In PNG, the Pukpuk Treaty not only strengthens its defense relationship with Australia but also prompts a realignment of Australian strategy, influencing how major powers like China, the United States, and others engage in the region. The treaty demonstrates that small states are not merely reactive; they can take the initiative to defend their interests and manage the challenges of superpower competition.

The Pukpuk Treaty reflects how PNG is repositioning itself strategically due to limited capacity, geographic vulnerability, and internal security pressures. PNG has recognized its weaknesses in defense forces, including border patrol, sea patrols, internal security, police, and the equipment and software of its defense (training, doctrine, etc.).

The treaty will address these gaps by enhancing capacity, fostering interoperability with Australia, exploring recruitment of PNG staff into the Australian Defence Force (ADF), promoting joint training, and modernizing the military. By requesting the treaty, PNG is not merely accepting foreign assistance but choosing a partner and clearly defining the nature of cooperation, with its sovereignty as a central concern.

The political elite in PNG are using the treaty as a tool to influence the broader competition between the great powers. Part of the treaty’s design is a clear strategic counter-pressure by Australia against the rising Chinese influence in the Pacific.

Canberra is concerned that China’s growing influence through trade, investment, infrastructure, or even security arrangements with Pacific nations could pose a threat to Australia along its northern borders. The Pukpuk Treaty thus becomes a key part of Australia’s strategy to secure its neighborhood.

However, PNG is not passive; its foreign affairs ministry explicitly stated that the treaty will not include a third-party cooperation exception, and that PNG retains its constitutional right to engage in defense cooperation with other countries. This balancing act allows PNG to welcome Australian protection and investment while also trying to preserve flexibility in its foreign policy.

The Pukpuk Treaty shows how legal, constitutional, and domestic political constraints can serve as practical tools for small states to influence great powers. In Papua New Guinea, there is an ongoing debate: recently, retired Major General Jerry Singirok questioned concepts of sovereignty, non-alignment, and constitutionality, specifically whether integrating the PNG Defence Force into the ADF structures or adopting Australian military doctrine would be unconstitutional under PNG law.

Papua New Guinea also issued warnings that public consultation, parliamentary ratification, and legal safeguards are practical considerations. These constraints suggest that Australian strategic ambitions are not pursued unconditionally but require negotiation and moderation. PNG is leveraging its internal political processes to ensure its interests are protected. This demonstrates that small states are not merely vassals but hold significant agency through institutional rules, constitutional mechanisms, and civil-military relations.

The treaty reshapes how we view alliances and security in the Pacific. Currently, Australia has only a few formal mutual defense treaties. The Pukpuk Treaty is the first new treaty-level defense alliance in Australia in over 70 years. This indicates a shift from informal security cooperation, training, aid, and soft security towards more formalized mutual defense commitments.

For the Pacific, this means smaller states seeking such formal agreements gain greater bargaining power, more reliable security arrangements, and improved access to resources. It also increases the stakes in global competition. Any formal alliance is likely to provoke countermeasures by other major powers. In fact, China already warned PNG not to sign a treaty that restricts collaboration with other nations and stressed the importance of maintaining sovereignty and decision-making independence.

Being this close to Australia will limit PNG’s options, potentially tying it to Australia’s strategic interests, which may not align with those of PNG, leaving PNG vulnerable to diplomatic repercussions in its dealings with China.

There is also a constitutional risk; PNG’s legal framework might have to balance issues such as dual staffing, foreign military doctrine, foreign operational control, or access to bases. The treaty must protect PNG’s sovereignty while enabling productive cooperation. Additionally, there is a domestic political risk. A perception of lost sovereignty or involvement in an unwanted conflict could provoke public and political instability.

