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	<title>Topic:confidence-building measures &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
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		<title>Space: The Ungoverned Orbit</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/space-the-ungoverned-orbit/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/space-the-ungoverned-orbit/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Muneeb Ur Rahman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 03 Aug 2026 12:17:49 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Space Deterrence & Conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[1967 Outer Space Treaty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[anti-satellite weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Race]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Balochistan Think Tank Network]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[civilian infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[commercial satellites]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[enforcement]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[international law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[legal framework]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Weapons]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[weaponization]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32956</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: August 3, 2026 Under the 1967 United Nations Outer Space Treaty, states recognize that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for peaceful purposes, for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, and as the province of all mankind. Yet decades of reluctance to establish an enforceable framework [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/space-the-ungoverned-orbit/">Space: The Ungoverned Orbit</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: August 3, 2026</em></p>
<p>Under the <a href="https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html">1967 United Nations Outer Space Treaty</a>, states recognize that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for peaceful purposes, for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, and as the province of all mankind. Yet decades of reluctance to establish an enforceable framework for responsible behavior in space have left the domain governed by outdated rules and significant legal ambiguity. While diplomats continue to negotiate, military space programs continue to advance, widening the gap between treaty principles and operational reality. The result is a dangerous strategic environment in which technological capabilities are advancing far more rapidly than the international legal framework designed to regulate them.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-prevention-arms-race-space-paros-treaty/">Russia and China</a> have proposed a treaty that would prohibit the testing of weapons in space. The United States has rejected the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/31/russia-china-space-war-treaty-demilitarization-satellites/">proposal</a>, citing vague language and the absence of credible verification and enforcement mechanisms. Those concerns are legitimate, but they also expose an unfortunate situation. The United States has been <a href="https://www.swfound.org/publications-and-reports/u-s-direct-ascent-anti-satellite-testing-fact-sheet">testing</a> anti-satellite capabilities since the 1980s and continues to develop them. <a href="https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/08/14/statement-by-ambassador-wood-the-threats-posed-by-russia-and-china-to-security-of-the-outer-space-environment/">Russia and China</a>, have likewise expanded their own anti-satellite programs while simultaneously advocating for the peaceful use of outer space. This contradiction illustrates one of the defining challenges of modern space diplomacy. The nations capable of establishing a space weapons program are also the ones preventing a meaningful international agreement to restrain one. Every major space power argues that its own activities are defensive while portraying those of its competitors as destabilizing, making genuine progress increasingly difficult.</p>
<p>Even if governments genuinely sought a comprehensive agreement, practical obstacles remain. Many technologies with military applications in space also serve legitimate commercial purposes, making it difficult to distinguish between civilian and military systems. Systems capable of disrupting satellite communications, for example, often rely on the same underlying technologies used in commercial telecommunications. Rendezvous and proximity operations can be used to inspect or repair satellites, but the same capabilities could also be employed to interfere with or disable another nation&#8217;s spacecraft. Without an internationally accepted definition of what constitutes a space weapon, any treaty regulating weapons in space will struggle to establish meaningful legal obligations. This dual-use nature of space technology complicates verification efforts and makes traditional arms control models far more difficult to apply than they were during the Cold War.</p>
<p>A nuclear weapon detonation in orbital space presents consequences unlike those of conventional military actions because of its indiscriminate, long-lasting, and unpredictable nature. A large detonation could <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/wsj-russia-tested-space-based-anti-satellite-weapon-with-potential-nuclear-capabilities-in-2022/">disable or destroy</a> many satellites in a single event while enhancing radiation belts for years or even decades. The resulting debris and radiation could make certain orbital regions unusable, limiting access not only for military satellites but also for civilian and commercial spacecraft. Since modern societies depend on satellites for communications, navigation, weather forecasting, financial transactions, emergency response, precision agriculture,</p>
<p>and countless other essential services,  the effect is far beyond military operations, affecting virtually every nation and every individual. In early 2022, Russia <a href="https://www.swfound.org/publications-and-reports/faq-what-we-know-about-russias-alleged-nuclear-anti-satellite-weapon">launched</a> a satellite into an unusual orbit, prompting analysts to speculate that the activity was connected to its reported <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russia-space-satellite-csis-cosmos-2553-2065082">nuclear anti-satellite weapons program</a>. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Outer-Space-Treaty">prohibits</a> placing nuclear weapons in orbit or otherwise stationing them in outer space. However, the treaty was written during the early years of the Space Age, and it is a growing vulnerability made more dangerous by the inability of the international community to modernize the rules governing space before a crisis forces the issue. This is just one example of the limits of the treaty.</p>
<p>International space law was largely written in 1967, when only two countries operated satellites and outer space was viewed primarily as a scientific frontier. It was never designed for today&#8217;s environment, where governments, commercial companies, and private organizations operate thousands of satellites that underpin the global economy. The legal framework has failed to keep pace with these technological and geopolitical realities, leaving the international community increasingly reliant on norms and voluntary commitments that lack meaningful enforcement.</p>
<p>A comprehensive treaty prohibiting all space weapons is unlikely soon. That does not mean meaningful progress is impossible. Countries could <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-12/news/un-first-committee-calls-asat-test-ban">formalize</a> a ban on destructive anti-satellite missile testing, building upon voluntary commitments that several nations have already adopted. Transforming those political pledges into binding international obligations would represent a realistic first step. Likewise, civilian satellite systems could receive legal protections like those afforded under international humanitarian law to hospitals, electrical grids, and other civilian infrastructure during armed conflict. States could also expand voluntary exchanges of space situational awareness data, improving transparency regarding objects in orbit while creating the trust and technical foundation necessary for future arms control negotiations. Incremental agreements may lack the ambition of a comprehensive treaty, but history demonstrates that confidence-building measures often lay the groundwork for broader and more durable arms control frameworks.</p>
<p>The United Nations <a href="https://meetings.unoda.org/open-ended-working-group-on-prevention-of-an-arms-race-in-outer-space-2025">Open-ended Working Group</a> on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space held the third session in July 2026. The meeting made progress by deepening negotiations and narrowing discussion around threats, legal frameworks, and potential future rules for military activities in space, but it did not conclude with a binding agreement. If negotiations continue to stall, however, the costs of inaction will not be borne solely by the governments responsible for the impasse. They will be borne by every society that depends on space-based infrastructure, which means virtually the entire world.</p>
<p>Outer space is a shared domain that, in principle, belongs to all humanity. Allowing it to become a militarized arena governed by outdated laws and diplomatic paralysis is not inevitable. It is a policy choice. By failing to act, the international community is making that choice by default.</p>
