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		<title>The European Dilemma: Five Percent and Manpower</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-european-dilemma-five-percent-and-manpower/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-european-dilemma-five-percent-and-manpower/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amit Gupta]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Mar 2025 13:05:05 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30201</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Europeans have reacted with shock and dismay at President Donald Trump’s initiatives on settling the Ukraine war. The president is wisely keeping the Europeans out of any negotiations with Vladimir Putin. Getting consensus out of the 27 members of the European Union, whose attitudes range from the maximalist position of the Baltic states to [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-european-dilemma-five-percent-and-manpower/">The European Dilemma: Five Percent and Manpower</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/feb/15/donald-trumps-betrayal-of-ukraine-has-emboldened-vladimir-putin-and-pulled-the-rug-from-under-nato-allies">The Europeans have reacted with shock and dismay at President Donald Trump’s initiatives on settling the Ukraine war</a>. The president is wisely keeping the Europeans out of any negotiations with Vladimir Putin. Getting consensus out of the 27 members of the European Union, whose attitudes range from the maximalist position of the Baltic states to the more pragmatic approach of Greece and Spain, is difficult.</p>
<p>In fact, months ago, the president asked North Atlantic Treaty Council Organization (NATO) countries for a proposal by each state for putting peacekeeping troops in Ukraine. The Europeans dithered and then expressed consternation that Trump was keeping them out of the negotiations with Putin.</p>
<p>More pertinently, the president suggested that NATO countries increase their defense expenditure to five percent of gross domestic product (GDP). This is a far more realistic assessment of the decline in European capabilities than that which calls for a growth of defense expenditure to three percent of GDP.</p>
<p>The British, French, and Germans all expressed varying degrees of outrage at Trump’s actions including the suggestion by some that he is creating a “Munich”-like outcome in his negotiations with Putin by conceding too much even before the discussions began. The fact is that Trump is playing his cards knowing full well that the Europeans have no plan.</p>
<p><strong>Why Five Percent Is Impossible</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617-def-exp-2024-en.pdf">When one looks at NATO’s defense expenditure, countries like Canada, Italy, and Spain are below the two percent threshold while France, Germany, and the Netherlands barely cross it</a>.  Yes, countries like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are above the two percent threshold, but they are small nations with populations less than that of Chicago. Estonia has a mere 1.6 million people.</p>
<p>To get to three percent, let alone five, would require NATO countries to add tens of billions to their defense budgets and require cutting the social services that their citizens expect and value. <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-nato-allies-defense-spending/">As <em>Politico</em> pointed out, for France, which is one of the voluble proponents of European rearmament, to go from two to three percent of GDP would require Paris to add about 30 billion euros to its defense budget</a>.</p>
<p>Given the country’s budgetary problems that is unlikely to happen. Five percent is a bridge too far. Britain, which is also facing economic headwinds, cannot afford such an increase. In Germany, despite the 100 billion euros committed to modernization, which largely went to refurbish existing equipment that was mothballed, Berlin made it clear it is a long way from substantially increasing its defense budget. Countries like Italy and Spain, given their own economic compulsions, will also find five percent impossible.</p>
<p>The Europeans raise the issue that even if they went to five percent their defense industries are not able to crank up production to meet the demand for new weaponry. That is not the primary problem for these countries. Instead, it is an issue of manpower. Europe is aging and lacks the population for expanded militaries. Worse, as part of the peace dividend, conscription was removed in most countries in the 1990s. This left Gen X, the millennials, and now Gen Z, without any memory of military service.</p>
<p>Reinstating conscription, as seen from the figures below, would be the way to give teeth to European militaries. Compulsory military service, however, is hugely unpopular among the younger generation and a push to draft people would lead to an electoral backlash that few politicians in Europe want to face.</p>
<p>As Table I shows, the major European militaries drastically downsized after the Cold War:</p>
<table style="height: 338px;" width="807">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="84"><strong>Country</strong></td>
<td width="67"><strong>Army 1972</strong></td>
<td width="67"><strong>Army 2017</strong></td>
<td width="67"><strong>Army 2023</strong></td>
<td width="67"><strong>Army </strong><strong>2024</strong></td>
<td width="79"><strong>Aircraft 1972</strong></td>
<td width="79"><strong>Aircraft 2017</strong></td>
<td width="79"><strong>Aircraft 2023</strong></td>
