As of today, ChatGPT-5 Pro is said to have an IQ of 148, as tested officially by Mensa Norway. It is now significantly smarter than most adult humans in the United States (who average 99.7). Grok 4 may be weeks away from becoming even smarter, but the progress at which AI reasoning inches ahead matters little when humans write code for these programs. However, AI has started to write its own code. In tandem, Mark Zuckerberg is building a super team dubbed the “superintelligence AI” lab and he offered a single person, Daniel Francis, $1.25 Billion for a four-year contract (or a $312 million per year salary). Further, Zuckerberg has gone on to poach the top AI talent from OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google, nearing 24 people in total out of a team of only 44.

Unfortunately, U.S. companies are also allowed to funnel money into Chinese AI companies, in part because it is a less expensive alternative than U.S. developed AI. China, as a near-peer adversary cannot be allowed to reach superintelligence first because whoever wins the AI race to superintelligence will have nearly unlimited computing ability and will be able to launch devastating cyber-attacks with ease.

If there are two teams approaching the finish line in a winner-take-all superintelligence race, then there is also a direct implication for long-term deterrence on global war. Imagine the following scenarios:

SCENARIO 1: The U.S. is ahead in the race to superintelligence, but China works diligently to steal code, launch cyber-attacks, and intimidate U.S. scientists. Eventually, China assassinates critical AI scientists, prompting the U.S. to threaten the use of nuclear weapons against China to stop its attacks. Yet, just before all-out war, China ceases its efforts, having become successful in its bid to cripple the U.S. AI industry so it can reach superintelligence first.

SCENARIO 2: The U.S. is ahead, but China is only barely behind. China uses its innovative AI models to wargame nearly unlimited sequences and calculates what it believes is the perfect attack to prevent the U.S. from reaching superintelligence first. In this scenario, the attacks never ramp up. Instead, it results in a massive, unprovoked first strike that incapacitates the U.S. This might be a nuclear strike or simply an EMP strike that decimates the U.S. power grid. Either way, China wins again.

SCENARIO 3: The U.S. and China hide their governments’ AI progress. Public companies continue progressing toward superintelligence, but one or both achieve it in a military or national laboratory behind closed doors. They ponder the best way to use it, leveraging it like the nuclear football in global diplomacy (i.e., setting the briefcase on the floor next to the President). They may have accessed superintelligence but lack confidence in the technology to use it for the near future.

SCENARIO 4: The U.S. and China hide their governments’ AI progress, and both achieve superintelligence behind closed doors. Then one day, one of them launches an attack on the other, prompting the other side to launch its own superintelligence response. The two AI agents battle across every sector of society, arm-wrestling for control. Seemingly trivial differences between one model and another let one win in one sector and the other win in another.

This article does not presume that the outcome of a superintelligence race is represented in one of these four scenarios. Rather, it argues that AI will inevitably complicate the landscape of deterrence as it may give confidence of victory in otherwise stable situations. This moment in history is nothing less than the moment when scientists Leo Szilard and Albert Einstein wrote President Roosevelt to warn of the potential use of fission in bombs.

The United States government must think carefully about the current state of AI in the world and what it will mean for deterrence strategy. We need to have a planned response if a superintelligence cyberattack is launched against the U.S. This includes physically isolating our command-and-control systems and planning for surprise attacks, itself planned by another country’s AI technology. Worse yet, military planners need to consider how to detect and respond to multiple grey zone micro-attacks that may be a component of a larger cascading attack.

We are amid our generation’s Manhattan Project moment. The 2023 Oppenheimer movie culminates in the detonation of the 1945 Trinity test. Perhaps if the United States plans well, in 80 years, we may all be able to enjoy a movie about Zuckerberg forming his superintelligence lab.

Rob Kittinger, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The AI Revolution’s Outsized Impact on Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Cyber Shockwaves

Imagine a simple piece of computer code shutting down nuclear power plants, paralyzing transportation networks, and disrupting vital military systems. For more than a decade, cyberattacks against critical infrastructure have been more than just intrusions; they can have effects comparable to those of conventional acts of war, and threatening global stability. For nuclear democracies, the question has become crucial: at what point does a digital incident cross the threshold of severity required to trigger deterrence calculations, or even justify a nuclear response?

Cyberspace is now a theater of constant confrontation where adversaries seek to undermine each other’s trust, disrupt economies, and test resilience. This invisible competition weakens traditional deterrence mechanisms, which rely on clear signals. In cyberspace, nothing is clear, with uncertain effects and often unintentional escalation. Yet, the potential damage of a sophisticated cyberattack against an electrical grid or supply chains could exceed that of a conventional bombing. The problem stems from three major developments.

Critical Weak Spots

The first development is the increasing vulnerability of critical infrastructure, whose technical complexity creates countless points of weakness. Hospitals, refineries, water distribution systems, and railway networks rely on technologies that are sometimes outdated and rarely protected against determined state and non-state actors. A coordinated and simultaneous attack against multiple sectors could severely paralyze a country for weeks to months, causing economic chaos and widespread social disruption.

The second development concerns the strong integration of cyberspace and nuclear power. Command, control, and communication systems have become more digital than ever, and thus more exposed to cyberattacks. Even a non-destructive intrusion, subtly targeted and difficult to detect, could be interpreted as an attempt to undermine the capacity to retaliate. In such cases, the precise or approximate perception of risk becomes as dangerous as the attack itself, amplifying the potential for misunderstandings and unintentional escalation.