The case of PNG signals that small states are no longer just battlegrounds, but active creators of regional order. By taking the lead and signing such a treaty, PNG clarifies what it requires regarding defense cooperation, sovereignty safeguards, and strategic balance. Using domestic legal procedures (parliamentary ratification, constitutional review, popular debate), PNG ensures that any potential arrangement is stronger than past cooperation and aligns with its long-term interests. Other small states will observe this and may be encouraged to pursue more formal engagements and specific defense partnerships instead of informal or ad hoc arrangements.

Fawad Afridi is an MPhil Scholar at the National Defense University. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

What the Pukpuk Mutual Defense Treaty Tells Us about the Pacific Security Order was originally published on Global Security Review.

One example of this malfeasance was the repeated use of the term fascism/fascist or Nazism/Nazi to refer to Donald J. Trump and his supporters. Among those raising this concern were disaffected officials from the first Trump presidency. For example, retired four-star general John F. Kelly, who served as Trump’s White House chief of staff, caught media attention by going public with warnings that Trump would try to govern as a dictator.

In addition, thirteen republicans who served in the first Trump administration released an open letter on October 25 charging that Trump’s disdain for the professional military and his admiration for autocrats would be dangerous for America. They contended, “The American people deserve a leader who won’t threaten to turn armed troops against them, won’t put his quest for power above their needs, and doesn’t idealize the likes of Adolf Hitler.”

The widespread use of the fascist moniker by Trump opponents, as well as the identification of Trump as an admirer of Hitler, substitutes emotional frustration for a nuanced appreciation of history and policy. This is so for at least two reasons.

First, the Nazi and fascist ideologies of the 1920s and 1930s cannot be replicated in 21st- century America. There are too many checks and balances in the American system of government to permit a fascist dictatorship or a similarly authoritarian system from taking root in the United States.

The geniuses who designed the American system of government dispersed power among three branches of the federal government and divided powers between the federal government and the states for a reason. The priority of values in the American political system favors liberty over efficiency. Admittedly the apparent inefficiency of government compared, say, to private business, is sometimes frustrating. But Americans instinctively mistrust centralized power as inimical to freedom, and history validates the prudence of that judgment.

Second, the character and training of the US professional officer corps would preclude the collaboration of the highest-ranking generals and admirals in subverting democracy. The graduates of American war colleges are steeped in the constitutional legitimacy that surrounds civil-military relations. An anti-democratic usurper demanding that the armed forces become partisan subordinates, as opposed to apolitical guardians of democracy, would meet with Pentagon resistance and, if necessary, refusal to carry out illegal orders.

Of course, complacency on the character of civil-military relations is never desirable; democracy must always be safeguarded against imminent dangers. But overstatement of American vulnerability to any single president or administration is distracting from more probable and immediate dangers and challenges.

First among these dangers is the relentless march of technology and its tendency to produce an elite of technocrats who exert indirect or direct control over public choice. When technocrats are in the private sector, they can influence public policy indirectly by leading successful corporations that make desirable consumer goods or other commodities.

On the other hand, when technocrats reside in government bureaucracies, their influence and power are not determined by market forces, but by law and government regulation. For most of the 20th century, the United States successfully balanced the creativity of the private business sector with the regulatory regimes of government bureaucracy. In the twenty-first century, this balance is at risk by bureaucracy in hyperdrive.

Aided by the explosion in new information technology, the federal bureaucracy now resembles Cheops’ pyramid and intrudes into every corner of American life. In turn, a more activist government is demanded by disgruntled interest groups or litigious citizens who take every grievance, real or imagined, into the local, state, or federal judicial system.

The result is a logjam of jurisprudential clutter and a never-ending cascade of regulations that dictate how Americans work, eat, sleep, drive, watch television, cook, and educate their children. A list of things that the government does not regulate would be harder to draw up than a list of things that the government controls directly or indirectly.

In short, mastery of advanced technology is a necessary condition for American national security and defense. On the other hand, technological micro-management of the American body politic can only depress innovation, discourage original thinking, and empower dysfunctional government controls over social and political life.

