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		<title>A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-blueprint-for-deterring-war-over-taiwan/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alan Dowd]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Mar 2026 12:09:45 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32469</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: March 23, 2026 Two parties have watched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) from a distance. China has been taking notes. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has tracked munitions consumption rates of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Both the PRC and INDOPACOM know that what is happening above, in, and around Tehran will impact Beijing’s plans [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-blueprint-for-deterring-war-over-taiwan/">A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: March 23, 2026</em></p>
<p>Two parties have watched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) from a distance. China has been taking notes. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has tracked munitions consumption rates of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Both the PRC and INDOPACOM know that what is happening above, in, and around Tehran will impact Beijing’s plans to take Taiwan. And they know Washington plans to prevent that.</p>
<p><strong>Opposing Forces</strong></p>
<p>The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) strongman Xi Jinping <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-46733174?utm_source=RC+Defense+Morning+Recon&amp;utm_campaign=74efb51fbd-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_01_02_10_54&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_694f73a8dc-74efb51fbd-81835633">declared</a> Taiwan “must and will be” absorbed. He has even set a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/cia-chief-says-chinas-xi-little-sobered-by-ukraine-war-2023-02-02/">deadline</a> of 2027 for his military to be ready to seize Taiwan. The Pentagon <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF">reports</a> that Beijing “continues to refine multiple military options” to take Taiwan “by brute force.” Xi is assembling the <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF">capabilities</a> to execute those options. This includes 420,000 troops, 750 fighter-jets, 300 bombers, 158 warships (including 50 landing ships) and hundreds of missile systems, all in the Taiwan Strait region.</p>
<p>In response, Taiwan has increased defense spending from 2% of GDP in 2019 to 3.3% of GDP in 2026, with plans to invest 5% of GDP on defense by 2030. Taiwan is using those resources to produce <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/inside-taiwans-massive-domestic-missile-arsenal">homegrown</a> antiship, air-defense, land-attack and air-to-air <a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2024/01/16/taiwan-missile-bases-china/">missiles</a>; expand production of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/08/18/1186919198/taiwan-military-weapons-manufacturing-industry">attack-drones</a>; and build a fleet of <a href="https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2025/taiwans-domestically-built-submarine-enters-sea-trials-to-strengthen-defense-against-chinese-invasion-threat">submarines</a>. Taiwan recently <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/taiwan-is-getting-its-u-s-weaponrybut-years-behind-schedule-11c151b1?mod=asia_news_article_pos1">received</a> ATACMS missiles and HIMARS systems. Taipei is still awaiting delivery of dozens of F-16V fighters and TOW antitank systems, which is part of a $21 billion <a href="https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-arms-backlog-february-2025-update-early-trump-admin-arms-sales-and-rumors-of-a-big-request-from-taiwan/">backlog</a> of U.S. arms. Taipei also <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/11/11/2003826737">wants</a> F-35s and additional Patriot systems. In short, Taiwan is racing to construct “a porcupine defense”—one that would make an invasion so painful as to dissuade Xi from even attempting it.</p>
<p><strong>The United States Response</strong></p>
<p>While Xi has been clear about his plans for Taiwan, Washington has been vague. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, neither side of the Taiwan Strait knows exactly what Washington would do in the event of war.</p>
<p>The INDOPACOM commander, Adm. Samuel Paparo, is doing his part to send a clear message. If Beijing attacks Taiwan, he <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/06/10/taiwan-china-hellscape-military-plan/">plans</a> to “turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape.” The drones and missilery of “hellscape” would come from multiple directions. Further supporting this clear message is that in 2024, the U.S. Army <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/u-s-plans-to-deploy-more-missile-systems-in-the-philippines-challenging-china-d0f42427?mod=world_feat2_asia_pos1">moved</a> Typhon missile systems to the Philippines, and in 2025 the Pentagon created Task Force-Philippines and deployed a Marine unit armed with anti-ship systems to the Philippines. Lastly, in 2026, the Pentagon unveiled <a href="https://news.usni.org/2026/02/02/u-s-army-quietly-stands-up-rotational-force-in-the-philippines">Army Rotational Force-Philippines</a>, which will deploy <a href="https://news.usni.org/2026/02/20/u-s-philippines-commit-to-increased-missile-drone-deployments-in-first-island-chain">missile and drone assets</a>.</p>
<p>Currently the Pentagon is <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/inside-us-plans-to-reopen-wwii-air-bases-for-war-with-china-11286002">revitalizing</a> airfields in the Philippines, <a href="https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2023/12/22/asia/us-air-force-pacific-tinian-island-airfield-intl-hnk-ml">Tinian</a> and <a href="https://www.15wing.af.mil/Units/11th-AF-Det-1-Wake-Island/">Wake Island</a>; basing top-of-the-line fighters on <a href="https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2024-07-03/f-15ex-kadena-okinawa-japan-f-35-misawa-iwakuni-14380105.html">Okinawa</a>; and rotating B-52s through Australia. Army units on <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2024/06/25/us-armys-new-precision-missile-hit-moving-target-in-pacific-exercise/">Palau</a> have tested land-based missiles against seagoing targets. And F-35s are now carrying <a href="https://www.twz.com/air/f-35-shown-carrying-stealthy-long-range-anti-ship-missiles-for-first-time">long-range antiship missiles</a> tailormade for targeting a PRC invasion fleet.</p>
<p>Near the end of his tenure, however, commanding U.S. Army-Pacific, Gen. Robert Brown <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-little-bit-of-fear-is-a-strong-deterrent/">reported</a> that his PRC counterparts “don’t fear us anymore.” This is regrettable, but understandable. America’s Navy deploys fewer than 300 ships which, like America’s commitments, are spread around the world. Those commitments expend finite assets: OEF has exposed the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-races-to-accomplish-iran-mission-before-munitions-run-out-c014acbc?mod=middle-east_more_article_pos9">limitations</a> of U.S. weapons stockpiles and production capacity, and it has forced the Pentagon to <a href="https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/03/03/OTCQNNDNORCHHG6Q5RB6YZ4NLA/">shuffle</a> assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.</p>
<p><strong>Allied Response</strong></p>
<p>America’s not-so-secret weapon is its interconnected system of alliances. America’s alliances serve as force-multipliers, layers of strategic depth, and outer rings of America’s own security, which enable power projection through prepositioning, basing, overflight, and resupply. Even though U.S. allies are critical, China has no real allies.</p>
<p>Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi <a href="https://www.gmfus.org/news/japans-takaichi-stands-firm-taiwan">describes</a> an attack on Taiwan as a “threat to Japan’s survival,” indicating Japan would <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/japan-us-alliance-would-crumble-if-tokyo-ignored-taiwan-crisis-pm-takaichi-says-2026-01-27/">assist</a> the U.S. in defending the island. In hopes of preventing such a scenario, Japan has bolstered defenses across its southwestern <a href="https://news.usni.org/2024/04/01/japan-stands-up-amphibious-rapid-deployment-brigade-electronic-warfare-unit-for-defense-of-southwest-islands">territories</a>, placing F-35Bs on Kyushu, anti-ship systems, air-defenses, and electronic-warfare units on islands south of Kyushu; and air-defense and missile-defense units on <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/Japan-boosts-defenses-on-remote-islands-near-Taiwan-amid-China-fears">Yonaguni Island</a> (70 miles east of Taiwan). In addition, Japan is fielding 22 attack submarines, acquiring 500 TLAMs, <a href="https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2026/02/japans-emerging-counterstrike-missile-posture/">producing</a> missiles domestically, and upconverting ships into aircraft carriers armed with F-35Bs.</p>
<p>Australia is partnering with the U.S. and Britain to deploy a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, and Australia has opened its territory to U.S. Marines, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australia-pledges-27-billion-progress-nuclear-submarine-shipyard-build-2026-02-15/">submarines</a> and B-52s.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/22/business/defense-industry-rare-earth-restrictions-china.html">Briain and France</a> have stepped up in production of a key element needed for TLAM production due to China shutting off the supply. Norway is supplying the U.S. with antiship <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2024/11/14/kongsberg-wins-biggest-ever-missile-contract-from-us-navy-marines/">missiles</a> and <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/air-force-buys-first-lot-norwegian-joint-strike-missiles/">joint strike missiles</a>. A U.S.-Israeli partnership is manufacturing <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2025/10/israels-uvision-looks-to-cement-us-army-ties-after-nearly-1b-loitering-munition-win/">loitering munitions</a>, which are likely part of Paparo’s “hellscape.” Japan, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, and Germany have conducted freedom-of-navigation operations through the Taiwan Strait further supported by Britain, Italy, and France <a href="https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/uk-france-and-italy-align-carriers-for-indo-pacific-mission/">coordinating deployments</a> of their aircraft carriers in the Pacific.</p>
<p><strong>Enhancing A Deterrent Posture</strong></p>
<p>China’s commitments and assets, conversely, are focused on its neighborhood. If Xi moves against Taiwan, his arsenal will be better positioned than the U.S. and is more sophisticated than Iran’s.</p>
<p>Deterring Xi from making that move will require more capability and more defense spending.</p>
<p>Sen. Roger Wicker has unveiled a <a href="https://www.wicker.senate.gov/2024/5/senator-wicker-unveils-major-defense-investment-plan">plan</a> to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Similarly, the Commission on National Defense Strategy <a href="https://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/NDS-commission.html">recommends</a> lifting defense spending to levels “commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.”</p>
<p>Although the president recently <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/07/trump-calls-record-defense-budget-00715298">called</a> for more military spending, the administration’s FY2026 defense budget was just 3.2% of GDP. The Cold War average was more than twice that.</p>
<p><strong>The Way Forward</strong></p>
<p>It is time to maintain a policy of “strategic ambiguity” to one of strategic clarity because of the great danger it presents. The secret alliances that led to World War I remind us that there is a greater risk in leaving defense guarantees opaque. The open defense treaties that followed World War II, and prevented World War III remind us that the prudent course is clarity of commitment.</p>
<p>There is a blueprint for deterring war over Taiwan: Washington needs to be clear about the nature of its commitment to Taiwan. Washington needs to view alliances not as liabilities to cut, but as resources to nurture. “We cannot afford,” as Churchill once counseled, “to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.”</p>
<p><em>Alan Dowd is a regular contributor to Global Security Review and a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, where he leads the </em><a href="https://sagamoreinstitute.org/policy-2-2/defense/cap/"><em>Center for America’s Purpose</em></a><em>. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/A-Blueprint-for-Deterring-War-Over-Taiwan.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="184" height="51" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 184px) 100vw, 184px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-blueprint-for-deterring-war-over-taiwan/">A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>America’s Managed Retreat: How the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy Shifts the Burden to Allies</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/americas-managed-retreat-how-the-2025-u-s-national-security-strategy-shifts-the-burden-to-allies/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sidra Shaukat]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2026 13:05:03 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32284</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The United States’ 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) is a document that has been written under the shadow of economic strain and military overreach, and it raises the slogan of “America First” while shifting the burden to partners and allies. The document was presented as a thoughtful adjustment of American priorities and speaks the language [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/americas-managed-retreat-how-the-2025-u-s-national-security-strategy-shifts-the-burden-to-allies/">America’s Managed Retreat: How the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy Shifts the Burden to Allies</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The United States’ 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) is a document that has been written under the shadow of economic strain and military overreach, and it raises the slogan of “America First” while shifting the burden to partners and allies. The document was presented as a thoughtful adjustment of American priorities and speaks the language of restraint, fairness, and realism. However, underneath a confident tone, Washington is attempting to preserve primacy by redistributing the costs and risks of global order onto its allies, especially in Asia and Europe.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf">strategy</a> emerged from a moment of truth. Years of military overstretch, industrial erosion, and fiscal strain have collided with domestic anxieties over migration, trade imbalances, and energy security. The document acknowledges, indirectly, that the United States can no longer afford to be everywhere, doing everything, for everyone. In response, it narrows the definition of what truly matters for the United States––the Western Hemisphere.</p>
<p>The Western Hemisphere is elevated as the primary theater of concern by invoking a 200-year-old policy of the <a href="https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/monroe-doctrine">Monroe Doctrine</a> that rejects external influence close to home. The Middle East is quietly downgraded, its strategic relevance diminished by American <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2617439">energy independence</a>. Europe, which was once a central theater to Washington’s worldview, is urged to take primary responsibility for its own security and political future by restoring stability within the region.</p>
<p>The strategy is not one of isolationism, as the NSS is careful to reject that label. As per the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf">document</a>, the United States will continue to prevent adversaries from dominating key regions. Nowhere is this commitment clearer than in the Indo-Pacific, where China is described as a main competitor. But while the ends remain familiar, the means have changed. The burden of maintaining or reinforcing regional balance is no longer something Washington is willing, or claims it should ever have been expected, to carry alone.</p>
<p>The Indo-Pacific strategy outlined in the NSS revolves around the First Island Chain, the arc of territory stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. This geography is cast as the front line of any future conflict in East Asia. The United States pledges to build a force capable of denying aggression anywhere along this chain; however, it also emphasizes that such denial must be collective. Diplomacy will be used to press allies to increase defense spending and investment in deterrence-focused capabilities. In effect, the strategy seeks to integrate partnered militaries into a dense denial network in which primary responsibility lies with regional partners, with the U.S. aiding through commercial matters, technology sharing, and defense procurement.</p>
<p>There is a cold logic to this approach. If successful, it would complicate any Chinese military campaign, raising costs through layered defenses, maritime surveillance, anti-ship missiles, cyber capabilities, and hardened infrastructure. It would allow the United States to concentrate on high-end enablers such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and missile defense, while others invest in the less glamorous but more geographically exposed components of deterrence. This move can be seen as a reconfiguration designed to make competition with China cheaper and more sustainable for Washington.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, for America’s partners, the strategy feels less like empowerment and more like exposure. Japan offers the clearest example. Tokyo is amid a historic military buildup. Its defense budget now exceeds <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/26/japan-govt-greenlights-record-58bn-defence-budget-amid-regional-tension">9 trillion yen</a> and is on track to reach 2 percent of its GDP, a threshold once unthinkable in a country shaped by postwar pacifism. Japan is acquiring <a href="https://ipdefenseforum.com/2025/12/japan-to-deploy-domestically-developed-long-range-missiles-at-four-sites/">long-range</a> standoff missiles, expanding <a href="https://turdef.com/article/japan-announces-shield-coastal-defence-system-with-uxvs">coastal defenses</a>, and revising its <a href="https://www.thinkchina.sg/politics/takaichi-manufacturing-crisis-and-rewriting-japans-security-future">security doctrines</a> to prepare for contingencies that explicitly include Taiwan. These steps reflect genuine threat perceptions, particularly as Chinese military activity intensifies near Japanese territory. But they also reveal how burden shifting works in practice, and Japan is expected to bear frontline risks in a conflict whose escalation dynamics it might not be able to fully control.</p>
<p>South Korea’s dilemma is even starker. Long praised as a model non-proliferation state, Seoul built its security on trust in the American nuclear umbrella. That trust is now fraying. North Korea’s arsenal has grown more sophisticated, and its missiles are more mobile and survivable. At the same time, the South Koreans are increasingly <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/article/3319662">skeptical</a> that Washington would risk Los Angeles or New York to save Seoul, particularly amid U.S. political polarization and the personalization of foreign policy under President Donald Trump. The NSS urges partners to spend more and do more for collective defense, but it cannot dispel the fundamental fear that extended deterrence may fail at the moment of truth. The result is a <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2025/11/25/south-koreas-nuclear-debate-is-no-longer-taboo/">once-taboo debate</a> over whether South Korea needs its own nuclear weapons, a debate that speaks volumes about how burden shifting erodes confidence even as it seeks to strengthen deterrence.</p>
<p>The Philippines illustrates another facet of this strategy. Cast as a frontline state in the South China Sea, Manila is offered expanded U.S. access under the <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-the-philippines">Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement</a>. The benefits are tangible; however, the risks are also profound. <a href="https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2493836/world">Philippine lawmakers</a> have openly questioned whether hosting U.S. forces makes the country a target without ensuring reciprocal American vulnerability. There is a lingering fear of becoming a buffer state, absorbing grey-zone pressure while great powers manage escalation elsewhere. These developments urged Manila to deepen ties with Washington, but simultaneously <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2025/10/web-of-deterrence-how-the-philippines-is-reframing-security-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific/">diversify partnerships</a> with Japan, France, India, and regional neighbors to avoid being locked into a proxy role.</p>
<p>These anxieties are compounded by the broader signals the NSS sends about American leadership. The document features President Trump with unusual prominence, underscoring how closely U.S. strategy is now associated with a single, mercurial figure. Its harsh treatment of European allies will not go unnoticed in Asia, where confidence in U.S. commitments has always rested as much on perception as on capability. The strategy also stated that “the outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations.” This assertion is most striking because it indicates that international order rests on the rule of the major powers. This framing implicitly places major powers (Washington, Moscow, and Beijing) in an exclusive tier of decisive actors and reminds the middle powers that their agency has limits. For allies asked to shoulder greater burdens, such language offers little reassurance.</p>
<p>A familiar Asia strategy thus sits alongside a more disquieting and unsettled redefinition of global leadership. The United States still seeks to shape outcomes, deter adversaries, and preserve its primacy. But it increasingly does so by asking others to stand closer to the fire. Whether allies will continue to accept that role, without firmer guarantees and clearer commitments, may determine not only the future of the Indo-Pacific but the credibility of American power itself.</p>
<p><em>Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at the </em><a href="https://thesvi.org/"><em>Strategic Vision Institute</em></a><em> (SVI), a leading Pakistani think tank focused on nuclear and strategic affairs. Her research and commentary have addressed peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority, nuclear diplomacy, and broader geostrategic developments in South Asia, Europe, and the Middle East across various platforms. A full list of her publications is available on </em><a href="https://thesvi.org/category/analyses/"><em>SVI’s</em></a> <em>website. Views Expressed in this article are author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Americas-Managed-Retreat-How-the-2025-U.S.-National-Security-Strategy-Shifts-the-Burden-to-Allies.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="241" height="67" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 241px) 100vw, 241px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/americas-managed-retreat-how-the-2025-u-s-national-security-strategy-shifts-the-burden-to-allies/">America’s Managed Retreat: How the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy Shifts the Burden to Allies</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Deterrence of North Korea and Iran: Interests-Objectives-Analysis Framework</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/extended-deterrence-of-north-korea-and-iran-interests-objectives-analysis-framework/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nathan Heath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Oct 2025 12:05:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31642</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On June 22, the United States struck multiple Iranian nuclear sites, marking a tipping point in its deterrence of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear ambitions. It was no longer enough to institute unilateral or multilateral sanctions against the regime, carry out strikes against its proxies, or support Israel’s own military action; direct American military power was [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/extended-deterrence-of-north-korea-and-iran-interests-objectives-analysis-framework/">Deterrence of North Korea and Iran: Interests-Objectives-Analysis Framework</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On June 22, the United States <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/06/21/world/iran-israel-trump">struck</a> multiple Iranian nuclear sites, marking a tipping point in its deterrence of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear ambitions. It was no longer enough to institute unilateral or multilateral sanctions against the regime, carry out strikes against its proxies, or support Israel’s own military action; direct American military power was needed against Iran itself. After all, Iran was <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/mossad-says-iran-15-days-from-bomb-us-agencies-still-say-up-to-a-year-report/">dangerously close</a> to producing a nuclear weapon.</p>
<p>The near completion of Iran’s nuclear weapon brings to mind another rogue state’s activities. In 2006, after years of global efforts aimed at preventing the Kim regime from obtaining nuclear weapons, North Korea (DPRK) conducted its first nuclear test. Today, the DPRK has an <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms-control-and-proliferation-profile-north-korea">estimated</a> 50 nuclear weapons and fissile material for 6 or 7 more.</p>
<p>An in-depth comparison of US engagement with Iran and the DPRK’s nuclear programs requires a much longer paper. However, a brief comparative analysis of American deterrence of these adversaries is possible. Applying national interests, objectives, and activities, a methodology employed by decision analysis experts yields interesting results.</p>
<p>Globally, the United States has an enduring interest in safeguarding its national security and sovereignty. Underneath this enduring interest, it has a core objective of defending allies and partners, including through credible deterrence (e.g., preventing conventional and/or nuclear attacks on allies and partners by the DPRK, China, Russia, and Iran). Other <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/us-policy-middle-east-second-quarter-2025-report-card">major American objectives</a> include <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-five-keys-of-donald-trumps-grand-strategy">safeguarding</a> the free flow of commerce, countering <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf">transnational threats</a>, preventing <a href="https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/indopacom_posture_statement_2025.pdf">regional domination or aggression</a>, and <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2025/08/trump-wants-to-stop-nuclear-proliferation-stratcom-could-play-a-major-role/">advancing nonproliferation</a>.</p>
