While certification is contingent on the US Navy’s ability to maintain its own submarine production rate, which is struggling to meet the planned two Virginia-class submarines per year, Australia would benefit greatly from their acquisition. Overall, it is worth noting that AUKUS Pillar I and Pillar II are likely to significantly enhance US undersea capabilities in the long term. Pillar I includes the rotational presence of one UK Astute-class submarine and up to four US Virginia-class submarines at HMAS Stirling, Western Australia, from 2027. HMAS Stirling provides the United States with greater access for the forward presence of nuclear-powered submarines in the Indo-Pacific.

Indo-Pacific access is further expanded via the new submarine base that is planned for the east coast of Australia by 2043. The authorized consolidated Commonwealth-owned Defence Precinct at Western Australia’s Henderson shipyard will provide contingency-docking and depot-level maintenance for AUKUS submarines by 2033, potentially alleviating some of the burden on US-based maintenance facilities. Pillar II will provide the advanced technology necessary to enhance US, UK, and Australian undersea capabilities, particularly for longer term advantages in mobility, survivability, lethality, and sustainability of allied forces.

Conversely, the SLCM-N is likely a significant factor in retaining American undersea capabilities. The SLCM-N will provide the US with flexible deterrence options in austere Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres, particularly as the US needs to provide extended nuclear deterrence to 32 NATO allies plus Australia, Japan, and South Korea. There are three options to consider when attempting to deter China, North Korea, and Russia.

First, the United States can provide Australia three to five conventionally armed Virginia-class submarines. This option is likely to significantly degrade American undersea capabilities through a lack of flexible response options for strategic deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence. Plus, Australia will need to manage three classes of submarines: the Collins-class, the AUKUS-class, and the SSN-AUKUS under this option.

Second, Australia can field a dual-capable submarines (DCS) mission for Australian Virginia-class submarines. This option requires the establishment of a nuclear planning group (NPG) to plan for a DCS mission for Australian Virginia-class submarines. These submarines would be capable of carrying the SLCM-N. This nuclear-armed option is unlikely to degrade US undersea capabilities, as Australia could support some US missions in the Indo-Pacific and provide flexible deterrence options. Australia will still need to manage three submarine classes under this option.

Third, the United States does not sell Virginia-class submarines to Australia, but instead bases submarines armed with SLCM-N in Australia, either on a permanent or rotational basis. This option does not degrade US undersea capabilities. However, under this option Australia should negotiate for extended nuclear deterrence guarantees. This option is not the end of AUKUS, but Australia will need to build sovereign SSN-AUKUS submarines to fill the gap left by Australia’s aging Collins-class submarines when they are retired.

Policymakers should not be afraid to consider a flexible nuclear-armed option in light of recent and historic Russian and Chinese rhetoric on AUKUS, especially when this rhetoric concerns “non-nuclear long-range precision strike capability.” Having a nuclear-armed option would provide enough flexibility to backstop and limit conventional war.

On April 18, 2025, Russia’s envoy to Indonesia, Sergei Tolchenov, defended military ties with Jakarta and did not deny claims that Russia seeks to station long-range military aircraft at the Manuhua Air Force Base at Biak Numfor, about 1400 kilometers north of Darwin, Australia. Russia asserted that AUKUS is more of a threat to the Asia-Pacific than Russian ties with Indonesia, which are “not aimed against any third countries and poses no threat to security in the Asia-Pacific region.” Tolchenov added that challenges to regional stability

are more likely to arise from the rotational deployment of large military contingents from extra-regional states on Australian territory, including the provision of airfields for the landing of strategic bombers and port infrastructure for visits by nuclear-powered submarines. Particularly alarming are the currently discussed plans to deploy the US intermediate-range missiles in Australia, which would put ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries, including Indonesia, within its range, as well as the acquisition by the Royal Australian Navy of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS trilateral partnership.

These comments are consistent with Putin’s rhetoric against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

This is not the first time Russia and China accused the US, UK, and Australia of risking an intensified arms race and military confrontation in the Indo-Pacific. A report by the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, China Nuclear Strategic Planning Research Institute, and the Russian Energy and Security Research Centre stated, “non-nuclear long-range precision strike capability, being provided to Australia, will affect nuclear deterrence and strategic stability.” The report goes on to say that “[w]hile current non-nuclear strategic weapons cannot carry out all the missions assigned to nuclear weapons those still can produce strategic effects.” The report further criticizes AUKUS’ nuclear submarine cooperation, which the report suggests will trigger a regional submarine arms race.

Chinese and Russian threats should not limit or contain AUKUS to non-nuclear options. This is particularly true when the US has historically provided non-nuclear long-range precision-strike capability. In the past this included the F-111 Aardvark, F/A-18F Super Hornet, E/A-18G Growler, and F-35A Lightning II.

Under the UN Charter, members have “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.” Hence, Australia and its allies should stand by the expression, si vis pacem, para bellum. Australia and its AUKUS allies should not back down from non-nuclear long-range precision strike capability or nuclear-armed deterrence options that provide more flexible responses.

