Artificial intelligence is quietly redrawing the front lines of national security, and the United States’ Defense Industrial Base (DIB) now sits in the crosshairs of a new style of conflict. What once looked like routine cyber incidents now appears as a persistent campaign that fuses digital intrusion, supply chain manipulation, and targeted information operations into a single pressure system aimed at the factories, laboratories, and logistics networks that keep American forces armed and ready.

When most Americans imagine national defense, they focus on the uniformed force and the platforms that dominate headlines. Behind that visible edge of power stands a sprawling, largely private ecosystem of designers, manufacturers, software firms, logistics providers, depots, and research institutions that convert national intent into fielded combat capability. Federal regulation describes this DIB as the combined government and private sector industrial complex that can research, develop, produce, and sustain weapon systems and their components at the scale required for military operations.

That chain is far more diverse than the marquee names on major defense contracts. It includes niche machine shops, regional logistics firms, university laboratories, software providers, and government facilities that share technical data and workflow information through a constant flow of digital exchanges. Design files, bills of material, maintenance records, and operational telemetry form the nervous system of this industrial organism. When the system is healthy, the nation can surge production and sustain readiness under stress. When it is strained, deterrence becomes much harder to demonstrate in a crisis.

This industrial nervous system is absorbing AI at high speed, often with limited guardrails. Across the DIB, machine learning supports predictive maintenance, defect detection, demand forecasting, scheduling, and supply chain visibility. Corporate leadership often has only a surface-level understanding of how thinking machines can erode corporate identity, trust, and reputation quietly, yet catastrophically.

For the strategist, this adaptation expands the terrain adversaries can probe. Industry surveys in the World Economic Forum’s Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2026 report show that executives see AI as the primary driver of change in cybersecurity and regard AI-related vulnerabilities as the fastest-growing category of cyber risk. Organizations recognize that their attack surface is expanding as AI tools move into sensitive workflows, yet governance practices and security controls often lag deployment.

Hybrid campaigns against the DIB rarely announce themselves through spectacular outages. Security officials describe a patient pattern that begins with access and aims for endurance rather than immediate disruption. Once inside a network or supplier ecosystem, adversary teams map production rhythms, supplier dependencies, identity systems, and critical decision points where even modest delays can ripple across schedules and inventories. AI has become a force multiplier

for this reconnaissance, mining engineering files, and communications at machine speed and surfacing patterns that would take human analysts far longer to identify.

The contest is unfolding below the threshold of open conflict. Strategic competitors apply pressure through cyber intrusion, intellectual property theft, data manipulation, counterfeit insertion, and narrative operations designed to erode confidence in the U.S. capacity to arm itself and its allies. Hybrid pressure often manifests as subtle slowdown, rising cost, and creeping doubt rather than overt sabotage.

The stakes for deterrence are significant. Modern deterrence depends not only on visible platforms and war plans but also on an adversary’s belief that the United States can sustain forces and generate combat power at speed. If competitors conclude that AI-enabled systems in the DIB are brittle or easily manipulated, the credibility of deterrence weakens. The 2026 National Defense Strategy emphasizes strengthening the industrial base as a pillar of national power, tying cyber resilience directly to the ability to deter and wage war.

Pentagon planners increasingly describe cyber activity against the DIB as a persistent campaign environment. Adversaries can pursue national security effects through intrusions into private networks and business processes that support critical programs.

The technical attack surface is broad because the DIB operates as a tightly coupled system. Engineering teams collaborate across companies, moving design data through shared tools and platforms. Components flow through multiple tiers of suppliers before the final assembly. A single compromised vendor can offer adversaries access to multiple programs. Hybrid campaigns exploit these seams.

The effect of these operations extends beyond physical outcomes. Manipulated or stolen data can become material for influence narratives that frame U.S. production as unreliable or compromised. Production delays caused by cyber incidents can be amplified to sow doubt among allies about American capacity.

Adversary teams also benefit from repetition. They have treated the DIB as a learning environment, refining tradecraft through continuous operations. Hybrid coercion in this context is deliberate and calibrated, remaining below the threshold that would trigger a national response while still generating uncertainty and doubt.

Emerging evidence suggests that agentic AI systems are beginning to automate portions of this intrusion lifecycle. Automated chains reduce the cost of probing many suppliers and narrow the window for defenders to respond. For smaller firms with limited security resources, the pressure can quickly become unmanageable.

Security experts argue that defending against such campaigns will require disciplined governance and architecture. Pre-deployment AI security assessment and continuous validation must become standard practice, covering model selection, data provenance, access control, logging, and periodic reevaluation.