<p>The United States advances deterrence through a range of activities, including the presence of its own military assets and security cooperation with allies and partners. In the Indo-Pacific, this includes mutual defense treaties with Australia, the Philippines; South Korea, and Japan (the latter two of which are explicitly covered by the US nuclear umbrella); <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2025/05/31/2003837800#:~:text=The%20US%20plans%20to%20ramp%20up%20weapons%20sales,two%20US%20officials%20said%20on%20condition%20of%20anonymity.">arms</a> sales to Taiwan; and <a href="https://www.army.mil/article/286395/exercise_talisman_sabre_2025_to_showcase_us_australia_alliance">military exercises</a> with allies.</p>
<p>More recently, the Trump administration emphasized <a href="https://uscnpm.org/2025/06/24/the-trump-administrations-indo-pacific-strategy/">increased allied defense spending</a> to support “burden-sharing.” Given the limitations of the American industrial base, this is necessary even as the US <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/20250131/hegseth-reaffirms-strong-alliance-with-s-korea-during-1st-phone-talks-with-seouls-defense-chief">maintains</a> efforts to prevent Chinese and North Korean aggression.</p>
<p>Deterrence against North Korea is successful insofar as it keeps the North from invading the South or launching nuclear strikes on US Indo-Pacific allies. However, this deterrence is increasingly complicated by Chinese and Russian <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/russia-china-north-korea-relations-obstacles-to-a-trilateral-axis/">protection</a> of the DPRK through mutual defense treaties.</p>
<p>This lends greater urgency to the American call for allies to increase defense spending, as there is a real risk of <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-united-states-and-its-allies-must-be-ready-to-deter-a-two-front-war-and-nuclear-attacks-in-east-asia/">simultaneous conflict</a> with China and North Korea, a scenario requiring substantial military assets in the region. Fulfilling the objective of regional deterrence also requires containing aggression from adversaries and bolstering security cooperation with allies and partners.</p>
<p>The United States supports deterrence in the Middle East by deploying its military forces and cooperating with allies and partners. However, regional deterrence, which <a href="https://cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/2025-05/Extended%20Deterrence%20in%20a%20Multipolar-Nuclear-World-Workshop-Summary.pdf">does not</a> formally extend the US nuclear umbrella to regional allies and partners (including Israel), often manifests as kinetic operations against adversaries, whether through security assistance or direct attacks. Thus, in the Middle East, deterrence also means advancing the goals of counter proliferation and degrading terror groups who threaten allies.</p>
<p>Unlike in the Indo-Pacific, where the United States <a href="https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4202504/hegseth-outlines-us-vision-for-indo-pacific-addresses-china-threat/">prefers</a> to contain aggression and expansion from nuclear-armed adversaries without firing a shot, in the Middle East, it will <a href="https://instituteofgeoeconomics.org/en/research/2025040904/">employ</a> kinetic means to fulfill its objectives. For decades, the United States deterred Iran through sanctions, negotiations, and the threat of military action. It was when President Trump believed Iran’s uranium enrichment program was “<a href="https://www.politifact.com/article/2025/jun/23/Tulsi-Gabbard-Iran-nuclear-weapon-Donald-Trump/">at its highest levels and…unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons</a>” that the US conducted kinetic attack.</p>
<p>The deep rifts in Middle East politics complicates the activities needed to maintain deterrence in the region. Prospects for security cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states, for example, are <a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-strike-in-doha-crosses-a-new-line-from-which-relations-with-gulf-may-not-recover-264954">challenging</a> given the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Israel’s recent strike against Hamas in Qatar.</p>
<p>Deterrence must also account for energy security concerns, given that US attempts to contain a nuclear-armed Iran may lead the regime to weaponize its <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/four-questions-and-expert-answers-about-irans-threats-to-close-the-strait-of-hormuz/">control</a> over the Straits of Hormuz. It is also <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/assessing-effect-us-strikes-iran">unclear</a> how far back American strikes set Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran’s proxy network <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/06/28/iran-is-severely-weakened-but-remains-a-regional-threat/">persists</a>, they can also commit further violence against the United States, its allies, and partners through attacks on military, commercial, and civilian targets.</p>
<p>None of these challenges are simple. In the coming years American deterrence guarantees to allies and partners may look very different as the nation <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/policy_briefs/2025/02/14/stark-strategic-realities-hegseth-tells-nato-u-s-must-prioritize-pacific-deterrence/">shifts focus</a> to the homeland and the Indo-Pacific. It remains to be seen how this imperative is realized in the forthcoming <em>National Defense Strategy</em>. Some critics <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2025/09/analysts-await-forthcoming-nds-to-clear-up-defense-policy-contradictions/">note</a> that, in practice, the United States remains heavily focused on the Middle East and Europe. Much of the ability to deter Iran and North Korea will be determined by these larger strategic shifts.</p>
<p>As American decision-makers face questions about effectively deploying American power across the globe, analyzing national interests, objectives, and activities can provide a helpful framework. Assessing the requirements needed to advance larger regional goals brings trade-offs into focus, better preparing the American warfighter for multiple threat scenarios. In short, this approach can yield meaningful results for those in the decision-making chair at critical moments when faced with complex problems, including maintaining credible deterrence.</p>
<p><em>Nathan Heath is an analyst at NSI. Views expressed are his own.</em></p>
<p><em><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Extended-Deterrence-of-North-Korea-and-Iran-Interests-Objectives-Analysis-Framework.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="238" height="66" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 238px) 100vw, 238px" /></a></em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/extended-deterrence-of-north-korea-and-iran-interests-objectives-analysis-framework/">Deterrence of North Korea and Iran: Interests-Objectives-Analysis Framework</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Invest, Don’t Spend, Peace Dividends</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/invest-dont-spend-peace-dividends/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 Aug 2025 12:45:49 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31287</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was assumed that the US no longer needed a robust defense budget. As a result, the nation went on what Lt. Gen. Garret Harencak called a procurement holiday or a “holiday from history.” Many assumed it was indeed the end of history. After all, between 1987–1993, Washington [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/invest-dont-spend-peace-dividends/">Invest, Don’t Spend, Peace Dividends</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was assumed that the US no longer needed a robust defense budget. As a result, the nation went on what Lt. Gen. Garret Harencak called a procurement holiday or a “holiday from history.”</p>
<p>Many assumed it was indeed the end of history. After all, between 1987–1993, Washington and Moscow signed four notable arms control deals: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties I and II (START), the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Outer Space, and the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) treaty.</p>
<p>Russian strategic nuclear weapons were scheduled to drop from over 10,000 deployed to 3,500 by the year 2000. The INF treaty banned shorter range missiles altogether. And Warsaw Pact conventional forces in central Europe and Russia dropped precipitously.</p>
<p>President Reagan’s economic war against Moscow was successful. It ended the Soviet empire by pushing Moscow to the brink of insolvency. Russia could not financially maintain its formidable Cold War nuclear and conventional force levels.</p>
<p>From 1993–2001, the US did not enjoy the promised “end of history.” State sponsors of terror in Iran, Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq took the fight to the US, albeit in a different mode than threatening to send massive tank armies through the Fulda Gap into Western Europe.</p>
<p>The US responded with a war that would last more than a decade and cost Americans an estimated $7 trillion. It was all for naught and accomplished very little.</p>
<p><strong>Readiness and Modernization Shortfalls</strong></p>
<p>While spending trillions on nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Department of Defense (DoD) suffered from severe readiness and modernization shortfalls. The defense budget was roughly $305 billion in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and almost exactly that in 2001 before 9/11. In the interim the budget dropped to as low as $250 billion and it was only after 1996 that the budget gradually increased to $300 billion.</p>
<p>When adjusted for inflation (1991–2011), the defense budget of $300 billion (1991), aside from “overseas contingency operations,” should have grown to $480 billion by 2011, assuming a 3 percent growth rate. That did not happen. The shortfall in defense spending reached $1.25 trillion during the two decades following the Soviet Union’s collapse.</p>
<p>The base defense budget in 2011 was roughly $500 billion, and at first glance equal to that expected. Out of a defense budget of $656 billion, $160 billion was allocated for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the two decades from 2001–2021, the Department of Defense spent $1.56 trillion on nation building—an average of $80 billion annually.</p>
<p>Over three decades after the Cold War’s end, the US did not invest in the modernization of the military. The three-decade peace dividend, which saw $2.8 trillion fewer defense dollars spent, was instead spent domestically and on nation building. As a result, the modernization and recapitalization of the armed forces, especially nuclear forces, were postponed.</p>
<p>By September 11, 2001, the US nuclear forces were already in the field for two decades (<em>Ohio</em>-class submarines), three decades (Minuteman III), and five decades (B-52). The nuclear budget, $77 billion at the end of the Cold War, dropped to less about $25 billion, with most of those funds simply maintaining legacy nuclear forces.</p>
<p>It was not until 2009–2010 that the Obama administration and Congress agreed on a plan for upgrading and replacing nuclear forces—three decades after President Ronald Reagan rolled out his nuclear modernization and sustainment plans in late 1981. New systems are projected to begin fielding in 2031 with completion by 2050.</p>
<p>The failure to prioritize the planning and implementation for replacing aging systems included nuclear command-and-control systems, warheads, and all three legs of the nuclear triad. The belief that the world was safer was a fool’s errand.</p>
<p>By shifting federal dollars from defense to social spending, the US also ensured the workforce needed to build nuclear weapons, space and missile defenses, and cyber systems are no longer there. Vendors associated with the building of <em>Ohio</em>-class submarines and the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) numbered in the hundreds once. Now, the nation is starting from scratch. The submarine industry lost 14,000 workers and now lacks the manpower to meet demand.</p>
<p>As for ICBMs, with the shutdown of the Peacekeeper production line, the US Air Force was left with a guidance and propulsion replacement program that over a period of more than a decade invested $8 billion in making sure the Minuteman III (1970) would stay in the force “through 2030.” Again, many hundreds of vendors no longer exist to make ICBM parts. Even worse is the current state of the available workforce. American universities grant more PhDs in the hard sciences to Chinese students than to American students. Across the board, the US has fewer workers in the hard sciences than needed, although industry is now reaching into the schools to bring students along a planned program of education that leads them to careers in the aerospace business.</p>
<p><strong>The Challenge Ahead</strong></p>
<p>The nation now finds itself in a precarious position at a time when China and Russia are at their most aggressive. The <em>Columbia</em>-class submarine, which will replace the <em>Ohio</em>-class submarine, was recently delayed two years, further increasing costs. And the herculean task of building 450 new ICBM silos armed with 400 missiles will prove costly. The US will maintain the current 400 ICBMs while simultaneously deploying 400 new missiles in new silos. The Sentinel ICBM, a technological marvel, is progressing toward production. It is a highly capable weapon that is planned for initial deployment in 2033.</p>
<p>Chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Roger Wicker (R–MS) recently concluded, “It will take several years of sustained investment and real growth beyond this down payment to keep pace with China’s military advances…. But to be clear: The cost of deterring war will always be dwarfed by the cost of fighting one.” This could not be more true. It is time the American people understand the challenge facing the nation and what it will take to overcome it.</p>
<p><em>Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/The-Consequences-of-Spending-the-Peace-Dividend-II.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="248" height="69" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 248px) 100vw, 248px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/invest-dont-spend-peace-dividends/">Invest, Don’t Spend, Peace Dividends</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Return of the United States Primacy</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-return-of-the-united-states-primacy/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Todd Clawson]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Jul 2025 11:56:27 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31239</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The death of the United States’ unipolar moment is exaggerated. Foreign policy experts claiming the United States is on the decline and international relations are headed to multipolarity are less than accurate. Pundits insist that China’s economic and military rise will allow the country to eclipse the United States and lead to the creation of [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-return-of-the-united-states-primacy/">The Return of the United States Primacy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The death of the United States’ unipolar moment is exaggerated. Foreign policy experts claiming the United States is on the decline and international relations are headed to multipolarity are less than accurate. Pundits insist that China’s economic and military rise will allow the country to eclipse the United States and lead to the creation of new international institutions led by Beijing.</p>
<p>The results of the American air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities serves as a harsh reminder to those who believe multipolarity is the future of the world order. American military power is still unmatched.</p>
<p><a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/operation-midnight-hammer-how-the-us-conducted-surprise-strikes-on-iran/">Operation Midnight Hammer</a> demonstrated the remarkable military power of the United States and President Donald Trump’s willingness to use it when an adversary crosses American red lines. The surgical strikes of American stealth aircraft and cruise missiles expertly showcased the awesome power of the American military.</p>
<p>The strikes were more than a display of power. They left no doubt that President Trump is laser focused and committed to protecting American vital interests. The strikes were also a message to allies and foes alike that the United States will stand by its allies when facing an existential threat, especially when that ally demonstrates a willingness to defend itself.</p>
<p>Even though the Trump administration used limited strikes against the nuclear facilities, the underlying message is clear. Red lines, deadlines, and ally support are back. Through the masterful use of deception, stealth, and precision, the American strike was unseen. Tehran’s subsequent retaliatory strikes were nothing more than preplanned and face-saving missile launches to placate domestic audiences.</p>
<p>The follow-on <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/06/23/world/iran-israel-ceasefire-trump">ceasefire agreement</a> stands to put an end to Iran’s regional and nuclear ambitions and forces Iran and Israel to tamp down their hostilities to allow for a negotiated settlement. Interestingly, Iran’s allies effectively abandoned Tehran as the Ayatollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) looked feckless and weak compared to the combined strength of Israel and the US.</p>
<p>China, Russia, and Iran’s Middle East proxies were nowhere to be found. The so-called “<a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/why-iran-faced-israel-and-the-us-alone-as-its-friends-stood-by">Axis of Resistance</a>” is in tatters as the result of Israeli and American action. Whether or not Iran takes the opportunity to deescalate and seek a peaceful resolution remains to be seen.  Regardless, Operation Midnight Hammer should be seen as a return to deterrence with Tehran and in the capitals of America’s adversaries worldwide.</p>
<p><strong>Bolstering Alliances</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>On the heels of successful air strikes, President Trump received another geostrategic win as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/06/president-trumps-leadership-vision-drives-nato-breakthrough/">NATO</a>) member states agreed to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense spending. NATO members, with the goading of President Trump, realized that Russian aggression necessitated greater commitment to defense.</p>
<p>Trump’s goal for increased defense spending is not to weaken NATO but to strengthen it. By requiring all members to carry a proportional share of collective defense, American leadership will only strengthen a once great alliance. Russia must reconsider its desire to once again expand its sphere of influence and control by force.</p>
<p>Alliances are based on shared values and commitments. President Trump made it clear that free riding is no longer an option. A strong NATO, with the needed capabilities and political will, can confront aggression and serve as a stabilizing force.</p>
<p><strong>The Dealmaker</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>Finally, President Trump made it clear that he desires to be a peacemaker rather than a war maker. Thus, he is seeking to negotiate the end to conflicts around the globe.</p>
<p>First, the administration brokered a peace deal between the <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/rwanda-congo-sign-us-brokered-peace-deal-to-end-fighting-that-killed-thousands/ar-AA1HAP8e?ocid=BingNewsVerp">Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda</a> to end decades of fighting. The administration states that the peace deal will include mechanisms that address the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-heralds-us-brokered-peace-deal-drc-rwanda/story?id=123277316">underlying causes of the conflict</a> and pathways for reconciliation.</p>
<p>Second, Trump continues to work toward the resolution of conflict between Ukraine and Russia. While negotiating peace is proving more difficult than expected, the president continues to work toward an acceptable option.</p>
<p>In another significant turn of events, Trump’s dealmakers made overtures to Israel in pursuit of an end to the conflict in Gaza—hoping to end the conflict in the <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-xl/politics/government/trump-netanyahu-agree-to-end-gaza-war-in-two-weeks/ar-AA1Hvc9Y?ocid=BingNewsSerp">next few weeks</a>. As part of ending the conflict, several Arab neighbors agreed to allow Gazans to immigrate to their countries.</p>
<p>Additionally, the Trump administration also plans to <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/trump-s-crown-jewel-abraham-accords-may-expand-to-normalize-ties-between-israel-and-other-nations/ar-AA1HtI4v?ocid=BingNewsVerp">expand the Abraham Accords</a> so that more Arab nations commit to resolving decades of conflict. Trump’s dealmaking goals are aspirational considering that much work remains to fulfill these goals. After decades of animosity, a two-state solution for the Arabs in Israel would be a welcome step toward a lasting peace.</p>
<p>Russia and China failed to provide any resolution to conflict in the Middle East and Africa. Russia has no ability to negotiate a peace deal considering its continued war on Ukraine.  China’s domestic troubles coupled with its questionable usage of the Belt and Road Initiative are backfiring. Russia and China were unwilling to support their friends in need, whereas Washington sought to end conflict. So much for multipolarity.</p>
<p>The past few weeks show a marked contrast to years of wishful thinking and kicking the proverbial can down the road. Peace through strength, President Trump’s foreign policy agenda, seeks to deter adversaries and assure allies while avoiding new conflicts. Ending protracted conflicts through negotiated settlements may also prove a critical element of the Trump Doctrine. The combination of peace and military power may prove a winning combination.</p>
<p>Russia and China cannot achieve these goals. They lack the standing to do so. It should come as no surprise that all eyes are returning to Washington as the world’s leading power broker. Mark Twain once said in response to news stories he was dead, “The rumors of my demise are greatly exaggerated.” Much the same is true of America’s unipolar moment.</p>
<p><em>Todd Clawson is a retired naval officer with 28 years of service and combat tours in the Middle East, Horn of Africa, and South Asia. He holds a doctorate in defense and strategic studies from Missouri State University. The views expressed are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/The-Return-of-the-United-States-Primacy.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="172" height="48" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 172px) 100vw, 172px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-return-of-the-united-states-primacy/">The Return of the United States Primacy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Exposing Willful Blindness: American Strength Is Nonnegotiable</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/exposing-willful-blindness-american-strength-is-nonnegotiable/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brandon Toliver]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2025 12:16:50 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31205</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Katerina Canyon’s op-ed, “From Deterrence to Diplomacy: Why Nuclear Dominance Is a Dangerous Illusion,” calls for restraint and diplomacy rather than a robust nuclear arsenal. While her concerns over escalation risks and humanitarian impacts have merit, her critique mischaracterizes the robust, empirical arguments in “From Deterrence to Dominance: Strengthening US Nuclear Posture in a Shifting [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/exposing-willful-blindness-american-strength-is-nonnegotiable/">Exposing Willful Blindness: American Strength Is Nonnegotiable</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Katerina Canyon’s op-ed, “From Deterrence to Diplomacy: Why Nuclear Dominance Is a Dangerous Illusion,” calls for restraint and diplomacy rather than a robust nuclear arsenal. While her concerns over escalation risks and humanitarian impacts have merit, her critique mischaracterizes the robust, empirical arguments in “<a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/from-deterrence-to-dominance-strengthening-us-nuclear-posture-in-a-shifting-world/">From Deterrence to Dominance: Strengthening US Nuclear Posture in a Shifting World</a>.”</p>
<p>Peace in international affairs is not a natural state; it is actively maintained through strength. As <a href="https://daily.jstor.org/reconsidering-appeasement/">Winston Churchill</a> famously noted, true peace is achieved not by retreating from power, but by wielding it wisely.</p>
<p>Today, with China rapidly modernizing its conventional and nuclear forces and Russia pursuing territorial ambitions backed by nuclear threats, a kinder and gentler approach risks inviting greater aggression. Only a credible deterrence posture—grounded in empirical evidence and historical lessons—can secure strategic stability.</p>
<p>Reinforcing American nuclear dominance is not about favoring conflict over diplomacy; it is about ensuring that American deterrence is strong enough to compel respect and maintain global order in an increasingly volatile world.</p>
<p><strong>First Things First</strong></p>
<p>American nuclear weapons serve as a cornerstone of deterrence, preventing strategic attack and reassuring allies. This element of deterrence is under pressure as China and Russia rapidly expand their arsenals, and North Korea advances its capabilities, creating a complex, multipolar threat environment.</p>
<p>The primary point in the original article was the need to reestablish American nuclear dominance—not as a provocation but as a stabilizing force. In an era of rising threats and eroding deterrence, a more robust and flexible nuclear posture is essential to prevent conflict, assure allies, and preserve global security.</p>
<p><strong>Misreading the Nature of Nuclear Dominance</strong></p>
<p>A primary claim presented by Canyon is that advocating for nuclear dominance is tantamount to seeking advantage through expansion, thereby increasing the risk of catastrophe. This is a misrepresentation of evidence. The call for dominance is not about reckless arms racing or seeking victory in nuclear war. Rather, it is about ensuring that the United States’ nuclear posture is credible, flexible, and resilient enough to deter adversaries in a world where the old rules no longer apply.</p>
