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	<title>Topic:conflict resolution &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
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		<title>Proliferation of Small Arms: Impact on Conflict Resolution</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/proliferation-of-small-arms-impact-on-conflict-resolution/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/proliferation-of-small-arms-impact-on-conflict-resolution/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kumail Mehdi]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jul 2025 12:56:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control & Nonproliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[arms proliferation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[arms traffickers. ​]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[autonomy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conflict resolution]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[ethnic conflict]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[identity-based disputes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kurds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[light weapons]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[psychology of guns]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Small arms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[smuggling routes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[structural reforms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[survival]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tribal conflict]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31087</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Religious, ethnic, and tribal affiliations often fuel identity-based disputes. The current conflict in South Sudan is a prime example. These hostilities are deadly and challenge the ability to live in peace. What makes them nearly impossible to resolve is an unchecked arms supply. The availability of arms exacerbates the length and severity of identity-based strife. [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/proliferation-of-small-arms-impact-on-conflict-resolution/">Proliferation of Small Arms: Impact on Conflict Resolution</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Religious, ethnic, and tribal affiliations often fuel identity-based disputes. The current conflict in South Sudan is a prime example. These hostilities are deadly and challenge <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2012-33890-000">the ability to live in peace</a>. What makes them nearly impossible to resolve is an unchecked arms supply.</p>
<p>The availability of arms exacerbates the length and severity of identity-based strife. <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14656.doc.htm">The United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs</a> pointed out that the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons undermine peace and security at the national, regional, and global levels.</p>
<p>Conflict often revolves around identity politics, where one group views another group with hatred, resulting in conflict. Violence often stems from perceptions of who is inside or outside the group, especially when survival is at stake. When a group of people attaches meaning to political and economic forces and considers compromise and disagreement unbearable, it erupts into violence, making conflict resolution a formidable challenge.</p>
<p>In this volatile situation, the presence of light arms and small weapons only worsens the situation. One of the main reasons for having guns is that they bring safety. The existing relationship between safety, survival, and weapons, especially in developing states, makes the differences deadly. <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0373-z">According to “The Psychology of Guns</a>,” the availability of weapons can drive aggressive behavior, leading to violence. In this regard, the proliferation of small arms and light weaponry needs to be checked.</p>
<p>Armed conflicts are ubiquitous, and those based on ethnic and tribal lines are often the most brutal. One estimate suggests <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/conflict-deaths-breakdown">that around 3.8 million people</a> died in such conflicts between 1989 and 2023.</p>
<p>For instance, in South Sudan, two groups, Dinka and Nuer, felt threatened by each other and launched into a violent war. It is important to understand the identity-borne roots of this dispute. Land and cattle hold significant prestige in South Sudanese society. With limited resources, achieving political power becomes a top priority.</p>
<p>In a bid to maintain political power and control over resources for one ethnic group, a <a href=".%20https:/www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan">political conflict between two leaders</a> turned into an ethnic war, which resulted in the killing of nearly 400,000 people. It is important to note the destructive impacts of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons on the civil war in South Sudan.</p>
<p>Likewise, the ethnic unrest of the Kurds in the Middle East illustrates how the combination of small arms proliferation and ethnic grievances can burst into conflict. <a href="https://uow.edu.pk/ORIC/MDSRIC/Publications/8th%20MDSRIC-147.pdf">The struggle for autonomy</a>, a free Kurdistan, is driving a war against Türkiye, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.</p>