Architectural choices will also play a critical role. Zero trust principles and micro segmentation can reduce the impact of intrusions by limiting movement across networks. For DIB operators, this means treating segmentation and strong identity controls as the default architecture.

The industrial context around these cyber efforts is already volatile. The aerospace and defense sector is managing supply chain disruptions and resource constraints while trying to scale production. This environment amplifies the effectiveness of cyber sabotage and influence operations because attacks land in systems that are already stressed.

The strategic logic behind adversary focus on the DIB is clear. By degrading confidence and throughput, competitors can undercut deterrence without open conflict. When intrusions are contained and production continues under pressure, the calculus of hybrid aggression shifts.

Hybrid warfare against the DIB aims to bend trust in the systems that generate combat power. If those trust systems are distorted through advanced technologies and coordinated information operations, the result is slower decisions, higher costs, delayed output, and a quieter form of coercion.

Mr. Greg Sharpe is a Fellow and the director of Communications and Marketing for the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and the Managing Design Editor for the Global Security Review. Greg has over 35 years of military, federal civilian, and defense contractor experience in the fields of database development, digital marketing & analytics, technology use case exploration and assessment, and as a USAF doctrine outreach and engagement analyst. The views of the author are his own.

Quiet Warfare: Bending Data and Perceptions in the Defense Industrial Base was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Western Hemisphere is the de facto core position for undisputed U.S. power, integrity, and uncompromising sovereignty. While the U.S. commitment to Europe remains, European nation-states must step up to the plate and take charge of funding and leadership of their own defense. The segment on “civilisational erasure” is directly aligned with the position already made explicit by Vice President JD Vance in early 2025 at the Paris artificial intelligence conference in France and the Munich Security Conference in Germany.

One of the most meaningful merits of the NSS is its call to reposition economic security, industrial renaissance, and technological leadership at the heart of the U.S. strategy to deter and prevail in the event of military conflict. The NSS refrains from mentioning “major power competition,” opting instead for an acknowledgement of spheres of influence.  The NSS does not antagonizes China, instead framing it as an economic and technological competitor, rather than an ideological one. Sustaining American reshoring, reindustrialization, industrial base funding, technological edge, manufacturing supply chains, and access to critical materials, is what underwrites how the U.S. deals with China, deterrence postures notwithstanding. A clear focus on economic competition allows the NSS to remain as vague as possible on the potential for military confrontations in the Indo-Pacific.

Economy, Industry, Technology

In the 2025 NSS, the terms “economy/economic” are used 66 times and “industry/industrial” 19 times, including under “industrial base,” “industrial production,” and “industrial supply chains.” As for “technology/technological,” they appear 17 times. The core meaning of a dozen such mentions is captured as follows:

U.S. military power and diplomatic influence rest on a strong, resilient domestic economy. National security depends on rebuilding America’s industrial base, restoring economic self-reliance, and securing critical supply chains. Economic and technological competitiveness over the long term is essential to preventing conflict and sustaining global leadership. Further, the United States will actively protect its workers and firms from unfair economic practices.

American power requires an industrial sector able to meet both civilian and wartime production needs. Reindustrialization is a top national economic priority, aimed at strengthening the middle class and regaining control over production and supply chains. The U.S. will reshore manufacturing, attract investment, and expand domestic capacity, particularly in critical and emerging technologies. Hence a credible military depends on a robust and resilient defense industrial base.

Preserving merit, innovation, and technological leadership is essential to maintaining America’s historic advantages. Strengthening the resilience of the U.S. technology ecosystem, especially in areas such as AI, is a national priority and a foundation of global leadership. Thus, long-term success in technological competition is central to deterrence and conflict prevention.

Economic Security First

The 2025 NSS references industries primarily through a national-security lens, rather than civilian market categorization, including defense (industrial base, munitions production, weapons systems manufacturing, military supply chains), manufacturing (re-shored industrial production, domestic manufacturing capacity, wartime and peacetime production), energy (oil, gas, coal, nuclear) and its infrastructure and exports, strategic supply chains (critical materials, components and parts manufacturing, logistics and production networks), infrastructure, both physical and digital to be built at industrial-scale, and strategic technologies.