<p><em>The author is Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network at BUITEMS Quetta. He can be reached at </em><a href="mailto:muneebnasar@yahoo.com"><em>muneebnasar@yahoo.com</em></a><em>. The views of the author are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Space-The-Ungoverned-Orbit.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32906 size-full" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/@-Download-Button-2026.png" alt="" width="250" height="80" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/space-the-ungoverned-orbit/">Space: The Ungoverned Orbit</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Arms Control is No Panacea, But It Helps</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/arms-control-is-no-panacea-but-it-helps/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/arms-control-is-no-panacea-but-it-helps/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stephen Cimbala]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 12:16:30 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[academic research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[arms control agreements]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[civil society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cold war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[confidence-building measures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[crisis management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cyber capabilities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cyber-nuclear interactions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[diplomatic frameworks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[economic costs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[escalation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ethical concerns]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[global stability]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[humanitarian consequences]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hypersonic Weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[INF Treaty]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[missile defense]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[North Korea]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[opportunity costs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regional rivalries]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[restraint]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[technological governance]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32784</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: June 22, 2026  Some eighty years after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the global community still struggles with the strategic, political, and ethical implications of nuclear arms races. The Cold War’s bipolar competition once defined the global nuclear dynamics, but today’s landscape is more complex, involving multiple nuclear-armed states, emerging technologies, and shifting [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/arms-control-is-no-panacea-but-it-helps/">Arms Control is No Panacea, But It Helps</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Published:</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> June 22, 2026</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Some eighty years after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the global community still struggles with the strategic, political, and ethical implications of nuclear arms races. The Cold War’s bipolar competition once defined the global nuclear dynamics, but today’s landscape is more complex, involving multiple nuclear-armed states, emerging technologies, and shifting geopolitical alliances.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">From Bipolar to Multipolar Competition and Arms Racing</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union </span><a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Evolution_of_Nuclear_Strategy.html?id=cq3WvwEACAAJ"><span data-contrast="none">engaged in</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> a massive arms buildup driven by deterrence theory, ideological rivalry, and fears of vulnerability. The end of the Cold War lowered tensions and decreased the number of nuclear weapons, but it did not eliminate them completely. Instead, the </span><a href="https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2024"><span data-contrast="none">global system has evolved</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> into a multipolar environment with nine nuclear-armed states, each with distinct strategic cultures and security concerns. Although most states in the United Nations have endorsed the principle of nuclear disarmament, no current nuclear weapons state has embraced the concept or taken even small steps in that direction.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">New Drivers of Competition</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The current nuclear environment is shaped by a mix of technological advances, growing regional rivalries, diminishing arms control agreements, and renewed great-power competition. Unlike the organized bipolar order of the Cold War, today’s strategic landscape is becoming more multipolar, faster-paced, and less predictable based on emerging factors.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-contrast="auto">Technological innovation:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> Hypersonic weapons, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, and missile defense systems introduce </span><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26777846"><span data-contrast="none">new uncertainties</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> about the survivability of nuclear arsenals. Another source of potential instability is the growing effectiveness of conventional weapons for long</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">range precision strike, with destructive capabilities that might provoke a responsive nuclear first use or first strike. In addition, modern information and manufacturing systems, compared to earlier generations, shorten the timelines between concept and prototype, and between prototype and mass production.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Regional rivalries:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> Regional military competition </span><a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Nuclear_Strategy_in_the_Modern_Era.html?id=1GmYDwAAQBAJ"><span data-contrast="none">between India and Pakistan</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, North Korea and South Korea, China and India, and among China, North Korea, Japan, and the United States, threatens to escalate conventional war into nuclear first use, and even short of crossing the nuclear threshold, exacerbate regional and global nuclear tensions.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Erosion of arms control:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> The termination of nuclear arms control agreements, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the New START Treaty, has created a situation of arms control anomie that invites competitive distrust among nuclear powers and increases uncertainty about their nuclear</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">strategic thinking.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Great</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">power competition:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> The almost </span><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/FP_20190930_china_nuclear_weapons_talmadge-2.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">inevitable arrival of China</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> as a third nuclear superpower creates an additional axis of uncertainty compared to the two</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">sided Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. China&#8217;s involvement in a tripartite format for exchanging strategic thinking on nuclear weapons and arms control is an important, albeit challenging, imperative for all three states and their military leaders.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">Risks and Consequences of Renewed Arms Races</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The modern nuclear landscape is increasingly defined not only by military competition but also by growing concerns over strategic stability, economic sustainability, and ethical responsibility.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Strategic Instability:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> As states pursue more sophisticated and diversified arsenals, the risk of miscalculation grows. Technologies that compress decision</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">making time—such as hypersonic glide vehicles or AI</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">enabled early</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">warning systems—</span><a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Second_Nuclear_Age.html?id=zkhRjTumZTkC"><span data-contrast="none">could increase the likelihood</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> of accidental or preemptive nuclear use. AI</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">enhanced technology for intelligence, warning, and estimation of others’ options and intentions will become standardized among great powers, raising the issue of shared guardrails in military applications of AI technology for crisis management.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Economic and Opportunity Costs:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> Nuclear modernization programs require enormous financial investments. For many states, the pursuit of nuclear capabilities reflects a tradeoff between perceived security benefits and long</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">term societal needs. Even within the umbrella of defense needs per se, there are important tradeoffs among preferred weapons systems and supporting infrastructure. For example, in the case of the United States, the </span><a href="https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2026-05/62379-golden-dome.pdf."><span data-contrast="none">costs</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> of developing and deploying the proposed Golden Dome antimissile defense system may compete with the demands of military services for new generations of offensive strategic nuclear weapons.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Normative and Ethical Concerns:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> The continued reliance on nuclear weapons raises profound ethical questions. The humanitarian consequences of any nuclear exchange—intentional or accidental—</span><a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/nuclear-weapons-averting-global-catastrophe"><span data-contrast="none">would be catastrophic</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">. The potential erosion of norms against nuclear testing and against cavalier threats of nuclear first use threatens decades of progress toward the avoidance and management of nuclear crises.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">Future Pathways: Escalation or Restraint?</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">As nuclear and non-nuclear systems become increasingly entangled, states, international institutions, and civil society organizations will play an important role in developing risk-reduction measures, strengthening strategic dialogue, and preserving norms to prevent nuclear escalation and maintain global stability.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Technological Governance:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> Technological “black swans” have the potential to upend previously understood mechanisms for reassuring nuclear-weapon states against fears of preemptive nuclear attack. As AI, </span><a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Hacking_the_Bomb.html?id=hshQDwAAQBAJ"><span data-contrast="none">cyber operations</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, and autonomous systems become intertwined with nuclear command and control, states may need new norms or agreements to prevent destabilizing uses. Establishing shared understandings of “red lines” in cyber</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">nuclear interactions could be a starting point.