Since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, the Korean Peninsula has experienced violent ideological strife, culminating in a war that claimed the lives of 10 percent of its people. The following decades were marked by authoritarian governments in the South and a cult-like regime in the North—cloaked in the guise of communism.

During authoritarian rule in South Korea, which was often characterized as a dictatorship, martial law was declared on several occasions to maintain law and order. It also served as a crucial mechanism in preparing for potential invasions by North Korea.

Martial law in South Korea refers to a legal framework under which the administrative and judicial powers of the state are transferred to a military commander. This extraordinary measure is stipulated under the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. It grants the president authority to declare martial law in circumstances of war, armed conflict, or other national emergencies of similar gravity. Its objective is to address military requirements or ensure public safety and order when normal governance is deemed inadequate.

Martial law is divided into two types: emergency martial law and security martial law. Emergency martial law grants the government sweeping powers, including the suspension of the warrant system, restrictions on freedom of the press, curbs on publication rights, limitations on assembly and association, and the overriding of civilian courts and government agencies.

These measures are intended to ensure swift and decisive action in times of crisis. When martial law is declared, the president must notify the National Assembly immediately. If the Assembly demands its termination through a majority vote, the president is legally obligated to comply. While the National Assembly retains legislative authority, there are exceptional cases where a military regime may temporarily assume control, particularly during a coup or other events that disrupt the constitutional order.

On December 3 at 10 p.m., President Yoon Suk-Yeol declared martial law. This marked the first time in 45 years that martial law was invoked in South Korea. President Yoon justified the decision by citing actions of the National Assembly and opposition party, which he claimed were paralyzing the judicial and administrative systems. Specifically, their pursuit of numerous impeachment motions against officials and ministers, coupled with a unilateral decision to reduce key public welfare and defense budgets for the coming year. Yoon specifically cited these actions as undermining the essential functions of the state.

President Yoon framed them as attempts to disrupt constitutional order and overthrow the liberal democratic system. He went so far as to label the National Assembly a “den of criminals,” warning that the nation was in a “dire and precarious state.” To safeguard the liberal democratic system and protect citizens from North Korean communist forces and anti-state elements, he declared martial law, taking a step that would significantly escalate political tensions.

What followed was both alarming and puzzling. The Martial Law Commander was announced almost immediately, accompanied by a proclamation that limited civil liberties.

Troops were deployed to the National Assembly building, ostensibly to secure control, but the details of their mission remained unclear. Notably, the government refrained from taking control of broadcasting networks, implementing a curfew, or restricting internet access—measures that have traditionally been associated with martial law. This restraint raised questions about the intent and preparedness behind the declaration.

Within just two hours, 190 of the 300 National Assembly members gathered in an extraordinary session. Demonstrating remarkable decisiveness, they unanimously voted to overturn the martial law decision. The swift and unified response underscored the strength of South Korea’s democratic institutions, even under extraordinary pressure. The critical question that followed was whether President Yoon would adhere to this decision, given the volatile circumstances.

As of this writing, the democratic mechanisms appear to have prevailed. President Yoon complied with the Assembly’s decision, and the troops, whatever their initial directives may have been, refrained from any extreme actions. The system of checks and balances worked, averting what could be a prolonged and destabilizing crisis. This resolution highlights the resilience of South Korea’s democracy, even when tested under such dramatic circumstances.

The entire ordeal lasted only six hours, yet its implications are profound. It was bizarre, embarrassing, and politically damaging for the Yoon administration. The short-lived declaration of martial law raises significant questions about the president’s judgment, the advice he received, and the decision-making process within the government.

The absence of traditional martial law measures, such as media control or curfews, suggests either a miscalculation or an intent to avoid inflaming public outrage. Regardless, the political fallout will be severe and long-lasting.

This six-hour ordeal, while alarming, ultimately reaffirmed the strength of South Korea’s democratic systems. The National Assembly acted swiftly and decisively, and the president adhered to constitutional norms, ensuring the crisis did not escalate further.

However, the incident leaves lingering doubts about the future of the nation’s political climate and the ability of its leadership to navigate complex challenges. It will serve as a sobering case study in the delicate balance of power, the risks of executive overreach, and the resilience required to uphold democratic principles.

The “silver lining” of this affair is undeniable; the democratic system worked. Yet the political and reputational costs will shape South Korea’s discourse for months, if not years, to come. It is a stark reminder that democracy, though tested, must remain vigilant and steadfast in protecting its core values against both external and internal threats.

