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		<title>Why the &#8220;First AI War&#8221; is Still a Human Struggle</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-the-first-ai-war-is-still-a-human-struggle/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-the-first-ai-war-is-still-a-human-struggle/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew J. Fecteau]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:14:48 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32749</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: June 8, 2026 The label of the “first AI war” obscures the reality that Operation EPIC FURY is still a conflict in which human judgment remains central to targeting. Artificial intelligence (AI) has not replaced human operators, but it has redefined how human judgment functions. The contemporary battlefield is now shaped by rate of fire, targeting accuracy, AI-enhanced cognition, and the [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-the-first-ai-war-is-still-a-human-struggle/">Why the &#8220;First AI War&#8221; is Still a Human Struggle</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Published:</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> June 8, 2026</span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The </span><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikebrown/2026/03/30/the-first-ai-war-how-the-iran-conflict-is-reshaping-warfare/"><span data-contrast="none">label</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> of the “first AI war” obscures the reality that Operation EPIC FURY is still a conflict in which human judgment remains central to targeting. Artificial intelligence (AI) has not replaced human operators, but it has redefined how human judgment functions. The contemporary battlefield is now shaped by rate of fire, targeting accuracy, AI-enhanced cognition, and the real transformation that machine learning has introduced into modern warfare.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">One of the most persistent misunderstandings about AI-assisted targeting is the claim that humans have somehow been removed from the loop, decisions are made solely on AI recommendations, or strikes are approved in seconds without meaningful review. The human factor has not disappeared. Humans remain indispensable to targeting. What has evolved is not the elimination of human involvement, but the rapid synthesis of intelligence with target acquisition. That distinction matters because many assume there is little or no review before a strike is done. However, no systems make decisions independently. They supplement human decision-making by sorting and ranking information to generate recommended outcomes that must still meet rigid criteria. Analysts verify intelligence, legal teams conduct reviews, commanders make the final decision, and human beings remain responsible for the outcome.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Critics often point to </span><a href="https://warontherocks.com/autonomous-weapon-systems-no-human-in-the-loop-required-and-other-myths-dispelled/"><span data-contrast="none">ambiguity</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> in strategic-level U.S. directives. The Department of War </span><a href="https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">Directive 3000.09</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> attempted to regulate certain AI-enabled systems, though the technology at the time was far less sophisticated than it is today. Military doctrine undermines the myth of autonomous targeting as well. The Army’s </span><a href="https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN39048-FM_3-60-000-WEB-1.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">FM 3-60</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> frames targeting as an iterative command process and states that commanders remain the final approval authority for targeting activities and acceptable levels of risk. Machines may assist with detection, but they do not inherit command responsibility. The result is that humans remain in the loop because targeting is still a command process, not an autonomous one. Military doctrine frames targeting as a cycle of deciding, detecting, delivering, and assessing, but commanders retain authority over acceptable risks. AI can compress and organize the data, but it cannot make strategic or moral judgments.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">AI models remain central to identity-based targeting and advanced decision support. </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2026/mar/01/claude-anthropic-iran-strikes-us-military"><span data-contrast="none">Open-source reporting</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> indicates that sophisticated models, such as </span><a href="https://claude.ai/login"><span data-contrast="none">Anthropic’s Claude</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, integrated into systems such as </span><a href="https://www.heise.de/en/news/Palantir-US-Department-of-Defense-makes-Maven-Smart-System-the-standard-11220659.html"><span data-contrast="none">Palantir designed Maven Smart System</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, have enabled rapid conversion of vast amounts of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), signals intelligence, and behavioral data into target packages.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Human productivity has also increased. Tasks that once required weeks and a large staff can now be completed in minutes with fewer personnel. However, speed and efficiency do not mean AI independence. It does not change what Clausewitz described as the </span><a href="https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/Reconsidering-Wars-Logic-and-Grammar/"><span data-contrast="none">“grammar of war.”