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Regional Security Architectures:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> In regions with acute nuclear tensions, tailored diplomatic frameworks may help reduce risks. Confidence</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">building measures in South Asia, renewed dialogue on the Korean Peninsula, and discussions on European security could all contribute to stability. The containment of growth in the numbers and lethality of non</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">strategic or tactical nuclear weapons, in the context of preserving regional deterrence and security, is of immediate importance.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The Role of Civil Society and International Institutions:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> Nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions, and international bodies continue to play a vital role in shaping public discourse, conducting research, and advocating for risk-reduction measures. Their influence may be especially crucial as formal diplomatic channels encounter political obstacles. One challenge is the relative shortage of nuclear deterrence and arms control studies in research university departments nowadays, compared to the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War periods.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">Conclusion</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">In the twenty-first century, nuclear arms racing is no longer defined by the relatively stable bipolar logic of the Cold War, but by a far more complex and uncertain multipolar environment shaped by emerging technologies, regional rivalries, weakened arms control structures, and renewed great-power competition. The combination of emerging technology and increasingly sophisticated strike systems has </span><a href="https://warontherocks.com/america-needs-a-dead-hand/"><span data-contrast="none">compressed decision-making timelines</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> and introduced new risks of miscalculation, escalation, and strategic instability among nuclear-armed states. At the same time, the financial costs of nuclear arsenals and the potential catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any nuclear exchange continue to raise profound ethical and political questions about unchecked nuclear capacities.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Preventing future nuclear crises will require renewed commitments to arms control, technological governance, regional confidence-building measures, and sustained dialogue among both states and nonstate actors. In an era when formal diplomatic channels are increasingly strained, international institutions, academic communities, and civil society organizations may help preserve norms of restraint and advance practical risk-reduction measures. Ultimately, the challenge facing the international community is not only how to manage nuclear competition, but how to prevent technological change, geopolitical rivalry, and strategic mistrust from producing a new era of nuclear instability with potentially irreversible consequences.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Arms-Control-is-No-Panacea-But-It-Helps.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="198" height="55" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 198px) 100vw, 198px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/arms-control-is-no-panacea-but-it-helps/">Arms Control is No Panacea, But It Helps</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: A New Battlefield Reality</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems-a-new-battlefield-reality/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems-a-new-battlefield-reality/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jawad Ali Shah]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 12:10:24 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[autonomous weapons]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32504</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published:  March 31, 2026  Technological advances and rising military expenditures in recent years have accelerated the development of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS). Though this technology is still in its infancy, it has already transformed modern warfare. LAWS, when fully evolved, will provide means for precise and independent selection and engagement of targets without exposing soldiers to [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems-a-new-battlefield-reality/">Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: A New Battlefield Reality</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Published: </span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> March 31, 2026</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Technological advances and rising military expenditures in recent years have accelerated the development of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS). Though this technology is still in its infancy, it has already transformed modern warfare. LAWS, when fully evolved, will provide means for precise and independent selection and engagement of targets without exposing soldiers to battlefield dangers. A 2025 Congressional Research Service report titled </span><a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11150"><span data-contrast="none">Defense Primer: U.S. Policy</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> on LAWS classifies it as “a special class of weapon systems that use sensor suites and computer algorithms to independently identify, target and employ an onboard weapon system to engage and destroy it without manual human control.” The US Department of Defense </span><a href="https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems (2023)</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, defined LAWS as systems that, once activated, “can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.” This concept, known as “human out of the loop” or “full autonomy,” involves target selection and engagement based on inputs from artificial intelligence (AI), big data analytics, and sensor-based identification.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">According to </span><a href="https://www.datamintelligence.com/research-report/autonomous-weapons-market"><span data-contrast="none">Data M Intelligence</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, the global autonomous weapons market reached USD 14.2 billion in 2024 and is expected to grow to USD 33.47 billion by 2032, with a compound annual growth rate of 11.39 percent during 2025-2032. Simultaneously, global civil society initiatives are advocating a ban on fully autonomous systems. In October 2012, Amnesty International launched the </span><a href="https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/stop-killer-robots-x-amnesty-international/"><span data-contrast="none">Stop Killer Robots</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> campaign, an alliance of over 180 organizations across 65 countries, calling for an international law on autonomy in weapon systems to ensure machines are not allowed to make decisions that affect life and death.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Concerns have arisen over unsupervised use and the potential for system errors that can cause unintended civilian casualties, escalate conflicts, and threaten global peace and security. The increasing integration of autonomous weapon systems in combat has already been highlighted by their reported use in Ukraine conflict and in Gaza. A February 2025 </span><a href="https://media.setav.org/en/file/2025/02/deadly-algorithms-destructive-role-of-artificial-intelligence-in-gaza-war.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">report</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> by the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research titled </span><i><span data-contrast="auto">Deadly Algorithms: Destructive Role of Artificial Intelligence in Gaza War</span></i><span data-contrast="auto"> revealed that Israel employed AI-based systems, Lavender and Habsora, to identify and attack human targets. The report states that Lavender can approve targets within 20 seconds, often without substantive human review. Since October 2023, the system has compiled a list of 37,000 potential individuals labelled as Hamas members without verifying their military profile.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Since 2014, the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW) has debated the regulation of LAWS. In May 2024, Arms Campaign Director Steve Goose of Human Rights Watch </span><a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13374209/chinese-russian-ai-nukes-ww3-fears-missiles-america.html"><span data-contrast="none">warned</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> that “the world is approaching a tipping point for acting on concerns over autonomous weapons systems,” underscoring the urgency of an international legal instrument. On 2 December 2024, the UN General Assembly adopted </span><a href="https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/391/35/pdf/n2439135.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">Resolution A/RES/79/62</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> on LAWS by 166 votes in favor, 3 against, and 15 abstentions. The resolution marked a decisive step in acknowledging global concerns over autonomous weapon systems, affirmed the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) and called for further consultations in 2025. The </span><a href="https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/news/dynamic-consultations-demonstrate-a-clear-need-for-all-states-to-have-a-seat-at-the-table/"><span data-contrast="none">first UNGA meeting</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> on autonomous weapons, held on 12-13 May 2025 and attended by 96 countries, including representatives from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and civil society, reinforced momentum to prohibit and regulate LAWS. On that occasion, UN Secretary-General António Guterres advocated for a legally binding instrument to </span><a href="https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/news/un-secretary-general-calls-for-new-international-law-to-regulate-and-prohibit-killer-robots-by-2026/"><span data-contrast="none">ban LAWS by 2026</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, describing them as “politically unacceptable and morally repugnant.”