A second concern that both political parties need to address is the restructuring of the international political and economic system to the detriment of American leadership and security.  Russian President Vladimir Putin recently hosted a conclave of member states of BRICS (originally Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) plus some thirty other countries interested in joining or otherwise supporting the group. BRICS is explicitly designed to push back against the rules-based international order led by the US and its Western allies.

On the international security front, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (the CRINKs) are acting in concert as system disrupters in support of aggression in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Iran and North Korea are providing explicit military assistance to Russia for its war against Ukraine, including ballistic missiles and drones.

North Korea has also begun sending troops to fight under Russian command in Ukraine.  China has moved into a more open military alliance with Russia, that includes joint war games and training exercises, including scenarios with forces that are potentially nuclear-capable.  Russia is confident that it can outlast Ukraine in manpower and war-related resources despite NATO support for Kiev. At the level of high diplomacy and statecraft, no recipe for a negotiated settlement of this war is on offer.

China continues to press forward its Belt and Road Initiative and other measures to dominate global trade and infrastructure development. As well, China apparently aspires to become a third global nuclear superpower, with forces essentially equivalent to those of the United States and Russia by 2035 or sooner.

A third concern that should occupy the attention of the next administration is the matrix of challenges to American and allied conventional and nuclear deterrence. Russia’s war against Ukraine, China’s gathering storm for a future strike against Taiwan, and Iran’s wars against Israel via proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen, all point to a decline in respect for American power and a willingness to test American resolve by direct or indirect action.

In addition, Iran is already a threshold nuclear weapons state, and an Iranian bomb could set off a reaction among Middle Eastern countries that would make a serious dent in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Iran’s Houthi proxies in Yemen have diverted maritime commerce throughout the world and have evolved from a fledgling insurgency into a well-armed terrorist strike force capable of ballistic missile and drone attacks throughout the region.

With respect to nuclear deterrence, the fate of the American strategic nuclear modernization program that was supported by the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations is now uncertain as to its timing and continuing support from Congress. The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) component (Sentinel) of the nuclear triad faces scrutiny over its rising costs and delayed schedules. The possible collapse of the New START regime in 2026 could presage an open-ended nuclear arms race among China, Russia, and the US.

Other challenges to nuclear deterrence stability include developments in hypersonic offensive weapons, in advanced missile and air defenses, and in space and cyber weapons for deterrence or defense. Kinetic attacks on US space-based assets and cyberattacks against both military and civilian targets can be acts of aggression in themselves; or, on the other hand, they can be precursors for nuclear first strikes or for large-scale conventional offensives against American and allied North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and infrastructure.

In short, (1) managing the balance between governmental and private-sector technology innovation; (2) steering the pivotal role of the United States in a more competitive international system; and (3) supporting credible conventional and nuclear deterrence against more ambitious regional actors and nuclear competitors provides a partial menu of priorities that should receive more attention from policymakers. Demagoguery’s day has passed. It is now time to govern for the betterment of the nation.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine.

The Wrong Agenda for Political Debates was originally published on Global Security Review.

I was taken aback by his comment. It also convinced me of the role Air & Space Power Journal played, albeit small, in deterring the Chinese from choosing conflict with the United States. In the decade since that encounter, Air & Space Power Journal—Mandarin, which published Mandarin language (often translated from English) articles written specifically for a Chinese audience, ceased publication. Arabic and French editions are also no longer published. Air University Press, which publishes books by military and civilian authors and the Air Force’s professional journals, also lost several of its staff positions.

If Air Education and Training Command’s proposed 2025 budget remains unchanged, Air University Press’s operating budget will shrink to a point that operations will become virtually untenable. The circumstances are similar for National Defense University Press, which publishes Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), and a number of books and research monographs on topics related to joint operations. Naval War College Press, Army War College Press, Marine Corps University Press and Joint Special Operations University Press also saw their budgets decline over the past decade. It is only Army University Press at Fort Leavenworth that still seems to maintain significant support—despite being smaller than at past points in time.

