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		<title>AI Paris Summit and Emerging Paradox of AI Haves and Have-Nots</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/ai-paris-summit-and-emerging-paradox-of-ai-haves-and-have-nots/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Huma Rehman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Apr 2025 11:54:22 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30505</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p> The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming industries, economies, societies, and global politics. However, this artificial intelligence and technological revolution also exacerbates existing competitions, creating a stark divide between states that are AI haves and AI have-nots. This digital divide is not just about access to technology but also about the ability to [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/ai-paris-summit-and-emerging-paradox-of-ai-haves-and-have-nots/">AI Paris Summit and Emerging Paradox of AI Haves and Have-Nots</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong> </strong>The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming industries, economies, societies, and global politics. However, this artificial intelligence and technological revolution also exacerbates existing competitions, creating a stark divide between states that are AI haves and AI have-nots.</p>
<p>This digital divide is not just about access to technology but also about the ability to harness AI’s potential for economic, social, and global political empowerment. The implications of the AI divide are leading to a tech race that impact geopolitical power dynamics, exacerbating competition major powers like the US, China, France, and India. Depending on how the race ends, it could swing the balance of power in a negative direction.</p>
<p><strong>AI Paris Summit</strong></p>
<p>The recent <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/en/sommet-pour-l-action-sur-l-ia">AI Action Summit</a> held in Paris emerged as a pivotal event that highlights both the opportunities and challenges associated with this evolving AI tech race. This summit serves as a beacon of innovation, encouraging <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/2527932/frances-macron-calls-for-equal-access-to-ai-for-all-nations">France</a> and India to collaborate more closely, while also exposing the complex interplay of international reactions, particularly from major powers like the United States, United Kingdom (UK), and China.</p>
<p>The summit focused on expanding AI’s boundaries while respecting environmental and ethical obligations. France’s President Emmanuel <a href="https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2025/02/11/statement-on-inclusive-and-sustainable-artificial-intelligence-for-people-and-the-planet">Macron</a> reaffirmed his nation’s commitment to AI innovation, while maintaining high regulatory standards that draw parallels to Notre Dame Cathedral’s restoration. Such a strategy will likely accelerate AI ventures and foster innovation.</p>
<p>However, the regulation proposed was also a noose around the neck of the summit’s emphasis—deregulation. It is worth considering whether drastic deregulation will lead to genuine advances or the weakening of certain crucial safety nets as the world grapples with how to handle ever expanding data and the fragmentation that result from the intersection of geopolitical interests and the private ownership of data and capability. The US and China approach the issue differently than Europe, whose <a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai">adoption of the AI Act</a> (2023) will see the first comprehensive AI regulation in the world.</p>
<p>Many wondered how agentic AI will impact the balance of power. Whether AI will have a net positive or negative effect is uncertain. The rate at which agentic AI is developed and adopted in the three main economic blocs of China, Europe, and the United States will determine much.</p>
<p><strong>India-France AI Alliance </strong></p>
<p>India and France are forming a partnership to leverage AI’s full potential globally, sharing knowledge, resources, and best practices to create a robust framework for AI initiatives and global dialogue. <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/frances-ai-action-summit">During the summit</a>, leaders from both countries addressed how their alliance could facilitate joint ventures, research collaborations, and talent exchange programs. <a href="https://in.ambafrance.org/India-France-will-harness-AI-s-potential-for-global-good">Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Macron foresaw</a> great potential for future cooperation in 2019 when they endorsed the <em>Indo-French Roadmap on Cybersecurity and Digital Technology</em>. India and France, founding members of the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, aim to develop a safe, open, secure, and ethical AI for human development and global commons.</p>
<p><strong>Global Reactions</strong></p>
<p>As the world watches the developments in Paris, reactions from other global powers, notably <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/reports/essay-reframing-the-us-china-ai-arms-race/why-us-china-ai-competition-matters/">China and the United States</a>, added another layer of complexity to the conversation around AI regulation and collaboration. In recent years, both states have invested heavily in AI research and development, seeing it as critical to their national security and economic competitiveness.</p>
