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		<title>Why Washington Has Turned to Pakistan—and What It Means for India</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-washington-has-turned-to-pakistan-and-what-it-means-for-india/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-washington-has-turned-to-pakistan-and-what-it-means-for-india/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ziaulhaq Tanin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 12:42:25 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32438</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: March 16, 2026 In the summer and fall of 2025, Washington’s decision-makers faced an urgent question: which partners could act immediately and deliver tangible results? This focus on short-term capability, rather than potential or size, has brought Pakistan back into the spotlight of U.S. foreign policy. Its importance today is tied not to historical [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-washington-has-turned-to-pakistan-and-what-it-means-for-india/">Why Washington Has Turned to Pakistan—and What It Means for India</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: March 16, 2026</em></p>
<p>In the summer and fall of 2025, Washington’s decision-makers faced an urgent question: which partners could act immediately and deliver tangible results? This focus on short-term capability, rather than potential or size, has brought Pakistan back into the spotlight of U.S. foreign policy. Its importance today is tied not to historical ties, but to what it is prepared to deliver. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/19/trumps-pakistan-embrace-tactical-romance-or-a-new-inner-circle?utm_source=chatgpt.com">Recent</a> high-level meetings and agreements provide evidence of this shift, signaling a new calculus in Washington’s regional approach.</p>
<p><strong>The Main Reason Behind Trump’s Foreign Policy Shift</strong></p>
<p>The main reason for the U.S. foreign policy pivot toward Pakistan is neither ideology nor historic friendship, but Pakistan’s current capacity to deliver on Washington’s key objectives—security, resources, and political flexibility. This “capacity to deliver” consists of three dimensions on which Washington is counting today.</p>
<p>The first is the operational-security dimension, involving intelligence and operational cooperation that yields measurable results, such as counterterrorism cooperation and mediation in Afghanistan. The second is strategic and economic resources, referring to access to energy, minerals, or contracts supporting U.S. industrial and defense initiatives, including mineral promises and economic or crypto agreements. The third is diplomatic and tactical flexibility, characterized by Pakistan’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-official-says-differences-with-india-cannot-be-resolved-overnight-deal-2025-08-01/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">readiness</a> to make quick deals, assume regional roles, and engage in de-escalation aligned with Washington’s interests—something India is less willing to do.</p>
<p>In short, Washington seeks a “measurable partner,” not merely an “ideal strategic ally,” and Pakistan is offering that measurable partnership.</p>
<p><strong>Why Didn’t India Become Dependable?</strong></p>
<p>To understand why the U.S. is stepping back from India, it is essential to distinguish between two types of capability: long-term capacity—such as market size, population, and economic strength—and immediate ability to cooperate, meaning willingness to align with U.S. interests. While India’s long-term potential is undeniable, several factors have eroded Washington’s trust in its short-term reliability.</p>
<p>New Delhi’s independent economic and energy behavior, including <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-india-oil-ties-us-trade-deal-targets-crude-imports-2026-02-03/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">continued</a> purchases of discounted Russian oil and increasingly protectionist trade policies, has been interpreted in Washington as undermining U.S. economic interests, prompting tariff responses and weakening strategic trust. In addition, tactical asynchrony on regional and international issues has made India reluctant to reach quick agreements with Washington or bear domestic political costs of alignment.</p>
<p>As a result, India’s behavior has become, in Washington’s view, “predictably resistant.” When a partner’s cooperation becomes constrained, the U.S. tends to look elsewhere—even if the alternative is smaller or less prominent globally.</p>
<p><strong>How Did Pakistan Build a “Deliverable” Status?</strong></p>
<p>Pakistan actively crafted a “delivery package” <a href="https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-washington-trade-deal-oil-reserves-development-b891d26a9047cba4c13f098be7e068d1">combining</a> tangible security cooperation, fresh economic offers, and regional coordination—the formula Washington sought.</p>
<p>On the security front, <a href="https://mofa.gov.pk/press-releases/joint-statement-of-pakistan-us-counterterrorism-dialogue?utm_source=chatgpt.com">reports</a> point to growing counterterrorism cooperation and structured dialogue between the U.S. and Pakistan, signaling that Islamabad can play an immediate operational and intelligence role. Economically, Pakistan has presented <a href="https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/1342174-pakistan-inks-mous-with-us-firms-on-minerals-500m-pledged?utm_source=chatgpt.com">proposals</a> tied to vital minerals, energy projects, and partnerships involving firms linked to Washington’s business circles. These offers, coupled with access to strategic resources and investment contracts, have added significant political value.</p>
<p>Regionally, Pakistan&#8217;s role in Afghanistan and participation in recent arrangements—such as the <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/pakistan-saudi-arabia-partnership-what-are-both-sides-seeking/">defense pact</a> with Saudi Arabia—have further positioned Islamabad as a pragmatic actor in Washington’s calculus.</p>
<p><strong>The Role of Leadership Style in Washington: Trump’s Transnationalism</strong></p>
<p>The trajectory of U.S. foreign policy is closely tied to leadership style. The Trump administration embodies a distinctly transactional approach—offering rewards for cooperation and swift punishment for actions undermining American interests.</p>
<p>This style has reshaped Washington’s behavior in three ways. First, speed has become paramount: quick deals and visible short-term results matter more than long-term strategies. Second, deliverability is the new standard: Washington prioritizes what a partner can provide immediately rather than who might remain loyal in the future. Third, domestic politics and business networks, including figures linked to Trump’s inner circle, have made decision-making more interest-driven and risk-prone. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/02/01/trump-uae-crypto-world-liberty-financial/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">Reports</a> of business ties close to the White House have reinforced this perception.</p>
<p><strong>The Costs and Risks of This Shift</strong></p>
<p>Washington’s tilt toward Pakistan may follow the logic of “deliverability,” but it carries risks that should not be overlooked. Partnering with a nuclear-armed state facing internal instability exacerbates security vulnerabilities, especially amid discussions of Saudi-Pakistan defense arrangements. India is unlikely to remain neutral; it could lean further toward China or reinforce strategic autonomy, both weakening U.S. influence in Asia. Moreover, privileging Islamabad risks alienating regional and Middle Eastern allies, opening the door to new bloc formations complicating U.S. strategy.</p>
<p>These risks are structural. For Pakistan, the gamble is also dangerous: entanglement in U.S.-China rivalry may deepen domestic fragility rather than strengthen its position.</p>
<p><strong>The Messages of the Shift for Key Players </strong></p>
<p>Washington’s pivot sends clear signals to New Delhi and Islamabad. For India, the first is the need to make foreign policy more operational—demonstrating tangible results in areas Washington prioritizes, from technology supply chains to selective security cooperation. The second is using multilateral channels to reduce risks while carefully addressing costs of diverging from Washington.</p>
<p>For Pakistan, two messages stand out: if it seeks to move from being merely “deliverable” to becoming a “responsible partner,” transparency on nuclear issues and guarantees of internal political stability are essential. Pakistan must also channel its leverage into structural investments—through institutional building and resource legislation—to reduce dependence on transactional deals.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion: A Warning and an Opportunity </strong></p>
<p>Washington’s pivot to Pakistan reflects a key principle in contemporary geopolitics: in fluid, high-pressure environments, actors able to deliver short-term results gain advantage—but this edge is not lasting without transparency, accountability, and risk management. For observers, the story is clear: today, the U.S. seeks tangible results; Pakistan provides them; if India cannot—or chooses not to—adapt to “practical deliverability,” it must be prepared to bear strategic costs. Washington’s choice signals that in the current era, those who can act immediately hold significance.</p>
<p>If India fails to show greater flexibility in trade, energy, and geopolitical alignment, years of diplomatic investment in its relationship with the U.S. could be seriously undermined.</p>
<p><em>Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher specializing in international security, regionalism, and foreign policy. As a freelance writer, he contributes to national and international publications, including Modern Diplomacy, Global Security Review, RealClearDefense, and Afghan outlets such as Hasht-e-Subh and Madanyat Media, and has published articles in academic journals of Afghan universities, providing analysis on Afghanistan, South Asia, and broader global affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. </em></p>
