporate entities are often complicit in the crime which maintains and perpetuates a system of political and economic domination and sustains structural inequalities inherent in the global economy. The illicit labor landscape is further complicated by mass population movements resulting from conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East. Vulnerable and at-risk populations turn to organized networks of smugglers and traffickers, who profit from human tragedy. Fresh supply of labor of forced and unforced nature creates opportunities for exploitation which often falls under the definitional category of ‘modern slavery’ or other forms of ‘consensual exploitation’ stemming from economic desperation offered in exchange for inhumane treatment and substandard working conditions. According to the 2005 A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour report “80 percent of forced labor is found in the private economy, mainly in the rural and informal sectors in developing countries, but also penetrating the supply chain of major companies in the developing and industrialized world alike.” Yet, the enforcement and criminalization of such practices remains elusive due in large measure to the architecture of modern demand and supply chains. Scholars even suggest that

“…the majority of victims of forced labour are not slaves of brutal war lords, dictatorial regimes or mafia-type criminal networks. They are subjected to coercion in the informal economy and in mainstream economic sectors, tied to their workplaces by subtle means of coercion and control… their exploitation is part and parcel of labour relations in certain parts of the economy.”²

Can international criminal law be an effective instrument against modern slavery?

The present-day landscape of corporate- and government- level initiatives attempting to address and redress the transnational nature of modern slavery has been gradually populated by a set of guidelines and good practices across industries and continents. Since the enactment of International Labour Organization’s 1977 Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, the UN Global Compact, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises – which call for elimination of forced and child labor – governments and businesses alike have been forced to reckon with human rights abuses within their supply chains. Additionally, the Athens Ethical Principles adopted by business companies in 2006 to combat human trafficking worldwide, have espoused seven main values:

“(1)  Demonstrate the position of zero tolerance towards trafficking in human beings, especially women and children for sexual exploitation (Policy Setting); (2) Contribute to prevention of trafficking in human beings including awareness-raising campaigns and education (Public Awareness-Raising); (3) Develop a corporate strategy for an anti-trafficking policy which will permeate all our activities (Strategic Planning); (4) Ensure that our personnel fully comply with our anti-trafficking policy (Personnel Policy Enforcement); (5)  Encourage business partners, including suppliers, to apply ethical principles against human trafficking (Supply Chain Tracing); (6) In an effort to increase enforcement it is necessary to call on governments to initiate a process of revision of laws and regulations that are directly or indirectly related to enhancing anti-trafficking policies (Government Advocacy); (7) Report and share information on best practices (Transparency).”³

The identification, prevention, and mitigation of human trafficking, forced labor, and human rights abuses propelled by sporadic intensification of stakeholder pressures and generalized public boycotts, could benefit, however, from the assistance of regulators and law enforcement entities. By criminalizing behavior of companies and governments and holding them accountable for falling short on their commitments to the minimization of opportunities for human exploitation are severely overdue steps in the corporate responsibility and state liability discourse and practice. Domestic and international legal and criminal liability might be an effective last resort in incentivizing human rights compliance in both mainstream and informal sectors of the economy and broader state development schemes. The International Criminal Court (ICC) with its comprehensive transnational legal mandate can be a powerful institutional weapon in the fight against modern forms of slavery, which can ensure a modicum of accountability and just satisfaction as it prospectively endeavors to redress the all-too-prevalent abrogation of human, civil, and political rights. Strategic litigation that draws on international criminal law – be it through the ICC or other international judicial mechanisms – can provide a requisite roadmap to future prosecution of offenses of universally objectionable nature and issue an authoritative statement on crimes shocking to the human conscience.

¹ Y. Sun. 2020. “China and Africa’s debt: Yes to relief, no to blanket forgiveness” https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/04/20/china-and-africas-debt-yes-to-relief-no-to-blanket-forgiveness/

² B. Andrees, “Defending Rights, Security Justice: The International Labor Organization’s Work on Forced Labor” JICJ. 343-362.

³ Business and Human Rights Resource Centre. “The Athens Ethical Principles” https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/pdf-athens-ethical-principles

Africa’s (Modern) Slavery Problem was originally published on Global Security Review.