<td width="34"><strong>Aircraft 2024</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="84">Britain</td>
<td width="67">180,458</td>
<td width="67">85,600</td>
<td width="67">79,350</td>
<td width="67">80,350</td>
<td width="79">500</td>
<td width="79">254</td>
<td width="79">201</td>
<td width="34">201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="84">France</td>
<td width="67">328,000</td>
<td width="67">111,650</td>
<td width="67">114,000</td>
<td width="67">113,800</td>
<td width="79">500</td>
<td width="79">281</td>
<td width="79">261</td>
<td width="34">234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="84">Germany</td>
<td width="67">327,000</td>
<td width="67">111,650</td>
<td width="67">62,950</td>
<td width="67">61,900</td>
<td width="79">459</td>
<td width="79">235</td>
<td width="79">226</td>
<td width="34">226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="84">Italy</td>
<td width="67">306,000</td>
<td width="67">102,200</td>
<td width="67">93,100</td>
<td width="67">94,300</td>
<td width="79">320</td>
<td width="79">244</td>
<td width="79">231</td>
<td width="34">192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="84">Sweden</td>
<td width="67">22,000 (750,000 reserves)</td>
<td width="67"></td>
<td width="67"></td>
<td width="67">6,850 (40,000 reserves)</td>
<td width="79">400</td>
<td width="79"></td>
<td width="79"></td>
<td width="34">99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p><em>Source: The Military Balance [IISS: London], 1972, 2017, 2023, 2024 editions. </em></p>
<p>The above figures clearly show that remilitarization would require a major intake of manpower that the European countries would be unable to achieve because of the factors discussed above. Yet, this does not stop them from making bold pronouncements about future militarization efforts. Reality is something else.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/news/germany-is-rearming-too-slowly-to-stand-up-to-russia/">The Kiel Institute for the World Economy states the German case of weakness quite bluntly</a>:</p>
<p>The decline in German numbers over the past 20 years is particularly striking: in 2004 Germany had thousands of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and even almost one thousand howitzers. By 2021, these numbers had come down to the hundreds, as Germany only had 339 tanks and 121 howitzers. The German numbers for 1992 must be interpreted carefully, as they include weapons and equipment from the newly incorporated East German army. Still, when considering the available Leopard tanks, i.e., the West German tanks, Germany had around 4200. The German decline in military stock is thus massive.</p>
<p>Despite all the optimistic talk emanating from Berlin, German rearmament is a myth.  The country’s industrial capability, which is in the doldrums, will not allow it to rapidly militarize. And young people will not join the military in droves as Olaf Scholz and Ursula van der Lyon fondly believe. There is a reason Ukraine has not dipped into its pool of 18–21-year-olds for the current war. It would probably lead to mass flight from the country by younger Ukrainians.</p>
<p>If Europe cannot remilitarize easily and lacks the manpower to build Cold War–level forces, what can it do? The answer is simple. Write checks.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/02/15/updated-ukraine-recovery-and-reconstruction-needs-assessment-released">Ukraine requires reconstruction. The World Bank estimated that it would cost around $486 billion</a>, while Zelensky put the number closer to $700 billion. It is a year since the World Bank made its estimate so one can safely assume that in the intense conflict of 2024 the damage to infrastructure may have added another $50 billion to $100 billion to the bill. The Europeans can make a $25 billion a year commitment to Ukraine for the next twenty years to aid reconstruction. This would lead to the rapid build-up of Ukraine’s economy and stop the population from fleeing the war-torn nation.</p>
<p>As things stand, Ukraine’s population is set to decline to around 30 million by 2050 and it will largely be a country of old people thanks to a decline in fertility. If Kyiv stands a chance, it needs a sustained dose of financial aid with no strings attached. A side benefit would be that China would not be the major post-war economic player in Ukraine.</p>
<p>From the European perspective, Brussels can go to Trump and say that yes, we engaged in burden sharing and it would be a lot less expensive than five percent of GDP and far less socially divisive than the imposition of conscription.</p>
<p>Xi Jin Ping suggested Chinese and Indian peacekeepers be inserted in Ukraine. This would change the future security architecture of the region. Russia will be far more comfortable with such a peacekeeping force rather than a crypto-NATO force posing as peacekeepers. It will be interesting to watch how this plays out.</p>
<p>Perhaps most interesting is the fact that Trump called Europe’s bluff. If London, Paris, and Berlin want to be relevant, it is time to write a big check. At least for now, Americans are no longer willing to subsidize Europe’s welfare states.</p>