<p>The region has witnessed chaos, with over <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czel3ry9x1do">40,000 deaths</a> in an insurgency against Türkiye. The presence of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2017/8/29/a-dangerous-smuggling-route-across-iraq-iran-border">smuggling routes </a>across the Iran-Iraq and Türkiye -Iraq borders aids in weapon proliferation. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czel3ry9x1do">The recent decision</a> to lay down arms by the Kurdish insurgents in Türkiye is a welcome step towards conflict resolution. The warring parties realised the economic and human cost of the conflict.</p>
<p>Hiruni Alwishewa notes that <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jcsl/article/29/3/331/7909057">the international regime to control the proliferation of small arms exhibits serious dichotomies</a>. For example, the Firearms Protocol and the European Union’s Programme of Action lack regulatory distinction between legal arms exports and illegal transfer of arms, so even legal transfers end up as illicit ones.</p>
<p>Likewise, the <a href="https://www.wassenaar.org/about-us/">Wassenaar Arrangement</a> and the Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons of the West African States failed to address the proliferation of small arms. It is because both agreements do not scrutinise military aid, which flows undetected, causing arms proliferation. Similarly, the Arms Trade Treaty and United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) lack definitional clarity between small arms and firearms, thus hampering any substantial effort to curb the proliferation of small arms.</p>
<p>In resolving identity-based conflicts, a needs-based approach is an important tool because it works to build trust. It focuses on accepting needs, based on ethnic, religious, and resource-related issues that parties in conflict believe essential to their survival. Repression and tyranny only worsen a conflict.</p>
<p>Unlike other disputes, conflicts sparked by ethnic and religious differences cannot be settled by contractual arrangements. <a href="https://erlanbakiev.weebly.com/uploads/1/0/8/3/10833829/ho-won_jeong-conflict_management_and_resolution___an_introduction-routledge_2010.pdf">They rest on bringing structural reforms that involve</a> either power redistribution or changing the political and economic systems to benefit all parties. Such efforts ensure that understanding and accepting diverse cultures run in tandem with each other.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/new-regionalism">After the fall of the Soviet Union</a>, regionalism received significant attention in the form of trade agreements, economic integration, and increasing interdependence. Regional initiatives such as coordinating between border states to curb illicit arms transfer, strengthening national laws, and promoting transparency were useful in controlling the proliferation of small and light weapons.</p>
<p>Understandably, effectively controlling small arms is a challenging task. In this regard, significant attention must be given to improving the international structure of arms control. Theoretically, arms control agreements cover all weapons, but, practically, nuclear weapons are the primary focus. In this regard, these agreements must be revisited to fill the existing gaps. This includes removing definitional gaps and bringing military aid under scrutiny.</p>
<p>Similarly, artificial intelligence (AI) can be utilized to effectively trace and detect light weapons. AI’s utility in data analysis, detection, and surveillance makes it useful in controlling arms proliferation.</p>
<p>For example, AI-based weapon detection software combines video analysis, learning, and object recognition. This software can be used to identify and track weapons, which will be useful in controlling the proliferation of small arms.</p>
<p>In the end, the goal is to reduce needless casualties in needless conflicts. It is possible to undertake intelligent measures that deter arms traffickers from providing the weapons sowing so much death in the world today.</p>
<p><em>Kumail Mehdi is a researcher at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad</em>.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Proliferation-of-Small-Arms-Its-Impact-on-Conflict-Resolution.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="187" height="52" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 187px) 100vw, 187px" /></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/proliferation-of-small-arms-impact-on-conflict-resolution/">Proliferation of Small Arms: Impact on Conflict Resolution</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>An Endgame in Ukraine</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/an-endgame-in-ukraine/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/an-endgame-in-ukraine/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christophe Bosquillon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 03 Jan 2025 14:25:50 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence & Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Government & Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Christophe Bosquillon ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conflict resolution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Crimea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cyber