Although, the sale of Virginia-class submarines to Australia under the AUKUS agreement may be contingent on the US Navy’s ability to maintain its submarine production rate. It is worth noting that American undersea capabilities, particularly in the long term, may be greatly enhanced through other means under AUKUS Pillar I and Pillar II.

In the new era of nuclear disorder, the key to maintaining American undersea capabilities will likely be the SLCM-N deployed on Virginia-class attack submarines. The SLCM-N will provide AUKUS flexible deterrence options and limit risk of conflict in austere Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres.

Natalie A. Treloar is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. She is the Australian Company Director of Alpha–India Consultancy. Natalie formerly contracted to the Australian Department of Defence. Views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policies, or positions of any organization, employer, or affiliated group.

SLCM-N, the Virginia-Class Submarine, and AUKUS was originally published on Global Security Review.

While specific nations to be deterred are not directly named in the DSR, China’s increased involvement in strategic competition in the region is clearly documented. The DSR also highlights the critical importance of Australia’s alliance with the United States to its security. It recognizes that the alliance will play an increasingly important role in the coming decades given increased rotations of American forces to Australia and ongoing cooperation on science and technology under agreements like Pillar II of AUKUS.

While much of the formal implementation plan to improve ADF capabilities associated with the DSR will be released in 2024 as part of the inaugural National Defence Strategy and its associated Integrated Investment Program, a few priorities for immediate action were identified including preparing to acquire nuclear-powered submarines; increased long-range strike capabilities, including the manufacture of munitions locally; and upgrades to Australia’s northern bases. The review also recognizes the role of resilience in Australia’s deterrence strategy, calling upon the nation to harness all element of national power to make Australia less susceptible to coercion by hostile nations.

Australia’s strategic environment is extremely challenging when considering deterrence of China’s large, capable, and increasingly expeditionary, conventional military forces. However, China also possesses a significant nuclear force structure which is modernizing and expanding at a dramatic pace. Assuming the current growth in forces leads to a stockpile of 1,500 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by 2035. In considering methods for the ADF to deter China, Australia must find ways to address threats of nuclear escalation and develop methods to deescalate any potential limited nuclear use. It is interesting to note that the word nuclear appears in the DSR report 41 times in total, yet 36 of those instances refer to nuclear-power submarines planned for delivery under AUKUS. The critically important topic of nuclear escalation and the role of American extended deterrence is barely mentioned, being covered in two sentences of a 116-page document.

Effective deterrence of a major nuclear power like China, even assuming the presence of the American “nuclear umbrella,” will require both effective engagement between the US and Australia, and detailed thought about ways nuclear threats or limited nuclear use can affect any potential future conflict.

Recent tabletop exercises at the Center and Strategic and International Studies highlighted a lack of imaginative thinking by “Blue” players in a simulated US-China conflict over Taiwan, labeling the Blue team as “stuck in a Cold War mindset.” “Red” players, at the outbreak of the conflict, used the threat of nuclear use in an attempt to deter Blue forces from entering the war, similar to the way Putin has successfully leveraged nuclear threats to deter NATO’s increased involvement in  Ukraine. In one tabletop exercise, Red players employed a low-yield nuclear weapon against Guam as a response to conventional attacks on Red’s mainland. Understanding and developing methods to limit and manage escalation within the alliance construct, while maintaining deterrence, are especially critical for a non-nuclear weapon state like Australia.

Although increased numbers of American troops rotating through Australian bases may increase deterrence, those bases are attractive targets for long-range ballistic and cruise-missile strikes early in a conflict should conflict erupt between the US and China. Several wargames and expert analyses show that the US could lose hundreds of aircraft on the ground from attacks by Chinese conventional missiles unless new methods of base hardening, base resilience, and agile combat employment are implemented. The US and Australia need to work together to find ways to ensure the maritime and air forces of both nations are able to effectively operate through such attacks.

Missile defenses, rapid base repair capabilities, infrastructure upgrades, and methods of deception and denial form a partial list of options. Proven resilience during peacetime against such attacks on air and maritime bases will help deter those attacks in wartime.

To increase deterrence and the nation’s resilience, Australia’s government must also start an open and frank dialog with the public about the significance of the threats the nation is facing and the ways in which the ADF and other parts of government are posturing to deter those threats. This is needed to help motivate the “renewed focus on national planning for Defence preparedness” as part of the transition to national defence recommended in the DSR. This discussion must include more than conventional threats. While only the United States possess nuclear weapons, Australia has a role to play in shared extended deterrence. This includes helping the US understand what assurances Australia requires given various routes to escalation in potential future crises. Further examination of these issues and sharing finding with the public, friends, and adversaries should lead to a more stable Indo-Pacific region.

Carl Rhodes is a senior fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and is founder of Robust Policy, a Canberra firm providing high-quality analysis and policy solutions. Previously, he served 25 years with RAND Corporation including a term as director of RAND Australia.

Australia’s Defence Strategic Review and the Growing Importance of Extended Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.