<p><em> <a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Why-Washington-Has-Turned-to-Pakistan.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="241" height="67" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 241px) 100vw, 241px" /></a></em></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-washington-has-turned-to-pakistan-and-what-it-means-for-india/">Why Washington Has Turned to Pakistan—and What It Means for India</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Deterrence of North Korea and Iran: Interests-Objectives-Analysis Framework</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/extended-deterrence-of-north-korea-and-iran-interests-objectives-analysis-framework/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/extended-deterrence-of-north-korea-and-iran-interests-objectives-analysis-framework/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nathan Heath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Oct 2025 12:05:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31642</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On June 22, the United States struck multiple Iranian nuclear sites, marking a tipping point in its deterrence of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear ambitions. It was no longer enough to institute unilateral or multilateral sanctions against the regime, carry out strikes against its proxies, or support Israel’s own military action; direct American military power was [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/extended-deterrence-of-north-korea-and-iran-interests-objectives-analysis-framework/">Deterrence of North Korea and Iran: Interests-Objectives-Analysis Framework</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On June 22, the United States <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/06/21/world/iran-israel-trump">struck</a> multiple Iranian nuclear sites, marking a tipping point in its deterrence of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear ambitions. It was no longer enough to institute unilateral or multilateral sanctions against the regime, carry out strikes against its proxies, or support Israel’s own military action; direct American military power was needed against Iran itself. After all, Iran was <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/mossad-says-iran-15-days-from-bomb-us-agencies-still-say-up-to-a-year-report/">dangerously close</a> to producing a nuclear weapon.</p>
<p>The near completion of Iran’s nuclear weapon brings to mind another rogue state’s activities. In 2006, after years of global efforts aimed at preventing the Kim regime from obtaining nuclear weapons, North Korea (DPRK) conducted its first nuclear test. Today, the DPRK has an <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms-control-and-proliferation-profile-north-korea">estimated</a> 50 nuclear weapons and fissile material for 6 or 7 more.</p>
<p>An in-depth comparison of US engagement with Iran and the DPRK’s nuclear programs requires a much longer paper. However, a brief comparative analysis of American deterrence of these adversaries is possible. Applying national interests, objectives, and activities, a methodology employed by decision analysis experts yields interesting results.</p>
<p>Globally, the United States has an enduring interest in safeguarding its national security and sovereignty. Underneath this enduring interest, it has a core objective of defending allies and partners, including through credible deterrence (e.g., preventing conventional and/or nuclear attacks on allies and partners by the DPRK, China, Russia, and Iran). Other <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/us-policy-middle-east-second-quarter-2025-report-card">major American objectives</a> include <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-five-keys-of-donald-trumps-grand-strategy">safeguarding</a> the free flow of commerce, countering <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf">transnational threats</a>, preventing <a href="https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/indopacom_posture_statement_2025.pdf">regional domination or aggression</a>, and <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2025/08/trump-wants-to-stop-nuclear-proliferation-stratcom-could-play-a-major-role/">advancing nonproliferation</a>.</p>
<p>The United States advances deterrence through a range of activities, including the presence of its own military assets and security cooperation with allies and partners. In the Indo-Pacific, this includes mutual defense treaties with Australia, the Philippines; South Korea, and Japan (the latter two of which are explicitly covered by the US nuclear umbrella); <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2025/05/31/2003837800#:~:text=The%20US%20plans%20to%20ramp%20up%20weapons%20sales,two%20US%20officials%20said%20on%20condition%20of%20anonymity.">arms</a> sales to Taiwan; and <a href="https://www.army.mil/article/286395/exercise_talisman_sabre_2025_to_showcase_us_australia_alliance">military exercises</a> with allies.</p>
<p>More recently, the Trump administration emphasized <a href="https://uscnpm.org/2025/06/24/the-trump-administrations-indo-pacific-strategy/">increased allied defense spending</a> to support “burden-sharing.” Given the limitations of the American industrial base, this is necessary even as the US <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/20250131/hegseth-reaffirms-strong-alliance-with-s-korea-during-1st-phone-talks-with-seouls-defense-chief">maintains</a> efforts to prevent Chinese and North Korean aggression.</p>
<p>Deterrence against North Korea is successful insofar as it keeps the North from invading the South or launching nuclear strikes on US Indo-Pacific allies. However, this deterrence is increasingly complicated by Chinese and Russian <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/russia-china-north-korea-relations-obstacles-to-a-trilateral-axis/">protection</a> of the DPRK through mutual defense treaties.</p>
<p>This lends greater urgency to the American call for allies to increase defense spending, as there is a real risk of <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-united-states-and-its-allies-must-be-ready-to-deter-a-two-front-war-and-nuclear-attacks-in-east-asia/">simultaneous conflict</a> with China and North Korea, a scenario requiring substantial military assets in the region. Fulfilling the objective of regional deterrence also requires containing aggression from adversaries and bolstering security cooperation with allies and partners.</p>
<p>The United States supports deterrence in the Middle East by deploying its military forces and cooperating with allies and partners. However, regional deterrence, which <a href="https://cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/2025-05/Extended%20Deterrence%20in%20a%20Multipolar-Nuclear-World-Workshop-Summary.pdf">does not</a> formally extend the US nuclear umbrella to regional allies and partners (including Israel), often manifests as kinetic operations against adversaries, whether through security assistance or direct attacks. Thus, in the Middle East, deterrence also means advancing the goals of counter proliferation and degrading terror groups who threaten allies.</p>
<p>Unlike in the Indo-Pacific, where the United States <a href="https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4202504/hegseth-outlines-us-vision-for-indo-pacific-addresses-china-threat/">prefers</a> to contain aggression and expansion from nuclear-armed adversaries without firing a shot, in the Middle East, it will <a href="https://instituteofgeoeconomics.org/en/research/2025040904/">employ</a> kinetic means to fulfill its objectives. For decades, the United States deterred Iran through sanctions, negotiations, and the threat of military action. It was when President Trump believed Iran’s uranium enrichment program was “<a href="https://www.politifact.com/article/2025/jun/23/Tulsi-Gabbard-Iran-nuclear-weapon-Donald-Trump/">at its highest levels and…unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons</a>” that the US conducted kinetic attack.</p>
<p>The deep rifts in Middle East politics complicates the activities needed to maintain deterrence in the region. Prospects for security cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states, for example, are <a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-strike-in-doha-crosses-a-new-line-from-which-relations-with-gulf-may-not-recover-264954">challenging</a> given the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Israel’s recent strike against Hamas in Qatar.</p>
<p>Deterrence must also account for energy security concerns, given that US attempts to contain a nuclear-armed Iran may lead the regime to weaponize its <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/four-questions-and-expert-answers-about-irans-threats-to-close-the-strait-of-hormuz/">control</a> over the Straits of Hormuz. It is also <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/assessing-effect-us-strikes-iran">unclear</a> how far back American strikes set Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran’s proxy network <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/06/28/iran-is-severely-weakened-but-remains-a-regional-threat/">persists</a>, they can also commit further violence against the United States, its allies, and partners through attacks on military, commercial, and civilian targets.</p>
<p>None of these challenges are simple. In the coming years American deterrence guarantees to allies and partners may look very different as the nation <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/policy_briefs/2025/02/14/stark-strategic-realities-hegseth-tells-nato-u-s-must-prioritize-pacific-deterrence/">shifts focus</a> to the homeland and the Indo-Pacific. It remains to be seen how this imperative is realized in the forthcoming <em>National Defense Strategy</em>. Some critics <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2025/09/analysts-await-forthcoming-nds-to-clear-up-defense-policy-contradictions/">note</a> that, in practice, the United States remains heavily focused on the Middle East and Europe. Much of the ability to deter Iran and North Korea will be determined by these larger strategic shifts.</p>
<p>As American decision-makers face questions about effectively deploying American power across the globe, analyzing national interests, objectives, and activities can provide a helpful framework. Assessing the requirements needed to advance larger regional goals brings trade-offs into focus, better preparing the American warfighter for multiple threat scenarios. In short, this approach can yield meaningful results for those in the decision-making chair at critical moments when faced with complex problems, including maintaining credible deterrence.</p>
<p><em>Nathan Heath is an analyst at NSI. Views expressed are his own.</em></p>
<p><em><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Extended-Deterrence-of-North-Korea-and-Iran-Interests-Objectives-Analysis-Framework.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="238" height="66" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 238px) 100vw, 238px" /></a></em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/extended-deterrence-of-north-korea-and-iran-interests-objectives-analysis-framework/">Deterrence of North Korea and Iran: Interests-Objectives-Analysis Framework</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Pak-US relations: Areas of Engagement beyond Security Cooperation</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/pak-us-relations-areas-of-engagement-beyond-security-cooperation/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nawal Nawaz]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Jun 2025 12:11:44 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Abbey Gate bombing]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[counterterrorism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[critical minerals]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[diplomatic engagement.]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30940</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Historically, the nature of Pakistan-US relations is transactional and often lopsided with divergent strategic interests on key issues. Since the beginning of bilateral ties in the 1950s, Pakistan and the United States have a checkered history, establishing no permanent basis for a relationship. After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, the fragility of Pakistan-US [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/pak-us-relations-areas-of-engagement-beyond-security-cooperation/">Pak-US relations: Areas of Engagement beyond Security Cooperation</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Historically, the nature of Pakistan-US relations is transactional and often lopsided with divergent strategic interests on key issues. </strong>Since the beginning of bilateral ties in the 1950s, Pakistan and the United States have a checkered history, establishing no permanent basis for a relationship. After the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/withdrawal-of-United-States-troops-from-Afghanistan">US withdrawal</a> from Afghanistan in 2021, the fragility of Pakistan-US relations were exposed once again, requiring both states to find avenues of cooperation beyond traditional security concerns.</p>