The third development, finally, is the bolder behavior of adversaries of democratic regimes, who use cyberspace as a tool for exerting pressure without incurring significant costs. Who would doubt that Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran regularly demonstrate their ability to disrupt the institutions of democratic regimes? The relative success of their operations encourages them to push the boundaries even further, as they are aware of the existence of a “gray zone” where traditional deterrence does not fully apply.

These major transformations lead to a fundamental question: should democracies clarify as quickly as possible that certain cyberattacks could cross a threshold triggering a major military response, including nuclear? The objective of a new doctrine would then not be to lower the nuclear threshold, but to re-establish a credible and robust level of deterrence. Because if adversaries believe that cyberattacks are “zero-cost,” they will continue to systematically target vital infrastructure, exploiting critical vulnerabilities with impunity and minimal risk to themselves.

Strategic High Stakes

A first argument for clarifying the doctrine rests on proportionality: a massive cyberattack targeting critical infrastructure could have consequences comparable to a bombing. In this context, it would be consistent to specify that the response is not limited to conventional means. Analysts point out that U.S. nuclear doctrine already considers the possibility of devastating consequences from non-nuclear strategic attacks, and they believe that the nuclear threat is not explicitly excluded, even if the no-first-use scenario remains dominant.

A second argument concerns strategic stability. Today, adversaries regularly stress the defenses of democratic regimes in the “gray zone,” without immediate risk of escalation. Clarifying the rules of engagement and explicitly integrating cyberspace into strategic thinking could strengthen deterrence and limit adversarial gambles in this gray zone. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France could thus reduce uncertainty regarding the potential consequences of sophisticated cyberattacks, one form of irregular warfare, while emphasizing that any major offensive would have significant repercussions.

A third argument concerns the protection of nuclear command. Even a limited attack on control systems could be interpreted as an attempt to neutralize the second-strike capability, creating an extreme risk of miscalculation, especially with the increasing use of artificial intelligence. By clearly announcing that such an intrusion would be considered a serious and unacceptable act, democratic regimes would strengthen their strategic stability, discouraging any hostile action and reducing the risk of unintentional escalation during times of international crisis.

Perilous Lines

This doctrinal shift, however, carries significant risks, notably the unintentional lowering of the nuclear threshold. Even if the clarification primarily aims to strengthen deterrence, it could be perceived as an excessive threat by non-democratic States, prompting them to rapidly modernize their nuclear arsenals or develop sophisticated offensive cyber capabilities. The proliferation of cyber threats with potentially physical effects creates a low-profile but ultimately strategic space for competition, paradoxically exacerbating tensions and instability.

Responding to a cyberattack with a nuclear strike requires absolute certainty as to its true perpetrator. Yet, operations in cyberspace often involve proxies, opaque international relays, and technical masking of the source. An attribution error could have profound consequences. Additionally, a cyber intrusion seen as preparation for a major attack might provoke an overreaction during a crisis. Any doctrine that includes the possibility of a nuclear response must therefore incorporate rigorous deconfliction mechanisms, otherwise the worst will happen.

However, these risks should not obscure a strategic reality: current doctrine dates to a time when cyberattacks could not paralyze a country in minutes. This is no longer the case. Adversaries of democratic regimes have understood that cyberspace offers them a means of inflicting considerable damage while remaining below the threshold for a nuclear response. Doing nothing would amount to accepting a structural vulnerability, especially since middle ground is emerging. This involves explicitly defining two categories of cyberattacks likely to trigger an appropriate military response:

1. Attacks causing massive impacts on the civilian population or critical infrastructure (hospitals and emergency services, water distribution networks, etc.).
2. Intrusions targeting the command systems of the armed forces, even without destructive effects, with the aim of degrading a country’s decision-making capacity.

Though it would not directly reference nuclear weapons, this clarification would connect strategic cyberattacks to potential responses, giving decision-makers flexibility while clearly warning adversaries. A more explicit doctrine should reduce the risks of accidental escalation and limit the audacity of State and non-State actors willing to test the nerves of democratic regimes, in line with recent analyses on the evolution of the U.S. nuclear posture in the face of new strategic threats that the war in Ukraine has only exacerbated.

About the Author

Gilles A. Paché is a Professor of Marketing and Supply Chain Management at Aix-Marseille University, France, and a member of the CERGAM Lab. His research focuses on logistics strategy, distribution channel management, and military studies. On these topics, he has authored over 700 scholarly publications, including articles, book chapters, and conference papers, as well as 24 academic books. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Hacking the Apocalypse: How Cyberattacks Could Trigger Nuclear Escalation was originally published on Global Security Review.

An American submarine also fired thirty Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) against surface infrastructure targets at Isfahan. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine described it, the entire operation was a complex timed maneuver requiring exact synchronization across multiple platforms in a narrow piece of airspace.

American deception tactics contributed to surprise as neither Iraqi fighters nor their surface-to-air missile defenses attempted to interdict the American bombers and their supporting fighter aircraft, all of which returned safely.

According to General Caine, Operation Midnight Hammer involved more than 125 aircraft, including the seven B2 stealth bombers, numerous fourth- and fifth-generation fighters, and dozens of refueling tankers. Some 75 precision-guided munitions were used in Midnight Hammer, including fourteen GBU-57 MOPs, which were used for the first time in combat.

The operational excellence of Midnight Hammer doubtless constituted a setback to Iran’s nuclear enrichment programs, although exactly how much of a setback remains to be determined.  Battle damage assessment is dependent on overhead photography unless and until further information is obtained from intelligence sources near or at the affected sites.

