<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Topic:defense strategy &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
	<atom:link href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/defense-strategy/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/defense-strategy/</link>
	<description>A division of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Mon, 23 Jun 2025 13:56:23 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.9.4</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>Irregular Warfare: An Indian Perspective</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/31029-2/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/31029-2/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Natalie Treloar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 25 Jun 2025 13:38:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bonus Reads]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[allied response]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[border conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deterrence strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[diplomacy and defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[escalation dynamics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[force posture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[geopolitical risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Great Power Competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-China tensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo-Pacific]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[international defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military partnerships]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regional stability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security cooperation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Alliances]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic foresight]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[threat perception]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31029</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>An Ally’s Candid Concern: Watching India-China Tensions from the Front Row In a rare and refreshingly direct conversation, a senior international defense partner outlines why the growing tensions between India and China are raising alarms far beyond the region. Why it matters: Strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific hinge on stability between these two nuclear powers. [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/31029-2/">Irregular Warfare: An Indian Perspective</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>An Ally’s Candid Concern: Watching India-China Tensions from the Front Row</strong></h3>
<p>In a rare and refreshingly direct conversation, a senior international defense partner outlines <strong>why the growing tensions between India and China are raising alarms far beyond the region</strong>.</p>
<p><strong>Why it matters</strong>:</p>
<ul>
<li>Strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific hinge on stability between these two nuclear powers.</li>
<li>Border disputes aren’t just bilateral—they ripple across regional defense planning.</li>
<li>Allies are preparing for scenarios where diplomatic friction could escalate into something far more dangerous.</li>
</ul>
<p><span style="box-sizing: border-box; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">This isn’t just a warning—it’s a call for <strong>greater alignment, deterrence, cooperation, and strategic foresight</strong> across like-minded nations.</span></p>
<p>If you&#8217;re in security policy, defense strategy, or Indo-Pacific affairs, this is essential viewing.</p>
<p>#IndoPacific #IndiaChina #StrategicAlliances #Deterrence #DefenseDiplomacy #GlobalSecurityReview #ThinkDeterrence #NationalSecurity #AlliedStrategy #Geopolitics</p>
<p>Watch the interview: <a href="https://youtu.be/2m-uj8G0RkA">https://youtu.be/2m-uj8G0RkA</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/31029-2/">Irregular Warfare: An Indian Perspective</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/31029-2/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>ICBM EAR Report December 8th</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 20 Dec 2024 13:11:55 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bonus Reads]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EAR Report]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Abraham Accords]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[aircraft]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Appropriations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[artillery shells]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assad regime]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[battleground states]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[congress]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[continuing resolution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CSIS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense appropriations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense budget]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense funding]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense policy bill]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense Production Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense Spending]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense-related activities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[environmental regulations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[escalation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[escalation dominance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[extremist organization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fast breeder reactors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[gender-affirming care]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[House]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IISS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo-Pacific]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Los Alamos]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military veterans]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[modernization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[national security programs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO expansion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[natural gas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NDAA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NNSA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[North Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear age]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear arms race]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear arsenal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear brinksmanship]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear deterrent]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear enterprise]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear modernization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear proliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear testing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear treaties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear warheads]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oil]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Palantir]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pentagon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[plutonium]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[precision-guided munitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reagan Defense Forum]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rocky Flats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rosatom]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Savannah River]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Senate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[stockpile stewardship]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic competitors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic developments]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic environment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[submarines]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Taiwan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Taiwan conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[transition team]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[wargaming]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[wartime footing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[world war III]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Xi Jinping]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29631</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Executive Summary: Week of December 8, 2024 This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/">ICBM EAR Report December 8th</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Executive Summary: Week of December 8, 2024</strong></p>
<p>This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture at which the US finds itself—facing nuclear, economic, and strategic challenges requiring unwavering resolve and bipartisan cooperation.  Here are some highlights:</p>
<p><strong>Quotes of the Week</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Chelsey Wiley (IISS):</strong> <em>“US–China tensions could lead to heightened security concerns for allies.”</em>
<ul>
<li>Editor’s note: The focus must remain on countering China&#8217;s threats, not shifting blame to the US.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Admiral Tony Radakin (UK):</strong> <em>“The third nuclear era is more complex, with proliferating technologies and absent security architectures.”</em></li>
<li><strong>Palantir CEO:</strong> <em>“Adversaries need to wake up scared; peace comes through strength.”</em></li>
<li><strong>Rep. Chuck Fleischmann (R-TN):</strong> <em>“Modernizing our nuclear deterrent ensures the US remains the global superpower.”</em></li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Essay of the Week</strong></p>
<p><strong>&#8220;Call it Chinese Communist Imperialism&#8221; by Christopher Ford (NIPP)</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Explores China&#8217;s military expansion and its quest for global influence.</li>
<li>Highlights its nuclear ambitions and parallels with historical imperialism.</li>
<li>Advocates for robust US policies to counter these threats.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Congressional Update</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>FY25 NDAA:</strong> Approved at $895 billion, fully funding nuclear initiatives and strengthening deterrence.</li>
<li>Key provisions:
<ul>
<li>Full funding for ICBMs and submarine components of the TRIAD.</li>
<li>Establishment of a unified Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Matters.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>New Congressional Members:</strong>
<ul>
<li>78 new members, with significant additions to defense committees.</li>
<li>Focus on battleground states with strategic implications for military readiness.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Strategic Developments</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>China’s Nuclear Expansion:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Accelerating development of fast-breeder reactors for weapons-grade plutonium.</li>
<li>Collaboration with Russia raises global security concerns.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>CSIS Wargaming:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Highlights the risk of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict.</li>
<li>Diplomacy and readiness key to preventing catastrophe.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Third Nuclear Age:</strong>
<ul>
<li>UK and US emphasize increasing complexity in global nuclear threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Reagan Defense Forum: Key Takeaways</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Panel 1: Indo-Pacific Challenges</strong>
<ul>
<li>Admiral Paparo stressed the urgency of deterrence in the face of China’s ambitions toward Taiwan.</li>
<li>Marine Corps General Eric Smith: <em>“What would you pay not to lose a war? Everything and anything.”</em></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Panel 2: Innovation in Defense</strong>
<ul>
<li>Heidi Shu: Encouraged bolstering supply chains and supporting small, innovative companies.</li>
<li>Senator Todd Young: Warned about biological threats and vulnerabilities tied to US-China economic ties.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Peace Through Strength:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Reinforced the need for defense investment to deter adversaries and maintain global stability.</li>
<li>Palantir CEO emphasized America’s role as a dominant power, inspiring both fear in adversaries and confidence in allies.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<h3><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/ICBM-EAR-Week-of-December-8th.pdf"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Read The Full Report</span></a></h3>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/">ICBM EAR Report December 8th</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>ICBM EAR Report Nov 5, 2024</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-nov-5-2024/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-nov-5-2024/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Nov 2024 13:30:48 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control & Nonproliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bonus Reads]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EAR Report]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[arms control erosion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Race]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[B-21 bombers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China nuclear buildup.]