</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Despite global concerns, progress on a legally binding treaty on LAWS remains elusive due to divergent strategic interests of major powers. The </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/progress-rules-lethal-autonomous-weapons-urgently-needed-says-chair-geneva-talks-2026-03-03/"><span data-contrast="none">US continues to resist</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> codification of a new binding framework, emphasizing the adequacy of national weapons review mechanisms to preserve strategic and technological flexibility. While the US maintains that it does not currently possess LAWS, senior military leaders have acknowledged that Washington may be compelled to develop them if adversaries do so. </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/progress-rules-lethal-autonomous-weapons-urgently-needed-says-chair-geneva-talks-2026-03-03/"><span data-contrast="none">Russia has opposed</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> any binding treaty, while </span><a href="https://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/chinaandun/disarmament_armscontrol/202510/t20251024_11739691.htm"><span data-contrast="none">China</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> supports negotiations on the CCW and the development of norms “when conditions are ripe.” </span><a href="http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-%E2%80%93-united-nations-1st-committee-thematic-discussion_en"><span data-contrast="none">The European Union</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, in contrast, advocates for a legally binding international instrument, emphasizing Meaningful Human Control (MHC) and compliance with IHL. The EU’s approach seeks to differentiate between systems that incorporate human oversight and those that operate without it.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The integration of artificial intelligence into weapon systems also presents an increasing challenge to nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. For instance, during the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Peru in November 2024, the then US President Joe Biden and China’s President Xi Jinping jointly </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-xi-agreed-that-humans-not-ai-should-control-nuclear-weapons-white-house-2024-11-16/"><span data-contrast="none">pledged not to integrate AI</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> in nuclear command-and-control systems, recognizing the catastrophic risks of automation in nuclear decision-making. However, as AI rapidly improves surveillance, missile guidance and targeting systems, it is unclear whether this restraint will hold.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The integration of AI in nuclear forces may introduce instability into deterrence dynamics by reducing decision-making time and increasing challenges caused by algorithmic bias in early warning systems, posing the threat of false nuclear alarms. Cold War history reminds us of human judgment, central to nuclear stability, and averted catastrophes. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, </span><a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2022-10-03/soviet-submarines-nuclear-torpedoes-cuban-missile-crisis"><span data-contrast="none">the B-59 submarine incident</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> on 27 October 1962 brought the two superpowers close to nuclear exchange when a Soviet submarine commander considered launching a nuclear-tipped torpedo under the mistaken belief that hostilities had commenced. The refusal by Vasily Arkhipov to authorize the attack prevented a potential nuclear war. Similarly, Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov, a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet Air Defense Forces, chose to disregard a false early-warning alert indicating an incoming US nuclear strike in 1983, </span><a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-10/news-briefs/man-who-saved-world-dies-77"><span data-contrast="none">preventing</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> a global nuclear disaster. Such decision-making underscores the indispensable role of human rationality in nuclear command-and-control systems.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">As LAWS presents multifaceted threats to international peace and security, states need to consider negotiating a legally binding instrument that ensures MHC over autonomy in weapon systems. Enhancing transparency, accountability, and rigorous weapons reviews are essential to prevent destabilization and ensure that technological progress does not outpace the human element in the use of force. Confidence-building measures, such as transparency in military AI, the establishment of international verification mechanisms and a moratorium on the development and deployment of LAWS, could help mitigate future dangers.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Jawad Ali Shah is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies Sindh (CISSS), Pakistan. He holds a BS in International Relations from the University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan. His research areas are emerging military technologies, and South Asian nuclear deterrence and strategic stability dynamics. The views are the author’s own.</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Lethal-Autonomous-Weapon-Systems-A-New-Battlefield-Reality.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="205" height="57" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 205px) 100vw, 205px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems-a-new-battlefield-reality/">Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: A New Battlefield Reality</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>India’s Strategy of Escalation Dominance</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-strategy-of-escalation-dominance/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sher Ali Kakar&nbsp;&&nbsp;Atta Ullah]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Oct 2025 12:44:00 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Recent, statements by Indian Air Force Chief Marshal AP Singh and Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi reflect how India’s military doctrine is transforming, which, in recent years, has undergone a significant shift and is marked by a more offensive and assertive approach. India continues to expand its military modernization program beyond its defense needs, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-strategy-of-escalation-dominance/">India’s Strategy of Escalation Dominance</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recent, statements by <a href="https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/world-should-learn-from-india-air-chief-marshal-ap-singh-on-russia-ukraine-conflict-israel-war-494869-2025-09-19">Indian Air Force Chief Marshal AP</a> Singh and <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1947463">Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi</a> reflect how India’s military doctrine is transforming, which, in recent years, has undergone a significant shift and is marked by a more offensive and assertive approach. India continues to expand its military modernization program beyond its defense needs, as evidenced by its ranking as the world’s <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf">second-largest</a> importer of military equipment, alongside its huge <a href="https://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/IB_Maheen_Sept_24_2024.pdf">investment</a> in indigenization.</p>
<p>India’s strategy of escalation dominance, aimed at acquiring the ability to control the pace, intensity, and outcome of a conflict at each successive rung of the escalation ladder, as well as termination on its own terms, is underway. There are indications of development of such a strategy. Conventional superiority, strategic signaling, ready-to-use nuclear forces, and crisis management are all examples. Its strategy of escalation dominance, coupled with damage limitation, is supported by multilayered missile and air defense systems and canisterization of its nuclear-capable missile for a ready-to-use force, as well as cyber and space capabilities.</p>
<p>These capabilities are considered key to a state’s <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-crucial-role-of-escalation-dominance-and-narrative-control-in-nuclear-deterrence/">escalation dominance strategy</a>. However, India’s <a href="https://sci-hub.se/https:/link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-15-6961-6">escalation dominance</a> in South Asia is not only accelerating the intensity of the security dilemma by increasing its own security but also deepening the threat perception of the adversary—weakening the strategic stability of South Asia.</p>
<p>In 2004, India revealed its Cold Start doctrine, a limited warfighting offensive plan to achieve conventional objectives within a limited time frame. Later, two more doctrines, known as the Joint Doctrine for Indian Armed Forces and the Land Warfare Doctrine, were issued in 2017 and 2018.</p>
<p>Recently, the Indian government announced a joint exercise by the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, named <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1944192">Cold Start</a>, in the first week of October 2025. The exercise aimed to test drones and counter-drone systems that officials labelled as the biggest such drill to be conducted since the May India-Pakistan conflict.</p>
<p>On September 25, 2025, the Indian Ministry of Defense announced that India had conducted a successful flight test of a rail-based Agni-Prime intermediate-range ballistic missile (MRBM). This is the first railway-based ballistic missile, which the minister called “under a full operational scenario.” A rail-based launcher is considered a significant development since the missile can move freely across the national rail network. This  increases the flexibility of the system in terms of its <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-significance-north-koreas-rail-mobile-ballistic-missile-launcher">operational capability and survivability</a>, as well as its ability to be deployed quickly.</p>
<p>The development is part of India’s ongoing military modernization program by fielding more types of weapon systems. A rail-based launcher, compared to fixed silos and road mobile launchers, has the advantage of quick deployment, maneuverability, and greater chances of survivability. With the test, India has joined a select group of nations with this capability.</p>
<p>India’s counterforce capability, followed by emerging trends in its nuclear posturing and technological developments, play into Pakistan’s fears. Indian ambitions for conventional counterforce capabilities only increases Pakistan’s fears. Reportedly, India is also pursuing a missile capable of carrying a <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1925251">bunker-buster</a>. Its potential to cause massive destruction could cross Pakistan’s threshold for nuclear use, thereby leading to a serious crisis.</p>