<p>The Cold War’s doctrine of <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/348671812.pdf">mutually assured destruction (MAD)</a> worked because both sides fielded survivable second-strike capabilities and clearly communicated those capabilities to the other. Today, China and Russia are modernizing and diversifying their arsenals at a pace not seen since the 1980s. <a href="https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/nuclear-risks-grow-new-arms-race-looms-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now">China’s warhead stockpile</a> surpassed 600 in 2025 and is projected to double by 2030. Russia, meanwhile, maintains the world’s largest <a href="https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/">inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons</a>—estimated at 2,000 warheads—many of which are integrated into conventional military operations, as seen in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Dominance in this context means closing critical gaps—like the absence of credible theater-range nuclear options—and ensuring that American extended deterrence is not just theoretical, but practical and adaptable to new threats.</p>
<p><strong>Historical Lessons: Arms Races and Escalation</strong></p>
<p>Invocation of the Cold War arms race is erroneously used as a cautionary tale, suggesting that any move toward dominance will inevitably provoke adversaries and increase the risk of miscalculation. History is more nuanced.</p>
<p>The most dangerous moments of the Cold War—Berlin (1961) and Cuba (1962)—were not the result of American dominance but of <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315633039-22/power-weakness-robert-kagan">perceived weakness, ambiguity, and miscommunication</a>. The 1980s nuclear buildup, while expensive, ultimately contributed to the Soviet Union’s willingness to negotiate arms reductions (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)) from a position of mutual strength. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger noted, “<a href="https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&amp;&amp;p=a3fac9e88c000058ee85484ecbc89fdcf1fa74b76d9705f6e87846a5dbba38cfJmltdHM9MTc1MDcyMzIwMA&amp;ptn=3&amp;ver=2&amp;hsh=4&amp;fclid=0a79bb16-1a35-60c1-3402-af001b7a6139&amp;psq=Deterrence+is+not+about+parity%3b+it%e2%80%99s+about+credibility+and+resolve.&amp;u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly9wcmVzcy51bWljaC5lZHUvcGRmLzA0NzIxMTI4NzItY2g4LnBkZg&amp;ntb=1">Deterrence is not about parity; it’s about credibility and resolve.</a>”</p>
<p>Moreover, the post–Cold War era of American nuclear restraint did not prevent Russia’s annexation of Crimea, China’s militarization of the South China Sea, or North Korea’s nuclear breakout. A senior research professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, asserting that “<a href="https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Mahnken_10-22-15.pdf">adversaries exploit perceived gaps</a> in US resolve and capability, not its strength.”</p>
<p><strong>The Risks of a Passive Posture</strong></p>
<p>Canyon argues that modernizing or expanding American nuclear capabilities—such as the SLCM-N or space-based interceptors—will only accelerate a global arms race. Yet, the data show that adversaries are already racing ahead, regardless of American action.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiR7dbzlYqOAxXKEVkFHVzDEh8QFnoECBkQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fcarnegieendowment.org%2Frussia-eurasia%2Fpolitika%2F2024%2F01%2Frussias-nuclear-modernization-drive-is-only-a-success-on-paper%3Flang%3Den&amp;usg=AOvVaw0xSFTrjP2MUHZL-LkRW0WX&amp;opi=89978449">Nearly 95 percent of Russia’s nuclear triad is modernized,</a> with new hypersonic and dual-capable systems. <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjIxbmRloqOAxXdEFkFHbZ0OpIQFnoECBcQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fchinapower.csis.org%2Fchina-nuclear-weapons%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw146oe4HqpAgeuNTp3UL7Zx&amp;opi=89978449">China</a> is rapidly fielding road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), ballistic missile submarines, and hypersonic glide vehicles. <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiCoN2nloqOAxXtFFkFHf1LC24QFnoECCMQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.armscontrol.org%2Fact%2F2025-04%2Fnews%2Fnorth-korea-justifies-nuclear-weapons-expansion&amp;usg=AOvVaw2bN4ozw670jepNgZx88RAk&amp;opi=89978449">North Korea bolsters over 50 nuclear weapons</a> with growing missile survivability and regional reach.</p>
<p>Iran was advancing toward a nuclear threshold, with uranium-enrichment activities previously nearing weapons-grade levels. In response, the United States launched a preemptive strike targeting Iran’s key nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. American officials framed the operation as a limited, precision action designed to neutralize an imminent threat and prevent a larger, more destructive regional war.</p>
<p>By acting before Iran could cross the nuclear threshold, the US aimed to avoid a future scenario in which multiple states—particularly Israel—might engage in broader, uncoordinated military campaigns. The strike also sent a calibrated message intended to deter further escalation while leaving diplomatic channels open.</p>
<p>Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal remains one of the largest in the region, and its proxy network, coordinated through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, continues to operate across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.</p>
<p>The US, by contrast, faces delays and budget overruns in its own modernization efforts and lacks credible theater-range nuclear options in both Europe and Asia. This is not dominance; it is vulnerability.</p>
<p><strong>Diplomacy and Arms Control: Not Mutually Exclusive</strong></p>
<p>Canyon calls for a return to arms control and diplomacy, citing the expiration of New START in 2026. Diplomacy is essential, but history shows that arms control only works when backed by <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjv18uwl4qOAxW4JUQIHSBEAW0QFnoECBcQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ftnsr.org%2F2018%2F11%2Fthe-purposes-of-arms-control%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw394GwgBWUdQqNos61KdXAC&amp;opi=89978449">credible deterrence</a>.</p>
<p>The most successful arms control agreements (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), INF, START) were negotiated when the US held a position of strength. The collapse of the INF Treaty and the uncertain future of New START are not the result of American intransigence but of Russian violations and China’s refusal to join trilateral talks. As the Congressional Research Service notes, “Arms control is not a substitute for deterrence; it is a complement to it.”</p>
<p><strong>Alliance Cohesion and Forward Deployment</strong></p>
<p>The suggestion that forward-deploying nuclear assets makes allies “targets, not safer” is textbook pacifist propaganda. This ignores decades of alliance management and empirical research. Extended deterrence—backed by visible, credible, American capabilities—has prevented proliferation in Japan, South Korea, and NATO for generations.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiO4aX6l4qOAxUR_skDHWiXHy8QFnoECCcQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.heritage.org%2Fmilitary-strength%2Fassessment-us-military-power%2Fus-nuclear-weapons&amp;usg=AOvVaw15LGIyBLHmyufWRZz5DxVZ&amp;opi=89978449">2023 RAND study</a> found that allies are more likely to pursue their own nuclear options if they doubt American commitments. Forward deployment, joint planning, and regular consultations are essential to alliance cohesion and nonproliferation. The United States’ nuclear umbrella extends to over 30 allied and partner nations, primarily within <a href="https://www.google.com/search?sca_esv=ccb8066356fd07b7&amp;cs=0&amp;q=NATO&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiDhfnsmIqOAxWr6skDHYqJL1wQxccNegQIAhAB&amp;mstk=AUtExfAceYhAF-0mtB58rM7SNIoAYPP3OmhRwOD6NFvxAiatNzIFKqvv-w96a1UlLSy6D538GPoivqrkNQQNRFZ3ForFQFIRNCLXH-0QrW9WE9j_e0_J4TKLFgdNAwPWlSE-JyM&amp;csui=3">NATO</a>, but also including countries like Australia, Japan, and South Korea. These nations are assured of American protection, including potential nuclear response, in case of attack.</p>
<p><strong>Economic Trade-offs: Security and Prosperity</strong></p>
<p>Context is key. Canyon points to the $1 trillion cost of nuclear modernization over 30 years, suggesting these funds would be better spent elsewhere. This figure represents less than 5 percent of projected defense spending over that period, and less than 0.1 percent of gross domestic product annually. The cost of deterrence is dwarfed by the potential costs of conventional war should deterrence fail. Small conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq cost over $7 trillion. The cost of a war against China would be far higher.</p>
<p>National strength is not a zero-sum game between security and social spending. The credibility of US leadership—and the stability it underwrites—enables the very prosperity and global order that supports education, healthcare, and infrastructure.</p>
<p><strong>Public Opinion and Global Norms: A Reality Check</strong></p>
<p>Canyon’s claim that “most Americans and the global community favor arms reduction” lacks empirical rigor. Sweeping generalizations like this demand robust, replicated data across diverse populations. Without that, such assertions are more rhetorical than factual.</p>
<p>In contrast, multiple credible surveys reveal consistent public support for deterrence and defense. For example, a November 2022 poll found that 60 percent of Americans believe the military’s primary role is to deter attacks on the US. A national survey showed that a vast majority of voters view nuclear deterrence as critical to national security, with nearly three-quarters supporting modernization efforts.</p>
<p>The 2023 NATO Annual Tracking Survey found that 61 percent of allied respondents believe NATO membership reduces the likelihood of foreign attack, and 58 percent see it as a deterrent. In Germany, 64 percent support a European nuclear deterrent independent of the US, reflecting growing concern over strategic autonomy.</p>
<p>Another poll reported that 69 percent of Americans feel defense spending increases their sense of security. These data points underscore a clear trend; public opinion, in the US and Europe, favors credible deterrence over disarmament, especially amid rising threats from China, North Korea, and Russia. This is the factual foundation that reinforces the case for maintaining and strengthening American nuclear capabilities, not as a provocation, but as a stabilizing force in an increasingly volatile world.</p>
<p><strong>The Real Existential Threats</strong></p>
<p>Extreme weather events, natural disasters, pandemics, and mass displacement are among today’s gravest challenges. Yet, using these non-nuclear crises to justify a softened stance on nuclear deterrence is like comparing apples and oranges. Even the most intelligent and well-informed individuals sometimes fall into the trap of an “either-or” debate, mistakenly assuming it is only possible to address one threat or the other.</p>
<p>Multiple risks demand simultaneous attention. Credible nuclear deterrence is not an overreaction; it is a precise, vital response to a threat that, if unleashed, would compound other crises and shatter global stability.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion: Dominance as Responsible Leadership</strong></p>
<p>Canyon’s critique is a masterclass in wishful thinking, a dangerously naive philosophy that would lead the free world to ruin if ever implemented. It stems from a misplaced comfort with notions of restraint and diplomacy, ignoring the hard reality that security is founded on military strength. History, from the catastrophic failures of appeasement in the 1930s to the isolationism preceding Pearl Harbor, teaches that weakness only emboldens tyrants. Each concession, whether to Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland or to modern-day aggressors, proves that diplomacy without credible force is nothing more than indulgence.</p>
<p>The current global landscape is dominated by adversaries who respect only strength. Russia, under its neo-imperialist regime, wields its vast nuclear arsenal to bolster conventional aggression. China’s unprecedented military modernization is reshaping the balance of power in Asia, and Iran continues its relentless march toward nuclear capability while sponsoring proxy terror. To imagine that these regimes would respond to soft words or empty promises is akin to believing that a repeatedly misbehaving child will learn simply by being put in timeout. Real change is forced change.</p>
<p>American strength, particularly through a robust nuclear deterrent, is not a provocation; it is the only language these adversaries understand. It ensures that any aggressive action exacts a price too steep to consider. In an increasingly perilous world, where the stakes are nothing less than the survival of global stability, a commitment to maintaining unparalleled military dominance is both pragmatic and essential. Ignoring this reality is not idealism, it is willful blindness that invites disaster.</p>
<p><em>Brandon Toliver is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/A-Rebuke-to-Willful-Blindness.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="216" height="60" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 216px) 100vw, 216px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/exposing-willful-blindness-american-strength-is-nonnegotiable/">Exposing Willful Blindness: American Strength Is Nonnegotiable</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Restoring Deterrence</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/restoring-deterrence/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/restoring-deterrence/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 14 Jul 2025 12:14:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Victor Davis Hanson commemorated D-Day and reminded Americans of how difficult it was for the allies in WWII to recover from the May 26–June 4, 1940, evacuation from Dunkirk. For Nazi Germany it was assumed the British would not try a cross-channel invasion again, despite the rescue of 338,000 British and French troops. For Berlin, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/restoring-deterrence/">Restoring Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Victor Davis Hanson commemorated D-Day and reminded Americans of how difficult it was for the allies in WWII to recover from the May 26–June 4, 1940, evacuation from Dunkirk. For Nazi Germany it was assumed the British would not try a cross-channel invasion again, despite the rescue of 338,000 British and French troops. For Berlin, the defeat at Dunkirk was assumed to eliminate any potential second front, leaving the Wehrmacht free to invade the Soviet Union.</p>
<p>It was not until June 6, 1944, four years later, that the allies landed on the Normandy coast. Over 200,000 troops, in a 48-hour period, in the largest amphibious operation in history, stormed the beaches to do what the Germans thought impossible. Eight months later, Germany was defeated.</p>
<p>The cost was high, however. With the German Army facing little opposition in the Rhineland, Austria, or Czechoslovakia, the German invasion West into the low countries and France was easy. Western Europe fell in a matter of three months from April to June 1940. At the end of the day, once deterrence was lost, World War II led to the death of over 60 million people. Getting deterrence back was a tough proposition.</p>
<p>In 1949, the United States withdrew its military from the Republic of Korea. Then, in January 1950, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, asserted that the Republic of Korea (ROK) was beyond the US defense perimeter. In early June, the US Congress approved an aid package for the ROK, but it was not delivered until after the North Korean invasion that began on June 25, 1950. Undermining American deterrence of North Korea with Acheson’s speech ultimately cost 2 million Korean lives and nearly 200,000 allied casualties.</p>
<p>Although the US was able to reestablish deterrence in Korea seven decades later, in 2014, the United States lost effective deterrence once again—this time in Europe. That was the year Washington declared that Ukraine was not of interest to the United States, leaving Ukraine to the tender mercies of the Russian Army. Russia soon took Crimea and ultimately launched a brutal invasion in 2022.</p>
<p>In 2021, the US withdrew ignobly from Afghanistan, further signaling the nation’s enemies that the US was not in the deterrence business. The consequences of that act are still unknown.</p>
<p>Later in 2021, the administration hesitated in making it clear whether Washington would or would not defend Ukraine from further Russian aggression. Though the mistake was later rectified, the damage to deterrence was done.</p>
<p>Further harm came to Ukraine, the US, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) European member states when it became clear Washington was fearful of a Russian escalation of the conflict should the allies get serious about pushing back against Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly threatened the use of nuclear weapons should Ukraine and the allied coalition get serious about rolling back Russia’s aggression—the successful use of Russian deterrence.</p>
<p>To counter the American loss of deterrence, Congress agreed to markedly increase defense spending and investments in America’s nuclear deterrent, space capability, and missile defense. Over time, and coupled with a sense of urgency, the United States can restore deterrence if these new investments are sustained.</p>
<p>The nation’s legacy nuclear deterrent, which is now between 35 to 65 years old, will soon age to obsolescence. The Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), <em>Columbia</em>-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), and the B21 Raider strategic bomber, along with the long-range nuclear cruise missile, once built, will markedly restore nuclear deterrence. An improved theater nuclear deterrent, with a new sea-launched nuclear cruise missile and a stand-off nuclear capability for the F-35, would also significantly improve deterrence.</p>
<p>These systems give the nation the capability required to deter China and Russia. However, the second part of deterrence is will. Whether the United States has the will to employ its deterrent capability is uncertain.</p>
<p>How the administration handles Iran will say a great deal about how adversaries see American will. The administration is committed to preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Washington said you could do this the easy way or the hard way. A negotiated deal is one way but military strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is the other.</p>
<p>With the Israelis and Americans on the same page and the war already begun, the die is now cast and the US does not have endless patience. But whether it is willing to use military force is uncertain. Although Henry Kissinger once said that diplomacy without the threat of force is without effect, the conventional wisdom in Washington is that no military action will be forthcoming.</p>
<p>The Trump administration carefully laid out a challenge to the Iranians. There were 60 days for negotiations. Now, it is widely known that on day 61 the Israelis, with US missile and air defense assistance, took out most of the above ground Iranian nuclear capability as well as the top Iranian nuclear leadership.</p>
<p>Perhaps Israeli deterrence credibility was restored, but whether that is true of the United States is far less certain. The Trump administration did what it said it would do. The Israelis did what they had to do. Both nations did what was necessary to restore deterrence. The Iranian nuclear capability is gone. How this will affect Chinese and Russian aggression, that requires more insight.</p>
<p><em>Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Restoring-Deterrence.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="220" height="61" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 220px) 100vw, 220px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/restoring-deterrence/">Restoring Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Ghosts in the Skies: How Ukraine’s Drone Tactics Recast Modern Deterrence</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/ghosts-in-the-skies-how-ukraines-drone-tactics-recast-modern-deterrence/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/ghosts-in-the-skies-how-ukraines-drone-tactics-recast-modern-deterrence/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brandon Toliver]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 24 Jun 2025 12:35:23 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31040</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>What happens to nuclear deterrence when a non-nuclear state strikes deep into a nuclear-armed adversary? The stark reality is that the world does not collapse, but the era of conventional deterrence is rapidly evolving. Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes, penetrating deep into Russian territory, upended traditional deterrence theory. These unmanned and precision attacks targeted strategic locations, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/ghosts-in-the-skies-how-ukraines-drone-tactics-recast-modern-deterrence/">Ghosts in the Skies: How Ukraine’s Drone Tactics Recast Modern Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What happens to nuclear deterrence when a non-nuclear state strikes deep into a nuclear-armed adversary? The stark reality is that the world does not collapse, but the era of conventional deterrence is rapidly evolving. <a href="https://copilot.microsoft.com/chats/sF4qQ3JxwBAucoaty1PUV#:~:text=Ukraine%E2%80%99s%20Drone%20Ecosystem%20and%20the%20Defence%20of%20Europe%E2%80%9D">Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes</a>, penetrating deep into Russian territory, upended traditional deterrence theory.</p>
<p>These unmanned and precision attacks targeted strategic locations, ranging from early warning radar sites to critical military installations. They did not provoke the feared nuclear response. Instead, these operations exposed a new threat calculus where persistence, precision, and the power of perception are paramount.</p>
<p>Recent analyses suggest that such <a href="https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/241022-Occasional-Paper-29-Lessons-Learnt-from-Ukraine_2.pdf">drone operations</a> contributed to shifting risk assessments within adversary states, where even a 10 percent to 15 percent error in perception could lead to miscalculation. American nuclear strategists now contend with an urgent need to rethink deterrence as the boundary between conventional and nuclear erodes.</p>
<p><strong>Spectral Shifts: Rethinking Strategic Assumptions</strong></p>
<p>For decades, American nuclear strategy hinged on the assumption that any conventional attack on nuclear command and control assets would inevitably trigger a nuclear counter-response. Data from Cold War–era exercises and subsequent real-world incidents reinforced this mindset among defense planners. Ukraine’s repeated drone strikes on sensitive Russian assets, including radar installations integral to Russia’s early warning systems, force a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00320">reconsideration of long-held assumptions</a>.</p>
<p>The Kremlin’s response is notably restrained, treating these incursions as manageable costs rather than triggers for nuclear escalation. This strategic restraint, observed in multiple public and classified communications from Moscow, signals that deterrence may now rely less on the brute force of nuclear capability and more on the sophistication of targeting and intent. The takeaway for modern policymakers is that deterrence must now incorporate a broader array of factors, including technology-driven precision and the adversary’s threshold for escalation.</p>
<p><strong>Phantom Impact: Redefining Strategy Beyond Nuclear Might</strong></p>
<p>The era when the primary measure of strategic impact was synonymous with nuclear firepower is ending. Ukraine’s innovative use of low-cost, high-precision drones demonstrates that small platforms can disrupt traditional security calculations. Recent reports from defense think tanks estimate that the unit cost of drone operations is less than 1 percent of what a conventional fighter aircraft mission might cost, yet their operational impact in terms of intelligence and tactical disruption is comparable in key areas.</p>
<p>These drones infiltrate deep into adversary territory and strike high-value military and economic assets once presumed invulnerable. Such operational dynamics challenge the long-standing monopoly of nuclear-armed states over credible homeland threats. American planners must now <a href="https://copilot.microsoft.com/chats/sF4qQ3JxwBAucoaty1PUV#:~:text=The%20Implications%20of%20Drone%20Proliferation%20for%20US%20Grand%20Strategy%E2%80%9D">recalibrate</a> their threat models to integrate non-nuclear options, recognizing that the future of strategic impact is both more economical and more technologically complex than ever before.</p>
<p><strong>Haunted Homelands: The Crumbling Illusion of Sanctuary</strong></p>
<p>During the Cold War, vast distances, natural barriers, and the geographic isolation provided by oceans created the comforting illusion that major powers could enjoy an impenetrable sanctuary. Today, that illusion is crumbling. Ukraine’s drone operations are a vivid demonstration that even regions thought to be well-protected can be penetrated. Attacks targeting Russia’s early warning networks, critical oil infrastructure, and military bases reveal that no area can rest on its laurels.</p>
<p>American infrastructure, ranging from energy grids to communication systems and early warning radars, face elevated risks in an age of highly agile autonomous systems. Consider that the global market for unmanned aerial vehicles is projected to reach nearly $50 billion by 2030. Considering this, there is an immediate imperative to overhaul homeland defense strategies. Rapid response protocols, increased situational awareness, and investment in counter-drone technologies are no longer optional. They are emerging as essential components of modern deterrence.</p>
<p><strong>Phantom Signals: How Optics and Intent Drive Escalation</strong></p>
<p>One of the most remarkable aspects of Ukraine’s campaign is its ability to secure tactical advantages without spiraling into uncontrolled escalation. The success of these drone strikes lies in their careful timing, precision, and measured execution. Ukrainian forces consistently space out operations and meticulously choose targets that convey national resolve without risking mass casualties. This dual messaging, delivering a tangible operational effect while sending a clear political signal, underscores a critical evolution in deterrence thinking.</p>
<p>Today, the optics and perceived intent behind an action can be as decisive as the physical impact. One analysis points out that misinterpretations of strategic intent now pose as much risk of inadvertent escalation as traditional force-on-force scenarios. For the United States, this means that <a href="https://copilot.microsoft.com/chats/sF4qQ3JxwBAucoaty1PUV#:~:text=%E2%80%9CDefending%20U.S.%20Military%20Bases%20Against%20Drones%3F%20A%20Recent%20Tabletop%20Exercise%20Explores%20How%E2%80%9D">developing clear, well-articulated signaling frameworks</a> is crucial. Such frameworks must enable policymakers and military leaders to assert credible force while avoiding actions that might be misread as provocative by adversaries. In a world where every action is scrutinized and the margins for error are thinning, clarity in communication becomes a cornerstone of modern deterrence.</p>