There also remained unsettled issues relative to American and allied strategy going forward. The Trump administration’s declaratory policy wants to draw a line between going to war with Iran, on one hand, and neutralizing its nuclear capabilities and potential, on the other.  This is a fine line to draw and Iran response, and follow-on condemnations, suggest they see the American position as a distinction without a difference.

Ater the strikes, President Trump indicated that Iran should come to the diplomatic table and negotiate the status of its nuclear future. Iran rejected further negotiations. This left the American and Israeli defense communities to await whatever diplomatic or military response the Iranians offered, including possible military attacks against American forces deployed in the Middle East.

Based on experience, Iran would likely respond with continuing missile strikes against Israel and asymmetrical warfare against the United States. With regard to the latter, Iran’s options included: (1) disrupting the flow of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz; (2) committing cyberattacks against American military or societal targets; (3) committing missile or insurgent attacks against American military personnel in Iraq or elsewhere in the region; (4) supporting protest demonstrations or terrorism in the American homeland, perhaps making use of prepositioned cells made up of illegal aliens; and/or (5) encouraging Iranian proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen to further harass American, Israeli, and allied interests.

Thus far, Iran limited its response to employing a small number of missiles against Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, even giving the Americans advance warning of the strike. For the Trump administration, this is the best possible outcome. Already, imagery intelligence suggests Iran is digging out its capabilities at Fordow and Esfahan. What the future may hold is uncertain. Whether Iran is simply buying time and learning lessons for future success or whether the regime truly desires peace is up in the air.

Future options for Iran have their positives and negatives. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz would harm Iran’s own economy, which needs the infusion of cash from oil sales to China.

Cyberattacks are a low-risk, low-cost option that may appeal to Iran in the near term, but they present a more serious potential threat to civilian targets compared to more heavily defended military ones. They will also draw severe reprisals from very competent American and Israeli cyber forces.

Additional attacks against American military personnel and facilities in Iraq are an option, as are missile or unconventional warfare against other regional states hosting American military bases. However, this path was not successful the first time.

Support for antiwar demonstrations or outright terrorism in the American homeland, including “lone wolf” terrorists recruited online, are still a possibility. New stories of Iranian illegal aliens arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement are almost a daily occurrence.

As for Iranian proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah are on the ropes, momentarily, due to prior engagements with Israel, but the Houthis declared their intention to plus-up their disruptions of commerce in the Red Sea in the wake of Midnight Hammer. Whether this is possible is yet to be seen.

With respect to Iran’s future nuclear options and American responses, they may proceed in one of three ways: (1) a continuing “whack-a-mole” competition in which Iran continues surreptitious enrichment and the US and Israel continue to monitor its progress and, if necessary, repeat Midnight Hammer, or worse; (2) Iran undergoes a change of regime due to domestic opposition, leaving uncertain for a time exactly who is in charge and who controls the supplies of enriched uranium and nuclear infrastructure, never mind the armed forces and security police; or (3) Iran agrees to negotiate with the US and representatives of the international community another deal to limit its stockpiles of fissile material and its levels of enrichment.

These are possible options, but by no means the only options. Iran may pursue an unexpected path in an effort to outthink the United States and Israel. Whatever the future holds, President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu must keep a close eye on a regime that is built on destroying both countries. Hope is critical to human perseverance, but it is not a strategy.

Dr. Stephen Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State university, Brandywine. He is currently a senior fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Midnight Hammer and After was originally published on Global Security Review.

Maritime ports authorize customs clearance and are involved in regulatory checks, ensuring compliance with national and international law. Ports perform most of these functions digitally. Maritime ports are now under serious threat of malicious cyberattacks that can disrupt and compromise port operations worldwide.

Industry is deeply interconnected, and a cyberattack on one major port can send shockwaves through global trade networks. Consider a scenario where a major port, responsible for handling millions of cargo containers, suddenly halts operations due to a cyberattack. Cranes freeze, logistics systems collapse, and cargo ships are left stranded at sea. This is not a hypothetical scenario; it is a real and escalating threat to global trade.

The maritime industry, long seen as the backbone of international commerce, now faces an urgent cybersecurity crisis. Ports are no longer just about cranes and cargo; they have evolved into digital ecosystems reliant on interconnected networks, automation, and artificial intelligence. As ports become smarter, they are also becoming more vulnerable. Cybercriminals are increasingly exploiting these vulnerabilities, causing financial losses, operational disruptions, and even national security risks.

Maritime cyberattacks are no longer rare occurrences, they are becoming alarmingly frequent. In 2023, a ransomware attack crippled more than 1,000 vessels by targeting a software provider used across the shipping industry. The attack forced the shipping industry to shut down its ShipManager system, affecting global supply chains. A year earlier, the Port of Lisbon suffered a cyberattack that took its website offline for days, with the ransomware group LockBit claiming responsibility and alleging that it had stolen financial reports, contracts, and ship logs.

In Germany, a 2022 cyberattack on two oil companies disrupted fuel shipments, forcing Shell to reroute supplies and exposing the vulnerabilities of critical maritime infrastructure. The 2017 NotPetya ransomware attack, which paralyzed Maersk and caused an estimated $300 million in damage, remains one of the most devastating cyberattacks in shipping history.

Ports are among the most attractive targets for cybercriminals. The motives behind these attacks vary as some hackers seek financial gain, while others aim to steal sensitive trade-related data, and some may even use cyberattacks as part of hybrid warfare.

