The 2026 United States’ war against Iran is a matter of international and domestic political controversy. Regardless of its outcome, the trajectory already suggests important lessons about the continuing relevance of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence for international peace and security.  

The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union led to a shift in American and allied European expectations about relations with Russia and the importance of nuclear weapons. Many assumed it that a new world order had emerged that validated American triumphalism and the superiority of democracy and capitalism. The United States in the 1990s and early 2000s, despite the 9/11 attacks and the global war on terror, remained the preeminent international promoter of world order and international peace.  

Similar optimism about the twenty-first century led to the diminished appreciation for nuclear weapons and its effect on deterrence. Researchers who focused on nuclear deterrence became fugitives in an intellectual climate that favored the study of unconventional warfare, terrorism, human rights, and climate change. Only a small coterie of academics and think tank specialists continued to warn that the significance of nuclear weapons and its deterrent effect would not depreciate in the new world order, and, in fact, that they might prove to be even more relevant and challenging for world peace and international security than hitherto. With the advantage of hindsight, the optimism for a peaceful new world order and the expectations of diminishing nuclear relevance were clearly a mistake. New challenges to international security and political stability arose on several fronts.   

First, political relations between the United States, its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, and Russia dramatically deteriorated because of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Putin’s war on Ukraine created an existential threat to European security, supported by Russia’s nuclear modernization and increasing diversity of advanced conventional weapons. The expiration of New START, the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty, did not help.  

Second, China emerged as a third and soon to be nuclear peer. They are moving steadily to rival the United States and Russia, all while expanding regional aspirations. This leaves the United States facing a future that, even with modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad, will lag significantly behind the combined Russian and Chinese nuclear forces by 2035.  

Additionally, Russia also has thousands of non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons and maintains a collection of delivery systems deployed and/or stored for deployment. In comparison, the United States currently deploys some 200 tactical nuclear weapons in five European countries for delivery by dual capable aircraft (DCA) under NATO. Russia also moved the needle on deployable long range hypersonic land based and air delivered nuclear weapons. Russian experience with drones in Ukraine challenge preexisting assumptions about deterrence and defense in Europe. The West should expect more change. The possibility of simultaneous Russian and Chinese attacks in the European and Indo-Pacific theaters with conventional weapons, supported by the threat of nuclear escalation, cannot be ruled out by American and allied military planners.  

Third, the successful containment of nuclear proliferation by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and other restraints, is now at imminent risk. Iran’s nuclear program has doubtless been set back by Israeli and American attacks. However, in the absence of regime change, Iran seems determined to continue with plans for uranium enrichment toward nuclear weapons. Even if Iran’s nuclear ambitions are temporarily contained by outside pressure or diplomatic agreement, other regional powers are already considering their own options.  

Saudi Arabia reached an agreement with the United States to support a larger nuclear energy program for the kingdom. The Saudis want not only to diversify energy sources, but hedge against an Iranian breakthrough to nuclear weaponization. Development of a “Shia bomb” or even a robust development of fissile material on the threshold of weaponization could affect decisions in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt.  

Some critics of American and Israeli insistence that Iran is not permitted to develop nuclear weapons contend that the same arguments were made against North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, but a rogue North Korea has decided to establish a nuclear weapon program anyway. And like Iran, it is tied to Russia and China as supportive powers. On the other hand, North Korea is almost completely dependent on China for its economic survival and security guarantees, and China has made it clear that it opposes any North Korean nuclear first use or first strike unless Pyongyang itself is invaded.  

China enjoys North Korean saber rattling as a distraction from China’s own aggression. Thus, an important distinction between Iran and North Korea is that the latter is subject to friendly regional restraint on its nuclear ambitions. On the other hand, regional restraint against Iran’s nuclear trajectory is the responsibility of Israel, who is distrusted and surrounded by Arab countries.  

Finally, observers of American foreign policy cannot help but notice the difference in outcomes between adversaries that develop nuclear weapons and those that do not. The United States invaded and occupied Iraq and Afghanistan and, with support, assisted regime change in Libya. On the other hand, North Korea receives a light touch.  

Although not an American adversary, Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons and has faced Russian aggression and interference for at least two decades. This is despite American, British, and Russian guarantees of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Some Ukrainians must surely wonder whether nuclear abstinence was cockeyed optimism.  

Lastly, India and Pakistan fought three wars before either had acquired a nuclear arsenal. Since then, despite periodic skirmishes, the number of major wars between the two Asian nuclear powers is zero.  

The preceding does not imply that nuclear deterrence is infallible, nor that it is easy to accomplish. The United States today recognizes the need for tailored deterrence, based upon capabilities for assured retaliation, flexible targeting, escalation control, and war termination.  Continuing updates of threat assessments should be accompanied by appropriate modernization of strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces, as well as competitive breakthroughs in missile defense, hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science. The nuclear deterrent is also shrink-wrapped around expected challenges in the space and cyber domains. The CRINK (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) coalition poses continuing challenges to world order, including those that require strong nuclear equities. 