<p><strong>Ghosts in the Arsenal: Integrating Drones into Deterrence</strong></p>
<p>Drones are transcending their traditional role on the battlefield and are emerging as indispensable strategic assets. Modern unmanned systems serve multiple roles, from surveillance and intelligence gathering to direct precision strikes against key targets. Their integration is revolutionizing how <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2215-1.html">military operations</a> are conducted without risking human life. Moreover, these systems have the added benefit of being less politically charged than manned strike platforms. However, their growing prominence also introduces the potential for miscalculation.</p>
<p>With investments in drone technology doubling over the past decade in many leading militaries, the United States must swiftly incorporate these assets into its overarching deterrence framework. This requires the formulation of robust policies that define the operational limits and acceptable contexts for drone employment, comprehensive training programs for commanders in escalation management, and public messaging that reinforces strategic resolve without escalating tensions. The rapid pace of technological adoption means that the window for effective integration is short, and strategic agility is paramount.</p>
<p><strong>Phantoms of the Future: Recasting Deterrence in the Drone Age</strong></p>
<p>Retaining U.S. strategic credibility in the coming decades will demand an evolution beyond a <a href="https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/extending-deterrence-by-detection-the-case-for-integrating-unmanned-aircraft-systems-into-the-indo-pacific-partnership-for-maritime-domain-awareness">deterrence model</a> solely anchored in nuclear might. Although nuclear forces remain critical, they are no longer the exclusive instruments that shape adversary behavior in today’s multidomain conflicts. The future of deterrence depends on a seamless strategy where nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities are coherently integrated. This entails developing a comprehensive national doctrine for drone utilization that explicitly defines clear thresholds for action, acceptable target sets, and robust escalation-management protocols. In parallel, efforts must focus on modernizing homeland defenses to counter the threat of long-range, autonomous drone attacks, especially in sectors such as space-based assets, energy, and telecommunications. Data from defense budget analyses show that if every NATO member met the 2 percent gross domestic product defense spending target, the alliance’s budget would increase by over $100 billion annually. Such investments, along with analogous U.S. initiatives to enhance technological resilience, are crucial if deterrence is to remain credible and effective in this <a href="https://www.academia.edu/41364115/Artificial_Intelligence_Drone_Swarming_and_Escalation_Risks_in_Future_Warfare">new operational environment</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Final Haunting: Embracing the Ghostly Evolution of Deterrence</strong></p>
<p>“Ghosts in the Skies” is not just a metaphor; it encapsulates the profound transformation underway in <a href="https://c2coe.org/seminar-read-ahead-hybrid-warfare-operating-on-multi-domain-battlefields/">modern deterrence</a>. Ukraine’s innovative use of drone technology is forcefully redefining the conventional wisdom that has long informed global security policy. This paradigm shift challenges entrenched assumptions and demands a rapid evolution of U.S. military strategy. In an era of hybrid threats and rapid technological change, our global security environment is more complex and interdependent than ever before. The future of deterrence will rely on the capacity to adapt swiftly, integrate non-linear threat responses, and build flexible defense systems that are as agile as the adversaries they are designed to deter. The message for policymakers is clear: embrace this ghostly evolution now, for in the emerging multidomain battlefield every misstep carries the risk of destabilizing not only regional security but also global order.</p>
<p>The transformation in deterrence prompted by Ukraine’s drone operations is a stark reminder that innovation in warfare can render old paradigms obsolete. As nations invest in cost-effective, high-precision autonomous systems, the calculus of deterrence will continue to shift, compelling the United States and its allies to rethink both doctrine and defense spending. In this new era, where even the faintest ghost can upend strategic balance, the ability to adapt and respond with agility will be the true measure of national security.</p>
<p><em>Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author alone.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Ghosts-in-the-Skies.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="248" height="69" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 248px) 100vw, 248px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/ghosts-in-the-skies-how-ukraines-drone-tactics-recast-modern-deterrence/">Ghosts in the Skies: How Ukraine’s Drone Tactics Recast Modern Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Nuclear Umbrella: Reassurance or Relic in a Shifting World?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-nuclear-umbrella-reassurance-or-relic-in-a-shifting-world/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-nuclear-umbrella-reassurance-or-relic-in-a-shifting-world/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brandon Toliver]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Jun 2025 12:16:57 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30876</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Imagine a world where America’s allies are forced to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Instead of enhancing security, this proliferation could heighten the risk of nuclear conflict. Such a scenario is not speculative. It is a likely outcome if the United States abandons its extended deterrence commitments. While President Trump, Secretary of States Marco Rubio, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-nuclear-umbrella-reassurance-or-relic-in-a-shifting-world/">The Nuclear Umbrella: Reassurance or Relic in a Shifting World?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Imagine a world where America’s allies are forced to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Instead of enhancing security, this proliferation could heighten the risk of nuclear conflict. Such a scenario is not speculative. It is a likely outcome if the United States abandons its extended deterrence commitments. While President Trump, Secretary of States Marco Rubio, and Vice President JD Vance have all publicly stated that the United States remains committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), American pressure for reform is worrying NATO’s member-states.</p>
<p>Extended deterrence, commonly known as the “nuclear umbrella,” represents America’s commitment to defend its allies against strategic threats, including the use of nuclear weapons. Since the late <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-u-s-nuclear-umbrella-and-extended-deterrence/">1940s</a>, this policy provides security guarantees to NATO members and Asian allies like Japan and South Korea.</p>
<p>Rising threats from adversaries like <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/northkoreanuclear">North Korea</a> and <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran-Nuclear-Profile">Iran</a>, coupled with the <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/NPR-2022.PDF">modernization of arsenals by Russia</a> and China, underscore its continued necessity. Without this safeguard, allies may feel compelled to pursue independent nuclear programs, triggering preventable proliferation that can destabilize entire regions and weaken American influence.</p>
<p>Consider a scenario where the United States’ failure to build a peer theater nuclear capability and public statements are viewed by allies as a reduction in American nuclear commitments in East Asia. <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/29/japan-s-nuclear-identity-and-plutonium-stockpile-pub-86702">Japan</a>, confronted by an assertive China and threatening North Korea, initiates a covert nuclear program, leveraging its advanced civilian nuclear technology and plutonium reserves. Constitutional constraints notwithstanding, mounting public anxiety could drive Tokyo toward its first nuclear test.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/south-korea-nuclear/">South Korea</a>, facing similar security vulnerabilities, revives its previously dormant nuclear ambitions. Taiwan, under existential threat from China, sees nuclear capability as essential for survival. Alarmed by these developments, President Xi Jinping orders an accelerated attack on Taiwan and, potentially, attacks targets in South Korea and Japan to preempt support of Taiwan.</p>
<p>This ripple effect would yield devastating global repercussions. The Treaty on the <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/">Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)</a>, a cornerstone of nonproliferation, ceases in relevance. Nations such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Germany, and Poland might explore nuclear options. With more nuclear actors in play, risks increase as a statistical probability. Diplomatic and economic instability would likely surge, potentially fracturing alliances, crippling foreign investment, and destabilizing global markets.</p>
<p>Extended deterrence is not merely about preventing proliferation; it provides substantial military and economic benefits as well. American allies contribute robust defense capabilities, hosting critical strategic bases essential for American operations. South Korea’s military fought alongside American forces in every conflict since Vietnam, while Japan’s formidable naval and air capabilities enhance American strategic flexibility. European NATO allies provide indispensable missile defense and air operations infrastructure, reinforcing American global power projection.</p>
<p>Economically, the nuclear umbrella fosters stability, encouraging foreign direct investment from treaty allies like Japan, Germany, and South Korea—three of the top investors in the US. This security framework ensures mutual prosperity and deepens economic interdependence, strengthening not just trade partnerships but long-term strategic relationships. South Korea, the world’s <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=KR">14th-largest economy</a>, thrives under this arrangement, further reinforcing cross-border trade and investment.</p>
<p>Upholding extended deterrence demands a long-term investment of American resources, ensuring stability across NATO. Allied nations pledged to meet defense spending commitments, emphasizing the principle that collective security thrives on shared responsibility. Given that the US allocates just under three percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, committing at least <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/nato-spending-by-country">two percent</a> is a reasonable expectation.</p>
<p>Eleven nations met the two percent target in 2023, up from just four in 2017. President Trump’s pressure campaign on NATO defense spending is working. If every NATO nation adhered to the two percent minimum, the alliance’s <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_133127.htm">total defense budget</a> would rise by over $100 billion annually, reinforcing military capabilities, strengthening infrastructure, and fortifying global stability.</p>
<p>More than just a financial obligation, honoring these agreements is fundamental to sustaining NATO’s unity and trust. Increased investment not only bolsters collective security but also eases the strain on the US, which continues to shoulder the responsibility of protecting Western civilization from instability.</p>
<p>Extended deterrence long served as the backbone of global stability, shaping a world where security, military cooperation, economic prosperity, and nuclear nonproliferation are upheld. Stability is not self-sustaining; it demands vigilance, action, and unwavering commitment. NATO’s legacy proves this repeatedly. From coalition forces uniting in <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48818.htm">Kosovo</a> to prevent ethnic cleansing, to NATO-led air campaigns in Libya that dismantled an oppressive regime, alliance members stood together in moments of crisis. Joint operations in Afghanistan, where NATO countries fought side by side for nearly two decades, showcased the strength of shared commitment. Even today, as NATO fortifies defenses in Eastern Europe, the principle remains unchanged. Security is only as strong as the unity behind it.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm">NATO’s Article 5</a> is more than a pledge; it is a promise that must be upheld through action. Security is not theoretical; it is built on resources, strategy, and cooperation. The deterrence piggy bank needs deposits, not just withdrawals. If allies fail to uphold their commitments, the burden on the US becomes untenable.</p>
<p>The stakes could not be higher. Geopolitical tensions are rising, nuclear threats are evolving, and adversaries are watching for cracks in the foundation. The American nuclear umbrella remains a <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/extended-deterrence-and-nonproliferation">pillar of international security</a>, but it is only as strong as the resolve behind it. Allies must step up because if they do not, the rain will come, and they will find themselves unprotected in the storm.</p>
<p><em>Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/The-Nuclear-Umbrella.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="241" height="67" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 241px) 100vw, 241px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-nuclear-umbrella-reassurance-or-relic-in-a-shifting-world/">The Nuclear Umbrella: Reassurance or Relic in a Shifting World?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Trump’s Disintegrated Deterrence and Lessons for Australia</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/trumps-disintegrated-deterrence-and-lessons-for-australia/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/trumps-disintegrated-deterrence-and-lessons-for-australia/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Carl Rhodes]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Apr 2025 12:11:18 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Houthi targets]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30551</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The American approach to deterrence has undergone a significant transformation during the initial months of President Donald Trump’s second administration. Where President Joe Biden’s national security strategy was premised on the concept of integrated deterrence, Trump’s approach lacks coordination across the United States government and with key partners and allies. This is resulting in a [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/trumps-disintegrated-deterrence-and-lessons-for-australia/">Trump’s Disintegrated Deterrence and Lessons for Australia</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The American approach to deterrence has undergone a significant transformation during the initial months of President Donald Trump’s second administration. Where President Joe Biden’s national security strategy was premised on the concept of integrated deterrence, Trump’s approach lacks coordination across the United States government and with key partners and allies. This is resulting in a state of disintegrated deterrence. Consequently, Australia and other allies of the United States will be compelled to adopt a distinct approach to their own deterrence and engagement with the United States.</p>
<p>The primary objective of Biden’s integrated deterrence strategy was to harmonize and unify the efforts of various government agencies and allied nations to deter aggression from China and other hostile actors. To achieve this objective, the strategy aimed to maximise the utilisation of all available tools of American power, encompassing diplomacy, intelligence, economic assistance, and force posture decisions. Integration with allies and partners was an integral component of Biden’s deterrence strategy and would be achieved by enhancing the interoperability of allied military forces and coordinating the diplomatic and economic initiatives of friendly nations.</p>
<p>While the goals of integrated deterrence appear sensible, many expressed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14751798.2024.2352943#abstract">concerns about the concept</a>. Some claimed the term was not new or unique. It simply described the implementation of any effective, tailored deterrence strategy that leverage various organisations to prevent hostile actions.</p>
<p>American deterrence was executed in an integrated fashion throughout the Cold War by necessity, thanks to the size and significance of the Soviet threat. Concerns were also expressed that proponents of integrated deterrence overstated the ability of sanctions, diplomacy, and other non-military tools to prevent conflict. History shows that the threat of major military action has a unique strength in deterring an enemy, especially when that threat comes from a nation with a nuclear arsenal.</p>
<p>Regardless of one’s stance on integrated deterrence and its implementation, a coordinated US strategy that leverages the strengths of its allies should be preferred to the alternative currently being pursued in Washington. A lack of integration in deterrence matters is evident both within the US government and in its interactions with partners and allies.</p>
<p>Within the United States government, there are several reported disconnects between President Trump and senior members of his administration. For example, Secretary of State Marco Rubio was <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/u-s-news-decision-points/articles/2025-02-06/trumps-gaza-gambit-puts-top-aides-in-tough-spot">first informed of Trump’s proposal</a> to take Gaza by military force and evict Palestinians while watching a press conference held by Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Furthermore, it was <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/story/trump-ukraine-and-the-meme-ing-of-marco-rubio?srsltid=AfmBOoo3S5gOZmISSbM-oSOqE1sBQSVA-PumDiYwlQSFEkvae2H8fkt5">recently reported</a> that Rubio is “privately frustrated that Trump has effectively sidelined him.” More recently, Signal messages disclosed <a href="https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-signal-chat-journalist-foreign-policy-e91cb838">highlight significant differences</a> between Vice President Vance and President Trump on the timing and signaling associated with strikes on Houthi targets.</p>
<p>This lack of vertical integration diminishes the authority that the secretary holds in meetings with both allies and adversaries. Additionally, it eliminates the potential for any exchange of ideas that could transpire within the Department of State to develop more effective policy options to present to the president.</p>
<p>Horizontal integration of deterrence across various departments was also weakened, partially by budgetary cuts and eliminations of entire organizations. Foreign assistance and development resources were pivotal components of the 2022 <a href="https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf"><em>Indo-Pacific Strategy</em></a>. However, extensive cuts made to the United States Agency for International Development and other government agencies by the Department of Government Efficiency did not fully consider or comprehend the regional implications or potential negative impacts on deterrence.</p>
<p>To date, much of Trump’s foreign policy is focused on addressing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. A strategy for dealing with China, beyond the use of tariffs and other economic measures, is yet to be revealed. There are lessons to be learned from what has transpired with allies facing a menacing Russian threat in Europe.</p>
<p>President Trump consistently urges the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) member-states to <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/trump-effect-nato-spending-staggering-192052080.html">significantly enhance their defence expenditures</a>, even suggesting that 5 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) may be an appropriate threshold. For those nations that fail to meet NATO’s spending guidelines, Trump stated that US military support under Article 5 may not be available. While NATO nations were increasing defense spending prior to Trump taking office (a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/europe-canada-increased-defence-spending-by-20-2024-nato-says-2025-02-07/">20 percent increase in 2024</a>), <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-03-19/germany-greenlights-major-defence-spending/105069076">Germany</a> and the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-sets-out-biggest-sustained-increase-in-defence-spending-since-the-cold-war-protecting-british-people-in-new-era-for-national-security">United Kingdom</a> (UK) recently announced plans to further bolster defense budgets.</p>
<p>While additional insights into Trump’s approach to allies in the Indo-Pacific are anticipated in the coming weeks and months, Australia should draw upon several valuable early lessons. The first pertains to the long-standing Canberra tradition of analyzing and dissecting the statements and writings of senior officials within an American administration to comprehend policy. Maintaining cordial relations with officials at all levels of the US government remains prudent, but it is uncertain whether statements from senior administration officials can be relied upon to fully reflect Trump’s perspectives.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the current level of Australian defense spending, which accounts for 2 percent of GDP, will not meet Trump’s expectations for allies. A pre-emptive move to increase defense spending to 2.5 percent of GDP by 2027, similar to what was announced in February by the UK, would demonstrate Australia’s national commitment to addressing its deteriorating strategic circumstances and to contributing more towards its share of the alliance. If President Trump has made one thing clear to allies, it is that if they do not value their own defense neither will he.</p>
<p><em>Carl Rhodes is founder of </em><a href="https://www.robustpolicy.com/"><em>Robust Policy</em></a><em> and a senior fellow with the </em><a href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/"><em>National Institute for Deterrence Studies</em></a><em>. Carl hosts the </em><a href="https://rss.com/podcasts/deterrence-down-under/"><em>Deterrence Down Under</em></a><em> podcast and previously spent 25 years with RAND Corporation. Carl has a PhD in chemical engineering from Caltech.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Disintegrated-Deterrence.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29719" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="292" height="81" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 292px) 100vw, 292px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/trumps-disintegrated-deterrence-and-lessons-for-australia/">Trump’s Disintegrated Deterrence and Lessons for Australia</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Report Week of March 17-23</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-week-of-march-17-23/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-week-of-march-17-23/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Mar 2025 12:46:15 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[nuclear modernization]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30367</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Quotes of the Week ​ General Anthony Cotton: Emphasizes the importance of the Sentinel project and regrets the simultaneous tackling of multiple strategic modernization programs. ​ Strategic Command: Highlights the vital role of the Nuclear Triad in national security. ​ USAF Vice Chief of Staff General James Slife: Stresses the necessity of maintaining a nuclear [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-week-of-march-17-23/">ICBM EAR Report Week of March 17-23</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Quotes of the Week ​</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>General Anthony Cotton</strong>: Emphasizes the importance of the Sentinel project and regrets the simultaneous tackling of multiple strategic modernization programs. ​</li>
<li><strong>Strategic Command</strong>: Highlights the vital role of the Nuclear Triad in national security. ​</li>
<li><strong>USAF Vice Chief of Staff General James Slife</strong>: Stresses the necessity of maintaining a nuclear arsenal. ​</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Essay of the Week: Ukraine, Proliferation, &amp; Deterrence ​</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Peter Huessy</strong>: Discusses the complexities of the US and NATO&#8217;s approach to Ukraine, the implications of a ceasefire, and the need for a robust deterrent against Russian aggression. ​</li>
<li><strong>Key Points</strong>:
<ul>
<li>Historical failures in responding to Russian aggression. ​</li>
<li>Current defense spending and military assistance to Ukraine.</li>
<li>The importance of a strategic security arrangement involving NATO and Ukraine. ​</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Event of the Week ​</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Defense Conference</strong>: General Anthony Cotton calls for more B-21 bombers and underscores the urgency of nuclear modernization. ​</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Administration Developments ​</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth</strong>: Plans to increase spending on space operations, highlighting the importance of the space domain in future warfare. ​</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>The AF Chiefs Corner ​</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Air Force Chief Gen. David Allvin</strong>: Sees an opportunity for additional funding for missile defense and nuclear modernization. ​</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>The Commanders Corner</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>General Cotton</strong>: Advocates for increased production rates of B-21 bombers and more Long Range Stand-Off weapons due to evolving security threats. ​</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Strategic Developments ​</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Taiwan</strong>: Defense budget to exceed 3% of GDP due to rising threats from China. ​</li>
<li><strong>NATO Air Command</strong>: Demonstrates interoperability and transatlantic unity through Bomber Task Force missions. ​</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Top Essays of the Week ​</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Essay #1</strong>: Discusses the uncertainty surrounding US extended deterrence guarantees and the potential for nuclear proliferation among US allies. ​</li>