The economic consequences are staggering, from ransom payments and insurance hikes to delays that can ripple across global supply chains. Beyond financial losses, cyber threats to ports pose serious security risks. For example, a well-coordinated cyberattack on a major port could disrupt military logistics, cripple trade networks, or even manipulate cargo data to facilitate smuggling and illicit trade.

Hackers carry the potential for unauthorized intrusion into ports’ digital networks and interrupt ports’ routine operation through malicious software attacks. The workforce involved in port management may be trapped into revealing sensitive data by clicking on malicious links. The hackers can also disrupt digital networks that regulate critical port infrastructure, such as cranes, pumps, and valves. Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems can come under cyber threats disrupting routine functions. Nonstandard computing hardware like sensors, actuators, or appliances that transmit data from the network wirelessly are vulnerable to data theft.

Hackers can steal data such as cargo manifests, crew information, and financial records. They can also manipulate data, such as altering cargo manifests, or manipulate navigation systems. Hackers can also steal intellectual property, such as trade secrets or proprietary software.

Another pressing issue is supply-chain security. Ports rely on a complex web of third-party vendors for logistics, software, and cargo management. If one vendor is compromised, the entire port system could be at risk.

Hackers can also use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance means or to attack port infrastructure, such as damaging equipment or disrupting power supplies. Ports may be exposed to cyberattacks through third-party suppliers, such as logistics providers or maintenance contractors. Ports may be exposed to cyberattacks through cargo and containers, which may contain malicious devices or software.

Cybersecurity in the maritime sector is often treated as an afterthought. Many ports still operate with outdated software and weak security protocols, making them easy targets. Given the critical role of ports in the global economy, the widening cybersecurity gap is a growing challenge. Strengthening port security necessitates urgent regulatory mechanisms, some of which are proposed below.

Regulatory Mechanisms

To mitigate the growing cyber threat, ports should adopt internationally recognized cybersecurity frameworks. First, ports should adhere to the rules and protocols of the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Maritime Cyber Risk Management Guidelines, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework, and ISO 27001 standards. Implementing these frameworks will help establish clear security protocols and ensure that ports are prepared to defend against cyberattacks.

Second, network security should be reinforced by segmenting information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems, preventing malware from spreading across critical infrastructure. Regular penetration testing and vulnerability assessments can further identify weak points before attackers do.

Third, investing in cybersecurity training for port workers is equally crucial. Many cyberattacks exploit human error—phishing e-mails, weak passwords, and social engineering attacks remain among the most common entry points for hackers. A well-trained workforce can serve as the first line of defense against these threats.

Fourth, leveraging artificial intelligence and machine learning for threat detection can enhance ports’ ability to identify cyber risks before they escalate into full-scale attacks. Artificial intelligence (AI)–led systems can monitor network activity in real time, flagging suspicious behavior and predicting potential breaches before they happen. In this regard, the strict security assessments of third-party vendors and blockchain-based cargo tracking can enhance transparency and reduce the risk of supply-chain cyberattacks.

Fifth, beyond prevention, ports should also be prepared to respond effectively to cyber incidents. For this, establishing cyber incident response teams (CIRT) can ensure that ports have trained professionals ready to mitigate and recover from cyberattacks swiftly.

Sixth, regular cyber drills and crisis simulations should be conducted to test response plans. This ensures that when an attack occurs, the damage is minimized, and recovery is swift.

Seventh, international collaboration to deal with these threats is essential. Governments, port authorities, and private stakeholders should work together to share intelligence, standardize security protocols, and invest in collective defense mechanisms.

Public-private partnerships can play a key role in funding advanced cybersecurity infrastructure, while international regulatory bodies like the IMO must enforce stricter cybersecurity mandates across the industry. Finally, as ports transition into smart ports, powered by the internet of things (IoT), AI, and automation, cybersecurity should be at the forefront of maritime security strategies. Emerging technologies like quantum computing and zero trust architecture will play a crucial role in strengthening digital defenses, but ports should remain vigilant. The very technologies designed to enhance security could also introduce new vulnerabilities if not properly managed.

Cybersecurity is no longer just a technical issue; it is a fundamental pillar of modern port management. If cybersecurity continues to be treated as an afterthought, the next major cyberattack could bring global trade to a standstill. Ports are the lifelines of the world economy, and securing them is not just about protecting data, it is about safeguarding the stability of international commerce and national security.

Maryyum Masood is working as a Research Officer & Associate Editor at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad. She is an MPhil scholar in the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU) Islamabad.

Rizwana Abbasi is an Associate Professor of Security Studies at the National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, a non-resident Fellow of the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad, and a Visiting Fellow at the Central European University of Austria.

Cybersecurity Framework for Maritime Port Management was originally published on Global Security Review.

Their low cost, flexibility, and ability to operate without putting human pilots at risk make drones increasingly valuable in conventional military conflicts. Their capabilities already include reconnaissance and surveillance, long-range strike missions, electronic warfare, and precision killing.

With their precision-targeting ability, drones can be integrated into nuclear deterrence strategies. For instance, they could be used to ensure the survivability of a country’s nuclear forces by providing continuous surveillance and early warning against potential nuclear threats. Drones could also support a more viable second-strike capability, potentially increasing the credibility of nuclear deterrence by ensuring that a country retains a means to retaliate even after a nuclear first strike.