warfare]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Donbass]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drone warfare]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[natural gas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[negotiated settlement]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29718</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The incoming Trump administration will pick up the Ukraine dossier where the outgoing administration left it. As American leadership moves away from election rhetorics and back to the reality of governing, President Trump will attempt to bring the war in Ukraine to a negotiated resolution, but what that might look like is uncertain. The incoming [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/an-endgame-in-ukraine/">An Endgame in Ukraine</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The incoming Trump administration will pick up the Ukraine dossier where the outgoing administration left it. As American leadership moves away from election rhetorics and back to the reality of governing, President Trump will attempt to bring the <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5059813-russian-minister-rejects-trump-proposals/">war in Ukraine</a> to a negotiated resolution, but what that might look like is uncertain.</p>
<p>The incoming administration may prefer a blend of hard power and transactional diplomacy. An exit strategy for Ukraine and Russia is for both to come across as winners through conflict resolution.</p>
<p>A Russian maximalist position would require Ukraine to lose on all fronts. This means no return of territory; no European Union (EU) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. In theory, Russia needs to be incentivized to either give back the territories, and/or allow Ukraine to join NATO and the EU. The latter, however, is the least likely since it was Western encroachment on Russian borders and Ukrainian efforts to join Western organizations that served as Russian justification for their aggression.</p>
<p>In reality, Russia will never return Crimea to Ukraine. Crimean history, for Russia, is a bloody struggle against the Ottomans, making Crimea important to Russian pride.</p>
<p>The normal EU or NATO accession process takes years or decades. Expediting Ukraine’s accession to either will only reinforce Russian fears that the West is attempting to encircle Russia.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s reconstruction represents a serious economic challenge for the West. The United Nations currently <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/02/1146562#:~:text=Reconstruction%20and%20recovery%20in%20war-torn%20Ukraine%20is%20projected,a%20UN-backed%20study%20published%20on%20Thursday%20has%20revealed.">estimates the cost of reconstruction</a> at $486 billion. Who will pay for that reconstruction may play a large role in any negotiations.</p>
<p>Previous public statements by Western officials calling for the expedited membership of Ukraine in NATO only provokes Russian recalcitrance, which will be a challenge for Donald Trump to overcome. With Finland and Sweden now part of NATO, the Baltic Sea is a NATO lake that is closed to Russian naval assets. Ukraine in NATO will threaten Russia’s warm-water ports.</p>
<p>Ukraine in NATO is a non-starter for Russia. Keeping Crimea is an important part of ensuring Russian security. An acceptable compromise will require both sides to walk away unhappy while claiming victory. Ukraine may have to accept the loss of Crimea and the Donbass. It may also require an agreement to forgo joining NATO and, likely, the EU. Russian troops will end their aggression against Ukraine and leave. Western states will likely have the unenviable task of rebuilding Ukraine.</p>
<p>The Biden administration’s decision to allow Ukraine to strike Russia with American weapons is not sustainable in the long run, making it difficult for Ukraine to coerce Russia into a “good deal” in any peace talk. Public opinion in Ukraine supports ending the war short of victory. Ukrainians just want the war to end.</p>
<p>The endgame for Ukraine does not stop at Ukraine’s border. The Trump administration is expected to also play a role in protecting NATO member-states near Russia from further aggression. Appearing too weak empowers Russian aggression, while imposing unrealistic conditions will not end the war.</p>
<p>The exact conditions of any deal are certain to include elements that are not strictly related to the conflict’s settlement. For example, European states may agree to purchase American natural gas instead of Russian natural gas. European NATO member-states may also be required to pay for reconstruction.</p>
<p>A return to the purchase of Russian natural gas, Russia’s biggest export to Europe, may serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations, it is easily conceivable that a Trump administration will want payback for previous American support. This may include a much larger position on Europe’s energy and other markets.</p>
<p>Germany, which is heavily dependent on Russian natural gas, will care deeply about such negotiations. Lifting sanctions will be important for Russia and Europe.</p>
<p>The brave new world that is the future of Europe may stand somewhere between a new NATO versus Russia bipolarity and balkanization. Some countries may attempt to play all sides involved. Deterrence may still hold, but European NATO must certainly rearm.</p>