<li><strong>Essay #2</strong>: Emphasizes the importance of maintaining the US nuclear umbrella over its allies. ​</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Congressional Budget Developments ​</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Defense Spending Tips</strong>: Recommendations for cuts and increases in various defense programs, including missile procurement and Air Force programs. ​</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Economic Developments</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Stephen Moore</strong>: Highlights the shift towards a production-driven economy and its impact on inflation and economic growth. ​</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Proliferation Concerns ​</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Colin Demarest</strong>: Discusses the global proliferation of nuclear weapons and the implications for international security. ​</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Ukraine Corner ​</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Clifford May</strong>: Advocates for a realistic goal of achieving a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, leading to a frozen conflict. ​</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Media Error of the Week ​</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Wall Street Journal</strong>: Criticized for suggesting negotiations with Houthis terrorists, which could lead to endless conflict.</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/ICBM-EAR-Week-of-March-19.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29877" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png" alt="" width="371" height="103" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 371px) 100vw, 371px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-week-of-march-17-23/">ICBM EAR Report Week of March 17-23</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Week of Feb 24th</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-week-of-feb-24th/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 05 Mar 2025 12:57:01 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Executive Summary ICBM EAR – Week of February 24, 2025 Deterrence at a Crossroads: A Call for Strength and Resolve America is pivotal in nuclear modernization, strategic deterrence, and global security. As threats from Russia and China escalate, U.S. defense policy must adapt—or risk catastrophic consequences. Key Strategic Insights 🔹 Nuclear Deterrence Imperative – The [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-week-of-feb-24th/">ICBM EAR Week of Feb 24th</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2 style="text-align: center;"><strong>Executive Summary</strong></h2>
<h2 style="text-align: center;"><strong> ICBM EAR – Week of February 24, 2025</strong></h2>
<p><strong>Deterrence at a Crossroads: A Call for Strength and Resolve</strong></p>
<p>America is pivotal in nuclear modernization, strategic deterrence, and global security. As threats from Russia and China escalate, U.S. defense policy must adapt—or risk catastrophic consequences.</p>
<p>Key Strategic Insights</p>
<p><img src="https://s.w.org/images/core/emoji/17.0.2/72x72/1f539.png" alt="🔹" class="wp-smiley" style="height: 1em; max-height: 1em;" /> <strong>Nuclear Deterrence Imperative</strong> – The Minuteman III test launch underscores the critical need for modernization. General Tom Bussiere warns: <em>“We must recapitalize our nuclear forces while maintaining the old—an unprecedented challenge.”</em></p>
<p><img src="https://s.w.org/images/core/emoji/17.0.2/72x72/1f539.png" alt="🔹" class="wp-smiley" style="height: 1em; max-height: 1em;" /> <strong>The Russian Threat</strong> – Moscow’s aggression is reinforced by information warfare and nuclear coercion. Sergei Shoigu states: <em>“We must undermine the political, economic, and social system of the West.”</em> The impending New START Treaty expiration (2026) raises concerns of a Russian nuclear breakout.</p>
<p><img src="https://s.w.org/images/core/emoji/17.0.2/72x72/1f539.png" alt="🔹" class="wp-smiley" style="height: 1em; max-height: 1em;" /> <strong>China’s Strategic Decline</strong> – $168 billion in foreign direct investment fled China in 2024. Its aggressive military expansion—the largest since WWII—coupled with its alliance with Russia, isolates Beijing internationally.</p>
<p><img src="https://s.w.org/images/core/emoji/17.0.2/72x72/1f539.png" alt="🔹" class="wp-smiley" style="height: 1em; max-height: 1em;" /> Global Realignment &amp; Defense Priorities –<br />
<img src="https://s.w.org/images/core/emoji/17.0.2/72x72/2705.png" alt="✅" class="wp-smiley" style="height: 1em; max-height: 1em;" /> Britain increases defense spending (2.5% GDP by 2027).<br />
<img src="https://s.w.org/images/core/emoji/17.0.2/72x72/2705.png" alt="✅" class="wp-smiley" style="height: 1em; max-height: 1em;" /> South Korea considers nuclear options in response to North Korea.<br />
<img src="https://s.w.org/images/core/emoji/17.0.2/72x72/2705.png" alt="✅" class="wp-smiley" style="height: 1em; max-height: 1em;" /> The U.S. must act decisively to maintain strategic dominance.</p>
<p><strong>The Cost of Hesitation</strong></p>
<p>From Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament to past Western miscalculations on Russia, history warns against underestimating adversaries. De-escalation as a default strategy has failed.</p>
<p>The Air Force Association calls for a $45 billion annual increase in USAF and Space Force funding. As Stephen Feinberg, Deputy Secretary of Defense nominee, bluntly states:</p>
<p><em>“If we do not plug our capability gaps, we will lose to China.”</em></p>
<p><strong>Call to Action: Strength Through Deterrence</strong></p>
<p><img src="https://s.w.org/images/core/emoji/17.0.2/72x72/2705.png" alt="✅" class="wp-smiley" style="height: 1em; max-height: 1em;" /> Fully modernize the U.S. nuclear triad<br />
<img src="https://s.w.org/images/core/emoji/17.0.2/72x72/2705.png" alt="✅" class="wp-smiley" style="height: 1em; max-height: 1em;" /> Accelerate next-generation air and missile defense<br />
<img src="https://s.w.org/images/core/emoji/17.0.2/72x72/2705.png" alt="✅" class="wp-smiley" style="height: 1em; max-height: 1em;" /> Fund a credible and flexible deterrent</p>
<p>Deterrence is not optional—it is the foundation of peace. America must lead with strength, invest in security, and ensure our adversaries understand that aggression will never be left unanswered.</p>
<p>The future is watching. We must be ready.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/ICBM-EAR-Week-of-February-24th.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29877" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png" alt="" width="238" height="66" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 238px) 100vw, 238px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-week-of-feb-24th/">ICBM EAR Week of Feb 24th</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Trump’s Trade and Tariff Policy Benefits America’s Nuclear Deterrent</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/trumps-trade-and-tariff-policy-benefits-americas-nuclear-deterrent/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Curtis McGiffin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 03 Mar 2025 13:11:25 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30190</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Recently, President Donald Trump established a new Trade and Tariff Reciprocity Policy. In his signed memo, he stated, “It is the policy of the United States to reduce our large and persistent annual trade deficit in goods and to address other unfair and unbalanced aspects of our trade with foreign trading partners.” His memo also [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/trumps-trade-and-tariff-policy-benefits-americas-nuclear-deterrent/">Trump’s Trade and Tariff Policy Benefits America’s Nuclear Deterrent</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recently, President Donald Trump established a new Trade and Tariff Reciprocity Policy. In his <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/02/reciprocal-trade-and-tariffs/">signed memo</a>, he stated, “It is the policy of the United States to reduce our large and persistent annual trade deficit in goods and to address other unfair and unbalanced aspects of our trade with foreign trading partners.” His memo also instructs his administration to identify “the equivalent of a reciprocal tariff for each foreign trading partner.”</p>
<p>During the signing event, President Trump <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kMzfeyHmq2s">remarked</a>, “On trade, I have decided, for purposes of fairness, that I will charge a reciprocal tariff, meaning whatever countries charge the United States of America, we will charge them no more, no less. In other words, they charge the US a tax or tariff, and we will charge them the exact same tax or tariff, very simple.”</p>
<p>A strong economy is vital to national security. In addition to reliable access to energy, minerals, and capital, any great power fundamentally requires a resilient, production-oriented, economic infrastructure that ensures a comprehensive and adequate industrial base capable of producing most of the nation’s necessities.</p>
<p>Furthermore, America’s national debt exceeds $36 trillion, with a debt-to-GDP ratio surpassing 133 percent. In fiscal year 2024, the cost of servicing the debt’s interest <a href="https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/us-national-debt-interest-exceeds-defense-spending-cbo">surpassed</a> America’s defense budget.</p>
<p>Americans place great importance on fairness and balance. The Declaration of Independence famously states that “all men are created equal” and advocates for equal treatment for all individuals, regardless of status or position. The Constitution establishes a framework that balances power among various branches of government, as outlined in James Madison’s <em>Federalist 51</em>.</p>
<p>Socrates once remarked, “If measure and symmetry are absent from any composition in any degree, ruin awaits both the ingredients and the composition&#8230;. Measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue the world over.” He was right.</p>
<p>President Trump seeks to implement tariff reciprocity towards America’s competitors in a fair, just, and balanced manner. Can this same principle be applied to his peace through strength <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/peace-through-strength-enhancing-americas-nuclear-deterrence-today/">deterrence</a> approach? Yes, it can.</p>
<p><a href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/dynamic-parity/">Dynamic parity</a> is a nuclear deterrence strategy that deliberately achieves and maintains a contextually symmetrical balance of nuclear force capabilities, capacities, and composition in relation to the combined nuclear strength of China, North Korea, Russia, and possibly Iran. This strategy seeks to balance America’s nuclear deterrent force against the potentially collaborative arsenals of these adversaries, thereby enhancing deterrence, reassuring allies, and preserving strategic stability in a world lacking binding arms control agreements.</p>
<p>America is about <a href="https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/10/08/us_nuclear_deterrence_what_went_wrong_and_what_can_be_done_1063632.html">15 years</a> into a 30-year effort to recapitalize its nuclear arsenal, which has a <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/us-modernization-2024-update">program of record that offers</a> a one-for-one intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) swap, two fewer ballistic missile submarines, and a reduced bomb load capacity. The current program of record was designed for a world that no longer exists.</p>
<p>Even the Biden administration’s acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/nuclear-threats-and-role-allies-conversation-acting-assistant-secretary-vipin-narang">acknowledged</a> the need to explore “options for increasing future launcher capacity or adding more deployed warheads in land, sea, and air capabilities” to address the significant growth and variety of China’s nuclear arsenal. The 2023 Congressional Commission <a href="https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/a/am/americas-strategic-posture/strategic-posture-commission-report.ashx">report</a> on U.S. Strategic Posture stated that the current nuclear modernization program is “necessary, but not sufficient” for facing two nuclear peers: China and Russia.</p>
<p>Americans often assess the fairness of financial rewards and the distribution of costs, commonly reacting to perceived unfairness with feelings of hostility and responding with protest. Regarding economic, political, or national security issues, we are “<a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-mindful-self-express/201408/the-neuroscience-fairness-and-injustice?msockid=3899c21deff46a6631b0d76bee226b9e">wired to resist unfair treatment</a>.” This sense of fairness and balance also extends to America’s defensive posture. A recent Reagan National Defense Forum <a href="https://www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan-institute/centers/peace-through-strength/reagan-national-defense-survey/">Survey</a> noted that 77 percent of voters were concerned that the national debt might force defense cuts, with 79 percent supporting increased defense spending, and 70 percent of those surveyed were concerned about “Russia launching a thermonuclear attack against the US.”</p>
<p>In this context, geopolitical fairness refers to the perceived evenhandedness among nations in a manner that mutually impacts interests. Meanwhile, geopolitical balance pertains to the distribution of perceived power between states in the international system. The 2024 <em>Annual Threat Assessment</em> <a href="https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2024/3787-2024-annual-threat-assessment-of-the-u-s-intelligence-community">noted</a> that Russia possesses the largest, most diverse, and <a href="https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/01/24/recent_developments_in_russian_nuclear_capabilities_1086894.html">most modern</a> nuclear weapons stockpile in the world. This infers that America remains inferior in aggregate nuclear weapon numbers and is trailing in modernization, which creates an imbalance.</p>
<p>Correcting long-standing imbalances in trade policy and military shortfalls is vital to the American conscience. Allowing trade deficits with economic competitors to persist without challenge is akin to unilateral disarmament. The US trade deficit for goods reached <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-trade-deficit-exports-imports-tariffs-us-consumers-2025-2">a record $1.2 trillion</a> in 2024, while the treasury <a href="https://www.crfb.org/press-releases/treasury-confirms-calendar-year-2024-deficit-tops-20-trillion">borrowed $2 trillion</a> that same year. Ongoing deficits of this magnitude threaten domestic companies and jobs, putting negative pressure on GDP and the prosperity of individual Americans. Ensuring that America’s nuclear deterrent can counter the threats posed by its adversaries will safeguard citizens’ security and sovereignty, enabling prosperity.</p>
<p>President Trump’s new Trade and Tariff Reciprocity Policy, like the nuclear deterrence strategy of <em>Dynamic Parity</em>, places the burden of acceptable behavior on America’s competitors. They both empower America to act in the interest of fairness, aiming to achieve balance in both process and product. Geopolitical stability is not born of an America exploited economically or constrained militarily. This kind of weakness is not only provocative but also insulting.</p>
<p><em><a href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/the-team-2/curtis-mcgiffin/">Col. Curtis McGiffin</a> (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has over 30 years of total USAF service. The views expressed are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/How-Trumps-Trade-and-Tariff-Reciprocity-Policy-Can-Benefit-Americas-Nuclear-Deterrent.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29719" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="302" height="84" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 302px) 100vw, 302px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/trumps-trade-and-tariff-policy-benefits-americas-nuclear-deterrent/">Trump’s Trade and Tariff Policy Benefits America’s Nuclear Deterrent</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Feb 2025 13:23:04 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>This report, prepared by Peter Huessy for the week of February 22, 2025, covers various aspects of nuclear deterrence, defense budget developments, and geopolitical threats. Key topics include the Biden administration&#8217;s approach to nuclear escalation, Senator McConnell&#8217;s retirement and his views on restoring deterrence, and Russian official Medvedev&#8217;s nuclear threats. The House and Senate have [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-22-feb-2025/">ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdown___oYf6O">
<p>This report, prepared by Peter Huessy for the week of February 22, 2025, covers various aspects of nuclear deterrence, defense budget developments, and geopolitical threats.</p>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>Key topics include the Biden administration&#8217;s approach to nuclear escalation, Senator McConnell&#8217;s retirement and his views on restoring deterrence, and Russian official Medvedev&#8217;s nuclear threats.</p>
</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The House and Senate have added $100-150 billion over ten years to defense, focusing on expanding the Navy, strengthening the defense industrial base, and modernizing strategic nuclear forces.</div>
<p>​<br />
SecDef Hegseth seeks an additional $50 billion for top priorities, excluding nuclear deterrence from budget cuts.</p>
<p>The report highlights the importance of concurrent modernization work at the three ICBM bases, which could save billions.</p>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>It also discusses the U.S. Air Force missileers&#8217; critical role in nuclear deterrence, the ethical and psychological aspects of their job, and the challenges of retaining diverse personnel.</p>
</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The Christian Science Monitor provides an in-depth look at the missileers&#8217; responsibilities and the evolving nuclear landscape.</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>Regarding North Korea, USAF General Jason Armagost emphasized that the U.S. can respond overwhelmingly to a North Korean ICBM attack, underscoring the strength of the U.S. nuclear deterrence system.</p>
</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>The report also touches on the potential for arms control negotiations with Russia and China, with President Trump expressing a desire for &#8220;denuclearization.&#8221;</p>
</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>However, the feasibility of such agreements remains uncertain, given the geopolitical complexities and the need for the U.S. to maintain a competitive edge in military capabilities.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p><strong>MUST READ: </strong> The most awe-inspiring piece of the report is about  &#8220;RESPONSIBILITY&#8221; from the Christian Science Monitor, dated February 14, 2025, which provides an in-depth look at the lives and duties of U.S. Air Force missileers stationed at F.E. Warren Air Force Base.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
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<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-30165" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel.png" alt="" width="341" height="228" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel.png 470w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel-300x200.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel-360x240.png 360w" sizes="(max-width: 341px) 100vw, 341px" /></p>
<ul>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">It highlights their critical role in nuclear deterrence, the gravity of their mission, and the personal and ethical complexities they face.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The article follows missileers during their 24-hour shifts, emphasizing their readiness and strict operational protocols.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">It also explores the mental burden and moral dilemmas they encounter, particularly in the context of faith.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The piece touches on the historical context of missileers, their continued relevance, and the growing nuclear threats from Russia, China, and Iran.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">Additionally, it discusses the challenges of attracting and retaining personnel, especially women and minorities, within this demanding career field.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The article underscores the human element of nuclear deterrence, the operational challenges of aging systems, and the evolving nuclear landscape.</li>
</ul>
<p>Overall, the report underscores the need for robust defense investments, the challenges of modernizing nuclear forces, and the geopolitical threats posed by adversaries like Russia, China, and North Korea.</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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<div><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-EAR-of-Week-of-2-17^^.Prepared-by-Peter-Huessy.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29877" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png" alt="" width="346" height="96" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 346px) 100vw, 346px" /></a></div>
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<p>​</p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-22-feb-2025/">ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-week-of-february-10-2025/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-week-of-february-10-2025/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 19 Feb 2025 13:15:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30092</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Key Takeaways from: ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025 Overview The report, prepared by Peter Huessy, comprehensively assesses nuclear deterrence, strategic security issues, and emerging threats. It includes key quotes from U.S. leaders, updates on nuclear modernization, policy discussions, and geopolitical analysis. Key Themes &#38; Highlights Strategic Nuclear Posture &#38; Modernization: U.S. nuclear deterrence [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-week-of-february-10-2025/">ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Key Takeaways from: ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025</strong></p>
<p><strong>Overview</strong></p>
<p>The report, prepared by Peter Huessy, comprehensively assesses nuclear deterrence, strategic security issues, and emerging threats. It includes key quotes from U.S. leaders, updates on nuclear modernization, policy discussions, and geopolitical analysis.</p>
<p><strong>Key Themes &amp; Highlights</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Strategic Nuclear Posture &amp; Modernization:</strong>
<ul>
<li>U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies are facing significant challenges, with adversaries such as Russia and China expanding their arsenals.</li>
<li>The U.S. Air Force has paused elements of the Sentinel ICBM program due to evolving requirements.</li>
<li>Modernization efforts include upgrades to the B61 and B83 nuclear gravity bombs, though concerns persist regarding the adequacy of U.S. capabilities against hardened enemy targets.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Policy &amp; Leadership Insights:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth emphasizes the need to rebuild the military’s warrior ethos and align capabilities with threats.</li>
<li>House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Mike Rogers stresses the necessity of increased defense spending to counter global threats.</li>
<li>Former President Donald Trump calls for nuclear arms control talks with Russia and China, while also questioning the need for new nuclear weapons given existing stockpiles.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Geopolitical Developments &amp; Deterrence Challenges:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Concerns over a growing Sino-Russian-North Korean-Iranian alignment seeking to undermine the Western security order.</li>
<li>Debate over extended nuclear deterrence and the potential for allied nations to develop independent nuclear capabilities.</li>
<li>The future of U.S. nuclear triad strategy amid reports of China’s advancements in submarine detection technology.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Ukraine Conflict &amp; U.S. Policy:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Differing views on U.S. involvement in Ukraine, with some advocating for continued support while others argue for de-escalation and negotiations.</li>
<li>Analysis of Russian vulnerabilities, including internal instability and the potential for civil unrest post-Putin.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Congressional &amp; Budgetary Updates:</strong>
<ul>
<li>The House Budget Committee supports increased defense spending, with an additional $100 billion allocated for the next year.</li>
<li>Senate Majority Leader John Thune discusses priorities related to Air Force modernization, including the B-21 bomber program.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Emerging Threats &amp; Strategic Risks:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Reports suggest that China has developed new submarine detection technologies that could undermine the stealth advantage of U.S. nuclear submarines.</li>
<li>Analysis of the potential consequences of Vladimir Putin’s downfall, including the risk of nuclear proliferation due to internal instability in Russia.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Download the full report</strong></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-EAR-week-of-February-10.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="227" height="63" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 227px) 100vw, 227px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-week-of-february-10-2025/">ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR for 23 Jan 25</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-for-23-jan-25/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Jan 2025 12:53:20 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29937</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>ICBM Ear for the Week of January 23, 2025 Prepared by Peter Huessy, President of Geostrategic Analysis and Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrent Studies Key Takeaways Significant Military Budget Increase in Russia: Russia’s defense spending will rise by 25% to 13.5 trillion rubles (~130 billion euros), continuing its high military expenditure trend. [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-for-23-jan-25/">ICBM EAR for 23 Jan 25</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>ICBM Ear for the Week of January 23, 2025</strong></p>
<p><strong>Prepared by Peter Huessy, President of Geostrategic Analysis and Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrent Studies</strong></p>
<p><strong><u>Key Takeaways</u></strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Significant Military Budget Increase in Russia:</strong> Russia’s defense spending will rise by 25% to 13.5 trillion rubles (~130 billion euros), continuing its high military expenditure trend.</li>