The use of drones in situations where nuclear escalation is a possibility could lead to unintended consequences. The increasing autonomy of drones raises the risk of misinterpretation, as drones could be perceived as a precursor to a larger attack, even when they are only conducting reconnaissance. This could trigger a preemptive nuclear strike by an adversary, leading to an inadvertent escalation into full-scale nuclear war. Cold War and subsequent histories show that the danger of inadvertent nuclear escalation is not trivial.

The possibility that expansion of the war in Ukraine from conventional weapons into nuclear first use could occur from Russian views of Ukrainian deep strikes into Russian territory, with NATO ballistic and cruise missiles, provides one example of concerns in this category.  Lewis A. Dunn suggests that President Donald Trump is faced with a world sliding into nuclear anarchy. He writes:

Brinkmanship among major nuclear powers is rising. China is relentlessly expanding its nuclear forces but rejecting serious engagement with the United States on arms control. US–Russia cooperation on nuclear matters, already in a dire state, has deteriorated further with President Vladimir Putin’s repeated nuclear threats in the course of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Recent reports based on information from senior US officials indicate that the United States, too, could modify its posture and expand its arsenal to strengthen deterrence of coordinated Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear adventurism. All these developments have eroded critical pillars of nuclear order and raised the risk of nuclear warfare.

Drones are relatively fast, low-cost, and difficult to detect, which makes them ideal for preemptive strikes against high-value targets. In theory, a nation could deploy a drone strike against an adversary’s nuclear command-and-control infrastructure or missile silos, aiming to disrupt or neutralize a potential nuclear retaliation before it can be launched. In addition, drones equipped with nuclear payloads or advanced conventional weapons could be used as part of a disarming strike. The ability to carry out such strikes could shift the strategic calculations of nations, as adversaries might feel more vulnerable to a preemptive attack, especially if they believe their nuclear retaliation capabilities could be neutralized by fast-moving drone strikes.

As drones become more autonomous, the risk of them making decisions without human oversight increases. In a nuclear context, where the consequences of any action are catastrophic, the delegation of decision-making to machines is highly controversial. The potential for autonomous drones to trigger a nuclear response or make fatal miscalculations due to algorithmic errors presents a possible threat to strategic stability.

Given that drones can operate autonomously, one challenge is ensuring that their actions do not trigger unintended escalation. Moreover, the reliance on technological systems for communication and control in a nuclear context raises concerns about vulnerabilities in these systems, especially if adversaries employ cyberattacks or electronic warfare tactics to disrupt drone operations.

Future generations of drones will interact with artificial intelligence that also supports other elements in the matrix of deterrence and defense. AI will privilege deterrence by denial compared to deterrence by credible threat of unacceptable retaliation. It will do so because states will have to quickly manage the deterrence and/or conduct conflicts in multiple domains: land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, and the information or knowledge domain. The knowledge domain wraps around all the others. It is the “gnostic center” that controls, connects, and prioritizes among the component parts of the various domains in order to provide for the correct response to threats or attacks.

AI-assisted attacks on the gnostic center will require immediate responses by AI-assisted defenses that can defeat or diminish the cost of those attacks. Absorbing the first blow and then retaliating may not be a choice that is available to beleaguered and time-pressed decision-makers. This situation poses an especially concerning challenge for nuclear deterrence. Decisions for or against nuclear war should allow policymakers sufficient time to deliberate alternatives with their advisors and to select the most appropriate option for the exigent circumstances. But the potential speed of AI-boosted attacks against space and cyber assets, together with the rising speed of kinetic strikes from hypersonic weapons, may leave leaders fearful of an enemy nuclear first strike to choose preemption instead of retaliation.

Just as we can conceive of drones as reconnaissance and strike platforms for offenses, it is also possible that drones can be part of any state’s comprehensive antimissile and air defense plan. One illustration is the use of drone swarms to defeat attacking drones tasked with reconnaissance or strike missions. Another example would be the use of drones for electromagnetic “hit to kill” within the atmosphere or, even more ambitiously, in midcourse intercept against attacking ballistic missile forces. Drones based on one or more lunar spaceports could protect American interests in cislunar space.

Futuristic drones with embedded AI and space-to-space weapons could defend orbital satellites against attack (so-called DSATs) or engage another state’s satellites that appear threatening (ASATs). Priority DSATs and ASATs would deter or defend against any threat to the viability of American satellites for warning and assessment; command, control, and communications; geolocation; and other missions.

Comparatively inexpensive drones could thus take over some of the strategic defense burden, otherwise requiring both upgraded terrestrial missile launchers and kill vehicles or, eventually, sophisticated ballistic missile defenses based on space-to-earth weapons such as lasers or particle beams. Future planners should expect a more crowded space domain, including newer generations of orbital satellites with diverse missions, space stations, and additional reconnaissance and strike weapons along with smarter drones and larger swarms.

The preceding discussion about drones and their possible relationship to nuclear deterrence has implications for nuclear arms control. It is important for a peace agreement to terminate the war in Ukraine for many reasons. One reason is so that the United States and Russia can resume negotiations about an arms control regime to succeed the New START agreement, due to expire in 2026.

The “beyond New START” consultations should include discussions about the two states’ arsenals of non-strategic nuclear weapons and protocols for nuclear first use. Vladimir Putin’s repeated warnings about the possibility of Russian nuclear first use in Ukraine is dismissed by some as bluffing for effect, a form of coercive diplomacy. On the other hand, Russia’s doctrinal shifts appear to move toward a more permissive standard as the war continues. In addition to clarifying this matter, the United States and Russia must acknowledge that China is an aspiring nuclear peer and include China in discussions about nuclear policy issues, including transparency about force structures and military doctrines. China is unlikely to be interested in arms reductions per se, but dialogue should be initiated at the expert level to clarify China’s thinking about strategy, arms control, and related issues.