The 2025 NSS strategic technologies are artificial intelligence, explicitly cited as a comparative U.S. advantage; other critical and emerging technologies such as dual-use and strategic technologies tied to national power; defense and military technologie integrated with industrial and innovation advantages; intelligence and surveillance technologies such as monitoring supply chains, vulnerabilities, and threats; cyber technology including espionage, theft, and protection of intellectual property; industrial and manufacturing technologies aiming at re-shoring, reindustrialization, and advanced manufacturing; energy technologies directly linked to economic and national security; and sensitive technologies protected via aligned export controls.

The 2025 NSS treats economic power, industrial superiority, and technological edge as inseparable pillars of national security. Technology is framed less as a civilian growth driver and more as a strategic asset, a competitive weapon, and a deterrence multiplier. Civilian industry is subordinated to national resilience, mobilization capacity, and deterrence, reinforcing the 2025 NSS’s broader fusion of economic security, industrial policy, and military strategy. This constitutes an optimal response to the Chinese “civilian-military fusion” and “unrestricted warfare” model.

Space

While a mention of “space” appears only once on page 21 of the NSS, the second Trump administration published on December 18th an Executive Order “Ensuring American Space Superiority“ prioritizing lunar basing and economic development by 2030 with a clear focus on Artemis, cislunar security as a theatre, and space nuclear power on a schedule. To secure U.S. assets and interests from Earth orbit through cislunar space to the Moon, integrating commercial capabilities into the defense complex, reforming acquisition, and modernizing the nation’s military space architecture become paramount. Space traffic management and space situational awareness services are no longer solely provided by the U.S. government for free.

Repositioning the U.S. as an unrivalled economic-industrial-technological leader provides valuable opportunities to the Western Hemisphere and Indo-Pacific and Europe-Middle-East-Africa regions: “The goal is for our partner nations to build up their domestic economies, while an economically stronger and more sophisticated Western Hemisphere becomes an increasingly attractive market for American commerce and investment.” After 35 years of the West divorcing itself from Reality, we now face a technology-savvy tripolar world. The NSS, complemented by the Executive Order on Ensuring American Space Superiority, merely reflects a long overdue readjustment to 21st-century geopolitics. These are fundamentally the space, nuclear, and disruptive industries, focused in ways that achieve techno-strategic power.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Techno-Economic power at the heart of the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

The partnership is a result of a long-standing history of defense partnerships but does not represent a paradigm shift in defense collaborations. However, the nature of this defense collaboration continues to evolve concerning the relationship of Pakistan to the United States and India. Examining the India-US defense partnership with an eye to the history, agreement details, and overall implications is worth the effort. Chanakya’s philosophical concepts, which are discussed below, are also instructive.

History

The United States and India are not new defense partners. The current agreement is an extension of those older agreements. This series of partnerships began in 2002 under the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), and the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA).

The most recent agreement expands the areas of cooperative defense to cyber and maritime security issues. This agreement will help bring the American and Indian militaries into alignment and make their defense capabilities and strategies align more effectively.

This US-India defense partnership is one of the ways that India can move toward greater defense independence and create “self-reliant” defense industries. The goal of this effort is to encourage the development of defense systems produced domestically or developed through technology transfers from other countries and to allow India to produce and export these products globally.

The US-India partnership also anticipates India having an upgraded military, being able to project maritime power more effectively, and enhancing its ability to deter aggression. The improvements in India’s military capabilities and its nuclear posture align with India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy; however, India’s evolving security environment is beginning to mirror the American security environment.

The partnership between the US and India will also help to reinforce the Quad framework (US, Japan, Australia, and India) as a key element of American Indo-Pacific Strategy, creating a free, open, and rules-based regional order. It is also anticipated that increased defense cooperation between the US and India will provide an enhanced collective deterrent against Chinese assertiveness and will enable the US and India to conduct more frequent and extensive joint naval and air exercises, such as the Malabar exercise.

Similar to other forms of strategic wisdom that are based upon the doctrines of Chanakya, the US-India defense agreement appears to reflect the concepts of not engaging directly with an adversary, depleting an adversary’s resources, and winning when the circumstances are appropriate. As such, it appears that India is employing a similar approach (building partnerships, establishing a defense industrial base, attaining strategic independence, and then waiting until the opportunity presents itself to engage) with similar replenishment concepts (economic and diplomatic) that were outlined in Chanakya’s playbook to allow India to capitalize on a potential weakening of the enemy due to internal politics.

While this agreement does provide a framework for cooperation and addresses some of the regional security concerns, including India’s negative view of China as an aggressive actor in the Indo-Pacific, the agreement does not establish a legally binding security arrangement, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Rather, the agreement reflects an increasing level of strategic convergence and represents a cooperative structure for defense. Media coverage of the agreement frequently exaggerates the significance of the agreement, while downplaying the fact that defense relationships between the US and India are not new and have little impact on the strategic balance between India and Pakistan.