<li><strong>U.S. Defense Leadership Changes:</strong> Senator Marco Rubio has been confirmed as Secretary of State, with several other key appointments, including Peter Hegseth as Secretary of Defense.</li>
<li><strong>Nuclear Policy and Strategic Posture Adjustments:</strong> Discussions on nuclear deterrence focus on the modernization of U.S. strategic forces, balancing deterrence against Russia and China, and the implications of extended deterrence.</li>
<li><strong>Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Capabilities:</strong> Reports indicate Iranian cargo vessels carrying crucial chemical ingredients for missile propellant, raising concerns about Iran&#8217;s growing missile capability.</li>
<li><strong>Ukraine Conflict and NATO’s Deterrence Mission:</strong> NATO leaders stress that a Russian victory would severely weaken the alliance&#8217;s credibility.</li>
<li><strong>U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Extended Deterrence Debates:</strong> Several officials emphasize the need for a robust and adaptable nuclear strategy to counter emerging threats from Russia, China, and Iran.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><u>International Developments</u></strong></p>
<p><strong>Russia’s Defense Budget Expansion</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Russia&#8217;s military spending will increase to <strong>13.5 trillion rubles</strong>, estimated at <strong>7-8% of GDP</strong>, its highest post-Soviet military budget.</li>
<li>Significant investments in <strong>modernized nuclear and conventional forces</strong> to maintain strategic parity with the U.S. and NATO.</li>
<li>Russia’s total defense expenditure, when adjusted for purchasing power, rivals European military spending, highlighting its focus on long-term military capabilities.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Iran’s Missile and Nuclear Advancements</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Intelligence sources indicate <strong>Iranian cargo ships transporting missile propellant materials from China</strong>, raising alarms among Western security analysts.</li>
<li>Iran continues <strong>uranium enrichment</strong>, prompting <strong>warnings from the UN</strong> about Tehran’s growing nuclear capability.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>China &amp; Russia’s Nuclear Expansion</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Reports predict that by <strong>2035, China and Russia will collectively hold over 11,000 nuclear warheads</strong>, posing a direct challenge to U.S. nuclear deterrence.</li>
<li>Concerns grow over <strong>China’s accelerated nuclear development</strong> and its integration into a broader strategic competition with the U.S. and Russia.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><u>Key Strategic Issues on the Horizon</u></strong></p>
<p><strong>Escalation Risks in Space Warfare</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>A <strong>RAND Corporation study</strong> warns that <strong>Russia may escalate conflicts in space</strong> early due to its <strong>heightened fears of a U.S. first strike</strong>.</li>
<li>The study underscores Moscow’s <strong>increasing risk tolerance</strong> and potential responses to perceived U.S. threats in space.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Ukraine’s Role in NATO’s Deterrence Strategy</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte</strong> warns that a Russian victory would weaken NATO’s credibility, requiring significant investments in deterrence.</li>
<li>U.S. extended deterrence remains <strong>under scrutiny</strong>, with debates over whether the <strong>Biden administration’s fear of escalation weakened deterrence against Russia</strong>.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force Modernization</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>The <strong>U.S. Air Force confirms</strong> that the <strong>Sentinel ICBM and B-21 Raider</strong> will remain the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence until at least 2050.</li>
<li>Discussions continue over potential <strong>mobile ICBM systems, expanded long-range bombers, and additional dual-use aircraft</strong> to ensure nuclear survivability.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>‘Iron Dome for America’ Missile Defense System</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>President <strong>Trump’s proposal for a nationwide missile defense system</strong>—similar to Israel’s Iron Dome—is gaining momentum.</li>
<li>Critics call it <strong>overly ambitious</strong>, but proponents argue that it is essential to <strong>counter growing threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea</strong>.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><u>Key Events</u></strong></p>
<p><strong>Upcoming NIDS Seminar (January 31, 2025)</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Speakers:</strong> Shoshana Byren (Jewish Policy Center) &amp; Ilan Berman (American Foreign Policy Council).</li>
<li><strong>Topic:</strong> Iranian security threats to the U.S. and its allies, with a focus on Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>NIDS conference at Truman Library (August 6, 2025)</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>A <strong>4-star USAF officer</strong> will serve as the featured speaker.</li>
<li>Expected discussions on <strong>extended deterrence, strategic stability, and nuclear policy</strong>.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><u>Conclusion</u></strong></p>
<p>The <strong>ICBM Ear report for the week of January 23, 2025</strong>, highlights key developments in <strong>U.S. nuclear policy, global security challenges, and strategic deterrence issues</strong>. With <strong>Russia&#8217;s increasing military budget, Iran&#8217;s missile advancements, and China’s nuclear expansion</strong>, the U.S. faces <strong>a growing multipolar nuclear environment</strong>. Discussions on <strong>extended deterrence, arms control, and new strategic capabilities</strong> will shape U.S. defense posture in the coming years. The upcoming <strong>TRIAD Symposium and NIDS events</strong> will provide further insights into these critical security matters.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-Ear-for-the-week-of-January-23.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29877 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-for-23-jan-25/">ICBM EAR for 23 Jan 25</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Escalation Dominance Does Matter</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/escalation-dominance-does-matter/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joe Buff]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Jan 2025 13:12:17 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29772</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In a reply to a recent article in Global Security Review, which advocated for American escalation dominance, Katerina Canyon, Executive Director of the Peace Economy Project, challenged the importance of escalation dominance, instead advocating for a reduction in nuclear weapons and an increase in domestic spending. Canyon is wrong on three points: the history of the [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/escalation-dominance-does-matter/">Escalation Dominance Does Matter</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In a reply to a <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-crucial-role-of-escalation-dominance-and-narrative-control-in-nuclear-deterrence/">recent article</a> in <em>Global Security Review</em>, which advocated for American escalation dominance, Katerina Canyon, Executive Director of the Peace Economy Project, challenged the importance of <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/escalation-dominance-is-a-flawed-framework/">escalation dominance</a>, instead advocating for a reduction in nuclear weapons and an increase in domestic spending. Canyon is wrong on three points: the history of the Cuban Missile Crisis, who started the nuclear arms race, and the need for nuclear cost cutting.</p>
<p><strong>The Cuban Missile Crisis</strong></p>
<p>Canyon begins her article by employing the Cuban Missile Crisis as an example of where diplomacy rather than military force carried the day. Her explanation is simple disinformation and misunderstands how nuclear deterrence works.</p>
<p>Early in the crisis, President John F. Kennedy moved <a href="https://www.historynet.com/the-end-was-near/">nuclear-armed bombers</a> to Air Force bases in Florida, lining them up wing tip to wing tip, as a visible display of the nuclear hell both Cuba and the Soviet Union would face if Nikita Khruschev did not remove nuclear weapons from Cuba. That signal was seen by the Soviets.</p>
<p>President Kennedy also called the then-recent deployment of Minuteman I intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) his “<a href="https://www.intothelittlebelts.com/things-to-do/historic-points/ace-in-the-hole">ace in the hole</a>.” He credited his ICBMs with forcing the Soviets to back down. Minuteman I was very much American escalation dominance that the Soviets could not match.</p>
<p>He also implemented a blockade around Cuba. When the Soviet submarine <em>B-59 </em>attempted to run the blockade, the USS <em>Beale </em>depth charged the submarine. Rather than launching its nuclear torpedoes against the <em>Beale</em>, B-59 retreated.</p>
<p>Contrary to Canyon’s assertion that diplomacy carried the day, it was military strength and nuclear superiority that carried the day. General Secretary Khruschev knew that the United States had a superior nuclear arsenal and backed down.</p>
<p><strong>Arms Racing</strong></p>
<p>Canyon is also concerned that the United States will invite an arms race should it develop the full spectrum of capabilities that are required to effectively deter China, North Korea, and Russia. The reality is the race has already begun. The only participant that is yet to leave the starting block is the United States.</p>
<p>Russian strategic nuclear modernization is nearly complete, with Russia also maintaining at least a 10 to 1 advantage in theater nuclear weapons. China is adding at least 100 new nuclear weapons per year and will soon outmatch the United States.</p>
<p>North Korea is now capable of striking the homeland with intercontinental ballistic missiles. According to Kim Jung Un, North Korea will build an arsenal of 500 nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>It is only the United States that is yet to field a new nuclear delivery system. The newest American nuclear delivery vehicle, the B2 bomber, is three decades old.</p>
<p>Contrary to the aspirations of nuclear disarmament advocates in the United States, not a single nuclear-armed adversary is willing to follow the United States down the path of disarmament. The post–Cold War era, three decades now, is a glaring example of the failures of the disarmament delusion.</p>
<p>Canyon is completely wrong when she asserts that China and Russia are modernizing and expanding their nuclear arsenals because of American nuclear modernization. They began their own nuclear modernization and expansion efforts long before the United States began its effort to replace aging weapons with new variants.</p>
<p>It was not American nuclear weapons that drove Chinese and Russian modernization to begin with. It is American superiority in conventional precision-guided weapons, which neither adversary can match, that led them to follow a strategy like President Dwight Eisenhower’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/New-Look-United-States-history">New Look Policy</a>.</p>
<p>For some reason, Canyon claims that the ability to maintain nuclear escalation dominance is advocating “unchecked militarization.” Nothing could be further from the truth. Nuclear forces are a deterrent to conventional military aggression. Historically, great powers wage war four to six times per century, killing millions in the process. Nuclear weapons put an end to great power war and led to a more than 90 percent decline in conflict-related casualties. Lest Canyon forget, the last great power war, World War II, led to the death of 70 million people and saw the United States spend almost half of its gross domestic product fighting the war.</p>
<p>Canyon, like many in the disarmament community, mistakenly believes that weakness leads to peace. They incorrectly impose their own aversion to conflict onto Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jung Un. In reality, these authoritarians, who are actively seeking to topple the American-led international order, only see American passivity as weakness and an opportunity to coerce the United States.</p>
<p>Peace through strength is no mere slogan. It is the most accurate and effective way to deter America’s adversaries and ensure they never believe that they can achieve their objectives through conflict.</p>
<p><strong>Defense Spending</strong></p>
<p>Canyon also argues that defense spending is too high and the need to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad is wasteful. Instead, she proposes increasing spending on social programs. Any examination of federal, state, and local budgets illustrates that Canyon is again incorrect.</p>
<p>In 2024, the federal budget was <a href="https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/americas-finance-guide/federal-spending/">$6.75 trillion</a>. Of this, <a href="https://usafacts.org/articles/how-much-does-the-us-spend-on-the-military/">$841.4 billion</a>, 14 percent, went to defense spending. Of defense spending, about $50 billion was dedicated to current operation and modernization. This was about 6 percent of defense spending and less than 0.1 percent of federal spending.</p>
<p>Federal, state, and local governments spent more than $10 trillion in 2024. The federal government alone spent <a href="https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/americas-finance-guide/federal-spending/">69 percent of its budget</a> on social programs. That is approximately $4.6 trillion—more than all federal revenue collected ($4.4 trillion) in 2024. Excluding federal pass-through funds, state and local governments spent an additional $4 trillion in 2024. State and local governments spent 65 percent of their budgets on social programs—another $2.6 trillion. Federal, state, and local governments spent <a href="https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policymakers-9th-edition-2022/poverty-welfare">$1.8 trillion</a> just on anti-poverty programs—more than twice the defense budget.</p>
<p>According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the federal agency that runs these two programs, Medicare and Medicaid lose more than <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/09/how-medicare-and-medicaid-fraud-became-a-100b-problem-for-the-us.html">$100 billion</a> every year to waste, fraud, and abuse. That is twice the cost of the entire nuclear enterprise. Surprisingly, Canyon is not bothered by this and other waste, fraud, and abuse in federal, state, and local programs. They are affordable. In her mind, it is nuclear spending that is breaking the bank.</p>
<p>The simple fact is that social justice warriors have never seen a dollar they do not want to spend. After all, more than 100 percent of federal revenues are already spent on their preferred programs. State and local governments spend two-thirds of their budgets on social programs. Americans also spend more than <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1040">$450 billion a year</a> in charitable donations. Despite the spending on social programs, the demand only grows.</p>
<p>Defense spending, however, is at a 70-year low. At 3.4 percent of gross domestic product, these rates of defense spending have not been seen since prior to World War II.</p>
<p>Thus, when Canyon argues that too much is spent on defense and nuclear modernization, she is flat wrong. It is just the opposite.</p>
<p>Americans now live in a nation where social programs crowd out defense spending at a time when avoiding war is only possible by fielding a military and a nuclear force that is powerful enough to not only deter Russian aggression, but Chinese, North Korean, and Iranian as well. That can never be done by good intentions. Weakness is provocative. Peace comes through strength and an unwillingness by aggressive adversaries to challenge the United States.</p>
<p>Canyon is wrong in her reading of history, wrong in her understanding of strategy, and wrong about government spending. The time is now to have a guns-versus-butter debate because it may soon be too late.</p>
<p><em>Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Escalation-Dominance-Really-Does-Matter.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29601 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png" alt="Download here." width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2025-Download-Button.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><em> </em></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/escalation-dominance-does-matter/">Escalation Dominance Does Matter</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Report for December 20th</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-december-20th/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Dec 2024 13:42:17 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Summary Report for ICBM EAR Report of December 20, 2024 The EAR Report is a must read for National security professionals to stay informed about rapidly evolving global threats and the strategic implications for U.S. defense policy. This report addresses critical developments in nuclear deterrence, missile defense, and geopolitical trends, and equips professionals with actionable [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-december-20th/">ICBM EAR Report for December 20th</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Summary Report for ICBM EAR Report of December 20, 2024</strong></p>
<p>The EAR Report is a must read for National security professionals to stay informed about rapidly evolving global threats and the strategic implications for U.S. defense policy.</p>
<p>This report addresses critical developments in nuclear deterrence, missile defense, and geopolitical trends, and equips professionals with actionable insights to navigate the complexities of modern security challenges effectively.</p>
<p><strong>Commentary and Quotes of the Week</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin</strong>: Reaffirmed the U.S.-ROK alliance and the strengthening of extended deterrence through the Nuclear Consultative Group.<br />
<strong>Peter Huessy</strong>: Detailed the financial and strategic implications of eliminating the ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, emphasizing the costs of alternative measures for maintaining current deterrence levels.<br />
<strong>Jon Finer, Deputy National Security Adviser</strong>: Highlighted Pakistan&#8217;s emerging threat with the development of long-range ballistic missile capabilities.<br />
<strong>Bill Gertz</strong>: Revealed China&#8217;s rapid nuclear buildup and the expansion of its missile capabilities.<br />
<strong>Russian Leaders</strong>: Asserted advancements in missile systems and dismissed arms control as a relic of the past.<br />
<strong>Rep. Chuck Fleischmann</strong>: Stressed the urgency of modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent, citing contributions from Tennessee&#8217;s Oak Ridge Lab.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Strategic Developments of the Week</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>China&#8217;s Military Build-Up</strong>: The Pentagon report highlighted Beijing&#8217;s dramatic advancements in hypersonic missile technology, nuclear warheads, and &#8216;intelligentized warfare.&#8217;<br />
<strong>Russia&#8217;s Strategic Actions</strong>: Russia&#8217;s legislative shift regarding the Taliban and progress in missile systems underlined its geopolitical maneuvers.<br />
<strong>U.S. Missile Defense Challenges</strong>: Reports emphasized the lag in U.S. hypersonic missile capabilities compared to China, pressing the need for enhanced missile defense systems.<br />
<strong>Space and Drone Developments</strong>: New legislation and technological advances highlight the increasing role of space and drones in modern warfare.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Important Reports of the Week</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>&#8220;President Trump Must Put the Nuclear Enterprise on a Wartime Footing&#8221; by Robert Peters</strong>:
<ul>
<li>Advocates for accelerating nuclear arsenal modernization to restore deterrence credibility.<br />
Calls for a stronger commitment to stockpile stewardship and missile defense.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>&#8220;Importance of Building Homeland Missile Defense&#8221; by Robert Joseph</strong>:
<ul>
<li>Reiterates the vision of a comprehensive missile defense system to counter emerging threats.<br />
Proposes leveraging space-based systems for more robust and efficient protection.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>&#8220;What Happens if the United States Eliminates the ICBM Leg of the Triad?&#8221;</strong>:
<ul>
<li>Examines the repercussions of removing the ICBM leg, including massive financial costs for alternative deterrence methods and strategic vulnerabilities.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<h2><span style="color: #000080;">Download the Full Report</span><br />
<a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/ICBM-EAR-Report-of-December-12.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></h2>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-december-20th/">ICBM EAR Report for December 20th</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Report December 8th</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 20 Dec 2024 13:11:55 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29631</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Executive Summary: Week of December 8, 2024 This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/">ICBM EAR Report December 8th</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Executive Summary: Week of December 8, 2024</strong></p>
<p>This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture at which the US finds itself—facing nuclear, economic, and strategic challenges requiring unwavering resolve and bipartisan cooperation.  Here are some highlights:</p>
<p><strong>Quotes of the Week</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Chelsey Wiley (IISS):</strong> <em>“US–China tensions could lead to heightened security concerns for allies.”</em>
<ul>
<li>Editor’s note: The focus must remain on countering China&#8217;s threats, not shifting blame to the US.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Admiral Tony Radakin (UK):</strong> <em>“The third nuclear era is more complex, with proliferating technologies and absent security architectures.”</em></li>
<li><strong>Palantir CEO:</strong> <em>“Adversaries need to wake up scared; peace comes through strength.”</em></li>
<li><strong>Rep. Chuck Fleischmann (R-TN):</strong> <em>“Modernizing our nuclear deterrent ensures the US remains the global superpower.”</em></li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Essay of the Week</strong></p>
<p><strong>&#8220;Call it Chinese Communist Imperialism&#8221; by Christopher Ford (NIPP)</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Explores China&#8217;s military expansion and its quest for global influence.</li>
<li>Highlights its nuclear ambitions and parallels with historical imperialism.</li>
<li>Advocates for robust US policies to counter these threats.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Congressional Update</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>FY25 NDAA:</strong> Approved at $895 billion, fully funding nuclear initiatives and strengthening deterrence.</li>
<li>Key provisions:
<ul>
<li>Full funding for ICBMs and submarine components of the TRIAD.</li>
<li>Establishment of a unified Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Matters.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>New Congressional Members:</strong>
<ul>
<li>78 new members, with significant additions to defense committees.</li>
<li>Focus on battleground states with strategic implications for military readiness.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Strategic Developments</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>China’s Nuclear Expansion:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Accelerating development of fast-breeder reactors for weapons-grade plutonium.</li>
<li>Collaboration with Russia raises global security concerns.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>CSIS Wargaming:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Highlights the risk of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict.</li>
<li>Diplomacy and readiness key to preventing catastrophe.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Third Nuclear Age:</strong>
<ul>
<li>UK and US emphasize increasing complexity in global nuclear threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Reagan Defense Forum: Key Takeaways</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Panel 1: Indo-Pacific Challenges</strong>
<ul>
<li>Admiral Paparo stressed the urgency of deterrence in the face of China’s ambitions toward Taiwan.</li>
<li>Marine Corps General Eric Smith: <em>“What would you pay not to lose a war? Everything and anything.”</em></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Panel 2: Innovation in Defense</strong>
<ul>
<li>Heidi Shu: Encouraged bolstering supply chains and supporting small, innovative companies.</li>
<li>Senator Todd Young: Warned about biological threats and vulnerabilities tied to US-China economic ties.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Peace Through Strength:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Reinforced the need for defense investment to deter adversaries and maintain global stability.</li>
<li>Palantir CEO emphasized America’s role as a dominant power, inspiring both fear in adversaries and confidence in allies.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<h3><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/ICBM-EAR-Week-of-December-8th.pdf"><span style="color: #0000ff;">Read The Full Report</span></a></h3>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-december-8th/">ICBM EAR Report December 8th</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>The Political Economy of Security</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-political-economy-of-security/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-political-economy-of-security/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Holland]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 31 Oct 2024 19:19:51 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29252</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As Americans enter an era of unprecedented technological innovation and global instability, the question of how to secure the nation’s future looms large. While discussions around deterrence often focus on military strategies, weapons modernization, and the shifting balance of power, there is an economic dimension to national security that is largely overlooked. Without proper fiscal [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-political-economy-of-security/">The Political Economy of Security</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As Americans enter an era of unprecedented technological innovation and global instability, the question of how to secure the nation’s future looms large. While discussions around deterrence often focus on military strategies, weapons modernization, and the shifting balance of power, there is an economic dimension to national security that is largely overlooked. Without proper fiscal management, the United States risks losing its ability to maintain credible deterrence in the face of growing challenges.</p>