<p>Across NATO, there is an effort already underway to learn the lessons of the Ukraine war. Any endgame must ensure the West is far more effective at making sense of those lessons than are China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Developments in cyber, space, drone, and missile warfare are all critical elements of post-war learning.</p>
<p>For the sake of the Ukrainian people, it is time to end this conflict. But it must be done in a way that protects the future of Ukraine while understanding Russian fears. Rightly, Russian President Vladimir Putin deserves the disdain of the free world. Absent the ability to impose a clear victory on Russia, which is a challenge given Russian nuclear arms, a negotiated settlement is the only viable option.</p>
<p><em>Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/An-Endgame-in-Ukraine.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29719 " src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png" alt="" width="260" height="72" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 260px) 100vw, 260px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/an-endgame-in-ukraine/">An Endgame in Ukraine</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Ukraine’s Incursion into Russia: What’s Next for the Peace Process?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/ukraines-incursion-into-russia-whats-next-for-the-peace-process/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Seher Intikhab]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Nov 2024 12:49:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Kursk Oblast]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29339</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In August 2024, Ukraine launched a significant incursion into Russia’s Kursk Oblast, advancing up to 30 kilometers and gaining control of 1,200 square kilometers and 93 villages. Analysts suggest the offensive aims to pull Russian forces away from the eastern front lines and secure leverage for potential peace talks. However, Russia continues to make gains [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/ukraines-incursion-into-russia-whats-next-for-the-peace-process/">Ukraine’s Incursion into Russia: What’s Next for the Peace Process?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In August 2024, Ukraine launched a significant incursion into <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682">Russia’s Kursk Oblast</a>, advancing up to 30 kilometers and gaining control of 1,200 square kilometers and 93 villages. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/ukraine-russia-kursk-incursion-war.html">Analysts suggest</a> the offensive aims to pull Russian forces away from the eastern front lines and secure leverage for potential peace talks. However, Russia continues to make gains in eastern Ukraine, capturing the town of Niu-York near Donetsk and pushing Ukrainian troops to evacuate Pokrovsk. As both sides dig in, the conflict shows no signs of abating, resulting in a severe humanitarian crisis.</p>
<p>As the international community struggles to manage the escalating crisis, the prospect of a peace process remains distant. Russia maintains that peace is only achievable when its objectives are met. These <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67711802">objectives</a>, central to Moscow’s stance from the beginning of the war, include the demilitarization and neutralization of Ukraine, as well as changes that align with Russia’s security interests. These include control over Crimea and influence in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/un-ukraine-zelenskyy-russia-peace-territorial-blinken-db3954c29fa826601f42101e05fd6db0">dismissed peace talks</a> with Russia, insisting that any resolution must involve the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.</p>
<p>He emphasized that Russia, as the sole aggressor, must be compelled to comply with international law and respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Despite ongoing military engagements and international diplomatic efforts, both sides remain entrenched in their positions, with Russia demanding territorial concessions and Ukraine insisting on sovereignty and territorial integrity.</p>
<p>A potential resolution could involve establishing a neutral zone in contested areas, facilitating a phased withdrawal of both Russian and Ukrainian forces. Ukraine’s commitment to its territorial integrity should be upheld, while Russia could receive assurances regarding its security concerns, particularly concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) commitment to Ukraine’s future membership. Such a balanced approach could open avenues for dialogue, encourage a more stable regional environment, and ultimately benefit both nations while contributing to broader international stability.</p>
<p><strong>Russia’s Domestic Situation</strong></p>
<p>Russian President <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/06/14/europe/putin-conditions-peace-talks-ukraine-intl/index.html">Vladimir Putin</a> outlined Russia’s conditions for ending the war in Ukraine, which focus on Ukraine’s full withdrawal from the entire territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia—regions Moscow claims as Russian land. He also demands that Ukraine abandon its bid to join NATO—addressing Russian concerns about NATO’s eastward expansion. Furthermore, Putin called for Ukraine’s demilitarization and insisted on the lifting of Western sanctions that, while not crippling, impact Russia’s economy.</p>