<p>These ambitions require expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal in terms of more missiles, more warheads, and more fissile material to fulfill the requirements of its emerging nuclear posture, which is detrimental to regional peace and stability. India’s pursuit of an escalation dominance strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan could be perilous and lead to retaliation and war, as true escalation dominance is rarely attainable in any confrontation.</p>
<p>It is not something that is a feasible policy objective. Ending conflict on favorable terms remains a perilous policy objective. This is the capability of a state to dictate the endgame of a conflict, ensuring that peace is maintained on its own terms, not the opponent’s.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, India’s policy of escalation dominance in South Asia is escalatory, while remaining elusive. The recent four-day conflict is the latest example of India’s objectives to end the conflict on advantageous terms militarily, economically, and diplomatically. For instance, after its strike inside Pakistan, the Indian government immediately started to claim the success of Operation Sindoor, praising its <a href="https://www.deccanherald.com/india/modis-address-to-nation-key-statements-made-by-pm-on-pakistan-3536977">military capabilities</a> and technological strides.</p>
<p>On the diplomatic level, India anticipated the international community`s response to the attacks and support for the Indian stance to strengthen its regional and international standings. However, the failure of the Indian strategy was exposed at the military level when India faced tough retaliation from Pakistan, resulting in the reported loss of its six jets, besides damage to its key military installations, including its costly defense systems. At the diplomatic and economic levels, <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1937611">Trump</a>’s repeated claims of credit for ending the conflict question its long-held stance of strategic autonomy and rejecting third parties’ role in resolving the Kashmir dispute. After the ceasefire, Trump claimed that to end the conflict between India and Pakistan, his threat of extremely high <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1937611">tariffs</a> was instrumental in reaching a ceasefire agreement.</p>
<p>India has been unable to achieve the desired outcomes from the conflicts it has initiated many times over the past two decades. Latest statements from the Indian military leadership also show that India is unsatisfied with the outcomes of its strategy. It is more useful to treat escalation dominance as a philosophical aspiration than as a feasible policy objective, especially against a country that has a qualitative edge over the initiator of the crisis. Therefore, advanced technologies could be decisive in any future conflicts, but it could be that reciprocal development can offer a counter-capability in the same-domain deterrence and thus may challenge escalation dominance. Pakistan’s policy of full-spectrum deterrence is instrumental in countering Indian ambitions at every level of the escalation ladder. India’s pursuit of escalation dominance complicates the regional security dynamics, which already lack institutionalized Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), a nuclear risk-reduction mechanism, and an arms control framework aligned with the emerging technologies.</p>
<p><em><strong>Sher Ali Kakar </strong></em><em>is an Associate Director of Research with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. </em><strong><em>Atta Ullah</em></strong><em> is a Research Fellow with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Views express in this article are the Author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Indias-Strategy-of-Escalation-Dominance.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="238" height="66" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 238px) 100vw, 238px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-strategy-of-escalation-dominance/">India’s Strategy of Escalation Dominance</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-artificial-intelligence-ai-arms-race-in-south-asia/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Vaibhav Chhimpa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Oct 2025 12:14:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31719</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>When India’s AI-powered missile defense system intercepted a simulated hypersonic threat in 2023, American analysts were surprised by the ethical framework guiding its development. In South Asia, rapid AI adoption intensifies deterrence challenges as India and Pakistan field autonomous strike capabilities. Existing arms control regimes fail to account for the region’s rivalries, asymmetric force balances, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-artificial-intelligence-ai-arms-race-in-south-asia/">The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When India’s AI-powered missile defense system intercepted a simulated hypersonic threat in 2023, American analysts were surprised by the ethical framework guiding its development. In South Asia, rapid AI adoption intensifies deterrence challenges as India and Pakistan field autonomous strike capabilities. Existing arms control regimes fail to account for the region’s rivalries, asymmetric force balances, and non-aligned traditions.</p>
<p>That gap undermines American extended deterrence because Washington cannot reassure allies or deter aggressors without accounting for South Asia’s threat calculus. AI arms developments in this region stem from colonial legacies and mistrust of great power intentions, creating a volatile strategic environment.</p>
<p><strong>India’s Governance Innovation in Defense AI</strong></p>
<p>India’s governance model integrates<a href="https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2021-02/Responsible-AI-22022021.pdf"> civilian oversight</a> with defense research and ensures ethical deployment of AI. The Responsible AI Certification Pilot evaluated algorithms for explainability before clearance. Its <a href="https://www.niti.gov.in/national-strategy-for-ai"><em>National Strategy for AI</em></a> mandates ethical review boards for dual-use systems. Developers must document bias-mitigation measures and escalation pathways. Embedding accountability at design phase stabilizes deterrence signals by reducing inadvertent algorithmic behaviors.</p>
<p>The<a href="https://visionias.in/current-affairs/"> Evaluating Trustworthy AI</a> (ETAI) Framework advances defense AI governance. It enforces five principles: reliability, security, transparency, fairness, privacy, and sets rigorous criteria for system assessment. Chief of Defense, Staff General Anil Chauhan, stressed resilience against adversarial attacks, highlighting the challenge of balancing effectiveness and safety. By mandating continuous validation against evolving threat scenarios, ETAI prevents mission creep and maintains operational integrity under stress.</p>
<p>India’s dual use by design philosophy embeds safeguards within prototypes from inception. This contrasts with reactive models that regulate AI after deployment. Civilian launch-authorization channels separate political intent from technical execution, ensuring decisions remain under human control and reinforcing credibility in crisis moments. Regular<a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10493592"> red-team exercises</a> involving independent experts further validate system robustness and reduce risks of false positives in autonomous targeting.</p>
<p><strong>Strengthening Extended Deterrence through Cooperation</strong></p>
<p>US-India collaboration on <a href="https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/06/17/joint-fact-sheet-the-united-states-and-india-continue-to-chart-an-ambitious-course-for-the-initiative-on-critical-and-emerging-technology/">AI verification</a> can reinforce extended deterrence by aligning technical standards and testing protocols. The <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/international-center-excellence-in-technology">iCET fact sheet</a> outlines secure information sharing and joint safety trials. Launched in January 2023, iCET has already enabled co-production of jet engines and transfer of advanced drone technologies. Building on this foundation, specialized working groups could develop common benchmarks for adversarial-resistance testing and automated anomaly detection.</p>
<p>A Center for Strategic and International Studies report recommends a trilateral verification cell blending American evaluation tools with India’s ethical reviews. Joint trials of autonomous air-defense algorithms would demonstrate interoperability and resolve. A shared “AI Red Flag” system would alert capitals to anomalous behaviors and reduce strategic surprise. Embedding cryptographically secure logging of decision path data ensures an immutable audit trail for post-event analysis and confidence building.</p>
<p>The INDUS-X initiative, launched during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2023 US visit, integrates responsible AI principles into defense innovation. By aligning standards, both countries ensure AI systems enhance strategic stability rather than undermine it. Expanding INDUS-X to include scenario-based wargaming with allied partners can stress-test ethical frameworks and calibrate thresholds for human intervention under duress. This model can extend under the <a href="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Lalwani%20-%20U.S.-India%20Divergence%20and%20Convergence%20.pdf">Quad framework,</a> pressuring authoritarian regimes to adopt transparency measures.</p>
<p><strong>Institutionalizing Global AI Arms Control</strong></p>
<p>A formal arms control dialogue should adopt India’s baseline standards for ethical AI governance. The<a href="https://unidir.org/publication/artificial-intelligence-in-the-military-domain-and-its-implications-for-international-peace-and-security-an-evidence-based-road-map-for-future-policy-action/"> UNIDIR report</a> calls for universal bias audits and incident-reporting obligations to prevent unintended escalation. Carnegie scholars propose a tiered certification process under a new protocol for autonomous systems within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, requiring peer review of algorithms before deployment. Embedding such certification in national export-control regimes would create global incentives for adherence.</p>
<p>The UN General Assembly has established an <a href="https://dig.watch/updates/fourth-revision-of-draft-unga-resolution-for-scientific-panel-on-ai-and-dialogue-on-ai-governance">Independent AI Scientific Panel</a> and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance to issue annual assessments on risks and norms. This mechanism can evaluate military AI applications and recommend confidence-building measures. Procedural transparency would coexist with confidentiality requirements, balancing security with mutual reassurance. Regular joint workshops on risk-assessment methodologies can diffuse best practices and diffuse mistrust among major powers.</p>