<p><strong>The most significant avenue of cooperation between Pakistan and the US in recent years was counterterrorism. </strong>Despite diplomatic challenges, Pakistan facilitated American counterterrorism efforts time and again. The <a href="https://trt.global/world/article/463226f6e7bd">arrest and extradition</a> of the Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) terrorist, Sharifullah, the man behind the August 26, 2021, attack on the US Marines, highlights the significance of the US-Pakistan counterterrorism partnership. This cooperation, between <a href="https://trt.global/world/article/7d42e03d1093?sfnsn=scwspwa">CIA and Pakistan’s intelligence services</a> over Sharifullah’s capture, who was accused of planning the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3741245/kabul-airport-attack-review-reaffirms-initial-findings-identifies-attacker/">Abbey Gate bombing</a> at the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, serves as a reminder for the Trump administration that Pakistan remains central to the US counterterrorism efforts.</p>
<p>The provision of security assistance to the Trump administration could be Pakistan’s strategic move, but its long-term cooperation with the US depends largely on shared interests and mutual trust. In this regard, past experience demonstrates that security cooperation alone does not ensure a viable long-term partnership. For a sustainable relationship, security collaboration must be complemented by economic partnership, technological exchanges, and diplomatic engagement. Otherwise, history might repeat itself as a sporadic pattern of bilateral interaction.</p>
<p>While formal alliance and strategic partnership may not be on the table, Pakistan and the US could tap into potential areas of cooperation. This is especially true in key areas of mutual benefit like critical minerals and information technology (IT).</p>
<p><a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/2533254/us-military-grateful-to-pakistan-for-sharifullahs-arrest">Sharifullah’s</a> arrest serves as a reminder that Pakistan and the United States will remain intertwined in a need-based relationship when it comes to counterterrorism. As terrorism surges regionally, and as the Islamic State (IS) and its regional factions continue to function as the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, Pakistan will remain crucial to global counterterrorism efforts. However, intelligence sharing with the US could become a double-edged sword, exposing Pakistan to retaliatory attacks. Therefore, a robust, well-fashioned, and coordinated counterterrorism strategy must be pursued by both states to mitigate the menace of terrorist attacks.</p>
<p>Besides cooperation in counterterrorism, both Pakistan and the US are collaborating to serve economic interests of each state. Pakistan is a large export destination for the US.  The US also invests in Pakistan’s key sectors like energy and technology. However, President Trump’s desire to balance trade could undermine Pakistan’s exports. Uncertainty regarding the <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/2408858/green-alliance-framework">US-Pakistan Green Alliance</a>—the climate resilience initiative—highlight differences between the current administration and its predecessor.</p>
<p>To broaden the bandwidth of relations between Pakistan and the US beyond security issues, Pakistan needs to diversify its exports market away from textiles. Investment in Pakistan’s mining sector could provide the US with a chance to have access to critical minerals for its products, while reducing its dependency on China for supply of critical minerals. Given considerable untouched mineral resources, Pakistan could offer a stable supply of critical minerals.</p>
<p>Given Pakistan’s stable supply chain, investment in Pakistan’s mining sector could be cost effective for the US. However, the United States ignores such an opportunity, carrying out resource planning without considering Pakistan. As the US negotiates with Ukraine for critical mineral mining rights, it is wise to keep Pakistan in mind. The trade dispute with China makes such an approach a particularly good idea. Given the much lower labor cost in Pakistan than in Australia or Canada, Pakistan’s untapped mineral wealth could be a boon for the United States beyond rare.</p>
<p><strong>Since World War II, Pakistan has enjoyed significant benefits from American educational opportunities like the Fulbright program. The US government, through its educational exchange programs, brings almost </strong><a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-pakistan/">800 Pakistanis</a><strong> to the United States every year in pursuit of knowledge and cultural exchange. This strengthens people-to-people ties and nurtures enduring Pakistan-US relations.</strong></p>
<p>However, the suspension of US Agency for International Development (<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2025/02/what-the-us-aid-suspension-means-for-pakistan/">USAID) programs</a> and the unilateral imposition of sanctions on Pakistan’s state-owned National Development Complex <a href="https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-sanctions-on-four-entities-contributing-to-pakistans-ballistic-missile-program/">(NDC)</a> undermine the stability of Pakistan-US relations. Policies that isolate key partners prove counterproductive, especially when global security challenges demand multilateral cooperation. To maintain stability in South Asia and beyond, the US must adopt policies that strengthen rather than weaken its relations with Pakistan.</p>
<p>Pakistan-US ties are shaped by a complex interplay of collaboration, alignment, and friction. To ensure stable relations, a comprehensive strategy that encompasses diplomatic, security, economic, and regional issues must be formulated. The future of Pakistan-US relations can be more fruitful if commercial and economic matters take precedence over security concerns.</p>
<p><em>Nawal Nawaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Potential-Areas-of-cooperation.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="202" height="56" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 202px) 100vw, 202px" /></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/pak-us-relations-areas-of-engagement-beyond-security-cooperation/">Pak-US relations: Areas of Engagement beyond Security Cooperation</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Syria and Saudi Arabia’s Northern Front: A New Theatre for the Kingdom’s Security Policy</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/syria-and-saudi-arabias-northern-front-a-new-theatre-for-the-kingdoms-security-policy/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed ELDoh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Jun 2025 11:55:13 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30855</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In the aftermath of Bashar al-Assad’s fall, Syria has become more than just a war-ravaged state grappling with political vacuum and economic decay—it has transformed into a critical security frontier for many regional players, including Russia, Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). However, for KSA, its involvement is not a matter [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/syria-and-saudi-arabias-northern-front-a-new-theatre-for-the-kingdoms-security-policy/">Syria and Saudi Arabia’s Northern Front: A New Theatre for the Kingdom’s Security Policy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the aftermath of Bashar al-Assad’s fall, Syria has become more than just a war-ravaged state grappling with political vacuum and economic decay—it has transformed into a critical security frontier for many regional players, including Russia, Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). However, for KSA, its involvement is not a matter of foreign solidarity or Arab diplomacy—it is a strategic imperative. As the geopolitical terrain of Syria shifts under the influence of regional and extra-regional actors, the kingdom finds itself compelled to project power, shape outcomes, and protect its internal stability.</p>
<p>Considering several key factors, including KSA’s concerns and evolving security calculus in Syria post-Assad, as well as the growing competition with Iran, Turkey, and Israel, Riyadh’s multidimensional approach to turning Syria from a threat zone into a buffer state can be highlighted, where it can be assumed that in the eyes of Saudi policymakers, Syria today is not just a crisis—it is a frontline of national defense.</p>
<p><strong>A Post-Assad Vacuum and Saudi Strategic Anxiety</strong></p>
<p>The collapse of the Assad regime, though celebrated in some Arab capitals as the end of a brutal era, has opened a power vacuum in Damascus that threatens to unleash a new phase of instability. For KSA, this vacuum is not just a theoretical concern—it is a real-time geostrategic challenge. The kingdom’s national security architecture is heavily shaped by two core threats emanating from northern Arab lands: the spread of Iranian proxies and the return of extremist networks exploiting failed governance. Syria, with its shattered institutions, porous borders, and competing militias, presents both.</p>
<p>The memory of Iraq&#8217;s fragmentation after 2003 lingers heavily. Riyadh understands that when Arab state sovereignty collapses, the resulting anarchy can cross borders. KSA’s southern security challenges in Yemen are still active; to see a similar threat emerge from the north would overstretch its security posture. Thus, Syria has become a high-stakes arena—one that Riyadh cannot afford to ignore.</p>
<p><strong>Competing Powers in Syria’s New Chessboard</strong></p>
<p><strong>Iran: A Threat Undiminished</strong></p>
<p>Despite Assad’s downfall and the recent tactical retreats of Iranian-aligned forces, Tehran is not likely to withdraw easily. On the contrary, it is adapting. Iranian-backed militias, particularly in southern Syria and the Qalamoun region, will likely continue to consolidate control over trade routes and urban districts under the guise of local tribes and militias. In this regard, Tehran’s objectives are threefold. Firstly, it aims to maintain influence in the Levant through non-state actors. Secondly, it seeks to sustain a logistics corridor linking Iran to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria. Furthermore, expanding its asymmetric capabilities—such as drone operations and Captagon trafficking—to destabilize adversaries indirectly remains to be among Iran’s objectives.</p>