<p>Specifically, if the United States does not reduce government spending and reduce the national debt, the nation’s ability to modernize the nuclear arsenal and keep pace with rapid technological advancements is not possible. It is time for a “guns versus butter” debate that ultimately reigns in domestic spending.</p>
<p>The relationship between economic power and military strength is well-documented. As Paul Poast notes, “<a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-070912">Money is power</a>.” <a href="https://cheirif.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/paul-kennedy-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-great-powers-19891.pdf">Paul Kennedy’s research</a> empirically shows, from the Roman Empire to the Cold War, that economic decline often precedes the erosion of military dominance. In today’s context, the United States faces a growing national debt, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/06/18/national-debt-budget-projections-cbo/">projected to surpass $50 trillion by 2033</a>, according to the <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58946">Congressional Budget Office</a>. While this staggering figure is often discussed in terms of domestic economic consequences, such as inflation and interest rates, its implications for national security are equally alarming. The costs of servicing this debt, combined with rising entitlement spending, will leave fewer resources available for defense.</p>
<p><strong>Deterrence and the Need for Modernization</strong></p>
<p>Deterrence, particularly nuclear deterrence, is the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1801797/4-things-to-know-about-the-us-nuclear-deterrence-strategy/">bedrock of American security strategy</a> since the end of World War II. The ability to deter adversaries—whether through nuclear capabilities or advanced conventional forces—depends on maintaining a credible threat of retaliation. This requires not only a robust military infrastructure but also a commitment to modernization.</p>
<p>The American nuclear arsenal, a cornerstone of deterrence, is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/06/opinion/nuclear-power-us-invest.html">aging</a>. The <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/Americas-Nuclear-Triad/">nuclear triad</a>—comprising land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), ballistic missile submarines, and strategic bombers—was largely developed during the Cold War. Many of these systems are nearing the end of their operational lives, and without significant investment, they will soon become less effective. The <a href="https://www.afnwc.af.mil/Weapon-Systems/Sentinel-ICBM-LGM-35A/">Sentinel ICBM</a> program and the <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf"><em>Columbia</em>-class submarine</a> are critical components of this modernization effort, but they come with hefty price tags. The Department of Defense estimates that modernizing the nuclear triad will cost over <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/U.S.-Nuclear-Weapons-Modernization-Costs-Constraints-Fact-Sheet-v-May-2023.pdf">$1.5 trillion</a> over the next 30 years.</p>
<p>This modernization is not optional. As adversaries like <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/16/china-nuclear-arsenal-weapons/">China</a> and <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12672">Russia</a> expand their nuclear capabilities, failure to update our arsenal would undermine the credibility of American deterrence. In addition, <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/IF10472.pdf">North Korea’s continued nuclear development</a> and <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/irans-nuclear-threshold-challenge/">Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons</a> only increase the need for a reliable deterrent. However, modernization is only possible with sustained investment. If the US continues its current fiscal trajectory, defense spending will only decline, as it already has, by the <a href="https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2024/08/what-is-the-national-debt-costing-us#:~:text=The%20Congressional%20Budget%20Office%20(CBO,trillion%20over%20the%20next%20decade.">growing demands of interest payments</a> on the national debt and mandatory spending on programs like Social Security and Medicare.</p>
<p><strong>Technological Advancements: The New Frontier of Deterrence</strong></p>
<p>Beyond nuclear modernization, the future of deterrence will be defined by emerging technologies. As Michael Horowitz notes in his <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-032725">2020 article</a>, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, autonomous drone warfare, cyber warfare, and hypersonic weapons are reshaping the nature of conflict. These technologies have the potential to transform military operations by providing advanced capabilities for precision strikes, autonomous systems, and cyber operations that can incapacitate an adversary’s critical infrastructure without the need for traditional warfare.</p>
<p>However, the integration of these technologies into the American defense apparatus requires substantial investment in research, development, and deployment. <a href="https://itif.org/publications/2024/09/16/china-is-rapidly-becoming-a-leading-innovator-in-advanced-industries/#:~:text=In%20all%20these%20industries%2C%20China,over%20the%20last%2025%20years.">China is already making significant strides in AI and quantum technologies</a>, while <a href="https://fortune.com/2024/03/15/russia-china-hypersonic-innovation-holding-us-back-politics-tech/">Russia continues to prioritize hypersonic weapons development</a>. The US cannot afford to fall behind in this technology race, as the consequences for deterrence are dire. A nation that lacks cutting-edge capabilities risks becoming vulnerable to both traditional and non-traditional forms of warfare.</p>
<p>Yet, technological innovation is expensive. Maintaining a competitive edge in AI, cyber capabilities, and other advanced technologies requires not only a well-funded military but also a robust industrial and academic infrastructure. If government spending continues to spiral out of control, the funds necessary to develop and integrate these technologies will be diverted to service the national debt or shore up social welfare programs. This creates a vicious cycle in which the American military falls further behind while adversaries close the gap—or even surpass the United States—in critical areas.</p>
<p><strong>The Economic Roots of Military Power</strong></p>
<p>The decline in military readiness that results from unchecked government spending and rising debt is not hypothetical. Historical examples illustrate the dangers of economic mismanagement leading to military weakness. The Soviet Union, for instance, collapsed, in part, because it <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/first/s/simes-collapse.html?scp=169&amp;sq=george%20kennan&amp;st=Search">overextended itself militarily</a> while failing to <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/021716/why-ussr-collapsed-economically.asp">manage its economic challenges</a>. While the US is far from Soviet-style economic collapse, the lesson is clear; no nation can maintain military dominance without a strong economic foundation.</p>
<p>Paul Poast, a leading scholar on the political economy of security, <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-070912">highlights the importance of economic capacity in sustaining military power</a>. Military expenditures are only sustainable if the state has the economic resources to support them. Poast argues that focusing solely on military budgets without addressing the underlying economic conditions that make those budgets possible is a recipe for disaster.</p>
<p>In the American case, <a href="https://www.pgpf.org/the-fiscal-and-economic-challenge/fiscal-and-economic-impact">the growing national debt is directly threatening the economic foundation</a> necessary for sustained military investment. Interest payments on the debt already consume $900 billion each year, and that figure is expected to rise significantly in the coming decade. As interest rates increase, so will the cost of servicing the debt, leaving fewer funds available for national defense. Without a course correction, this fiscal irresponsibility will leave the US incapable of maintaining its military superiority, much less modernizing its forces for the future.</p>
<p><strong>The Path Forward: Fiscal Responsibility as a National Security Imperative</strong></p>
<p>To avoid this grim future, the US must prioritize fiscal responsibility as part of its broader national security strategy. There are no historical examples of any nation borrowing its way to prosperity. This begins with reining in government spending and reducing the national debt. While this may require difficult political choices—such as reforming entitlement programs or scaling back certain discretionary spending—the alternative is far worse. A nation that cannot afford to invest in its defense is a nation that cannot defend itself.</p>
<p>Moreover, reducing the national debt would free up resources for the investments necessary to modernize the nuclear arsenal and integrate emerging technologies into the military. By putting the nation’s fiscal house in order, it is possible to ensure that the US remains a global leader in both traditional and technological forms of deterrence. Failure to do so risks not only economic consequences but also the erosion of America’s ability to defend its interests and allies in an increasingly volatile world.</p>
<p>The political economy of security is not just about guns and bombs—it is about dollars and cents. If the nation fails to address the growing national debt, the US will prove unable to modernize its nuclear arsenal or keep pace with the technological change that is defining the future of warfare. Fiscal responsibility is not just a domestic issue; it is a national security imperative. Only by controlling spending and reducing debt can deterrence remain credible.</p>
<p>By taking the necessary steps now, the nation can secure a future where America’s deterrent capabilities remain strong and its security unassailable. Failing risks a future where deterrence fails, and with it, the ability to protect the nation and its allies. The stakes could not be higher.</p>
<p><em>Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/The-Political-Economy-of-Security_Deterrence.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-political-economy-of-security/">The Political Economy of Security</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>NATO’s Defense Math Does Not Add Up</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/natos-defense-math-does-not-add-up/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/natos-defense-math-does-not-add-up/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christophe Bosquillon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Oct 2024 12:38:50 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29001</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The United States is by far the largest contributor to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations. According to NATO estimates published in June 2024, the United States will spend $967.7 billion on defense in 2024, roughly 10 times as much as Germany, the second-largest spending country, with $97.7 billion. Total NATO military expenditures for 2024 are estimated at $1.474.4 [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/natos-defense-math-does-not-add-up/">NATO’s Defense Math Does Not Add Up</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The United States is by far the largest contributor to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations. According to NATO estimates published in June 2024, the United States will spend $967.7 billion on defense in 2024, roughly 10 times as much as Germany, the second-largest spending country, with $97.7 billion.</p>
<p>Total NATO military expenditures for 2024 are estimated at $1.474.4 trillion. As Russia grows increasingly assertive, many on both sides of the Atlantic are wondering how NATO member-states will step up and contribute to the continent’s defense.</p>
<p>To withstand a Russian attack, NATO must plan for between 35 and 50 extra brigades of 3,000–7,000 troops each—adding 105,000–350,000 soldiers. Germany must contribute 3–5 extra brigades or 20,000–30,000 combat troops.</p>
<p>Protection from air attacks is a major German and Eastern European vulnerability. Former German Defense Minister and current President of the European Commission Ursula van der Leyen recently emphasized the need for Germany, under its new defense plans, to quadruple its air defenses. That includes Patriot missile batteries and shorter-range systems to protect bases, ports, and railway transportation systems.</p>
<p>Should Russia attack NATO, hundreds of thousands of troops, together with tanks, equipment, and ammunitions, will have to make their way to the eastern front through Germany. Preparations for war with Russia indicate that Poland, the Baltics, and other Eastern NATO allies are primary targets, but so is Germany. During the Cold War, Germany had 36 Patriot missile air defense units. The count is down to nine—after donating three to Ukraine. Berlin just ordered four Patriot missile units at a cost of 1.35 billion euros.</p>
<p>The United States spends about 3.5 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, but the Congressional Budget Office projects that will fall to 2.5 percent by 2034. NATO member-states recently issued a joint communique that said, “We reaffirm that, in many cases, expenditure beyond 2 percent of GDP will be needed in order to remedy existing shortfalls and meet the requirements across all domains arising from a more contested security order.”</p>
<p>The Baltic states are adamant about the need for increased defense spending. Tuuli Duneton, Estonia’s Undersecretary for Defense Policy, praised the 23 NATO member-states who now meet the 2 percent spending target. She suggested raising the spending goal to 2.5 to 3 percent.</p>
<p>Pointing to NATO’s “capability gaps,” Lithuanian Defense Minister Laurynas Kasčiūna stated, “We’ll start to talk at least about 2.5 percent as a floor,” pointing to NATO’s “capability gaps.” He added, “When we analyze what the countries need to develop soon, for a decade maybe, it’s not even 2.5 percent. It’s not even 3 percent. It should be more if you want more air defense systems, if you want more long-range strike capabilities.”</p>
<p>NATO plans focus on logistics, troop movement, and cyber defenses in preparation for conflict with Russia. After NATO’s plans for the biggest defense upgrade in three decades were agreed upon last year, now is the moment of truth: the minimum defense requirements to meet these plans were sent to national governments, highlighting significant shortfalls in air defenses, long-range missiles, troop numbers, ammunition, logistics, and secure digital communications.</p>
<p>Fixing these shortfalls requires billions of euros in investment. By autumn 2025, NATO aims to set binding targets for members to ensure Europe’s defense. Achieving these targets may be difficult due to budgetary constraints and differing views on NATO’s stance towards Russia.</p>
<p>NATO’s effort to navigate a moment of clear and present danger is made more difficult by the Herculean task of rearming. Deep industrial reconstitution and technological evolution are both needed and taking place across all value chains in all defense tech investments, including space, cyber, drones, and the role of artificial intelligence on the battlefield. Despite its current state of political uncertainty, change-adverse politicians and populations must be convinced of the need for refocusing on defense.</p>
<p>Europe must face a <em>Kulturkampf</em> in which Europeans overcome the three decades of cognitive denial about war in Europe. The biggest obstacle to the above efforts is likely to come from populations that are accustomed to generous welfare programs at the expense of defense preparations. Europe cannot tax its way out of its current problem. European taxes are already the highest in the world.</p>
<p>Compelling communication strategies are essential to justify the increased defense budgets. Officials need to emphasize the pan-European necessity for national and regional security. The twin brother of blood and treasure returned from a long hiatus. Making the argument to citizens becomes an even tougher sell if conscription across Europe is required to mobilize hundreds of thousands of troops to fight.</p>
<p>Asking ordinary citizens in Western or Southern Europe whether they are willing to die for Ukraine or Lithuania or even Poland will likely draw a negative response. Not all European populations seem willing, able, and ready to fight as nation-states united under the concept of pan-European patriotic defense. Those now leading the <em>effort de guerre</em> are found among Poles, Balts, and, in no small part, the newly energized Nordic countries.</p>
<p>In short, if Europe wishes to survive, it must adapt, deter, and defend itself now. Waiting will only add more blood and treasure to the bill that must be paid.</p>
<p><em>Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/NATOs-Defense-Math-Doesnt-Add-Up.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/natos-defense-math-does-not-add-up/">NATO’s Defense Math Does Not Add Up</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Our Delusional Presidential Campaigns</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/our-delusional-presidential-campaigns/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/our-delusional-presidential-campaigns/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stephen Blank]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Sep 2024 12:11:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Government & Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American prosperity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense buildup]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense Spending]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[domestic pressures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[economic illiteracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[economic policies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[generational change]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[international challenges]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[media scrutiny]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military modernization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National debt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[presidential campaigns]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tariffs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vice President Kamala Harris]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[world leadership]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=28822</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>To date, both presidential campaigns have mostly evaded any serious discussion of the real issues challenging the United States. When they have discussed them, they have interspersed potentially serious ideas with dismaying, if not shocking, examples of economic illiteracy. Vice President Kamala Harris certainly grasps the fact that voters respond to promise that their cost [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/our-delusional-presidential-campaigns/">Our Delusional Presidential Campaigns</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>To date, both presidential campaigns have mostly evaded any serious discussion of the real issues challenging the United States. When they have discussed them, they have interspersed potentially serious ideas with dismaying, if not shocking, examples of economic illiteracy.</p>
<p>Vice President Kamala Harris certainly grasps the fact that voters respond to promise that their cost of living will come down, but they rarely understand the implication for the economy of government intervention. Harris’ calls for price controls on drugs and groceries and promises of tax cuts for the poor or benefits increases fails to explain how and who will pay for them.</p>
<p>At the same time, Donald Trump’s call for 10 percent tariffs on all imports and 60 percent tariffs on Chinese goods, plus his threat to deport many of the estimated 20 million illegal aliens currently in the United States, not only amounts to higher prices, but it will devastate the agricultural, restaurant, construction, and hospitality industries. It is certainly not a free trader perspective. Thus, neither party’s perspective offers a clear path to growth, offsetting tax hikes, like tariffs, or increased federal revenue with which to pay for all the benefits they are offering.</p>
<p>Since the US is both the principal and ultimate arbiter of international order, whose power rests on the sound management of its economy, both examples of this illiteracy endanger not just the American economy, but that of other states around the world. Worse yet, these examples of misconceived economic thinking come at a time when international challenges are rapidly multiplying. Indeed, <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2024/07/national-defense-commission-pentagon-has-insufficient-forces-inadequate-to-face-china-russia/">bipartisan reports</a> describe the American military as increasingly maladapted to contemporary and future threats.</p>
<p>These reports underscore the urgent need for comprehensive modernization, recapitalization, and increases of both conventional and nuclear arsenals due to mounting challenges from the axis of authoritarianism: China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Indeed, <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/2024AnnualMeeting/Pranay-Vaddi-remarks">even the Biden administration,</a> which cannot be accused of partiality towards nuclear weapons, has stated the need for modernization and investment in newer and more nuclear weapons and, recently, went so far as to alter nuclear employment guidance.</p>
<p>At the same time, Americans have equally urgent domestic pressures that must be seriously addressed but are not discussed. These include the need to reduce deficits, ensure long-term non-inflationary growth, increase the labor participation rate, maintain technological leadership, reform and simplify the tax code, and apply existing immigration law while determining if new laws are needed. Yet nobody is seriously raising these domestic issues let alone addressing the fact that a strong economy is needed to address defense challenges—and build the military needed.</p>
<p>For example, neither campaign mentioned that servicing the national debt, for the first time in history, exceeded defense spending in 2024. This fact represents an unmistakable sign of decline and is a canary in the coal mine that the nation must reduce domestic redistribution programs while also carefully employing military force when absolutely necessary.</p>
<p>Neither should a response to these challenges lead the nation, as some Republicans argue, into a new unilateralism that would isolate the US from its allies and lead to further chaos. Nor can the nation afford a progressive policy of ever greater spending on redistribution programs—without paying for them.</p>
<p>Both sets of delusional thinking ultimately bring about the worst of all possible outcomes. Americans will find themselves with a greater probability of war and lower economic growth.</p>
<p>It is time both campaigns’ economic policies are subjected to tougher scrutiny by the media and voters. They must be persuaded, if not compelled, by the exigencies of politics, to explain how they will pay for future needs, balance the budget, and confront well-known challenges.</p>
<p>This requirement should apply to defense modernization as well. If history is any guide, only a serious threat to the nation motivates government and industry to mobilize capability for the required defense buildup. The bipartisan reports, mentioned above, clearly suggest the United States is facing a similar threat to that faced by imperial Japan and Nazi Germany before World War II began.</p>
<p>Vice President Harris and former President Trump must address questions going far beyond the partisan bickering that is endemic of this election. Perhaps the September 10 presidential debate will offer some clarity on important issues.</p>
<p>Commentators suggest that this election is about generational change. This, however, is no guarantee that change is for the better. Eastern Europe experienced great change after 1945, but it was decidedly for the worse.</p>
<p>Thinking strategically about medium- and long-term challenges and consequences is imperative. The abiding delusion that American prosperity, world leadership, and security is unending and self-sustaining deserves a much more rigorous evaluation. The nation may very well be standing on a precipice, and it will be the next president who either pulls the nation back or sends it over the edge. Let’s hope it is the former.</p>
