Is North Korea winning? Along with the country’s expanding nuclear arsenal and delivery systems, North Korea continues to develop and demonstrate expertise in cyber and space warfare that soon may threaten U.S. vital interests and complicate the broader competition between great powers. North Korea’s deepening ties with Russia, including valuable lessons gained from its participation in Russia’s war against Ukraine, will further embolden an already aggressive regime. While each of these developments has been analyzed individually, their cumulative strategic implications have received far less attention. A comprehensive assessment is overdue. The world needs to understand how North Korea’s advancing nuclear, missile, conventional, cyber, and space capabilities, along with its growing strategic partnership with Russia, will influence the regional and global security environment in the coming decades. 

North Korea has proven to be adept at using its cyber capabilities to evade or mitigate the effects of economic sanctions. The theft of cryptocurrency and other assets from financial institutions has evolved into a complex and sustained effort. Pyongyang’s strategy now includes penetrating Western firms that unknowingly hire North Korean IT workers. North Korea has been able to generate billions of dollars from these activities, both through earned income and the theft of intellectual property, and the funds are then used to finance the regime’s missile and nuclear programs: a lose-lose proposition for the U.S. and its allies. 

At present, Western governments are struggling to respond to these challenges even as China and Russia continue to provide North Korea with cyber-related training and support. Coordinated cyber operations between these three powers will be a logical outgrowth. Accurate and timely attribution of cyberattacks is already challenging. In a crisis or conflict, North Korea could serve as a proxy for China and Russia to leverage against the U.S. 

North Korea has recently shown an interest in developing military capabilities in space. This includes surveillance and so-called “counterspace capabilities” to inhibit an adversary’s assured access to space. Russia is increasingly providing North Korea with space-related expertise, including launch infrastructure and launch assistance. With ongoing Russian support, North Korea could achieve significant technological breakthroughs that typically take other countries decades. It remains uncertain what restrictions Moscow is willing to impose on technology transferred to Pyongyang. Considering North Korea’s willingness and history of proliferation, the U.S. might face new threats from other states seeking counterspace capabilities. 

The U.S. is dependent on assured access to space for the functioning of its economy and to conduct military operations. Thanks to its missile program, North Korea could seek to develop a capability to knock out U.S. satellites. Additionally, North Korea has shown interest in using nuclear weapons at high altitudes to generate an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to negate U.S. technological dominance. Because North Korea does not rely on space as the U.S. does, these developments would give the regime significant leverage in a future confrontation. As in the cyber domain, China and Russia may leverage North Korea as a deniable proxy actor in space to threaten or attack U.S. interests. 

As the U.S. watches from the sidelines, North Korea continues to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has stated that the regime has recently added infrastructure at its Yongbyon complex, which will allow it to increase the yearly production of nuclear warheads. North Korea is developing and testing a wide range of missiles, including hypersonics, some of which can hold the U.S. homeland at risk. North Korea is expected to have 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles by 2035. Worse yet, as North Korea’s nuclear-tipped ballistic missile arsenal grows, the existing U.S. missile defense architecture is at risk of being overwhelmed and becoming obsolete. Golden Dome for America could strengthen homeland defense against North Korea by improving missile detection, tracking, and interception. As Pyongyang expands its missile arsenal, a layered and expanding missile defense architecture could diminish North Korea’s nuclear strike credibility and boost U.S. resilience. 

While significant emphasis is placed on analyzing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, it is important to highlight that the regime is believed to possess a significant biological and chemical weapons capability. Biological and chemical weapons provide an adversary with deniability. Continued investment in production and research infrastructure indicates the regime values these asymmetric capabilities despite international tones and laws. In February 2017, Kim Jong Nam, the half-brother of North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un, was assassinated in the Kuala Lumpur International Airport after being exposed to the VX nerve agent. North Korea’s ability to produce biological and chemical weapons at an industrial scale, along with its proliferation history and willingness to employ such weapons, presents significant challenges for the U.S. 

For decades, observers have confidently declared that North Korea is on the verge of collapse. Yet, despite years of domestic, economic, and geopolitical sanctions, the regime has not only survived but also thrived in measurable ways. Throughout its history, North Korea has shown a tendency for brinkmanship, coercion, and deception to achieve its goals. Furthermore, Kim Jong Un has integrated the proliferation of military technology, cyber-enabled theft, and sanctions evasion into his broader strategy for sustaining the regime and advancing its military modernization programs. Supported by China and Russia, North Korea has moved from being an isolated rogue state to a dangerous regional power with proxy potential. If Pyongyang effectively combines its growing cyber, space, and WMD capabilities into a coordinated denial and coercion strategy, the U.S. may have limited options during a crisis or conflict. Given the high stakes, Washington must holistically reevaluate its goals, objectives, and means toward Pyongyang before it is too late. The U.S. must ensure that North Korea cannot succeed in coercing the world, threatening the U.S. homeland, or fundamentally altering the strategic balance in Northeast Asia. 

