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		<title>Invest, Don’t Spend, Peace Dividends</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/invest-dont-spend-peace-dividends/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 Aug 2025 12:45:49 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31287</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was assumed that the US no longer needed a robust defense budget. As a result, the nation went on what Lt. Gen. Garret Harencak called a procurement holiday or a “holiday from history.” Many assumed it was indeed the end of history. After all, between 1987–1993, Washington [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/invest-dont-spend-peace-dividends/">Invest, Don’t Spend, Peace Dividends</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was assumed that the US no longer needed a robust defense budget. As a result, the nation went on what Lt. Gen. Garret Harencak called a procurement holiday or a “holiday from history.”</p>
<p>Many assumed it was indeed the end of history. After all, between 1987–1993, Washington and Moscow signed four notable arms control deals: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties I and II (START), the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Outer Space, and the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) treaty.</p>
<p>Russian strategic nuclear weapons were scheduled to drop from over 10,000 deployed to 3,500 by the year 2000. The INF treaty banned shorter range missiles altogether. And Warsaw Pact conventional forces in central Europe and Russia dropped precipitously.</p>
<p>President Reagan’s economic war against Moscow was successful. It ended the Soviet empire by pushing Moscow to the brink of insolvency. Russia could not financially maintain its formidable Cold War nuclear and conventional force levels.</p>
<p>From 1993–2001, the US did not enjoy the promised “end of history.” State sponsors of terror in Iran, Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq took the fight to the US, albeit in a different mode than threatening to send massive tank armies through the Fulda Gap into Western Europe.</p>
<p>The US responded with a war that would last more than a decade and cost Americans an estimated $7 trillion. It was all for naught and accomplished very little.</p>
<p><strong>Readiness and Modernization Shortfalls</strong></p>
<p>While spending trillions on nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Department of Defense (DoD) suffered from severe readiness and modernization shortfalls. The defense budget was roughly $305 billion in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and almost exactly that in 2001 before 9/11. In the interim the budget dropped to as low as $250 billion and it was only after 1996 that the budget gradually increased to $300 billion.</p>
<p>When adjusted for inflation (1991–2011), the defense budget of $300 billion (1991), aside from “overseas contingency operations,” should have grown to $480 billion by 2011, assuming a 3 percent growth rate. That did not happen. The shortfall in defense spending reached $1.25 trillion during the two decades following the Soviet Union’s collapse.</p>
<p>The base defense budget in 2011 was roughly $500 billion, and at first glance equal to that expected. Out of a defense budget of $656 billion, $160 billion was allocated for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the two decades from 2001–2021, the Department of Defense spent $1.56 trillion on nation building—an average of $80 billion annually.</p>
<p>Over three decades after the Cold War’s end, the US did not invest in the modernization of the military. The three-decade peace dividend, which saw $2.8 trillion fewer defense dollars spent, was instead spent domestically and on nation building. As a result, the modernization and recapitalization of the armed forces, especially nuclear forces, were postponed.</p>
<p>By September 11, 2001, the US nuclear forces were already in the field for two decades (<em>Ohio</em>-class submarines), three decades (Minuteman III), and five decades (B-52). The nuclear budget, $77 billion at the end of the Cold War, dropped to less about $25 billion, with most of those funds simply maintaining legacy nuclear forces.</p>
<p>It was not until 2009–2010 that the Obama administration and Congress agreed on a plan for upgrading and replacing nuclear forces—three decades after President Ronald Reagan rolled out his nuclear modernization and sustainment plans in late 1981. New systems are projected to begin fielding in 2031 with completion by 2050.</p>
<p>The failure to prioritize the planning and implementation for replacing aging systems included nuclear command-and-control systems, warheads, and all three legs of the nuclear triad. The belief that the world was safer was a fool’s errand.</p>
<p>By shifting federal dollars from defense to social spending, the US also ensured the workforce needed to build nuclear weapons, space and missile defenses, and cyber systems are no longer there. Vendors associated with the building of <em>Ohio</em>-class submarines and the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) numbered in the hundreds once. Now, the nation is starting from scratch. The submarine industry lost 14,000 workers and now lacks the manpower to meet demand.</p>
<p>As for ICBMs, with the shutdown of the Peacekeeper production line, the US Air Force was left with a guidance and propulsion replacement program that over a period of more than a decade invested $8 billion in making sure the Minuteman III (1970) would stay in the force “through 2030.” Again, many hundreds of vendors no longer exist to make ICBM parts. Even worse is the current state of the available workforce. American universities grant more PhDs in the hard sciences to Chinese students than to American students. Across the board, the US has fewer workers in the hard sciences than needed, although industry is now reaching into the schools to bring students along a planned program of education that leads them to careers in the aerospace business.</p>
<p><strong>The Challenge Ahead</strong></p>