<p>Riyadh sees the situation for what it is: a long-term entrenchment strategy. Iranian influence in Syria is no longer contingent on the Assad regime’s survival; it is embedded in paramilitary networks, ideological infrastructure, and narco-trafficking cartels. The <a href="https://israel-alma.org/the-captagon-industry-in-syria-after-assads-fall-a-current-overview/">proliferation</a> of Captagon—a synthetic drug smuggled extensively into Saudi Arabia—has already become a national crisis. It is both a public health threat and a political signal from Iran: proxy warfare can take many forms.</p>
<p><strong>Turkey: Strategic Expansionism in the North</strong></p>
<p>While Turkey’s military <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-operations-against-kurdish-militants-northern-syria-continuing-official-2025-03-12/">presence</a> in northern Syria is largely framed as an anti-Kurdish campaign, its ambitions extend further. Ankara has built governance mechanisms, school <a href="https://hawarnews.com/en/reality-of-kurdish-language-following-turkification-of-afrin">education</a> systems, police units, and currency networks (using the Turkish lira) across key zones from Afrin to <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/1395551/amp">Jarabulus</a>.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia is concerned about Turkey&#8217;s influence on multiple fronts. On one hand, it supports factions influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, which Riyadh opposes ideologically. In addition, it presents an alternative Sunni leadership model in the region, weakening Saudi Arabia’s position of being the central voice of Sunni politics. On the other hand, it fragments Syria’s territorial integrity, which undermines efforts to rebuild a centralized Arab-led post-conflict state.</p>
<p>Though tensions between Riyadh and Ankara have eased recently, especially post-2021 diplomatic <a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/migrated_files/documents/atoms/files/2jabbour_turkey_sa_uae_mai2022.pdf">resets</a>, deep-seated rivalry remains. Syria is where that rivalry plays out subtly—through reconstruction bids, tribal influence, and diplomatic patronage.</p>
<p><strong>Israel: Security-Driven Fragmentation</strong></p>
<p>Israel’s posture in Syria is surgical, not expansive—but it is no less consequential. Through persistent <a href="https://acleddata.com/2024/12/19/syria-israeli-airstrikes-reach-an-all-time-high-after-assad-regime-falls/">airstrikes</a> targeting Iranian and Hezbollah assets, covert liaisons with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c62z05wpdj4o">Druze</a> militias in Suwayda, and alleged backing of anti-Iran groups in southern Syria, Israel is carving out spheres of strong influence.</p>
<p>While KSA shares Israel’s concerns over Iranian militarization, it is wary of the side effects. Israel’s support for minority autonomy (especially the Druze) or indirect fragmentation of Syria risks turning the country into a loose collection of zones governed by foreign interests. For Riyadh, the fragmentation of Syria not only endangers Arab unity—it opens space for criminal syndicates, extremist revival, and ideological confusion that could destabilize Jordan and, by extension, Saudi Arabia’s northern frontier.</p>
<p><strong>Riyadh’s Multi-layered Response: From Passive Diplomacy to Strategic Projection</strong></p>
<p>Faced with this hostile mosaic of actors, KSA is executing a comprehensive policy in Syria that mixes security, economics, diplomacy, and media influence.</p>
<ol>
<li><strong> Hard Security: Countering Extremism and Trafficking</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>Saudi security agencies are likely to expand coordination with Jordan and Iraq to monitor cross-border infiltration and drug routes. The <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/syrias-dictator-is-gone-but-his-drug-dealers-are-still-busy/a-72033154">Captagon</a> crisis has led Riyadh to treat Syrian drug trafficking not merely as criminal activity, but as hybrid warfare. Defensive fortifications, signal intelligence operations, and counter-smuggling raids are being intensified along the northern corridor.</p>
<p>Simultaneously, Riyadh is likely to be tracking the <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/islamic-state’s-global-long-game-and-resurgence-syria-poses-evolved-threat-west">resurgence</a> of ISIS remnants in eastern Syria. It is likely investing in tribal militias and vetted opposition units capable of neutralizing terrorist footholds without creating long-term militias that could evolve into new threats.</p>
<ol start="2">
<li><strong> Economic Leverage: Buying Strategic Influence</strong></li>
</ol>
<p>Saudi Arabia’s pivot to reconstruction diplomacy is both humanitarian and strategic. By calling for sanctions <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/saudi-arabia-urges-lifting-of-sanctions-on-syria/3458919">relief</a>, Riyadh aims to reduce Syria’s reliance on Iran and Russia and reintegrate it into the Arab economic order. Saudi intent in paying Syria’s <a href="https://www.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/saudi-arabia-will-reportedly-settle-syrias-15b-world-bank-debts-93CH-3983591">debt</a> to the world bank as well as possible strategic investments in infrastructure, energy, and services—particularly in Sunni-majority urban centers like Aleppo and Daraa—is intended to build loyalty and dependency.</p>
<p>Moreover, the Kingdom is leveraging sovereign funds and private sector tools to position itself as Syria’s main Arab partner in the post-war phase. It wants to ensure that the rebuilding of Syria does not become a Turkish or Iranian-led project.</p>
<p><strong>An Evolving Alignment with Turkey: Tactical Convergence</strong></p>
<p>Ironically, Syria is also offering Saudi Arabia and Turkey an <a href="https://gulfif.org/turkey-saudi-arabia-steering-syrias-future-together/">opportunity</a> for pragmatic convergence. While mutual distrust remains, both states share certain interests. This includes preventing full Iranian dominance, keeping extremist groups marginalized, and rebuilding economic influence in Syria to offset Western retreat.</p>
<p>This has possibly opened a window for joint intelligence sharing and perhaps coordinated reconstruction projects, especially in areas where Sunni communities dominate. For Riyadh, this is most likely not an alliance but a temporary alignment of interests that must be carefully managed.</p>
<p><strong>Supporting Syria’s Transitional Government: A Bid for Arab Sovereignty</strong></p>
<p>Perhaps most crucially, KSA is throwing its weight behind the Syrian transitional government emerging from the post-Assad political framework. Riyadh’s objectives are clear, and these are to reunify Syria under an Arab-oriented administration, prevent federalization or sectarian fragmentation, and, most importantly, marginalize Iranian-aligned or extremist political actors.</p>
<p>Backed by Gulf states, this new Syrian leadership is presumably envisioned as a technocratic, security-minded, and pro-Sunni Arab entity unlike the Assad regime which was viewed as a pro-Iranian. Saudi Arabia’s goal is not to install a puppet but to ensure that the new government aligns with regional stability, Arab League integration, and mutual security commitments.</p>
<p><strong>Syria as a Forward Defense Zone</strong></p>
<p>Saudi Arabia’s posture toward Syria has shifted dramatically—from cautious observation to assertive engagement. The kingdom is likely to be treating Syria not only as a humanitarian concern but as a critical northern front for its long-term security. It is investing in hard power, economic influence, and regional diplomacy to shape Syria’s post-conflict architecture.</p>
<p>In doing so, Riyadh is acknowledging a broader regional truth: the fate of failed or transitioning Arab states cannot be left to the mercy of non-Arab powers, including Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Israel. From Damascus to Daraa, Syria is no longer a distant conflict—it is a forward defense zone for Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity, generational stability, and regional leadership. However, the challenge ahead lies in sustaining this engagement without overreach, balancing power projection with local legitimacy, and ensuring that Saudi Arabia’s Syria policy remains strategic—not reactive.</p>
<p>Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management &#8211; France, an MBA from the EU Business School- Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Syria-and-Saudi-Arabia-security-policy.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="252" height="70" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 252px) 100vw, 252px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/syria-and-saudi-arabias-northern-front-a-new-theatre-for-the-kingdoms-security-policy/">Syria and Saudi Arabia’s Northern Front: A New Theatre for the Kingdom’s Security Policy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Pahalgam Attack and Its Impact on South Asia’s Security Landscape</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-pahalgam-attack-and-its-impact-on-south-asias-security-landscape/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arman Ahmed]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Jun 2025 12:09:56 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Arman Ahmed. ​]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30844</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The terror episode at Pahalgam, Kashmir, in April 2025 marked a significant shift in the contemporary security narrative of South Asia. Not only did militants connected to The Resistance Front, a proxy allegedly linked to Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, kill 26 civilians, mostly Indian tourists, but they also gravely destabilized regional equilibrium and resurrected the threat of [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-pahalgam-attack-and-its-impact-on-south-asias-security-landscape/">The Pahalgam Attack and Its Impact on South Asia’s Security Landscape</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The terror episode at Pahalgam, Kashmir, in April 2025 marked a significant shift in the contemporary security narrative of South Asia. Not only did militants connected to The Resistance Front, a proxy allegedly linked to Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cze10y59j91o">kill 26 civilians</a>, mostly Indian tourists, but they also gravely destabilized regional equilibrium and resurrected the threat of cross-border terrorism. Political, economic, social, and strategic shockwaves were generated by the attack that emphasizes existing flaws and exacerbates long-standing rifts in South Asian security. This is all happening at a time when Pakistan fears India’s nuclear modernization and India fears China’s nuclear expansion.</p>
