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		<title>The New Economics of War: Cheap Drones, Asymmetric Threats, and the Democratization of Destruction</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-new-economics-of-war-cheap-drones-asymmetric-threats-and-the-democratization-of-destruction/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrey Koval]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 12:14:45 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[airspace surveillance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asia-Pacific]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[asymmetric threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cheap drones]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[commercial components]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[commercial drone technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cost-exchange ratio]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[criminal networks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[critical infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense strategies. ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[democratization of destruction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[domestic production ecosystems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[economic inversion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[extremist groups]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FPV drones]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[gray zone conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[insurgent movements]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Japan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[logistics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[loitering munitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[maritime security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Modern warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[non-state actors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[open-source software]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[precision strikes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[scalable countermeasures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[shipping lanes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Southeast Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[target detection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[technology transfer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Terra A1 interceptor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Terra Drone Corporation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[terrorist organizations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UAVs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[unmanned aerial vehicles]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32721</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: May 28, 2026 In the past three years, the war in Ukraine has marked a decisive turning point in global security. Low-cost, mass-produced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have become the decisive factor on the battlefield, fundamentally altering the economics of modern warfare. Expensive, low-volume traditional weapon systems are increasingly being neutralized by drones priced [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-new-economics-of-war-cheap-drones-asymmetric-threats-and-the-democratization-of-destruction/">The New Economics of War: Cheap Drones, Asymmetric Threats, and the Democratization of Destruction</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: May 28, 2026</em></p>
<p>In the past three years, the war in Ukraine has marked a decisive turning point in global security. Low-cost, mass-produced unmanned aerial vehicles (<a href="https://www.wwno.org/2026-04-22/small-inexpensive-drones-are-changing-the-battlefield-the-pentagon-is-playing-catchup">UAVs</a>) have become the decisive factor on the battlefield, fundamentally altering the economics of modern warfare. Expensive, low-volume traditional weapon systems are increasingly being neutralized by drones priced at just a few thousand dollars. This inversion has established a new guiding principle of defense: countering low-cost threats with low-cost means. This shift extends beyond state-on-state conflict. Affordable drone technology is expanding the military potential of small and medium-sized nations. At the same time, it multiplies the operational capacity of non-state actors, terrorist organizations, extremist groups, insurgent movements, and criminal networks that are turning what was once an expensive domain into an accessible tool of asymmetric warfare.</p>
<p><strong>The Economic Inversion of Warfare</strong></p>
<p>Traditional defense procurement has long relied on high unit costs and limited production runs. A single main battle tank or advanced air-defense missile can cost tens of millions of dollars. Yet, inexpensive drones costing as little as $500 have repeatedly destroyed or disabled assets worth <a href="https://www.epc.eu/publication/the-new-economics-of-warfare/">millions</a>. A commercially modified quadcopter or loitering munition can achieve effects once reserved for precision-guided munitions costing orders of magnitude more. The result is a dramatically altered cost-exchange ratio that favors the attacker. This forces even well-funded militaries to reconsider force structures and procurement chains. For smaller nations with constrained budgets, affordable and scalable drone systems offer a way to build credible denial capabilities without disproportionate spending.</p>
<p><strong>Ukrainian Technology Transfer</strong></p>
<p>A recent example of technology diffusion is the strategic investment <a href="https://terra-drone.net/global/2026/03/31/terra-drone-announces-strategic-investment-in-amazing-drones-a-ukraine-based-interceptor-drone-company-and-the-launch-of-new-interceptor-drone-terra-a1/">announced</a> on March 31, 2026, by Japan’s Terra Drone Corporation in Ukraine’s Amazing Drones LLC through its subsidiary Terra Inspectioneering. The partnership includes the launch of the Terra A1 interceptor drone: an electrically propelled system with a 32 km range, maximum speed of 300 km/h, 15-minute flight time, low noise and heat signature, and the ability to perform airspace surveillance, target detection, and neutralization in a single sortie.</p>
<p><strong>Empowering Non-State Actors and Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region</strong></p>