LTG (Ret.) Chun In-Bum was the commander of the Republic of Korea’s Special Forces Command. He is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. 

Six Hours of Crisis: Martial Law, Democracy, and Leadership in South Korea was originally published on Global Security Review.

While many readers may not be familiar with the inner workings of constitutional monarchies, it is important to keep in mind that a prime minister serves at the pleasure of the monarch, in whose name the prime minister forms a government. While not common, the monarch can remove the prime minister due to a loss of confidence. In the case of Iran (1953), the Shah saw Mosaddeq as a threat to the constitutional order, which, in fact, he was.

The Shah’s restoration of constitutional order in 1953 also addressed three important geostrategic issues. The first concerned the nature of Iran’s government and how its leadership would be determined. In 1951, as a member of the parliament or Majles, and subsequently as prime minister, Mosaddeq pushed for a public referendum to have the parliament dismissed and the constitutional monarchy eliminated, which would have given him virtual dictatorial powers to rule.

By 1953, as prime minister, Mosaddeq again called for just such a public referendum to choose between his government by decree and what he viewed as an antiquated monarchy. The referendum passed overwhelmingly, and Mosaddeq signed a decree calling for the results to be implemented although Iran’s constitution recognized no such role for referendums. The prime minister was clearly seeking to engage in unconstitutional activities.

The second issue was Mosaddeq’s long sought effort to nationalize Iran’s oil reserves, then controlled jointly through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. In 1951, prior to becoming prime minister, he led parliament to pass legislation nationalizing Iranian oil assets. The United Kingdom took Iran to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but because Iran did not recognize the authority of the ICJ, the court dismissed the lawsuit in 1952. This ultimately led the UK to organize a boycott of Iranian oil exports, which was effective in preventing Iranian oil, 50 percent of the nation’s foreign currency assets, from being sold on the international market.

The third issue was Mosaddeq’s growing rapprochement with the Soviet Union (USSR) and reliance on the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party as an important source of political support. Moscow was looking to control more oil resources, particularly those in Iran and the Middle East, which led the Soviets to actively engage in the spread of communist propaganda and revolutionary efforts in the region.

The American Role

For supporters of today’s regime in Tehran, it is an article of faith that the US and UK illegitimately overthrew a popular and democratic ruler, Mosaddeq, over a desire to keep Iranian oil resources under British control and an unwarranted fear of communism.

The Associated Press for example, concluded that what they saw was a “reactionary CIA-led 1953 coup against revolutionary Mosaddeq” which “lit the fuse” for the 1979 Islamic revolution a quarter century later. All the elements were there—greed for oil, a supposed push to stop popular democracy, and an irrational fear of communism—to make the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the “bad guys” in this narrative.

By accepting the narrative that Iran’s path toward progressive democracy was hijacked by the CIA, wholesale excuses are possible to explain away Iran’s terrorist enterprise over the past four decades. For many fellow travelers in the West, the fictional “coup” against Mosaddeq provided an excuse for avoiding a confrontation with Iran over its rogue behavior.

Iran’s mullahs describe American and British action from 1953–1979 as “the great arrogance”—the meddling in Iranian affairs by foreign interests. However, the legitimate constitutional restoration of the Shah (1953) was led by a completely legitimate loyalist-royalist coalition made up of members of the Iranian military, the Iranian theocracy, Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi’s supporters, and supporters of the Iranian constitution. The Shah legitimately issued two decrees on August 19, 1953, dismissing Mosaddeq as prime minister and appointing General Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister.

The American desire to staunch the spread of communism was a perfectly legitimate concern that led President Dwight D. Eisenhower to support constitutional government under the Shah. For the British, without whose investment in infrastructure, processing, and export there would be no Iranian oil to export, legitimate financial interests were at stake. The Soviet Union also cared about oil. In the early 1950s, Iranian oil and gas reserves were a growing part of known oil and gas reserves. Control over them would provide economic and diplomatic leverage for an economically impoverished Soviet state.

It should come as no surprise that a false narrative surrounding Mosaddeq’s removal developed almost immediately. Reality, however, is far different. Mohammad Mosaddeq was legitimately removed from power for attempting to topple the constitutional monarchy on behalf of the Soviet-supported Tudeh party. American and British support was exactly what the Shah required to restore the constitution. The ultimate collapse of the Shah’s government and its replacement with an Islamic fundamentalist theocracy is a tragedy the United States regrets even to this day.

Peter Huessy and Joe Buff are Senior Fellows at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are their own.

Iran’s 1953 Coup that Wasn’t was originally published on Global Security Review.