While some in Pakistan see this latest agreement as a threat, the best option for Pakistan is to employ diplomacy, act in good faith to prevent future terror attacks in Indian territory, and avoid escalating tensions due to a false perception of encirclement. Positive dialogue with India and other regional actors will decrease the chance of conflict and build trust.

The US can serve as a stabilizing force to create dialogue between India and Pakistan and enhance regional cooperative mechanisms. Regional actors, such as China, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, etc., need to develop new policies to maintain an equilibrium in South Asia and not take action that exacerbates existing regional tensions.

The latest US-India agreement serves as a foundation for increased cooperation and may benefit regional stability and the overall security of the Indo-Pacific region. The degree to which this defense agreement has the ability to positively contribute to the strategic stability of South Asia depends on successful implementation of its provisions and the degree to which the United States and India can work with other regional states to address emerging challenges.

Harsa Kakar is as an Assistant Research Fellow at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), Quetta. The views expressed are personal. She can be reached at Kakarhsa01@gmail.com.

The Impact of the India-US Growing Strategic Partnership on South Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

30 HS Rebuilding Lethality: Conservative Priorities for U.S. Nuclear and Missile Defense FY 2027 with Robert Peters was originally published on Global Security Review.

Informed by the works of Lieutenant General Tom D. Miller, particularly “The Defense Sustainment Industrial Base” and “Capability, Capacity, and Risk in Sustainment of Air Force Weapon Systems,” it is clear that the challenges and strategies surrounding maintenance of Air Force weapon systems are multifaceted. The first article highlights the foundational elements necessary for a robust defense sustainment industrial base, emphasizing the need for a resilient infrastructure. The second publication further develops this analysis, delving into the evolving landscape of capability, capacity, and risk management in the context of sustaining advanced weapon systems. Collectively, these works offer critical insights and recommendations on optimizing the sustainment process, ensuring readiness and effectiveness in a changing security landscape.

This passage highlights a significant juxtaposition of key themes present in the Secretary of Defense’s goals and Gen. Miller’s examination of Air Force sustainment challenges. To navigate these challenges effectively, specific focus must be placed on three pivotal areas: restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding the military, and reestablishing deterrence.

In the effort to restore the warrior ethos, the military needs skilled personnel, modern facilities, and a sustainable defense industrial base. Workforce retention and a shortage of technical expertise undeniably impact operational readiness. According to the Secretary of Defense’s mandate, there is a pressing need to “revive the warrior ethos and restore trust in our military.”

Miller’s analysis reveals that the sustainment workforce is facing severe challenges such as an aging workforce, a lack of recruitment, and significant technical expertise gaps. The Air Force Sustainment Center (AFSC) is currently experiencing a 30 percent shortage in experienced depot maintenance personnel. This shortfall adversely affects the maintenance and throughput of mission-critical aircraft. A 2022 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that workforce shortages at Air Logistics Complexes (ALCs) contribute to an average delay of 20 percent in aircraft depot maintenance cycles, diminishing operational readiness.

Transitioning from a counterterrorism focus to one that emphasizes great power competition necessitates a sustainment workforce capable of advanced manufacturing and software maintenance, but current training pipelines struggle to produce such expertise. The implications are stark; a degraded sustainment workforce directly undermines operational readiness, particularly in maintaining high-end platforms like the F-35, which are essential for effective deterrence.

In relation to rebuilding the military, the defense industrial base faces significant hurdles due to aging infrastructure, inefficient procurement processes, and inconsistent funding. Secretary Hegseth emphasizes the importance of this rebuilding process, stating the need to match threats with capabilities. Gen. Miller’s assessments indicate that the Air Force’s sustainment infrastructure is outdated and that funding for depot modernization is inconsistent. The average age of Air Force maintenance depots exceeds 60 years, with several facilities dating back to World War II. Supply-chain vulnerabilities also arise. Significant dependence on a sole supplier for 67 percent of critical spare parts for legacy aircraft creates potential crises during conflicts. Moreover, extended procurement cycles often delay readiness enhancements, averaging 8 to 10 years from requirement to fielding for sustainment modernization projects.

Thus, without rapid modernization of sustainment infrastructure and necessary acquisition reform, the Air Force will struggle to maintain aging fleets while simultaneously integrating essential next-generation capabilities for initiatives like joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) and agile combat employment (ACE).