<p><em>Amit Gupta is a Senior Fellow of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views in this article are personal.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/The-European-Dilemma.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="328" height="91" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 328px) 100vw, 328px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-european-dilemma-five-percent-and-manpower/">The European Dilemma: Five Percent and Manpower</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Ukraine’s Incursion into Russia: What’s Next for the Peace Process?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/ukraines-incursion-into-russia-whats-next-for-the-peace-process/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/ukraines-incursion-into-russia-whats-next-for-the-peace-process/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Seher Intikhab]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Nov 2024 12:49:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29339</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In August 2024, Ukraine launched a significant incursion into Russia’s Kursk Oblast, advancing up to 30 kilometers and gaining control of 1,200 square kilometers and 93 villages. Analysts suggest the offensive aims to pull Russian forces away from the eastern front lines and secure leverage for potential peace talks. However, Russia continues to make gains [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/ukraines-incursion-into-russia-whats-next-for-the-peace-process/">Ukraine’s Incursion into Russia: What’s Next for the Peace Process?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In August 2024, Ukraine launched a significant incursion into <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682">Russia’s Kursk Oblast</a>, advancing up to 30 kilometers and gaining control of 1,200 square kilometers and 93 villages. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/ukraine-russia-kursk-incursion-war.html">Analysts suggest</a> the offensive aims to pull Russian forces away from the eastern front lines and secure leverage for potential peace talks. However, Russia continues to make gains in eastern Ukraine, capturing the town of Niu-York near Donetsk and pushing Ukrainian troops to evacuate Pokrovsk. As both sides dig in, the conflict shows no signs of abating, resulting in a severe humanitarian crisis.</p>
<p>As the international community struggles to manage the escalating crisis, the prospect of a peace process remains distant. Russia maintains that peace is only achievable when its objectives are met. These <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67711802">objectives</a>, central to Moscow’s stance from the beginning of the war, include the demilitarization and neutralization of Ukraine, as well as changes that align with Russia’s security interests. These include control over Crimea and influence in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/un-ukraine-zelenskyy-russia-peace-territorial-blinken-db3954c29fa826601f42101e05fd6db0">dismissed peace talks</a> with Russia, insisting that any resolution must involve the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.</p>
<p>He emphasized that Russia, as the sole aggressor, must be compelled to comply with international law and respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Despite ongoing military engagements and international diplomatic efforts, both sides remain entrenched in their positions, with Russia demanding territorial concessions and Ukraine insisting on sovereignty and territorial integrity.</p>
<p>A potential resolution could involve establishing a neutral zone in contested areas, facilitating a phased withdrawal of both Russian and Ukrainian forces. Ukraine’s commitment to its territorial integrity should be upheld, while Russia could receive assurances regarding its security concerns, particularly concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) commitment to Ukraine’s future membership. Such a balanced approach could open avenues for dialogue, encourage a more stable regional environment, and ultimately benefit both nations while contributing to broader international stability.</p>
<p><strong>Russia’s Domestic Situation</strong></p>
<p>Russian President <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/06/14/europe/putin-conditions-peace-talks-ukraine-intl/index.html">Vladimir Putin</a> outlined Russia’s conditions for ending the war in Ukraine, which focus on Ukraine’s full withdrawal from the entire territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia—regions Moscow claims as Russian land. He also demands that Ukraine abandon its bid to join NATO—addressing Russian concerns about NATO’s eastward expansion. Furthermore, Putin called for Ukraine’s demilitarization and insisted on the lifting of Western sanctions that, while not crippling, impact Russia’s economy.</p>
<p>Domestically, Putin frames the war as essential to Russia’s security and national identity, maintaining significant support despite economic hardships caused by sanctions. The extended nature of the war, however, is seeing inflation, falling living standards, and localized protests over conscription. Despite these pressures, Putin shows little interest in peace, viewing the war as vital to Russia’s strategic objectives. Without significant internal shifts or international pressure, it is unlikely that Russia will pursue peace soon. Putin’s current stance suggests that the conflict will persist, with little sign of de-escalation unless broader geopolitical changes occur.</p>
<p><strong>Ukraine’s Domestic Conditions</strong></p>