The character of war changes with the advent of new technologies and strategic thinking.  But the nature of war is perennially the environment of competition and conflict, uncertainty, chance, and friction. The relationship between drones and nuclear deterrence represents a mixed blessing for military planners and arms control. Drones have the potential to enhance nuclear deterrence, but they also introduce significant risks in terms of escalation control and first-strike stability. As drone technology advances, it will be critical for policymakers to develop strategies that account for the unique challenges drones pose in nuclear deterrence and, as well, their future roles in space and cyber wars.

Professor Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Nuclear Deterrence and Drones: An Unpredictable Mix? was originally published on Global Security Review.

These domains and areas are being weaponized for strategic purposes, as adversaries target cross-domain North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interests with the intent of weakening the Western security architecture and fragmenting alliance cohesion. The Trump administration must work closely with NATO allies to confront the many challenges that face them.

Strategic challenges, such as the Arctic, deep sea, and space, and the threats they pose require improved joint military readiness, enhanced deterrence by denial capabilities, and improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

“Over the last 15 years,” writes Scott Savits, “the Arctic has become a renewed theatre of military competition…. [T]op Russian officials have referred to the Arctic as Russia’s ‘Mecca,’ and a large fraction of Russia’s economy is based on Arctic fossil fuels and minerals.” Frustrating Russian efforts to gain a strategic advantage in the Arctic is of paramount importance to NATO’s deterrence mission.

Russia gaining an advantage in the Arctic will enhance its ability to establish escalation dominance against NATO in the event of a conflict with the alliance. Deterring Russia from broadening the scope of conflict, by threatening NATO’s vital interests in the Arctic, remains critical in dissuading other adversaries, such as China, from seeking to gain similar advantage.

With China developing and deploying new detection technologies in anti-submarine warfare, American nuclear submarine capabilities are becoming increasingly vulnerable to detection and targeting. China’s “Death Star” satellite claims to possess detection capabilities that renders the ocean transparent for up to 500 meters beneath the surface, putting American submarines at risk.

In the space domain, it is estimated that loss of access to space would come at a cost of roughly One billion pounds per day to the British economy. The reported deployment of Russian anti-satellite weapons systems (ASAT) in space are clearly coercive moves designed to threaten NATO’s space assets.

Russia’s weaponization of space is especially concerning as NATO depends on space to conduct an array of operations across the spectrum of deterrence and defence. Most notably, NATO airpower relies on space-based and space-dependent systems to fulfil a series of critical security functions. Leveraging robust deterrence capabilities in orbit, through targeting Russian and Chinese space-based military and non-military assets, is critical to securing NATO’s vital interests in space.

Beyond seeking strategic advantage, China is also expanding and modernising its nuclear arsenal at an unprecedented rate since the end of the Cold War. The Pentagon forecasts that China will be a nuclear peer of the United States by 2035. The latest figures published by the Federation of American Scientists show that China now possesses at least 500 operationally deployed nuclear weapons—up 43 percent from 2020.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to undermine international norms by persisting in threats to use battlefield nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Russia also deploys dual-use satellite technologies in space, capable of carrying nuclear warheads into orbit, in direct contravention of long-standing international treaties such as the Outer Space Treaty (1967), which prohibits the weaponization and nuclearization of space.

Meanwhile, Iran, a latent nuclear state, coerces the West by threatening the weaponization of its nuclear program. Iran also infiltrated the West by creating extremist networks through community centers, laundering money in major European and American cities that is used by criminal gangs to plot and execute terrorist attacks.

Proxies supported by Iran, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, can also launch increasingly devastating attacks. Furthermore, attacks like October 7, 2024, or September 11, 2001, do not warrant nuclear retaliation. A nuclear response to a terrorist attack, depending on the attack, is likely a disproportionate response.

China and Russia also engage in subversive activities within the cyber domain, sowing discord by using disinformation, intellectual property theft, and malign interference to destabilize NATO member states. Cyberattacks on critical national infrastructure can also inflict severe levels of damage. The appropriateness of cross-domain responses is yet to be decided.

The cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007, which lasted for 22 days, did not result in the triggering of NATO’s Article 5 collective defense clause. Yet, it was an attack on a NATO member state. The character of the attack complicated the process by which a viable and appropriate retaliatory response could be devised. In a multidomain threat landscape, hostile state actors conducting their operations in the grey zone can claim plausible deniability.

China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea also hold joint exercises, share intelligence, exchange military capabilities, and share a diplomatic and political kinship. This axis of Western adversaries shares the same geopolitical and economic objectives. They seek to replace the international rules-based order and establish alternative institutional frameworks to global order that undermine concepts such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, and national sovereignty.

Militarily, nowhere is this more apparent than in Russia, where Iranian drones and North Korean soldiers were provided to aid Putin’s war in Ukraine. Politically, emerging international blocs such as the BRICS demonstrate the extent to which countries like China and Russia are gaining traction in driving alternatives to the current order.

“As hybrid threats evolve to encompass the whole of digital and networked societies,” wrote Sean Monaghan, “so too will the capabilities required to deter them. A more complex threat environment will make predicting attacks and vulnerabilities more difficult, so nations may rely more on resilience.”