Nathan A. Heard is a doctoral student in the Defense and Strategic Studies Program at Missouri State University, focusing on deterrence and strategic competition. Heard holds a master’s degree in defense and strategic studies and a graduate certificate in countering weapons of mass destruction from Missouri State University, as well as undergraduate degrees in business and information systems management. He authored the December 2025 graduate thesis, “A Novel Deterrence Strategy: Denial Through Space and Cyberspace.” The views expressed in this article are solely his own.

The Coming Crisis with North Korea was originally published on Global Security Review.

The challenge is clear; adversaries are developing ASAT weapons, electronic warfare capabilities, and cyber threats that can disable American satellites—disrupting military operations, global communications, and economic stability. Without a robust deterrence framework, adversaries are emboldened to target space infrastructure. To counter these threats, the US must enhance resilient space architectures, strengthen policy frameworks, and refine operational doctrine to deter and, if necessary, defeat adversarial actions in space.

Resilient Space Architectures: Hardening the Backbone of American Space Operations

One of the most effective deterrence measures is making space assets more difficult to target and replaceable, if attacked. The United States is shifting from large, centralized satellite systems to disaggregated and proliferated constellations, reducing the risk posed by any single point of failure. The Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA), led by the Space Development Agency, aims to deploy a network of small, low-cost satellites that provide redundancy, making it harder for adversaries to cripple American space capabilities with a single strike.

Additionally, on-orbit servicing, maneuverable satellites, and rapid launch capabilities enhance resilience. SpaceX’s Starlink and the Rapid Agile Launch Initiative ensure that the US can quickly replenish space assets, denying adversaries the ability to achieve lasting effects through space attacks. By maintaining a dynamic, self-healing space architecture, the US strengthens deterrence by signaling that any attempted disruption will be ineffective.

Counterspace Capabilities: Strengthening Active and Passive Defenses

While resilience is key, deterrence also requires credible counterspace capabilities to impose costs on adversaries. The US Space Force and other defense agencies are investing in defensive counterspace measures, such as jamming-resistant communications, maneuverable satellites, and cyber-hardened space systems to protect critical assets.

At the same time, the US must maintain offensive counterspace capabilities as part of a deterrence posture. This includes electronic warfare tools to disrupt enemy satellite operations, rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) for on-orbit inspection and intervention, and ground-based kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to neutralize hostile space threats. By demonstrating both defensive resilience and credible response options, the US reinforces deterrence by denial and punishment.

Policy and Alliances: Strengthening Space Norms and Collective Security

A strong policy framework and allied cooperation bolster deterrence by shaping adversary behavior and reinforcing international stability. The Artemis Accords, a multinational agreement on responsible space conduct, establish norms that promote transparency and discourage hostile activities. The US must continue leading diplomatic efforts to build consensus on space security standards, making aggressive actions politically and strategically costly for adversaries.

Additionally, alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), partnership with the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the US), and Five Eyes intelligence network provide collective security in space. The Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative, which includes Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the UK, and the US, enhances shared situational awareness and rapid coordination in space crisis scenarios. By integrating allied capabilities, the US deters adversaries by presenting a unified, multinational response to any hostile space activity.

Space Domain Awareness: Gaining the Tactical Advantage

Deterrence depends on knowing when and where threats emerge. The US Space Force and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) are advancing Space Domain Awareness (SDA) through advanced radar systems, AI-powered surveillance, and persistent monitoring of space objects. Programs like the Deep Space Advanced Radar Concept (DARC) and the Space Surveillance Telescope provide real-time tracking of adversary satellite maneuvers, ensuring that hostile actions do not go undetected.

By integrating AI and machine learning, the US can predict and respond to potential threats before they escalate. Improved SDA capabilities deny adversaries the element of surprise, reinforcing deterrence by ensuring that any aggressive move is immediately identified and countered.

Military Space Operations: Defining Rules of Engagement

To deter and defeat adversary actions, the US must develop clear space warfighting doctrine and operational concepts. The Space Force’s “competitive endurance” strategy emphasizes continuous engagement with adversaries to counter gray zone tactics, such as cyber intrusions, satellite blinding, and electromagnetic interference. Establishing clear rules of engagement for responding to hostile actions in space strengthens deterrence by ensuring decisive and proportional responses when necessary.

Additionally, the integration of space with multi-domain operations ensures that any adversary attack on space assets is met with cross-domain retaliation, whether in cyber, air, land, or sea. This raises the stakes for adversaries, reinforcing deterrence by making space conflict an unattractive option.

Conclusion: A Comprehensive Approach to Space Deterrence

The US must pursue a multi-layered strategy to deter and defeat adversary actions in space. Resilient architectures, credible counterspace capabilities, strong alliances, superior space domain awareness, and well-defined military operations are essential to ensuring freedom of action in space and securing national security interests. As space becomes increasingly contested, the ability to deter, detect, and defeat threats will determine whether the US maintains its strategic advantage beyond the atmosphere.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, is an engineer and career civil servant with the Department of the Air Force. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the US Air Force. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond the Atmosphere: Strengthening US Space Deterrence in a Contested Domain was originally published on Global Security Review.