<p><em>Stephen Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Our-Delusional-Presidential-Campaigns.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28497 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Download3-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Download3-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Download3.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/our-delusional-presidential-campaigns/">Our Delusional Presidential Campaigns</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Political Uncertainties Are Affecting Europe’s Defense Buildup</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/political-uncertainties-are-affecting-europes-defense-buildup/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/political-uncertainties-are-affecting-europes-defense-buildup/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christophe Bosquillon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Aug 2024 12:11:05 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[6th generation aircraft program]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense buildup]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense Spending]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Commission]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Parliament]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[France's parliament]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[French President Emmanuel Macron]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[French President Macron]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[General Sir Roland Walker]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitical alliances]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[German Chancellor Olaf Scholz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Green Deal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo-Pacific]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Labour Party's defense spending pledge]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Munich Security Conference]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National debt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Institute for Deterrence Studies. ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Rally]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO accession]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO's goals]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Political uncertainties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Senator JD Vance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK Conservatives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK Labour Party]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine's path to membership]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US fiscal constraints]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US military aid for Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US presidential election]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=28697</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Following European Parliament elections in June, French president, Emanuel Macron, abruptly dissolved his own parliament and held elections that left him without a majority. In the United Kingdom (UK), Keir Starmer’s Labour Party won a majority in parliament, making Starmer the first Labour prime minister in 14 years. Former German Defense Minister, Ursula von der [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/political-uncertainties-are-affecting-europes-defense-buildup/">Political Uncertainties Are Affecting Europe’s Defense Buildup</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Following European Parliament <a href="https://apnews.com/article/eu-election-results-european-parliament-acd0ceef91d198cf5e9ee695f394b28c">elections</a> in June, French president, Emanuel Macron, abruptly dissolved his own parliament and held elections that left him <a href="https://apnews.com/article/france-elections-far-right-macron-08f10a7416a2494c85dcd562f33401d1">without a majority</a>. In the United Kingdom (UK), Keir Starmer’s Labour Party won a majority in parliament, making Starmer the first Labour prime minister in 14 years. Former German Defense Minister, Ursula von der Leyen, was reelected for 5 more years as President of the European Commission. And while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) called Ukraine’s path to membership “irreversible” in a new pledge, American support for Europe and Ukraine may shift after the presidential election in November. In short, political uncertainty is impacting Europe’s defense buildup.</p>
<p>Prior to their defeat, the UK’s Conservatives advocated for raising defense spending to 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030, higher than NATO’s existing 2 percent goal for member states. Their 14-year record left much to be desired with programs cancelled, defense investment waning, and the British armed forces nearly “hollowed out.” Enter Labour, which also pledged to spend 2.5 percent of GDP on defense, subject to streamlining government finances. With an unwavering commitment to NATO and the UK’s nuclear deterrent, such an increase may be possible.</p>
<p>However, Labour’s immediate decision was to declare a “strategic” pause on the 6th-generation aircraft program whilst they investigate its feasibility. Chief of the General Staff General Sir Roland Walker <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rDIip1V5c5Y">predicted</a> that Britain must be ready within three years to fight a war against an “axis of upheaval” of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. And when delivering his closing keynote address at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Land Warfare Conference (2024), Walker declared that he intends to double the Army in three years and triple it by 2030.</p>
<p>In France, foreign and defense policy are reserved for the president. However, it is the parliament that controls the purse, which is problematic when the president’s party does not hold a majority in parliament—the case for Macron. Because Macron was concerned with the strong showing of the “far right” National Rally in European Parliament elections, he abruptly dissolved the French Parliament, calling for constitutionally scripted elections in two rounds, for its 577 members (called “députés”) to be renewed.</p>
<p>The first round saw the National Rally come in first place, followed by an improvised grouping of “far left” communists, socialists, and greens, with Macron’s centrist party shrinking and the center-right Les Républicains barely surviving. Tactical voting in the second round had Macron’s party and the hastily coalesced left mutually desist to prevent the right-leaning candidates from reaching an absolute majority. This resulted in a hung parliament, with no pathway for coalitions leading to an absolute majority from which a prime minister could be selected.</p>
<p>Because of France’s election outcome, Macron might wait until September to nominate a prime minister. No one knows from which party the prime minister will come. The key is choosing a person who can ensure the government survives any parliamentary motion to terminate the government. Thus, it remains unclear how the potential ungovernability of France, until the 2027 presidential election, may affect defense policy.</p>
<p>The European Parliament’s swing to the right weakened German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social-Democrat Party and his Green Party allies. Former German defense minister, Ursula von der Leyen, recently won reelection to the presidency of the European Commission by a more comfortable margin than five years ago, grabbing the vote of Green Party members. She pledged to implement the <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en">Green Deal</a>, albeit in diluted form. Von der Leyen also received support from Italian prime minister Georgia Meloni, who leads the right-wing coalition immediately on von der Leyen’s right, though not as “far” right as the coalition led by French National Rally’s Marine Le Pen and Hungary’s Victor Orban. As president of the European Commission, von der Leyen offers strong support for Ukraine, and stronger European defense—in areas where the European Commission can sway what national governments plan and implement.</p>
<p>At the NATO 75th anniversary summit in Washington, DC, the national leaders of member-states issued a plan for the next year, calling Ukraine’s path to membership in the alliance “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-nato-membership-summit-4156df4062e69e0da38e7c18bf657285">irreversible</a>.” That statement follows a <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/ru/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm?selectedLocale=en">document</a> issued by NATO at the 2023 Vilnius, Lithuania, summit. For NATO accession to start, a country should not be involved in on-going conflict. So even if the NATO accession process could be accelerated for Ukraine, it is unlikely to happen any time soon. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, was not given an accession schedule.</p>
<p>In February 2024, at the annual Munich Security Conference, long before his selection as Donald Trump’s running mate, Senator JD Vance rang alarm bells among Europe’s political and foreign policy elites when he voiced his opposition to military aid for Ukraine and bluntly warned that Europe will have to rely <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/rebuilding-a-credible-european-nuclear-deterrent/">less on the US</a> to support NATO. Political rhetoric has a place in American elections, but the fact is, American presidents change their views as resources tighten.</p>
<p>Regardless of whether Donald Trump or Kamala Harris win the White House in November, the United States faces fiscal constraints in the years ahead because it faces a national debt that now exceeds defense spending. A perfect storm driven by the “Axis of Upheaval” may absorb American capability in the Indo-Pacific while the US is stretched thin elsewhere.</p>
<p>Europeans may signal which candidate they perceive as more hostile to their interest, but it is the geopolitical and budgetary math that ultimately shapes the nature of alliances. Unless Europe tackles the harsh reality that it must take its own defense seriously, French President Macron will be proven right after he once argued that it was not only an issue of sovereignty, but a matter of survival for Europe<em>.</em> How that works politically and fiscally is for Europe to figure out.</p>
<p><em>Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Political-Uncertainties-Impact-Defense-Buildup.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28497 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Download3-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Download3-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Download3.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/political-uncertainties-are-affecting-europes-defense-buildup/">Political Uncertainties Are Affecting Europe’s Defense Buildup</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Allied Air Defense</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/allied-air-defense/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Todd Clawson]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2024 12:14:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Air Defense]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[cruise missiles]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[drones]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=28135</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Recent action by the United States and like-minded nations to defend Israel from an unprecedented Iranian airstrike demonstrates how the United States and NATO can defend their allies and partners against similar air threats. With a 99 percent success rate in downing Iranian ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and long-range attack drones, this should serve as [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/allied-air-defense/">Allied Air Defense</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recent action by the United States and like-minded nations to defend Israel from an unprecedented Iranian airstrike demonstrates how the United States and NATO can defend their allies and partners against similar air threats. With a 99 percent success rate in downing Iranian ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and long-range attack drones, this should serve as an indicator of how NATO can support the defense of Ukrainian critical infrastructure, for example. The use of a diverse mix of air defense ships and aircraft, as part of providing an advanced integrated air and missile defense shield for Israel, offers valuable lessons for future endeavors.</p>
<p>The lessons from this experience are numerous. First, American and coalition air defenses performed marvelously in the <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/opinion-five-considerations-after-iran-s-attack-on-israel/ar-BB1lEOla">political act of coordinating multiple nations</a> in the defense of Israel. This required working out the logistical issues prior to taking a defensive posture ahead of time.</p>
<p>Second, the response proved the maturity of ballistic missile defenses. Israel’s Iron Dome (and other defenses), American SM-3s, and coalition systems were excellent. It was a practical demonstration of the technical improvements in air and missile defenses.</p>
<p>Third, the response was a demonstration of successful intelligence integration. Coordinating intelligence among coalition partners is never easy, but as the coalition response proved, it is possible.</p>
<p>Fourth, coalition members took full advantage of the geography and time provided by Iranian air strike. With the coalition expecting a response, they had the time needed to prepare for an attack. Moreover, due to the distances the cruise missiles and drones had to traverse, coalition defenders could best posture themselves at the optimal locations to intercept inbound weapons.</p>
<p>However, there are also negative lessons to learn from the coalition’s response to Iran’s attack. First, the response was expensive. At least <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/2968223/navy-down-1-billion-munitions-has-fended-off-130-direct-attacks-six-months/">$1 billion was spent to defend Israel</a> from Iranian and Houthi attacks. Israel <a href="https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-iran-strikes-live-coverage/card/israel-s-cost-of-intercepting-iranian-barrage-is-put-at-over-550-million-uamrOjZkoRBNGRfjWbD6">spent half a billion dollars</a> to defend against this single attack.  Such expenditures are unsustainable. While this captures the immediate costs, more time is needed to determine the long-term/opportunity costs.</p>
<p>Second, the United States is continuing to deplete limited stocks of expensive and exquisite missile systems against relatively cheaper Iranian weapons. The US and coalition must reverse this exhaustion strategy.</p>
<p>The variation in responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Iran’s attack on Israel certainly create difficult political questions. Taiwan, for example, may look at its own situation and see this varied response as politically problematic for itself. Fears of escalation against a nuclear power are logical, but to defeat any of these nations equates to extinction. Defending these democratic nations’ right to exist is in the United States’ and NATO’s interest.</p>
<p>The United States does not, however, have the luxury of time in preparing for future Russian or Chinese attacks on Ukraine or Taiwan. Any attack will also see far more sophisticated weaponry than that employed by Iran. Thus, defending Ukraine and Taiwan requires persistent forces ready to defend these nations.</p>
<p>If the United States, NATO, and other American allies are committed to defending democracies like Ukraine and Taiwan, there are three moves the United States should make. First, it must take proactive and deliberate actions. It could include establishing defensive zones around critical infrastructure and civilian population centers. This includes combined land- and sea-based defenses for shooting down air attacks. The goal is to protect civilians and critical infrastructure against indiscriminate attacks.</p>
<p>Second, the United States should accelerate investments in inexpensive weapon systems.  Providing more inexpensive air defenses allows for sustained defense. Focusing on capabilities that disrupt adversary surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting systems along with electronic warfare effort should serve as a central focus. The US and NATO must counter the exhaustion strategy employed by Russia, China, and Iran.</p>
<p>Third, the United States and its allies should enhance their partnership by further exchanging lessons learned, innovative ideas, and best practices for defending against evolving attacks. Reducing bureaucratic obstacles that limit ally and partner access to critical air defenses is part of that effort.</p>
<p>The reasons for doing this are simple and best summarized in four points. First, it is important to improve American credibility. Nothing will aid American deterrence efforts more. There is ample reason to argue that Ukraine and Taiwan should receive the same support as Israel. All are fighting for their nations as enemies vow to destroy them. Thus, the US and NATO must do more to protect democratic nations.</p>
<p>Second, for the sake of deterrence, demonstrating to adversaries that the United States will not allow air strikes on democratic nations is important. Establishing protective cover with American and NATO forces can act as a deterrent that drives tensions down. The “responsibility to protect” concept is useful in deterring Russia, China, and/or Iran from attacking the infrastructure and citizenry of democratic states. There is always a risk of escalation by intervening, however. The risk of defeat and the elimination of democratic states by authoritarian regimes would, however, do irreparable harm to the United States’ standing in the world.</p>
<p>Third, there is value in creating and enforcing international norms. Even though Russia and China would veto any UN Security Council resolution supporting the defense of Ukraine or Taiwan, establishing such norms is worth the effort.</p>
<p>Fourth, the United States must defend democracy and freedom. Many nations are looking at both Western democracies and Eastern authoritarians to determine which path to follow. It is in the United States’ interest for them to take the democratic path.</p>
<p>It is time for the West to take a stand. While Americans may not seek war, authoritarian adversaries often believe that war is their best option for reshaping the world in their own image. The United States and some NATO member states demonstrated the means and will to defend Israel against Iranian air attack. Providing a similar defense to Ukraine and Taiwan certainly deserves further consideration if the United States aspires to continue leading the free world. Abrogating that position would be a mistake. It is now time for the US and NATO to take more risks in supporting friends in their hour of need.</p>
<p><em>CDR (Ret.) Todd Clawson is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  Opinions expressed are the author&#8217;s own and not those of the Department of Defense or the Department of the Navy. </em></p>
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		<title>The US Must Handle Its Fiscal Challenges</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-us-must-handle-its-fiscal-challenges/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Carl Rhodes]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 10 Jun 2024 12:11:55 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>The United States government finds itself in an unprecedented financial situation. Over the next 12 months, the amount of public debt held by the federal government will exceed the size of the nation’s economy. As a fraction of gross domestic product (GDP), debt has grown to a size not seen since the end of World [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-us-must-handle-its-fiscal-challenges/">The US Must Handle Its Fiscal Challenges</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The United States government finds itself in an unprecedented financial situation. Over the next 12 months, the amount of public debt held by the federal government will exceed the size of the nation’s economy. As a fraction of gross domestic product (GDP), debt has grown to a size not seen since the end of World War II. <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59710">Projections from the Congressional Budget Office</a> (CBO) indicate debt will continue to grow to 130 percent of GDP by 2040.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-28079 aligncenter" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Fiscal1-300x168.png" alt="" width="590" height="330" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Fiscal1-300x168.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Fiscal1-1024x572.png 1024w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Fiscal1-768x429.png 768w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Fiscal1.png 1212w" sizes="(max-width: 590px) 100vw, 590px" /></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Data source: <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59710#data">https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59710#data</a></p>
<p>Deficit spending is a long-standing tradition in the US, with a budget surplus occurring in only four of the past 50 years. Debates about the size and importance of the federal debt raged for decades. With interest rates at historically low levels prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, debt financing came at a relatively small price soothing many concerns about deficit spending. Over the 2010s, net interest to finance the debt averaged only 6.8 percent of government spending and just 1.4 percent of GDP. Low interest rates led <a href="https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Furman%20Jason%20Summers%20and%20Lawrence_2019_whos%20afraid%20of%20budget%20deficits_foreign%20affairs.pdf">some to argue</a> that “[t]he economics of deficits have changed,” and that reducing the debt and deficit spending should be a low priority compared to continued government investments in security, infrastructure, and well-being.</p>
<p>Two fundamental factors emerged to accelerate debt accumulation during the COVID-19 pandemic and aftermath. First, federal deficit spending limited the negative economic consequences of federal, state, and local responses to COVID-19. Second, the Federal Reserve sought to control inflation, a result of the Federal Reserve’s practice of “quantitative easing,” by increasing interest rates following the end of the pandemic—increasing government borrowing costs. The overall result was that net interest on government debt more than doubled between 2019 and 2024 in actual dollars. More funds spent to finance the debt leaves a smaller fraction of outlays available for discretionary spending, including national defense.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class=" wp-image-28080 aligncenter" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Fiscal2-300x167.png" alt="" width="580" height="323" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Fiscal2-300x167.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Fiscal2-1024x571.png 1024w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Fiscal2-768x428.png 768w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Fiscal2.png 1213w" sizes="(max-width: 580px) 100vw, 580px" /></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Data source: <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-tables/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-tables/</a><br />
<a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59710#data">https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59710#data</a></p>
<p>As the above chart illustrates, the percentage of GDP allocated to debt repayment surpassed defense spending in 2024. Future CBO projections appear in dashed lines. Major wars in Korea, Vietnam, and the height of the Cold War increased defense spending in the short term, but the overall trend was downward. Future defense spending is increasingly constrained by spending growth in both debt and nondiscretionary programs. With debt repayment exceeding <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-defense-budget-pentagon-u-s-military-china-russia-israel-ukraine-ba7fd46b">defense spending</a>, the American people should see this as a warning that must be redressed. Given great-power competition with China and several active hotspots around the world, decreasing American defense funding as a fraction of GDP is a significant concern. However, defense spending remains at a relative high point when examined in constant-year dollars.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28081 aligncenter" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Fiscal3-300x166.png" alt="" width="528" height="292" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Fiscal3-300x166.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Fiscal3-1024x566.png 1024w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Fiscal3-768x425.png 768w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Fiscal3.png 1213w" sizes="(max-width: 528px) 100vw, 528px" /></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Data source: <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-tables/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-tables/</a><br />
<a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59710#data">https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59710#data</a>.</p>
<p>The size of defense budgets, accounting for inflation, provides a more optimistic view. The solid line presents historic defense spending in constant 2024 dollars and the dashed line, again, represents CBO projections. From 1950–2000, US defense spending increased significantly during major conflicts and at the height of the Cold War. Over those fifty years, peaks in defense spending remained below $750 billion in fiscal year 2024 dollars. Post–September 11, 2001, operations resulted in much higher levels of spending, approaching $940 billion at its peak. Even with reductions over the 2010s, spending over the next decade projects to be 15 percent higher annually than at the peak of the Cold War.</p>
<p>Even with high levels of spending, the current US force structure is in desperate need of modernization due to a laser-sharp focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in prior decades. Since the year 2000, operations and maintenance (O&amp;M) spending has taken an increasing share of the national security budget. This means the United States is using its assets in combat and on deployment. Over the past 24 years, O&amp;M averaged 39 percent of the national security budget. In the 35 years prior to 2000, this number was only 30 percent.</p>
<p>The growing fraction of O&amp;M costs left a smaller fraction of the budget available for system acquisition. What funds remained were heavily focused on winning the Global War on Terrorism, meaning that investments in technologically advanced systems to counter threats posed by China and Russia often took a back seat. A second effect of the lack of procurement is that today’s military is simply smaller. For example, the US Air Force will soon have a <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/air-force-divest-fleet-2025/">fleet of less than 5,000 aircraft</a> for the first time in its history and the US Navy will sail only <a href="https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/americas-incredible-shrinking-navy/">half the ships it did 40 years ago</a>. The outcome of these decisions, according to leading researchers, is that the “<a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2555-1.html">US defense strategy and posture have become insolvent</a>.”</p>
<p>What does this situation mean for the security of the US and its allies? While American involvement in a major conflict would certainly result in increased defense spending, there is precious little room for the peacetime defense budget to grow without large tax increases or significantly reduced spending on entitlement programs like Social Security and Medicare. The most likely outcome is that new investments will need to come at the expense of other platforms or spending inside the defense budget.</p>
<p>Closing the gap between strategic goals and the means needed to achieve those goals during this dangerous time of strategic competition requires a thorough examination of solutions beyond increasing defense spending. The defense strategy needs rightsizing and a focus on the most stressing threats to the nation’s security. New concepts for imposing costs on competitors need to be developed. Methods to deter conventional and nuclear conflict should also be prioritized with special attention paid toward developing methods to prevent a conventional conflict from escalating across the nuclear threshold.</p>
<p><em>Carl Rhodes, PhD, is a Senior Fellow with the </em><a href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/"><em>National Institute for Deterrence Studies</em></a><em> and the founder of Canberra-based </em><a href="https://www.robustpolicy.com/"><em>Robust Policy</em></a><em>.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-us-must-handle-its-fiscal-challenges/">The US Must Handle Its Fiscal Challenges</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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