<p>The most destabilizing aspect is the accessibility of these systems to non-state actors. Terrorist and extremist organizations no longer require state sponsors or complex supply chains. Commercial components, open-source software, and simple assembly have lowered the barrier to entry, allowing insurgent groups, criminal syndicates, and ideological extremists to field effective aerial capabilities.In the Asia-Pacific, where vast maritime spaces, porous borders, and multiple gray-zone disputes already exist, the proliferation of cheap drones carries specific risks. Small terrorist cells or insurgent movements could use first-person view (FPV) drones or loitering munitions to disrupt shipping lanes, attack critical infrastructure, or conduct targeted operations with minimal logistical needs. The same technology that enables smaller states to deter larger neighbors also equips criminal networks and extremist groups to challenge law-enforcement or rival factions in remote areas. The combination of low cost, commercial availability, and rapid adaptability means that non-state actors in the region can now sustain prolonged asymmetric campaigns. Reports from other conflict zones show terrorist and insurgent groups already employing commercial UAVs for resupply and precision strikes, and similar patterns are emerging in <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/03/david-vs-goliath-cost-asymmetry-in-warfare.html">Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands</a>.</p>
<p>In Southeast Asia, the risks are particularly acute. The Philippines’ ongoing insurgencies in Mindanao and the porous maritime borders of the Sulu Sea already see small extremist cells experimenting with commercial drones for reconnaissance and occasional strikes. Similar patterns are visible in Myanmar’s borderlands, where insurgent groups have modified off-the-shelf UAVs for logistics and targeted operations. In the Malacca Strait and South China Sea gray zones, low-cost drone swarms could disrupt vital shipping lanes or harass naval patrols with minimal investment. These developments lower the threshold for violence: a terrorist or criminal network with a few thousand dollars can now field persistent aerial surveillance or precision munitions that once required state-level resources. The combination of vast ungoverned maritime spaces and readily available commercial technology creates ideal conditions for prolonged asymmetric campaigns by non-state actors across the region.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>The convergence of economic inversion, widespread accessibility, and rapid technology transfer has created a more volatile global security environment. In the Asia-Pacific—a region defined by strategic chokepoints, unresolved territorial disputes, and active non-state threats, the democratization of lethal drone capabilities lowers the threshold for conflict and expands the operational reach of terrorist, extremist, insurgent, and criminal organizations. Policymakers can no longer rely solely on high-end systems. The principle of “countering cheap threats with cheap means” has become the new baseline for credible defense. Without scalable, affordable countermeasures and domestic production ecosystems, states risk ceding initiatives not only to peer competitors but also to far smaller and resource‑constrained actors operating in the region’s gray zones. The economics of war have changed, and the Asia-Pacific region is one where the consequences of the new economics will play out.</p>
<p><em>Andrey Koval is a defense planner working on issues of military effectiveness and long-duration conflict. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/The-New-Economics-of-War-Cheap-Drones-Asymmetric-Threats-and-the-Democratization-of-Destruction.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="209" height="58" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 209px) 100vw, 209px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-new-economics-of-war-cheap-drones-asymmetric-threats-and-the-democratization-of-destruction/">The New Economics of War: Cheap Drones, Asymmetric Threats, and the Democratization of Destruction</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>Striking from Afar: The Strategic Edge of Standoff Warfare</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/striking-from-afar-the-strategic-edge-of-standoff-warfare/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/striking-from-afar-the-strategic-edge-of-standoff-warfare/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Thibert]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Oct 2024 12:15:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[anti-access/area denial]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[asymmetric tactics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[collateral damage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cruise missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cyberattacks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[decentralized tactics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense budgets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense strategies. ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drones]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[electronic warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[escalation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[high-value equipment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hybrid Warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hypersonic technologies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo-Pacific region]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[long-range weapon systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[low-observable technologies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military doctrines]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military personnel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[persian gulf]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[precision strikes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[precision-guided munitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[psychological impact]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rapid deployment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[reconnaissance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Standoff warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[targeting data]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[targeting technologies]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29176</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Standoff warfare has emerged as a pivotal approach in modern warfare. By keeping forces beyond the reach of adversaries and utilizing long-range offensive capabilities, nations aim to maintain a tactical advantage while minimizing risk to personnel and equipment. This article delves into the pros and cons of standoff warfare and examines its potential as a [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/striking-from-afar-the-strategic-edge-of-standoff-warfare/">Striking from Afar: The Strategic Edge of Standoff Warfare</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Standoff warfare has emerged as a pivotal approach in modern warfare. By keeping forces beyond the reach of adversaries and utilizing long-range offensive capabilities, nations aim to maintain a tactical advantage while minimizing risk to personnel and equipment. This article delves into the pros and cons of standoff warfare and examines its potential as a preferred strategy against formidable adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran.</p>