<p><strong>The Decline of Bilateral Trust and Regional Diplomacy </strong></p>
<p>The breakdown of already fragile India-Pakistan diplomatic relations was the most immediate strategic victim of the Pahalgam assault. India’s quick charge that Pakistani-backed terrorists planned the assault brought up historical complaints. Within days, both countries cancelled diplomatic talks, visa access, and expelled officials.</p>
<p>While Islamabad reacted by stopping trade, suspending the <a href="https://www.tbsnews.net/world/south-asia/pakistan-suspends-simla-agreement-reaction-indias-indus-water-move-1125236">Shimla Agreement</a>, and restricting its airspace to Indian flights, New Delhi repudiated the <a href="https://www.thedailystar.net/news/world/news/india-suspends-indus-waters-treaty-3879326">Indus Waters Treaty</a>—long thought a bedrock of bilateral cooperation. These responses show a rising lack of confidence between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.</p>
<p>Formal diplomatic channels are now frozen, therefore removing avenues for crisis de-escalation. Especially along the unstable Line of Control, an area quite prone to miscalculations and without institutionalized communication. The assault has not only weakened confidence-building initiatives but also confirmed every country’s geopolitical position, hence lowering the probability of near-term rapprochement.</p>
<p><strong>Rising Nationalism and Domestic Political Fallout </strong></p>
<p>Both India and Pakistan used the Pahalgam disaster as a political fulcrum. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India used public anger to support its strong-on-security image. The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi reacted with militarized rhetoric and increased security operations in Kashmir. Among Indian voters, the story of avenging the martyrdom of civilians solicits a strong appeal and increases the political capital of Modi’s desire for greater internal security, including increased police authority in Kashmir.</p>
<p>The government of Pakistan characterized India’s claims as slander and a diversionary strategy. Denying complicity, Pakistan’s government mobilized internal support against fear of Indian aggression, accusing India of orchestrating a “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2025/4/24/kashmir-attack-live-india-summons-pakistani-envoy-hunts-pahalgam-gunmen">false flag</a>” strike. These stories polarize both sides and provide little space for moderation or bilateral diplomacy. The assault strengthened a populist-nationalist cycle in which every government raises internal power by means of external dangers.</p>
<p><strong>Strategic Setbacks and Economic Disturbance</strong></p>
<p>The Pahalgam attack has several financial repercussions. Most directly, Kashmir’s tourist industry suffered. An attack on tourists diminished confidence precisely when the area was recovering from low confidence in security by tourists. Cancellations of travel already resulted in significant losses for local companies relying on tourism—hotels, guides, and transporters.</p>
<p>The psychological effect of the assault will dissuade not only internal mobility but also investment in Kashmir’s faltering economy. Regionally, the decrease of commercial connections between India and Pakistan, already limited since 2019, further compromises economic integration.</p>
<p>Visa cancellations by Pakistan and restriction of flight access interfere with trade flows and logistical infrastructure. In industries like energy and infrastructure needing cross-border collaboration, the diplomatic conflicts have a cooling impact on foreign direct investment (FDI). Multilateral projects like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), already under pressure from India-Pakistan rivalry, now confront an existential crisis. Stagnation and lost chances for cooperation, especially in commerce, water sharing, and digital connectivity, hurt the regional economy.</p>
<p><strong>Increasing Social Division and Insecurity</strong></p>
<p>The attack’s societal effects are equally grave. It set off a flood of anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim feeling in India. Some right-wing Indians see the whole Kashmiri community as terrorists. Among Indian Muslims and Kashmiris, the incident has heightened feelings of <em>alienation </em>and helped to create a divided national identity. In the days following the assault, reports of harassment, stereotyping, and hate speech skyrocketed.</p>
<p>The government’s counter-narrative of Indian aggression also generated nationalism and skepticism about cross-border communication in Pakistan as well. As distrust rises, civil society projects encouraging people-to-people communication struggled. Both cultures are thus being driven into echo chambers, where polarization and rhetoric distort nuance and cause more chaos.</p>
<p><strong>Issues in Counterterrorism and Security Realignment </strong></p>
<p>The Pahalgam incident shows major shortcomings in regional security systems. The attack exposed India’s shortcomings in intelligence and the protection of soft targets. The Indian government reacted by dispatching more soldiers to Kashmir, raising checkpoints, and vowing to eradicate the last militant networks. Such actions, however, can irritate locals and aggravate conflicts.</p>
<p>The assault also highlights a tactical change in insurgency strategy, specifically the intentional targeting of visitors and civilians to undermine the narrative of peace. This implies a desire to create broad concern and provoke a socio-political response, marking a departure from assaults primarily directed at military or security institutions.</p>
<p>Counterterrorism initiatives, therefore, must evolve to fit this evolving threat profile by balancing military responses with intelligence-based interventions and community involvement. On the other hand, Pakistan is attracting more outside attention over the existence of terror organizations inside its borders. The assault raises questions about Islamabad’s claims to be a responsible actor and could compromise its attempts to draw international investment or receive preferential treatment from organizations such as the <a href="https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/india/pahalgam-terror-attack-does-pakistan-risk-returning-to-fatf-s-grey-list-13001714.html">Financial Action Task Force (FATF)</a>. The scenario calls for a recalibration of Pakistan’s internal security strategy to neutralize non-state actors and reassure the world community of its commitment to counterterrorism.</p>
<p><strong>Regional Cooperation in Crisis </strong></p>
<p>The Pahalgam incident could set off a shift in South Asia’s regional security framework despite the grave effects. Though India and Pakistan vary, the entire regional community, including Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, has a stake in preserving stability. These nations may suggest fresh security pacts emphasizing crisis management and counterterrorism; bring back SAARC talks; or work together to encourage de-escalation.</p>
<p>Furthermore, countries like the United States, China, and the Gulf states have a special chance to intervene quietly. The United Nations’ appeal for caution and regional collaboration emphasizes the prospect of global involvement in lowering tensions. After all, it was between India and Pakistan that many analysts thought would see the first use of nuclear weapons since 1945—prior to Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats over Ukraine. Civil society, think tanks, and academic conferences can also help to fill the diplomatic vacuum by providing frameworks for communication, conducting collaborative danger assessments, and promoting cross-border awareness.</p>
<p><strong>A Crossroads for South Asia</strong></p>
<p>Undoubtedly, the Pahalgam terror incident altered South Asia’s security scene. Its effects are being felt well beyond the blood-soaked fields of Kashmir—disturbing governments, economies, and cultures throughout the subcontinent. It has revived old conflicts, exposed new weaknesses, and challenged regional players to face the fragility of peace.</p>
<p>Within this uncertainty is a chance to rethink security in terms of trust, inclusion, and cooperation rather than only in military ones. South Asia’s challenge is to make sure this tragedy propels a more stable, secure, and cooperative regional order rather than just another chapter in a cycle of retribution that always has the chance of going nuclear. Whether that vision comes true relies on the decisions its leaders make in the next weeks and months.</p>
<p><em>Arman Ahmed is the Founder and President of Dhaka Thinks, a Research Analyst at the Spykman Center, and a Research Fellow, International Council on Human Rights, Peace, and Politics. Views expressed by the author are their own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Regional-Reverberations.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="252" height="70" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 252px) 100vw, 252px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-pahalgam-attack-and-its-impact-on-south-asias-security-landscape/">The Pahalgam Attack and Its Impact on South Asia’s Security Landscape</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>American Sanctions and Pakistan’s Strategic Realities</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/american-sanctions-and-pakistans-strategic-realities/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nawal Nawaz]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 11 Feb 2025 13:19:55 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30022</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>A diplomatic controversy erupted following the recent imposition of American sanctions on Pakistan’s state-owned National Development Complex (NDC) and three private Karachi-based companies, accused of involvement in developing Pakistan’s long-range missiles. These sanctions, which bar American companies from conducting business with them, brings to light a different approach by the US toward a non-NATO ally, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/american-sanctions-and-pakistans-strategic-realities/">American Sanctions and Pakistan’s Strategic Realities</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A diplomatic controversy erupted following the recent imposition of American sanctions on Pakistan’s state-owned National Development Complex (NDC) and three private Karachi-based companies, accused of involvement in developing Pakistan’s long-range missiles. These sanctions, which bar American companies from conducting business with them, brings to light a different approach by the US toward a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2004/6/17/pakistan-made-major-non-nato-ally">non-NATO ally, Pakistan</a><strong>.</strong></p>
<p>The latest round of sanctions showed the Biden administration’s disregard for Pakistan’s long history of cooperation with Washington. Islamabad always sought to engage diplomatically with the White House in a constructive manner—aspiring to nurture its relationship with the United States. However, the sanctions imposed on Pakistan’s missile program by the US, grounded in doubts and assumptions, do not bode well for the overall stability of the relationship.</p>