Reestablishing deterrence requires a comprehensive assessment of readiness to ensure that sustainment capacity effectively aligns with the threats posed by nations such as China and Russia. As stated in the SECDEF mandates, deterrence must be reestablished through defense of the homeland and collaboration with allies. However, Miller’s 2022 assessment points out a disconnect between current sustainment funding models and the operational requirements of deterrence in contested environments. For instance, from 2012 to 2022, the readiness rates for the USAF fighter fleet plummeted from 75 to 57 percent, with sustainment backlogs contributing significantly to non-mission-capable status. Only 40 percent of American sustainment infrastructure is currently forward-positioned in the Indo-Pacific, which is crucial for countering aggressive actions from adversaries.

To counter these challenges and bolster national defense strategy, courses of action should be implemented. First, revitalizing the sustainment workforce through expanded training and technological improvements is essential. According to projected outcomes, this could reduce depot maintenance delays by 15 to 20 percent within five years while raising mission-capable rates for advanced platforms.

Second, prioritizing infrastructure and acquisition reform will require streamlining procurement processes and integrating industry best practices. This reform could lead to a reduction in aircraft downtime and enhance rapid repair capabilities essential for operating within geographic regions such as the Indo-Pacific. Finally, adopting a risk-based resource-allocation strategy aligned with high-threat mission areas can significantly strengthen deterrence, ultimately raising mission-capable rates of critical platforms.

By aligning sustainment actions with the objectives of the National Defense Strategy, the Air Force can demonstrate improved deterrence capabilities, build enduring advantages, and modernize its force. An immediate investment in revitalizing the sustainment workforce, modernizing depot infrastructure, and aligning resources with operational needs is imperative. A reformative approach to sustainment is not merely an operational necessity; it constitutes a vital aspect of maintaining peace through strength. Without these necessary adjustments, the Air Force risks facing severe mission degradation in high-threat scenarios, ultimately jeopardizing national defense.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

Achieving Peace Through Strength: A Sustainment Imperative was originally published on Global Security Review.

This week’s EAR Report brings critical updates on global security dynamics in a world fraught with geopolitical tensions and nuclear threats. ​ From the evolving nuclear doctrines of major powers to the strategic imperatives of missile defense, we provide a comprehensive overview of the current state of international security. ​ Understanding these developments is crucial for policymakers and the public as nations grapple with the complexities of deterrence and defense. ​

Strategic Developments: New Russian Nuclear Doctrine Summary ​

Russian President Vladimir Putin has ratified a revised nuclear doctrine, emphasizing nuclear deterrence against potential adversaries, including countries and military alliances that view Russia as an enemy. ​ The doctrine allows for nuclear responses to significant threats to Russia’s sovereignty, even from conventional weapons, and includes the possibility of nuclear retaliation if Belarus, as part of the Union State, is attacked. ​

Homeland Missile Defense ​

North Korea, Russia, and China continue to enhance their long-range missile capabilities, posing a threat to the U.S. homeland. ​ The next U.S. president must prioritize restoring credible missile defense. ​ Recommendations include developing space-based sensors for persistent missile tracking, advancing boost-phase intercept technologies, and creating a multi-layered defense framework incorporating land, sea, air, and space interceptors. ​ The goal is to counter both rogue state missile salvos and limited nuclear launches from major powers. ​

Deterring the Nuclear Dictators: Foreign Affairs by Madelyn Creedon and Franklin Miller ​

The U.S. faces renewed nuclear threats from Russia, China, and North Korea. ​ The Biden administration has updated nuclear-targeting guidance to deter these adversaries simultaneously. ​ However, modernization efforts for the U.S. nuclear deterrent are hampered by industrial base limitations, material shortages, and funding gaps. ​ The next administration should expedite modernization without extensive policy reviews, focusing on replacing aging systems and enhancing the defense industrial base. ​

Key Takeaways

1. Russian Nuclear Doctrine: Emphasizes deterrence against adversaries and allows nuclear responses to significant threats, including conventional attacks. ​
2. Missile Defense: Urgent need for a comprehensive, layered missile defense system incorporating advanced technologies and space-based sensors. ​
3. U.S. Nuclear Deterrence: Updated guidance to deter multiple adversaries; modernization efforts must be accelerated to address current and future threats. ​
4. Industrial Base Challenges: Modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is hindered by industrial limitations and funding issues. ​
5. Strategic Imperatives: The U.S. must maintain a robust nuclear triad and enhance its defense capabilities to ensure national and allied security. ​

ICBM EAR Report – November 22 was originally published on Global Security Review.