History shows that the world order is strongly linked to strategies that include nuclear weapons, which if anything, are becoming more diverse in this century. Western powers must recognize this plan accordingly. In the end, the worst option is to do nothing. 

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

Iran Shows Why Nuclear Deterrence Still Matters was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the United States heads toward another set of midterm Congressional elections in November 2026, issues related to nuclear weapons, including deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation, will be important. Whether candidates will give issues of nuclear policy and strategy the attention that they deserve is another matter. Historically midterms have tended to focus on the state of the economy and the personalities of the respective candidates. The 2026 midterms should also see debates about foreign policy issues and U.S. national security. 

The first issue that U.S. politicians must address is the emerging new world order and the coalition of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK) opposed to American and allied vital interests worldwide. In this regard, the efforts to set back Iran’s progress toward development and deployment of nuclear weapons will continue to meet with resistance among the other CRINKS, each with its own nuclear arsenal and an ongoing program of nuclear modernization. Russia remains the country with the world’s largest numbers of operationally deployed and stored nuclear warheads. China is rapidly building new long-range delivery systems and warheads on a trajectory that will enable it to deploy some 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons on land based, sea based and airborne launchers by 2035. North Korea is also increasing and diversifying its inventory of nuclear weapons and launchers in addition to supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine with thousands of DPRK infantrymen. 

Given the preceding context, the U.S. must anticipate and plan for the contingency of two simultaneous large scale conventional wars in Europe and Asia. Either or both conflicts would be fought under the shadow of potential nuclear first use. Since the start of the Russian war against Ukraine in February 2022, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly warned of Russia’s willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons in various circumstances. Russia has in fact exercised its nuclear command and control systems in various war games over the past several years as a direct strategic signal. NATO has responded with significant improvements in its military preparedness for protracted conventional war, and by enhancing its protocols for sharing U.S. and allied nuclear weapons with other members of the alliance in time of need. France has adopted a revised nuclear policy doctrine that includes a more explicit commitment for its nuclear force de dissuasion to alliance wide deterrence in addition to deterrence of attack against French state territory. In the Far East, China is relatively ambiguous about the conditions under which it might engage in nuclear first use, but it would be safe to assume that the option remains open in case of a major U.S. military intervention to oppose a Chinese takeover of Taiwan.  

Second, and related to the preceding discussion about the possible behavior of existing nuclear powers, is the prospect of additional countries that decide to join the ranks of nuclear weapons states. In the Middle East. and especially in the aftermath of Operation Epic Fury and Iran’s reactions, some countries may be rethinking their commitment to nuclear abstinence. The most immediate concern among proliferation experts is Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has already decided to go forward with an ambitious civilian nuclear infrastructure plan as a hedge against future uncertainty in oil markets. At a certain level, this program would open the door to weaponization if the kingdom felt sufficiently threatened by Iran, since the latter has already targeted Saudi economic infrastructure and U.S. military bases throughout the region. In Asia, the threat posed by China and North Korea might increase interest in nuclear weaponization in Japan and South Korea. Although in theory, the U.S. nuclear umbrella extends as a deterrent that protects Japan and South Korea, a rising Chinese nuclear superpower and an unpredictable North Korea could shift public opinion and government policy in Seoul and-or Tokyo. 

In addition to the preceding challenges posed for U.S. national security and nuclear related defense policy, a third problem is the spread of technologies that are potential game changers for conventional war and/or nuclear deterrence. These technologies include hypersonic weapons, drones, artificial intelligence with strategic mind games, and space-based weapons.  

Hypersonic weapons reduce the time for opponents to close the OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act loop) before disaster strikes. Drones have already changed the nature of the conventional battlefield in Ukraine and in the Middle East in myriad ways. Conceivably, they could eventually be nuclear armed with tiny nukes or mini nukes and even more precisely targeted than hitherto. Artificial intelligence will have enormous implications for the art of war, and deterrence: the applications are too numerous to mention in a single compass. But one immediate application of AI to strategy is the creation of strategic mind games for the purpose of deception. False images of political leaders making fake statements about military and political issues are already on offer. Future creative cyber warriors may, in the manner of William Randolph Hearst and the Spanish American war, be able to instigate public anger against one or more regimes and propel national leadership over the edge of brinkmanship into conventional or even nuclear conflict. Finally, space is now officially recognized as a domain for potential warfighting (along with land, sea, air, and cyberspace) and the deployment of space-based weapons by major powers is inevitable. Weapons once based in space will have to be defended against potential attacks from enemy space or terrestrially based weapons. The U.S. currently and prospectively depends at least partly on the safety and reliability of space-based assets for navigation, warning, command and control, and other components of the brain and nervous system for nuclear deterrence. Although the current environment for nuclear or space arms control among the great powers seems unpropitious presently, an eventual regime of “rules of the road” for orbital components of strategic power will have to be designed and agreed upon to avoid unacceptable celestial (and related terrestrial) chaos. 

In such a chaotic and uncertain strategic environment, citizens should know where their leaders stand on the challenges posed by foreign policy and nuclear war. Voters would be well served to demand those answers before a crisis arrives. 

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own. 

Nuclear Deterrence and the Midterm Elections was originally published on Global Security Review.