<p>In Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky maintains strong public support despite the immense challenges the country faces. The Ukrainian population remains united in their resistance against Russian aggression, bolstered by a deep sense of national pride and resilience. However, the ongoing conflict has taken a severe toll on the country’s infrastructure, economy, and civilian population.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s desire for peace is clear, but not at the cost of sovereignty or territorial concessions. Zelensky’s government has repeatedly stated that any peace deal must include the withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.</p>
<p><a href="https://apnews.com/article/un-ukraine-zelenskyy-russia-peace-territorial-blinken-db3954c29fa826601f42101e05fd6db0">President Zelensky</a> dismissed the idea of peace talks with Russia, urging for decisive global action to compel Moscow into peace. Speaking at a United Nations Security Council meeting, he emphasized that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion violated numerous international laws and will not cease through negotiations. Zelensky’s government consistently maintains that any peace deal must include the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea. He argued that as the sole aggressor, Russia must be forced into peace, underscoring the need to uphold the UN Charter’s principle of respecting every nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.</p>
<p><strong>The Collapse of Peace Proposals for the Russia-Ukraine Conflict</strong></p>
<p>Multiple international peace efforts failed to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict. <a href="https://time.com/6258052/china-russia-ukraine-cease-fire/">China’s 12-point peace proposal</a> for the Russia-Ukraine conflict advocated for an immediate cease-fire and respect for national sovereignty. It called for the lifting of non-UN sanctioned sanctions, protection of civilians, and the promotion of dialogue while emphasizing humanitarian issues and global energy security. The plan also included a cease-fire that would freeze Russian troops in place on Ukrainian territory and urged cooperation among nations to achieve lasting peace.</p>
<p>However, it was dismissed by the West for favoring Russia and not addressing Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty. The <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/us-russia-talks-ukraine-/31645760.html">Geneva talks</a> regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict sought to establish a framework for dialogue aimed at addressing security concerns and finding pathways to a peaceful resolution. Key topics included NATO expansion, security guarantees for Ukraine, and managing the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. These discussions, however, have faced obstacles due to differing views among the parties involved, leading to limited progress and a continuing stalemate in negotiations.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgr542l753po">Hungary’s attempts</a> to mediate in the Russia-Ukraine conflict faced significant challenges, culminating in the European Union’s (EU) decision to strip Budapest of its right to host foreign and defense ministers’ meetings due to Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s meeting with Vladimir Putin. EU leaders viewed it as undermining a united European response to the war. As a result, Hungary’s role as a mediator has been called into question, with criticism from various EU member states highlighting the lack of consensus around its diplomatic initiatives.</p>
<p><strong>Is Peace Possible?</strong></p>
<p>The prospect for peace in the Ukraine-Russia conflict remains vague at best. A potential resolution could involve creating a neutral zone, phased troop withdrawal, and maintaining Ukraine’s territorial integrity while addressing Russia’s NATO-related concerns. However, entrenched geopolitical dynamics may prolong the conflict for years, worsening devastation, and complicating diplomatic efforts.</p>
<p><em>Seher Intikhab is a university student majoring in international relations. Views expressed are the author&#8217;s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Ukraines-Incursion-into-Russia.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/ukraines-incursion-into-russia-whats-next-for-the-peace-process/">Ukraine’s Incursion into Russia: What’s Next for the Peace Process?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>NATO’s Defense Math Does Not Add Up</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/natos-defense-math-does-not-add-up/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christophe Bosquillon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Oct 2024 12:38:50 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[troop movement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29001</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The United States is by far the largest contributor to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations. According to NATO estimates published in June 2024, the United States will spend $967.7 billion on defense in 2024, roughly 10 times as much as Germany, the second-largest spending country, with $97.7 billion. Total NATO military expenditures for 2024 are estimated at $1.474.4 [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/natos-defense-math-does-not-add-up/">NATO’s Defense Math Does Not Add Up</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The United States is by far the largest contributor to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations. According to NATO estimates published in June 2024, the United States will spend $967.7 billion on defense in 2024, roughly 10 times as much as Germany, the second-largest spending country, with $97.7 billion.</p>