<p>China’s approach to AI governance contrasts significantly with that of France and India. While the <a href="http://fi.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/kxjs/201710/P020210628714286134479.pdf">Chinese government</a> prioritizes rapid innovation with minimal regulatory oversight, this led to concerns about privacy, surveillance, and ethical implications. The US, on the other hand, grapples with debates around data privacy, corporate responsibility, and the potential for AI misuse. As a result, the responses from these two states illustrate differing philosophies about how best to harness AI’s potential while safeguarding public interests.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/feb/11/us-uk-paris-ai-summit-artificial-intelligence-declaration">The US and UK declined</a> to sign a declaration on “inclusive and sustainable” artificial intelligence at the Paris summit, in a blow to hopes for a concerted approach to developing and regulating the technology. The document was backed by 60 other signatories on February 11, 2025, including France, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/china">China</a>, India, Japan, Australia, and Canada.</p>
<p>The reactions from the relevant stakeholders highlight the urgent need for international cooperation and dialogue. As AI transcends borders, creating harmonized standards and frameworks could mitigate risks associated with its deployment.</p>
<p><strong>Opportunities and Challenges Ahead</strong></p>
<p>The summit concluded by emphasizing the need for proactive state engagement in AI regulation, prioritizing innovation while protecting individual rights and societal values. This, participants believed, would allow the world to fully capitalize on AI’s benefits.</p>
<p>As the world grapples with the realities of increasingly AI-driven technology, <a href="https://www.innovationaus.com/is-the-paris-ai-declaration-as-vulnerable-as-the-climate-accord/">the voices of diverse stakeholders</a>, including technologists, ethicists, policymakers, and civil society must be heard in shaping the future of AI. Under the flag of the AI Paris Summit, the India-France AI alliance is entering into a new and more unpredictable phase. By defying red tape and cultivating a spirit of cooperation, states are setting the pace for unlocking unprecedented opportunities while highlighting the inherent challenges of this transformative technology.</p>
<p><em>Huma Rehman is a project consultant, consultant, and defense and foreign affairs analyst. She can be reached at X @HumaRehman1.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/AI-Paris-Summit-and-Emerging-Paradox-of-AI-Haves-and-Have-Nots.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29601" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2025-Download-Button.png" alt="Download here." width="302" height="84" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2025-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 302px) 100vw, 302px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/ai-paris-summit-and-emerging-paradox-of-ai-haves-and-have-nots/">AI Paris Summit and Emerging Paradox of AI Haves and Have-Nots</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Cybersecurity Framework for Maritime Port Management</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/cybersecurity-framework-for-maritime-port-management/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Maryyum Masood & Rizwana Abbasi]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 08 Apr 2025 12:37:28 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30472</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Maritime ports act as mediums for international trade and transportation. They facilitate the legitime flow of trade and the transfer of goods between ships and shore. Ports have the requisite infrastructure to run routine operations, such as handling the docking of ships and cranes and management of storage facilities and warehouses. Ports not only link [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/cybersecurity-framework-for-maritime-port-management/">Cybersecurity Framework for Maritime Port Management</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Maritime ports act as mediums for international trade and transportation. They facilitate the legitime flow of trade and the transfer of goods between ships and shore. Ports have the requisite infrastructure to run routine operations, such as handling the docking of ships and cranes and management of storage facilities and warehouses. Ports not only link the sea lines of communication (SLOC) but also connect to land transportation, such as highways, railroads, and airports, enabling the smooth movement of goods to and from the ports.</p>
<p>Maritime ports authorize customs clearance and are involved in regulatory checks, ensuring compliance with national and international law. Ports perform most of these functions digitally. Maritime ports are now under serious threat of malicious cyberattacks that can disrupt and compromise port operations worldwide.</p>
<p>Industry is deeply interconnected, and a cyberattack on one major port can send shockwaves through global trade networks. Consider a scenario where a major port, responsible for handling millions of cargo containers, suddenly halts operations due to a cyberattack. Cranes freeze, logistics systems collapse, and cargo ships are left stranded at sea. This is not a hypothetical scenario; it is a real and escalating threat to global trade.</p>
<p>The maritime industry, long seen as the backbone of international commerce, now faces an urgent cybersecurity crisis. Ports are no longer just about cranes and cargo; they have evolved into digital ecosystems reliant on interconnected networks, automation, and artificial intelligence. As ports become smarter, they are also becoming more vulnerable. Cybercriminals are increasingly exploiting these vulnerabilities, causing financial losses, operational disruptions, and even national security risks.</p>
<p>Maritime cyberattacks are no longer rare occurrences, they are becoming alarmingly frequent. In 2023, a ransomware attack crippled more than 1,000 vessels by targeting a software provider used across the shipping industry. The attack forced the shipping industry to shut down its ShipManager system, affecting global supply chains. A year earlier, the Port of Lisbon suffered a cyberattack that took its website offline for days, with the ransomware group LockBit claiming responsibility and alleging that it had stolen financial reports, contracts, and ship logs.</p>