<p><strong>Regional Applications and Future Prospects</strong></p>
<p>India’s responsible AI framework must inspire regional adoption and confidence-building measures. Pakistan and China should engage transparency initiatives to prevent dangerous asymmetries in AI capabilities. Proposed measures include <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2024/mapping-the-prospect-of-arms-control-in-south-asia/">joint research on AI safety</a>, shared performance databases, and collaborative development of detection algorithms.</p>
<p>Successful tests of India’s hypersonic ET-LDHCM system, capable of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5bSpONUdcms">Mach 8</a> and a 1,500-kilometer range, underscore the urgency of governance frameworks before fully autonomous weapons deploy. The Quad’s model of Indo-Pacific cooperation provides a template for multilateral norms on responsible AI in defense. Extending these norms to confidence-building measures such as pre-deployment notifications and automated backchannels can reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation.</p>
<p>Looking ahead to the United Nations General Assembly meeting on AI governance in September 2024, American policymakers can leverage India’s experience. Joint verification exercises and an ethical audit regime will establish global norms for military AI. Integrating lessons from ETAI and iCET into the assembly’s resolutions can produce enforceable standards that bind both democratic and authoritarian states. This approach will reaffirm American extended deterrence and help prevent destabilizing AI-driven arms races worldwide.</p>
<p>By demonstrating that ethical AI development strengthens rather than weakens deterrence credibility, India’s model provides both technical solutions and normative frameworks for managing the military applications of artificial intelligence. Sustained international cooperation on these principles is pivotal for securing strategic stability in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.</p>
<p><em>Vaibhav Chhimpa is a researcher who previously worked with the Department of Science &amp; Technology (DST), India. Views expressed are the Author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/AI-Arms-Race-South-Asia.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="241" height="67" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 241px) 100vw, 241px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-artificial-intelligence-ai-arms-race-in-south-asia/">The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Hypersonic Weapons: Are We Entering a New Era of Vulnerability?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-weapons-are-we-entering-a-new-era-of-vulnerability/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brandon Toliver]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 05 May 2025 12:09:30 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30673</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The advent of hypersonic weapons, with their unparalleled speed and maneuverability, ignited a global debate about the future of strategic security. Some argue these weapons unwittingly ushered in an era where traditional defenses are rendered obsolete, leaving nations exposed to swift and devastating attacks. The emergence of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) and hypersonic cruise missiles [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-weapons-are-we-entering-a-new-era-of-vulnerability/">Hypersonic Weapons: Are We Entering a New Era of Vulnerability?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The advent of hypersonic weapons, with their unparalleled speed and maneuverability, ignited a global debate about the future of strategic security. Some argue these weapons unwittingly ushered in an era where traditional defenses are rendered obsolete, leaving nations exposed to swift and devastating attacks. The emergence of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCM) prompts a fundamental reassessment of assumptions about deterrence and defense.</p>
<p>Hypersonic weapons, capable of exceeding Mach 5 with unpredictable flight paths, <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjDyqS03ISMAxXdSDABHdn2BmUQ-NANegQIShAG&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.csis.org%2Fanalysis%2Fcomplex-air-defense-countering-hypersonic-missile-threat-0%23%3A~%3Atext%3DI%2520think%2520it%27s%2520a%2520number%2Cto%2520adequately%2520address%2520the%2520threat.&amp;usg=AOvVaw3XVxaqX_L8zs0rOiDfXyxI&amp;opi=89978449">shatter the bedrock principles</a> of conventional missile defense. Their ability to glide and maneuver within the atmosphere allows them to evade radar detection and interceptor systems, compressing warning times to mere minutes. This drastic reduction in reaction time amplifies the risk of miscalculations and accidental escalation, particularly in moments of crisis.</p>
<p>The global balance of power is being fundamentally altered, not merely adjusted, by the aggressive pursuit of maneuverable hypersonic weapon capabilities. China’s DF-17 hypersonic missile, coupled with its reported testing of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) with a hypersonic payload, demonstrates a clear intent to achieve <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjZvb7O3ISMAxVQM9AFHQYhEjgQFnoECCMQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.defense.gov%2F2023%2FOct%2F19%2F2003323409%2F-1%2F-1%2F1%2F2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF&amp;usg=AOvVaw071h0Fy5906vIE-xj7tnoR&amp;opi=89978449">global strike capabilities with minimal warning</a>. Russia’s deployment of the Avangard HGV on its SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles and the operational status of the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwimx7rg3ISMAxX3JNAFHdOhCP4QFnoECBYQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fjamestown.org%2Fprogram%2Fthe-role-of-hypersonic-weapons-in-russian-military-strategy%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw3n36uTFyvfkRCtN8vA3S-g&amp;opi=89978449">Zircon hypersonic</a> anti-ship missile further highlight the growing proliferation of these advanced weapons. North Korea’s claim of <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjQ2_zs3ISMAxVm8MkDHV_GL5YQFnoECCAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fthediplomat.com%2Ftag%2Fnorth-korea-hypersonic-missile%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw20bRg4HsjuR_uIgDgG7ptn&amp;opi=89978449">successful hypersonic missile tests</a>, while requiring verification, signal a potential integration of these weapons into its theater nuclear strategy, adding another layer of complexity to regional security.</p>
<p>The inherent capacity of maneuverable hypersonic weapons to render existing missile defense systems obsolete signifies not just a technological leap, but a deliberate dismantling of established strategic certainties. The unpredictability of their flight paths and the compression of warning times do not just complicate defense planning; they erode the very foundation of strategic stability, where deterrence relies on the certainty of retaliation. The potential for these weapons to carry both conventional and nuclear payloads does not just increase their versatility; it blurs the lines between conventional and nuclear conflict, creating a perilous ambiguity that heightens the risk of miscalculation.</p>
<p>The ability to strike targets with minimal warning does not just enhance offensive capabilities; it creates a coercive tool, enabling states to exert pressure and achieve strategic objectives without resorting to large-scale conventional warfare. The potential for hypersonic weapons to be deployed in a first-strike role does not just raise concerns about escalation; it fundamentally alters the calculus of deterrence, where the threat of retaliation may no longer be sufficient to prevent aggression.</p>
<p>To counter this burgeoning vulnerability, the United States must not merely react, but fundamentally redefine its strategic posture, acknowledging that piecemeal technological solutions are insufficient to address the profound shift hypersonic weapons impose on the security landscape. The rapid development of the glide phase interceptor (GPI) and space-based tracking systems is not just about enhancing missile defense; it is about restoring a sense of strategic stability, reassuring allies and deterring potential adversaries. The expansion of conventional hypersonic programs, such as the AGM-183 ARRW, conventional prompt strike, and the long-range hypersonic weapon, is not just about developing counterforce capabilities; it is about demonstrating a commitment to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiMkcr93ISMAxXy78kDHb_0AS0QFnoECCIQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gao.gov%2Fproducts%2Fgao-24-106792&amp;usg=AOvVaw2jIDDvLxHHcvNklw37Y8Mg&amp;opi=89978449">maintaining a credible deterrent</a>, signaling to potential adversaries that aggression will be met with a swift and decisive response. The integration of hypersonic weapons into existing military doctrines does not just require tactical adjustments; it demands a fundamental reevaluation of strategic thinking, adapting to a new era of high-speed warfare.</p>
<p>The international community’s response to hypersonic weapons must not be limited to national defense initiatives; it must include a concerted effort to promote arms control and transparency. The absence of clear <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwigzbuP3YSMAxWsRTABHY1wDBgQ-NANegQIKxAC&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Funidir.org%2Fpublication%2Fthe-implications-of-hypersonic-weapons-for-international-stability-and-arms-control-report-on-a-unidir-unoda-turn-based-exercise%2F%23%3A~%3Atext%3DView%2520or%2520Download%26text%3DIn%2520September%25202019%252C%2520a%2520one%2C%252C%2520UNIDIR%252C%2520Geneva%252C%2520Switzerland.&amp;usg=AOvVaw0Dza55Gx-PQxOYY8KilYUi&amp;opi=89978449">international norms and regulations regarding hypersonic weapons</a> does not just create uncertainty; it fosters a climate of strategic competition, where states are incentivized to develop and deploy these weapons without restraint. The development of transparency and confidence-building measures is not just about reducing the risk of miscalculation; it is about building a foundation for strategic stability, where states can engage in dialogue and cooperation to mitigate the risks posed by these advanced weapons.</p>
<p>Hypersonic weapons represent a paradigm shift in military technology, fundamentally questioning if the world is entering a new era of vulnerability, undermining the foundations of traditional missile defense and reshaping the strategic landscape. Addressing this challenge requires a comprehensive approach that combines technological innovation, strategic adaptation, and international cooperation. Only through a concerted effort can the international community hope to mitigate the risks posed by hypersonic weapons and ensure a more stable and secure future.</p>