</span></a><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The most consequential shift in conflict today is the compression of time within the targeting cycle and its integration into intelligence. In the past, high-value or high-payoff targets were often missed because manual processes relied heavily on human operators and overwhelming amounts of ISR data. Past conflicts reflected these limitations. During Operation Desert Storm, Iraqi mobile Scud launchers exploited delays by firing and relocating before U.S. forces could strike them. Kinetic precision still frequently exceeds intelligence fidelity. A munition could hit its coordinates perfectly while the underlying intelligence remained flawed. The use of intelligence to target enemy combatants predates modern technology. AI did not invent decapitation strategies; it made them more data-driven and less dependent on purely human intelligence sources. The Information Age once overwhelmed operators with data. AI now provides a way to navigate that environment. This is why cyber intelligence and persistent access are essential to modern targeting. Pattern-of-life targeting relies on multiple streams of surveillance and behavioral data. AI’s greatest strength is its ability to combine these streams on a scale that would overwhelm most military units. Yet the central question remains unresolved by algorithms alone: should the target be neutralized? That decision is legal, moral, political, </span><i><span data-contrast="auto">and </span></i><span data-contrast="auto">strategic.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">A clear example of AI-integrated intelligence limits came on the first day of the 2026 Iran War, when a U.S. missile </span><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/11/iran-war-missile-strike-elementary-school"><span data-contrast="none">struck an elementary school</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> in Minab, Hormozgan province, killing civilians, including children, in one of the war’s deadliest civilian incidents. The incident underscored a basic truth: AI-enabled targeting is only as dependable as its data. Here, the system likely </span><a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/old-intelligence-likely-led-us-strike-iran-elementary-school-rcna262967"><span data-contrast="none">relied on outdated intelligence</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> that missed the school’s proximity to an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps compound.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">AI was not the likely source of failure. More likely, flawed intelligence and the fog of war were to blame. Human operators still validated the strike with satellite imagery and intelligence reviews, even though the target was effectively co-located with the school.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The episode showed both the limits of AI models and the need for human review. Systems like </span><a href="https://www.palantir.com/assets/xrfr7uokpv1b/1IqzwzpemtBSm98TNCczao/49bbc30cbec4d2d4d189ab27bd07376c/Palantir_Target_Workbench___1_.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">Maven Smart System’s Target Workbench</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> sort, correlate, and reveal intelligence, but humans still approve of final actions. AI can aid target validation, but legal review and command authorization remain essential.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">CONCLUSION</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The effectiveness of any algorithm depends entirely on the intelligence architecture and data supporting it. AI does not create certainty; it produces probability. If the underlying data is manipulated, incomplete, stale, or inaccurate, the output will reflect those flaws. The greater danger is not the removal of the human in the loop, but the compression of human judgment into groupthink. AI-generated recommendations can create an aura of probabilistic certainty that encourages agreement instead of scrutiny. Human operators may still make the final call, but the risk is that they increasingly validate model logic rather than independently challenge it.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Humans remain in the loop today, but intelligence is now sorted at machine speed while generative systems provide recommendations to reviewers within the targeting cycle. Doctrine should evolve to ensure that human judgment takes precedence over AI-generated recommendations. The defining feature of this so-called first AI war is therefore not the replacement of human agency, but the intensification of human responsibility to judge, restrain, and decide at machine speed.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Fecteau is an information operations officer working with artificial intelligence, and a PhD researcher at King’s College London. The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of War, or the US Government.</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Why-the-_First-AI-War_-is-Still-a-Human-Struggle.