The decision to further reduce military press budgets in fiscal year 2025 to the point that even operating is a challenge, is short sighted in the extreme. For example, the 2025 NDU Press budget, proposed as an unfunded requirement (UFR), is 54 percent less than the 2012 budget. NDU eliminated funding for NDU Press, including Prism and JFQ, as of FY21. Temporary funds were identified, but those will likely expire in 2025. Without the UFR, NDU Press, now down to a staff of 5, will cease production of JFQ for the first time in 32 years.

Military presses play a vital role in the life of the services and the joint community. They are unique tools that allow each service to discuss and debate tactical, operational, and strategic issues internally and share and debate the perspectives of service members with the academic community, other services, allies, and partners, and, as our experiences illustrates, America’s adversaries.

For less than 0.000025 percent of the defense budget (roughly $20-25 million), the services can fully fund all seven presses. Such a sum does not even constitute noticeable waste in the federal government. Service presses play an important role that goes well beyond the few points offered above. Let us explain.

The Service Press

Just over 40 years ago, noted civil-military scholar Sam Sarkesian observed, “All militaries must be socialized into reinforcing their commitment to the political system and in their understanding of the political-social dimensions of their role as soldiers. How well this is accomplished is primarily a function of military professionalism.” The US military, as a group of individuals with specialized knowledge, “are granted autonomy contingent on maintaining the trust of the society they serve,” and in which members become experts on this knowledge and “share a commitment to common values and ethical principles.”

Debate and discussion about these issues often take place in the pages of service journals. For example, in the Spring 2024 issue of the US Air Force’s, Aether: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower, three Air Force officers discuss the challenge of “moral injury” as a result of waging war. Service presses also frequently publish articles or books on professional ethics, leadership, and related topics. They serve as a vital outlet for members of the military and civil service to identify and discuss the very challenges that undermine the character of a free nation’s military.

The importance of thinking about larger ideas and crafting thoughtful arguments is nothing new. In an October 1946 speech to the US Air Force’s Air University, Army Air Forces Major General F. L. Anderson noted, “It is not enough for airmen to be technicians. They must be versed in human affairs; they must understand the political, social, and economic aspects of international relations. They must be educated to the standard required by the history-changing role of Air Power.” Service presses serve as leading indicators of the intellectual health of the military as they affirm, explore, and expand the “specialized knowledge” of the profession as well as the all-volunteer force’s shared “commitment” to broader societal values and principles.

By providing a platform for Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Guardians to discuss and debate the profession of arms in a rigorous manner—a platform that includes inputs from the public at large including taxpayers, Allies, partners, diplomats, and civilian researchers—largely unavailable anywhere else, servicemembers are compelled to think deeply about war and its consequences. Consider the persistent debate over the role of retired senior military officers in US foreign policy in the pages of Parameters first in 2006 and revived again in 2020, or the Gian Gentile-John Nagl debate over Afghanistan in pages of JFQ. These professional academic fora provide an opportunity for military professionals and civilian contributors to challenge the existing orthodoxy and offer new and better approaches for achieving American interests through military means. Publications of publicly funded professional military presses are often a place for self-examination and criticism of the system. As discussed below, they are the one place where authors are free to challenge the institution they serve.

These long-standing institutions are places where the military’s best and brightest can engage with and participate in the intellectual development of the military profession and its members. In fact, key service doctrinal innovations were developed and honed in military publications—consider Air Force Colonel John A. Warden’s Five Rings, Army General Don Starry’s AirLand Battle, and Air Force Lieutenant Colonel John Boyd’s OODA Loop. Finally, professional military presses serve as a critical repository and history of the military’s intellectual development, providing Americans a window into the proclivities, trends, and concerns of a subordinate military, which, while representing a fraction of the population that the Constitution makes subordinate to civilian authority. Sadly, in an era focused on technological solutions to all military challenges, service presses and their role in encouraging innovative thought within the military is seen as expendable.