<p>When Pakistan became an ally of the United States in the 1950s and supported American strategy in the region, especially during the Cold War and the War on Terror, Pakistan took significant risk both domestically and with often unfriendly neighbors. Pakistan valued the relationship and made significant strides in fostering a partnership. However, it still struggles to preserve peace and stability in the region after a hasty American withdrawal from Afghanistan.</p>
<p>The recent spate of American allegations against Pakistan not only increase mistrust between the two states but also undermine the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Current sanctions tend to create an imbalance in the strategic calculus of South Asia, shifting the balance of power towards Pakistan’s adversary, India. New Delhi’s military and nuclear modernization is already destabilizing South Asia.</p>
<p><strong>            </strong><a href="https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3292891/us-sanctions-pakistan-will-only-push-it-closer-china">Washington’s favoring of New Delhi furthers the augment that there is an increasing gap between India and Pakistan, which could reignite an arms race</a><strong>.</strong> Historically, the US played a constructive third-party role in easing tensions between Pakistan and India. However, growing mistrust between Pakistan and the US could limit its leverage to act as neutral mediator in any future crisis. Such a trust deficit between the US and Pakistan could undermine regional stability in South Asia.</p>
<p>With New Delhi’s evolving missile capabilities, Pakistan considers its strategic capabilities crucial for deterrence. This ensures that the country does not face an existential threat from across its border. Islamabad maintains that its missile and nuclear program are intended to counterbalance India’s growing conventional and nuclear superiority.</p>
<p>According to the former US Principal Deputy National Security Advisor, Jon Finer, Pakistan has pursued “increasingly sophisticated missile technology, from long-range ballistic missile systems that would enable the testing of significantly larger rocket motors.” If that continues, Finer said, “Pakistan will have the capability to strike targets well beyond South Asia, including in the United States.” He further said that the advancement in Pakistan’s ballistic missile systems could pose a direct threat to global security, enabling Pakistan to target countries far beyond its immediate neighborhood.</p>
<p>In response Pakistan’s Foreign Office (MOFA) commented on Finer’s statement and said that the perception of an alleged threat was “unfortunate.” These sanctions which are imposed under <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-sanctions-on-four-entities-contributing-to-pakistans-ballistic-missile-program/">Executive Order 13382,</a> are based on mere doubts and suspicions devoid of any substantial evidence. In its statement, the MOFA said that “Pakistan has also made it abundantly clear that our strategic program and allied capabilities are solely meant to deter and thwart a clear and visible existential threat from our neighborhood and should not be perceived as a threat to any other country.” With such clarity in Pakistan’s strategic approach, the American sanctions on Pakistan’s ballistic missile program are nothing more than misplaced concerns.</p>
<p>The US is turning a blind eye towards Indian nuclear expansion and is strengthening its strategic partnership so that it can serve as a counterweight to China. Because of this strategic cooperation, the US aids India with the transfer of high-end defense technologies. Agreements such as the <a href="https://issi.org.pk/issue-brief-on-lemoa-comcasa-and-beca-in-indias-foreign-calculus/">Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) and the Communications Capability and Security Agreement (COMCASA)</a> are critical to Indian development. Under the framework of the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) and the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (CET), India also benefits.</p>
<p>In 2008, the United States pampered India with a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) restrictions, exempting it from obligations that apply to nuclear export controls for states outside the scope of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/remarks-and-releases-bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/missile-technology-control-regime-mtcr-frequently-asked-questions/">Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)</a>.This mutual defense cooperation between the US and India augments Indian military capabilities, accentuating military asymmetries in South Asia.</p>
<p>While maintaining silence on India’s intercontinental ballistic missile program, with a manifest <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/pune/india-test-fires-agni-v-ballistic-missile-8326983/">range</a> of above 5,000 kilometers, American officials raised misleading concerns regarding Pakistan’s capabilities. In reality, the longest-range ballistic missile of Pakistan, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/21/pakistan-says-medium-range-missile-test-a-success">Shaheen III</a>, demonstrated a range of 2,750 kilometers, explicitly designed to deter only India. The country’s ballistic missile program has no intention of endangering the sovereignty of any other state, including allies of its long-standing partner, the United States.</p>
<p>To overcome this trust deficit, Pakistan and the US must take the initiative and forge a comprehensive security dialogue that aligns their strategic interests. This security dialogue would provide an avenue to discuss common security objectives, including regional stability, counterterrorism efforts, and transnational threats. Furthermore, mutual collaboration in intelligence-sharing will augment the effectiveness of both nations’ security apparatus. Constructive communication between Pakistan and the US is crucial to building a more stable and cooperative future, which would not only strengthen their bilateral ties but also contribute to peace and security in South Asia and beyond.</p>
<p>While the Biden administration expressed concerns about Pakistan’s missile capabilities, Islamabad maintained, then and now, that these measures are purely defensive in nature. They are designed to safeguard national security amidst evolving regional tensions. It would be fruitful for both nations for President Donald Trump to correct the mistake of the Biden administration, acknowledging Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns and engaging with a willing ally. Collaboration rather than coercion is necessary for Pakistan and the US to address shared challenges.</p>
<p><em>Nawal Nawaz is a research assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/U.S-Sanctions-and-Pakistans-Strategic-Realities.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/american-sanctions-and-pakistans-strategic-realities/">American Sanctions and Pakistan’s Strategic Realities</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Future of US-Pakistan Relations</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-future-of-us-pakistan-relations/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Haseeb Riaz]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 23 Jan 2025 12:55:32 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29892</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>President Donald Trump’s return to the White House may or may not prove auspicious for Pakistan. Trump’s victory will certainly have wide-ranging ramifications for the geopolitical chessboard because of existing challenges to international order. It could potentially transform the fabric of international cooperation. No region will remain untouched. South Asia will be no exception. Most [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-future-of-us-pakistan-relations/">The Future of US-Pakistan Relations</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>President Donald Trump’s return to the White House may or may not prove auspicious for Pakistan. Trump’s victory will certainly have wide-ranging ramifications for the geopolitical chessboard because of existing challenges to international order. It could potentially transform the fabric of international cooperation. No region will remain untouched.<br />
South Asia will be no exception. Most South Asian nations are betting their hopes on greater American engagement in the region despite Donald Trump’s “America First” approach to trade and foreign and security policy.</p>
<p>President Trump’s foreign policy will primarily focus outside South Asia and engage countries with a lens toward their relationship with China. Drawing on his known foreign policy orientation, Trump 2.0 is poised to keep India on a high strategic pedestal in the broader framework of Indo-Pacific strategy.</p>
<p>Pakistan is unlikely to play a major foreign policy role for the Trump administration. Thus, it is pertinent for the Pakistani diplomatic community to find areas of convergence with the Trump administration. Policy options must be exercised in a way to constructively approach strategic divergencies between the two states.</p>
<p>America’s engagement with the Global South is likely going to decline as an “America First” approach calls for reducing international engagement towards all but a handful of countries. Critics may characterize President Trump’s foreign policy approach as short term and transactional, but this sells the president short. A policy of “minilateralism” is not shortsighted but may allow him to focus on more pressing domestic issues in the United States. This redirection of focus is, however, bad news for global agendas like climate change and multilateral cooperation.</p>
<p>There is a broader consensus in the Trump team, based on a strategic imperative to counter China in the Asia-Pacific, that leaves less room for lower priorities. Thus, the trade and tariff wars between China and the US may have second-order effects for countries like Pakistan.</p>
<p>President Trump’s advisers are likely to approach China as an adversary and will view Pakistan with some caution, perceiving it as an ally of Beijing. The Trump administration may seek to intensify the competition with China and up the ante for countries who are onboard with Chinese infrastructure and development projects, such as Pakistan, which could be a potential victim of a new Great Game.</p>
<p>An era of conditional trade agreements between Pakistan and the United States appears imminent and is characterized by a departure from preferential trade practices. Instead, the US is likely to prioritize market-driven agreements, emphasizing economic pragmatism over diplomatic goodwill. To enhance bilateral trade relations, Pakistan could strategically leverage its geopolitical significance and pursue a proactive approach to addressing American concerns, without compromising its national strategic interests.</p>
<p>This would necessitate credible efforts to combat terrorism and contribute to stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. Such measures could foster greater mutual confidence and pave the way for more constructive economic engagement between the two nations.</p>