Both sides subsequently took steps to militarize the border and there was talk in New Delhi of following a more aggressive policy towards the Chinese. It was quite a surprise, therefore, that before the 2024 BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit at Kazan, India announced that it reached an agreement with the Chinese on how to patrol the border without clashes. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping also had a bilateral meeting in Kazan. Several factors led to this turn of events.

The Indians knew for some time that to dislodge the Chinese from the positions they occupied in the Himalayas would lead to an expensive war where India would likely not succeed in achieving its objectives. The alternative was to negotiate a settlement on resuming patrolling along the border and move towards improving the relationship in other areas, as the Chinese had suggested, notably by increasing trade and foreign direct investment in India.

The first sign that a policy shift was taking place came when the Ministry of Finance’s publication, “The Economic Survey of India,” called for seeking Chinese foreign direct investment to boost the economy. Such a statement could only come with the approval of the prime minister’s office signaling a change in thinking in New Delhi. While India’s bureaucratic and military establishments wanted a hard line towards China and to move closer to the United States, India’s three major business houses—Ambani, Adani, and Tata—all wanted closer economic ties with the Chinese, as did others in the business community. China provides the necessary equipment for Indian industry as well as the much-needed middle managers for India’s bourgeoning high-tech industries.

Further, while the United States was engaged in discussions with India it could not provide anything concrete and meaningful to New Delhi. Foreign direct investment from the United States was not forthcoming in significant amounts. Militarily, Washington was not providing the high-tech weaponry that India badly needed—at least not without terms and conditions that India found onerous. On the other hand, India lacked the financial resources to pay for the more advanced technology it wanted.

In terms of the Quadrilateral Alliance (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), the Indians were always the outliers since their military technology could not operate seamlessly with the American, Australia, and Japanese systems. Moreover, the Indians were cautious about the extent to which they wanted to aggravate the Chinese, worrying about Beijing’s potential to complicate the security environment in South Asia.

The budding bilateral alliance between Beijing and Moscow also worried New Delhi. Beijing and Moscow are moving towards a much closer political and economic relationship that is partly aimed at transforming the dollar-dominated international financial system.

Militarily, the emergence of closer military ties between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK) is worrying not only to the West but also to India since Russia is a major supplier of weaponry to India and New Delhi does not want to see this supply chain disrupted because Moscow decides to favor Beijing and reduces supplies to India.

Moreover, within BRICS there is a move towards accepting the Beijing-Moscow position on an alternative world order—the Law Based International Order—that while India accepts it, it is also concerned that it would be dominated by Beijing (and India would be shut out of framing the new narrative). All these reasons required mending fences with the Chinese.

Outcomes

             At the very least, this move is welcome because it is going to lead to a lowering of tensions along the border, which helps the internal position of the incumbent prime minister. Narendra Modi was weakened in the May-June 2024 general elections where his party went from having an absolute majority to being forced into a coalition with untrustworthy partners.

In such a situation, a bad military outcome along the border would severely weaken Modi’s internal standing and lead to calls for him to be replaced. Stabilizing the border, therefore, removes an irritant in domestic politics.

India needs foreign direct investment and despite all the talk from Tokyo and Western capitals, China is the most likely source of such financial resources. Chinese companies, despite the downturn in India-China relations, now control over 70 percent of the country’s cellphone market with companies like OnePlus, Redmi, Oppo, and Vivo outselling Apple, Samsung, and Sony.

Huawei and Hisense are making inroads in India’s white goods market while Chinese electric scooters (or ones powered by Chinese batteries) are becoming the ride of choice for young Indians. Paytm, the mobile payment service, has a Chinese majority share in its ownership and it is one of the leading players in the Indian market.

All of this has happened while relations between the two countries were sour. There is, therefore, considerable room for growth if the political climate between the two countries improves significantly. There is talk, in fact, that China may do a substantial foreign direct investment in India because, unlike Pakistan and Sri Lanka, there is less worry about nonperforming loans in India.

Some worry that the Indian rapprochement with China could have an adverse impact on US policy toward the Indo-Pacific and will give greater momentum to a BRICS-inspired move to de-dollarize the global economy. The Indians have a residual distrust of China and, therefore, are not going to bail out of Western-directed initiatives in the Indo-Pacific just because New Delhi is now the recipient of Chinese largesse.

Instead, India will encourage the development of Western-crafted institutions in the Indo-Pacific and participate in them particularly if they lead to economic growth. As far as de-dollarization is concerned, the Indians want to go to payments in one’s own currencies within BRICS but are not talking of displacing the dollar. In part, this is because the alternative could be the yuan or a Chinese-dominated BRICS currency.

The rapprochement between the two countries is good because it deescalates tensions and makes room for investment that India badly needs to reinvigorate its economy. At the same time, it does not shift India into the Chinese camp since New Delhi is a long way from trusting Beijing and entering into an anti-Western partnership with it. For the West, the best move is to wait and see, while remaining on good terms with India.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Advisor to the Forum of Federations Ottawa. The views in this article are his own.

Why India Made Up with China at the BRICS Summit was originally published on Global Security Review.