<p>In Germany, a 2022 cyberattack on two oil companies disrupted fuel shipments, forcing Shell to reroute supplies and exposing the vulnerabilities of critical maritime infrastructure. The 2017 NotPetya ransomware attack, which paralyzed Maersk and caused an estimated $300 million in damage, remains one of the most devastating cyberattacks in shipping history.</p>
<p>Ports are among the most attractive targets for cybercriminals. The motives behind these attacks vary as some hackers seek financial gain, while others aim to steal sensitive trade-related data, and some may even use cyberattacks as part of hybrid warfare.</p>
<p>The economic consequences are staggering, from ransom payments and insurance hikes to delays that can ripple across global supply chains. Beyond financial losses, cyber threats to ports pose serious security risks. For example, a well-coordinated cyberattack on a major port could disrupt military logistics, cripple trade networks, or even manipulate cargo data to facilitate smuggling and illicit trade.</p>
<p>Hackers carry the potential for unauthorized intrusion into ports’ digital networks and interrupt ports’ routine operation through malicious software attacks. The workforce involved in port management may be trapped into revealing sensitive data by clicking on malicious links. The hackers can also disrupt digital networks that regulate critical port infrastructure, such as cranes, pumps, and valves. Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems can come under cyber threats disrupting routine functions. N<em>onstandard computing hardware</em> like sensors, actuators, or appliances that transmit data from the network wirelessly are vulnerable to data theft.</p>
<p>Hackers can steal data such as cargo manifests, crew information, and financial records. They can also manipulate data, such as altering cargo manifests, or manipulate navigation systems. Hackers can also steal intellectual property, such as trade secrets or proprietary software.</p>
<p>Another pressing issue is supply-chain security. Ports rely on a complex web of third-party vendors for logistics, software, and cargo management. If one vendor is compromised, the entire port system could be at risk.</p>
<p>Hackers can also use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance means or to attack port infrastructure, such as damaging equipment or disrupting power supplies. Ports may be exposed to cyberattacks through third-party suppliers, such as logistics providers or maintenance contractors. Ports may be exposed to cyberattacks through cargo and containers, which may contain malicious devices or software.</p>
<p>Cybersecurity in the maritime sector is often treated as an afterthought. Many ports still operate with outdated software and weak security protocols, making them easy targets. Given the critical role of ports in the global economy, the widening cybersecurity gap is a growing challenge. Strengthening port security necessitates urgent regulatory mechanisms, some of which are proposed below.</p>
<p><strong>Regulatory Mechanisms</strong></p>
<p>To mitigate the growing cyber threat, ports should adopt internationally recognized cybersecurity frameworks. First, ports should adhere to the rules and protocols of the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Maritime Cyber Risk Management Guidelines, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework, and ISO 27001 standards. Implementing these frameworks will help establish clear security protocols and ensure that ports are prepared to defend against cyberattacks.</p>
<p>Second, network security should be reinforced by segmenting information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems, preventing malware from spreading across critical infrastructure. Regular penetration testing and vulnerability assessments can further identify weak points before attackers do.</p>
<p>Third, investing in cybersecurity training for port workers is equally crucial. Many cyberattacks exploit human error—phishing e-mails, weak passwords, and social engineering attacks remain among the most common entry points for hackers. A well-trained workforce can serve as the first line of defense against these threats.</p>
<p>Fourth, leveraging artificial intelligence and machine learning for threat detection can enhance ports’ ability to identify cyber risks before they escalate into full-scale attacks. Artificial intelligence (AI)–led systems can monitor network activity in real time, flagging suspicious behavior and predicting potential breaches before they happen. In this regard, the strict security assessments of third-party vendors and blockchain-based cargo tracking can enhance transparency and reduce the risk of supply-chain cyberattacks.</p>
<p>Fifth, beyond prevention, ports should also be prepared to respond effectively to cyber incidents. For this, establishing cyber incident response teams (CIRT) can ensure that ports have trained professionals ready to mitigate and recover from cyberattacks swiftly.</p>
<p>Sixth, regular cyber drills and crisis simulations should be conducted to test response plans. This ensures that when an attack occurs, the damage is minimized, and recovery is swift.</p>
<p>Seventh, international collaboration to deal with these threats is essential. Governments, port authorities, and private stakeholders should work together to share intelligence, standardize security protocols, and invest in collective defense mechanisms.</p>
<p>Public-private partnerships can play a key role in funding advanced cybersecurity infrastructure, while international regulatory bodies like the IMO must enforce stricter cybersecurity mandates across the industry. Finally, as ports transition into smart ports, powered by the internet of things (IoT), AI, and automation, cybersecurity should be at the forefront of maritime security strategies. Emerging technologies like quantum computing and zero trust architecture will play a crucial role in strengthening digital defenses, but ports should remain vigilant. The very technologies designed to enhance security could also introduce new vulnerabilities if not properly managed.</p>