<p>American attempts to make India its strategic surrogate in the Asia-Pacific will embolden Indian hegemonic ambitions. Intense security collaboration between the US and India at bilateral and multilateral defense groups like the Quad could disrupt the regional strategic stability calculus in South Asia.</p>
<p>Pakistan’s economic woes may not allow it to sustain the brunt of a growing Indian strategic modernization in the long run. This will impact strategic stability in the region.<br />
Retrospective analysis of the first Trump administration suggests that American cooperation with Pakistan, in the realms of climate change and clean energy, will be relegated as more pressing geostrategic issues take precedence. Moreover, the dwindling economy of Pakistan may find the Trump administration far less sympathetic as far as economic aid and loan packages are concerned. The first Trump administration was less sensitive to Pakistan’s core interest, like Kashmir, and more demanding of Pakistan in its Afghanistan conundrum.<br />
The US State Department under Trump will likely pursue a limited set of priorities, especially in the security and counterterrorism realms. US-Pakistan relations are traditionally marked by events in Afghanistan. This was true from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the war on terror. With the reduction of American engagement in Afghanistan, Pakistan finds itself entangled in an increasingly intricate security matrix amid deteriorating relations with the Taliban and increasing terrorism in Pakistan.</p>
<p>Shifting the onus onto Pakistan for an American policy debacle was a convenient strategy of the Biden administration. Pakistan may find the new administration more aggressive in its demands for stabilizing Afghanistan. The “do more” mantra will not go over well with Pakistan anymore and will require a more practical approach on the part of the US.<br />
On the flip side, President Trump’s personality-centered diplomatic overtures, rather than institutionalized mechanisms, are not good for Pakistan. President Trump engaged with Imran Khan constructively, but he is no longer in office. Criticism could come from Trump’s team regarding the crackdown on Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) movement. State Department and Pentagon engagement with Pakistan’s diplomatic corps and security establishment will depend on the whims of Trump rather than an ongoing policy framework. The absence of mutual interests between the US and Pakistan remains a hurdle.</p>
<p>These are interesting times for the diplomats of Pakistan. On the one hand, they will try to resist President Trump’s pressure-based strategy toward Pakistan. On the other hand, they will try to convince State Department officials to pursue more practical approaches to the US-Pakistan relationship. How hard this proves is yet to be determined.<br />
Either way, Pakistan will face a more conditional and transactional relationship with the US. It will hinge on security concerns rather than economic issues. Being close to China diplomatically and strategically opens a unique window of opportunity for Pakistan. It can play the role of a bridge between China and the US, as it has done historically, should the Trump administration seek it out.</p>
<p><em>Muhammad Haseeb Riaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Future-of-Pak-US-Relations-under-Trump-2.0.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-future-of-us-pakistan-relations/">The Future of US-Pakistan Relations</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Now That Trump Is Back, What Should Arab States Do?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/now-that-trump-is-back-what-should-arab-states-do/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed ELDoh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Dec 2024 12:35:07 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29704</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Arab states already face a pivotal moment in shaping their foreign policy. Known for his transactional diplomacy and “America First” approach, Trump is likely to prioritize issues that directly benefit the US economy and enhance its strategic power, particularly vis-a-vis China and Russia. For Arab states, the [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/now-that-trump-is-back-what-should-arab-states-do/">Now That Trump Is Back, What Should Arab States Do?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Arab states already face a pivotal moment in shaping their foreign policy. Known for his transactional diplomacy and “America First” approach, Trump is likely to prioritize issues that directly benefit the US economy and enhance its strategic power, particularly vis-a-vis China and Russia.</p>
<p>For Arab states, the current situation in the Middle East, US, and regional Arab partners presents an opportunity to work on realigning strategic interests and unify stances on critical files, including but not limited to the conflict in Gaza and Lebanon, the rising tensions in <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/12/01/middleeast/syrian-regime-airstrikes-opposition-forces-intl/index.html">Syria</a>, Iran’s regional agenda, the war in Sudan, and the increasing instability in Africa. This is all made worse by Russia’s growing influence across the continent, including but not limited to Libya and West Africa.</p>
<p>There are three main pathways Middle Eastern governments should pursue in navigating the complex dynamics of Trump’s second term. These approaches can further enhance US-Arab cooperation.</p>
<p>First, they should strengthen regional security cooperation with the US. The Trump administration adopted a more “hands-off” approach during his first term, encouraging regional players to take greater responsibility for security issues. While this may seem advantageous, as it motivates America’s regional Arab partners to fortify their security frameworks, bolster the development of their defense capabilities, forge regional alliances, and cultivate rapid-response capabilities to manage intricate and intensifying threats, the region has never experienced such a high concentration of security risks and geopolitical tensions.</p>
<p>Accordingly, Trump’s return to the White House could significantly alter American engagement in Middle Eastern conflicts on a diplomatic as well as a military front. While Arab and American defense and security cooperation, particularly with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, steadily improved over the past several decades, escalating regional tensions necessitate closer security cooperation.</p>
<p>Furthermore, Arab states face multifaceted threats from non-state actors and cross-border insurgencies. The Houthis in Yemen, for instance, <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/cost-inaction-yemen">continue</a> to pose a serious risk through their use of drones, missiles, and other asymmetric tactics. Given the Trump administration’s prior backing of Saudi operations against the Iranian-backed Houthis, Arab states should use this time to rally support for a collective defense strategy.</p>
<p>This should involve the creation of a coalition to monitor Houthi activities in Yemen and across the Gulf, establish missile defense systems, and coordinate intelligence-sharing to counter both Houthi and Iranian influence in the region, which is likely to increase if not countered proactively. Regardless of the geopolitical context of the Houthis’ missile attacks on Israel, the firing capabilities they possess presents an existing threat to regional Arab states, especially those states perceived by Iran as American allies.</p>
<p>The situation with the Houthis in Yemen is even more complex than it seems. While it seems that Iran is the main influencer over the Houthis’ actions, <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/is-russia-helping-the-houthis-in-yemen-if-its-true-it-could-lead-to-a-major-problem-for-shipping/articleshow/115534358.cms?from=mdr">concerns</a> are growing over the possible support the Houthis are receiving from <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/07/russia-houthis-targeting-data-war-western-shipping-gaza/">Russia</a>. There is also a belief that Iran is facilitating negotiations with Russia to supply advanced missiles to the Houthis. If confirmed, this strategy already proved successful for Russia in West Africa. There, Russia succeeded in supplanting the West’s influence in the region. It appears that Russia is likely pursuing a similar strategy through the Houthis to expand its influence in the region surrounding the Red Sea.</p>
<p>The Red Sea remains strategically vital, not only for Arab states along its coast but for global energy markets and trade. With American forces taking the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/">lead</a> in trying to mitigate the Houthi threat to international maritime security, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will need to take a leading role in jointly securing these waters. Undoubtedly, the Red Sea requires enhanced security coordination. A joint Arab-Western naval task force could assist in patrolling shipping routes, countering smuggling and piracy, and monitoring hostile activities from Yemen. Establishing a formalized security alliance with a mandate to promptly respond to Red Sea threats would also empower Arab states to protect this vital trade route from disruptions caused by the escalating regional tensions.</p>
<p>Second, the Arab states should establish clear strategies for key regional conflicts. Trump already demonstrated a strong pro-Israel stance and a preference for rapid conflict resolution in areas like Syria and Yemen. Middle Eastern states should prepare for a Trump-led push toward “finishing” ongoing conflicts quickly. By articulating clear positions on key conflicts, Arab states can ensure their voices are considered in any accelerated diplomatic initiatives or negotiations aimed at de-escalating the rising tensions in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Iran’s influence in the Middle East remains a unifying concern for most of the Arab states, especially those in the Gulf. Trump previously adopted a “maximum pressure” policy against Iran, along with stricter sanctions and renewed efforts to isolate Tehran diplomatically. To capitalize on this stance, Arab states might consider forming a Gulf-led coalition that directly addresses Iran’s regional activities, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.</p>
<p>Iran is also trying to influence the conflict in <a href="https://gulfif.org/irans-concerted-efforts-to-secure-a-foothold-in-sudan/">Sudan</a> and other parts of Africa via different means, including the <a href="https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/evidence-iran-weapons-deliveries">supply</a> of drones. Enhanced joint counterterrorism programs, intelligence sharing, and military exercises with Arab, African, and Western states would ultimately improve their collective capacity to deter Iran’s influence and destabilizing operations.</p>
<p>Iran’s nuclear program remains a daunting issue. Iran continues to <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241122-iran-to-launch-advanced-centrifuges-in-response-to-iaea-censure">progress</a> its nuclear capability and may one day decide to break out of current restraints.</p>