<p>Standoff warfare is characterized by the use of long-range weapon systems, such as cruise missiles, drones, and precision-guided munitions, to engage targets from a safe distance. This approach leverages advanced surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting technologies to identify and strike enemy assets without direct engagement.</p>
<p><strong>Advantages of Standoff Warfare</strong></p>
<p>One of the primary advantages of standoff warfare is the significant reduction in the risk to military personnel. By operating from a distance, forces are less exposed to direct enemy fire and ambushes, leading to fewer casualties and increased morale. By keeping forces out of the immediate reach of the enemy, standoff warfare helps preserve valuable military assets. This approach ensures that high-value equipment and personnel are available for prolonged engagements and future conflicts.</p>
<p>Modern long-range weapons are highly accurate, allowing for precision strikes on strategic targets. This capability enhances operational efficiency by focusing on high-value targets and minimizing collateral damage, which is crucial in maintaining public support and adhering to international laws of warfare.</p>
<p>The ability to strike from a distance can have a significant psychological impact on the enemy. The constant threat of unexpected precision attack can demoralize opposing forces and disrupt their operational planning and execution.</p>
<p>Standoff warfare allows for rapid deployment and response to emerging threats. With assets positioned at a safe distance, commanders can quickly adapt to changing battlefield conditions and execute strikes without the need for extensive mobilization.</p>
<p><strong>Disadvantages of Standoff Warfare</strong></p>
<p>Standoff warfare relies heavily on advanced technologies for surveillance, targeting, and weapon delivery. This dependence can be a vulnerability if these systems are disrupted by electronic warfare, cyberattacks, or other countermeasures.</p>
<p>The development, procurement, and maintenance of long-range weapon systems and associated technologies are expensive. The financial burden of sustaining a standoff warfare capability can strain defense budgets and divert resources from other critical areas.</p>
<p>Standoff warfare is most effective against concentrated, high-value targets. When facing adversaries employing dispersed, decentralized tactics, the efficiency of long-range strikes diminishes, necessitating alternative approaches.</p>
<p>Accurate intelligence and targeting data are crucial for successful standoff operations. The reliance on real-time, high-fidelity information can be a limitation if there are gaps in intelligence or if adversaries employ deception and concealment strategies.</p>
<p>The use of long-range strikes can be perceived as highly provocative and potentially escalatory in a conflict. Adversaries may respond with retaliatory measures, leading to a cycle of escalation that can spiral out of control.</p>
<p><strong>China</strong></p>
<p>China’s military modernization and expansion pose a significant challenge to American and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s development of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, including long-range missiles, sophisticated air defenses, and naval assets, necessitates a robust standoff strategy.</p>
<p>Standoff warfare allows the US and its allies to engage Chinese assets from a distance, mitigating the risk posed by China’s A2/AD systems. The ability to strike from afar can disrupt Chinese operations, degrade critical infrastructure, and maintain freedom of navigation in contested areas.</p>
<p>China’s advancements in electronic warfare, cyber capabilities, and counter-space operations could undermine the effectiveness of standoff warfare. Additionally, the vast expanse of the Indo-Pacific region presents logistical challenges for sustaining long-range operations.</p>
<p><strong>Russia</strong></p>
<p>Russia’s military doctrine emphasizes hybrid warfare, combining conventional and unconventional tactics. Its integrated air defense systems, long-range missile capabilities, and electronic warfare proficiency make it a formidable adversary.</p>
<p>Standoff warfare enables NATO forces to counter Russian aggression by targeting key military installations, command-and-control centers, and logistical hubs from a safe distance. Precision strikes can degrade Russia’s offensive capabilities and hinder its operational tempo.</p>
<p>Russia’s integrated air defenses and advanced electronic warfare capabilities pose significant challenges to standoff operations. The risk of miscalculation and escalation is also high, given the proximity of NATO forces to Russian borders and the potential for rapid conflict escalation.</p>
<p><strong>Iran</strong></p>
<p>Iran’s strategic posture relies on asymmetric tactics, including the use of proxy forces, ballistic missiles, and naval assets in the Persian Gulf. Its ability to disrupt critical waterways and target regional adversaries necessitates a nuanced approach.</p>
<p>Standoff warfare allows the US and its allies to target Iranian missile launch sites, naval assets, and command structures with minimal risk to their forces. This approach can help deter Iranian aggression and protect vital shipping lanes in the region.</p>
<p>Iran’s use of underground facilities, mobile missile launchers, and dispersed assets presents challenges for effective targeting. Additionally, the potential for retaliatory actions against regional allies and American interests necessitates careful consideration of the broader geopolitical implications.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>Standoff warfare continues to offer significant advantages in terms of force protection, precision, and operational flexibility. However, its effectiveness is contingent on technological superiority, accurate intelligence, and the ability to adapt to evolving threats. Against adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran, standoff warfare provides a valuable tool for countering their respective military capabilities. Nonetheless, it must be integrated into a comprehensive strategy that addresses the unique challenges posed by each adversary and mitigates the risks of escalation and technological vulnerabilities. As hypersonic, low-observable, and other advancing technologies continue to develop, they will force the need for rapid evolutions of military doctrines which will need to consider the role of standoff warfare as a critical component of modern defense strategies.</p>
<p><em>Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the </em><a href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/"><em>National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</em></a><em> with nearly 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Striking-from-Afar-The-Strategic-Edge-of-Stand-Off-Warfare.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/striking-from-afar-the-strategic-edge-of-standoff-warfare/">Striking from Afar: The Strategic Edge of Standoff Warfare</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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