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[global tensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[House control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Minuteman III test]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO-Russia tensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New start treaty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Deterrent Seminar]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear modernization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[President Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Republican Senate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russian ICBM launch]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sentinel ICBM program]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Triad Symposium]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. foreign policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine nuclear decision]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29350</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Summary Report Events of Significance​ Nuclear Deterrent Seminar: Scheduled for December 6, 2024, focusing on China&#8217;s nuclear buildup with Christopher Yeaw from the University of Nebraska. Triad Symposium: Announced for June 24, 2025, at Louisiana State University in Shreveport, hosted by LSUS, NIDS, and BRF Defense in cooperation with the USAF Global Strike Command.​ Quotes [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-nov-5-2024/">ICBM EAR Report Nov 5, 2024</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div id="answer_copyable_1a8dae14-b0f3-400c-8180-bcc023389c0f" class="copyable_answers" data-testid="qna_answer">
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdown___oYf6O">
<h3>Summary Report</h3>
<p>Events of Significance​</p>
<ol>
<li>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4"><strong>Nuclear Deterrent Seminar</strong>: Scheduled for December 6, 2024, focusing on China&#8217;s nuclear buildup with Christopher Yeaw from the University of Nebraska.</div>
</li>
<li>
<p class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4"><strong>Triad Symposium</strong>: Announced for June 24, 2025, at Louisiana State University in Shreveport, hosted by LSUS, NIDS, and BRF Defense in cooperation with the USAF Global Strike Command.​</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 24px; font-weight: bold;">Quotes of the Week​</span></li>
</ol>
<ol>
<li>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4"><strong>CNN, November 5, 2024</strong>: “Kamala Harris Predicted to Win By Nearly Every Major Forecaster.”</div>
</li>
<li>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4"><strong>President-elect Donald Trump</strong>: “I am honored to nominate Chairwoman Elise Stefanik to serve in my Cabinet as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.​</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">She is an incredibly strong, tough, and smart America First fighter.”</div>
</li>
<li>
<p class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4"><strong>Gen. Thomas A. </strong>Bussiere, AFGSC: “An airborne launch validates the survivability of our ICBMs, which serve as the strategic backstop of our nation’s defense and defense of allies and partners.” ​</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 24px; font-weight: bold;">Strategic Developments</span></li>
</ol>
<ul>
<li><strong>Ukraine&#8217;s Nuclear Decision</strong>: With Trump&#8217;s election, Ukraine may consider nuclear options due to anticipated reduced U.S. support.</li>
<li><strong>Russian ICBM Launch</strong>: A Yars ICBM was loaded into a silo launcher at the Kozelsk missile base, signaling potential nuclear escalation.</li>
<li><strong>MM III Test Flight</strong>: The U.S. Air Force conducted a test flight of an unarmed Minuteman III ICBM from Vandenberg Space Force Base.</li>
<li><strong>Nuclear Modernization</strong>: The U.S. is advancing its nuclear arsenal, including new B-21 bombers and the Sentinel ICBM program.</li>
<li><strong>International Arms Control</strong>: The erosion of arms control treaties, such as New START, raises concerns about a new arms race.​</li>
</ul>
<h3>Five Key Takeaways</h3>
<ol>
<li>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4"><strong>Political Shift</strong>: President Trump’s victory and the Republican control of the Senate and likely the House signal significant changes in U.S. foreign and defense policies.</div>
</li>
<li>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4"><strong>Nuclear Deterrence Focus</strong>: Upcoming events like the Nuclear Deterrent Seminar and Triad Symposium highlight the importance of nuclear deterrence in U.S. national security strategy.</div>
</li>
<li>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4"><strong>Ukraine&#8217;s Uncertain Future</strong>: Ukraine faces a critical decision on its defense strategy, potentially considering nuclear options due to expected changes in U.S. support.</div>
</li>
<li>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4"><strong>Nuclear Modernization</strong>: The U.S. is heavily investing in modernizing its nuclear forces, including new bombers and ICBMs, amid rising global tensions.​</div>
</li>
<li>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p><strong>Arms Control Challenges</strong>: The decline of international arms control agreements poses a risk of escalating nuclear arms races, particularly with Russia and China.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/ICBM-EAR-Week-of-November-5th.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
</div>
<p>​</li>
</ol>
</div>
</div>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-nov-5-2024/">ICBM EAR Report Nov 5, 2024</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-nov-5-2024/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>ICBM EAR Report October 28th 2024</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-october-28th-2024/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-october-28th-2024/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 06 Nov 2024 13:54:53 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bonus Reads]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EAR Report]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ballistic missile]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[congress]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deployment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[geopolitical landscape]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[global threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ICBM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intercontinental ballistic missile]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[joint air drills]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LGM-35A Sentinel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Funding]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military modernization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Minuteman III]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[missile test]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[modernization efforts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Nuclear Security Administration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[North Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[North Korean troops]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regional instability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security alliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U. S. Air Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. Department of Defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. nuclear triad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S.