<p>Cybersecurity is no longer just a technical issue; it is a fundamental pillar of modern port management. If cybersecurity continues to be treated as an afterthought, the next major cyberattack could bring global trade to a standstill. Ports are the lifelines of the world economy, and securing them is not just about protecting data, it is about safeguarding the stability of international commerce and national security.</p>
<p><em>Maryyum Masood is working as a Research Officer &amp; Associate Editor at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad. She is an MPhil scholar in the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU) Islamabad.</em></p>
<p><em>Rizwana Abbasi is an Associate Professor of Security Studies at the National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, a non-resident Fellow of the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad, and a Visiting Fellow at the Central European University of Austria.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Cybersecurity-Framework-for-Maritime-Port-Management.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="317" height="88" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 317px) 100vw, 317px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/cybersecurity-framework-for-maritime-port-management/">Cybersecurity Framework for Maritime Port Management</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>An Uncertain Future for Arms Control</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/an-uncertain-future-for-arms-control/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stephen Cimbala]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Jan 2025 13:08:23 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29846</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>A strong nuclear deterrent reduces risks to the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Such is the view of many within the nuclear enterprise. Arms control and disarmament advocates differ with this view, seeing the deterrent as a risk that must be reduced in size and function via various forms of diplomacy [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/an-uncertain-future-for-arms-control/">An Uncertain Future for Arms Control</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; text-indent: .5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun">A strong nuclear deterrent reduces risks to the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Such is the view of many within the nuclear enterprise. </span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; text-indent: .5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun">Arms control and disarmament advocates differ with this view, seeing the deterrent as a risk that must be reduced in size and function via various forms of </span><a href="https://tnsr.org/2023/03/the-role-of-u-s-diplomacy-in-countering-russias-nuclear-threats-and-misbehavior/">diplomacy</a><span class="normaltextrun"> that range from one-party declarations and codes of conduct to formal arms control agreements. These sorts of undertakings are currently </span><a href="https://www.newparadigmsforum.com/leveraging-strength-into-peace-arms-control-isnt-quite-dead-and-heres-how-to-revive-it">moribund within officialdom</a><span class="normaltextrun">, though enjoying an eternal spring of hope among the single-issue think tanks, academics, and commentators who strive to sway government.</span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; text-indent: .5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun">Paradoxically the current surge in hostilities between the United States and the axis of autocracy (China, North Korea, and Russia) could furnish the spark that revives official efforts at both improving deterrence and renewed arms control. For instance, an updated Budapest Memorandum might form one component of a settlement or freezing of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. An Iranian “regime change” may also offer a path for a true and verifiable non-nuclear-weapon Iran.</span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; text-indent: .5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun">The modality of any future arms control arrangement could vary greatly. Not all arms control arrangements are treaties. Given the current international situation among nuclear-armed states, treaties might indeed be the least likely of modalities. Some modalities that future arms control arrangements could take</span><span class="eop"> include </span>unilateral American declarations, American-backed codes of conduct, American-backed norms, agreement within NATO (such as the Committee on Proliferation or the Nuclear Planning Group), unilateral American renewal of earlier Negative Security Assurances (such as those deposited with the United Nations), bilateral or multilateral statements, bilateral or multilateral memorandum or other agreed instrument short of a treaty, and/or bilateral or multilateral treaties.</p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;"><b>The Process of Arms Control</b></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;"><b> </b></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; text-indent: .5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun">All these arms control approaches present challenges to American and NATO forces. They also present opportunities to refine force posture and employment options. Three concrete steps are useful in ensuring American and alliance leadership receives constant feedback with operational decision-makers. </span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; text-indent: .5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun">First, it is important to sustain collaboration. As government and American allies contemplate arms control arrangements, nuclear-force commanders should offer information on the challenges and opportunities that various permutations of an arrangement present to force posture and operations. Not all ideas are operationally possible. </span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; text-indent: .5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun">Second, highlight the challenges that an arrangement poses to fielded forces. As part of any discussions, commanders should relate how they would adjust operations as nascent arrangements move toward implementation. This would likely be a stepwise evolution of operations in reaction to implementation of disclosures and intrusion that could accompany various forms of arms control measures. Policymakers rarely understand what their aspirational objectives mean for operational forces.