<p>Total NATO military expenditures for 2024 are estimated at $1.474.4 trillion. As Russia grows increasingly assertive, many on both sides of the Atlantic are wondering how NATO member-states will step up and contribute to the continent’s defense.</p>
<p>To withstand a Russian attack, NATO must plan for between 35 and 50 extra brigades of 3,000–7,000 troops each—adding 105,000–350,000 soldiers. Germany must contribute 3–5 extra brigades or 20,000–30,000 combat troops.</p>
<p>Protection from air attacks is a major German and Eastern European vulnerability. Former German Defense Minister and current President of the European Commission Ursula van der Leyen recently emphasized the need for Germany, under its new defense plans, to quadruple its air defenses. That includes Patriot missile batteries and shorter-range systems to protect bases, ports, and railway transportation systems.</p>
<p>Should Russia attack NATO, hundreds of thousands of troops, together with tanks, equipment, and ammunitions, will have to make their way to the eastern front through Germany. Preparations for war with Russia indicate that Poland, the Baltics, and other Eastern NATO allies are primary targets, but so is Germany. During the Cold War, Germany had 36 Patriot missile air defense units. The count is down to nine—after donating three to Ukraine. Berlin just ordered four Patriot missile units at a cost of 1.35 billion euros.</p>
<p>The United States spends about 3.5 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, but the Congressional Budget Office projects that will fall to 2.5 percent by 2034. NATO member-states recently issued a joint communique that said, “We reaffirm that, in many cases, expenditure beyond 2 percent of GDP will be needed in order to remedy existing shortfalls and meet the requirements across all domains arising from a more contested security order.”</p>
<p>The Baltic states are adamant about the need for increased defense spending. Tuuli Duneton, Estonia’s Undersecretary for Defense Policy, praised the 23 NATO member-states who now meet the 2 percent spending target. She suggested raising the spending goal to 2.5 to 3 percent.</p>
<p>Pointing to NATO’s “capability gaps,” Lithuanian Defense Minister Laurynas Kasčiūna stated, “We’ll start to talk at least about 2.5 percent as a floor,” pointing to NATO’s “capability gaps.” He added, “When we analyze what the countries need to develop soon, for a decade maybe, it’s not even 2.5 percent. It’s not even 3 percent. It should be more if you want more air defense systems, if you want more long-range strike capabilities.”</p>
<p>NATO plans focus on logistics, troop movement, and cyber defenses in preparation for conflict with Russia. After NATO’s plans for the biggest defense upgrade in three decades were agreed upon last year, now is the moment of truth: the minimum defense requirements to meet these plans were sent to national governments, highlighting significant shortfalls in air defenses, long-range missiles, troop numbers, ammunition, logistics, and secure digital communications.</p>
<p>Fixing these shortfalls requires billions of euros in investment. By autumn 2025, NATO aims to set binding targets for members to ensure Europe’s defense. Achieving these targets may be difficult due to budgetary constraints and differing views on NATO’s stance towards Russia.</p>
<p>NATO’s effort to navigate a moment of clear and present danger is made more difficult by the Herculean task of rearming. Deep industrial reconstitution and technological evolution are both needed and taking place across all value chains in all defense tech investments, including space, cyber, drones, and the role of artificial intelligence on the battlefield. Despite its current state of political uncertainty, change-adverse politicians and populations must be convinced of the need for refocusing on defense.</p>
<p>Europe must face a <em>Kulturkampf</em> in which Europeans overcome the three decades of cognitive denial about war in Europe. The biggest obstacle to the above efforts is likely to come from populations that are accustomed to generous welfare programs at the expense of defense preparations. Europe cannot tax its way out of its current problem. European taxes are already the highest in the world.</p>
<p>Compelling communication strategies are essential to justify the increased defense budgets. Officials need to emphasize the pan-European necessity for national and regional security. The twin brother of blood and treasure returned from a long hiatus. Making the argument to citizens becomes an even tougher sell if conscription across Europe is required to mobilize hundreds of thousands of troops to fight.</p>
<p>Asking ordinary citizens in Western or Southern Europe whether they are willing to die for Ukraine or Lithuania or even Poland will likely draw a negative response. Not all European populations seem willing, able, and ready to fight as nation-states united under the concept of pan-European patriotic defense. Those now leading the <em>effort de guerre</em> are found among Poles, Balts, and, in no small part, the newly energized Nordic countries.</p>
<p>In short, if Europe wishes to survive, it must adapt, deter, and defend itself now. Waiting will only add more blood and treasure to the bill that must be paid.</p>
<p><em>Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/natos-defense-math-does-not-add-up/">NATO’s Defense Math Does Not Add Up</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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