<p>The nation now finds itself in a precarious position at a time when China and Russia are at their most aggressive. The <em>Columbia</em>-class submarine, which will replace the <em>Ohio</em>-class submarine, was recently delayed two years, further increasing costs. And the herculean task of building 450 new ICBM silos armed with 400 missiles will prove costly. The US will maintain the current 400 ICBMs while simultaneously deploying 400 new missiles in new silos. The Sentinel ICBM, a technological marvel, is progressing toward production. It is a highly capable weapon that is planned for initial deployment in 2033.</p>
<p>Chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Roger Wicker (R–MS) recently concluded, “It will take several years of sustained investment and real growth beyond this down payment to keep pace with China’s military advances…. But to be clear: The cost of deterring war will always be dwarfed by the cost of fighting one.” This could not be more true. It is time the American people understand the challenge facing the nation and what it will take to overcome it.</p>
<p><em>Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/The-Consequences-of-Spending-the-Peace-Dividend-II.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="248" height="69" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 248px) 100vw, 248px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/invest-dont-spend-peace-dividends/">Invest, Don’t Spend, Peace Dividends</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>What Nuclear Deterrence Might Look Like Under a Second Trump Presidency</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/what-nuclear-deterrence-might-look-like-under-a-second-trump-presidency/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/what-nuclear-deterrence-might-look-like-under-a-second-trump-presidency/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Holland]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Sep 2024 11:54:33 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=28862</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As the November presidential election approaches, the prospect of a second Donald Trump presidency raises important questions about the future of American nuclear deterrence. Trump’s first term was marked by a significant focus on nuclear weapons modernization and a distinct approach to nuclear deterrence that contrasted sharply with his predecessor. Understanding what nuclear deterrence could [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/what-nuclear-deterrence-might-look-like-under-a-second-trump-presidency/">What Nuclear Deterrence Might Look Like Under a Second Trump Presidency</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As the November presidential election approaches, the prospect of a second Donald Trump presidency raises important questions about the future of American nuclear deterrence. Trump’s first term was marked by a <a href="https://publicintegrity.org/national-security/future-of-warfare/under-trump-the-nuclear-weapons-industry-has-boomed/">significant focus on nuclear weapons modernization</a> and a distinct approach to nuclear deterrence that contrasted sharply with his predecessor. Understanding what nuclear deterrence could look like under another Trump administration requires a closer examination of his past statements, policies, and actions, as well as the perspectives of his closest national security advisors.<br />
<strong><br />
Trump’s Views on Nuclear Weapons: Modernization and Importance</strong></p>
<p>Throughout his first term, Trump consistently emphasized the importance of nuclear weapons to national security. He viewed nuclear modernization as essential to maintaining military superiority, often stating that the United States must have the strongest nuclear arsenal in the world. In a 2017 interview, Trump <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/24/politics/trump-interview-nuclear-weapons/index.html">said</a>, “We have to be the top of the pack,” signaling his commitment to nuclear dominance.</p>
<p>Trump’s push for nuclear modernization culminated in the <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF">2018 <em>Nuclear Posture Review</em> (NPR)</a>, which highlighted the need to revitalize the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/Americas-Nuclear-Triad/">nuclear triad</a>—comprising land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and strategic bombers. The NPR called for developing low-yield nuclear warheads, modernizing aging delivery systems, and investing in new nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) infrastructure. These initiatives reflected Trump’s belief that a robust and credible nuclear deterrent is the bedrock of national security.</p>
<p><strong>Policies and Actions During Trump’s First Term</strong></p>
<p>Trump’s nuclear policies were characterized by a blend of assertiveness and unpredictability. He withdrew the United States from the <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-inf-treaty-glance">Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty</a>, citing <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43832/38#:~:text=This%20report%20stated%20that%20the,to%205%2C500%20km%2C%20or%20to">Russian violations</a>, and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/29/trump-china-new-start-nuclear-arms-pact-expiration/">signaled reluctance to renew the New START Treaty without significant changes</a> such as adding China to the treaty. While these actions were criticized by some as undermining arms control efforts, they were consistent with Trump’s view that the United States should not be constrained by treaties that he perceived as one-sided or outdated.</p>
<p>Under Trump<a href="https://fas.org/publication/w76-2deployed/">, the Pentagon pursued the development of new nuclear capabilities, including the W76-2 low-yield warhead</a>, which was deployed on <em>Ohio</em>-class submarines. This move was intended to provide the US with more flexible and credible deterrence options, particularly against regional adversaries. Trump also supported the development of the <a href="https://www.northropgrumman.com/space/sentinel/rising-to-the-occasion-northrop-grumman-and-the-sentinel-gbsd-program">Sentinel </a>ICBM to replace the aging Minuteman III.</p>