</span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; text-indent: .5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun">Third, highlight opportunities an arrangement creates for forces. Similarly, commanders should monitor the evolution of arms control arrangements and be on the lookout for arrangements that permit gleaning information about adversary forces—information that is useful in crafting the best force posture, plans, and operational tactics.</span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; text-indent: .25in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun">These feedback loops would evolve in phases over the time that an arms control arrangement is contemplated, refined, and implemented (or rejected). </span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun"> </span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun"><b>The Phases of Arms Control</b></span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun"><b> </b></span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun">Any future arms control agreement should have six phases:</span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; text-indent: .5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun">Phase 1 takes place during internal American contemplation of potential arms control arrangements. Classified analysis of changes to operations that an arrangement might necessitate are discussed. When inspections are proposed, any detrimental effects to operations from various forms of inspection are discussed. Discussing the benefits of inspecting adversary installations is also an important consideration.</span><span class="eop"> </span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; text-indent: .5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun">Phase 2 occurs during outreach with adversaries and third-country parties. Internal “food-for-thought” papers from the operational community are prepared for negotiators and strategic-communications personnel. Deliberate public statements such as editorials and conference presentations serve a useful purpose in explaining American interests. </span><span class="eop"> </span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; text-indent: .5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun">Phase 3 takes place during formalization of an arms control arrangement.</span><span class="eop"> W</span><span class="normaltextrun">hen requested by the Department of Defense, Department of State, National Security Council, the president, or other officials, public statements are made for adversary consumption.</span><span class="eop"> </span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; text-indent: .5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun">Phase 4 is the implementation phase. This is the period in which an arms control arrangement comes into effect by treaty agreement or as a unilateral/bilateral/multilateral action. Classified reports on implementation progress of the new arrangement are prepared. When inspections are part of the arrangement, coordination between government agencies occurs. </span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; text-indent: .5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun">Phase 5 is focused on sustainment. During this period an arms control arrangement is in effect. Classified reports address difficulties from the arrangement.</span><span class="eop"> </span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; text-indent: .5in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun">Phase 6 is the sunset period. This is when the arms control arrangement ends or appears to be faltering. Analysis of the operational steps, timeline, costs, equipment, and personnel necessary to terminate the arms control arrangement is conducted. Classified reports on progress toward ceasing any earlier changes to operations and capabilities, necessitated by the arrangement, are conducted. </span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun"> </span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun"><b>Conclusion</b></span></p>
<p class="paragraph" style="margin: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;"><span class="normaltextrun"><b> </b></span></p>
<p class="xdefault" style="margin: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">Arms control for the sake of arms control was always a bad idea. The United States is no longer in a position where it can enter into arms control agreements because it furthers an idealist ambition to promote peace. Today, arms control is only useful if it furthers American interests.</p>
<p class="xdefault" style="margin: 0in; text-indent: .5in;">Taking a hard-nosed look at arms control in its various forms is necessary, but it must be acceptable for the answer to be no. The United States is no longer in a position to act altruistically. Russia is a superior nuclear power, and China may reach a similar status within a decade. The world has changed and American leaders must accept that its adversaries are no longer willing to follow America’s lead.</p>
<p class="xdefault" style="margin: 0in;"><i><br />
Professor Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a professor at Penn State-Brandywine. Views expressed are his own.</i></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/an-uncertain-future-for-arms-control/">An Uncertain Future for Arms Control</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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