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="173" height="48" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 173px) 100vw, 173px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-the-first-ai-war-is-still-a-human-struggle/">Why the &#8220;First AI War&#8221; is Still a Human Struggle</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Deterring Iran: The Art of No Deal</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/deterring-iran-the-art-of-no-deal/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/deterring-iran-the-art-of-no-deal/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christophe Bosquillon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 28 Jul 2025 11:09:42 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31265</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Since its inception, the Iranian regime (1979) has terrorized and subjugated the Middle East and killed far too many Americans. For nearly 50 years, Iran successfully used a combination of proxies and agents of influence within the US and Europe to deter the West. The regime also built a credible missile program with thousands of [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/deterring-iran-the-art-of-no-deal/">Deterring Iran: The Art of No Deal</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Since its <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Iranian-Revolution">inception</a>, the Iranian regime (1979) has terrorized and subjugated the Middle East <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/06/19/iranian-and-iranian-backed-attacks-against-americans-1979-present/">and killed far too many Americans</a>. For nearly 50 years, Iran successfully used a combination of proxies and agents of influence within the US and Europe to deter the West. The regime also built a credible missile program with thousands of ballistic missiles, useful for blackmail. Iran’s effort to deceive the West about its nuclear ambitions was not allowed to last indefinitely.</p>
<p>By mid-June 2025, after years of preparation, the Israelis, in one fell swoop, destroyed half of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, destroyed some nuclear facilities, and assassinated Iran’s leading nuclear scientists and the leadership of the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-poised-for-more-power-7ed0ba63">Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps</a> (IRGC). Then on June 23, 2025, a pre-dawn bombing raid <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LSfs58cGx1U">ordered by US President Donald Trump</a> took out of commission the hard-to-crack nuclear facilities of Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan.</p>
<p>Beyond adding to Israel’s capabilities with American B2 bombers loaded with GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrators, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg9r4q99g4o">bunkers busters</a>, the bombing cemented American leadership in dealing with the Iran problem. A review of joint Israel-US capabilities helps explain how deterrence in the region is returning and what to expect next.</p>
<p>Since the October 7, 2023, massacre of Israelis by Hamas, an Iranian proxy, Israeli intelligence and military units, all backed by superior defense technology, methodically destroyed Iranian capabilities and supporters. Iran’s “<a href="https://jiss.org.il/en/amidror-irans-ring-of-fire/">Ring of Fire</a>” utterly failed to achieve Iran’s strategic aims.</p>
<p>Israeli and American <a href="https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/us-should-leverage-middle-east-partners-to-boost-space-capabilities/">space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</a> enabled early warning, target verification, and battle damage assessment. Israel relied on a precision-strike doctrine that is supported by systems like the <a href="https://www.gov.il/en/pages/ofek-13-satellite-successfully-launched-into-space-29-mar-2023">Ofek</a>, <a href="https://ts2.tech/en/inside-israels-space-power-satellites-services-and-the-secret-strength-of-the-israel-space-agency/">AMOS</a>, and <a href="https://www.eoportal.org/satellite-missions/eros-b">Eros-B</a> space assets. Israel maintained surveillance for dominance above Iranian military and nuclear infrastructures. Iran merely <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/irans-quest-for-middle-east-hegemony/">linked its space program</a> to the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">IRGC</a>.</p>
<p>With multi-layer sensor fusion, Israel integrates <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/topic/eitan-uav/">Eitan unmanned aerial vehicles</a> (UAV), <a href="https://www.iai.co.il/p/elw-2090">ELW-2090 airborne warning and control systems</a>, and ground-based radars like the <a href="https://armyrecognition.com/military-products/army/radars/air-defense-radars/green-pine-elm-2080-elm-2080s">EL/M-2080 Green Pine</a> with satellite data into a national and regional situational awareness (SA) web, shaping strikes and missile defense prioritization. Space-derived situational awareness enables real-time assessment of missile launches, UAV swarm attacks, or asymmetric maritime threats by Iran and proxies operating from the Red Sea or Persian Gulf.</p>
<p>Cyber intelligence, signal intelligence (<a href="https://www.elbitsystems.com/land/land-ew-sigint">SIGINT</a>), and electronic warfare form another layer. In the conflict, Israel <a href="https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/directorates/c4i-and-cyber-defense-directorate/c4i-and-cyber-defense-directorate/">command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems</a> pit <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-820689">Unit 8200</a> against <a href="https://ir.usembassy.gov/designating-iranian-cyber-officials/">IRGC</a> affiliated cyber units.</p>
<p>Israel’s missile shield includes <a href="https://www.rafael.co.il/system/iron-dome/">Iron Dome</a>, <a href="https://www.rafael.co.il/system/medium-long-range-defense-davids-sling/">David’s Sling</a>, and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-running-low-on-arrow-interceptors-us-burning-through-its-systems-too-wsj/">Arrow-2/Arrow-3</a>. They combine to create a web of coverage. Arrow’s high-altitude, long-range interceptors tackle <a href="https://news.usni.org/2025/06/18/report-to-congress-on-irans-ballistic-missile-programs">Iranian ballistic missiles</a> such as <a href="https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/iran-launches-first-strike-isreal-mach-13-fattah-hypersonic">Fattah</a>, <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/shahab-3/">Shahab</a>, and <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2025/06/20/new-missile-enters-israel-iran-conflict-what-we-know-about-tehrans-sejil">Sejil</a>. <a href="https://www.rafael.co.il/system/iron-beam/">Iron Beam</a> laser defense, under development, aims to address low-cost, high-volume threats like UAVs and small rockets.</p>