Scholarly For a Reason

Except for National Defense University Press and Joint Special Operations University Press, which work for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Special Operations Command, respectively, military presses are subordinate to each services’ education and training command and aligned under their professional military education institutions. These schools are civilian-accredited masters- and, in some cases, doctoral-degree granting institutions. These presses adhere strictly to civilian academic publishing standards but vary in one important way. They provide an unmatched level of support to the many military officers who seek to publish an article, book, or monograph related to their profession. Military press editors spend far more time helping their writers craft quality articles than traditional academic presses. After all, military presses serve the profession of arms, along with university academics who write for a living.

The founding of military presses and their publications date back seven decades or more. Importantly, they offer military members a place to publish that maintains a strong tradition of discourse and academic freedom. In the inaugural issue of Air University Quarterly Review in March 1947, the editorial board noted the now-familiar disclaimer that accompanies all publications of military presses, that the content therein represents authors’ opinions and may not “coincide with” that of the military service or department.

The 1947 opening statement said, “The Editor and Editorial Board wish to encourage new thinking. Consequently, if the appearance here of articles which may not agree with accepted policy, or even with majority opinion, will stimulate discussion and provoke controversy, an important part of this journal’s mission will have been accomplished: to induce airmen to have original thoughts on these matters and to give these thoughts expression.” In the immediate post-World War II era, leaders of the Army Air Forces knew how important it was to encourage airmen to think, write, and develop ideas that challenge the status quo.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, established Joint Forces Quarterly in 1993, soon after the Gulf War, admonishing readers not to “read the pages that follow if you are looking for the establishment point of view or the conventional wisdom. Pick up JFQ for controversy, debate, new ideas, and fresh insights—for the cool yet lively interplay among some of the finest minds committed to the professional of arms.”

Military presses are not part of a service’s public affairs office, nor should they be. Understandably, contributions to military presses must be cleared to ensure no classified information is released and that a service’s doctrine is not misrepresented. However, well-reasoned dissent and criticism are not only acceptable but highly desired. In fact, in many cases, that is the purview of a military press—loyal opposition. Starving military presses of funding or killing them outright shuts down the very discussion they were designed to facilitate.

Contributions to military presses are necessarily wide-ranging and include everything from the fine details of drone technology to satellite operations, international political economy, deterrence, and discussions of social issues affecting the military. Again, the military not only must execute America’s political will with lethal force but must continually replenish its all-volunteer ranks through enticing individuals and families to serve.

Society-Wide Intellectual Engagement

Military presses engage in a dialogue that is both internal to each service, where iron sharpens iron, and external, where Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Guardians attempt to shape perspectives nationally and abroad. The relatively few academic journals that cover “security studies” broadly speaking, rarely publish the type of scholarly yet professionally focused articles and books that are the purview of service presses. This means that without them, the debate ceases to occur.

Western militaries are bureaucratic and technocratic in nature and rigorously examine failures. Coming from open societies, they often freely discuss their challenges to find the best solutions. Cutting off that discussion by killing the venues where those discussions take place will inevitably lead to suboptimal outcomes. The civilian and military contributors to service press publications, together with readers, create a larger intellectual common where dialogue that is critical to stewarding the effective execution of politics by other means takes place.

The common created by this dialogue has significant worldwide reach and impact. For example, Air University Press’s four journals have an annual audience of well over one million readers globally. National Defense University’s Joint Force Quarterly had close to one million readers worldwide in 2023. The other military presses have similar annual readerships. Ally and partner militaries read American military publications and often adopt similar thinking and approaches. Adversary militaries read American military publications and are impressed by the level of creativity, intelligence, and thoughtfulness of the United States’ military establishment.