<p><em>Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Hypersonic-Weapons_-Are-We-Entering-a-New-Era-of-Vulnerability.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="234" height="65" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 234px) 100vw, 234px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-weapons-are-we-entering-a-new-era-of-vulnerability/">Hypersonic Weapons: Are We Entering a New Era of Vulnerability?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Weekend Gouge</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Sharpe]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Nov 2024 12:16:08 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Staying informed is more critical than ever in an era of rapidly shifting global dynamics. Global Security Review delivers unmatched insights into the issues shaping our world, from examining the intricate strategies of geopolitical players to exploring innovations in deterrence and space security. Modern Escalation Dominance Is Essential to Effective Deterrence and Assurance Joe Buff [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-weekend-gouge/">The Weekend Gouge</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Staying informed is more critical than ever in an era of rapidly shifting global dynamics. Global Security Review delivers unmatched insights into the issues shaping our world, from examining the intricate strategies of geopolitical players to exploring innovations in deterrence and space security.</p>
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<li><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/modern-escalation-dominance-is-essential-to-effective-deterrence-and-assurance/"><strong>Modern Escalation Dominance Is Essential to Effective Deterrence and Assurance</strong></a><br />
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-weekend-gouge/">The Weekend Gouge</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Hypersonic Horizons: The Next Generation of Air Superiority</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Thibert]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Nov 2024 13:29:06 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>The development of hypersonic technology is poised to redefine the landscape of military airpower. Hypersonic vehicles, capable of reaching speeds greater than Mach 5, offer unprecedented speed and agility, making them a game-changer in modern warfare. This article delves into the advancements, challenges, and strategic implications of hypersonic technology, highlighting how it is set to [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-horizons-the-next-generation-of-air-superiority/">Hypersonic Horizons: The Next Generation of Air Superiority</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The development of hypersonic technology is poised to redefine the landscape of military airpower. Hypersonic vehicles, capable of reaching speeds greater than Mach 5, offer unprecedented speed and agility, making them a <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/how-hypersonic-weapons-are-redefining-warfare">game-changer</a> in modern warfare. This article delves into the advancements, challenges, and strategic implications of hypersonic technology, highlighting how it is set to transform air superiority in the twenty-first century.</p>
<p>Hypersonic technology encompasses both aircraft and missiles that travel at speeds exceeding five times the speed of sound. These vehicles leverage advanced propulsion systems, such as scramjets (supersonic combustion ramjets), to achieve and sustain such high velocities. The potential applications of hypersonic technology are vast, ranging from rapid global strike capabilities to enhanced missile defense systems.</p>
<p>However, interest in hypersonic technology is not new. Scientific research began during the Cold War, but only in recent years have significant breakthroughs been made towards advancing hypersonic technology from theory to practicality. The primary drivers of this renewed focus include advancements in materials science, computational fluid dynamics, and propulsion technology. Nations such as the United States, <a href="https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/Publications/Publication-View/Article/2484178/chinas-hypersonic-weapons/">China</a>, and Russia are at the forefront of hypersonic research, each vying for technological supremacy, with China and Russia attempting to challenge the status quo.</p>
<p>The strategic advantages of hypersonic technology are multifaceted. One of the most significant benefits is the ability to deliver payloads at unprecedented speeds, drastically reducing the time available for adversaries to detect, track, and intercept these threats. This capability enhances both offensive and defensive operations.</p>
<p>Hypersonic vehicles can reach their targets much faster than conventional missiles or aircraft. This rapid response capability is crucial in scenarios requiring immediate action, such as neutralizing high-value targets or responding to emerging threats. The ability to strike quickly and precisely could deter adversaries from initiating conflict, knowing that retaliation would be swift and devastating.</p>
<p>The high speed and maneuverability of hypersonic vehicles make them difficult to detect and intercept. Traditional air defense systems, designed to counter slower, more predictable threats, may struggle to adapt to the dynamic flight paths of hypersonic weapons. This enhanced survivability increases the likelihood of mission success, particularly in contested environments.</p>
<p>Hypersonic vehicles can cover vast distances in a short amount of time, providing global reach without the need for forward-deployed bases.</p>
<p>This capability is especially valuable for nations looking to project power and influence across the globe. It also reduces the logistical burden associated with maintaining overseas bases and allows for more flexible deployment strategies.</p>
<p>Despite their potential, hypersonic technologies face significant technological challenges. Overcoming these obstacles is essential for the successful development and deployment of hypersonic systems.</p>
<p>One of the primary challenges is managing the extreme heat generated during hypersonic flight. At speeds exceeding Mach 5, air friction can cause the surface temperature of a vehicle to reach several thousand degrees Celsius. Developing materials and cooling systems capable of withstanding and dissipating this heat is crucial to maintaining the structural integrity and performance of hypersonic vehicles.</p>
<p>The materials used in hypersonic vehicles must endure not only high temperatures but also extreme pressures and aerodynamic forces. Advanced composites, ceramics, and metal alloys are being developed to meet these demanding requirements. Researchers are also exploring innovative manufacturing techniques, such as additive manufacturing, to create components with enhanced durability and performance.</p>
<p>Maintaining control and accuracy at hypersonic speeds is another significant challenge. Hypersonic vehicles must navigate through rapidly changing atmospheric conditions, requiring sophisticated guidance and control systems. These systems must be able to make real-time adjustments to the vehicle’s trajectory, ensuring that it stays on course and reaches its intended target.</p>
<p>Developing reliable propulsion systems capable of sustained hypersonic flight is a major technological hurdle. Scramjets, which operate efficiently at hypersonic speeds, are still in the experimental stage. Achieving a balance between thrust, fuel efficiency, and structural integrity is critical for the success of these systems.</p>
<p>The deployment of hypersonic technology has profound strategic implications for global security. As nations race to develop and deploy hypersonic weapons, the balance of power could shift, necessitating new defense strategies and international regulations.</p>
<p>The development of hypersonic technology has the potential to trigger an arms race among major powers. Nations may feel compelled to develop their own hypersonic capabilities or invest in advanced defense systems to counter these threats. This escalation could lead to increased military spending and heightened tensions on the global stage.</p>
<p>Hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence by providing a credible and rapid response option. However, their deployment also raises the risk of miscalculation and escalation. The speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons could shorten decision-making windows, increasing the likelihood of accidental or preemptive strikes. That said, the opportunity to discuss potential <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-03/news/us-faces-wins-losses-hypersonic-weapons">gains and losses</a> for both development and implementation of hypersonic weapons is an opportunity to help drive future strategy development.</p>
<p>Developing effective countermeasures against hypersonic threats is a priority for many nations. Advanced radar systems, directed-energy weapons, and missile defense systems are being explored as potential solutions. Integrating these technologies into existing defense frameworks is essential for maintaining a robust defense posture.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-hypersonic-weapons/">proliferation</a> of hypersonic technology underscores the need for international regulations and agreements. Establishing norms and guidelines for the development, testing, and deployment of hypersonic weapons could help mitigate the risks associated with their use. Diplomatic efforts to promote transparency and confidence-building measures are crucial for maintaining global stability.</p>
<p>Regardless of the <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2024/03/hypersonic-weapons-are-mediocre-its-time-to-stop-wasting-money-on-them/">naysayers</a>, hypersonic technology represents the next frontier in military airpower, offering unparalleled speed, agility, and reach. While the strategic advantages are significant, the technological challenges and strategic implications cannot be overlooked. As nations continue to invest in hypersonic research and development, the race for air superiority will intensify, shaping the future of global security. Balancing the benefits and risks of hypersonic technology will be essential for ensuring a stable and secure international environment.</p>