<p>The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially the Gaza situation, remains a flashpoint with the potential to escalate regional instability given the growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Trump is likely to adopt a pro-Israel stance, perhaps further supporting Israel’s objectives in Gaza and across the West Bank, which could lead to intensified confrontations.</p>
<p>Arab states, especially those participating in the Abraham Accords, are likely to strike a delicate balance. Arab states will mostly maintain new alliances with Israel to counter Iran and its proxies in the Middle East while simultaneously supporting Palestinian civilian and humanitarian rights. Establishing diplomatic channels and regional communication frameworks dedicated to de-escalating potential violence in Gaza and supporting humanitarian efforts could prevent larger-scale disruptions.</p>
<p>Third, engage proactively with the US on trade and economic reforms. Trump’s “America First” policy often includes economic demands, which could translate into renewed expectations for favorable trade agreements or investments. Arab states should be ready to highlight their contributions to American economic interests, particularly in energy, infrastructure, and tech investments, including artificial intelligence and the acquisition of advanced defense and security platforms. By advancing reforms that make their markets more attractive to American investors, Arab nations can enhance their economic relationship with the US and position themselves as valuable trade partners, thus securing a foothold in Trump’s strategic calculus.</p>
<p>However, Trump’s likely shift to a more confrontational <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/29/china/trump-cabinet-picks-china-response-intl-hnk/index.html">stance</a> toward China could offer both challenges and opportunities. Middle Eastern states, particularly those heavily involved in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and oil exports, should prepare for potential pressures from Washington to limit Chinese economic influence. To balance these dynamics, Arab states could focus on diversifying alliances beyond the US-China dichotomy, enhancing relations with countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe.</p>
<p>That said, the ambitious India-Middle East-Europe corridor (IMEC) project announced during the 2023 G20 summit still holds great potential for regional integration and trade. Furthermore, the project which mainly involved India, Israel, Jordan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and the UAE has the full <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/us-uae-discuss-progress-on-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor/articleshow/113614959.cms?from=mdr">support</a> of the US. In this respect, despite the <a href="https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-india-middle-east-europe-corridor-challenges-ahead/">challenges</a> facing IMEC, it still presents an opportunity for all the involved nations to strategically engage with Trump on an economic front.</p>
<p>Understanding the internal divides within the US will be crucial for Arab states as they navigate the Trump administration. Trump’s “America First” base and his support among conservative Americans may reshape US foreign policy in ways that do not align with traditional Arab interests. By strengthening ties not only with Trump but also with Congress, local leaders, and both major US political parties, Arab states can foster a more balanced approach and create broader support for their long-term interests within American policy circles.</p>
<p>Trump’s return to the White House brings new opportunities and challenges for Arab states, particularly during a period of reshaping the region’s geopolitical power. By proactively engaging with the US, strengthening alliances, and enhancing their regional security frameworks, Arab nations can adapt to the changing American foreign policy landscape. In doing so, they will be better positioned to secure their interests and foster regional stability amid Trump’s renewed presidency.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Now-That-Trump-is-Back.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/now-that-trump-is-back-what-should-arab-states-do/">Now That Trump Is Back, What Should Arab States Do?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Why a Joint US-Pakistan Counterterrorism Task Force Is Necessary</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-a-joint-us-pakistan-counterterrorism-task-force-is-necessary/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Timor Nawabi]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Oct 2024 12:16:36 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29231</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>For more than 70 years, the world has avoided nuclear war. However, the nuclear order is changing dramatically. Pakistan’s growing nuclear capabilities and ties to terrorist groups present an especially dangerous combination that the United States cannot afford to overlook. It is the world’s fastest-growing nuclear state—with an estimated 170 nuclear weapons. Its military and intelligence service [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-a-joint-us-pakistan-counterterrorism-task-force-is-necessary/">Why a Joint US-Pakistan Counterterrorism Task Force Is Necessary</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For more than 70 years, the world has avoided nuclear war. However, the nuclear order is changing dramatically. Pakistan’s growing nuclear capabilities and ties to terrorist groups present an especially dangerous combination that the United States cannot afford to overlook. It is the world’s fastest-growing nuclear state—with an estimated 170 nuclear weapons. Its military and intelligence service (ISI) maintain close connections to terrorist groups. Pakistan presents a complex challenge that demands urgent action. To address this challenge, the United States should establish a joint US-Pakistan counterterrorism task force to secure Pakistan’s nuclear assets.</p>
<p><strong>Instability and American Aid </strong></p>
<p>Pakistan is not a stable country. There are concerns that the state may disintegrate. Its military and ISI are infiltrated by individuals linked to terrorist groups. Without focused American engagement, Pakistan’s instability could lead to either the theft of a nuclear weapon by terrorists or the sabotage of a nuclear facility. Moreover, a long-running territorial dispute over Kashmir and cross-border terrorism could easily escalate into a conflict or nuclear war between India and Pakistan.</p>
<p>Pakistan gets a free ride. Between 1948 and 2016, it received over $78.3 billion in US military and economic support. In return, it is duplicitous. Over half of this aid was allocated to counterterrorism efforts, yet Pakistan’s military and the ISI continue supporting the Taliban and other extremists. The US annually provides Pakistan $2 billion in military and economic aid without proper oversight. Of this amount, $100 million is allocated to the Strategic Plans Division to help Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal. Despite this assistance, Pakistan provides safe haven to dozens of terrorist organizations and their leadership. Its military’s continued support for them increases the risk of a catastrophic nuclear attack by a proxy.</p>
<p><strong>The Case for a Joint US-Pakistan Task Force</strong></p>
<p>A joint US-Pakistan task force is necessary to enforce oversight, strengthen strategic ties, and provide a direct US role in securing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. A formal framework will mitigate the risks of mismanagement or unauthorized access and maintain control over critical aspects of nuclear security. It will enhance collaboration between military and intelligence agencies, enabling both sides to identify and respond to emerging threats while leveraging their combined expertise in human intelligence and counterterrorism.</p>
<p>A joint task force will also enhance nuclear security through specialized training. American experts in nuclear security and cyber defense can provide essential training to Pakistani forces, strengthening their operational readiness and capability to protect nuclear sites. Both nations conduct regular nuclear security drills—often referred to as “Armageddon tests” to assess vulnerabilities at nuclear sites. These drills help identify personnel weaknesses and prevent potential security breaches.</p>
<p><strong>Deterrence, Sovereignty, and Regional Tensions</strong></p>
<p>The presence of US military personnel in Pakistan will also serve as a powerful deterrent to terrorist organizations. US support in securing nuclear facilities reduces the probability of terrorist attempts to infiltrate and breach nuclear facilities or execute large-scale attacks. This cooperation also signals the seriousness of nuclear security in the region to potential adversaries.</p>
<p>Establishing an American military presence in Pakistan could be perceived as a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. However, US involvement would be limited to advisory, intelligence, and technical support roles. This role would enable Pakistan to retain full control over its nuclear assets and security operations.</p>
<p>A US military presence in Pakistan could also escalate regional tensions—particularly with India. The two states have irreconcilable differences when it comes to Kashmir, and both sides believe they should control all of Kashmir, not just one part of it. An attack on civilians or military forces on either side of the line of control in Kashmir could easily escalate into a major conflict. However, the US can use diplomatic channels to ensure regional actors, including India, are aware of the task force’s defensive nature. The task force aims to secure nuclear sites and combat terrorism, not alter the region’s strategic balance.</p>
<p><strong>Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe</strong></p>
<p>The world cannot afford nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands. By establishing a Joint US-Pakistan task force, the US both protects global security and reaffirms its leadership in the fight against nuclear terrorism. This partnership strengthens nuclear safeguard, prevents nuclear theft, and stabilizes the region. The US must act now to ensure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are protected. Together, we can turn a potential crisis into a collaborative success. The time to act is now for a safer and more stable world.</p>
<p><em>Timor Nawabi is currently pursuing a master’s degree in security policy studies with a concentration in Science and Technology, focusing mainly on cybersecurity and artificial intelligence, at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Why-a-Joint-US-Pakistan-Counterterrorism-Task-Force-is-Necessary.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-a-joint-us-pakistan-counterterrorism-task-force-is-necessary/">Why a Joint US-Pakistan Counterterrorism Task Force Is Necessary</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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