Hence, for deterrence to be effective today, credibility must incorporate more than hard power capabilities. Red lines must be communicated effectively across different channels. Resolve must be demonstrated through a force posture that includes a willingness to establish escalation dominance in a crisis scenario. The art of deterrence is also about determining and holding at risk what an adversary values.

As the outgoing US Secretary of Defence General (Ret.) Lloyd Austin said in 2022, cross-domain deterrence “is the right mix of technology, operational concepts, and capabilities—all woven together and networked in a way that is credible, flexible and so formidable that it will give any adversary pause…. [It is] multidomain, spans numerous geographic areas of responsibility, is united with allies and partners, and is fortified by all instruments of national power.”

Ultimately, deterrence is about credibly threatening to impose unacceptable costs, by denial or punishment, on a would-be aggressor. Those costs must convince the would-be aggressor that they outweigh any potential gains made.

Therefore, it is imperative for the US and NATO to increase cross-domain capabilities to match those of adversaries. Adopting a combination of different violent and non-violent means, to conduct deterrence credibly across multiple domains and at various levels of intensity, will enhance NATO’s ability to secure its vital interests in an increasingly volatile era of global strategic competition.

Alex Alfirraz Scheers holds a diploma in Politics and History from the Open University, a bachelor’s degree in War Studies and History from King’s College London, and a master’s degree in National Security Studies from King’s College London. He has held research positions at the Henry Jackson Society and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, and his articles have been published in the Diplomat, Times of Israel, RealClearDefense, and the Royal United Services Institute. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Deterrence and NATO’s Emerging Security Environment was originally published on Global Security Review.

Standoff warfare is characterized by the use of long-range weapon systems, such as cruise missiles, drones, and precision-guided munitions, to engage targets from a safe distance. This approach leverages advanced surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting technologies to identify and strike enemy assets without direct engagement.

Advantages of Standoff Warfare

One of the primary advantages of standoff warfare is the significant reduction in the risk to military personnel. By operating from a distance, forces are less exposed to direct enemy fire and ambushes, leading to fewer casualties and increased morale. By keeping forces out of the immediate reach of the enemy, standoff warfare helps preserve valuable military assets. This approach ensures that high-value equipment and personnel are available for prolonged engagements and future conflicts.

Modern long-range weapons are highly accurate, allowing for precision strikes on strategic targets. This capability enhances operational efficiency by focusing on high-value targets and minimizing collateral damage, which is crucial in maintaining public support and adhering to international laws of warfare.

The ability to strike from a distance can have a significant psychological impact on the enemy. The constant threat of unexpected precision attack can demoralize opposing forces and disrupt their operational planning and execution.

Standoff warfare allows for rapid deployment and response to emerging threats. With assets positioned at a safe distance, commanders can quickly adapt to changing battlefield conditions and execute strikes without the need for extensive mobilization.

Disadvantages of Standoff Warfare

Standoff warfare relies heavily on advanced technologies for surveillance, targeting, and weapon delivery. This dependence can be a vulnerability if these systems are disrupted by electronic warfare, cyberattacks, or other countermeasures.

The development, procurement, and maintenance of long-range weapon systems and associated technologies are expensive. The financial burden of sustaining a standoff warfare capability can strain defense budgets and divert resources from other critical areas.

Standoff warfare is most effective against concentrated, high-value targets. When facing adversaries employing dispersed, decentralized tactics, the efficiency of long-range strikes diminishes, necessitating alternative approaches.

Accurate intelligence and targeting data are crucial for successful standoff operations. The reliance on real-time, high-fidelity information can be a limitation if there are gaps in intelligence or if adversaries employ deception and concealment strategies.

The use of long-range strikes can be perceived as highly provocative and potentially escalatory in a conflict. Adversaries may respond with retaliatory measures, leading to a cycle of escalation that can spiral out of control.

China

China’s military modernization and expansion pose a significant challenge to American and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s development of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, including long-range missiles, sophisticated air defenses, and naval assets, necessitates a robust standoff strategy.

Standoff warfare allows the US and its allies to engage Chinese assets from a distance, mitigating the risk posed by China’s A2/AD systems. The ability to strike from afar can disrupt Chinese operations, degrade critical infrastructure, and maintain freedom of navigation in contested areas.

China’s advancements in electronic warfare, cyber capabilities, and counter-space operations could undermine the effectiveness of standoff warfare. Additionally, the vast expanse of the Indo-Pacific region presents logistical challenges for sustaining long-range operations.

Russia

Russia’s military doctrine emphasizes hybrid warfare, combining conventional and unconventional tactics. Its integrated air defense systems, long-range missile capabilities, and electronic warfare proficiency make it a formidable adversary.

Standoff warfare enables NATO forces to counter Russian aggression by targeting key military installations, command-and-control centers, and logistical hubs from a safe distance. Precision strikes can degrade Russia’s offensive capabilities and hinder its operational tempo.

Russia’s integrated air defenses and advanced electronic warfare capabilities pose significant challenges to standoff operations. The risk of miscalculation and escalation is also high, given the proximity of NATO forces to Russian borders and the potential for rapid conflict escalation.

Iran

Iran’s strategic posture relies on asymmetric tactics, including the use of proxy forces, ballistic missiles, and naval assets in the Persian Gulf. Its ability to disrupt critical waterways and target regional adversaries necessitates a nuanced approach.

Standoff warfare allows the US and its allies to target Iranian missile launch sites, naval assets, and command structures with minimal risk to their forces. This approach can help deter Iranian aggression and protect vital shipping lanes in the region.