<p><em>Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the</em> <a href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/"><em>National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</em></a> <em>with nearly 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Hypersonic-Horizons-The-Next-Generation-of-Air-Superiority.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-horizons-the-next-generation-of-air-superiority/">Hypersonic Horizons: The Next Generation of Air Superiority</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Generative Artificial Intelligence and Deterrence Stability between India and Pakistan</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anum A. Khan]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Sep 2024 12:23:49 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Imagine a scene. It is the Indian military command center on the night of May 28, 2028. A high-ranking Indian military officer sends a message to a subordinate commander; Pakistan has initiated a preemptive strike. Prepare for a retaliatory strike. This is not a drill. Missile flight time between both India and Pakistan is a [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/generative-artificial-intelligence-and-deterrence-stability-between-india-and-pakistan/">Generative Artificial Intelligence and Deterrence Stability between India and Pakistan</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Imagine a scene. It is the Indian military command center on the night of May 28, 2028. A high-ranking Indian military officer sends a message to a subordinate commander; Pakistan has initiated a preemptive strike. Prepare for a retaliatory strike. This is not a drill.</p>
<p>Missile flight time between both India and Pakistan is a few minutes. Hence, commanders do not have time for verification and decide to launch a retaliatory strike on warning.</p>
<p>In Pakistan, a high-ranking Pakistani military officer contacts Pakistan’s prime minister to tell him India has initiated a nuclear strike, and an immediate response is required. The prime minister immediately orders a counterstrike. Pakistan proceeds to counterstrike protocols.</p>
<p>Missiles begin crossing borders between India and Pakistan as the world hurtles towards a nuclear catastrophe in South Asia. The world’s worst fears are realized. It is only later realized that the high-ranking Indian military officer’s message to an Indian commander was made by a nuclear command-and-control system embedded with generative artificial intelligence (AI).</p>
<p><strong>The Role of Generative AI in Modern Warfare</strong></p>
<p>The use of generative AI, which is best exemplified by ChatGPT, by an adversary, or third party, can impact deterrence stability between India and Pakistan. In a worst-case scenario, it could trigger a nuclear war, like the scene mentioned above. Should generative AI be embedded in nuclear command-and-control systems, it is theoretically possible that hyper-personalized messages, like the one described above, could be generated in a system that was not originally designed to allow such an outcome. The potential for a <a href="https://www.wins.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/7.-world-institute-for-nuclear-Security-feb-2024-Giulio-Corci.pdf">tailored</a> message, for specific individuals, is possible.</p>
<p>Traditionally, content and information generation were based on human creativity. However, at present, generative artificial intelligence is being considered as a tool for digital transformation. <a href="https://news.mit.edu/2023/explained-generative-ai-1109">Generative AI</a> is a deep learning model which has the capability to generate synthetic media including text, video, and audio—dependent on training.</p>
<p><strong>Perception Building and the Escalation of Crises</strong></p>
<p>Generative AI can also play a distinctly different role in leading to nuclear crisis. In a deterrence framework, the development of a narrative and perception are crucial. Similarly, communication of deterrence threats is also achieved through perception-building of an adversary—concerning a state’s capabilities and credibility. In the specific case of India and Pakistan, India is creating <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&amp;hl=en&amp;user=BGR-PksAAAAJ&amp;citation_for_view=BGR-PksAAAAJ:UeHWp8X0CEIC">misperceptions</a> regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program. Recently, Pakistani Ambassador Munir Akram, at the United Nations Security Council’s high-level debate, <a href="https://www.app.com.pk/global/pakistan-urges-intl-instrument-to-counter-cyberwarfare-recalls-indian-networks-disinformation-drive/#google_vignette">stated</a> that India is actively pursuing a state-led disinformation campaign to malign Pakistan.</p>
<p>He was referring to recent EU Disinfolab’s <a href="https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/bad-sources-how-indian-news-agency-ani-quoted-sources-that-do-not-exist/">reports</a> on how India is using fake nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, media outlets, and international organizations to malign Pakistan. Similarly, it is possible that India may use Generative AI to manipulate public opinion, thereby, creating misperceptions among Pakistan’s public. This could make the citizenry, as well as the government of both India and Pakistan, susceptible to separate facts from fiction—especially in a crisis situation. Hence, AI-driven narratives could push both countries to a crisis leading to warfighting.</p>
<p><strong>Misinformation and Crisis Management Challenges in South Asia</strong></p>
<p>Misinformation through generative AI can make crisis management and escalation dominance between India and Pakistan much more difficult. According to Heather Williams and Alexi Drew, Herman Kahn’s escalation ladder has transformed into a <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/csss/assets/escalation-by-tweet-managing-the-new-nuclear-diplomacy-2020.pdf">web</a> across domains with multiple actors and alliances, especially in the age of social media. In South Asia, due to mated warheads and cannasterization of missiles by India, coupled with geographical contiguity with Pakistan, nuclear use may become <a href="https://ciss.org.pk/drivers-of-indian-mirv-ciss-strategic-view-v/">ultimate escalation</a> within minutes—without a ladder or a web. Social media could be a threat multiplier and can become lethal with the use of generative AI. Although, tweets are <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/csss/assets/escalation-by-tweet-managing-the-new-nuclear-diplomacy-2020.pdf">unlikely</a> to independently start a crisis, tweets from government officials of India and Pakistan could be fabricated through utilizing hacking and generative AI to escalate an ongoing crisis.</p>
<p><strong>Risks of Generative AI in Command-and-Control Systems</strong></p>
<p>While Indian nuclear weapons may have an effective command and control where nuclear weapons have nuclear safety and security mechanisms, there was a “Brahmos missile crisis” in 2022. Inadvertent or accidental, the launch of a missile could trigger a reactionary strike by Pakistan as the missile is <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/BrahMos-gains-sub-strategic-super-weapon-capability/article12556559.ece">dual</a>-capable. Furthermore, this fog of war could undermine strategic stability. As a Group Captain was <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/accidental-missile-firing-incident-prima-facie-fingers-pointed-at-group-captain-101648015107516.html">blamed</a> for the launch, many commanders like him, who may be capable of launching nuclear missiles, even on Indian nuclear submarines, could be manipulated via high-level orders created through generative AI.</p>
<p><strong>False Flag Operations and Strategic Escalation</strong></p>
<p>India has also opted for adventurism against Pakistan through its false flag operations and surgical strikes. Pakistan has adopted a conventional strategy of quid-pro-quo plus as a conventional response to such Indian limited strike. However, malicious false flag operations through disinformation and fake news by India to garner public support for electoral gains and domestic politics can result in crisis escalation in such a competitive strategic environment. It is due to mistrust within the adversarial relationship of India and Pakistan.</p>
<p><strong>The Need for Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) in AI</strong></p>
<p>There is a dire need for risk reduction and confidence-building measures (CBM) between India and Pakistan in the domain of AI. However, the appetite for CBMs and dialogue on the Indian side is non-existent. India and Pakistan could establish bilateral AI incident reporting and mitigation centers to counter the use of AI as a tool for inducing false alarms and other escalatory actions. Furthermore, there is a need for India and Pakistan to further opt for unilateral AI security and regulation measures, especially for inter-organizational and inter-state strategic communications. If leading states like the United States, China, and Russia opt for an AI arms control agreement, less powerful states, including India and Pakistan, may be persuaded to follow suit. This will help establish a universal AI arms control regime regarding the use of AI for military purposes.</p>
<p><strong>Generative AI and Deterrence Stability: A Scenario for De-escalation</strong></p>
<p>It is the night of May 28, 2028, at India’s military command center. A high-ranking Indian military officer sends a message to a subordinate commander; Pakistan has initiated a preemptive strike. Prepare for a retaliatory strike. This is not a drill.</p>
<p>Flight time between India and Pakistan is a few minutes. Hence, commanders do not have time for verification and need to decide quickly whether to launch a retaliatory strike. He calls the command center to verify the message received.</p>
<p>India’s prime minister is contacted immediately concerning the message received by one of his commanders. He picks up the hotline to Pakistan’s prime minister and asks, “Have you launched nuclear weapons?”</p>
<p>Pakistan’s prime minister responds, “Not at all. This is fake!”</p>
<p>India’s prime minister informs the military command center. The crisis is averted, and nuclear weapons are not used.</p>
<p>Confidence-building measures, which were present in the second scenario, have the opportunity to change the outcome of a conflict. Given the potential for artificial intelligence to be used in nefarious ways, it is time to take action to avert such a crisis.</p>
<p><em>Ms. Anum A. Khan is an Associate Director at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad. She is also currently a Research Fellow at Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization and a Project Associate of The Third Nuclear Age Project led by Prof. Andrew Futter.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Generative-AI.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="333" height="92" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 333px) 100vw, 333px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/generative-artificial-intelligence-and-deterrence-stability-between-india-and-pakistan/">Generative Artificial Intelligence and Deterrence Stability between India and Pakistan</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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