<p>However, Trump’s approach to nuclear deterrence also included moments of brinkmanship and unpredictability. His “<a href="http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1708/09/nday.01.html">fire and fury</a>” rhetoric toward North Korea and his <a href="https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/948355557022420992?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E948355557022420992%7Ctwgr%5E8f3c7c895f959526a3e4adcaae7b41e23ea14eba%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&amp;ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnn.com%2F2018%2F01%2F02%2Fpolitics%2Fdonald-trump-north-korea-nuclear%2Findex.html">famous twitter threat</a> that “I too have a nuclear button, but it is a much bigger &amp; more powerful one than his, and my button works!” underscored his willingness to use the threat of nuclear force as a means of coercion.</p>
<p>While these statements alarmed many, they also demonstrated Trump’s belief in the deterrent value of projecting strength and unpredictability. Ultimately, perceptions of Trump’s nuclear rhetoric varied—some saw it as inflammatory, others as necessary to exercise strength and resolve—but the fact remains that during his administration, the US avoided major conflicts.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>The Role of Trump’s National Security Advisors</strong></p>
<p>Trump’s national security advisors played a crucial role in shaping his nuclear policy during his administration and are likely to continue to do so moving forward. Looking ahead, a potential Trump administration is already seeing a <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/19/trump-national-security-candidates-00153381">contest for top national security positions</a>, with figures like <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/25/us/politics/grenell-trump-cabinet.html">Richard Grenell</a> and <a href="https://themarathoninitiative.org/elbridge-colby/">Elbridge Colby</a> emerging as frontrunners for the role of National Security Advisor. Grenell is known for his staunch “America First” stance and his confrontational style, which aligns closely with Trump’s preferences. Colby, a former senior Pentagon official, is a strong advocate for <a href="https://www.descifrandolaguerra.es/elbridge-colby-former-pentagon-advisor-the-united-states-is-not-ready-for-a-high-intensity-war-with-china/">focusing military efforts on countering China</a>, potentially signaling a shift in priorities away from Europe.</p>
<p>The selection of these advisors would likely shape Trump’s nuclear policy in significant ways, emphasizing a hardline stance on China, a push for further nuclear modernization, and a continuation of the “America First” doctrine that marked his first term. As Trump’s potential return to the White House looms, the advisors he chooses will play a pivotal role in determining how the US navigates the complex landscape of nuclear deterrence and global security.</p>
<p><strong>What Could a Second Trump Term Mean for Nuclear Deterrence?</strong></p>
<p>If Trump were to return to the White House, it is likely that his administration would continue to prioritize nuclear modernization. The Sentinel program, the development of the <em>Columbia</em>-class submarine, and the enhancement of NC3 infrastructure would likely remain top priorities. Additionally, Trump could seek to further expand the nuclear arsenal quantitatively and qualitatively, potentially fielding new nuclear weapons, such as sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) or new low-yield options.</p>
<p>A second Trump term could also see a continuation of his assertive approach to arms control. Trump may push for more stringent terms in any potential arms control agreements, or he could further distance the US from existing treaties if he perceives them as constraining American capabilities. This approach could lead to increased tensions with China and Russia, potentially sparking a new arms race, or it could be the exact prescription required for effective arms control.</p>
<p>At the same time, Trump’s willingness to engage in high-stakes diplomacy, exemplified by his dealings with North Korea, indicates he might pursue similar approaches with other nuclear-armed adversaries. However, the unpredictability that defined his first term could heighten the risk of miscalculation or escalation, especially in nuclear crises, or it could be that it just happens to induce a proper amount of fear that the adversary effectively backs down or ceases operations. Ultimately, Trump’s unpredictability serves as a tool to instill fear and uncertainty in adversaries, keeping them cautious and off-balance.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>A second Trump presidency could bring renewed momentum to US nuclear deterrence and modernization efforts. Trump’s first term demonstrated a clear commitment to revitalizing America’s nuclear arsenal, recognizing its crucial role in maintaining national security. His administration prioritized the development of modern capabilities, ensuring the nuclear triad remains credible and effective.</p>
<p>Trump’s focus on nuclear superiority aligns with his “America First” doctrine, which emphasizes the importance of military strength in securing peace and stability. By continuing to push for advanced nuclear technologies and modernized infrastructure, a second Trump term could restore America’s position as the world’s foremost nuclear power. A second Trump presidency, therefore, could enhance American nuclear deterrence, ensuring that the arsenal remains a potent force for peace and stability in an increasingly complex global landscape for years to come.</p>
<p><em>Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. </em><em>Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/What-Nuclear-Deterrence-Might-Look-Like-Under-a-Second-Trump-Presidency.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28497 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Download3-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Download3-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Download3.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/what-nuclear-deterrence-might-look-like-under-a-second-trump-presidency/">What Nuclear Deterrence Might Look Like Under a Second Trump Presidency</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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