Iran’s use of underground facilities, mobile missile launchers, and dispersed assets presents challenges for effective targeting. Additionally, the potential for retaliatory actions against regional allies and American interests necessitates careful consideration of the broader geopolitical implications.

Conclusion

Standoff warfare continues to offer significant advantages in terms of force protection, precision, and operational flexibility. However, its effectiveness is contingent on technological superiority, accurate intelligence, and the ability to adapt to evolving threats. Against adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran, standoff warfare provides a valuable tool for countering their respective military capabilities. Nonetheless, it must be integrated into a comprehensive strategy that addresses the unique challenges posed by each adversary and mitigates the risks of escalation and technological vulnerabilities. As hypersonic, low-observable, and other advancing technologies continue to develop, they will force the need for rapid evolutions of military doctrines which will need to consider the role of standoff warfare as a critical component of modern defense strategies.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS) with nearly 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection.

Striking from Afar: The Strategic Edge of Standoff Warfare was originally published on Global Security Review.

Those European intelligence agencies tasked with countering malicious cyber actors are simply unprepared for the fight they face. Disinformation campaigns waged by the Chinese, North Koreans, and Russians are also plaguing Europe. When Russia first began such efforts to shape election outcomes about a decade ago, their rather low-cost efforts were successful enough to encourage further disinformation efforts.

French efforts to sound the alarm about disinformation in Europe and Africa were largely unheeded and is now bearing fruit for China and Russia as several African nations are turning against the West and toward these autocracies. The cyber four of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, through their security institutions, targeted the UK and French institutions, financial markets, and security infrastructure at home and their prestige abroad.

In response to the exponential growth of cyberattacks, in April 2023, new regulations were passed in France to secure the computer networks of state institutions. The French government also recognized the importance of international security cooperation in combating cyber terrorism.

When the French rail network was vandalized in July 2024 the French Interior Minister warned of the possible involvement of foreign cyber warriors. Saboteurs had already carried out attacks against fiber-optic cables and other infrastructure. For months, French intelligence was on its heels as consecutive attacks on the country’s critical infrastructure occurred. Russian and other European nationals were arrested for varying destabilization attacks. French intelligence and police also launched an operation to find cyber sleeper cells.

The Olympics began as thousands of police and military personnel were operating across the country in an effort to prevent future terror attacks of any kind. If the cyberattacks on France prior to the Olympics are an indicator of a looming threat, France has its work cut out for it.

Cyber threats are more than just hackers exploiting the internet. On July 26, 2024, terrorists damaged lineside communication cables on three of the most important ligne a vitesse radiating from Paris. These attacks disabled signal technology at key junctions including in LGV Nord at Croisilles—connecting Paris with Lille. Eurostar rail networks were also disrupted ahead of the Olympics. Thus, damage to communication networks can take a physical form.

China is now engaged in open hybrid warfare against the West—more broadly. Policymakers, parliamentarians, and intelligence officials in the UK and France sometimes advocate for reforms to address these challenges, but little happens. The lack of cyber expertise within European intelligence agencies leads to numerous domestic security challenges. The French government, for example, was exasperated with the sabotage campaign that took place.

France accused Russia of cyberattacks during the election earlier this year—all to disrupt the country’s democracy. Authorities asserted that the Russian Federal Security Service was behind sustained attempts against the French institutions.

The UK took measures in response to cyber threats from China, demonstrating a proactive stance, but British efforts are not widely understood and accepted. Recent cyberattacks on the UK’s National Health Service and the Ministry of Defense highlight significant challenges faced by the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in countering hybrid warfare tactics from state actors like China and Russia.

These attacks illustrated vulnerabilities in the UK’s cybersecurity infrastructure and raised concerns about the effectiveness of GCHQ’s strategies in mitigating threats posed by advanced persistent threat (APT) groups.

In July 2024, cyberattacks on the NHS disrupted critical healthcare services, compromised patient data, and operational capabilities. Attacks on Ministry of Defense infrastructure jeopardized national security by leaking sensitive information and undermined military readiness.

The presence of foreign spies within UK state institutions suggests these networks have successfully penetrated high-security environments, posing substantial risks to national security. The presence of a strong Russian security and intelligence infrastructure in Eastern Europe, and its reluctance to accept Western security-sector reforms is a threat to internal and external security for the region.

In Eastern Europe, reshaping intelligence and police services is part of the consolidation of democracy. In the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, intelligence agencies are experiencing a cultural hangover from a bygone era. In these countries, the process of bringing intelligence services into a Western way of operating is progressing slowly.

The war in Ukraine is also leaving a deep impact. European intelligence service strategies, operations, and collection processes in and outside their sphere of influence. They never realized how to introduce the reforms required to prevent Russian success. The Danish, for example, produced the PET Report, which uncovered espionage networks in Denmark. The PET Report has noted several cases that illustrated how a number of foreign states were actively carrying out intelligence activities against Denmark using cyber and other means.

In short, Europe is facing a challenging future when it comes to the malicious cyber activities of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. European intelligence services are unprepared for the adversary they face. The challenge is growing. The time is now for Europe to respond.

Musa Khan Jalalzai is an author, journalist, and member of Research Institute for European and American Studies, Director of Law Enforcement and Intelligence Analysis Centre London, and Fellow of Islamic Theology of Counter Terrorism. The views expressed are his own.

The European Union’s Cyber War Challenge was originally published on Global Security Review.