In response, the Trump administration’s 2018 “Africa Strategy” specifically targets Russia as a key geopolitical rival, presenting the United States’ potential African partner countries with an apparent choice between Cold War-style enemies. Again in March, the U.S. pointed to Russia as a threat in Africa, when Deputy Secretary of State John J. Sullivan warned Angola of Russia’s interests in Africa. The U.S. media environment has also fostered an ascendant vision of Russia in Africa, quoting “alarmed” U.S. officials who speak of Russia being “highly active” in the region.

This growing narrative pushes an inflated interpretation of Russia’s real capabilities while ignoring or footnoting the broader context. The relative size, scope, and trajectory of Russia’s gradual increasing economic involvement in Africa indicate an approach fitting with the behavior of other similarly sized economies. Russia’s military footprint and economic connections remain comparably marginal in Africa, while the French, Chinese, and U.S. hold entrenched positions. Meanwhile, Russian military adventurism on the scale of with its involvement in the Syrian Civil War is unlikely in Africa, owing to a Russian population increasingly vocal over domestic issues and opposed to foreign entanglements. 

Russian global military posture skips Africa

The Kremlin’s military priorities are planted firmly in Russia’s elongated peripheral regions of Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, and East Asia. Insofar as Russia leaves these spaces, it is usually to counter the United States and allies (who are actively involved in Russia’s neighborhood themselves) with low-level incursions designed for disruption. 

In terms of intentions, the Russians, unlike the Americans, do not fight a Global War on Terror across the Sahara/Sahel, requiring a lily pad strategy of U.S. drone bases for thousands of miles. There is not an internal security dimension to Russian involvement in Africa, precluding similarly scaled military deployment. 

In terms of capabilities, Russia lacks a significant military or political command in Africa. Many African countries do not have a Russian embassy or even a small diplomatic mission, and Russia’s military footprint—outside of small contingencies of mercenaries—remains marginal, with no bases to bivouac within, and no host governments agreeing to allow them space.  Meanwhile, the United States has 5-6,000 soldiers across Africa and around 34 bases. 

While the United States and ally France fulfill air-land-sea campaigns across multi-country theaters, Russia fills niche support roles with countries the United States does not have significant military relationships with—such as Zimbabwe, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, and South Sudan. 

It is worth noting that the two most high-profile instances of Russian influence in Africa in recent years were borne out of economic enterprises for Russian businessmen. In 2017, mercenaries—not Russian soldiers—from the Wagner Group outfit began advising Central African Republic (CAR) on how to defend against militias in the country’s seven-year-long civil war.  In 2018, it was reported that Russian individuals arrived as consultants in several African countries to influence their elections, such as South Africa and Madagascar. As with the Wagner Group, it was possibly money that drew in the operatives, rather than clear strategic objectives from Moscow. 

Russo-African Economic Normalization is…Normal

In addition to a smaller military presence, Russia is also a minor economic player in the region. Russia retreated from Africa after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union but reinvested in a sharp increase over the past 20 years. The increases are notable not for their scope but rather their steep return from much lower levels. 

Russian trade with Africa makes up less than 1% of global trade with Africa, which is comparable to economies of its own size, though far behind the United States, China, and especially Europe. 

Foreign wars are increasingly unpopular in Russia, reducing the risk of major interventions beyond Russia’s periphery

Russia will continue attempts to drum up economic integration with Africa to bring life to its weak economy, but military interventions involving long-term ground deployments to active conflicts, especially at the levels seen by the United States and France, are unlikely—owing to the growing unpopularity of foreign wars among Russians. Refocusing inward, Russia is less likely to afford attention to far-reaching foreign entanglement in the future, moving Africa further to the bottom of the Kremlin’s limited agenda. 

Moving forward, and with this context in mind, the Cold War-esque U.S. government and media perspective may incur negative policy implications and misconstruing the United States’ geopolitical rivals’ roles risks miscommunication with current or potential African allies. The United States has the benefit of strong favorability in many Africa states. The U.S. should market itself as a productive partner irrespective of other outsiders, and remind African countries of their agency, rather than force a choice between supposed zero-sum competitors.