-South Korea cooperation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine conflict]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29280</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This report provides an in-depth look at recent developments in global defense, with a particular focus on North Korea’s and Russia’s military actions and the United States&#8217; strategic response. Readers will find insights into North Korea’s latest ICBM test and its increased alignment with Russia, including deploying troops to support Russia in Ukraine. The report [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-october-28th-2024/">ICBM EAR Report October 28th 2024</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="p1">This report provides an in-depth look at recent developments in global defense, with a particular focus on North Korea’s and Russia’s military actions and the United States&#8217; strategic response. Readers will find insights into North Korea’s latest ICBM test and its increased alignment with Russia, including deploying troops to support Russia in Ukraine. The report examines the implications of these actions on U.S. and South Korean security, highlighting their joint efforts to counter nuclear threats and deepen military cooperation.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>Additionally, the report covers the latest Congressional Research Service update on the LGM-35A Sentinel ICBM program, set to replace the aging Minuteman III as the land-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad. Readers will gain an understanding of the program’s funding, strategic goals, and modernization efforts, with deployment anticipated by 2029. Key sections explain the financial investments, technical advancements, and defensive rationale behind the Sentinel, emphasizing its importance for future deterrence against growing global threats. The report underscores the interconnectedness of regional conflicts and U.S. defense initiatives, painting a comprehensive picture of the evolving geopolitical landscape.</p>
<p class="p3"><b>Key Issues Include:</b></p>
<p class="p1"><b>Korea and Russia News</b></p>
<ol class="ol1">
<li class="li1"><b>North Korean ICBM and Military Collaboration with Russia</b>
<ul class="ul1">
<li class="li1">North Korea recently launched its most powerful intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to date, signaling its intent to counter U.S.-South Korean alliances. Following this, the U.S. and South Korea held joint air drills as a show of force.</li>
<li class="li1">Reports indicate North Korean troops in Russian uniforms are heading to Ukraine, marking a potentially destabilizing support for Russia’s war efforts. North Korea may seek advanced nuclear technology from Russia as part of their cooperation.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li class="li1"><b>Strategic Reactions and Military Developments</b>
<ul class="ul1">
<li class="li1">The U.S. and South Korea have pledged deeper military and technology cooperation, emphasizing nuclear defense scenarios. Meanwhile, North Korea’s alignment with Russia is raising concerns about heightened regional instability and the potential extension of the Ukraine conflict.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<p class="p1"><b>ICBM Report to Congress on LGM-35A Sentinel</b></p>
<ol class="ol1">
<li class="li1"><b>Program Overview</b>
<ul class="ul1">
<li class="li1">The LGM-35A Sentinel, set to replace the aging Minuteman III, forms the land-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad. The Sentinel will enhance the U.S.&#8217;s deterrent capabilities with an expected procurement of 634 missiles, modernized silos, and facilities across strategic areas</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li class="li1"><b>Funding and Development</b>
<ul class="ul1">
<li class="li1">The FY2025 budget includes $3.7 billion from the Department of Defense and $1.1 billion for the W87-1 warhead from the National Nuclear Security Administration. Modernization will involve upgrades to 450 silos and over 600 facilities, establishing the Sentinel as a long-term, modular system to address future threats</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li class="li1"><b>Strategic Justifications</b>
<ul class="ul1">
<li class="li1">As a critical element of U.S. defense, the Sentinel program is designed to meet evolving threats, preserve industrial capabilities, and ensure cost-effective lifecycle management. The Air Force targets initial deployment in 2029.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<h2><strong>Get the full report!</strong></h2>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/ICBM-EAR-Week-of-October-28th-2024.docx"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-october-28th-2024/">ICBM EAR Report October 28th 2024</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-october-28th-2024/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>American Legitimacy and Integrated Deterrence</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/american-legitimacy-and-integrated-deterrence/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/american-legitimacy-and-integrated-deterrence/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Thibert]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Jun 2024 12:18:36 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bonus Reads]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[congress]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deterrence strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[economic stability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[integrated deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[North Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic posture]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=28270</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture argued in its October 2023 report, the United States neglected to sustain political legitimacy through a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape by allowing the nation’s nuclear deterrent to degrade over the past three decades, despite the clear resurgence of Russia, China, and North Korea. Integrated deterrence, a cornerstone [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/american-legitimacy-and-integrated-deterrence/">American Legitimacy and Integrated Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture argued in its October 2023 <a href="https://www.ida.org/research-and-publications/publications/all/a/am/americas-strategic-posture">report</a>, the United States neglected to sustain political <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/americas-real-deterrence-problem/">legitimacy</a> through a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape by allowing the nation’s nuclear deterrent to degrade over the past three decades, despite the clear resurgence of Russia, China, and North Korea. <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2866963/concept-of-integrated-deterrence-will-be-key-to-national-defense-strategy-dod-o/">Integrated deterrence</a>, a cornerstone of the Biden administration’s defense strategy, is a multifaceted approach aimed at preventing conflict and coercion by combining military might with diplomatic, economic, and informational tools. While this strategy may hold promise for addressing some of the complex security challenges of the decades ahead, it also presents significant risks and uncertainties.  