Historical Record

Finally, military presses are an unrivaled record of military thought and the change in thinking that follows the nation’s many conflicts. Military Review is a case in point. It was first published in 1922 as a response to American involvement in World War I. In the century since the journal began, Military Review has played a vital role in the various reform movements that changed the Army after major conflicts like Vietnam, for example.

The flagship journal of the Air Force, currently represented by the journals Æther: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower and Air & Space Operations Review, turned 77 in March 2024 and predate the establishment of the US Air Force. Airpower’s evolution and debates surrounding topics like the Air Force role in countering a rising China and nuclear modernization are found in their pages.

Naval War College Review was founded in 1948 and serves as the central venue for the discussion of seapower. The journal’s archives are the central repository for discussion and debate concerning seapower’s role during the Cold War, for example.

Parameters: A Journal of Strategic Landpower published its first issue in 1971 and was largely a response to the US Army’s performance in Vietnam. Many of the post-Vietnam reforms undertaken by the Army were first discussed in its pages.

Further, these publications are peppered with the articles of field grade officers who later became general and flag officers—a sign of the importance the military places on the intellectual development of its future leaders. Just to name a few, then-Major David H. Petraeus, then-Major Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., then-Captain James Stavridis, and then-Lieutenant Colonel B. Chance Saltzman all wrote in their respective professional journals. Leading civilian scholars of the military also contribute to service professional journals. Barbara Tuchman, Richard Betts, John Mearshimer, Robert Pape, Eliot Cohen, Colin Gray, Tammi Biddle, Williamson Murray, Matthew Kroenig, and Hal Brands all contributed to the various professional publications of the military presses.

Whether Civilian or Military Outlet

Some ask why civilian-operated military-focused outlets cannot do the job of a military press. Indeed, fine civilian and association journals, such as Air & Space Forces Magazine, Texas National Security Review, Global Security Review, Marine Corps Gazette, Proceedings, Armed Forces & Society, RUSI Journal, and War on the Rocks are actively engaged in the various and important debates that arise from the military profession. However, service presses do not report to a board of directors, individual donors, or other private entities. They are publicly funded, open access, and are often staffed and led by active-duty, retired, or former servicemember with deep service-specific knowledge. This approach to publishing allows service presses to publish on topics that are important to their service, but not necessarily commercially viable.

The End of Service Presses?

For senior service leaders looking to pinch every last penny to fund new weapons or additional operations, this makes a support entity like a press an attractive target. This is a short-sighted effort to save very little money. In the case of the Air Force, eliminating Air University Press will save about $1 million in operations costs and $2 million in staff salaries and benefits. This, in an Air Force Budget of about $217 billion.

The services and the Department of Defense should reconsider the regular cuts to military press budgets. Rather than severely underfunding or effectively defunding their presses, the services and the Department of Defense should fund them to a level that allows each to perform the functions discussed above.

Service leaders must be fully cognizant of the role their presses play and the audience they serve. While most fall under the organization of each service’s military university or war college, service presses draw contributors and readers from across the service and beyond. Over 99 percent of the more than 1 million readers that learn from the Air Force’s professional journals are not students at Air University, for example.

It is also time to put to rest the incorrect belief that military presses exist solely to serve students at the various command and staff and war colleges. They do not. Instead, they belong to their respective services and provide information and research for audiences—military and civilian—at home and abroad. As such, it is perhaps time for service secretaries and chiefs of staff to take a role in ensuring that their presses continue to serve as the place where the service expresses its intellectual history, innovation, and thought.

Regardless of whether the United States wins or loses its wars, military presses and the professional books, monographs, and journals they publish will serve as the place where Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Guardians, and members of the broader society think, discuss, and debate the profession of arms. The demise of service presses is not in the interest of any service, but it seems it will take a senior leader or Congress to step in and stop this from happening.

Dr. Laura Thurston-Goodroe is the editor of Æther and Air & Space Operations Review. Dr. Adam Lowther is the Vice President of Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are their own.

Why Military Presses Matter was originally published on Global Security Review.