Don’t Buy the Hype on Russia in Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is worth considering Britain’s wider role in Africa as Theresa May visits this critical part of the world on a trade and investment tour. This latest diplomatic endeavor provides an opportunity to evolve UK’s Africa strategy in the context of forging a new path for a global Britain that seeks to maximize the opportunities of leaving the European Union. This is a crucial area of a global Britain approach, ensuring that the UK remains competitive in an ever-increasingly competitive global market.

In Cape Town, the prime minister announced an ambitious new approach to Britain’s spending on the continent, wishing to overtake the US by 2022 as the largest foreign investor in Africa, which would see Britain becoming Africa’s largest trading partner in the G7. This would seek to build upon the already high levels of existing British investment in Africa; with bilateral trade between the UK and Africa totaling $37 billion in 2016 and set to increase further post-Brexit.

With 29 business executives accompanying the prime minister and other officials on this trip, the overriding purpose of the mission is clear: to drum up business with some of the world’s fastest growing economies. The key stops on the Prime Minister’s tour include South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya. These three countries, traditionally strong British allies, are widely regarded as the core engine of future African growth.

By 2030, household consumption across the continent is expected to reach $2.5 trillion, up from $1.1 trillion in 2015. A third of that will come from these three states alone. Other countries with high growth rate forecasts over the next decade include Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, Ethiopia and Ghana. They all maintain strong relations with Britain, leaving considerable scope for developing these ties further.

Britain’s combined imports and exports with African countries more than doubled between 2005 and 2014, however exports to Africa still only represents 2.5% of total British exports. Considering Africa is a continent whose the population is set to increase by half a billion people by 2030–43% of whom will acquire middle and upper class status–it is remarkable that Britain has not sent such a top trade delegation to Africa sooner.

In that sense, Britain is somewhat late to the party. The U.S., despite seeing exports to Africa halve from 2014 – 2016, still has a bilateral trading relationship with the continent worth $53 billion. However. even this is dwarfed by both China and the E.U.-27’s trade numbers with Africa: in 2015 worth $188 billion, and $269 billion respectively.

In particular Beijing’s role in Africa has solidified in recent years. This trend goes well beyond the seven fold increase in trade with the continent since 2005. China is also seemingly aiming to become the preeminent security actor across Africa in an attempt to displace the legacy role still played by the former European colonial powers. In addition to establishing its first overseas base in Djibouti in 2017, Beijing also has 2,466 troops currently on active duty across Africa.

In recent years, Chinese military personnel have taken part in United Nations peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Sudan, with an 800-strong combat deployment sent to South Sudan in 2015, a country with significant Chinese oil investments. The security relationship between China and the UN contrasts sharply with the majority of western states, often more militarily risk-adverse regarding African deployments.

However, after meeting with Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, Mrs. May announced the two countries had signed a defense and security partnership which would see the British forces train full Nigerian army units to combat insurgents in the north-east of Nigeria. Furthermore, the UK will assist Nigeria in countering the use of improvised explosive devices used by Boko Haram, and in strengthening Nigeria’s lawless northern borders.

In order for the UK Government’s post-Brexit Africa strategy to really pay off, especially in the face of increasingly stiff international competition from the Chinese, Britain’s strengths as a security partner must be firmly emphasized as a reminder of why we should remain the firmest African ally. By leveraging Britain’s increasing role as a security actor in Africa, it should seek to press this advantage regarding trade deals post-Brexit.

Theresa May met members of the British military contingent based in Kenya, east Africa’s economic power and the focus of Britain’s greatest African security commitment. Kenya is utilized as a training area for British troops going on high readiness operations in other theaters, in addition to providing training and support for regional states engaged in the fight against al-Shabaab across east Africa. Ranging from Mali to Djibouti, Kenya to Gabon, the British military maintains a significant involvement across sub-Saharan Africa.

Currently providing training and support to no less than nine African states, small teams of specialized British personnel conduct a range of missions, from counter-terrorism to anti-piracy and anti-poaching. These missions are designed to build up the capability of host nations, by training their leaders and instructors in military skills often hard-learnt over recent British campaigns, now passed on to other states to assist in their own security development.

These training missions have tangible impact and results. For example, over 22 separate training missions by British forces in Uganda since 2011 have developed the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces, who undertake the majority of the heavy fighting in Somalia under the African Union mission. The success witnessed by the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) has led to increased international confidence in the security situation in Somalia, resulting in a gradual reduction in African Union personnel from the Horn of Africa.