<p>Domestically, Putin frames the war as essential to Russia’s security and national identity, maintaining significant support despite economic hardships caused by sanctions. The extended nature of the war, however, is seeing inflation, falling living standards, and localized protests over conscription. Despite these pressures, Putin shows little interest in peace, viewing the war as vital to Russia’s strategic objectives. Without significant internal shifts or international pressure, it is unlikely that Russia will pursue peace soon. Putin’s current stance suggests that the conflict will persist, with little sign of de-escalation unless broader geopolitical changes occur.</p>
<p><strong>Ukraine’s Domestic Conditions</strong></p>
<p>In Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky maintains strong public support despite the immense challenges the country faces. The Ukrainian population remains united in their resistance against Russian aggression, bolstered by a deep sense of national pride and resilience. However, the ongoing conflict has taken a severe toll on the country’s infrastructure, economy, and civilian population.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s desire for peace is clear, but not at the cost of sovereignty or territorial concessions. Zelensky’s government has repeatedly stated that any peace deal must include the withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.</p>
<p><a href="https://apnews.com/article/un-ukraine-zelenskyy-russia-peace-territorial-blinken-db3954c29fa826601f42101e05fd6db0">President Zelensky</a> dismissed the idea of peace talks with Russia, urging for decisive global action to compel Moscow into peace. Speaking at a United Nations Security Council meeting, he emphasized that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion violated numerous international laws and will not cease through negotiations. Zelensky’s government consistently maintains that any peace deal must include the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea. He argued that as the sole aggressor, Russia must be forced into peace, underscoring the need to uphold the UN Charter’s principle of respecting every nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.</p>
<p><strong>The Collapse of Peace Proposals for the Russia-Ukraine Conflict</strong></p>
<p>Multiple international peace efforts failed to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict. <a href="https://time.com/6258052/china-russia-ukraine-cease-fire/">China’s 12-point peace proposal</a> for the Russia-Ukraine conflict advocated for an immediate cease-fire and respect for national sovereignty. It called for the lifting of non-UN sanctioned sanctions, protection of civilians, and the promotion of dialogue while emphasizing humanitarian issues and global energy security. The plan also included a cease-fire that would freeze Russian troops in place on Ukrainian territory and urged cooperation among nations to achieve lasting peace.</p>
<p>However, it was dismissed by the West for favoring Russia and not addressing Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty. The <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/us-russia-talks-ukraine-/31645760.html">Geneva talks</a> regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict sought to establish a framework for dialogue aimed at addressing security concerns and finding pathways to a peaceful resolution. Key topics included NATO expansion, security guarantees for Ukraine, and managing the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. These discussions, however, have faced obstacles due to differing views among the parties involved, leading to limited progress and a continuing stalemate in negotiations.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgr542l753po">Hungary’s attempts</a> to mediate in the Russia-Ukraine conflict faced significant challenges, culminating in the European Union’s (EU) decision to strip Budapest of its right to host foreign and defense ministers’ meetings due to Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s meeting with Vladimir Putin. EU leaders viewed it as undermining a united European response to the war. As a result, Hungary’s role as a mediator has been called into question, with criticism from various EU member states highlighting the lack of consensus around its diplomatic initiatives.</p>
<p><strong>Is Peace Possible?</strong></p>
<p>The prospect for peace in the Ukraine-Russia conflict remains vague at best. A potential resolution could involve creating a neutral zone, phased troop withdrawal, and maintaining Ukraine’s territorial integrity while addressing Russia’s NATO-related concerns. However, entrenched geopolitical dynamics may prolong the conflict for years, worsening devastation, and complicating diplomatic efforts.</p>
<p><em>Seher Intikhab is a university student majoring in international relations. Views expressed are the author&#8217;s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Ukraines-Incursion-into-Russia.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/ukraines-incursion-into-russia-whats-next-for-the-peace-process/">Ukraine’s Incursion into Russia: What’s Next for the Peace Process?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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