Indeed, while integrated deterrence recognizes that military force alone is often insufficient to deter adversaries in today’s interconnected world by incorporating diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and information operations, it also aims to create a more comprehensive and resilient extended deterrent posture emphasizing strengthening alliances and partnerships, recognizing that collective action can amplify deterrence effects. This approach can certainly help pool resources, share intelligence, and coordinate responses to threats, making aggression less appealing to potential adversaries.</p>
<p>Though integrated deterrence outlines a comprehensive strategy, the complexities of integrating diverse tools and actors across multiple domains can be incredibly challenging. Coordinating actions between military, diplomatic, economic, and informational agencies require seamless communication, shared goals, and a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities. Even then, it still may not work. It is arguable that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was the first example of integrated deterrence’s failure.</p>
<p>Prioritizing non-military tools within an integrated deterrence strategy can mitigate the risk of escalation and unintended conflict while providing proportionate responses to aggression, potentially avoiding the need for military force. Despite the application of various non-military measures, Russia was not dissuaded from its invasion, demonstrating the limitations of this approach in altering aggressive behavior when considering the impacts on Russia’s political influence, economic stability, and military capabilities. Economic sanctions against Russia over the past two years are proving an abject failure, as are diplomatic efforts to isolate Russia.</p>
<p>The effectiveness of an integrated deterrence strategy hinges on the same factor as previous and long-standing deterrence strategies—the ability to credibly threaten and, if necessary, impose meaningful costs on adversaries. This is difficult to achieve, especially when dealing with adversaries who are willing to tolerate economic pain, information warfare, or other non-kinetic actions.</p>
<p>At its core, integrated deterrence is designed to be flexible and adaptable, allowing the US to tailor its response to specific threats and adversaries. Theoretically, this can make it more effective than traditional deterrence, but there is little evidence to support the theory. In fact, integrated deterrence has been successful at extending the conflict between Ukraine and Russia and has utterly failed to restore deterrence with Russia. Russia’s nuclear threats have proven more successful in deterring American and European intervention on behalf of Ukraine.</p>
<p>The complexity of integrated deterrence leaves it prone to miscalculation and misinterpretation, as adversaries may perceive certain actions as escalatory or provocative. This can lead to unintended consequences and increase the risk of conflict, rather than supporting deterrence. Implementing integrated deterrence requires significant resources and investment across multiple domains. This can strain budgets and create competition for resources between different agencies and priorities.</p>
<p>Alliances, a <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3315827/allies-partners-central-to-us-integrated-deterrence-effort/">crucial aspect</a> of integrated deterrence, are important, but relying too heavily on them for deterrence can create vulnerabilities if allies are unwilling or unable to meaningfully contribute capability. This undermines the credibility of the overall deterrent effort. The shift to integrated deterrence as a preferred strategy for discouraging aggression against the interests and allies of the United States has seemingly positioned Russia and China in an advantageous position to seize a small window of opportunity to reshape the global power dynamic, while potentially creating the opportunity for states such as North Korea and Iran to extend their regional objectives beyond words.</p>
<p>Alternative strategies to integrated deterrence could focus on revitalizing traditional military capabilities while fostering deeper diplomatic ties with allies. Bolstering conventional forces and modernizing nuclear arsenals can serve as a powerful deterrent by signaling a nation&#8217;s willingness and ability to defend its interests. Simultaneously, strengthening alliances and partnerships through information sharing, joint military exercises, and technology cooperation can create a united front against potential adversaries.</p>
<p>This multifaceted approach, combining hard power with robust alliances, may prove more effective in deterring aggression than relying solely on economic or informational tools. Moreover, a renewed focus on arms control agreements could reduce the risk of miscalculation and escalation, contributing to a more stable security environment. Ultimately, a balanced strategy that leverages military might, diplomatic cooperation, and arms control measures could offer a more comprehensive and robust approach to deterring aggression in the 21st century.</p>
<p>Time will tell if the choice to apply a strategy of integrated deterrence convincingly reinforces the all too important “<a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/integrated-deterrence-not-so-bad">will</a>” necessary for any effective deterrence strategy or it results in the United States grossly miscalculating its ability to deter with non-military and non-nuclear means. If the Biden administration is wrong, American interests around the world will suffer greatly.</p>
<p><em>Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS). With over 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. The views expressed in this article are his own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/A-New-Era-an-Old-Problem-US-Legitimacy-on-the-Line-in-the-Integrated-Deterrence-Game.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-27949 size-full" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Free-Download.png" alt="Download button" width="197" height="84" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/american-legitimacy-and-integrated-deterrence/">American Legitimacy and Integrated Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/american-legitimacy-and-integrated-deterrence/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