Mrs May will seek to highlight the threats posed to both European and international stability through letting the security challenges occurring across Africa go unaddressed. These challenges include the current situation in the DRC; ongoing Ebola outbreaks across the country, coupled with increasing civic strife has led to over four million internally displaced people throughout the DRC.

Considering the rising numbers of individuals wishing to flee internal conflicts, ethnic tensions, human trafficking and large scale poverty and corruption, Europe faces potentially a second wave of millions of migrants from the African continent escaping war and famine and seeking new opportunities. The case has already been made that Britain, in ensuring a strategic partnership with Africa, can do more to help mitigate these developments by training security personnel in the DRC to better cope with the country’s many crises.

Additionally, al-Shabaab poses a lethal security threat in the east of the continent, while Boko Haram and al-Qaeda affiliates threaten its western areas. UK military assistance is a key part of the multi-national efforts to contain and ultimately defeat these terrorist organisations. Concurrently with training Kenyans, Ugandans and Somalis in the fight against al-Shabaab, Britain has also trained over 30,000 Nigerian soldiers since 2015 in counter-insurgency operations to help the fight against Islamic militancy in Nigeria.

By highlighting the threats facing African security, combined with the pragmatic methods with which Britain utilizes its armed forces in developing local-level state actor security, a Global Britain approach to a new Africa strategy should therefore seek to combine increased trade and investment into African economies, with a renewed focus on strengthening existing bilateral military relationships.

This twin-tracked approach based around trade and security will seek to achieve the government’s target to be the G7’s largest African trading partner post-Brexit; filling a geostrategic void left in the wake of a withdrawing US. If Britain is to assert itself as Africa’s most valuable G7 trading partner, then Britain must seek to fulfill African desires for investment whilst simultaneously offering the continent a type of security assistance that is beyond China’s military skills and capabilities.

Security and Trade: The Need for a Global Britain Approach in Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

The ongoing humanitarian crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been described by the U.N. as the “highest level of emergency;” comparable with Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.

In January 2018 Jean-Pierre Lacroix, the head of U.N. peacekeeping operations, informed the Security Council of the recently deteriorating situation and the urgent need to bolster peacekeeping efforts within the country. However, in contrast to the latter crises, the ongoing conflict in the DRC has received far less attention from international media platforms.

Since 2016, at least 3000 civilians have been killed and a further 1.4 million displaced. A catalyst for this conflict has been significant public resistance to the rule of President Joseph Kabila. In June 2016, a traditional chief within the central Kasia region called for a popular uprising against the government and state institutions.

Following the chief’s death two months later, the result of a police raid, civil unrest escalated to a disturbing level unprecedented in recent years; including the alarming re-emergence of child soldiers.

The grievances voiced over President Kabila’s rule, which caused the initial protests earlier that year, intensified in December 2016 when the president refused to step down after his five-year term concluded.

Despite the earlier implementation of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Republic Mission in the Democratic of the Congo (MONUSCO), with a mandate aimed at protecting civilians, humanitarian personnel and stabilizing the government, civil conflict has continued to rise.

The current escalation in violence in the DRC is the latest in a series of bloody civil conflicts dating back to the mid-1990s.

The Second Congo War (1998-2003) was the deadliest conflict globally since the Second World War, resulting in 5.4 million deaths. The nature of violence was so extreme that children under the age of five were the hardest hit, accounting for almost half of all those killed.

The scale of the war was so vast that it destabilized the entire region, as foreign armies and rebel groups fought for control over the country’s natural resources; recently estimated to be worth more than $24 trillion.

The conflict, exacerbated by endemic corruption, forced millions to flee their homes, further destabilizing the region. The ongoing failure of the DRC security forces to prevent the humanitarian crisis has continued to this day.

The inherent weakness of those forces to protect civilians ultimately led to U.N. Resolution 1279, and the creation of the United Nation Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

Charged with the observation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, it was replaced in 2010 by the current MONUSCO mission, which as previously stated was to ensure the protection of civilians.

The latest manifestations of the conflict witnessed since 2016, have highlighted the glaring failures of the current U.N. mission in achieving that mandate.