<p>Israeli capabilities for missile defense, early warning, C4, and interoperability are integrated with US <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/">Central Command</a> and the systems of the Gulf States. The US supports Arrow and David’s Sling. <a href="https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/aegis-combat-system.html">Aegis</a> ballistic missile defense and terminal high altitude area defense (<a href="https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/thaad.html">THAAD</a>) systems in the region share radar feeds. <a href="https://www.spaceforce.mil/about-us/fact-sheets/article/2197746/space-based-infrared-system/">American space-based infra-red system satellites</a> provide missile-launch detection.</p>
<p><a href="https://cnreurafcent.cnic.navy.mil/Installations/NSA-Bahrain/">Bahrain hosts the US Navy</a> and supports regional <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/insights/cards/c4isr-military-nervous-system/">C4ISR</a>, and has growing maritime security ties with Israel. The US expanded its Saudi Arabian basing in <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-exploring-new-bases-saudi-arabia-counter-iran">Tabuk</a> to feed into the regional missile defense picture. The United Arab Emirates <a href="https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2025/exclusive-united-arab-emirates-boosts-air-defense-capabilities-with-m-sam-ii-integrating-with-us-pac-3-and-thaad">enables THAAD, Patriot (PAC-3), radar integration, and air picture sharing</a> with the US and <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/united-arab-emirates-israelpalestine/uae-israel">Israel</a>. Jordan, the United Kingdom, and France also contribute to defensive actions during missile and drone attacks.</p>
<p>Iranian targets and their proxies have nowhere to hide. The <a href="https://www.spoc.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/3878161/mission-delta-4-missile-warning">US Space Force’s Space Operations Command Mission Delta 4</a> identifies and tracks threats. It did so during the <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/space-force-guardians-missile-warning-iran-israel/">April 2024 </a>and <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/space-force-guardians-second-iranian-missile-attack/">October 2024</a> Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel. Operating 24 hours a day, 365 days a year to share intelligence, Mission Delta 4 ensures no missile launch ever catches America or her allies and partners by surprise.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/03/16/israel-super-capabilities-in-space/">A space-enabled Israel</a>, integrated with Gulf State operations, eliminated Iranian air defenses, triggered covert operations inside Iran, and launched targeted bombings and assassinations. The American bombing topped these other efforts. Israel, as the military strong horse, irreversibly altered the regional balance of power, possibly ushering in the demise of a threatening Iranian Shia hegemony—an objective shared by Sunni Arab Gulf States.</p>
<p>Regime change was never a stated war aim but was an anticipated consequence if it occurred. It did not. The surviving Shia Islamist leadership and IRGC are now engaged in repression and remain capable of inflicting much suffering on both the region and Iranians.</p>
<p>It is unclear to which extent proxies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shia militias can still attack Israel and American assets in the region. Military outcomes, though, are not the sole factors defining the Iranian endgame. The Iranian <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/us-iran-talks-unlikely-to-succeed-absent-a-military-strike/">taqiyya-driven regime</a> and its Shia hegemony ideology are down, but not out. Their nefarious ideological influence can persist <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-geostrategic-mind-of-iran/">around the Gulf, as far as Yemen and Africa, and beyond</a>.</p>
<p>Considering the cost of inaction and a failure to reinstate deterrence, eradicating a threat to the homeland, Middle East bases, and Gulf allies means the effort was worth it. If the conflict drags on, the costs will rise. Disruption of maritime traffic and oil markets could bring its predictable cohort of economic disruptions. Terrorism around the globe is <em>déjà vu</em>.</p>
<p>In the words of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, “<a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/germanys-merz-says-israel-is-doing-the-dirty-work-for-all-of-us-by-countering-iran/">Israel is doing the dirty work for all of us</a>.” Depending on the roles the new Syrian leadership and a resurgent Türkiye play, <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-this-the-right-moment-to-act-against-iran-on-all-fronts/">the Iranian endgame</a> may take different forms.</p>
<p>Yes, President Trump decisively <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/who-truly-benefits-from-a-us-iran-new-nukes-deal/">played the hand he was dealt</a>. But there are many more moves left in this game. The best moves may be still to come.</p>
<p><em>Christophe Bosquillon is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/deterring-iran-the-art-of-no-deal/">Deterring Iran: The Art of No Deal</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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