The Failures and Shortcomings of U.N. Peacekeeping Forces

In addition to being unable to fulfill its overall purpose, the latest U.N. mission has endured considerable losses; most recently the deaths of 15 Tanzanian peacekeepers in December 2017; in total, U.N. peacekeeping missions in the DRC have suffered the loss of 93 personnel.

A U.N. report from March 2018 investigating these deaths highlighted shortcomings in the training of its troops as a significant causal factor. Although contributing substantial troop numbers, the majority of the MONUSCO assisting militaries are from developing states themselves, inevitably posing limitations to the overall capability of the mission.

Despite some of these contributing states, specifically Tanzania, offering evident military strengths such as regional expertise, those forces do not provide the mission access to the technological military resources required by the mission’s efforts. For example, UAV surveillance technology has already been requested as a necessity. A further weakness of the current U.N. peacekeeping mission is the sizable reduction to its budget announced by the U.S. in 2017.

The ongoing conflict is by its nature a complex and fragmented issue which can only be resolved through a multi-dimensional approach, encompassing transformations in international assistance and new efforts which tackle corruption and the under-resourced security forces.

International Economic Legislation Exacerbates Destabilization in the DRC

Disconcertingly, the international economic legislation spearheaded by the Obama Administration, compels many corporations to avoid mineral extraction in conflict-prone areas.

While initially supported by the international community, this measure, known as the broader U.S. economic reform the Dodd-Frank Act, has propelled millions of miners and their families deeper into poverty.  As a direct result of reduced employment prospects for miners, destabilization has increased.

The growing unemployment has encouraged individuals to join the ranks of militias involved in the DRC conflict, exacerbating local corruption; DRC security forces themselves have routinely been involved in mineral extraction and subsequent smuggling into neighboring countries.

By some estimates, $400 million dollars in gold was smuggled out by militias the year after the U.S. legislation was passed. Although the negative impact on regional turbulence may be reduced with a redress of economic policy from the international community, the civil unrest has already generated long-term security issues for the European continent.

Recommendations for Policymakers

A 2017 Gallup Poll highlighted how in 2016, 50% of people within the DRC wished to migrate, accounting for approximately 40 million people. As recent migratory trends suggest, this would unequivocally place further strain on southern Europe. To prevent the danger of a mass exodus of the Congolese population, presenting a catastrophic risk to the DRC and the European continent alike, it is essential that the international community now provides a more suitable and capable approach to dealing with the increasing civil unrest within the country.

With the need for a more comprehensive approach, aimed at increasing the operational effectiveness of the current peacekeeping mission and alleviating the obstructive effect of the economic legislation, there leaves an opportunity for NATO’s recently operationalized Southern Hub.

This new facility, located in Naples, Italy, has been charged with the mandate of responding more effectively to security challenges beyond Europe’s southern boundary. This strategic aim is supported by leading European Security experts; Carnegie Europe claims that NATO is obligated to mitigate the consequences of security threats facing state failure.

The July 2018 NATO Summit has solidified the geopolitical climate for a NATO-led training mission to the DRC, aimed at the protection of civilians through the development of the DRC security forces. Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg highlighted the need for “a package of additional measures for the South.”

The increased deployment of short-term training teams by NATO members has proven highly effective in increasing the operational capabilities of European-allied states across Africa, including Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, Mali, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

Such training missions, often small enough in number to ensure political sustainability, enhance regional stability by increasing the capabilities of the local security forces themselves. This is in direct contrast to the hands-on approach witnessed by the U.N. peacekeepers, resulting in the significant death toll. As previously discussed, issues of civil unrest in the DRC require attention in various areas, with a particular emphasis for future missions potentially placed on anti-smuggling.

Of course, to address the root causes of the conflict, a unilateral security approach will not counter essential issues such as high unemployment, large-scale corruption and lack of social mobility. However, what a proposed NATO-led training mission would deliver is a hopeful reduction in the high figure of peacekeeping fatalities and an improvement in the local security situation in the DRC.

This would subsequently improve the security situation currently facing Europe’s Southern flank. With Europe’s politicians having only recently managed to implement systems to reduce the high levels of migration to the continent, a new migrant crisis numbering several million refugees fleeing this latest conflict presents a threat to European security which cannot be ignored.

Crisis in the Congo: A New Role for NATO’s Southern Hub was originally published on Global Security Review.